

Book Reviews

Kinship by Covenant: A Canonical Approach to the Fulfillment of God's Saving Promises by Scott W. Hahn. Anchor Bible Reference Library (*New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009*), xiv + 589.

AT LEAST since the time of the Council of Jerusalem in A.D. 49, Christians have wrestled with the question: What is the relationship between the Old Covenant and the New? Specifically, why are certain aspects of the Old Covenant economy—such as circumcision, food laws, and ritual purity—no longer binding on Christians, whereas other aspects of the Old Covenant—such as the Decalogue—remain in force?

These are questions of no little weight. Long before the problem of the two natures was taken up at Chalcedon, the problem of the two covenants had to be dealt with at Jerusalem. During that first council, the apostles and elders provided the Church with clear and authoritative teaching: contrary to the opinion of some believers, circumcision, though mandated by the Law, was not necessary “to be saved” (Acts 15:1–11). However, what the Council of Jerusalem did not provide—or, at least, the book of Acts does not record—was a detailed *exegetical* justification for how this change was even possible. Did not the Bible itself refer to circumcision as an “everlasting” covenant (Gn 17:13)? How then could the early Church dispense with it? Was this mere pragmatism, motivated by the need to make the gospel palatable to Gentile converts? Or is there any biblical *ratio*—from Jewish Scripture itself—for the passing away of certain aspects of the Old Covenant?

In this ground-breaking contribution to the prestigious Anchor Bible Reference Library, Scott W. Hahn provides what may well be one of the most ambitious exegetical attempts to answer the question of the relationship between the Old and New Covenants ever penned. His object is twofold. At the level of exegesis, the first goal is to offer a “covenantal interpretation” of three key New Testament texts: Luke 22 (the institution narrative), Galatians 3–4 (Paul’s diatribe against the circumcision party), and Hebrews 1–9. The overall aim of the book is to base the interpretation of

these New Testament passages on an extensive analysis of the multiple covenants of the Old Testament. At the level of theology, the second goal is to answer certain perennial questions, such as: “How legitimate is the New Testament authors’ reading of the Old Testament? Can their methods be justified in modern context? Do their interpretations find a basis in, and arise out of, the older Scriptures? Or are they imposed on them?” (22).

As these questions might suggest, *Kinship by Covenant* is a remarkably wide-ranging work, so much so that it is difficult in a short review to select which findings merit attention. The volume is brimming with exegetical arguments and theological insights, spanning both testaments and covering numerous primary texts. Therefore, it seems best to briefly introduce the format and methodology of the book, and then examine some of its most significant theses.

The study is bipartite: Part 1 explores the nature and history of covenant in the Old Testament, focusing both on the various types of covenants—kinship, treaty, and grant—as well as specific examples from the canonical narrative: for example, the Abrahamic, Sinaitic, Levitical, and Davidic covenants. Part 2 builds directly on the results of this analysis of the covenants of the Old Testament and applies the results of Part 1 to key New Testament texts that correlate the language of kinship with covenant (22).

The book begins, as one might expect, with a detailed overview of modern research on the covenant (Chapter 1), including a brief but important discussion of methodology. In this section, Hahn builds directly on the foundation of scholars who have emphasized a familial understanding of covenant relations, and the centrality of the sworn oath for the sealing of such covenants (e.g., D. J. McCarthy, M. G. Kline, F. M. Cross). He then goes on to describe his approach as consisting of both “narrative analysis,” which focuses on the biblical texts in their final form, and “canonical criticism,” which interprets texts in light of Scripture in its entirety (23). Although *Kinship by Covenant* draws extensively on the findings of historical criticism—some 140 pages of endnotes consist in large part of references to modern historical-critical works—Hahn’s primary goal is to “illuminate the logic of the text as we now have it” (102). As such, he has frequent recourse not only to modern exegesis but also to ancient Jewish and Christian interpretations, and he gives a normative place to the theological exegesis of the inspired New Testament authors (26–27). The result is a work that is at once historically, linguistically, and exegetically grounded and at the same time theologically oriented.

With that said, there are several major theses that can be singled out as meriting the attention of exegetes and theologians interested in the question of the relationship between the Old and New Covenants.

1. Before moving into in-depth analysis of particular texts, Hahn first makes the case that *not all covenants are created equal*. As modern research has shown, in the ancient Near East in general and in the Old Testament in particular, three basic types of covenants can be identified (28–31). First, there is the *kinship* covenant, in which familial bonds are extended to unite two (usually) equal parties under the divine sanction of an oath and/or sacrifice. This kind of covenant emphasizes the mutual nature of the relationship, which is often signified by a shared meal. A second type is the *treaty* covenant, in which covenant obligations are imposed on an inferior by a superior. This form of covenant is often sealed by self-curses on the inferior party, who invokes or symbolically enacts some punishment or curse as a penalty for breaking the oath. Significantly, the treaty covenant often emphasizes the servitude of the inferior party. The third and final type is the *grant* covenant, in which the covenant initiative and obligations rest primarily with the superior, who freely offers them to the inferior, usually in response to the latter's virtue or fidelity. This threefold typology is foundational to the overall argument of the book: for Hahn, in order to understand the internal logic of the covenant development in the Bible, one must be able to delineate the significant differences between various kinds of covenant relations.
2. Despite the rather common tendency to speak of "the Mosaic covenant" as a monolithic entity, *the covenant sealed at Sinai and the book of Deuteronomy are not one single covenant*. Through a detailed exegesis of multiple texts, Hahn mounts a powerful argument for distinguishing between the Sinai covenant—ratified in Exodus 24 and embodied in the Decalogue—and the Deuteronomic covenant—delivered on the plains of Moab and embodied in the book of Deuteronomy. Building on his earlier taxonomy, Hahn identifies Sinai as a kinship covenant and Deuteronomy as a treaty covenant. In support of this, he points out that the Old Testament itself refers to Deuteronomy as "another covenant" (Dt 29:1), explicitly distinct from that which was sealed at Mount Sinai. Moreover, within the canonical narrative there are also important differences between the Sinai and Deuteronomic covenants. For example, whereas the Sinai covenant law is kept *inside* the ark of the covenant, suggesting its permanence, the "book of the law" of Deuteronomy is kept *outside* the ark, suggesting its impermanence and its secondary status (cf. Dt 10:1–5; 31:25–26). Likewise, whereas God speaks directly to Israel at Mount Sinai, the covenant of Deuteronomy is established through the mouth of Moses on the

plains of Moab without any direct speech—that is, it is delivered solely through Moses’ words (contrast, for example, Exodus 20). “At Sinai, God had appeared to the people of Israel in a theophany of fire and smoke with a voice like thunder; on the plains of Moab he is silent and absent” (69).

Finally, Hahn makes the remarkable observation that some of the most morally difficult texts of the Old Testament—for example, the texts on *herem* warfare (Dt 20:16–17), the permission of divorce and remarriage (Dt 24:1–4), and the allowance to take usury from Gentiles (Dt 15:3; 23:20)—are “unique to Deuteronomy,” suggesting that they are covenant concessions made by God “in light of Israel’s sinfulness” (73). In support of this conclusion, Hahn shows that this stark difference between the Sinai and Deuteronomic covenants is already present in the Old Testament book of Ezekiel, who describes the laws of Deuteronomy as “statutes that were *not good* and ordinances by which they could not have life” (Ezek 20:25). Ezekiel’s highly negative estimation of the Deuteronomic legislation is inexplicable, unless there is an awareness *within the Old Testament canon itself* of the secondary status of this *deutero-nomos*, this “second law.”

The distinction between the Sinai and Deuteronomic covenants is critical to Part 2 of the book, which takes up Paul’s treatment of the covenant in Galatians 3–4 (Chapter 9). In this chapter, Hahn argues that Paul sees the Mosaic covenant as taking its definitive shape, not on Mount Sinai, but in the book of Deuteronomy, where it is ratified by the self-curses indicative of a treaty covenant (238). This is important, in part because it explains why Paul chooses to describe Jesus’ cross in the rather strange manner of a curse-bearing death (Gal 3:10). Paul sees Jesus’ dying on a tree—which manner of death is described by Deuteronomy 21:23 as a curse—as both bearing and expiating the covenant curses that figure so prominently in the Deuteronomic treaty covenant (Dt 27–30). Even more critically, the recognition that Deuteronomy is another covenant than Sinai provides a powerful and coherent explanation for Paul’s otherwise bafflingly negative statements about “the law.” For example, when Paul says that “the law” was “added because of transgressions” (Gal 3:9–22), he is referring, not to the Decalogue given in Exodus 20, but to the later laws, like Deuteronomy and its covenant concessions, which were given to Israel as a result of Israel’s idolatrous actions with the golden calf and at Beth-peor (see below for further discussion of the golden calf episode). In short, Paul’s sometimes negative estimations of the Law are rooted not in caprice but in his recogni-

tion of Deuteronomy as a “self-retiring” covenant, which looks beyond itself to a covenant in which God will circumcise the “heart” of Israel (270; cf. Dt 30).

3. Not only are there different types of covenants in the Old Testament, but *within a single given covenant, there can be multiple stages of development*. The most prominent example is the Abrahamic covenant. Hahn points out: “Scholars frequently speak of the Abrahamic covenant, as if there were just one” (102). However, from a narrative perspective, there are in fact multiple covenant-making episodes in the canonical account of Abraham, and it is critical to distinguish them.

In an exegetically masterful section, Hahn correlates God’s famous threefold promise to Abraham of (1) nationhood, (2) a great name, and (3) blessing for “all the families of the earth” (Gn 12:1–3) with three successive and cumulative covenants: (1) Abraham’s sleep, the animal sacrifices, and the “covenant” regarding his descendants (Gn 15); (2) the institution of the “covenant” of circumcision (Gn 17); and (3) the sacrifice of Isaac, and God’s sworn oath to Abraham to bless “all the nations of the earth” (Gn 22). This threefold correlation highlights the essential difference between a *promise*, which does not involve a sworn oath, and a *covenant*, in which the promise is sealed and elevated by means of an oath and/or sacrifice (Gn 15, sacrificial animals; Gn 17, circumcision; Gn 22, Abraham’s only beloved son). Hahn does not stop there, but goes on to argue that, from a canonical perspective, these three stages of the Abrahamic covenant can themselves be further correlated in significant ways to three later covenants in salvation history: (1) the Sinai covenant, (2) the Deuteronomic covenant, and (3) the Davidic covenant, the last of which constitutes the covenantal climax of the Old Testament (112).

Once again, the delineation of the Abrahamic covenants is essential to Part 2, both to the discussion of Galatians (Chapter 9) and to the analysis of the Epistle to the Hebrews (Chapter 10). For one thing, a clear delineation of these covenant stages enables one to grasp the logic of Paul’s arguments against the Judaizers’ insistence on the necessity of circumcision for salvation (Gal 3–4). For example, Paul’s appeal to the fact that Abraham’s faith was reckoned to him as righteousness (Gn 15) long *before* circumcision was required of him by God (Gn 17) is not merely an argument from chronology. Rather, Paul recognizes that in Genesis itself, circumcision is not part of God’s original requirement of Abraham but is a remedial and penitential response to his illicit relations with Hagar (cf. Gn 16). This is

why Paul can regard circumcision as unnecessary for Gentiles who wish to become children of Abraham (117; cf. Gal 4:21–31). Paul apparently recognizes the development of the covenant within the Abrahamic narrative, in which God's promise to bless "the families of the earth" is tied, not to the covenant of circumcision (Gn 17), but rather to the covenantal "sacrifice" of Isaac and the sworn oath made by the LORD in response to Abraham's fidelity (Gn 22:18). Paul sees the universal blessings of this covenant sacrifice as being fulfilled and released by the sacrificial death of Christ, the true beloved Son of the Father (239; cf. Gal 3:16).

This close reading of Galatians leads to one of Hahn's most intriguing conclusions: for Paul, "the old and new covenants are not distinguished so much by chronology as by faith or the lack thereof. Temporally speaking, the two covenants (old and new) interpenetrate" (246). In support of this, Hahn's analysis of Abraham in the Epistle to the Hebrews comes to a similar result: "The author of Hebrews has no simplistic understanding of the relationship between the Old and New Covenants, whereby the two are neatly divided by the arrival of Christ in history. Rather, on the one hand, figures of the old era"—chief among them, Abraham—"participated proleptically in the New Covenant by faith" (280; see Hebrews 11). This single thesis alone merits closer attention for a whole host of ecumenical, ecclesiological, and soteriological reasons. Whatever the ultimate verdict about it, Hahn clearly shows that a focus on the existence of covenant stages has the potential to shed intriguing light on the internal logic of the New Testament authors' interpretations of Jewish Scripture.

4. When Christians today think of the Old Testament priesthood, they are likely to think first—if not only—of the Levites, who dominate much of the Pentateuch and who exercised exclusive priestly prerogatives throughout the first millennium down to the time of Jesus. However, *according to the Pentateuchal narrative, the Levitical priesthood is not the original priesthood. Rather, it is a late development and a remedial response to Israel's idolatrous worship of the golden calf.* Indeed, as Hahn shows, both modern biblical scholarship and ancient Jewish tradition recognize the existence in Scripture of a "pre-Levitical" priesthood—a "primordial" priesthood of fathers and firstborn sons (136, 279). Think here of the book of Genesis, in which the patriarchs—not a professional class of priests—perform the priestly actions of building altars, dispensing blessings, and offering blood sacrifice (for

example, Gn 15, 22, 28). During the patriarchal period, the pre-Levitical form of the priesthood was “rooted in the patriarchal family, particularly in the idealized relationship of the father and his firstborn sons” (298). In fact, it was precisely this “primordial priesthood of the firstborn son” to which God calls Israel in the Exodus, when he describes them as the divine “firstborn son” and hence “a kingdom of priests” (279; cf. Ex 4:22; 19:5–6).

However, with the tragic incident of Israel’s idolatrous worship of the golden calf, eleven of the twelve tribes *lose* the priestly privileges of the firstborn son, which are from that point forward given to the tribe of Levites alone (Ex 32). Hence, according to the biblical narrative, the original covenantal arrangement of God was royal priestly primogeniture for all twelve tribes of Israel, not the exclusively Levitical priesthood of a single tribe. In other words—and this is significant—the Old Testament *itself* describes the Levitical covenant and the corresponding priesthood as “a remedial response” to Israel’s sin and a corrective measure that “naturally retains something of a provisional character” (167). That is why a number of prophetic texts in Isaiah appear to envision a future in which the privileges of the Levitical priesthood will be open to all twelve tribes, and even to Gentiles (for example, Is 56, 61, 66).

It is difficult to overestimate the explanatory power of this covenantal approach to the Levitical priesthood for Hebrews 1–9 in Part 2 (Chapter 10). One of the great mysteries of New Testament theology is how the Epistle to the Hebrews can be arguably the most *Jewish* document in the New Testament and at the same time contain what may be the most *negative* evaluation of the Old Covenant priesthood, sacrifices, and cult in the canon. Hahn’s analysis of the Levitical covenant as a secondary and remedial covenant provides a brilliant solution. In a memorable line, he writes that the author of Hebrews “is not anti-Semitic but *post-Levitical*” (327). In other words, in the epistle to the Hebrews, Christ’s identity as firstborn Son (Heb 1:2–6) and high priest (Heb 7) represents “the restoration of an *original* and *superior* form of covenant mediation that had been lost since the institution of the Levitical priesthood in response to Israel’s covenant infidelity” (278, emphasis added). That is why Melchizedek—the first man to be called “priest” in the Bible and thus a representative of the pre-Levitical priesthood—figures so prominently the christology of this epistle (Heb 7; cf. Gn 14:18). In short, once one grasps the covenantal stages of the canonical narrative, it becomes apparent that, in order to be a priest, Christ need not

be a Levitical priest at all. In the biblical story of salvation history, there were priests long before the Levites ever existed. Hence, Christ's status as firstborn son of God truly marks him out as "a high priest after the order of Melchizedek" (Heb 5:10; cf. Ps 110:4).

5. Finally, in what is perhaps the most original section in the book, Hahn argues that the *Davidic covenant is the essential bridge between the Old and New covenants* (Chapters 7 and 8). He begins by building on the virtual consensus among scholars that the covenant with David is a grant covenant, in which God swears to bless David's descendants as a response to David's loyalty and virtue (176; cf. 2 Sm 7; Ps 89). Hahn then proceeds to show how the Old Testament itself depicts the Davidic covenant as a bridge: it both *points back* to previous covenants and *points beyond itself* to a future covenant, which will both restore and transform the Davidic covenant kingdom in the messianic age of salvation. For example, the building of the Temple by the Davidic heir on Mount Moriah seems to recapitulate the climactic sacrifice of Isaac on Moriah in the Abrahamic covenant, while the international nature of David's kingdom appears to fulfill the Abrahamic promise to bless "all nations" (see Gn 22; 2 Chr 3:1). Likewise, the prominence of divine sonship in the Davidic covenant texts appears to point back to the corporate divine sonship lost by Israel at Sinai and Beth-peor, which is now transferred to the individual Davidic monarch (197; see 2 Sm 7; Ps 89). In addition, David's otherwise baffling (not to mention illicit) priestly activities—such as offering sacrifice and wearing a linen ephod—are explained as his aspiration "to be a new Melchizedek" (193; see 2 Sm 6; Ps 110). Last, but certainly not least, Hahn shows how throughout the prophetic corpus, "the goal of the New Exodus"—that is, the messianic restoration of Israel—"is *not Sinai*. . . . Instead, the New Exodus ends at *Zion*, 'David' is restored, and the people are reconstituted as a kingdom centered around the Zion Temple, ruling over the nations" (205; cf. Is 55; Jer 23, 30–31; Ezek 36–37, etc.).

The consequences of this focus on the Davidic covenant for understanding the New Testament are manifold. For one thing, it sheds important light on the remarkable *continuity* between the Davidic covenant and the New Testament accounts of Jesus and the early Church. In two striking sections, Hahn outlines what he refers to as the Davidic "covenant constellation": eight characteristic features of the Davidic covenant in the Old Testament. He then shows how these distinctively Davidic features explicitly undergird the presentation of Jesus as Messiah in Luke and Acts:

Davidic Covenant Constellation
(200–201)

1. Davidic kingdom is founded on *a divine covenant*.
2. Davidic king is the *son of God*, by covenant relation.
3. Davidic king is the *Messiah* (“anointed one”).
4. Davidic king is bound to *Jerusalem*, particularly *Mount Zion*.
5. Davidic kingdom bound to *the Temple*.
6. Davidic king monarch ruled over the united *twelve tribes*.
7. Davidic king rules over an *international empire*.
8. Davidic kingdom is *everlasting*. (see 2 Sm 7; Ps 2, 89, etc.)

New Covenant in Luke-Acts
(218–19)

1. Jesus’ kingdom founded on a *new covenant*.
 2. Jesus is the natural (not merely adopted) *son of God*.
 3. Jesus is *the Messiah*.
 4. Jesus’ royal mission is bound up with *Jerusalem*.
 5. Jesus’ royal mission is bound up with *the Temple*.
 6. Jesus restores the *twelve tribes* in the twelve apostles.
 7. Jesus’ kinship includes *all nations*.
 8. Jesus’ reign is *everlasting*. (see Lk 1–2, 22; Acts 1–2, 10, etc.)
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In light of such parallels, Hahn comes to the significant conclusion that for Luke, “the new covenant is not a complete *novum*, it is the renewal of the Davidic covenant” (226). This provides a solid exegetical bulwark against the idea—going back at least as far as Marcion—that the New Covenant is a kind of divine ‘plan-B’, in which God dispenses with the earlier economy in a way devoid of virtually any continuity.

On the other hand, Hahn’s treatment is balanced by an equally important recognition of discontinuity between David and Jesus. As he goes on to argue, in the work of Luke, Jesus’ kingdom is not simply the kingdom of David returned. Rather, it is “the kingdom of David restored *and transformed*” (218 [emphasis mine]). This transformation occurs in at least two spheres. First, in the account of the Last Supper, the Davidic kingdom is restored to the twelve tribes in the figures of the apostles, but it is reconfigured around the celebration of the Eucharist when Jesus says to the Twelve: “You are those who have continued with me in my trials; and I covenant to you, as my Father covenanted to me, a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel” (Lk 22:28–30). Hahn makes the point that, contrary to some recent scholarship pitting kingdom and covenant against one another, “kingdom” and “covenant” are inextricably tied to each other by Jesus in Luke’s account of the Last Supper (cf. S. McKnight). The new covenant is, at its core, a eucharistic covenant. Second, by beginning

the Book of Acts with an account of Jesus' ascension into heaven, Luke shows that the New Covenant, unlike the former grant to David, is not focused on the earthly Jerusalem. Rather, in the ascension of Jesus, "the kingdom has been *transposed from earth to heaven*, even though it continues to manifest itself on earth as the *ekklesia*. This ecclesial kingdom exists simultaneously on earth and in heaven" (233). In contrast to many modern discussions of the kingdom of God—which often leave one more bewildered than one was before beginning to study the topic—Hahn's focus on a *kingdom ecclesiology* provides an intriguingly clear picture of how Luke understands the fulfillment of the covenants in Christ.

In light of such theses—and these are really just a sampling—it should go without saying that Scott Hahn has succeeded in producing a major work of biblical scholarship, characterized by many significant strengths. There are, however, also several drawbacks. For one thing, the quotations from scholarly sources in the main text are sometimes so frequent that they threaten to drown out Hahn's voice. This makes for demanding reading at points. Thankfully, this is a problem primarily in Chapter 1; Hahn's own voice, which is quite lucid and engaging, emerges more and more clearly in each subsequent chapter. In addition, the choice to use endnotes was, to say the least, infelicitous. As stated above, one of the strengths of the book is the remarkable breadth of research that undergirds it. Indeed, many of its various exegetical conclusions—some of which at first blush may seem rather novel—are in fact deeply rooted in the works of major modern exegetes and commentators. Much of this is lost on any reader who does not take the time to study the endnotes. Finally, it is odd that in a work of canonical-criticism, the chapters dealing with the Old Testament in the first half of the book do not follow the canonical order of the covenants, but rather the threefold covenant taxonomy. For example, Deuteronomy is treated before Leviticus, which, canonically, is the previous covenant. This order of treatment can be quite difficult to follow at times, especially for those interested in the narrative development of the various covenants, and it puts upon the shoulders of the reader the rather heavy burden of integrating the results into an overarching salvation-historical framework.

Nevertheless, it would be tragic if any of these weaknesses overshadowed the outstanding contribution to biblical theology that has been made in *Kinship by Covenant*. If this review is somewhat longer than normal, then that is because this book is worth the space. For one thing, in these days of radical overspecialization, it is rare, very rare, to find an author whose grasp of both primary and secondary literature covers such a broad spectrum of the biblical canon: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Deuteronomy, the books of Samuel and Kings, the Prophets, Luke, Acts,

Galatians, and Hebrews. This is no small feat; the breadth and depth of the book are simply extraordinary and a model of close biblical exegesis.

Moreover, Hahn displays a remarkable ability to integrate detailed exegetical insights into an overarching theological synthesis. As anyone familiar with the history of research in the last century is well aware, the divide between exegesis and theology has grown into a gaping chasm that threatens to separate the two permanently. *Kinship by Covenant* not only successfully bridges this divide but does so in a way that promises to pay high dividends in more than one area of theological study. For example, Hahn's erudite analysis of oath-swearing and ritualized kinship has numerous points of contact with sacramental theology. Likewise, his penetrating exploration of the kingdom of God as the Davidic kingdom restored and transformed represents an important contribution to a neglected aspect of ecclesiology. Finally, his illumination of the covenant thinking of New Testament authors like Paul and the author of Hebrews could have manifold positive implications for Jewish-Christian dialogue, especially regarding the pressing questions of anti-Semitism and supersessionism in the New Testament (see 332–38, “Concluding Theological Reflections”).

Finally, for this reviewer, the greatest strength of the book is its remarkable amount of exegetical and theological *explanatory power*. Over and over again, Hahn convincingly shows the concept of the covenant to be a *sine qua non* for unlocking the internal logic of the biblical narrative of salvation history. Especially noteworthy is the exposition of the fact that the Old Testament itself depicts Deuteronomy as a secondary and self-retiring covenant filled with concessions to Israel's sinfulness, a covenant unabashedly containing “statutes that were not good” (Ezek 20:25). Contemporary theologians troubled by what Pope Benedict has recently referred to as “the ‘dark’ passages in the Bible” (*Verbum Domini*, §42)—many of which are contained in or based on Deuteronomy—may find in *Kinship by Covenant* a ground-breaking exegetical contribution to the pressing theological problems presented by such passages. At the very least, this study calls for further exploration of the canonical distinctions between the original Sinai covenant and later laws which—in the words of Jesus—were “allowed” by God because of Israel's “hardness of heart” (Mt 19:8).

In sum, it is hoped that biblical scholars and systematic theologians alike will take the time and effort to digest the exegetical and theological feast that Hahn has so ably served up in this truly great contribution to the study of the divine economy in sacred Scripture. N V

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Embracing Purpose: Essays on God, the World and the Church

by Geoffrey Wainwright (*Peterborough: Epworth, 2007*), x + 370 pp.

THERE IS a Russian proverb that responds to ecclesial disunity thus: "The walls of separation do not reach up to heaven" (222). That proverb aptly captures the ecumenically minded discontent and the eschatological confidence that mark all these essays, which apply Wainwright's liturgical and integrative theological perspective while ranging over doctrine, over Scripture and tradition, over church and world.

The image Wainwright gives for the thematic unity of these fourteen essays, which date from 1995 to 2007, is the image of Christ's outstretched arms on the cross. That image, as Christian Scripture and liturgical practice remind us, signifies God's cosmic purposes, working through Christ in the Spirit to gather all things in one loving embrace. It is a fitting image for the scope and depth of God's redemptive activity, which is in various ways gauged and plumbed in each essay. But Wainwright's purposes as an author are also "embracing." Indeed, they must be since the theologian's task is to trace the embracing purposes of God. So Wainwright seeks "embracing" perspectives, both through the thematic ambition of the essays and through his determination to do theology ecumenically.

The thematic comprehensiveness of the essays to some extent reflects the occasions for which they were crafted. Many of them stem from the author's distinguished list of lectureships and presentations. So we see Wainwright addressing the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity on the fortieth anniversary of Vatican II's decree on ecumenism, *Unitatis Redintegratio*. We see him giving the presidential address for the American Theological Society. We see him addressing the Oxford International Newman Conference or the Societas Liturgica. These settings invite systematic reflection and wide-angle vision, and Wainwright takes full advantage of the opportunities.

Something of the reach of God's purposes and of the vision of the theologian who attempts to articulate them can be seen in the sweeping and overlapping aims of the second and the last essay. Both rehearse salvation history as a liturgical progression through which God is bringing the cultures of the nations into harmony with the forms of true worship in anticipation of the culmination of God's purposes in the eschatological Kingdom. Both undertake this journey in order to revisit questions about the inculturation of the gospel and about how to respond to the West's modern crisis of faith. Chapter 2, "Babel, Barbary, and Blessing," reflects the concerns of the linguistic turn in philosophy but traces the problems through the lens of salvation history, unfolding a scriptural metanarrative

for thinking liturgically through questions of language, culture, and truth.

Chapter 14, "A Remedy for Relativism," peers through Joseph Ratzinger's book *The Spirit of the Liturgy* to envision God's ever-extending communion of worshippers as a leavening agent anticipating history's liturgical consummation in the face of the subjectivism and nihilism of contemporary culture. These complementary essays convey the scope of God's purposes and exemplify Wainwright's thematic ambitions. Part of his achievement is to have the audacity to attempt to develop such encompassing perspectives.

On the whole, in my estimation, he achieves those lofty goals. The reader must be prepared to see gathered up in a small space many topics each of which could merit volumes. These essays stand on mountains of learning but allow the reader to see only the peaks. Detailed argumentation takes a back seat to the synthetic skill and mature judgment of a seasoned scholar and churchman. The writing can be deceptively simple precisely because the judgments are so sure, as in this proposition from the opening essay, "The True, the Good, and the Beautiful": "Truth is found when created reality appears in light of its Creator and his disposition of it" (2).

Wainwright seeks an embracing perspective not only in the individual essays, but also in the structure by which they are linked. Only one of the essays has not appeared in print before (chapter 10, "Dynamics of Dialogue"), and their scattered provenance means they can be read with profit independently. But by collecting and organizing them in a single volume, Wainwright invites us to see the connections among them. Indeed, it may not be too much to claim that he has built these occasional pieces into a sort of culminating systematic theology to complement his great achievement nearly three decades earlier in *Doxology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine, and Life* (1980). Wainwright reveals in an Epilogue how that earlier work provides the underlying rubric by which these essays are organized. So the order of these chapters roughly corresponds to the three-part structural scheme of *Doxology*, beginning with "substantial matters" or the substance of Christian faith, moving on to "traditional means" or the instruments by which faith is handed on, and finishing with "contextual questions" or the human and cultural contexts in which faith is lived out. In the Epilogue, Wainwright also charts his career to reveal how these essays reflect its scope; one suspects the author sees the present book as a "capstone" text on a remarkable pilgrimage.

Wainwright's perspectives are "embracing" not only in their thematic ambition, but also in their ecumenical spirit. This collection fully demonstrates Wainwright's habit of doing theology ecumenically, which means for him at least three things: in dialogue with the documentary achievements

of official ecumenical commissions, with patience not to say what the current state of dialogue does not allow us yet to say, and in touch with the commonalities that link all ecumenically minded orthodox Christians.

Wainwright has been actively engaged in official ecumenical dialogue throughout his career, and his commitment to thinking with the Ecumenical Movement never wavers. So in chapter 4, "The Trinity Rediscovered," for example, Wainwright steers clear of evaluating the Trinitarian proposals of specific theologians, and instead argues for the general influence of the Ecumenical Movement on Trinitarian renewal, as well as showing the ecumenical benefits of that renewal.

His most sustained reflection on the progress of the Ecumenical Movement is found in chapters 8 to 10, where he considers ground gained on ecclesiology ("*Unitatis Redintegratio* in a Protestant Perspective") and on doctrine ("Does Doctrine Still Divide?") and submits as an object lesson the Methodist-Catholic international dialogue, which he has chaired from the Methodist side since 1986. These pages offer expert judgments about the fruit of the Ecumenical Movement. Wainwright is positive but also provisional. He notes progress on topics such as Christology, the *filioque*, authority, justification, and grace. He sees a shared desire for "ecumenism in time," such that churches are beginning to recognize common saints, and for shared expositions of the ancient faith. The role of the World Council of Churches is, in Wainwright's view, clearly waning, displaced somewhat by bilateral dialogues, especially those involving the Vatican, although the reader learns little of his analysis of this shift. He insists that the best ecumenical thinking understands that unity cannot be merely "federal"; a ministry of unity such as is represented by the papacy is crucial. But he is not satisfied with any mere "come home to Rome" model of ecumenism. He calls for continued work toward a mutual exchange of gifts between traditions, in recognition that reunion requires repentance and the willingness of each side to conceive a future different from each church's separate existence.

The often overlapping material can make these three chapters occasionally tedious. Wainwright's favored events in the history of the Ecumenical Movement receive repeated attention throughout the book, but especially here. Wainwright was one of the principal architects of the *Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry* document produced in 1982 by the WCC's Faith and Order Commission, and here the reader becomes very familiar with certain passages from it. Also repeatedly commended are the WCC's 1961 New Delhi statement that defined unity as an organic connection of "all in each place" and John Paul II's proposal in *Ut Unum Sint* for a "fraternal dialogue" on the universal ministry of unity as represented in the Petrine office. The

latter proposal, we are reminded a number of times, prompted Wainwright to respond by suggesting not a cooperative statement on the office itself, but a cooperative exercise of the authority it represents through a joint statement on what is to be believed and preached today.

These repetitions are not so much weaknesses of the book as necessary redundancies for which the reader who hopes to work straight through must be prepared. Wainwright does prepare the reader in the Preface, where he explains, "Occasionally, brief overlaps in material have been retained across chapters for the sake of the integrity of the argument in each context, and the repetitions may be benignly taken as indicating the importance I attach to those matters" (viii).

The book can exercise on the attentive reader a sort of discipline of patience, of learning to think with the churches without prematurely declaring what should be dialogue's result. This patience is another aspect of how Wainwright does theology ecumenically. In chapter 5, "Reading Scripture Together," for example, he refuses the temptation unilaterally to construct the one hermeneutic that will resolve all the ecumenical impasses. Instead, he sets a few minimal guidelines for exegesis rooted in ecumenical confessions about Scripture and then directs our attention to the possibilities for further agreement embodied in specific examples of ecumenical ventures in shared reading.

Despite this provisionality, Wainwright writes with confidence that the Christian tradition is in some sense already one, with a unity encapsulated in the Nicene Creed. So, though many dogmas Nicene or otherwise are questioned today, for Wainwright writing ecumenically means confessing without apology the ancient faith on which all orthodox Christians agree. At a number of points in the book, Wainwright himself seems to fade from the page, as an essay attempts to speak on behalf of all orthodox, ecumenically minded Christians, in dialogue with ecumenical documents. The writing in those places can seem less engaging. But this is another way in which he seeks to be "embracing," by offering not the views of one idiosyncratic theologian, but those of the wide and deep tradition of orthodox Trinitarian Christianity. He recalls with some relish "the disappointment [he] caused when, in (his) inaugural lecture at the Union Theological Seminary in New York, [he] expressed the hope that [he] would teach 'nothing new'" (259). But don't be fooled into expecting dry formulae. Instead, Wainwright's liturgically steeped Trinitarian orthodoxy in conversation with modern trends lends these essays fresh dynamism. The fruitfulness of this approach is on particular display in chapters 6 and 7, which provide Trinitarian readings of Psalm 33 and the Lord's Prayer, respectively. Especially noteworthy is Wainwright's argument for the legitimacy of

Trinitarian readings of the Psalms on the grounds that the church's history of Trinitarian readings is "part of the Trinitarian conception of God's history with the world to which the scriptures bear witness and of which they are a part" (121).

The weakest parts of the book are Wainwright's attempts to identify the threats to Christianity from an increasingly post-Christian world. One surmises that the author's impatience with nonsense keeps him from knowing his enemy. He paints with excessively broad brushstrokes against ill-defined "postmodernists," New Age types, materialists, and others. I found myself agreeing with many of Wainwright's judgments about the barbarism of contemporary culture, but disappointed with his lack of specificity. His acquaintance with the barbarism he hopes to ward off is broader than it is deep, which is especially unfortunate since it undermines our ability to recognize the degree to which the enemy is us.

If his diagnosis of our ills is vague and sometimes flimsy, his grasp of the cure is certain and exact. Our hope is God's embracing purpose for the entire cosmos. Wainwright's embracing essays trace those purposes most transparently when they give way to the ejaculations of hymnic praise readers of Wainwright have come to expect. Wainwright is at his best when he plumbs the depths of liturgical history and gauges the breadth of ecumenical dialogue to lead us toward wonder and praise at the liturgical ends God has in view and the liturgical means by which they are being reached. N V

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The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's *De Nominum Analogia* by Joshua P. Hochschild (*Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010*), xx + 248 pp.

RE-READING this classic text required hermeneutical skills akin to untangling a knot tightened by generations of misreading, so readers engaging in the task with the author can only admire his deft hand. Best rendered as "on the analogy of terms [expressions]," the title launches us into a semantic inquiry which many commentators had overlooked; Hochschild sets out to restore the logical-grammatical perspective of the original text. But how could generations of readers miss the point when the title was so clear? The Dominican Tomas de Vio Cajetan had composed commentaries on key works of Thomas Aquinas before being elected master-general of the Order in 1508, and in 1518 he was sent to Germany as

papal-legate to debate Martin Luther. His work explicitly treating “analogy of terms” was naturally considered part of his commentary oeuvre, and it was presumed to explicate celebrated analogical strategies which Aquinas had deftly employed yet cared little to clarify or justify. As studies of Aquinas’s conceptual strategies began to accumulate in the twentieth-century, scholars would inevitably ask, how helpful was Cajetan’s little work in illuminating Aquinas’s judicious use of analogous terms? Joshua Hochschild, however, found the treatise interesting in its own right and began to ask whether it was even intended to explicate Aquinas’s use of analogy, despite the author’s distinguished record as a commentator. Moreover, in the intervening three centuries, other voices had claimed attention, notably that of John Duns Scotus. What if this treatise belonged to a genre other than commentary and in fact had set out to answer questions about analogy posed by Scotus? Using this heuristic hypothesis, the author leads us in quite another direction, yet in the process is constrained to address the considerable secondary literature addressing Aquinas’s use of analogy, which had inevitably taken positions pro- and con-Cajetan.

After an illuminating analysis of Aristotle on analogical usage and a brief resumé of key figures between Aristotle and Aquinas (notably Boethius), Hochschild executes a hermeneutical tour-de-force, using Collingwood, Gadamer, and Thomas Kuhn to initiate a “new paradigm,” one based on identifying the questions Cajetan actually faced rather than reading in the expectations later Thomists brought to the text. (Bernard Lonergan regularly led students to appreciate the dialectics at work in early Church councils by noting: If these documents are presented as offering answers, we can grasp them properly only if we understand the questions they were supposed to answer.) This lapidary sense of hermeneutics guides Hothschild’s inquiry. For Scotus’s trenchant question—“If analogy is really a form of equivocation, how does it avoid the fallacy of equivocation?” (42)—makes it imperative to answer “the fundamental semantic question about analogy that arises within the framework of Aristotelian logic . . . : how is it possible to have a mean between univocation and equivocation?” (39). So “if one wants to maintain traditional semantics *and* preserve analogy, one cannot ignore Scotus’s challenge. One must characterize the unity of the analogical concept” (43). That defines Cajetan’s principal concern.

Only after having liberated the work from the genre of commentary on Aquinas, and clarified “the semantic intent of *de Nominum Analogia*” (33), does Hochschild address the bevy of critiques addressed to Cajetan’s treatment of the issue. Most of these follow Etienne Gilson’s insistence in his 1952 book on Scotus that “the Thomist doctrine of analogy is above

all a doctrine of the *judgment* of analogy. It is in fact thanks to judgment of proportion that, without a change of nature, one can make of the concept a usage sometimes equivocal, sometimes analogical, sometimes univocal" (52, citing Gilson, 1–102). Cajetan's search for an "analogical concept" leads these critics to associate Cajetan with Scotus's preoccupations, thereby diverting readers from Aquinas's principal strategy. But what if Cajetan's aim was not to elaborate a "Thomist doctrine of analogy"? Hochschild's "new paradigm" for parsing Cajetan makes this observation redundant, of course, yet we shall see how the concern of Gilson (and others) to highlight the role of *judgment* will re-emerge in Cajetan's semantic analysis in use, as Hochschild elaborates it. Ralph McInerny's recurrent studies (1968, 1986, 1996) on analogy prove to be at the root of the bulk of criticism of Cajetan, as he "argues that Cajetan allowed metaphysical considerations to intrude on his analysis of analogy" (39), yet Hochschild reminds us that such criticism "still assumes that Cajetan in fact intended, but only failed to execute, a logical analysis of analogy" (38). After forty years, I can trace my own lack of sympathy for Cajetan's mode of analysis to an antipathy to baroque commentary, as well as a lack of patience with abstract semantic analysis, which only enhances my appreciation of Hochschild's careful re-reading of this and other extensive works of Cajetan, to elicit their original intent. Moreover, anyone who has struggled with baroque Latin texts will second my accolade. But let us move forward along the pathways of the author's "new paradigm."

In four dense expository chapters constituting half of the work, we are presented with Cajetan's tortuous route to articulating a concept with sufficient unity to respond to Scotus's challenge. Part of what makes it tortuous is the Scotist penchant for *concepts*, which guides Cajetan's semantic analysis, "insofar as a concept seems to be, by its nature, univocal." Yet such "worries about the limits of semantic analysis [allow us to] discern two distinct conditions of any acceptable analysis of analogy: [that it] should not dissolve analogy into univocity, nor should it be circular (or lead to an infinite regress)" (134). The second is obvious, while the first identifies that penchant for univocity which invariably leads contemporary philosophers to seek a "univocal core" in disparate analogical uses—reflecting their Scotist concerns. Cajetan's analysis meets both conditions, we are told, by introducing the "notion of proportional unity to explain the semantics of a mean between univocation and equivocation" (136). At this point Hochschild employs Cajetan's technical language to endorse the statement that this notion of *proportional unity* "explain[s] how two concepts can be the same *secundum quid* in some way other than occurs

in the *pros hen* equivocation that is the analogy of attribution" (136). For the *judgment* which Gilson identified (and others have endorsed) as axial to analogical uses of language is indispensable if analogies that involve recourse to a paradigmatic sense (*pros hen equivocation*) are to have any bite. Yet by way of showing *judgment* to be indispensable to *proportional unity* as well, Hochschild insists "that Cajetan was not attempting to give an account of proportional unity; indeed, it is quite clear that he assumes our ability to recognize proportional unity." For "even if proportional unity is a respectable object of metaphysical attention, it is still difficult to give conditions for recognizing it" (137). Yet if we can recognize it, proportional unity cannot simply be denied. If the absence of an account makes "it reasonable at this point to ask what extent Cajetan's theory could be expected to satisfy a Scotist" (138), "Cajetan's response . . . confirms [that] the Scotist simply refuses to recognize something that is, in fact, real: proportional sameness, analogical unity" (139).

So *use* will be the test, as the author delineates what Cajetan calls "resolution": "the mind's capacity to give attention to the proportional unity of necessarily diverse *rationes* . . . [yet] this attention must be accompanied by awareness of the necessary diversity of the analogates—otherwise, the analogue would collapse into a univocal *ratio*, absolutely one. And since the analogous *ratio* so 'resolved' is not absolutely one, it necessarily includes an order of priority" (159). It seems that using Cajetan's concepts involving "proportional unity" will require some mode of "analogy of attribution." Again, "although a term analogous by proportionality can, like a univocal term, serve in scientific reasoning without causing the fallacy of equivocation, still its proportionality must be kept in mind, and it must not be treated as if it were a univocal term" (165). What can so acute an *awareness* or *keeping in mind* be but an exercise of judgment? Hochschild concludes that "*rationes* proportionally one are unified enough to preserve the validity of inferences" and so satisfy Scotus's demand, yet as we have seen, their use will require astute judgment, thereby corroborating the author's reminder that a semantic analysis of analogy is necessary yet not sufficient; more is required for actual use, including especially that "priority and posteriority" associated with analogy of attribution (170). This is further emphasized in the conclusion of this remarkable study:

Cajetan's analysis of what a proportionally unified concept entails for the rest of logic confirms the importance of context, and the necessary role of judgment, in the use and interpretation of analogical terms. Cajetan, apparently unlike some of his contemporaries, does not hold

that words have fixed semantic properties independently of their role in sentences; rather they must understood and analyzed in light of propositional and inferential context (175).

What better response to Scotus and Scotists? Is this not how we always use analogous terms (which are unavoidable) in reasoning? We are aware of the sense in which this term is being employed in this context, and so make adjustment for it. That is, we conclude only what we can; univocity seems to be the exception in most argumentation other than the strictly formal. Judgment will be called for throughout ordinary discourse.

Finally, however Cajetan may relate to Aquinas, Hochschild seems utterly in line with his use of analogy, given these reflections. A test case may be found in Aquinas's last article "on naming God" in the *Summa theologiae*, where he poses the decisive question: whether "affirmative propositions can be formed about God?" (*ST* I, q. 13, a. 12). In his concluding response, we read:

as considered in Himself, God is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of ideas; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.

Not easy reading, and presupposing much unsaid, but the gist of it is that we can realize when our terms do not match their subject, and in that realization sense the gap between our statement and what it states, for as Aquinas notes, we can at best imperfectly signify divine things. That means we will get it wrong much of the time, which is where self-correcting judgment will ever be called for. Cajetan's "proportionally unified concept" gestures in that direction, but the test will always be our use of them. As the author nicely puts it, Cajetan's deft analysis "has the advantage of respecting and confirming the limits of semantic analysis" (174). N V

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