

Book Reviews

Benedict XVI: A Life. Volume 2, Professor and Prefect to Pope and Pope Emeritus 1966–The Present by Peter Seewald, translated by Dinah Livingstone (*London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2021*), viii + 568 pp.

WHAT BETTER WAY TO SPEND Pope Benedict XVI's ninety-fifth birthday (which turned out to be his last) than by visiting his birth house in Marktl am Inn at his *birth minute*—4.15 AM! In addition to five Finnish pilgrims, twenty or so local grandmas and grandpas attended the now-traditional early morning prayer, which this year fell on Holy Saturday, the very liturgical day on which Joseph Ratzinger was born and baptized. Other destinations on a do-it-yourself Ratzinger pilgrimage included Freising (studies and ordination), Regensburg (professorial years), Altötting (favorite Marian sanctuary), childhood villages and towns (Tittmoning, Aschau am Inn, Hufschlag, Traunstein), and of course Munich (seminary and episcopal years), with beer, good food, and *Apfelstrudel* at the *Augustiner Klosterwirt*.

Such a trip is highly recommended, even though there were *no* Ratzinger books in the “Theology” section of University of Regensburg's bookshop, reflecting his *persona non grata* status in German academia. In Altötting, however, Peter Seewald's magnificent biography was on offer, as well as icon-like pictures of Pope Benedict and candles with his image on them—good for both admirers and critics!

In English, Seewald's biography is divided into two volumes (for my review of volume 1, see *Nova et Vetera* [English] 20, no. 3), the second one comprising three parts: (1) professor, (2) prefect, and (3) Pope. The book was certainly worth the wait and does not disappoint: the research and analysis are excellent, the style is enjoyable, and interesting new details are revealed, such as the “endless outbursts of crying” and “violent quarrels with cardinals” of “popess” (as the housekeeper was called in the curia) Ingrid Stampa, who “kept Ratzinger's diary, edited official speeches and even decided who could meet the Holy Father” (351).

As a journalist, Seewald is especially strong on the German press coverage

of Ratzinger. During his time as archbishop of Munich, “Ratzinger took part so frequently in the public debate that the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* feared that it would be a ‘big shock’ for millions of Upper Bavarian Catholics if his name did not appear in any edition of the four Munich daily papers” (109). Ratzinger’s predominantly negative media image seems to stem to a great extent from the actions of Hans Küng. Asked about the cancellation of Küng’s *missio canonica* at a youth event in 1979, Ratzinger said off the cuff that it was right, since Küng was actively disputing essential doctrines of the Catholic Church (128). The comments were published without authorization, which led to Küng accusing Ratzinger of “falling back on pre-conciliar customs of heresy-hunting, insinuation and defamation” (129). After the publication of Vittorio Messori’s *The Ratzinger Report* in 1985, Küng “crashed in with a sweeping blow in the Hamburg weekly *Die Zeit*” (170), not failing to bring up his “litany of complaints: the ‘case of Galileo,’ the ‘Chinese rites controversy,’ ‘putting all the most important European thinkers on the Index (Descartes, Kant, Sartre etc.),’ ‘9 million victims of witch trials’” (171). According to Seewald, this momentous article, ending with the claim that Ratzinger was “afraid of the truth more than anything else,” provided the endlessly reproduced media image of the prefect.

Seewald singles out the *Bild* journalist Andreas Englisch as a striking example of the kind of deliberate manipulation typical of so-called expert reporters. After Benedict XVI’s election, Englisch admitted with apparent remorse that, in previous reporting, in order to make John Paul II’s “light shine more brightly,” he had “needed an enemy to make the story more dramatic” (192). Seewald continues: “However, Englisch had no scruples about later applying his business model to books about Pope Francis, whom he raised almost to heaven, in order finally to shove the retired Benedict XVI down to hell” (192). Another Hamburg-based newspaper, *Der Spiegel*, ran a whole series of unfavorable cover stories on Pope Benedict—“The Unworldly One” (2005), “The Remote One” (2009), “The Infallible One” (2010), “The Incurable One” (2011), and “The Exhausted One” (2012)—“as if it was a matter of killing off a dangerous wild beast” (290). But when one of the writers, Alexander Smolczyk, actually took the time to read the encyclical *Deus Caritas Est* and to listen to Benedict’s speeches, irritation turned to interest, and he changed his mind: “This pope has got something. He can’t be simply dismissed with the usual suspicions” (290).

An even more spectacular success was the conversion of the British media during Benedict XVI’s apostolic journey to England in 2010. Having “fretted and fumed as usual” before the visit, and despite protests led by the famous atheist Richard Dawkins (who had suggested the Pope should be arrested

on arrival), the press finally turned around (442). “Britain learned to love the pope,” the *Sunday Times* wrote in an article titled “Rottweiler? No, he’s a holy granddad,” though the biography retranslates this from the German as “saintly grandfather” (443).

As an aside, such tiny mistakes in the book are relatively insignificant, though the translator and editors should have double-checked the established English for “hermeneutics of break” (44), which should be “of rupture,” and “Faith and Church Constitution” (85), which should be “Faith and Order.” The official English title of *Redemptor Hominis* is *The Redeemer of Man* (not “Humanity”), and the original of John Paul II’s *Theology of the Body* was of course not in German (212). The *Joint Statement on the Doctrine of Justification* should be the *Joint Declaration* (436), and finally, the correct translation of *Benedikts Kreuzzug* is “Benedict’s Crusade,” not “Benedict’s Way of the Cross” (448), though with the Williamson affair (380–89), abuse scandal (414–32), and Vatileaks (470–86), a book with the latter title could doubtless also be written.

Returning to Ratzinger/Benedict’s oft-forgotten successes, the following books should be mentioned. Ratzinger’s 1968 *Introduction to Christianity* reached its tenth reprint in a few months and has since become a classic read by millions around the world in “seemingly unending editions” (41). Another sensation that has reached millions was the 1985 *The Ratzinger Report*, whose original Italian edition of seventy thousand copies sold out in a few weeks (173). Similar success was seen with Seewald’s first interview book from 1996, *The Salt of the Earth*, which was translated to over thirty languages (224). Most importantly, the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, coordinated by Ratzinger and published in 1992, sold more than half a million copies in three weeks and finally reached a figure of over eight million, making it—in the words of John Paul II—one of the “most important events in recent church history” (210).

From the time of Benedict’s pontificate, special attention should be given to his 2006 encyclical *Deus Caritas Est*, which made even *Der Spiegel* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* enthusiastic. Seewald comments: “The dogmatist had amazed his public and confounded all negative expectations” (353). Furthermore, the 2007 book *Jesus of Nazareth* was “the largest ever first edition of a religious book” in German (one hundred and fifty thousand copies). It sold more than three million worldwide (369). Burkhardt Menke, editor and publisher of over eighty of Ratzinger’s books at Herder, said the Pope worked like a “Catholic Lutheran” (365): “Like Luther, he put the reality of God’s relationship [*sic*; i.e. relationship with God] at the centre” (366). In a similar vein, Heinz Joachim Fischer wrote: “Since

Martin Luther no German figure has made such an impact on the Catholic Church as Joseph Ratzinger" (194). For his part, pastor Jans-Martin Kruse from Rome's Lutheran *Kristuskirche* called Benedict "a model for Lutherans," and at the end of the pontificate, Free Church pastor Rolf Schwärzel wrote: "Quite a few orthodox believing Protestants, Lutherans, Evangelical Christians and representatives of confessing communities respect Benedict highly for his witness to Christ, which they themselves could subscribe to word for word" (519).

Another clear strength of Seewald's biography is the use of material from personal interviews with the Pope, some of which have never been published before. In this volume, we learn that the student rebellion in Tübingen in 1968 was emphatically *not* a "trauma" for Ratzinger and that he never had difficulties with his students (33). Moreover, contrary to rumors, Ratzinger and Karl Rahner did not remain unreconciled until the latter's death, but "remained in contact" (126). There are also enjoyable everyday details to satisfy the curious. We are told that Ratzinger's monthly salary was ten thousand marks (about five thousand U.S. dollars) as archbishop of Munich, but less than half of that as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in Rome (155). In 1991, Ratzinger suffered two strokes and begged John Paul II to let him retire: "But he said 'No, no, no, that won't do'" (210). Moving into the apostolic palace after John Paul II, Benedict XVI ordered a thorough renovation, especially removing the worn-out carpets: "A floor is a floor and a carpet is a carpet. . . . There was not even a guest toilet" (293).

At the end of the book, there is an afterword which includes new questions put to the Pope Emeritus in late 2018, many of which he preferred not to answer in order to avoid "interfering in the work of the present pope" (533). However, we are informed that his inaugural sermon's petition "Pray for me that I don't flee in terror from the wolves" referred to "ostensibly humanist ideologies" which declare "socially excommunicated" anyone opposing "homosexual marriage" (534). Benedict also further explained and defended the idea of "Pope Emeritus" (536–37), comparing it to the custom of Bavarian peasants to hand their farmhouses on to the next generation. "This means that the spiritual side of being a father endures, whereas the rights and duties change. . . . I am extremely grateful to the Lord that Pope Francis's warm and generous attitude towards me has made it possible to implement this idea in practice" (537). The last words of the book deal a well-deserved blow to those fans of Benedict—and Catholic social media are full of them—who act on their inclination to criticize and ridicule Pope Francis at every opportunity: "As you know, my personal friendship with Pope Francis has not just continued but grown stronger" (539). Think

about that for a moment. Insulting Pope Francis is insulting a dear friend of Pope Benedict.

To conclude, let us go back to 1977. Joseph Ratzinger wrote to his friend Siegfried Wiedenhofer: “I have something dreadful to tell you, something awful has happened. I have been appointed as bishop of Munich. And I have accepted” (98). Seewald asked Ratzinger whether this was the “end of your personal happiness and all your dreams,” And “the pope’s voice expressed a melancholy resignation as he answered: ‘You could say that. Yes’” (99). To mark the transition, Ratzinger took for his episcopal coat of arms the Moor and bear symbols from the thousand-year-old tradition of the bishops of Freising. The Moor symbolized for him “the universality of the church,” while the bear, in the story of St. Corbinian, is a “beast of burden” which, having killed the saint’s horse, is forced to carry his things all the way to Rome, and Ratzinger connected this with St. Augustine’s interpretation of Psalm 73, where Augustine sees himself as a “beast of burden,” the burden being the episcopal office (104). And indeed, though not foreseen at this point, Ratzinger would carry that burden all the way to Rome. But before that, as the newly elected archbishop of one of the most influential sees in Europe, Ratzinger got to move into the Holnstein Palace, furnished with Baroque statues and Rococo furniture. He left the apartment as it was, except for one thing. “The only new thing was the teddy bear from his childhood, who sat in his own chair in the bedroom” (105).

Now, need I explain why after “Ratzinger and reindeer” (which was small but a success), the next Helsinki Ratzinger conference in 2024 is nicknamed “Benedict and bears”? (See benedictandbears.wordpress.com for updates!) Peter Seewald has preliminarily accepted to speak. But in any case, read the brilliant biography. 

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The Light That Binds: A Study in Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of Natural Law by Stephen L. Brock (*Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2020*), xv + 277 pp.

FR. STEPHEN L. BROCK IS ARGUABLY one of the most important contemporary contributors to the Thomistic understanding of natural law. Hence, the publication of his updated and revised doctoral dissertation on the topic

of the metaphysics of natural law in St. Thomas will be gladly received by Thomistic scholars and moral theorists alike. In *The Light That Binds*, Brock's central task is to explain the metaphysics of the promulgation of natural law in man. Put differently, although extant literature on natural law may be useful for action analysis—why lying is always wrong, say—less attention has been paid to the way in which natural law has been promulgated by God and is present in the human intellect. What literature is available, either as an explanation of St. Thomas or as criticism of the same, has failed to do Aquinas justice, so Brock argues.

The book comprises seven chapters and an introduction. In the first chapter, Brock's central goal is to survey the ways in which (especially more recent) commentators of Aquinas have distorted the sense in which natural law constitutes genuine law, as well as the relationship between natural law and God. For, there is a line of thought on natural law, particularly prominent in the "new natural law" tradition, according to which the principles at the heart of the theory do not fully satisfy the four criteria of legitimate law given by Aquinas. Rival views have natural law constituting a real law, but in virtue of an epistemically explicit reliance on God as lawgiver, among other distortions. Figureheads surveyed in the chapter include Dom Odon Lottin, Ernest Fortin, and Francisco Suárez, among others.

In the second chapter, Brock outlines and defends his positive view regarding the legal status of the natural law by way of continued discussion of Lottin, particularly Lottin's contention that St. Thomas was heavily influenced by a mid-thirteenth-century Franciscan tract, *De legibus et praeceptis*. Brock argues that St. Thomas conceives of natural law as having an even closer relationship to eternal law than is posited by the earlier Franciscan tract, and the rest of the chapter is largely focused on unpacking this close relationship. In sum, natural law is law because it involves a rational ordering by God of our intellect to the goods of our nature, a human participation in an eternal ordering of all things to their ends (i.e., the eternal law). We need not discover the source of the ordering—namely, God—in grasping the first principles of his ordering, as Brock explains here and elsewhere. But the strictly legal status of the principles requires that natural law comes from a legitimate authority, among other essential elements.

Chapters 3 and 4 tackle the more human side of the metaphysics of natural law. More concretely, in these chapters, Brock explains the wheres and the whats of our possession of the natural law. For, not all ordering of objects to ends implies the sort of normativity we see in the natural law. Brute animals, among others, have natural inclinations too, and yet they are not governed through these instinctual drives by a natural law. Natural law

is present preeminently in the human intellect, Brock argues, and is not to be confused with the prerational drives that we share as part of our animal nature. God instills these rational drives—the light, as it were—into reason in such a way that an individual can grasp its force autonomously, as basic conceptional truths about what right and wrong consist in (72). Here it would have been nice for Brock to reflect briefly on how Aquinas's views on moral knowledge fit within his broader epistemological commitments, as the natural (conceptual) knowledge of right and wrong at first glance shares common ground with the Franciscan tradition on divine illumination as found in figures such as St Bonaventure. Elsewhere Brock drops hints of how this harmonization of Aquinas's epistemology might be done, in discussing how the goods to which we are inclined by the divine light naturally elicit a sort of response from us (131, cf. 169), namely an intellectual inclination to see these objects or ends as goods to which we are properly ordered. Although we appear to have divinely instilled innate knowledge regarding goodness, for Aquinas, the manifestation of such knowledge may require prior knowledge and consideration of the physical world, particularly related to the ends of our nature. Still, it appears that, in the case of moral knowledge, what God has instilled into the intellect is what grounds the knowledge that these ends are good. This may be a necessary corollary of the attributive nature of goodness, yet I find myself wanting to read more on this point, though it is understandable—given the focus of the book—that Brock omits a more thorough analysis.

The discussion of moral knowledge also includes a rather important suggestion of normative significance worth flagging: “The inclinations of the powers toward their proper objects (which is by divine ordination) are right, but they are right *because* the objects are good, and if reason judges them to be right, it is in light of its understanding that the objects are good” (131; emphasis original). Given the context of this discussion, Brock may not intend normative rather than merely epistemological implications. Still, this seems to suggest a sort of Thomistic consequentialism, such that the destination is of greater moral weight than the journey, so to speak. To use an example, one reason why we might judge an idealized form of in vitro fertilization (IVF), one that does not involve the unnecessary conception of multiple embryos or a sin against nature, to be wrong is that it subverts the drives of human nature such that the end is achieved circuitously, abandoning the natural powers and being achieved by artificial means. The satisfaction of the power is *prima facie* a more fundamental good than the achievement of the end to which it aims, and disconnecting an end's achievement from the power oriented toward its attainment might plausibly be seen

as dehumanizing for the agents whose powers are circumvented. (Never mind, of course, the dehumanizing aspects of a person being conceived in an artificial way.) In other words, when conception is an achievement of our nature, an end achieved through the natural function of our powers, that intuitively appears to be of a primary moral significance. Hence, powers should be supplemented but not subverted, even if the good end is the same. At first glance, Brock's statement implies that, as the end is the same in both idealized IVF and conjugal relations (namely, conception), they should have an equal share in the goodness conferred by the common good end.

The underlying principle at odds with Brock's suggestion here has been largely unexplored in the literature on the natural law. One might posit "orientationist" alternatives that ground the goodness of our powers' natural expressions not so much in the achievements toward which they are aimed, but in the propriety of a power ordered to its intrinsic end. On such an account, the ends to which our powers naturally strive partially explain what the natural function is but do not play (at least an exclusive) role in conferring onto that proper orientation its goodness. In other words, a rival account might be sketched according to which ends play more descriptive than prescriptive roles, and such a view may have an easier time explaining some intuitions, such as that about IVF above. Brock's suggestion regarding the primacy of the ends in explaining the goodness of our actions, if I understand it, is interesting and provocative. I hope it may stimulate ongoing discussions among theorists of natural law, as both alternatives have *prima facie* merit.

In the fifth chapter, Brock explains how Thomas grounds the intellectually apprehended goods in human nature, such that practical reason apprehends the goods as goods for us as human beings. Hence, knowledge of human nature forms part of the known norms of natural law, a point that is important to bring out in contrast to the new natural law tradition, which eschews (descriptive) metaphysical considerations from relevance in the normative realm. Throughout the book, Brock engages the Humean considerations that motivate the alternative moral grounding and rejection of the classical theory characteristic of the new natural law.

The remaining two chapters detail how it is that this light, revealed to us in the inclinations of our nature, bind us with the force of law without requiring the immediate apprehension (or judgment) that they arise from a divine lawgiver. As a law, the precepts of natural law carry with them a natural sanction—namely, remorse of conscience. Brock's discussion of such remorse is particularly interesting, for it is this side of the conscience which fits closely with the contemporary notions and discussions of conscience as

a sort of inner tribunal (following Immanuel Kant) or personal judge (for, e.g., Joseph Butler and John Henry Newman) of one's actions. Brock argues that, for St. Thomas, this subjective phenomena of (painful) felt guilt is "the punishment proper to natural law"—it is not the only punishment, but it is natural law's "immediate and connatural sanction" (207, 212). In this way, Brock does the Thomistic tradition a service by faithfully extending St. Thomas's more cerebral discussion of conscience to the commonplace subjective elements that have preeminence today, showing how the metaphysics at work in Aquinas can make deep sense of what is otherwise treated as nearly a brute fact about moral psychology. The universality of this phenomena is closely connected with the universality of the law itself, and in the last chapter, Brock tackles this topic in relation to the special revelation contained in the Decalogue. In due course, Brock also situates his read of Aquinas in the context of reads from G. E. M. Anscombe and Peter Geach, among others.

The Light That Binds must be considered a central text for those seeking deep understanding of Thomas's theory of natural law. Although the subtitle refers to a metaphysical analysis, this should not put readers off; the text does not contain weighty hylomorphism or analysis of substances. Brock offers a unified account of what natural law is, considered not so much through the lens of normative theory as through that of metaethics. Although Brock engages a relatively limited number of contemporary scholars, the exposition of St. Thomas on the points in question has intrinsic, perennial value and is a necessary addition to the collections of those working in natural law. Brock is to be commended for his insights and contribution. N.V

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Origen and Prophecy: Fate, Authority, Allegory, and the Structure of Scripture by Claire Hall (*Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021*), 195 pp.

ORIGEN'S (AD 185–255) SURVIVING CORPUS is studied by scholars across the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and classics. Drawing from each of these fields, in *Origen and Prophecy*, Clare Hall applies Origen's self-proposed tripartite exegesis of Scripture, in which verses can be read at a "somatic, psychic, or pneumatic level," to his conceptualization of prophecy

(193). Hall's argument examines the "landscape of pagan, Jewish, and early Christian religiosity" and considers the "whole range of Origen's corpus" in relation to "wider structures and themes in his work" (4, 25). In doing so, Hall presents a compelling analysis embedding Origen's system of exegesis and theology of prophecy within the intellectual history of prophecy in the late classical and early Christian world.

In her first few chapters, Hall explores Origen's definitions of prophecy in relation to its Jewish and Greco-Roman influences and his system of scriptural exegesis. Hall remains cognizant of terminology used by classical authors as she describes Origen's word choice, noting, for instance, that he varies his language most when the prophetic validity of the author is in question (9–12). She summarizes Greek, Roman, and Jewish conceptualizations of prophecy, then turns to Scripture and early Christian texts, all of which shape Origen's own "notions of wisdom, knowledge, and prophecy" (20, 29). Hall argues that Origen's *On First Principles* and homilies on Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers are underlaid by a coherent exegetical system. Further, she explains, Origen's *Commentary on the Song of Songs* applies this same system to other forms of knowledge, including prophecy, which has a future-telling sense, a moral sense, and a mystical and revelatory sense (27, 50, 39–45). In her analysis, Hall provides insight into the philosophical and theological foundations for the "revelatory potential of allegory" as understood by Origen and other early Christian authors and carefully distinguishes Origen's own beliefs from the tenets of Origenism (30–31). To strengthen her argument, Hall cites a plethora of secondary scholars on Origen, including Caroline Bammel, Gunnar af Hällström, Robert Hauck, and Ilaria Ramelli (18–25).

In her next few chapters, Hall unfolds Origen's system of distinguishing between true and false prophets and his advocacy for the unity of prophecy within Scripture in his response to Marcionism (199, 149–52). Chief among Hall's insightful contributions, however, is her treatment of the complex interrelation of prophecy and human autonomy: within Origen's framework, how does providential foreknowledge permit human free choice? To approach an answer, Hall traces the emerging conception of free will as "freedom of decision" among Greek authors such as Aristotle, Chrysippus and the Stoics, the Platonists, the Epicureans, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, who, she argues, laid the groundwork for Origen's "innovative narrative understanding of free will" in the context of "epistemological considerations surrounding prophecy" (55–71, 75). These sections of her book present a striking glimpse into early Christian departure from the Greek classical tradition, and her exploration of Origen's defense of both free will and

divine foreknowledge opens the door to further research on his theology of conversion and the relation between grace and nature (75–85, 91).

While the entirety of her work is thought-provoking, some elements of Hall's presentation of Origen's theology may be open to a critical response by patristic scholars. Throughout her work, Hall consistently characterizes Origen's spiritual readings of Scripture—and prophecy—in direct opposition to its literal readings. For instance, she writes that, for Origen, just as “some verses do not have a somatic reading and cannot be taken literally,” some prophecies are intended to be read as “stumbling blocks or riddles for the exegete to ponder,” rather than accurate or “coherent” predictions of the future (193, 53). Additionally, Hall ties Origen's insights on prophecy in the Old Testament to his depiction of Christ as the “ultimate content of all somatic, psychic, and pneumatic prophecy” (190). In doing so, she states that Origen held Christ's bodily Incarnation as “equivalent” to the Logos's incarnation in Scripture: “Origen understands scripture as directly analogous and even equivalent to the incarnate Christ—that is to say, in the same way in which Christ is incarnate in a human body in the world, so too is Christ incarnate in the ‘flesh’ of scripture” (183). Her thought-provoking analysis, carefully grounded in an examination of classical and late-antique tradition, is certain to engage readers and inspire further research into early Christian conceptions of knowledge, prophecy, exegesis, human autonomy, Christology, and soteriology. NEV

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Cross and Creation: A Theological Introduction to Origen of Alexandria
by Mark E. Therrien (*Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2022*), xxii + 303 pp.

ALTHOUGH ORIGEN OF ALEXANDRIA HAS been misrepresented and maligned since his own lifetime, allies have always arisen to defend him in his stead. Especially after the French Catholic reappraisal of Origen's theology in the twentieth century, the once-dominant interpretation of Origen as a Platonist dressed in Christian garb no longer holds sway among most scholars. As Mark Therrien notes, however, traces of a “metaphysical reductionist” interpretation of Origen, propounded most notably by Adolf

von Harnack, still influences Origenian scholarship (89). Therrien's book vigorously opposes this line of interpretation and provides a rereading of crucial passages in Origen's *On First Principles* (*Peri archōn*) and his *Commentary on John*. In addition to presenting a fresh interpretation of these texts, Therrien also offers an introduction for those who are encountering Origen's theology for the first time. Rather than prefacing with biographical remarks, this book dives straight into Origen's major theological texts, allowing the reader, as Henri de Lubac put it, "to see Origen at work."

Therrien operates under the principle that Origen is above all a biblical theologian whose speculation is driven primarily by his commitment to exegesis rather than Platonic presuppositions. Thus, his reading of various controversial excerpts of Origen, particularly from the *Peri archōn*, pays close attention to the biblical verses that Origen cites, which operate not as mere ornamentation but as the indispensable mechanics of his theology.

This book is divided into eight chapters, each of which presents a "fundamental pillar" of Origen's thought: God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, eschatology, the soul, the world, the Cross, and deification. Drawing attention to the first two cycles that comprise Origen's *Peri archōn*, Therrien treats the first cycle as authoritative to Origen's system, since it is here that Origen presents the Church's teaching in a more dogmatic form prior to the zetetic approach of the second cycle. Chapter 1 highlights the anti-Valentinian polemic that contextualizes Origen's account of divine incorporeality and the possibility of genuine knowledge of God. Following the insights of Cyril O'Regan, Therrien notes that an extreme apophaticism led the Valentinian Gnostics to "assimilat[e] God to creaturely categories," as seen in their account of various deities emanating from God as if by a material transfer of substance (36). For Origen, only the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are absolutely incorporeal, and it is their absolute incorporeality that separates the Trinity from all creatures. Despite this fundamental distinction between the Trinity and creation, Origen affirms that a limited knowledge of God is possible for rational creatures with the caveat that, whenever God is likened analogically to a created reality, the dissimilarity is always greater (38). Therrien contends that, unlike the Gnostics, Origen envisions the material world as the positive and even necessary means for creatures to derive knowledge of God.

Chapter 2 focuses on Origen's Christology, especially the primacy of Christ's title "Wisdom," which the author accounts for by explaining the logic behind Origen's exegesis of John's Prologue and Prov 8:22. Long before the Arian controversy of the fourth century, Origen insisted that God is eternally Father and thus generates the Son from all eternity. Origen has often been characterized, however, as arguing that God's eternal status as Creator

necessarily entails the existence of creation *ab aeterno*. Therrien points out that such a reading conflates Origen's two distinct notions of creation: the foreknown existence of creatures as "sketched and prefigured" in Wisdom from all eternity and the concrete, substantial existence of creatures that begins in time (60). The investigation of Origen's pneumatology in chapter 3 shows how Ps 103 (in the Septuagint) informs Origen's notion of the Holy Spirit as Creator. For Origen, creation is not simply a past event, but is instead a dynamic process: "Created beings must, so to speak, achieve what they are through a process of growth" (79–80). By looking through the lens of eschatology, what creatures ought to be as sanctified participants in divinity, one sees that Origen's understanding of the Holy Spirit's activity of sanctification is integral to the act of creation. Thus, contrary to the claim that Origen understands the work of the Holy Spirit exclusively in terms of sanctification rather than in creation, Origen's considers the Holy Spirit to be Creator precisely as Sanctifier.

Chapters 4 and 5 reassess critical passages from the *Peri archōn* that are often categorized as references to the soul's preexistence and putative fall into embodiment, notions that many have taken as *the* governing notion for Origen's theology as a whole and his evaluation of the material world in particular. While Therrien concedes that Origen postulates the soul's existence and sin before birth into this world, he argues that this notion served only as a hypothesis for Origen and that its importance to Origen's theological system is too often overstated. Instead, the author asserts one of his central theses, namely, that eschatology rather than protology is at the heart of Origen's theology. According to this reading, Origen's maxim "the end is like the beginning" should be understood as, "the end determines the beginning" (112).

Perhaps in an effort to correct the perceived exaggerations of opposing accounts of Origen's thought, Therrien does not examine the anti-Gnostic polemic that drove Origen to posit preexistence or antecedent merits as part of his theodicy, which harmonizes the disparate conditions of rational creatures with the justice and goodness of the Creator. Nevertheless, Therrien's corrective reorients the interpretation of passages such as *Peri archōn* 2.8.3, which are otherwise liable to be read exclusively in terms of a primordial fall. The author here identifies an easily missed yet crucial distinction between Origen's non-evaluative, synonymous usage of "mind" or "soul" to refer to ontological categories and the Pauline usage of "psychic" or "soul-ish" (*psychikos*) to indicate an existential state in opposition to the spiritual (*pneumatikos*). These chapters further develop a second major thesis that runs throughout this book: for Origen materiality per se is integral to the

constitution of all creatures and will not be dispensed with in the eschaton. Against the metaphysical reductionist reading, Therrien argues that Origen's view of eschatological unity is both fundamentally ecclesiological and deeply Pauline, wherein the unity and diversity of individuals coexist as members of one body with one head: Jesus Christ. In chapter 6, Therrien wrestles with Origen's discussion of the "casting-down" of the world (*katabolē kosmou*) in *Peri archōn* 3.5.4, arguing that "there is perhaps no text in Origen's corpus that seems to validate the metaphysical reductionist interpretation more than this one" (145). Attending to the unique New Testament usage of *katabolē* ("creation"; "casting-down"), Therrien argues that Origen's primary focus is on the existential condition of attachment to sin rather than on cosmological speculation, although he notes that *Peri archōn* 3.5.4 "makes several comments that clearly refer to preexistence" (171). Yet, Origen believes that the world in which humans find themselves is one of combat with demonic powers. Humans are delivered from subjection to this world not by a flight from corporeality, which would be impossible for creatures—but by participation in the Cross (see 179).

Chapters 7 and 8 highlight one of the most neglected, yet one of the most pivotal aspects of Origen's thought: salvation through the Cross and its relevance for human deification. In these two chapters lies the core of Therrien's reconstruction of Origen's Christology, which is grounded in the foregoing discussion on the eschatological status of matter and individuality. Since Christ is the archetype of all humans, the assumption and preservation of his human body and soul within the divine life indicates the eschatological integrity of redeemed and deified humankind. The redemption of humans, and even the final reconciliation of all creatures to God (Origen's famous notion of *apokatastasis*), does not occur by metaphysical necessity, but by the free decision of creatures to share in Christ's obedience to the Father. For Origen, the love of Christ for humans manifested on the Cross is a revelation of the Father's *philanthropia*, the love which the Father not only *has* but indeed *is*. Since Origen conceives of deification as nearly synonymous with the contemplation of the Father, the Cross, as the supreme revelation of the Father's *philanthropia*, is the source of deification for those who place it at the center of their life and thought.

Like all excellent scholarship, Therrien's book inspires its readers to "return to the sources" and take up Origen's *On First Principles* and *Commentary on John* afresh. Therrien's book is a well-defended portrayal of Origen as a biblical theologian and, above all, as a witness to the Christian faith. Although this book is subtitled as an introduction to Origen's theology, Therrien's careful reading of Origen in conversation with secondary

scholarship will also be of great value to scholars and students of patristic theology. At the same time, Therrien's direct and clear manner of conveying complex theological themes renders this book an ideal introduction to two of Origen's most daunting and yet most rewarding texts. The reader who navigates these two major works of Origen with Therrien as a guide will gain a firm vantage point from which the whole of Origen's writings can be engaged. N.V.

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The Achievement of David Novak: A Catholic–Jewish Dialogue, edited by Matthew Levering and Tom Angier (*Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2021*), 360 pp.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF DAVID NOVAK: A Catholic–Jewish Dialogue, edited by Matthew Levering and Tom Angier, brings together twelve essays on various aspects of Novak's thought along with a response to each essay by Novak himself. The topics themselves concern whether Jews and Christians worship the same God, suicide, natural law, Pope Pius IX, justice, the sanctity of human life, and supersessionism. Its contributors include senior scholars as well as those at the beginning of their careers. Each essay, arising from some aspect of Novak's vast corpus, is replied to by Novak himself. These replies are instructive, for they show a great teacher at work, responding with nuance and charity to criticisms and always moving the conversation forward in illuminative ways.

Levering opens the volume with a contribution about Novak as a master of Jewish–Christian dialogue, indeed, “the greatest master of Jewish–Christian dialogue who has ever lived” (1). Levering highlights the intellectual pedigree of Novak, whose teachers included Abraham Joshua Heschel, Leo Strauss, Yves Simon, Louis Dupré, and Germain Grisez. Jews are called to live according to the revelation to which they are accountable. Christians are called to live according to the revelation to which they are accountable. Neither Jews nor Christians should hold the other group accountable for their distinctive revelation, but neither Jews nor Christians should hide or minimize what they have to offer to the other.

Princeton's Robert P. George interviews Novak, revealing something of the origin story shaping decades of dialogue between the rabbi and

Catholic interlocutors, perhaps the most influential of which was Germain Grisez, Novak's dissertation director in the early 1970s at Georgetown University and a colleague in founding the "new natural law" school, along with George's own dissertation director, John Finnis.

Melanie Barrett's essay highlights the importance of natural law, a key theme in Novak's work, for a pluralistic and secular milieu. She cites him saying, "Jews ought to encourage non-Jews to pray in public in order to show how much they believe the world, including the political order, is dependent on God" (48). Such public prayer creates more opportunity also for Jews to express their faith in public.

Invoking Gottlob Frege's distinction between sense and reference, Francis Beckwith tackles the question of whether the Trinitarian God is the same God as the God of Abraham. Cassius Clay and Mohammed Ali have the same reference, though different senses. Like Novak, Beckwith believes Catholics and Jews worship the same God.

John Berkman returns to the subject of much of Novak's early writing, suicide. Berkman's chapter seeks to explore the similarities and differences between Jewish and Catholic views on the topic. Novak's dissertation exploration of Plato's, Aquinas's, and Kant's views was supplemented by his experience working as a rabbi and hospital chaplain at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, DC, a facility that specializes in treating mental illness. One of Aquinas's arguments against suicide is that it is contrary to proper love of self. In his response to Berkman's essay, Novak highlights that the command "to love your neighbor as yourself" could mean "as you love yourself" or "as you yourself are loved by God" (118).

David Elliot, a former student of Novak's, responds to quasi-Marcionite attacks on the manualist tradition by what might be called the "beige moral theologians" of the 1970s. He highlights Novak's insight that "our terror of God's power is mostly sublimated into our reverence for God's wisdom. . . . It should reappear only when we are tempted to stand up against God in contempt rather than standing before him in awe" (134).

Tom Angier, one editor of *The Achievement of David Novak*, treats the difference between a more typically Scholastic approach to natural law grounded in metaphysics and Novak's theologically formulated approach. But Novak replies, "I tried to argue that natural law, in my view, is not derived *from* theological premises, but rather theology gives natural law a more satisfactory ontological status than does philosophy" (161).

Douglas Farrow considers how people of faith, both Jewish and Christian, can challenge the legal and political prominence of an ethics of autonomy and replace it with an ethics of dignity. Novak, in turn, traces the rejection of

traditional religious grounding of public morality back to “the archetypal modern Jewish heretic, the seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza” (177). A natural-law ethic can, however, allow Jews, Christians, and Muslims to be proactive citizens in a “multicultural, democratic society in good faith.”

Rita George-Tvrković examines issues of inter-religious dialogue of Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Should Christians and Jews speak of Mohammed as a prophet? Might he be a prophet in a localized sense that he brought monotheism to the Arabs? Does respect for an individual with a different religious tradition require adopting the language that they use about their tradition?

Matthew Levering, the other editor of *The Achievement of David Novak*, provides a theological and historical examination of the case of Edgardo Mortara, a Jewish child removed from his family following his baptism without his parents' permission. Against some Catholic critics, Levering provides six reasons for considering the actions of Pope Pius IX as both imprudent and objectively unjust. This judgment does not call into question the authority of the papal office. Levering points out, “God has willed to mediate his revelation through the instrumentality of sinful human beings. . . . The followers of Jesus have always been sinners” (215). Nor does the personal holiness of Pope Pius IX mean that he was incapable of enduring lapses in practical judgment. Interestingly, Levering also cites the work of Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, “who points out that Jews, including Jews who convert to Christianity, have been among the prominent advocates of persecution of Jews” (218).

Daniel Philpott's contribution highlights the biblical idea of justice as more than giving to each his due, but rather right relationships and human flourishing. “Justice as due, in its modern forms, includes rights but excludes virtues like generosity, solidarity, mercy, care, and compassion; contrasts retribution sharply with mercy; focus on exterior action, not interior motives; and claims to be public while the other virtues are private. Biblical justice, by contrast, is wider and encompasses more” (244).

Thomas Slabon's chapter considers the relationship between faith and reason, the Jewish inheritance and Greek inheritance highlighted in Novak's Gifford Lectures entitled *Athens and Jerusalem*. “This paper begins by retracing Novak's radical response to Tertullian's dichotomy [What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?]: the relationship is not to be understood as a conflict between reason and revelation but rather between two (sometimes competing) revelations about which philosophy and theology reason” (253). Christ the mediator ends up, in Slabon's reading of Augustine, completing the Platonic project.

Christopher Tollefsen's essay treats possible exceptions to the sanctity of life such as capital punishment, self-defense, and a divine command like the one given to Abraham to take Issac's life. Tollefsen calls into question the claim of Aquinas that the death penalty can be ethically justified because the wrongdoer has lost his dignity in committing capital crime. Tollefsen writes: "If 'dignity' claims are intended to summarily capture certain truths about what it means to have a particular sort of nature, then one can lose one's dignity, if one initially has it, only by losing that nature. But losing one's nature just is ceasing to exist as the sort of thing one must be if one is to exist at all: it is to go out of existence altogether. This thought is impossible to sustain of a criminal who is the abiding subject of the drama of crime, investigation, apprehension, trial, conviction, and punishment, as even Aquinas's language, which refers to 'he' throughout, makes clear" (299).

In the final essay of the volume, Thomas Joseph White, O.P., distinguishes five different versions of supersessionism, some of which Jews and Christians both accept, but others that divide Jewish and Christian thinkers. Certain forms of supersessionism have a relevance that unites Jews and Christians. White writes: "Today Jews and Christians alike face two other forms of non-biblical supersessionism. Each is opposed to the other, in a certain sense, and both are opposed to core elements of Judaism and Christianity. I am referring here on the one hand to Islam and on the other hand to post-Enlightenment secular liberalism" (323).

The Achievement of David Novak: A Catholic–Jewish Dialogue highlights the wide-ranging scope of the rabbi's thought, as well as the insights that can be gleaned when colleagues, even of different religious traditions, speak together in friendship. No one interested in Catholic–Jewish Dialogue should ignore this volume. N·V

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Christian Social Ethics by Elmar Nass (*Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022*), 512 pp.

IN HIS EXTRAORDINARILY COMPREHENSIVE WORK, Elmar Nass, professor for Christian social sciences and societal dialogue at the Academy for Catholic Theology of Cologne, Germany, delivers with what he promises

in the title of this great opus: it is a real guide to Christian social ethics, including both its foundations and numerous fields of current application. Although the book was first published in Germany and some application parts refer rather to specific discussions in the Teutonic area, as the author himself says in the preface, his general intention to provide a “universal socio-ethical basis for argumentation” and the ambitious attempt to “make this work a starting point for globally effective Christian social ethics” (xiv) are fulfilled, as the book undoubtedly speaks to the universal questions of social ethics, while it invites a search for concrete solutions to regional problems by implementing the corresponding criteria and basic principles. Indeed, the original German perspective, in which the growing emphasis on the ultimate authority of human sciences in theology often leads to a Cinderella-like existence of genuine Christian traditions and proposals based on Revelation, may be understood as a productive challenge which incentives Nass’s efforts to re-create a “substantive ethics” that is marginalized in the postmodernity (xviii). However, these efforts are not destined to flow into a kind of restoration or a mere archaeological appreciation of former Catholic propositions. Nass struggles rather for adequate answers corresponding to the present, but answers deeply rooted in the conviction that Christians still have something to say to the world based on their own timeless knowledge.

Hence, it is understandable that, in the short introduction, the author first sets out the postmodern contexts of ethical tasks and, while dealing with secular orientations of the present, calls for an ethics that derives from respective views of humanity and society. For Nass, there is no reason to exclude the religious point of view from this dialogue. On the contrary, his anti-secularist programmatic statement—“Imagine there is a God” (xix)—is both courageous and provocative in a scientific world that forbids theology to give orientations to all the people, with the excuse of alleged lack of universalizability. In doing this, Nass complies with Jesus’s mandate to the disciples to be “leaven” in Matt 13:33 and light and salt of the earth in Matt 5:13 and following (xx). The rationale for addressing and advocating “substantive Christian social ethics” is its rationality and the author’s trust in the “healthy democratic culture of debate” (xx), which is, however, understood in terms of dialogue around common values and positions rather than based on mere rules of secular discourse ethics. The chosen Catholic perspective is thereby situated in an ecumenical context and directed to a real dialogue with other competing ethics, both religious and secular, including the disposition to better understanding of one’s own views. Out of this approach, Nass will propose some applications of Christian principles of social action.

These purposes determine the clear structure of the work, consisting of three main parts, divided in thirteen singular chapters. Part 1 ("The Mission") revives a concept which—at least under this specific term—is almost completely removed from mainstream theological debates in Germany, especially in ethical context. "Christians are in the world, but not of the world" (1)—that is how Nass begins his argumentation in favor of an indispensable missionary calling within Christianity. In my opinion, it is this part of the volume that deserves the most attention, as it expresses a sound, self-confident Christian awareness of being enabled and invited to do something good for the rest of the world, while starting from one's own metaphysical basis. Nass presents Christian social ethics without any inferiority complex, as if it were something to be hidden in the twenty-first-century world or as if Christians were compelled to merely repeat what the secular world permits them to say. Consequently, Nass addresses from a Christian perspective the question of goodness as a presupposition of ethics, (3–9), before he gets to the explicit Christian mission as "sanctification of the world" (11–33), accepting the facticity of ethical plurality in the present but simultaneously exhibiting the Christian answer to social issues as a stringent reasoning which is capable of serving as a moral compass not only for resolving particular dilemmas but also for evaluating alternative models of ethics, starting from a comprehensive view of human dignity that is based on creation. In this context, determined by an inclusive understanding of the call to holiness, Nass reflects on the objectivity of goodness and its foundation in God, while both eschewing a normative relativism and acknowledging that "finding objective truth remains a dynamic process" (20).

Some other basic questions of Christian social ethics follow: humanity, responsibility, values, and social principles (common good, personhood, solidarity, and subsidiarity). All these considerations amount to a normative Christian humanism which is clearly centred on the indestructible human dignity given by God. In the third and the last chapter of part 1, Nass analyzes the possible contributions of other Christian denominations in dealing with social questions based on the Christian message, giving another proof of his strong dialogical approach. The ecumenical obstacles are not denied, but are transcended to some extent on ethical topics. Nass principally sees other confessions as allies in contrasting some attempts to suppress religion in the postmodern world with the Christian mandate to "sanctify the world" (26). Nass names some forms of secular opposition, such as idolization of the market, belief in political discourse in the sense of Jürgen Habermas, absolutized belief in reason in the tradition of the French Revolution, and collectivist societal visions. In a nutshell, "Christians and

Christian ethics deserve a voice, and no apologies should be made even for public declarations of faith," as they open sources of transcendence (55).

In part 2 ("In Dialogue"), Nass uses the common foundations of normative Christian humanism, as identified in part 1, to examine the extent to which Christian social ethics (which relies on these foundations) may cooperate with other models of understanding social issues which originate from non-Christian sources. In particular, he explores the lack of a generally accepted definition of human dignity to be effectively protected by society. Christianity's view of humanity facilitates the identification of violations of human dignity. A special feature of this part of the volume is Nass's courageousness of criticizing other ethical concepts, joined with the positive purpose to affirm what is good in them from the Christian point of view, for "the main aim is to explore the extent to which other religious and secular ethics can justify unconditional human dignity as the basis of social ethics" (60). With this in mind, Nass proceeds to revise a number of pertinent ethical models, guided by the idea of "building relevant bridges" according to the criteria of transcendence and responsibility (61): from Islam, through Judaism and Buddhism, to humanism in Immanuel Kant, Amartya Sen, and Adam Smith. Nass criticizes the different forms of ethics beyond normative humanism, such as "normative relativism, postmodern discourse ethics, and the socio-ethically relevant features of systems theory" (95), which deny the recognizability of an objective truth. In this section, Nass's criticism focuses on the consequences of such approaches, especially in terms of disregarding of the weakest links in the societal chain. This provides useful arguments for Christians concerned with the non-Christian approach to social issues that very often dominate the public discourse, due to their current cultural hegemony. Finally, Nass reflects on the possibility of establishing a world authority to ensure the exercise of unconditional human dignity. He concludes that a normative humanism is needed which would include an objective understanding of human rights to be introduced to "popular sovereign constitutions as a yardstick for their legitimacy by the global authority" (121).

The third and largest part of the book concerns diverse fields of "application" of the socio-ethical principles set out in the previous parts. The most impressive thing is Nass's ability to address a great number of controversial issues. However, this is probably also the place where the author's approach could be most criticized, since scholars will disagree on these controversial topics. Some chapters or sections require more prior knowledge than others (e.g., "Currency," the fourth section in chapter 11, "Economy and Economic Order"), and it could be asked if they go beyond the scope of "a guide to

Christian social ethics.” The specific contents of this part are intended as proposing “Christian orientations” for concrete fields: environmental ethics, social justice, just war (peace), family, work, education, organ donation, death, economic ethics, property system, social market economy, currency, behavioral economic, leadership and organizational culture. This approach leaves a wide scope for further discussion, and the different points of view are summarized at the end of each section under “consequence and compass.” The last small section of part 3 concerns “future issues” and introduces some useful ethical observations for several questions that are becoming more and more relevant today. The most emphasized of them is digitalization, including some dilemmas such as use of humanoid robots in care of elderly people with dementia or telemedicine. Other questions are mentioned only by name (e.g., autonomous weapon systems, demographic development, and the future of social systems).

A particular advantage in the book is the evident but non-excessive presence of Church teaching in its full complexity, including the magisterium of all recent pontificates, without giving the impression of being a mere presentation of the current positions of Catholic Church. The papal teachings support Nass’s guiding idea of a Christian normative humanism.

To sum up, the author demonstrates that he is able “to show a logically stringent path from a good value rationale via the formulation of corresponding values and their compatibility with alternative positions to concrete proposals for solutions that at the same time remain open to dispute” (320). He manages to hold a constructive dialogue with non-Christian normative humanisms based on accurately analyzed commonalities, and not merely on a desire for social harmony. Nass also convinces the reader by his comprehensive knowledge of such different authors as Erasmus of Rotterdam and Habermas. He does not fear to question recognized approaches (e.g., discourse ethics) and to affirm approaches that are currently disregarded (e.g., natural law). He accepts the challenges given to Christian social ethics by a rapidly changing society, always trying to extract good insights from any ethical model while holding firm to his guiding premise: the concept of humanity based on transcendence and the call to holiness. N-V

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Primacy of Christ: The Patristic Patrimony in Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI's Analogy in Theology by Vincent C. Anyama (*Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2021*), xii + 263 pp.

IN THE FAMOUS DISPUTE BETWEEN Erich Przywara and Karl Barth, Przywara held the view that the analogy of being is the “formal principle of Catholic thought,” whereas Barth maintained the position that the analogy of being is the “invention of the Antichrist.” The recent work of Fr. Vincent Anyama presents how the theology of Joseph Ratzinger, with this emphasis on the primacy of Christ, under the influence of the Church Fathers, contributes to the discussion revolving around the role of analogy within theology. Gottlieb Söhngen, one of Ratzinger’s mentors and teachers, had appeased Barth with his argument of a Christocentric “*analogia entis* within an *analogia fidei*” (2–3). Anyama argues that Ratzinger has taken up the mantle of his mentor in appropriating his Christocentric synthesis of the analogy of faith and reason via his study of Augustine. The unique contribution of Anyama’s work is that his study of Ratzinger takes the reader beyond the typical presentation of Ratzinger as an Augustinian and Bonaventurian theologian. Anyama’s work engages the patristic influence of Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Clement of Alexandria, Irenaeus, Tyconius, Justin Martyr, and Maximus the Confessor in addition to the significance of Augustine in Ratzinger’s theology.

Anyama’s study is concerned with addressing Ratzingerian scholarship in two different areas. First, he wants to address what is an inadequate assessment of the patristic influence upon Ratzinger’s theology in the scholarship of Peter Fletcher and Peter Kucer. Second, he intends to address varying questions relating to Ratzinger’s use of analogy in the work of Peter McGregor, Justin Kizewski, Peter Kucer, and Gabino Bilbaco (235). Anyama explicitly notes that he relies upon a “hermeneutic of continuity” that is limited to the continuity between the patristic heritage and Ratzinger’s theology (13). Anyama limits the scope of his study on Ratzinger’s use of analogy by adopting the patristic categories utilized by Justin Kizekski in work *God-Talk*: (1) faith and reason, (2) image and participation, and (3) God-talk (12). These categories will frame the structure for part two of the book (chapters 3–5), whereas the first part of the book (chapters 1–2) focuses on the general patristic understanding of analogy and the Church Fathers quoted by Ratzinger.

Jesus Christ is the Incarnation of the *logos* of the Father. The Church Fathers use “wisdom” and *logos* in reference to both philosophy and the Christian faith. In the thought of Origen, Christ is the one unique *Logos*,

who is both the source and ultimate end of the many words (*logoi*) of natural reason (26). As the eternal *Logos*, Jesus Christ is the consummate Image, whereas the human person is an “image of the Image” via the rational soul in the theology of Clement of Alexandria (33–34). This line of patristic thought will become important later on in Anyama’s work as he addresses the theme of the primacy of Christ within Ratzinger’s thought. Creation in the image of God is distinct from the notion of likeness to God within much of patristic thought. In the thought of Irenaeus and other Fathers, likeness is “understood as *assimilation* of creatures into God,” which is a participation of the creature in the life of God via the gift of grace and the life of the Spirit (46–47). The notions used by the Fathers, which are underscored by Anyama, are the identification of reason as “seeds of wisdom” (Origen) and “Seeds of the Word” (Justin Martyr). The analogy between pre-Christian philosophy and the Christian faith will be a frequent theme in the writings of Ratzinger, who will begin his inaugural lecture at the University of Bonn with an insightful reflection upon the God of philosophy and the God of faith.

When Anyama begins the second part of the book, he focuses on the thought of Bonaventure because of the prominent influence he had on Ratzinger’s emphasis upon the primacy of Christ. Bonaventure’s preference for Christ as the *Logos* in the order of faith and reason continues to find resonance within the theology of Ratzinger. Commenting upon the similarities and differences between Bonaventure and Augustine, Anyama notes that “Bonaventure builds on Augustine’s dialogical character of word, which prioritizes the interior *logos* over its outward manifestation voice.” Yet distinct from Augustine, Anyama argues that “Bonaventure makes more explicit the full historical implication of the analogy between human intelligible word and the divine *Logos*” (139). Bonaventure’s understanding of the primacy of the *Logos* and his development of Augustine’s illumination theory, which proposes Christ as the light from which faith and reason emanate, will shape Ratzinger’s approach to modern theology.

Modernity, beginning with the late Middle Ages, gave birth to the opposition between reason and faith, in Ratzinger’s view. Anyama argues that Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers represent the philosophical argument against the premodern complementarity between philosophy and theology, whereas Martin Luther and Barth represent the theological rejection of philosophy (148–50). The rejection of philosophy within theology in Barth has contributed to a “progressive Kantian philosophical replacement of metaphysics with history” (149). Consequently, Ratzinger has argued in his work *Principles of Catholic Theology* that the need to comprehend the

mediation of history within ontology is one of the central crises in contemporary theology. Drawing upon the Fathers and Bonaventure, Ratzinger is able to argue for the primacy of Christ the *Logos*, who is the source of light for both faith and reason (philosophy). The Incarnation has brought philosophical *logos* to its fruition in a personal *Logos*, who can be known and loved. Anyama uses Ratzinger's well-known reflection on the concept of the person from *Communio* to demonstrate how the "*logos* of Greek philosophy is by ascent of thought in search of the *essence* of Being, while the *Logos* of faith descends as the Word in *relation* to being" (158). In Anyama's estimation, Ratzinger is able to use the Christian conception of *Logos* as a remedy to the self-imposed limitation upon reason by modernity, which has implications for politics, law, and ethics.

Following the influence of Augustine, Ratzinger emphasizes Trinitarian love as his central analogy for the notion of image. The human person has been created in the image of Christ as the eternal *Logos*, and hence he is made for the loving *dia-logos* with the eternal Thou. With Irenaeus, who characterizes Adam as the "scheme" (*dispositionem*) or "copy" of the Incarnation, Anyama notes that Ratzinger understands the human person "as image of the definitive Image" (176–77). Origen and Ratzinger share the notion that love is the highest degree of knowledge, and hence is the supreme way to know God. This is a key point that leads Anyama to argue that the term "heart" is a univocal concept because "Christ possesses an immediate vision of the Father." Consequently, Anyama concludes: "What the heart of Christ knows univocally about God, the hearts of believers receive from his words by analogy of participation" (182). The knowledge and love of the believer of the pierced heart of Christ is a key encounter, which can lead to the gift of salvation because it enables the believer to participate in the self-giving love of God.

Participation, likeness to God, and discipleship are best summarized for Ratzinger in Gregory of Nyssa's explanation of participation as "following." Anyama argues that the notion of following Christ in Ratzinger consists in "learning from him how God intends for his creature to participate in him" (184). The *Logos* has primacy because he embodies the authentic way of being and becoming a human person. Christ is the definitive Adam. The personalist dialogical anthropology of Ratzinger and his understanding of participation are developed throughout his work on eschatology. Contrary to Patrick Fletcher in *Resurrection Realism*, who notes a discontinuity in Ratzinger's appropriation of Platonic thought, Anyama favors a view of continuity predicated upon the influence of Augustine's dialogical notion of image and participation and the consistency of Ratzinger's presentation

of patristic anthropology of the heart with his dialogical eschatology of participation (185–91). Eternal life is a participation of the human person in the eternal *dia-logos* between God with man in Christ. Both Augustine and Origen enable Ratzinger to note that the participation of the believer in the heart of Christ is already an eschatological participation in the resurrected life. Finally, the development of Ratzinger's theology of image and participation culminates in his development of the theological notion of communion. Succinctly, Anyama notes that communion is "a synthetic analogy describing God's unique descent to humanity, humanity's spiritual ascent to the transcendent God, and humanity's union with one another" (197). In light of the primacy of Christ and his Incarnation, the Holy Eucharist becomes the privileged place of participation and communion in the life of God.

In his final chapter, on "Ratzinger's Primacy of Christ in God-Talk," Anyama emphasizes that Ratzinger follows the patristic tradition on the Christocentric unity of Scripture, Tradition, and worship. Drawing upon Benedict XVI's 2006 Regensburg lecture, Anyama outlines Ratzinger's proposal to restore the primacy of the truth in three ways. First, contrary to the self-limitation of reason, the analogy of reason can and should be used to speak well of God. Second, the view that truth is made should be countered with the notion that the truth (the *logos*) has been given and should be humbly received. Finally, we should give witness to the *Logos* in word and deed, contrary to the reigning relativism (208).

Anyama highlights the affinity between Ratzinger and Clement of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa in his commentary analogical nature of naming God. With the Fathers, Ratzinger distinguishes the limits of philosophy to make declaration about God and the primacy of Christ and his grace to name God (209–10). With respect to revelation via Scripture, Anyama highlights Ratzinger's critique of an exegetical method limited only to a purely historical-critical method. First, the words of the sacred Author become merely human words instead of divine speech. Second, the unity of Scripture can be undermined with the limited study of individual books in their historical context (216–17). Christ as the definitive *Logos* and a hermeneutic of faith which is carried out in prayer and culminates as worship can lead a fruitful reception of God's word. The divine condescension which takes place in Christ's proclamation of the Gospel is itself a model for evangelization. Anyama highlights that, for Ratzinger, we need to follow God's method of evangelization, which is one of humility and simplicity (232). This is a critical reminder for all of us who work in service to academia. God-talk must be translated to the faithful so they might experience the joy that comes from participation and communion with the incarnate *Logos*.

Anyama's work served as his dissertation at the Gregorian University. Consequently, its shortcomings are related to the characteristics that may be essential for a dissertation, but should be revised when published in book form. The typical *status quaestionis* could have been shortened or omitted to focus on the main ideas he was going to address in the work. The structure of the book could benefit from either leaving out the chapter 2, on "The Fathers whom Ratzinger Quotes," or integrating some of the quotations or ideas throughout the text. Finally, a more robust conclusion could have honed in on the implications of the arguments presented for the grace and nature analogy. A surprising lacuna is that there is no engagement of Ratzinger's inaugural lecture at the University of Bonn in the chapter on faith and reason. Also a treatment of Cyril's Christology may provide fruitful insight into Ratzinger's engagement with neo-Chalcedonian Christology.

Anyama's book is highly recommended because we get an in-depth treatment of patristic influence on the theology of Joseph Ratzinger. Ratzingerian scholars such as Joseph Lam and Patrick Fletcher have limited their scope to the Augustinian impact upon Ratzinger's theology. Anyama offers a deep dive into the patristic Ratzinger's theology. Anyama's work is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the discussion of analogy within theology. In light of Anyama's work, we can conclude that the *analogia entis* is not the Antichrist, but a way of receiving the revelation of the Father's *Logos* in Christ for the sake of the salvation of all of humanity. 

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