

Book Reviews

Resting on the Heart of Christ: The Vocation and Spirituality of the Seminary Theologian by Deacon James Keating, Ph.D (*Omaha: IPF Publications, 2009*), 208 pp.; and **Seminary Theology: Teaching in a Contemplative Way**, edited by Deacon James Keating, Ph.D (*Omaha: IPF Publications, 2010*), xiv + 165 pp.

DEACON James Keating and the Institute for Priestly Formation, through these two books, *Resting on the Heart of Christ and Seminary Theology: Teaching in a Contemplative Way*, have endeavored to give spiritual formation its rightful place in the seminary, beginning with the seminary theologian, who teaches and models wisdom to seminarians. These volumes are addressed principally to seminary theologians (professors), though they would be profitable to seminarians, helping them to take a more contemplative approach to their studies and to modify expectations for their professors and themselves.

Resting on the Heart of Christ addresses the vocation and spirituality of the seminary theologian. The book is divided into six chapters. In the first chapter, Keating describes the real state of the separation in theological methodology between universities and seminaries, providing a snapshot of the state of theology and of the attitudes of theologians today. The seminary theologian, unlike the pure academic, eagerly thinks “out of love for God in the ecclesial service of intellectually forming seminarians, whose desires are being purified by contemplative study within a sacramental communal life” (56).

In the second chapter, Keating expresses his desire for contemplative theology in the classroom. The seminary theologian is one who facilitates a deep encounter with Christ in the classroom. Lectures can be conceived as an extension of the Liturgy of the Word. Theology done with a deep sense of faith, rather than from a hermeneutic of suspicion, can lead to the necessary integration between knowing and believing.

This leads Keating, in chapter three, to lament the fact that seminary professors are not usually trained to so orient their lectures and study in this way. Recognizing that the study and teaching habits of seminary theologians will have a profound impact, not only on future priests but also on the laity, Keating proposes that the seminary theologian give greater attention to his own meditation and selection of books; interestingly, he advocates taking an “iconic stance” toward theological studies. The critical factor in making this possible will be the *horarium*. Keating admits (114): “The whole argument of this book will go nowhere unless and until seminary theologians are given time, guidance, and material assistance to move their teaching method and preparation in a direction that welcomes contemplation.”

Chapter four gives the seminary theologian some sense of how spirituality, integrated with academic theology, might concretely affect classroom teaching. Keating describes this integration as “a *surrendered searching*, a *discerning abandonment*, or a *listening trust*. The terms *listening*, *discerning*, and *searching* imply a cognitive aspect in welcoming *truth*, whereas *surrender*, *abandonment*, and *trust* express the faith response of welcoming a Person” (124).

Teaching in a contemplative way requires periods of silence in class to meditate and to allow oneself to behold the beauty of truth. The goal is not just to know about God but to know God in an affective way. These moments of silence will initially seem awkward, but Keating believes that the pastoral effects of this practice will build up the contemplative *habitus*, which will have pastoral effects through the handing on of the fruits of contemplation in parish life.

Ultimately, this is directed toward Eucharistic worship, a subject addressed in chapter five. Keating stresses the importance of praying together as a seminary faculty, especially at Mass; it is important not only for the theologian and for community life, but also for the seminarian, who will see that his professors are striving for holiness. In chapter six, Keating revisits the idea that the interpenetration of spirituality and academics has a pastoral aim. Since it is the task of the seminary to form future priests whose ministry flows from a pastoral charity rooted in deep communion with Christ, pure academic theology will never be enough. After a short conclusion, Keating provides a tool for seminarians to use in *receiving* this contemplative teaching, modeling student learning after the practice of *lectio divina*.

Seminary Teaching: Teaching in a Contemplative Way develops these themes more fully. The work is the fruit of a seminar in which seven seminary theologians, including Keating, studied the possibility of actually implementing this contemplative approach to teaching. The volume is divided

into three sections, each with two essays, and concludes with a synthesis by Dennis Billy, C.Ss.R.

In the first section ("Vision for Renewal") Keating and Thomas McDermott give the general overview of the approach. Keating's essay is a synthesis of *Resting* but provides the essential elements of the approach. McDermott's promotes the cultivation of the habit of lifelong learning in the diocesan priesthood. Ongoing formation is a neglected aspect of priestly formation. Given competing interests and time constraints, only the priest who is formed to love learning will continue his studies in a serious, contemplative way after ordination.

In the second section ("Sources of Wisdom"), Thomas Lane and Perry Cahal apply the contemplative approach to the teaching of Scripture and the Fathers. Lane, in an approach similar to that of Benedict XVI in *Jesus of Nazareth*, discusses the usefulness and limitations of the historical-critical method, which must be complemented by the life of prayer. The study of Scripture aims at deepening intimacy with Christ. Likewise, Cahal notes how deeply in love the Fathers were with the Word of God and the Person of Christ. It is the love of Christ that ultimately transformed the intellect of the Fathers and shaped the moral life and action of the early Church.

The third section ("Models of Writing and Teaching") is written by Margaret Turek and John Gresham. Turek's essay, "Balthasar's approach to a Theology of God the Father," allows one to contemplate the Fatherhood of God and gives a glimpse of what the contemplative approach might look like in the classroom. Her essay also allows one to contemplate the Paternal-Filial relationship and the Divine-human relationship, which have important implications for future priests in understanding spiritual fatherhood and their relationship to their flocks. Gresham focuses on applying a contemplative theological approach to Christology and attempts to draw seminarians into deeper intimacy with Christ through history, the Scriptures, the Fathers, and through the experience of and encounter with the Risen One. Dennis Billy concludes the work with a short synthesis of each essay and with a list of emerging challenges.

One of the challenges presented by Dennis Billy at the conclusion of *Seminary Theology* is the need for refinement of terminology. The terms "meditation" and "contemplation" are often used interchangeably, though this is not the case in the spiritual masters. The term "contemplative theology" needs further refinement. A second challenge that must be faced honestly is whether academic rigor can be maintained in the pursuit of quasi-monastic wisdom. There is some content (*fides quae*) that must be appropriated by seminarians and must be taught by seminary

theologians. What will the standard be? The proof will be seen in the works of new priests formed at those seminaries in which this model is being consistently applied. A third challenge lies in the *horarium* of the seminary. If the institution and faculty are not committed to an *horarium* that fosters contemplation, as Keating admits, the project will likely fail. A fourth challenge is that, with seemingly endless increases in the mandates of the *Program of Priestly Formation*, faculty may be resistant to changing their own habits in teaching style method and may be reluctant to thoroughly revise course notes and content to foster contemplation. Finally, some would argue that it is simply naïve and idealistic to think that “monks” can be formed who will, at the same time, also be effective pastoral ministers in an ever-busy world. On the other hand, it is by aspiring to holiness of life and contemplating the Lord that spiritual communion with Christ is reached. It is often the task of the Church to propose the ideal of excellence to her children.

Despite these challenges, the Institute for Priestly Formation and Deacon Keating purposefully have undertaken the task of rediscovering an approach to theology which cultivates a genuine love for learning and for the acquisition of holy wisdom. A truly positive assessment should be given to the contribution made by these works. First, the books recover and integrate into priestly formation the wisdom flowing from the monastic and Ignatian spiritual traditions. Second, the works capture the state of seminary theology and priestly formation in recent decades, accurately portraying the existing tension between the academic and formational models of seminary education. Through the proposed contemplative model, they challenge the idea of “pure” scholarship with the idea that faith, with its hermeneutic of trust rather than suspicion, is an essential, purifying element in seminary intellectual formation. Third, the books revisit the “content” of seminary education, reminding seminary theologians that the essential content of theology is God, the Word, written and handed down. While maintaining academic rigor, professors can be more judicious in their choices of course material, selecting readings which foster contemplation and intellectual conversion. Fourth, the volumes demonstrate a healthy affirmation of the vocation of the seminarian of today, acknowledging the cultural challenges, fears and hopes, and authentic desire for holiness that exists in many. These volumes are an important resource for anyone serving as a seminary theologian.

The Institute for Priestly Formation was founded to assist bishops in the spiritual formation of seminarians. If seminaries were fulfilling their mission, why was or is such an institute necessary? Romanus Cessario has pointed out that there has been a separation between scholarship and

sanctity, between the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of wisdom, exemplified in the differences between “university theology” and “monastic wisdom” (“Scholarship and Sanctity,” *Nova et Vêtera* 8 [Spring 2010]: 233–49). These separations are not the only ones. Indeed, *Pastores dabo vobis* and the *Program of Priestly Formation* speak of four dimensions or pillars of formation: human, intellectual, pastoral, and spiritual.

While it is hoped that these dimensions would be integrated, often one pillar dominates. Seminaries have attempted to keep pace with their secular peers and their Protestant counterparts through accreditation processes. This has brought about greater academic standardization and may have improved *academic* rigor at Catholic seminaries. Occasionally, this has come at the expense of the pursuit of wisdom or one of the other dimensions of priestly formation. At other seminaries, it is not the intellectual dimension that is emphasized but the pastoral dimension that is given priority, usually at the expense of academic rigor. Pastoral activity uprooted from the Church’s intellectual tradition and spirituality seldom, if ever, bears good fruit.

It is true that in *Pastores dabo vobis* (25 March 1992), Blessed John Paul II wrote: “The whole formation imparted to candidates for the priesthood aims at preparing them to enter into communion with the *charity of Christ* the Good Shepherd. Hence, their formation in its different aspects must have a fundamentally pastoral character” (57). Nevertheless, the dimensions of formation can become isolated from one another. By entering deeply into communion with Christ, by knowing Him, through prayer, study, and human formation, the seminarian is formed pastorally. The process begins with prayer. To be a shepherd of souls, one must know the Good Shepherd intimately. Hence, the *Program of Priestly Formation* (115) gives priority to spiritual formation: “Since spiritual formation is the core that unifies the life of a priest, it stands at the heart of seminary life and is the center around which all other aspects are integrated.”¹

This is what these two volumes represent: the initial movement toward re-establishing the rightful place of spirituality as the core of priestly formation. They are a reminder of a famous maxim of St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori: “If God is lost, all is lost.”

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¹ *Program for Priestly Formation*, 5th edition (Washington, DC: USCCB Publishing, 2006), 115.

The Historical Jesus of the Gospels by Craig S. Keener (*Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009*), 869 pp.

CRAIG KEENER has already made significant contributions to New Testament scholarship with his impressive and extremely thorough biblical commentaries. His more than one-thousand-page commentary on the Gospel of Matthew (1999) and his more than sixteen-hundred-page commentary on the Gospel of John (2003) are exhaustively researched and masterfully written. With his *The Historical Jesus of the Gospels*, Keener has made yet another significant mark in New Testament scholarship, this time in historical Jesus studies. As a Gospel commentator, Keener has a unique vantage point from which to engage historical Jesus scholarship, and this gives him certain advantages over other historical Jesus scholars who have not had to do the kind of painstaking work with the careful attention to the Gospels that Keener has done. Added to this experience is the fact that he has established himself as a world-class scholar not only of the synoptic tradition or of the Johannine tradition, but rather of both. Like his earlier commentaries, this volume is mammoth in size, containing more than two hundred pages of endnotes, which number more than four thousand, as well as a bibliography of works cited spanning more than one hundred pages. This book belongs on the shelf of every university library, and on the library of every scholar interested in historical Jesus research.

Keener's tome is divided into three major parts. In the first part, Keener spends four chapters discussing the history of historical Jesus scholarship and the various portraits of Jesus painted by contemporary scholars; he then concludes with a very careful and nuanced discussion of the various other "gospels" outside of the biblical canon. In the book's second part, composed of six chapters, Keener examines the historical nature of the synoptic Gospels and discusses their genre, very carefully arguing that they represent ancient biographies. In the volume's final section, Keener elucidates in twelve chapters what we learn about Jesus from what Keener believes to be the "best" sources, that is, the Gospels.

Keener's first chapter, "The Development of Jesus Scholarship" (3–13), provides a valuable overview of the history of historical Jesus scholarship, which would make for a useful handout in university classes introducing students to the study of the Bible, the New Testament, or Jesus. His initial comments linking such research with early trends within the Renaissance period and then with Deists in the sixteenth century are insightful but could have benefited from greater depth. In particular, Keener fails to mention key seventeenth-century precursors like Baruch Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (1670), John Locke's *The Reasonableness of Christi-*

anity (1695), and John Toland's *Christianity not Mysterious* (1696), despite the central role each played in laying the groundwork for later biblical studies, including the foundations of what would become known as the First *Quest* for the Historical Jesus.

In chapter 2, "Jesus the Cynic Sage?" (14–32), Keener deftly shows the problems with such modern reconstructions prevalent in television programs and in the Jesus Seminar, which too often ignore Jesus' authentic Jewish milieu (17–18). Chapter 3, "Jesus and Judaism" (33–46), highlights the most important emphasis of the so-called Third *Quest* of the Historical Jesus, namely that Jesus was Jewish. He surveys the works of scholars like Geza Vermes and E. P. Sanders, critically evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. The final chapter in this initial section, "Other Gospels?" (47–69), involves a nuanced discussion of other noncanonical "gospels," especially those found in Gnostic literature. Here his endnotes become especially illuminating, particularly regarding the debate about a Syriac original for the Gospel of Thomas, and Gnostic literature's reliance upon material in the canonical Gospels (419–24). For such a short chapter on such a complex topic, Keener's discussion is impressive.

Arguably the most trenchant section of his book is the second part, "The Character of the Gospels" (71–161), which includes a significant and thorough methodological discussion regarding ancient genre. This is where Keener's command of classical sources is especially impressive. He had already dazzled scholars with his use of more than ten thousand ancient extrabiblical sources in his commentary on Matthew, and his even more impressive use of not quite twenty thousand ancient extrabiblical sources in his commentary on John. His mastery and command of ancient Greco-Roman and Jewish literature shows throughout this present volume but is especially keen in his discussion of ancient genre. He argues very persuasively that the synoptic Gospels are best categorized in the genre of ancient biography, which he argues as well for John in his John commentary. Since the publication of Keener's book, any scholar who disputes this claim must wrestle with his arguments over these ninety pages of main text, and in the slightly more than fifty pages of discussion contained in his endnotes (428–82).

Keener explains, "Whereas the apocryphal gospels and apocryphal acts betray characteristics of novels . . . the four canonical Gospels much more closely resemble ancient biography" (77). He explains why this is the case on the same page:

one would . . . be hard-pressed to find a novel so clearly tied to its source as Matthew or Luke is. Works with a historical prologue like

Luke's (Lk 1:1–4; Acts 1:1–2) were historical works; novels lacked such fixtures, although occasionally they could include a proem telling why the author made up the story. . . . [T]he extant first-century Gospels reflect too much authentic Palestinian Jewish background, sometime including even obscure cultural details, to be ancient novels. (77)

Keener then spends the next eighty-three pages defending this case. His fifth chapter, "The Gospels as Biographies" (73–84), introduce the case for reading the Gospels as ancient biographies. Chapter 6, "Luke–Acts as History" (85–94), shows how, "[w]hile taken by itself the Gospel [of Luke] is biography, as part of Luke's two-volume work the Gospel becomes a biographic component in a larger history" (86). He enumerates many of the details within Luke and Acts that point to ancient historiography, including his selective use of the first-person plural, public monologues, and historical prefaces (86–87). As just one example, Keener explains, "As one might expect for eyewitness material, the 'we' sections tend to be among Luke's most detailed material" (90).

In chapters 7, "Ancient Historiography as History" (95–108), and 8, "Ancient Historiography as Rhetoric" (109–25), Keener underscores how important it was to ancient historians to get their facts correct and to communicate them in rhetorically sophisticated ways; he emphasizes the manner in which ancient history was both similar to and different from the modern historical enterprise. Chapters 9, "The Gospels' Written Sources" (126–38), and 10, "The Gospels' Oral Sources" (139–61), examine the types of sources the synoptic Gospels likely used. He follows a form of the two-source hypothesis that most New Testament scholars use, although, to his credit, he acknowledges the criticisms of such an approach, criticism which he believes "merits fair consideration" (131). Relying upon the groundbreaking work of Birger Gerhardsson (for example, *Memory and Manuscript*, 1961), Samuel Byrskog (for example, *Story as History—History as Story*, 2000), Alan Millard (for example, *Reading and Writing in the Time of Jesus*, 2000), and Richard Bauckham (*Jesus and the Eyewitnesses*, 2006), Keener demonstrates how Jesus' disciples would probably have been able to preserve the core of Jesus' teaching, possibly through note taking and also especially well-trained memory: "Our starting assumption should be that disciples of Jesus would have learned and transmitted his teachings no less carefully than most ancient disciples transmitted the wisdom of their mentors" (150).

The final and lengthiest portion of the book incorporates a careful look at the historical information contained in the Gospels on several matters. Chapter 11, "John the Baptist" (165–77), shows how reliable the

Gospel's basic portrayal of John the Baptist is. Chapter 12, "Jesus the Galilean Jew" (178–85), shows how well the Gospels' portrayals of Jesus fit his Galilean context. Chapter 13, "Jesus the Teacher" (186–95), relying especially upon the 1977 Hartford Seminary Foundation doctoral dissertation of Robert Johnston, entitled, "Parabolic Interpretations Attributed to Tannaim," emphasizes how Jesus' parables fit their Palestinian Jewish context. Chapter 14, "Kingdom Discipleship" (196–213), rightly emphasizes Daniel 7 and the figure of the Son of Man as an essential background to Jesus' discussion of the Kingdom. The chapter also discusses many of Jesus' teachings about the Kingdom within their Second Temple Jewish context. Chapter 15, "Jesus' Jewish Ethics" (214–22), links his ethical teachings on such things as love, divorce, halakhic issues of purity, et cetera, with his demands for discipleship. Chapter 16, "Conflicts with Other Teachers" (223–37), shows the likelihood of Jesus' conflicts with other Jewish teachers of the day, as found in every strand of the tradition.

In chapter 17, "Jesus the Prophet" (238–55), Keener discusses Jesus' ministry in the Second Temple Jewish context, where there was an expectation of a Moses-like and Elijah-like prophet. His discussion here of the community Jesus creates is very illuminating. Keener understands Jesus' selection of 12 disciples in light of parallels in the Dead Sea Scrolls from Qumran. I think an even stronger connection can be made with the early Israelite community in Exodus 24, where there are: twelve pillars representing the 12 tribes (like Jesus' 12 apostles); Moses leading (like Jesus); Aaron as Moses' high priest (like Peter); Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu set apart as the three (like Peter, James, and John); and the 70 elders functioning as priests (like Jesus' 70 disciples, and like the Sanhedrin which was contemporary with Jesus and which the rabbis understood as grounded in the early Israelite community after the exodus). As Brant Pitre explains:

Should there be any doubt about this, these parallels go a long way toward providing a historical explanation for the opposition Jesus met with from one particular ruling body within Second Temple Judaism: the Great Sanhedrin. For while modern scholars often miss the significance of Jesus' gathering and commissioning seventy disciples, the *seventy* members of the Jerusalem Sanhedrin would certainly have gotten the point. ["Jesus, the New Temple, and the New Priesthood," *Letter & Spirit* 4 (2008): 81 n. 94]

Keener understands Peter ranking first among the disciples as the "rock" on whom Jesus builds his community (Mt 16:17–19). But even more is going on in this passage; Jesus is appointing Peter as royal steward to the kingdom and high priest, which are signified by the keys of the kingdom (Mt 16:19),

which harken back to the temple keys and to the key of the house of David, itself a kingdom, and Eliakim the Davidic royal steward, who is also depicted (especially in the Targumic tradition) as high priest (Is 22:20–23). The rock imagery meanwhile harkens back to the temple, an allusion strengthened by the previous discussion of the wise and foolish builders (Mt 7:24–27). The wise builder (Solomon and Jesus) built his house (temple and church) on the rock (temple's foundation stone and Peter).

Chapter 18, "Jesus as Messiah?" (256–67), provides strong evidence that Jesus in fact saw himself as messianic king. Chapter 19, "More Than an Earthly Messiah?" (268–82), underscores that Jesus' kingship was not simply envisioned as earthly, but that it represented the kingdom of God. Chapter 20, "Confronting and Provoking the Elite" (283–302), shows the many ways in which Jesus' actions themselves bore the messages he was sending. Keener gives some credit to the idea that Jesus envisioned a new temple. He explains, "The expected restoration of the [temple] vessels, the ark and perhaps the manna [within the Judaism of the time] also implies a renewed, eschatological temple of some sort" (294). A few pages later, Keener includes his discussion of the Last Supper (296–301). Although Keener correctly points out that "Mention of 'memory' in a Passover context involved not mere recollection but more of a participatory commemoration" (296), he eschews a sacramental interpretation of Jesus' words. Keener notes the connection between the synoptic Last Supper accounts and Exodus 24 in the mutual use of the phrase "blood of the covenant" (300). Keener also acknowledges that "many of Jesus' words (such as 'flesh,' 'blood,' 'poured out') [probably] suggest sacrificial terminology, especially since crucifixion itself technically required no blood" (300), but he rejects the notion of the Last Supper itself as sacrificial. As he clarifies, "Presumably he means that the bread 'represents' or stands for his body in some sense" (300). Keener does not mention that the phrase "memory" here is used of the memorial offerings in the Old Testament, most notably of the Bread of the Presence, which was understood as an unbloody sacrifice consumed by the priests every Sabbath (e.g., Lv 24:7).

In chapter 21, "Jesus' Arrest and Execution" (303–29), Keener carefully examines the passion narratives in the synoptic Gospels and demonstrates how historically probable most of their details are. His chapter reviews the relevant historical evidence showing the certainty of Jesus' death and burial. The final chapter, "The Resurrection" (330–48), reviews the classic arguments in favor of Jesus' resurrection, based upon the tradition. He shows how historically likely the empty tomb tradition actually is, as well as the accounts of the eyewitness appearances. He also follows N.T. Wright and others emphasizing the distinctiveness of Jesus' resurrection from other

alleged dying-rising gods of the ancient world. He saves his conclusion on Jesus' resurrection for his eighth appendix, in which he states, "I believe that divine activity best explains the resurrection appearances" (384).

Keener's one-page conclusion (349) is followed immediately by nine very useful appendices. The first, "Zealots and Revolutionaries" (350–51), explains the historical information on the Jewish revolutionary movements of Jesus' day. The second, "Mack's Case for a Wisdom Q" (352–53), is a brief critique of Burton Mack's rejection of eschatology from Q. The third appendix, "Jewish Biographical Conventions" (356–60), is a very helpful summary of Jewish biographical techniques, showing that, "the canonical Gospels reflect Greco-Roman rather than strictly Palestinian Jewish literary conventions" (356). The fourth appendix, "Jesus' Sayings about the End" (361–71), reviews Jesus' eschatological sayings in light of Jewish eschatological expectations from the time, and includes a useful six-page chart (366–71) highlighting Jewish eschatological themes found in the New Testament, Jewish literature, and "pagan prodigies." The fifth appendix, "John and the Synoptics on Passover Chronology" (372–74), addresses the thorny issue of the apparent chronological discrepancies between the synoptic Gospels and the Gospel of John, assessing Annie Jaubert's now-famous attempt at reconciling the two based on the different calendars (lunar and solar) in use within the Jewish world of Jesus' day. In the end, Keener concludes that "most likely, John has simply provided a theological interpretation of Jesus' death" (374), not a strictly chronological one. The sixth appendix, "Roman Participation in Jesus' Arrest?" (375–76), is one of the rare engagements with John's Gospel found in this volume; it concludes that Roman participation in the actual arrest of Jesus was unlikely (376). The seventh appendix, "Capital Authority" (377–78), maintains that, despite the evidence that the Romans might have overlooked local executions, the Sanhedrin probably did lack the legal authority necessary to execute Jesus and thus would have needed Roman intervention (378). The eighth appendix, "What Really Happened at the Tomb?" (379–88), is Keener's moving account of his belief in Jesus' resurrection. He begins by defending the inclusion of the possibility of divine activity. He concludes with the testimonial of his own spiritual journey. The final appendix, "Some Postresurrection Teachings" (389–93), discusses such matters as the mission to the gentiles and the gift of the Holy Spirit.

To his credit, Keener is well aware of the limitations of his book, and he covers them in a subsection under that very heading. Of course, the book's largest weakness, which Keener realizes and to which he alerts the reader in his subsection on the volume's objective, is that he fails significantly to

engage the Gospel of John (xxxiv). I find this especially regrettable because Keener's two-volume commentary on John's Gospel is one of the finest commentaries available and, indeed, may very well be surpassed in thoroughness only by Rudolf Schnackenburg's three-volume commentary, *Das Johannesevangelium* (1965, 1971, and 1975). Although Keener's book is already very lengthy, and although he is able to "make the book's point" without much recourse to John (both arguments being the substance of his rationale for John's exclusion, xxxiv), the omission is unfortunate precisely because Keener is especially well placed to bring John's Gospel into dialogue with historical work on the synoptic Gospels. Indeed, in the first volume of his commentary, *The Gospel of John*, he argues very persuasively that John's Gospel, like the synoptics, fits the genre of ancient biography best and is useful for the study of the historical Jesus (3–52).

This criticism notwithstanding, Keener's *The Historical Jesus and the Gospels* is one of the most significant forays into historical Jesus scholarship since the field's inception, which began, according to Albert Schweitzer (*Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906), with Gotthold Lessing's 1778 posthumous publication of Hermann Reimarus's essay "Vom dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger." Thankfully, Keener's masterful treatment is not hampered by the same acidic skepticism that tainted the pioneers of historical Jesus research like Reimarus, David Friedrich Strauss, Ernest Renan and others, and by the more recent work of the Jesus Seminar. Keener's book is one of the most thorough and fruitful of a host of newer studies on the historical Jesus and promises to take the field of historical Jesus research forward. These important studies include Michael Bird's *Are You the One Who Is to Come?* (2009), Richard Bauckham's *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses* (2006), and Brant Pitre's *Jesus, the Tribulation, and the End of the Exile* (2005). Keener joins this growing group of scholars who are unwilling to be shackled by the bankrupt scholarly assumptions of the past, but yet continue to learn from and build upon the best of what has come before in historical Jesus research. This book will certainly rank with the classics of historical Jesus research like N. T. Wright's 3 volumes, *Christian Origins and the Question of God*, John Meier's multivolume *A Marginal Jew*, Raymond Brown's *Birth of the Messiah* and two-volume *Death of the Messiah*, and Ben Meyer's *The Aims of Jesus* and *Christus Faber*. I happily await the publication of Keener's multivolume commentary on the Book of Acts, which he mentions (xxvi and 436 n. 4).

N V

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Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham by Russell L. Friedman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), v + 198 pp.

“WHAT all of this material reveals,” concludes Russell Friedman at the end of his *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham*, “is the incredible *richness* of later-medieval trinitarian theology and later-medieval scholasticism as a whole.” Friedman’s book is an extended argument on behalf of this “richness,” and the Trinitarian story that unfolds accomplishes two primary goals. First, Friedman provides us a rigorous yet readable entrance (an impressive feat in and of itself) into the developments in Trinitarian theology that occurred from c. 1250 to 1350. As a “big picture” account of later-medieval Trinitarian theology, the book is a wonderful read, elucidating complex distinctions in a clear manner while providing access to scholastic material that would likely otherwise remain hidden. The trajectory of Friedman’s account is founded on the distinct Trinitarian theologies of Aquinas and Bonaventure, who form ground zero for the distinct “Dominican” and “Franciscan” traditions of articulating the “major issue” of Trinitarian theology: identity in essence and distinction in persons. Aquinas articulates the “relation account” of the personal properties, which distinguishes Father, Son, and Holy Spirit by their opposition of relations (paternity, filiation, and passive spiration). Bonaventure, on the other hand, emphasizes the “emanation account” of the personal properties, in which the *way* each person emanates or originates (unemanated, generation, spiration) takes precedence in distinguishing the three divine persons. Friedman contrasts the order of concepts attributed to God the Father in Aquinas’s and Bonaventure’s thought as follows: for Aquinas, the order is paternity, then Father, then generation; relation, then person, then emanation. For Bonaventure, the order is generation, then Father, then paternity; emanation, then person, then relation. Given that Bonaventure seems to hold that the Father gives himself being through the act of generation, an important feature of Bonaventure’s account is what Friedman describes as the existence of the “proto-Father,” who before acting has the “complete disposition” for emanating, that is, “primity.” Because of primity, explains Friedman, “it is not necessary for God the Father to be the Father in order to bring about generation and the resulting actual distinction of the persons.” These concepts become important within the Franciscan trajectory of Trinitarian thought.

Friedman concentrates his story mostly on the Franciscan trajectory, since, according to Friedman, scholarship has well addressed the late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Dominican Trinitarian tradition. The heart of Friedman’s argument is that, although the views of Aquinas and

Bonaventure are genuinely distinct, they were not yet mutually exclusive until later developments in Franciscan theology rendered the accounts “rivals.” Bonaventure posited the emanation account and the notion of primity in order to explain how we conceive the Trinitarian properties, “frequently adding caveats,” notes Friedman, “about how primity established the proto-Father ‘according to the way we understand things.’” But those who follow Bonaventure, such as John Pecham, “reify” Bonaventure’s conceptual ordering, so that primity is no longer a conceptual explanation but a real personal property. Friedman explains, “The Father is the Father because he generates and he generates on the basis of innascibility as primity.” The Franciscans continued to keep the relational distinction alongside the emanation distinction, “nesting” the former inside the later; yet, according to Friedman, the relational distinction became “hypothetically dispensable” (e.g., hypothetically the Spirit could be said to proceed only from the Father and still be distinctly the Spirit), which leaves the emanation properties doing the real work of distinguishing the divine persons. The Franciscans also began drawing a distinction between hypostasis and person, correlating the “hypostatic distinction” with emanation and the “personal distinction” with opposed relation. With Henry of Ghent, however, we see the complete rejection of the relation account of personal distinction. Whereas Aquinas and Bonaventure had agreed that the divine relations—whether according to the opposed relation or to the emanation distinction—were real but nevertheless non-essential (the relation “vanished” when compared to the divine essence), Henry of Ghent claims that no relation can exist apart from its foundation, so that such “vanishing” is nonsense. Henry therefore brings the properties of emanation to the center of his account while adding a new element into the Franciscan trajectory: the emanation of the Son is the emanation of a mental word or concept from the paternal intellect, and the emanation of the Holy Spirit is the emanation of zeal or enthusiasm from the will of the Father and Son. “In this way,” states Friedman, “Henry moves a psychological model of the Trinity into the heart of his trinitarian theology.”

The psychological model of the Trinity brings us to the second topic of “richness” in Friedman’s account (and the second chapter of the book). The Franciscan tradition, claims Friedman, employed the psychological model in the “strong way,” in that “the Franciscans thought that the Son quite literally is a Concept produced by the Father’s intellect, and that the Holy Spirit is Love produced by the will shared by the Father and the Son.” The Dominican tradition—John of Naples and Durand of St. Pourçian in particular—departed from Henry of Ghent’s “strong” use of the psychological trinity, emphasizing instead that “the power produc-

tive of the persons in God is the divine essence or nature, and not the intellect and the will as such." As Aquinas argues, will and nature in the divine are distinct "by reason alone [*solum ratione distinguuntur*]." Friedman spends considerable time engaging John Duns Scotus—Friedman locates Scotus as a part of the thirteenth-century Franciscan tradition—as representative of the strong use of the psychological model and shows how theology and psychological theory intertwined. The main difference between Aquinas and Scotus centered on how the mental word was begotten: either from the intellectual act (Aquinas's "object-act" theory) or directly from memory (Scotus's "mental-act" theory). Scotus agrees with Aquinas, however, that merely rationally distinct attributes cannot be the source of a real distinction between emanations. Thus Scotus requires a "formal" distinction between God's intellect and God's will. In fact, claims Friedman, Scotus introduces a second formal distinction between these attributes and the divine essence. Later Franciscans of the fourteenth century, however, such as Walter Chatton, Robert Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini, find these formal distinctions in God problematic and reject them as part of what Friedman calls their "search for simplicity." A "strict" adherence to simplicity, as Friedman illustrates in chapter three and the beginning of chapter four, left theologians unable to explain rationally the divine personal distinctions and resulted in a theology that is commonly characterized as fideism. What interests Friedman is why they arrived at their fideistic stance: it was not because of a lack of employing reason to think through Trinitarian questions; rather, the reasoning they applied to the Trinitarian questions led them to assert our inability to explain the distinctions of the divine persons. For Friedman, fourteenth-century theologians emphasized divine simplicity to such an extent that distinction in God was "ruled out," and, as a result, analysis and genuine explanation of the personal distinctions in God became "impossible." All that remained was to believe the Church when it declares there to be three persons in the one divine essence.

It is when we reach the later half of the fourth and final chapter of the book that we discover the second goal of Friedman's argument for theological "richness" in late-medieval scholasticism: a critique of Étienne Gilson. According to the "Gilsonian paradigm," as Friedman calls it, the fourteenth century can be characterized by the increased skepticism of the abilities of reason to explore the truths of the faith and the corresponding increased promotion of a fideistic approach to theology. The harmony of philosophy and theology and reason and revelation once held by Thomas Aquinas crumbled under the weight of such fideism, as is clearly witnessed in the thought of William of Ockham. Friedman does

not wholesale disagree with Gilson. Clearly the fourteenth-century popularity of “Praepositinianism”—the teaching that the divine persons are the personal properties (distinct in and of themselves [se ipsis]), which undermines any mechanism (relational or emanation) for explaining their distinction—reflects an increased fideistic approach to Trinitarian theology. But Friedman believes, on the one hand, that Gilson’s portrait is too generalized—Friedman claims that there were “a large number of important thinkers in the fourteenth century who were no more fideistic than John Duns Scotus or Thomas Aquinas.” More importantly, however, Friedman claims that Gilson failed to get at the heart of the supposed fideistic tendencies that surrounded fourteenth-century Trinitarian theology, namely the “search for simplicity.” For Friedman, as noted above, fourteenth-century theologians were not skeptical of the use of reason per se (contra Gilson); they employed reason to a great extent in order to arrive at their conclusions regarding God’s simplicity and their inability to account for divine distinctions. The fideistic accounts of Chatton, Holcot, and Rimini are therefore seen by Friedman not as an indication of the bankruptcy of late-medieval scholasticism but rather as an element alongside other Trinitarian accounts, all of which reflect the “immense vitality and creativity of later-medieval theologians.” This brings us back to where we began (yet now in contrast to Gilson): “what all this material reveals is the incredible richness of later-medieval trinitarian theology and later-medieval scholasticism as a whole.”

While Friedman’s story of the Trinitarian developments between c. 1250 to 1350 is solid and a delight to read, his criticisms of Gilson raise questions in this reviewer’s mind surrounding Friedman’s *evaluation* of the Trinitarian story. Friedman’s story could also be interpreted, it seems, as a demonstration of the perils encountered in the Franciscan slide into a univocal concept of being—witness, for instance, the Franciscan willingness to speak of the Son as literally a Concept of the Father’s intellect, and their willingness, especially Scotus’s, to posit “formal distinctions” between God’s intellect, God’s will, and God’s essence. Later reactions to these formal distinctions in the search for simplicity (Chatton, Holcot, and Rimini, for example) still work within the univocal pattern of thinking. All that is new is that they apply univocal thinking to simplicity, and this leads them to arrive at fideistic accounts of the divine distinctions.

When compared to the Franciscan trajectory, the Dominicans certainly seem to have insufficiently appreciated the Augustinian psychological model—and Friedman demonstrates clearly that this happened in some cases—but their deep qualifications of the psychological model when applied to the divine being (“resemblances”) is in some sense justi-

fied when God's being is taken not univocally but analogically. The question I pose is this: should we say with Friedman that the "reasoned fideism" (my words) of certain fourteenth-century thinkers is a sign of "vitality and creativity" or perhaps rather a sign of misdirection leading to a theological dead end? If by "vitality and creativity" Friedman simply means that later theologians were not merely replicating the thought of earlier theologians but proposing new answers to old Trinitarian questions, Friedman's account confirms such "vitality and creativity." But if by "vitality and creativity" Friedman means the *flourishing* of the use reason in theological speculation, this is not as clear.

Whether or not Friedman's account brings any major qualification to the "Gilsonian paradigm," it does bring tremendous clarification. There is no doubt that *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* is an indispensable book for understanding the Church's history of reflecting on the Trinity. Anyone interested in Trinitarian theology, not just historically but also constructively, would do well to read this work. N.V.

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The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion by Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), xiii + 319.

FATHER NICHOLAS LOMBARDO won the 2011 John Templeton Award for Theological Promise for his *The Logic of Desire*. In it, he argues that desire is the center of Aquinas's account of emotion, and both desire and emotion are central not only to the structure of the *Summa* but also to Aquinas's project as a whole (and his ethics). Desires are ordered toward human flourishing, and for Aquinas, ethics is "nothing other than the study of human psychology insofar as it flourishes or fails to flourish" (xi). His study does not equate "emotions" with any particular aspect of Aquinas's thought, since Aquinas would not have been familiar with the category, but instead it seeks to "focus on Aquinas's discussion of those psychological phenomena that we typically identify as emotions" (18). The book falls into two parts: first it follows Aquinas over a wide range of topics that can correspond to the ordinary use of "emotion" (the first seven chapters), and then it provides a discussion that connects Aquinas's account to contemporary philosophy and theology (the two final chapters).

Lombardo's first chapter deals with the passions of the soul. A passion is "a physiological and psychological response to the apprehension of a

sensible good or a sensible evil, that is, an object that is known through the senses, and judged to be either good or evil" (20). There are two important moments in this response: the apprehension of an object and the passion itself. Apprehension involves not only the material object, but also the intentional object; that is, apprehension combines the sense perception of an object with cognitive evaluation. It is not the object itself that elicits passion but the object grasped under a certain aspect (25). Appetite is an inclination toward something that is perceived as perfective of the being; it is teleologically oriented. Passions are indispensable for obtaining the telos, serving as "psychic motors" driving us toward it (40). Passion requires the guidance of reason, because of the fallen condition of humans: "The passions require the guidance of reason in order to become virtuous . . . but virtue also requires the passions. Without the passions, we would not respond to sensible objects, and without this first step toward engaging the world, human flourishing would not be possible" (41).

Next, Lombardo provides an explanation of the structure of the passions. He explains the two appetitive powers: concupiscible and irascible. Each of the eleven passions that Aquinas mentions receives a treatment, and Lombardo includes his own observations about their relationships. Lombardo also criticizes Aquinas's taxonomy at a few points, proposing alternate formulations that would still be consistent with Aquinas's overall system. For example, he states that love and hatred are not necessary to the system because love "can be interpreted as a combination of apprehension, desire, and pleasure" and hatred "might be dissolved into apprehension and the passions of aversion and sadness" (62). He again highlights the importance of intentional objects being both the cause of passions and the teleological ordering of the process toward human flourishing.

In chapter three Lombardo moves to the affections of the will. For Aquinas, affection is connected to both the sense appetite and the intellectual appetite, the will. All passions are affections, but not all affections are passions (76). Love is the first of all affections, and the rest are ordered to it. The will's most basic inclination is to goodness. However, each object can be attractive or repulsive in different degrees and under different aspects, so the will is forced to make a choice about what will lead to human flourishing (80). Both the passions and the intellectual affections influence one another, often being experienced together (84). The fulfillment of desire brings joy, which is the will's equivalent of sensible pleasure. The will's loves, desires, joys, hates, aversions, and sorrows can overflow into the bodily passions (89).

Next Lombardo considers the relationships among passions, reason, and virtue. He argues that in Aquinas's system, passions naturally tend toward reason. While not entirely subject, they do obey reason to some extent, and so "over time reason's guidance becomes embedded in the sense appetite, manifesting itself in either virtuous or vicious passions" (94). Aquinas followed Aristotle's political metaphor of reason governing the concupiscible and irascible powers with political rather than despotic rule (99). Reason can influence the formation of an intentional object, because it plays a role in connecting the material object to human flourishing. (Reason connects the passion to the *telos* by portraying the object in a certain way.) In this connection with reason, passions can be virtuous if they are rightly ordered to human flourishing. Also, they are vital to morality, because the more powerfully the will is directed toward an object, the more powerfully it overflows into the passions. Thus, someone passionate for a good manifests the intensity of their willing toward it. Lombardo provides a helpful explanation of the difference between consequent passion (passion as natural consequence of the will) and antecedent passion (passion preceding and opposing acts of the will) (109–11). No one can be moral without rightly ordered passions flowing from the will's inclinations.

Chapter five deals with the relationship between original sin, grace, and human affectivity. Original sin means a loss of grace and a loss of cooperation among the passions (they compete; 123). It has weakened humans but not fundamentally altered human nature. Redemption therefore is more than legal acquittal from sin; it is also restoration and renewal (125). Virtues can be infused or acquired. God, by his grace, infuses people with virtues, and the infused virtue works together with its acquired counterpart to produce the growth of that virtue in the person. Lombardo argues that the Holy Spirit plays an important but neglected role in Aquinas's ethics, for the Spirit constantly guides and sustains the moral agent (141).

In chapter six, Lombardo works systematically through the virtues and the vices, showing their connection to affectivity in order to argue for the centrality of perfecting affectivity as a central component of Aquinas's theological ethics. The virtues cannot be rightly understood or cultivated apart from a proper understanding of affectivity. Charity plays a central role, for it "makes our affections accord with God's. It unites all other virtues, gathering them together and ordering them to the love of God" (163). In his treatment of the moral virtues, he emphasizes that each perfects a power of the soul, and thus virtues are "convenient ways to talk about the perfection of particular aspects of the human person" (170).

Lombardo demonstrates that these connections affirm Aquinas's view that the passions are good and that virtue helps guide them to humanity's ultimate *telos* (186), which is also connected to Aquinas's conviction that human appetites are created by God and are therefore good. He insists that "the theme of human affectivity and its perfection by virtue is one of the major organizing principles of the Summa—that it is not just one of many themes, but a theme of central structural importance to his project" (198).

The first section of the book concludes by interacting with the passions in Christ's life, especially as they relate to Christ's knowledge. This treatment helps shape a proper understanding of Christology as well as of the human passions. Lombardo primarily relies upon Paul Gondreau's *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (University of Scranton Press, 2009). Lombardo argues that for Thomas, "Christ's affectivity is a fully human affectivity, and in fact the exemplar of human affectivity" (201). He develops both similarities and differences between Christ's experience and the typical human experience. The most difficult element to take into account is Christ's knowledge, for his immediate beatific knowledge of God constantly interacted with his passions. His theory of Christ's affectivity is in dialogue with his account of human affectivity (223).

In the final two chapters, Lombardo shows the usefulness of Aquinas's treatment of affection for contemporary thought. He argues that Aquinas's category of affection corresponds to the category of emotion: "Aquinas should be seen as advocating a theory of emotion that equates emotion with intentional feeling, views emotion as intrinsically dependent on cognition (including perception) and usually but not necessarily involving the body, and limits emotion's extension to discrete psychological events, thus excluding long-term affective dispositions from being considered emotions" (229). Aquinas's concept of appetite provides a metaphysical foundation for the psychology of human emotion. Desire and other forms of emotion manifest the appetite, so emotion is essential to human flourishing. Lombardo expounds Aquinas's understanding of desire, of passion's obedience to reason, of ethics, and of freedom. Before concluding chapter eight with some omissions and lacunae, he argues that desire could serve as a new foundation for ethical discourse between different ethical perspectives (245–47).

For Lombardo, passions contribute to ethics in three important ways. First, since the intellect's orientation to objects reflects a vision of human flourishing and overflows into the passions, the operation of passion or emotion can be a sign of intense orientation to the good. Thus emotion can fuel the pursuit of the *telos*. Second, "as individuals respond to partic-

ular events and establish patterns of interaction between passion and reason, character traits emerge" (101). Third, the emotions can serve as a guide. Because Aquinas believes that God has given the affections, their desires can be trusted to a certain extent (especially when in proper relation to reason) to indicate what one should choose to do.

Lombardo concludes the book with a few applications of Aquinas's thought to a contemporary theology of emotions. Aquinas's thought helps to situate asceticism, for giving up pleasure is proper only in the service of some greater good (251). Forgiveness can be seen as important for dispersing anger after it has ceased to be useful (252). Aquinas's understanding of emotion can also positively influence Christian preaching, which should deal with the passions in the right fashion (neither ignoring nor abusing them). Finally, he provides an extended treatment of the phenomenon of boredom, which he views as "the non-space between desire and joy: the will stuck in neutral, or spinning its wheels" (265). Secularization, which divorces things from their sacramental role of pointing us to God, also contributes to boredom by making the world less interesting (269–70). Boredom results from insufficient engagement with loving God and neighbor (friendship and love are most able to satisfy our infinite desires). Although Aquinas's approach is not perfect, "once integrated with modern science and post-Freudian psychology, its inclusive methodology, systematic depth, and holistic approach might provide the basis for a new vision of the human person, culled from millennia of anthropological reflection and yet thoroughly accessible today" (274).

Lombardo's work is strongest at his critical and creative points. He helpfully questions aspects of Aquinas's system, such as the place of love: "the absence of love from his system would not cause it to crumble" (62). He does a good job of fairly summarizing Aquinas's positions while also looking for problems of coherence. The end of the book focuses on bringing Aquinas into conversation with contemporary thinking and challenges, and Lombardo is adept at making connections. I found his most creative move to be in his treatment of boredom, in which he constructed a plausible explanation of how Aquinas's system would address this contemporary issue.

Lombardo routinely mentions (for example, at the start of his chapter on Christ [201]) that, in order to assess Aquinas's novel contribution, one must pay attention to his sources. Disconcerting, then, is Lombardo's occasional failure to provide the depth of interaction with these sources that his exhortation leads one to expect. For example, he interacts with Hilary of Poitiers and Peter Lombard, but he merely mentions the importance of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure,

without developing them as sources (202–3). In a book that so clearly rests upon a wealth of research, these omissions must be intentional; discussion of all of Aquinas's sources, however, would have strengthened the book.

This book cannot be ignored in future work on Aquinas's view of the passions, ethics, anthropology, and Christology. Because Lombardo connects so many aspects of Aquinas's thought together, the book is relevant beyond questions of the passions. This remarkably well-researched book contains more than nine hundred footnotes, which provide many avenues for further engagement with both Aquinas and secondary sources. An excellent index of primary citations makes the book useful for scholars pursuing specific questions from the *Summa* or other writings. This work would make a worthy addition to required secondary reading in upper-level undergraduate or graduate courses on Aquinas or theological ethics. **N V**

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