

Book Reviews

Thomas Aquinas on the Immateriality of the Human Intellect by Adam Wood (*Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2020*), xi + 318 pp.

THIS IS THE FIRST BOOK-LENGTH DISCUSSION of Aquinas's conclusion that the human intellect is immaterial. Its main purpose is to interpret that conclusion, and to interpret and assess the arguments Aquinas offers in support of it.

Of the many arguments Aquinas presents, three receive lengthy consideration. The first of these, originally Aristotle's, is based on the human intellect's ability to grasp all corporeal natures; the second, traceable to Avicenna, is based on the human intellect's ability to reflect on itself; the third is based on the fact that the human intellect understands things in a universal mode. According to Adam Wood's assessments of these arguments, the first most likely fails; it equivocates on what it means to "receive forms," and thus wrongly assumes that the "intentional presence of forms in cognizers requires their literal absence" (210). The second similarly equivocates on "self-reflexivity." The third, at least as Aquinas expresses it and as commentators usually understand it, is guilty of what Robert Pasnau calls the "Content Fallacy," as when one tries to infer, given that Bob is thinking about red cars, that Bob's thoughts are red. Nonetheless, Wood is cautiously optimistic that a certain argument put forward by some thinkers today, and resembling Aquinas's second attempt, is sound, although he is uncertain that it could stand as an interpretation of Aquinas's own argument. Similarly, he proposes that a certain argument advanced by Elizabeth Anscombe, Thomas Nagel, James Ross, and others succeeds in showing that the intellect is immaterial, and that it might be a way to interpret Aquinas's third argument.

For a book focused on so difficult and disputed a matter as the immateriality of intellect, and amassing and correlating so large a number of scholarly interpretations and evaluations of Aquinas's thought on the subject, its style is remarkably lucid, its logic easy to follow. Each chapter begins by describing the contents of its upcoming sections and the rationale for their inclusion and order. There are six chapters in all; the first two discuss forms, the third presents Aquinas's argumentation from the incorporeality of the intellect to the incorruptibility of the human soul, the fourth outlines his under-

standing of cognition, the fifth interprets and evaluates his understanding of the immateriality of intellect, and the last interprets some of Aquinas's views concerning the separated soul.

Much of the terminology in the book is not Aquinas's own, being neither his Latin nor equivalent English. This is a consequence of a secondary purpose of the book, which is to position Aquinas's thought "alongside recent developments in metaphysics and philosophy of mind." Thus readers will encounter such foreigners to Aquinas's diction as "truthmakers," "ontology," "emergentism," "hylomorphism," "tropes," "overarching structures," and many more. In itself, this kind of practice can be a positive service. The translatability of Aquinas's thought into the philosophical usage of other traditions and schools, especially those of our own time, so far as that is possible without distortion, highlights its objectivity and universality, and makes it accessible to those unaccustomed to its native vocabulary. (Aquinas himself "translated" the thought of Pseudo-Dionysius into his own philosophical terminology.)

As to the quality of the book's philosophical content, one may consider its originality, its captivating power, and above all, its truth. As to originality, the book as a whole is novel in the sense that it is the first book-length discussion of the subject, as noted. Its content is largely not new, however, though newly brought together; Wood admits he frequently relies on the work of others in order to support his own interpretations and conclusions. Still, the orderly and readable gathering of many arguments from the relevant secondary literature is itself a contribution, and a number of positions and arguments in the book are in fact Wood's own.

Certainly the book is engaging, even provocative. No one interested in Aquinas's philosophy of the human soul, or in his thought in general, could possibly find it a bore. Nor is that merely a function of the controversial nature of the matter; the writing is engaging, and the author's positions and argumentation, as well as his discussions of other commentators, are apt to rouse wonder about a great many things.

The criterion of truth is likely to be the greatest sticking point for some readers—naturally enough, since there is hardly an uncontroversial statement in the book, as its author is well aware.

One example of such reasonable doubt regards Wood's interpretation of Aquinas's understanding of knowing. According to Wood, "cognition can be understood in terms of information encoding" (208), and Aquinas himself "thinks of cognition as a sort of information processing" (152). This theory of knowing is not without its supporters, of course, nor is it without reason that many commentators hold it and read Aquinas himself as a subscriber to it. This interpretation, nonetheless, is not the whole truth

about Aquinas's understanding of what it means to know, and does not appear to be wholly true to his understanding. For Aquinas, the supreme knower is God, whose knowledge would be difficult to characterize as "a sort of information processing." The divine thought is not any sort of process or change (*Summa theologiae* [ST] I, q. 9, a. 1; q. 14, aa. 7 and 15). Even a human intellect, when simply grasping the nature of a thing, or seeing the truth of a self-evident statement, is not in any obvious sense processing something; the activity of the intellect is called *process* or *movement* only metaphorically (*In I de anima*, lec. 10), and even then refers mainly to discursive thought, not to the understanding that precedes or follows it (ST I, q. 79, a. 8). Also, is there "information" in God, encoded or otherwise? Not if that refers to a form added to his substance by which he knows things other than himself (ST I, q. 3, a. 6; q. 14, a. 4). Though Aquinas speaks of ideas in God, these are not distinct from the divine substance, and do not in any sense inform it. One might be tempted to regard God as an exception to the general rule of what it means to know, but Aquinas concludes that God is *in summo cognitionis* (ST I, q. 14, a. 1) from an altogether general definition of *cognoscentia* meant to include God, the angels, human beings, and even irrational animals.

Would Aquinas really agree with Wood, then, that knowers "become formally identical to what they cognize in the same sense that maps become formally identical to cities or compact discs become formally identical to songs written on them" (162–63)? Wood raises this interpretation's most obvious difficulty, known as the "Liberalism Objection" (175): according to this information-encoding view of knowing, maps should know the cities of which they are maps, and compact discs should know the music of which they are recordings. Aquinas himself, though unfamiliar with compact discs, certainly knew of maps. He also knew that the colors and shapes of visible things are somehow present in transparent media *intentionaliter* (*In II de anima*, lec. 14), that is, not in such a way as to change the natural colors or shapes of those media, which sounds very much like the manner in which he says visible forms are present in beings endowed with sight. Why, then, does Aquinas not attribute knowledge to such things? Wood suggests (180) that what must be implied in or added to the information-encoding account is the final cause of cognition. Animals, for instance, have sense for the sake of prompting and directing their survival-related action, whereas a map does not represent the plan of a city for the sake of any survival-related activity it is inclined to perform, nor does a compact disc store songs for the sake of any self-benefiting activity it is to perform. This observation is both true in itself and something with which Aquinas would agree. As a way of cordoning off knowers from non-know-

ers, however, it appears unsatisfactory and foreign to Aquinas. Knowing is a certain kind of activity, differing from all other activities by itself, not only by the further activities it might originate or support in its subject. In fact, it is not knowing that should be defined by the activities and powers flowing from it, but these other activities and powers that should be distinguished and defined in part by their proceeding from knowing. Sense appetite, for example, is distinguished from natural appetite by the fact that it proceeds from sense, and will, which is intellectual appetite (*ST* I-II, q. 8, a. 1), is distinguished from sense appetite by the fact that it proceeds from intellect (*ST* I, q. 80, aa. 1 and 2).

The book's assessments of the arguments of Aquinas for the immateriality of intellect would appear to lack cogency as well. Take the argument based on universality. Part of Wood's reason for rejecting this argument, at least as it is most readily interpreted, is that there seems to be nothing impossible about a material individual having universal representational power, as one sees in Aquinas's own example (from *De ente et essentia*) of a statue of a soldier standing for all the soldiers who fought in some battle. Why, then, cannot the thought of some common nature exist in the mind not only as an individual thought, as Aquinas says, but even as a material individual, contrary to his view? If statues can be universal, why not individual brain states and events? But surely Aquinas intends the statue not as an example of something universal in the strict sense, but only as a likeness to something strictly universal, in order to illustrate how universality is not a mode of existing even for a thought, but is instead a uniformity of relation between the one thought and the many things of which it is a likeness. Had Aquinas intended the statue as an example of something perfectly universal just as the definition of *triangle* is universal, he would have held that the statue is in no way more like some soldiers than others, and that it included in its own representation nothing except what could be found in all the soldiers. In fact, however, the statue is "universal" only in the way that a triangle drawn in a geometrical diagram is universal—it leaves out distractingly peculiar features of certain individuals, approaching a kind of average, something typical, like a drawing of an insect in a field guide or a specimen in a laboratory. It does not, however, leave out all individualizing material conditions whatsoever. A triangle printed on a page of some edition of Euclid's *Elements* is not purely and simply "what it is to be a triangle," including nothing peculiar to that triangle; rather, it includes a special ratio of the sides, a color, a location, and many other things that naturally and necessarily follow upon the existence of "what it is to be a triangle" in an individual material recipient such as a sheet of paper.

Finally, the success of Wood's attempt to salvage this argument based

on universality is suspect. The salvaged argument seems to be an entirely new argument, not a repaired or supplemented version of Aquinas's. The new version hinges on the "determinate" character of intellectual knowledge rather than on what Aquinas means by universality. In itself, it is certainly deserving of serious consideration, and may well be sound. But is it really what Aquinas had in mind with his argument based on universality? It seems a stretch to say so. The author himself calls this way of reading it "somewhat adventurous" (4).

Despite these and other shortcomings, the book is well worth reading. It brings many lines of thought together in an illuminating and thought-provoking way, and its own interpretations and arguments, whether I am right to call them mistaken or not, are always carefully constructed, clearly presented, and instructive. 

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The Bible and Catholic *Ressourcement*: Essays on Scripture and Theology by William M. Wright IV (*Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019*), xvii + 250 pp.

THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE in relation to the *ressourcement* movement is the topic of this stimulating collection of essays by William Wright, professor of theology at Duquesne University. All the chapters, except for chapter 6, were previously published as journal articles between 2006 and 2015. A helpful introduction (1–9) reviews the characteristics of the *ressourcement* movement and sketches the book's contents. Wright explains that the call to "return to the sources" (Scripture, the Fathers, the liturgy) served various purposes: a recentering on Christ, the reintegration of theology and spirituality, the rediscovery of the breadth of the Tradition, and the retrieval of its wisdom in order to speak meaningfully to present concerns. The essays are organized into three parts. First, Wright dedicates three essays to "Select *Ressourcement* Theologians and the Bible," namely, Henri de Lubac, Yves Congar, and Joseph Ratzinger. Wright admits that the omission of Hans Urs von Balthasar is a lacuna, which he hopes to address in the future (5n19). The second part consists of four essays that examine Gospel topics in Ratzinger's/Benedict

XVI's three-volume work *Jesus of Nazareth*, which was written in order to facilitate an encounter with Christ. In part 3, Wright turns to his area of specialty, John's Gospel, offering three studies of specific texts that relate to the mystery of Jesus. Wright draws on Robert Sokolowski's theology of disclosure, which provides a way to reconnect contemporary exegesis with the premodern tradition of the spiritual senses, so emphasized by de Lubac.

In chapter 1, "Patristic Exegetical Theory and Practice in de Lubac and Congar" (13–25), Wright highlights de Lubac's retrieval of the theological vision provided by the doctrine of the fourfold sense of Scripture. For de Lubac, the literal sense is about the verbal presentation of the realities or events of salvation history (*littera gesta docet*, according to the medieval distich), and the spiritual senses concern the biblical realities (*res*) themselves. Wright approvingly cites his colleague Francis Martin (a quotation repeated twice later): "The spiritual sense of Scripture is based, not on a theory of text, but on a theology of history" (17, 159, 227).¹ Turning to Congar, Wright explains how Congar uses the categories of sacramental theology (*sacramentum*, *res et sacramentum*, and *res tantum*) to express the doctrine of the four senses. Whereas de Lubac encouraged the integration of premodern exegesis with modern biblical criticism, Congar went further by also providing some examples (the Virgin Mary; the temple). Regarding this integration, Wright notes Congar's influence on *Dei Verbum* §12.

In chapter 2, "The Literal Sense of Scripture according to Henri de Lubac: Insights from Patristic Exegesis of the Transfiguration" (27–57), Wright elaborates on de Lubac's understanding of the literal sense, examining his comments on the interpretation of the Transfiguration accounts by Origen, Jerome, and Augustine. Because de Lubac's view includes the historical realities expressed by the biblical words, it differs from typical explanations that focus on the author's intended meaning or the meaning of the words themselves. The patristic authors interpreted the Transfiguration, in which Jesus's humanity reveals his divinity, as a symbol for understanding the relationship between the Old and New Testaments and between the literal and spiritual senses. For example, Peter, James, and John are like those who possess spiritual understanding of Scripture. To them, Jesus's clothes (representing the words of Scripture) become dazzling white, revealing both his divinity and the relationship of the Old Testament (Moses and Elijah) to Jesus. In contrast, Jesus's clothes appear unchanged to the disciples who did not ascend the mountain, who are like those who perceive only the letter of Scripture. There is thus a sacramental

¹ Francis Martin, "Election, Covenant, and Law," *Nova et Vetera* (English) 4 (2006): 867.

quality to de Lubac's understanding. However, Wright also points out that de Lubac leaves underdeveloped the relationship between the historical event and its biblical account, though he does affirm (with *Dei Verbum* §2) the intrinsic connection between them.² Wright here could have elaborated further, such as clarifying how de Lubac's understanding of the literal sense explains the three Synoptic accounts (having somewhat different details and intertextual phenomena) of the one Transfiguration event.³ Moreover, concerning literary genres, de Lubac's emphasis on the historical realities is more readily understood when considering biblical narratives; but is not a greater emphasis on words rather than events necessary when interpreting passages that are didactic, prophetic, poetic, and so on?⁴

In chapter 3, "Echoes of Biblical Apocalyptic in the Encyclical Teaching of Benedict XVI" (59–81), Wright considers Ratzinger's longstanding interest in eschatology (e.g., his textbook on the subject and his *Habilitationsschrift* on Saint Bonaventure's response to Joachim of Fiore's apocalypticism). Developing insights of Cyril O'Regan, Wright examines three apocalyptic themes echoed in Benedict's three encyclicals. First, there is the analysis of the present moment as one of crisis in which the Church is engaged in a conflict with an antagonist. Second, there is the interpretation of the antagonist (e.g., "atheist humanism") as an instantiation of the figure of the apocalyptic false prophet. Third, there is the Church's response to the false prophet's deception, namely, Christ-like witness of "charity-in-truth" (62). Wright concludes that Benedict indeed echoes certain themes of biblical apocalypticism, though he eschews its conventional literary form "to avoid the fanaticism with which apocalyptic is often associated" (81). This is an informative and perceptive essay, providing explanations of the Book of Revelation (and other apocalyptic texts) and illuminating some threads in Benedict's writings, such as his references to Vladimir Soloviev's story of the Antichrist in his Erasmus lecture and in volume 1 of *Jesus of Nazareth* (112). In the conclusion, Wright suggests another example of Benedict's use of apocalyptic interpretation,

² One of Wright's Ph.D. students offers a gentle critique of de Lubac on this point: Kevin Storer, *Reading Scripture to Hear God: Kevin Vanhoozer and Henri de Lubac on God's Use of Scripture in the Economy of Redemption* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2015), 45–50.

³ Later, Wright partly addresses this issue, indicating that the emphasis on the *res* does not downplay the "literary and rhetorical qualities" of the biblical texts (191).

⁴ See William M. Wright IV and Francis Martin, *Encountering the Living God in Scripture: Theological and Philosophical Principles for Interpretation* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2019), 206.

his “critique of religiously inspired violence” (81). He refers to a passage in volume 2 of *Jesus of Nazareth*, though Benedict’s Regensburg lecture also comes to mind. Perhaps another, more recent example would be Benedict’s 2019 essay “The Church and the Scandal of Sexual Abuse,” in which the Pope Emeritus refers to the current crisis in the Church, explains it in light of the Apocalypse (Rev 12:10), and calls on Christians to oppose the devil by their witness to truth and love in imitation of Christ.

Wright continues his engagement with Benedict’s thought in part 2 (chs. 4–7). In chapter 4, “A ‘New Synthesis’: Benedict XVI’s *Jesus of Nazareth: Volume 1*” (85–114), Wright explains that the work is Benedict’s own attempt to achieve the “new synthesis” called for in his 1988 Erasmus lecture, combining the historical-critical method with a hermeneutic of faith that reads Scripture in the context of the canon and the Tradition (101). The result of Benedict’s synthesis is a portrayal of Jesus that is simultaneously historically sensitive to Jesus’s Jewish context and attentive to his communion with the Father. Wright concludes by noting Benedict’s pastoral purpose of helping readers deepen their relationship with Jesus.

In chapter 5, “Pre-Gospel Traditions and Post-Critical Interpretation in Benedict XVI’s *Jesus of Nazareth: Volume 2*” (115–28), Wright carries on the discussion of Benedict’s two-level hermeneutical approach, which attempts to implement *Dei Verbum* §12. As a case study of this integrated approach, Wright examines Benedict’s discussion of the four Eucharistic institution narratives, noting his emphasis on both the historicity of the key events and the ecclesial reception and interpretation of those events.

Chapter 6, “Living with the Word of God: The Holy Family in *Jesus of Nazareth: The Infancy Narratives*” (129–41), exemplifies the *ressourcement* characteristic of integrating theology and spirituality. Wright beautifully reflects on Benedict’s interpretation of the Virgin Mary and Saint Joseph as models for believers, because of their inner relationship with God’s word and their humility and obedience in receiving it.

In chapter 7, “Patristic Biblical Hermeneutics in Benedict XVI’s *Jesus of Nazareth*” (143–62), Wright examines Benedict’s treatment of the Good Shepherd discourse (John 10:1–18), drawing out various ways in which Benedict incorporates features of patristic hermeneutics (though he is critical of patristic methods). For example, besides principles such as the canonical, Christocentric reading discussed in earlier essays, Wright notes Benedict’s use of mimetic exegesis, in which readers are invited to consider the biblical text as a mirror in order to reflect on their own situation (152, 156, 161). Wright also compares Benedict’s understanding of the senses of Scripture, with its focus on the text, to de Lubac’s understanding of the tradition, as represented by Aquinas, with its focus on the realities

presented by the text. Wright concludes that the two models “are not irreconcilable” (160). Indeed, both models are helpful, and choosing only one tends toward oversimplification.

In part 3, Wright gives us examples of his own efforts to integrate modern biblical criticism with a retrieval of patristic exegesis, especially its centering on Christ. Chapter 8, “Jesus’s Identity and the Use of Scripture in John 6:1–21” (165–84), provides an excellent analysis of the role of the walking on the sea (6:16–21) in relation to the feeding of the five thousand (6:1–15), in preparation for the Bread of Life discourse. Jesus’s revelation to his disciples—*egō eimi*, “I am” (6:20; cf. 8:24, 28, 58)—echoes YHWH’s self-identification (e.g., Exod 3:14; Deut 32:39; Isa 43:10). It thus corrects the crowd’s assessment in John 6:14–15: Jesus is not merely prophet or king, but “the Lord” (cf. 6:23). Hence, in multiplying the loaves, Jesus acts as God did in giving the people manna at the time of Moses. The manna and the multiplied loaves were both perishable, but they function as signs pointing to something greater, the bread of life that is Jesus himself, who gives himself in the Eucharist as food that endures to eternal life.

In chapters 9 and 10, Wright skillfully deploys insights drawn from Sokolowski’s theology of disclosure, a Husserlian phenomenological approach that pays attention to the realities presented by the biblical words. In chapter 9, “The Theology of Disclosure and the Christological Interpretation of Psalm 69 in John’s Gospel” (185–205), Wright provides a case study of the Christological interpretation of the three Psalm 69 references in the Fourth Gospel (John 2:17; 15:25; 19:28–30). He concludes that “the evangelist reads Psalm 69 as anticipating or foreshadowing Jesus because the words of the Psalm describe a situation which he sees mirrored in Jesus’s life” (204–5).

In chapter 10, “The Doctrine of God, the Theology of Disclosure, and the Liturgical *Res* in John 8:12–20” (207–27), Wright examines Jesus’s pronouncement, “I am the light of the world” (John 8:12), against the background of the Jewish feast of Sukkot (Tabernacles). During the festival, large lighted lampstands in the temple’s “Court of the Women” illuminated the city at night. It is precisely in this court (8:20) that Jesus makes his declaration. Using the theology of disclosure, Wright explains that the reality of the Sukkot liturgy, presented in manifold Old Testament texts (and in the Mishnah), gives Jesus “the context and terms for his disclosure, and Jesus in turn reveals previously unseen dimensions” of the feast (226). In traditional language, the Sukkot liturgy described by the biblical words (*verba/signa*) is a *res significans* pointing to the *res* of Jesus. Wright thus concludes by recalling Aquinas’s definition (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 10) of the spiritual sense as the Christological signification of the things

signified by the words of Scripture. He also returns to de Lubac's emphasis that the spiritual sense is found not in the text itself but in the realities described by the text (227; cf. 192n36). Wright thus leads the reader full circle, returning in a new light to the *ressourcement* concerns discussed at the book's beginning.

In summary, Wright's collection of essays is highly recommended reading for all those seeking to understand what an integrated hermeneutical approach actually looks like in practice. This reviewer thus plans to make use of these essays in his own teaching. Earlier in the book, Wright had said, "much work remains to be done toward the synthesizing of modern biblical criticism with the *Ressourcement* of patristic exegesis" (25). Through these essays, he has himself made a significant contribution toward that synthesis. REV

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Aesthetics by Dietrich von Hildebrand, vol. 1, trans. Brian McNeil, ed. John F. Crosby (*Steubenville, OH: The Hildebrand Project, 2016*), xxxvii + 470 pp.

Aesthetics by Dietrich von Hildebrand, vol. 2, trans. John F. Crosby, John Henry Crosby, and Brian McNeil, ed. John F. Crosby and John Henry Crosby (*Steubenville, OH: The Hildebrand Project, 2018*), xxxi + 574 pp.

THE HILDEBRAND PROJECT, dedicated, in its words, "to the presentation and exploration of the thought and witness of Dietrich von Hildebrand," continues its good work by its gift to the English-speaking world of original translations of von Hildebrand's two-volume *Aesthetics*. For the English-speaking reader who has studied the works by von Hildebrand previously available in English (on topics ranging from value to affectivity to liturgy), these volumes on beauty are an indispensable completion of the whole. For readers new to von Hildebrand, they present an excellent introduction.

I set out to do two things in this review. First, I present the general architecture of the work, and point out some areas that are especially rewarding for their broader philosophical implications. I can do little justice to the work in this respect, given its great length. Second, as an outsider to the

world of aesthetics, I raise some questions that I hope will spur scholars interested in beauty (and von Hildebrand's corpus) to read this work and contribute to a lively secondary literature in the years to come.

I.

Volume 1 begins by arguing for the objectivity of beauty (ch. 1). Beauty and the aesthetic values that do not fall under beauty are *objective values*, the knowledge of which is *isperceptual*. Our apprehension of values is thus *intentional* (or *frontal* in von Hildebrand's terminology), *immediate*, and *intuitive*. Many of the details of the perception of beauty and other aesthetic values will be familiar to readers of von Hildebrand's other works, as are the arguments for the objectivity of values. But what is noteworthy about this chapter, and what makes it a special treasure for the student of von Hildebrand, is its inclusion of sustained treatments of other philosophers.

Given the relative paucity of footnotes and critical discussion of other philosophers in his corpus, the opening of *Aesthetics* provides a much-needed contextualization of von Hildebrand, from the pen of the author himself. David Hume, William James, George Santayana, Baruch Spinoza, W. D. Ross, G. E. Moore—all are presented and dispatched by von Hildebrand in the opening salvo. For those readers of Thomas Aquinas who still cast a wary eye over the work of von Hildebrand, there is further fuel for the fire in his critique of the *appetitus* theory of beauty (1:30–34) and Jacques Maritain's treatment of beauty as a transcendental property of being (1:89–93, 266).

Following his defense of aesthetic objectivity, von Hildebrand distinguishes between metaphysical beauty (ch. 3) and the beauty of the audible and visible (ch. 4) and describes the relation between these kinds of beauty (ch. 5). Already in chapter 5, there is the indication of broader phenomenological insights to come. The expression of non-aesthetic (e.g., moral) values in the human face provides the reader with a concrete instance of the "mystery" of expression: how is it that metaphysical beauty (the "irradiation" of other values) (1:87)—which is itself invisible—gets expressed by that which is visible (form, color, and materials)? Of further interest is the distinction between visible beauty and expressed metaphysical beauty—for these, says von Hildebrand, can come apart. A human face may be beautiful on account of its form—yet lose its full beauty if it "looks emphatically stupid and narrow, or evil, cold, and heartless" (1:138). A human face may be visibly ugly, but "fascinate through its expression of kindness, love, and humility" (*ibid.*). In both cases, the face is not beautiful in the "full sense" (lacking either visible beauty or expressed metaphysical beauty).

Building upon the discussion of chapter 5, von Hildebrand next presents what he declares to be the central puzzle of aesthetics (ch. 6). How is it that the beauty of some objects surpasses the ontological “rank” or “dignity” of said objects? A particular waterfall, for example, ranks pretty low ontologically, yet it bears a beauty that far outstrips its ontological rank. Von Hildebrand’s solution (sketched in ch. 6 and developed in chs. 9–11) is his distinction between *beauty of the first power* (which appeals to the senses) and *beauty of the second power* (the lofty spiritual beauty that transcends the ontological rank and qualitative values of the object) (1:152).

The road to this distinction is a masterpiece of negative phenomenology. Von Hildebrand carefully rules out what beauty of the second power *is not*. It is neither grounded in the physical features of the object, nor is it the expression of other values inherent in the object. Rather, beauty of the second power “speaks of something completely different, something higher, . . . the world of higher goods and their values, . . . the whole world of values which surrounds us, rising up to the infinite beauty of God” (1:212–13). Beautiful objects, however lowly they may be, afford us access to “immaterial and higher realities” and thus present to us a beauty that is not really their own (1:212–14).

If I have focused long upon the first half of volume 1, it is because even if von Hildebrand had stopped writing here, his place in aesthetics would have been assured. Already, in his lengthy defense of the objective reality of beauty, he has done a great service to the restoration of beauty. In his articulation of the expressiveness of the human face, and the distinction between beauty of the first and second power, he crystallizes the central aesthetic experience: the ways in which the encounter with beauty is transcendent, carrying us far beyond the visible to something higher.

As it is, von Hildebrand has far more to say. He continues by presenting three antitheses to beauty (ch. 12): ugliness, triviality, and boringness—none of which lack for examples today. Yet one of von Hildebrand’s unexpected examples—the toad—illustrates yet another way in which his *Aesthetics* has far-reaching metaphysical implications. Not just by defect of form, but by the form itself, may a thing be ugly. Toads are ugly—and so a metaphysical theory of beauty (as a transcendental) and ugliness (as privation) supposedly falls.

The first volume is rounded out by describing the thematic bearers of beauty (in nature and in human life [ch. 14–15]), before turning to the aesthetic experience itself (ch. 16).

Here again, we see the phenomenologist’s mastery of distinction: *being pleased, being affected, apprehending a value, responding to a value*, and

forming a judgment about value—all differentiated and described prior to the situation of aesthetic value perception within value perception *simpliciter* and the ways in which a person may be blind to beauty and other aesthetic values (a point I return to below).¹

Volume 2 begins with the ontology of artworks. Artworks are described as “quasi-substances” which stand on their own, have a deeper level of being (than accidents), and stand out from surrounding things (2:6–7). Artworks are true individuals, capable of reproduction only into mere copies, unlike the inventions of the human mind that are destined for mass replication (2:8). Artworks are also distinguished from projections of the artist (ch. 2). While artworks presuppose an artist and usually (though not necessarily) bear his stylistic marks, “the theme of a work of art is not the person of its creator, but its own value, the beauty of the work of art itself. A work of art does not primarily make a proclamation about its author, but about the glory of the cosmos and, ultimately, about God’s ultimate beauty” (2:14). In this context, there is a nice reference back to the central problem of aesthetics: for not only can (e.g.) a waterfall afford us access to lofty spiritual beauty, but a human artist may “create works of a sublimity that far transcends what he as a human being accomplishes in a moral respect” (2:14).

From here, von Hildebrand turns to the wrongful attitudes to art (favoring something for its fame, fashion, or familiarity, or else regarding it un-thematically, e.g., looking at a painting that depicts a battle for its historical content and not its beauty) (2:17–23), before describing combinations between different arts (how different art forms work together to produce new unities) (ch. 4) and the claims to greatness and depth made by artworks (ch. 5). This discussion is particularly fascinating for its proposal of a norm by which to judge artworks—by reference to their intrinsic aspirations. While there is value in high, yet unmet, aspirations, there is also value in the fit between intended and fulfilled depth or greatness (2:41).

For the remainder of volume 2, we are plunged into detailed descriptions of different art forms: architecture, painting, sculpture, literature, and music. In all these chapters, von Hildebrand aims not at an analysis of what makes something beautiful, for artistry is irreducible to rule-following. Beauty is grounded, creatively, in the genius of the artist at work. Rather, he supplies his reader with reasons in virtue of which an artwork fails to be beautiful (2:54).

¹ He also describes two aesthetic values that are not species of beauty (elegance, the comical), before concluding with discussion of the relation of beauty to truth, love, and morality.

Of broader philosophical interest in the second half of volume 2 are phenomenological treatments of *representation* and *transposition*. In chapter 20, von Hildebrand distinguishes the representation-relation from adjacent relations of similarity, exemplar-image, copies, and replicas. *Transposition* is given its most sustained treatment in chapter 32, which describes the artistic transposition of figures in literary works of art. Take the case of a morally evil person (who is thereby metaphysically ugly). Somehow, observes von Hildebrand, such a person, in and through his “transposition and incorporation” into the artwork “becomes the bearer of magnificent artistic beauty” (2:344). While the evil person does not cease, in reality, to be evil (and metaphysically ugly), nevertheless the depiction of the evil and metaphysically ugly person contributes to the aesthetic value of the whole. By contrast with our response to an evil person in real life (indignation, disgust), our response to works containing depictions of evil persons (real or imagined) may be one of delight (2:345).

II.

Such is my condensation of over one thousand pages of text. On a crass materialistic note, it is hard not to wax critical when so many philosophical claims are made. With respect to volume 2, I will shy away from criticism. Commenting on the confidence with which von Hildebrand asserts comparative aesthetic judgments, Robert Wood writes in his preface: “What would it take to challenge that?” (2:xxiii). What would it take, indeed—though one might ask: where lies the burden of proof?

I will make bold, though, to advance two critical questions that pertain to claims made in volume 1. Von Hildebrand clearly thinks that we should not moralize the aesthetic. After all, they are separate domains of value (1:75–76). In illustration of this commitment, and discussing an example of the tournaments that are bearers of beauty in human life, he writes:

Bullfights have a definitely aesthetic quality of a positive kind. Despite all the cruelty to the bull and the danger to the bullfighter, the whole event has its own beauty and poetry in its style, in the beauty of the garments, the horses, the bull, the gracefulness of the bullfighter, and his courage. (1:352)

Just above this passage, speaking of tournaments in general, von Hildebrand maintains their aesthetic value, despite these events being morally impermissible (1:352).

Fast-forward to the discussion of the comical (ch. 19). Here one finds von Hildebrand at his most relaxed when it comes to moralizing the

aesthetic. Perhaps this is unsurprising, given that comedy is often the point at which persons are less willing to countenance aesthetic value when the content seems to breach moral norms. But given that von Hildebrand's treatment of the comic is preceded by an admission of the aesthetic value of gory bullfights and lethal tournaments, I wonder whether, by his own stated aims, von Hildebrand is at liberty to moralize the comic under the rubric of "indecenty" (1:428–29). Whether indecenty is allowed by von Hildebrand to instantiate the comical is restricted by explicitly moral considerations, including whether the "source material" for the joke is sinful (1:429). Hence my question: how can inferences from moral impermissibility in the case of a bullfight (or similar entertainment), which involves loss of life and animal cruelty, to its aesthetic disvalue be *blocked*, but similar inferences, from the moral impermissibility (or impropriety) of a joke, to its aesthetic disvalue, be *licensed*?

My second concern pertains to the epistemology of some of von Hildebrand's claims. Quite frankly, I worry that phenomenologists (especially of realist stripe) sometimes lean too heavily on the "givenness" of their claims. I worry that von Hildebrand conflates the desire for explanation or argument with reductionism. Whatever the lamentable effects of the latter, the former is a staple of philosophical thought and often quite necessary to compel rational agreement between author and reader. I want to illustrate where I think the inverse relation of asserted-givenness and absence of argument is most pronounced and recurring. Consider the following text:

Let us now put the unprejudiced question: what do we mean when we speak of the joyfulness of the sky? What is intuitively, immediately, given to us when we look at the blue sky? Naturally, we do not mean that the sky "feels" joy. We refer only to a pure quality that also characterizes the human reaction of joy over something, but that does not only occur as a consciously "felt" joy. There exists a quality of joyfulness that indeed occurs primarily in the personal act of joy. . . . But there also exists an objective quality of joyfulness that does not exist as consciously lived but is a quality that occurs only in some objects as a characteristic of those objects (1:181–82).

So "objective" joyfulness is a "pure quality" that some objects instantiate. (Which ones? Fortunately, the answer to that question is intuitively, immediately, given as well.) Possible explanations of the "pure quality" view as involving analogy, projection, or personification are ruled out (1:182–185). Nor is this passage an isolated curiosity. The view recurs at least two more times (1:277, 298). In the latter place, such "pure" qualities are

described with the equally unhelpful (and equally conversation-stopping) “primordial.”

Nor is joyfulness the only such objective, pure, primordial quality:

Like joyfulness, hopefulness naturally exists as a pure quality. It would be utter nonsense to say that nature is full of feelings of hope; to project an experienced, conscious hope into the apersonal world, into the life of apersonal nature, would be a pantheistic absurdity. Nevertheless, the quality that lives in the experienced and consciously lived hope of the human person *belongs as a pure quality also to the morning in the literal sense*. (1:300, emphasis added)

Similar, though less implausible, remarks are also made about the objective boringness of certain works (1:278).

What can be made of this? Metaphysically, the sense of “pure quality” is obscure. Epistemically, “primordial” seems to function as a bit of hand-waving. So what is the problem? In his criticism of William James’s theory of emotion, von Hildebrand writes:

It would be more interesting to clear up the psychological problem of how it was possible for such a stimulating and many-sided thinker as William James—to whom we owe the fine aphorism *I see what I see*, whereby he refused to acquiesce in a discussion of *theories* that would eliminate *facts*—to succumb to such a primitive error that so crudely violates the principle *I see what I see*. (1:24, emphasis original)

The problem with “I see what I see” is that it applies to everybody—everybody sees what they see. But note that James supposedly violates this principle² and the sought-after explanation is psychological in nature.

Psychology indeed—for persons who do not perceive beauty are like those born blind. They lack an ability (1:372) or organ (1:374) with which to see beauty. More broadly (and bracketing the case of a totally beauty-blind person), von Hildebrand claims that any apprehension of beauty requires a “special sense,” which admits of gradation depending on the breadth and depth of a person’s apprehension of beauty, and whether he has (or has not) artistic sensitivities (both generically and for specific genre) (1:373).

² How? By not seeing what he (James) sees? By ignoring what he (James) sees? By ignoring what he (von Hildebrand) sees? By not seeing what he (von Hildebrand) sees?

So, if you fail to see the objective joyfulness of the blue sky, does that entail deficiency or absence of a faculty? Perhaps all that is entailed is that *if* you understand what a “pure quality” is, *and* you do not perceive the objective joyfulness, *then* you are lacking the special sense, or some refinement thereof. But imagine a person who otherwise agrees with the aesthetic judgments expressed by von Hildebrand. Let us stipulate that his agreement is based upon original experience and not merely von Hildebrand’s authority. But he disagrees with the claims about objective joyfulness or hopefulness. Would we say of such a person that he lacked a (sufficiently) refined sensitivity? I submit that we would not, and moreover that, in such a case, any quick dismissal of concerns about peer-disagreement rings hollow.

Let me add that, if I have allowed myself the right to critique some aspects of the *Aesthetics* as an avowed non-aesthetician, it is on account of two reasons. The first is that the *Aesthetics* spills over in all directions—bearing implications for, or commenting upon, issues of method, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. It is far from being a work exclusively for insiders. The second is that I sincerely love the work of von Hildebrand. I want to understand it better, and these questions are a means to that end. Let me close by expressing again my gratitude to the Hildebrand Project and all responsible for these volumes, and my hope that the availability of this work will bear much fruit in the scholarly and cultural restoration of beauty.

N.V

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On Purpose by Michael Ruse (*Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018*), xv+294 pp.

DARWIN IS WIDELY THOUGHT TO HAVE COMPLETED the expulsion of final causes from nature that began with Bacon and Descartes. The success of evolutionary biology as an explanatory framework has not given Darwinians much pause to reconsider that judgment, yet talk of teleology refuses to disappear. It persists not only in traditionally philosophical questions like consciousness and morality, but in empirical problems like evolutionary “progress” and in the very grammar of adaptation itself. Michael Ruse has attempted a selective reconstruction of

discourse on teleology from Plato to the present. With eight chapters (just over 150 pages) devoted to this history, the coverage is broad and moves at a brisk pace. The last four chapters isolate key themes in connection with teleology: human evolution, mind, religion, and the philosophical coherence of Darwinism

Ruse presents a familiar historical arc. The Greek atomists were moving in the right direction until Plato, Aristotle, and their Christian inheritors steered Western philosophy onto the byway of teleological thinking, where it remained for two millennia. Modern mechanistic physics recovered course, relegating teleology to the initial design of the universe, but biology remained troublesome, and Kant was not alone when he mused that never would there appear “a Newton of a blade of grass.” But Darwin did just that, providing a mechanistic explanation for the functionality of organisms which seemed to demand final causality, and Darwinism has continually refined and extended his mechanisms. Despite attempts to recover teleology, whether theistic or vitalistic, Darwinism seems to have won the day.

Nearly everyone with some knowledge of Western intellectual history knows this story, and Ruse tells it with unfailing generosity and humor, though not without a splash of gentle irony. The very forces Augustine saw as clouding God’s purposes in nature and history—the struggle for existence, self-interest, suffering—turn out to be the means by which all those apparently teleological (“good”) features of nature come into existence. Readers may frequently desire more detailed exposition, but the analysis is never careless, and Ruse has an eye for sparkling quotations that move the narrative along quickly and without caricature.

The book’s most ambivalent feature is also its characteristic one, the use of a threefold typology dividing theories of teleology according to the *origin* of the telos: *external* to nature, *internal* to nature, and internal to the mind or *heuristic*, for which Plato, Aristotle, and Kant respectively stand in as author and archetype. Now these distinctions are philosophically substantive, but in Ruse’s account, they create some strange bedfellows, wrinkle the history a bit much, and cover over a number of other philosophical issues. If Plato and the Intelligent Design crowd end up together, or Kant with Darwin, that will be hard enough to swallow, but to couple Aristotle with a list of thinkers that includes philosophers like Friedrich Schelling, Herbert Spencer, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Henri Bergson, and Alfred North Whitehead, biologists like Hans Driesch and Brian Goodwin, and even the Gaia hypothesis, simply will not do. If we consider some other possible ways of organizing this history, the reasons why become evident.

One route would be to foreground the *goal* rather than the origin of the telos, placing four *teloi* in tension: a domain of *ultimate values*, such as beatitude or moral or logical truth, which are the end of human action and cosmic order; *terminal capacities*, such as reason or mind, that mark a predetermined or progressive end point for biological evolution; the *adaptive utility* of morphological change; and the ontogenetic course of *organic development*. If teleology is (minimally) goal-directed behavior, these are very different goals, different behaviors. Ruse confronts all of them at some point in the book but is preoccupied with the middle two forms, evolutionary progress and adaptation, and only rarely does he pause to discriminate the precise structure of teleology in one or another instance. Had he done so, Aristotle and Julian Huxley could scarcely end up in the same camp, for Aristotle concerned himself principally with what today we call development, Huxley with the cosmic whole of evolution. That Ruse emphasizes the “global” or cosmic element in Aristotle’s teleology, referenced to the Unmoved Mover, and does so with minimal attention to his theory of substance is telling (12–13, 16–17). Aristotle hammered out the idea of final causes to cope with the insufficiencies of atomism and Platonism in describing the growth and structure of organisms, but the logic of his argument is here glossed at best.

Something similar goes for Kant and Darwin. To say that teleological thinking arises from “dispositions” that “have been put in place by natural selection for their utility” or “filled in, as it were, by experience and culture” rather than being “synthetic a priori conditions . . . for all and any rationality” ignores what Kant was after on at least two counts (212). First, Kant, like Aristotle, was interested in what he perceived to be the structure of living organisms, the reciprocal relation of parts and wholes as both mutually means and ends (58–59). That he contemplated the possibility of extending this question to what Darwin later recognized as adaptation does not absorb or vanquish it (67). The twin facts of organic form and its alteration are quite distinct issues, philosophically and teleologically. Ruse seems to miss this point, or at least neglects it here. Just as important, Kant’s *a priori* employment of teleology as a regulative ideal will not bend to Darwinian appropriation without a category error. Even granting Kant’s formalism, its framing is ineradicably normative, appealing to criterion of validity or rightness that are immune to Darwinian explanation. The internal logic of such questions simply has nothing to do with the mechanisms of selection.

So Aristotle and Kant both seem to have the same telos in mind, that of organic development. Incidentally, though Darwin is more or less mute here, one might argue that contemporary evolutionary theory is busy

reconstructing the whole neo-Darwinian synthesis on precisely this basis (so-called “evo-devo”), and Ruse is curiously quiet about the current state of the field. A lot has happened since Stephen J. Gould. In any case, Kant and Aristotle *are* divided on a more fundamental level, namely, the antinomies that organize their interpretations of nature. Rather than starting with the origin or goal of teleology, we might emphasize the *conceptual strategies* within which any talk of teleology is taken up. Atomism is the most ancient and the most modern. If by this we mean the conceptual game of dividing nature into its smallest possible units, defining their properties, and explaining the movement of all nature from there, most of the pre-Socratics (not just Democritus or Empedocles) played along, and this strategy is constitutive of modern science. The other two strategies are harder to name, but their distinctive starting points are sufficiently plain. Plato and Aristotle, and for that matter the theistic traditions that followed them, began with the antinomy of *form* and matter. Post-Cartesian and especially post-Kantian philosophy departed from the antinomy of *mind* and matter. One is tempted to term at least one of these “idealism,” but that gets confusing for obvious reasons, and we can put the issue aside here. Point being, these conceptual strategies operate at such a fundamental level that talk about the origin or the goal of teleology *has* to be pre-fitted to one of them, since teleology makes sense only within the context of some more specific question concerning the structures and behavior of natural phenomena. Such strategies need not be mutually exclusive. Aristotle critiqued atomism—the inductive path to final causes is *founded* in this critique—but he knew well enough that the organization of parts in any living thing is crucial to its functioning. They are just ontologically posterior to its substance. Leibniz was a panpsychist of sorts, but an atomist too, as was Whitehead. And some recent Thomists, like Mariusz Tabaczek, are incorporating emergence with hylomorphism. These distinctions get blunted by Ruse’s “trichotomy,” or submerged to the point of silence.

It matters quite a lot that Aristotle’s whole theory of teleology started with a certain inductive problem, that of form, whereas post-Kantian theories tended to start from that of consciousness. By contrast, every advance of Darwinism has amounted to an upgrading of atomism: genetics, molecular biology, and neuroscience all give us more refined “atoms” that extend the theory’s reach. But all of the “vitalist” hitches in evolutionary theory—and there are quite a few, from Theodosius Dobzhansky and Sewall Wright to Goodwin and Harold Morowitz—tend to take development, morphology, or consciousness as a touchstone. Morphology and development get short shrift in Ruse’s telling, but mind forms a kind

of nexus for the later philosophical chapters of the book, a middle term between human evolution and religion.

The chapter on religion is the weakest, although the author has written thoughtfully on the topic elsewhere and widely enough that religious readers can forgive the appearance of hasty treatment. Ruse mostly gestures towards arguments against religious views of purpose at the personal and cosmic level, pointing to contradictions between and within religions, some evolutionary candidates for explanation (Scott Atran's hyperactive "agency detectors") or sociological ones (Émile Durkheim), and then some rather anecdotal remarks on the goodness of secular cultures and the rancor of certain religious ones. Similarly goes the chapter on human evolution, where the target is theories of evolutionary progress that Ruse tries to head off throughout the book. The logic here is slightly clumsy, but Ruse rehearses a recognizable selectionist argument, backing up from intelligence to brain size, dietary prerequisites, problem-solving in hunting, sociality, and the like. The path to human beings was sensible, if haphazard. But if recent work on convergent evolution is right (consider Simon Conway Morris and George McGhee here), then all of these seemingly incidental variables are stirring much farther down and more widely across the phylogenetic tree than Ruse lets on. As for the relative adaptive value of logic and morality, we might, he suggests, just as well conclude with a "warthog Aristotle" that "big brains and intelligence are not good adaptations" (164). Are wallowing in the mud and vigorous procreation really equally good to a reflective moral life, all things considered? I suspect category errors and performative contradictions lurk behind such assertions.

The chapter on mind is more thorough but surprisingly noncommittal. Much of it is spent sparring with Thomas Nagel, and while Ruse is "just not sure that a secular Aristotelianism has staying power," he is very sure that the problem of consciousness "doesn't really seem to be something that is going to wreck evolutionary theorizing" (172). And if neo-Darwinism can avoid reductive materialism, that is probably true. He rejects epiphenomenalism and dualism, acknowledging sentience in a variety of (even rudimentary) forms; but what of his claim that in Darwinian science "any kind of nonmechanical understanding is ruled out" (154)? With materialism and dualism off the table, and Nagel's panpsychist monism in doubt, that would seem to leave only emergentist theories, where consciousness supervenes on a self-organizing material base. These are often mechanical but also tend to revert to dualism or reductive materialism, as Ruse admits. In the end, he winds his way back to something like Nagel's neutral monism but in no way addresses the latter's argument (Nagel calls it "conjunctive")

that, if the conditions for the evolution of mind must be elementary to the universe, given the sort of thing mind is, then its evolution is inevitable, embedded in the nature of things and thus teleological. So Ruse's conclusion that Darwinism "does quite fine by mind," proving its adaptive value and selective origin and taking it "as a given," looks too easy.

There is a great deal more one could say in favor of this book, its clarity, tone, and economy in managing a welter of difficult material across multiple fields. Ruse knows where he stands, grants his interlocutors a good hearing, and is not out to settle all scores. He writes with a lightness of touch that is more than stylistic—it is open and joyful. We can of course imagine other and perhaps more detailed histories of teleology as a concept. Readers of this journal will particularly want to compare Ruse with Étienne Gilson's *From Aristotle to Darwin*, keeping an eye on the twin themes of organic development and vitalism. At present, however, this is the most complete study of teleology available. It also happens to be an excellent read. N.V.

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An Avant-garde Theological Generation: The *Nouvelle Théologie* and the French Crisis of Modernity by Jon Kirwan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), xiv + 311 pp.

KIRWAN SITUATES HIS BOOK as a work of historical theology. He seeks to locate the main French contributors to the *nouvelle théologie* within the context of their generational cohort, formed by World War I and the Great Depression. He focuses on notable Jesuits (associated with the Fourvière theologate) and Dominicans (associated with the theologate at Le Saulchoir). The Jesuits include Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou, Henri Bouillard, and Gaston Fessard; and the Dominicans include Marie-Dominique Chenu, Yves Congar, Louis Charlier, Henri-Marie Féret, and René Daguét. Kirwan describes his project as one of "global history" that treats its subject within its surrounding political-economic-cultural context (16). Different generations are shaped by different contexts.

The influential work of Jürgen Mettepenningen has described the *nouvelle théologie* as unfolding in four phases: 1935–1942, 1942–1950,

1950–1962, and 1962–1965. Kirwan demonstrates that this periodization does not work, both for reasons internal to the unfolding of the *nouvelle théologie*, and because it leaves out the larger political-economic-cultural contexts as well as pre-1935 writings, influences, and dialogue partners.

In chapter 1, employing cultural history's generational theory, Kirwan describes twentieth-century French "generations." He begins with the "generation of 1890" (born 1860–1875), also called the "generation of Dreyfus." The "generation of 1912" (born 1875–1885) receives the name "the generation of Agathon." The philosopher Maurice Blondel belonged to the Dreyfus generation, as did the Dominican Ambroise Gardeil and the Catholic Modernists Alfrey Loisy, Lucien Laberthonnière, and Édouard Le Roy. Members of the Agathon generation (named for a pseudonym shared by Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde, who rose up against the decadence and defeatism of the preceding generation) include the Dominican Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Jacques Maritain, Georges Bernanos, and Gabriel Marcel. Next comes the "generation of fire" (born 1885–1895) including many who fought or served in World War I; and finally the "generation of crisis" or the "generation of 1930" (born 1895–1905), to which belong the main figures studied by Kirwan, among them Henri de Lubac (who served in the war), Yves Congar, Jean Daniélou, and Marie-Dominique Chenu.

This last-named generation, as Kirwan says, "experienced an almost interminable series of crises from adolescence onwards: the First World War, the Great Depression, the rise of communism and fascism, and the Second World War. They had a sense that France, and even Western Civilization, had spent itself and remained in a perpetual state of upheaval" (37–38).

Briefly, Kirwan describes the Dreyfus controversy and its consequences, including the "1905 anticlerical backlash that established an official programme of secularism, or *laïcité*" (43). He notes that the Catholic Modernists in the Dreyfus generation were shaped both by philosophical and historical-critical impulses. With Kant, they accepted that "religious knowledge" has to do with practical rather than speculative reason (45). With the historical critics, they questioned the veracity both of the Bible and of Catholic dogma. Politically, their sympathies were on the liberal left, though not the far left.

After a quick survey of Albert Loisy's and George Tyrrell's approaches, Kirwan devotes ten pages to Blondel. Blondel developed a phenomenological path, rooted in human desire and action (through an analysis of the will's willing), to demonstrate the existence of God. Blondel faulted the neo-Scholastics for a rigid and jaundiced defensiveness vis-à-vis modernity,

for a conceptualist epistemology unable to handle religious reality (due to being separated from action and life), and for causing atheism and secularism due to a sharp dualism between nature and grace.

Blondel also argued that the neo-Scholastics, with their emphasis on timeless propositions, cut the true historical ground out from under Tradition and development of doctrine. For Blondel, Tradition relies not simply upon texts or other monuments but upon the lived experience of the Church in the present, which can be counted upon to gestate or generate previously unarticulated truths of faith and to prune away other elements, thereby freeing the future from the limitations of the present. This understanding of Tradition suggests, as Kirwan says, that the Church is not strictly answerable to texts or evidences but rather “is essentially self-justifying, carrying her own inner proofs within her,” as unfolded in the action or “Christian practice” of her communal life (61–62).

I will skip over Kirwan’s much briefer summaries of Laberthonnière and Le Roy, though it is important to note that the latter’s Kantian understanding of Catholic dogma goes well beyond the viewpoint of Blondel.

Kirwan devotes a chapter to the generations of 1890 and 1912, in preparation for his treatment of the French figures of the *nouvelle théologie*. He shows that significant movements in the direction of historical thinking were already afoot at the turn of the twentieth century among neo-Scholastic thinkers. In 1893, Dominicans including Ambroise Gardeil, Pierre Mandonnet, and Antonin Sertillanges, had founded *Revue thomiste* to undertake a more richly historical engagement with Aquinas’s work (as distinct from reading Aquinas through his Commentators). By 1910, two further historically oriented theological journals had been founded: *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (Dominican) and *Recherches de science religieuse* (Jesuit).

Turning to the generation of 1912, Kirwan lays the groundwork for de Lubac and his contemporaries (the generation of 1930) by observing that the work of Blondel was mediated to the young Jesuits by the brothers Auguste and Albert Valensin—both Jesuit philosophers. Kirwan attends as well to the highly influential Jesuit theologian Pierre Rousselot. Influenced by Blondel, Rousselot attempted to save Thomism from the critique mounted by Blondel. He did so by exploring “intellection”—via a neo-Platonic reading of Aquinas—as a form of action, and by probing further into the natural–supernatural relationship along Blondelian lines. Influenced by Rousselot and Blondel, Joseph Maréchal developed an epistemology rooted in “an a priori intellectual dynamism in which every act of judgment extends beyond the formal objects of the intellect” (93).

A further chapter examines in more detail the Jesuit formation of the

generation of 1930, with a focus on de Lubac. Kirwan sketches the powerful impact of the war upon this generation, and he also benefits from access to de Lubac's letters, journals, and earliest unpublished writings. Already in the 1920s the young Jesuits detested neo-Scholasticism and planned to overthrow it. In large part, their motives were rooted in apologetics. They could perceive the intellectuals and the working class slipping away from the Catholic Church. Kirwan describes the condemnation of the right-wing French movement *Action française* in 1926 and the emergence of Left Catholicism through diverse energetic figures and through the journals *Esprit*, *La Vie intellectuelle*, and *Sept*. With his teacher M.-D. Chenu, Congar began to plan for the dissolution of neo-Scholasticism, joining the young Jesuits in this effort.

After summarizing the arguments of de Lubac's 1938 *Catholicisme*—arguments that attempt to offer “a new apologetic method” for spreading the faith and promoting a “Catholic humanism” (170, 173)—Kirwan goes on to summarize the arguments of Chenu's 1937 *Une école de théologie*. He also attends to a 1932 article by Chenu titled “Les yeux de la foi” (with a nod to Rousselot), in which “Chenu makes a distinction between the dogmatic and juridical aspects of faith on the one hand and the non-conceptual and mystical drive to understand the object of faith, God himself, on the other” (177). The difficulty raised by these writings is whether, for Chenu, “dogmatic propositions can maintain any claims to immutability” (179).

Kirwan critically examines Jacques Maritain's 1936 *Humanisme intégral*. What interests Kirwan is Maritain's strongly positive appraisal of the modern emphasis on “human rights, justice, and solidarity,” which led Maritain to affirm “religious liberty” and “secular democracy” (191–92) and also to attempt to affirm what was positive in the aspirations of the Marxists.

Briefly, Kirwan presents Congar's work on ecumenism, before turning to various Dominicans and Jesuits on art, architecture, and engagement with Marxism. He examines the young Dominicans' encouragement of the architect Le Corbusier and the use (in the Jesuit Gaston Fessard's 1936 *Pax nostra*) of an offensive historical dialectic involving Judaism and paganism, with the “Jew” (communism) clinging to his particularity and the “pagan” clinging to his universality (fascism).

In a chapter about the 1940s, Kirwan traces the ascent of the *nouvelle théologie* and of “Left Catholicism,” an ascent that came about partly due to the collaboration of many of conservative Catholics with the Vichy puppet-government of Marshal Phillipe Pétain. He credits Fessard for quickly diagnosing the reality of Nazism, and he credits the young Jesu-

its with founding and contributing to a journal of spiritual Resistance, *Cahiers du témoignage chrétien*.

During the war years, theological projects continued, among them the founding of the patristics series *Sources chrétiennes* and the founding of a new series of works in “positive theology,” *Théologie*. De Lubac gave lectures, published in 1942, that presaged *Surnaturel*. Among the problems that de Lubac identified as in need of serious engagement were “the development of dogma, the supernatural, and Biblical criticism,” as well as dimensions of the Eucharist other than the real presence (210).

Among de Lubac’s other works of this period, Kirwan devotes about five pages to *Surnaturel* and a couple pages to *The Discovery of God*. The basic arguments of these books are found already in Blondel and Roussetot, even if de Lubac presses somewhat farther. During the same period, de Lubac published a book on Origen’s understanding of Scripture, in which he argued that “ultimate truth in the Scriptures is not ultimately propositional but rather is contained in the entire text and is Christ himself” (221). In addition, Kirwan attends to Henri Bouillard’s argument that both the immutability of dogma and its historical-cultural embeddedness can be defended by considering that “absolutes can be seized, but never in an absolute *representation*, only in an absolute *affirmation*. The latter, however, can only be apprehended through competent historical theology” (224).

A final section of this chapter on the 1940s details the triumph of “Left Catholicism” or “Social Catholicism” after the fall of Vichy and Nazism. This triumph was already underway during the war, through the “worker-priest movement” (240), but it accelerated tremendously in the heady days after the war. In this context, he examines Daniélou’s seminal 1946 “Les orientations des présentes pensée religieuse.” This article famously received pushback from neo-Scholastic Dominicans, leading ultimately to the condemnation of certain elements of the *nouvelle théologie* in Pope Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical *Humani Generis*, and also to the silencing of de Lubac, Congar, and others in the early 1950s.

Kirwan gives fascinating details regarding the impact that Maritain, de Lubac, and others had upon Angelo Roncalli (the future Pope John XXIII) and Giovanni Battista Montini (the future Pope Paul VI). He explores the unfolding of the Council, with particular attention to Chenu and Congar. The split between *Concilium* and *Communio* after the Council receives a few pages at the end of the book.

Kirwan’s underlying theme is that Blondel and his followers, above all de Lubac, opened the door to slippage on the enduring truth-status of dogmatic propositions, in part due to the strident ecclesiastical fall

narratives that they repeatedly painted with regard to the Church's second millennium (especially the post-Tridentine period), and in part due to Blondel's anti-propositional account of Tradition. Granted that a number of the leaders of the *nouvelle théologie* sincerely abhorred modernism, Kirwan has shown that the leaders of the *nouvelle théologie* were naïve about their ability to hold off the full force of Modernist understandings of dogma, when and if they accomplished their goal of destroying the neo-Scholastic understanding of the Church. Kirwan's book ends with de Lubac and Daniélou suffering "bitter persecution . . . in their own communities" (277).

More attention needs to be paid to two matters. First of all, what can be counted as real problems in neo-Scholasticism, given that (as Kirwan's book shows) it had evident strengths? Second, is there a way to move forward today in receiving the best teachings of the *nouvelle théologie* (including as found in Vatican II and the magisterial teachings of the postconciliar Popes) while also retrieving the best insights of the neo-Scholastics, especially regarding dogma and metaphysics? Is there a way to end the mutual search-and-destroy efforts and mutual blaming-for-everything that the neo-Scholastics and the *nouvelle théologie* unleashed upon each other in the period after World War II?

As the aftermath of the Council revealed, de Lubac and Garrigou-Lagrange were united in their commitment to opposing the Modernist attack upon the enduring truth of the Church's dogmatic and moral teaching. Now more than ever, due to the dominance of Rahnerian theology in the academy and the broader Church, this unity needs to be reclaimed and insisted upon.

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On Love and Virtue: Theological Essays by Michael S. Sherwin, O.P.
(Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2018), xix + 286 pp.

THERE IS A POINT IN EVERY GREAT SCHOLARLY LIFE at which a collection of previously published essays is not only tolerable but desirable. Father Sherwin has reached that point, and *On Love and Virtue: Theological Essays* are those essays (some of which have been revised). With his characteristic breadth and intelligence, Father Sherwin shows himself again to be a leading intellectual of Thomistic ressourcement and a fitting

torch bearer of Father Pinckaers' legacy. This volume is the fruit of twenty years of reflection, study, and scholarly activity, and anyone who reads it will benefit. The book organizes the essays into three parts. The first is dedicated to "The Question of Happiness and Human Flourishing." The second is dedicated to the "History of Christian Reflection on Love." And the third is dedicated to "The Mystery of Christian Virtue."

The first part, "Happiness and Love in Context," is rather small and covers only two essays: "Happiness and Its Discontents" and "On Love and War." They both constitute, each in its own way, a rejection of modern moral philosophy and a defense of ressourcement Thomism. The first intelligibly, insightfully, and accessibly covers a lot of ground: charting the modern divorce of happiness from morality, recovering an ancient view of happiness, explaining the relation of external goods to happiness, and showing how the tragedy and imperfection of natural happiness is a preparation for the Gospel. This essay would be a fantastic undergraduate introduction to the Pinckaersian thesis concerning moralities of obligation and the problems found therein. The second essay uses the affinities between love and war to give an extended reflection on the failures of technocratic (utilitarian) calculus to "solve human problems." Using Robert McNamara's failure in the Vietnam war as an example and G. E. M. Anscombe's writings against contraception as a diagnostic tool, Sherwin successfully shows how the same utilitarian reasoning lies behind both McNamara's failure and contraception. Though the section on contraception leaves the reader wanting more, Sherwin successfully makes his point: "Incoherence stems from treating sexuality reductively according to the same utilitarian calculus that has sown confusion in our wars."

The second part of the collection, "Love in Historical Perspective," encompasses five historical essays centered on an Augustinian/Thomistic account of the virtue of charity. The first essay, "If Love It Is: Chaucer, Aquinas, and Love's Fidelity," roams freely and coherently between Chaucer, modern psychological research, and Aquinas to explain the complexity of love. Identifying, distinguishing, and relating love as a passion and love as a choice, Sherwin explains not only the fidelity (and infidelity) of love but also how our communities form our loves. The second essay, "Aquinas, Augustine, and the Medieval Scholastic Crisis concerning Charity," combines two previously published essays, one on charity's desire and another on the twelfth-century Scholastic crisis concerning love of God. Though Sherwin recognizes that Aquinas's historical relationship to the twelfth-century controversy is uncertain, he suggests that Aquinas's psychology of love successfully combines the insights from both sides by separating the two terms of the debate into the virtues of hope and

charity. This essay does a good job introducing the reader to the historical ways in which Aquinas's account of charity is novel. The third essay, "Love in Thomas Aquinas' Biblical Commentaries: A Sketch," is a short, informative, and suggestive survey of Aquinas's treatments of charity in his biblical commentaries. In it, Sherwin shows a general consonance between Aquinas's systematic treatises and his biblical commentaries on love but leaves the wider selection of texts (a fuller picture) and the thorny question of dates and development for future work. The fourth essay, "Friends at the Table of the Lord: John Chrysostom's Theology of Divine Friendship," is an instructive and moving account of how Chrysostom transforms ancient Roman forms of patronage to situate the saints and the poor as special friends and intercessors with God. This essay does a good job of showing the implications of the Eucharistic sacrifice for justice, as well as grounding hospitality (*philoxenia*) in the friendship of God. The last essay in this section, "The Friend of the Bridegroom Stands and Listens: Augustine on Pastoral Ministry," fills a lacuna in studies of Augustinian friendship. In it, Sherwin not only articulates Augustine's general theory of friendship with God, but also shows how Augustine uses this theology to answer the Donatist claims about baptism. In doing so, he offers an important corrective concerning pastoral ministry (and all Christian love): "The bishops are to lead the faithful to Christ; the faithful are to love their bishops only as friends of the bridegroom, and not as the bridegroom." This essay is required reading for any minister in the Church.

The third part of the collection is entitled "Christian Virtue" and encompasses five essays concerning a Thomistic theory of virtue. The first essay, "Virtue as Creative Freedom and Emotional Wisdom," aims to recover the rich meaning and context of certain moral terms: virtue, knowledge, emotion, and infused virtue. Though it is very short, and so merely wets the appetite, this essay successfully recovers the Thomistic meaning of these terms and exposes some of their counterfeits. The second essay, "Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice: A Test Case," seeks to defend the Thomistic conception of infused cardinal virtues against a Scotist reading (also followed by Odon Lottin). In this Sherwin successfully argues that adult converts not only help to prove the existence of the infused cardinal virtues but also help us make sense of their operation. In the subsequent essay, "The Return to Virtue: Challenges and Opportunities," Sherwin gives a very short summary of the rise of virtue ethics in the twentieth century. Though overall Sherwin sees this as a positive development in moral philosophy, since it reinserts moral inquiry into the quest for happiness, he admits it is a "mixed blessing," since it can also give rise to moral/cultural relativism, as well as elitism. Nevertheless,

he argues that Aquinas has resources to counter both trends and integrate modern virtue ethics into a comprehensive picture of the Christian life. In the next essay, "Fire Grows in Water: Thomas Aquinas' Interpretation of Virtue in the Scriptures," Sherwin aims to give a short introduction to Aquinas's thought on virtue as presented in his biblical commentaries: virtue is an analogous term grounded in Christ as "the man of perfect virtue" and the Christian life is a "participation in the virtues of Christ." This essay is a good exposition of Aquinas's thought and gives the reader a taste of the fuller vision of Aquinas's theology of virtue, beyond the *Summa theologiae*. The final essay in this volume, "Christ the Teacher in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas," is a fantastic short study of Aquinas's Christology and pedagogy. In it, Sherwin not only successfully connects seemingly disparate parts of Aquinas's work, but also draws deep insights from them concerning the role of Christ as teacher and friend of the disciples. For any of us who spend time teaching, this essay can help us think about pedagogy in an explicitly Trinitarian and Christological way.

The above summaries, though they give a small window into these essays, fail to capture the depth and insight Sherwin brings. Sherwin seamlessly incorporates historical research, literature, psychological research, and an accurate, but not overly granular, exegesis of Aquinas. Quite a few of these essays bear re-reading in a contemplative way, and the reader will come away with some new insight each time. Undoubtedly, this is because Sherwin treats Thomism as a living tradition of thought, one in dialogue with the problems and research of today. Though most of us know it, Aquinas has much to offer and Sherwin proves it, especially concerning friendship, virtue, love, infused virtue, and the restoration of moral terms. In this recovery and creative use of Aquinas's ethical thought, Sherwin successfully takes up the mantle of his mentor, Father Pinckaers. Thomism is not only a potent intellectual understanding of the world, but a way of life centered on friendship and virtue.

Though this high praise is well deserved, this volume is not without *desiderata*. Many of the essays are suggestive and perceptive, but leave the reader wondering about further implications and other relations. Sherwin often uncovers deeply insightful and impactful readings of Aquinas only to simply pass them over without further exposition. An easy example of this is his essay concerning utilitarian calculus and contraception. From someone so well situated to treat this debate, it is disappointing to get only a page and a half. It is an insightful page and a half, but that only adds to the frustration. Likewise, other essays in the volume are already showing the date of their original publication and could have been updated to track the debate since then. For example, the essay "Infused Virtue and the Effects

of *Acquired Vice: A Test Case*” defends and explains the coexistence of the infused and acquired cardinal virtues. Since its original publication, however, this debate has seen a more vigorous defense of an alternative, though not Scotist, conception. The essay, and the wider debate, would have benefited from an updated essay. Those two issues notwithstanding, I would recommend this volume highly. Sherwin represents the best of Thomism. N.V

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Deification in the Latin Patristic Tradition, edited by Jared Ortiz
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2019), ix + 313 pp.

IT IS CERTAINLY A WELCOME EXPERIENCE to come across works today that seek to bridge the polemical gap between the Latin West and the Orthodox East. One of the more remarkable contributions to this conversation is the recent collection of essays on deification among the Latin Fathers published by Catholic University of America Press. The book originated out of a three-day symposium dedicated to the subject at the 2015 Oxford Patristic Conference. Such a topic was wisely chosen, as it is often supposed that the Latin theologians did not articulate a tradition of deification, often focusing instead on the paradigm of nature and grace. While it is the case that certain among the Latin Fathers, Ambrose especially, did in fact prefer the language of nature and grace, one of the consistent themes that emerges from this study is that this in no way precludes an understanding or *intellectus* that carries the same sense of deification as held by the East. The ecumenical ramifications of such a study needs no exaggeration, but what is more, it also contributes to a needed conversation today regarding the relationship between learning and piety within the academy, as well as the unity of theology as a professional enterprise. The remarkable thing about the subject of deification as a *locus theologiae* is that, while it retains a rigorous dogmatic and biblical foundation, lending itself easily to the specialties of systematicians, it necessarily involves or ought to involve the interior life of its practitioners as well. At least this was the case for all of the figures studied in this collection. As a topic under which many theological disciplines may be subsumed and synthesized, it also offers a certain unity to the theological science which may be reparative to some extent of

the fragmentation that is often seen within the faculties of many graduate schools of theology and divinity. Members of a learned body, who are conscious of certain shared convictions regarding the ethical implications of their respective fields, will soon discover that they have more in common than is usually assumed, despite the disparateness of specialties.

The book takes the form of fourteen chapters, most of which are dedicated to one or two principal figures in the Latin patristic tradition, while others examine larger themes, such as the liturgy, or provide more overarching and comparative analysis between multiple figures. After an insightful examination of the theme of deification in the early Latin liturgy, the essays progress chronologically, beginning with several of the early writers and works from North Africa: Tertullian, Cyprian, and the *Passion of Perpetua and Felicity*. Treatments of Novatian and Hilary of Poitiers follow, with subsequent chapters on the principal Latin theologians of the fourth and fifth centuries: Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. Situated within the context of the collapse of the Western half of the Roman Empire and the transition into the early Middle Ages, the figures of Peter Chrysologus, Leo the Great, Boethius, Benedict of Nursia, and Gregory the Great round out the study, with a concluding summary comparing the traditions of deification in the East and the West.

Though many of the thinkers and writers who are the subjects of the various chapters of this study had unique points of emphasis and even methods of articulation, more often than not, there were remarkable points of commonality. One of the most prominent being the reluctance among many of the Latin Fathers to use such words as *deificare*, *deificatio*, or any of its derivatives when speaking about the workings of grace in the life of the Christian. The reasonings behind this are debated, but some of the plausible theories put forward in this study include the notion that such doctrines were too advanced for the average audience, or that they suggested the wrong connotations given certain imperial customs then in force in many of the provinces where these respective theologians were preaching and writing. Nonetheless, as many of the scholars in this study went to great lengths to demonstrate, the same *intellectus* or understanding of deification was signified through the various conventional analogies or concepts that were deemed more appropriate and better suited for their respective listeners.

Some of the more unique idioms treated here that fall under the category of *communicatio idiomatum* include that of the “loaning or borrowing” that takes place between the divine nature of Christ and the human nature of humanity, seen most clearly in the writings of Novatian of Rome. Another is the notion, developed by Tertullian out of a basis in Roman

law, of Christ as the *sequester*, whereby Jesus, through his Incarnation, even more than simply identifying with the flesh of man, retains the obligation to restore this same flesh, now divinized, back to man in the eschaton. In terms of certain themes concerning deification which many of the Latin Fathers, and especially those of the fourth and fifth centuries, shared in common, one of the more prominent is the various ways in which the “exchange formula” of Athanasius was employed, particularly in their preaching and commentaries upon Scripture. Another common theme is that of divine adoption. This teaching, found especially in the writings of Ambrose, Jerome, Peter Chrysologus, and many other Fathers, is largely found in preaching addressed to neophytes and catechumens as it is closely linked to the sacrament of baptism. One of the most prevalent notions of deification seen throughout this study and which would have a long history in the Latin West is that of the progressive restoration of the image and likeness of God within man. In North Africa, Cyprian would preach about a needed *deifica disciplina*, the ascetical effort required for the sanctifying transformation of the interior life, while Augustine would subsequently speak of a certain “deified knowledge” that is the result of moral transfiguration. Another common element seen in many of the discourses of the Latin Fathers is the use of certain biblical texts to undergird their teaching of deification, foremost among those being Psalm 82, 2 Peter 1:4, and especially the doctrine of Saint Paul, particularly 2 Corinthians 8:9 and the Epistle to the Ephesians, wherein the teaching of divine adoption is expounded at great length. Perhaps the greatest commonality shared by the theologians concerned in this study is certainly the centrality of Jesus. No matter the particular idiom, biblical text, analogy, or metaphor, in the end, the doctrine of these Fathers always resolves back to the person of Christ and the implications for mankind of his Incarnation and resurrection. Even more than just emphasizing the essential mission of Christ for the redemption of mankind, many of these Fathers also drew attention to the moral and individual dimension of friendship and intimacy with the person of the Savior, the result of grace and the response of unmeasured love freely given.

Some of the particular strengths of the book include its remarkable accessibility. It has a certain continuity of style and format throughout, which include generous “signposting,” section headings, and concluding summaries at the end of each chapter. There are also copious footnotes throughout and a helpful bibliography at the end for those who might wish to follow up with their own research. Another asset to this study is its concluding chapter by Norman Russell, which summarizes the entire book and offers a comparative study with the Eastern doctrine of

deification. Besides highlighting the Latin patristic reception of certain Platonic themes, the Christological foundation of deification, and its ecclesial nature and eschatological orientation, one of the unique aspects seen throughout this book that Russell draws attention to is the role of monasticism. Many of the Fathers in both the Eastern and Western tradition lived and worked out of a monastic context, and in this regard, it was particularly good to see the essay contributed by Father Luke Dysinger, O.S.B., focusing on Benedict of Nursia and Gregory the Great, as the doctrine of deification is not often synonymous with their writings, yet is clearly a dominant theme for both of them.

In terms of certain weaknesses of the text, the treatment of Boethius, while strong from a philosophical perspective, appears to be more of a stretch in terms of inclusion in this collection. As the author, Michael Wiitala, rightly observes, Christ is everywhere absent in Boethius's notion of deification, as is the Scriptures and any reference to the previous patristic tradition. Another fault is the glaring lacuna of any treatment of John Cassian. Given Russell's estimation of the importance of the monastic theological tradition behind the Church's teaching on deification, especially that of Cassian for the Latin West, such a study, as instanced by the many contributions of Father Columba Stewart, O.S.B., would be a welcome addition to round out the essays in this collection.

Looking ahead, it might be suggested that a study of the ramifications of this topic within the context of ecumenism would be particularly apropos, especially given the context of monasticism, a deeply shared ecclesial experience for both the East and the West. Another might be to carry forward the research of this book into the Middle Ages and beyond with a companion volume or series. Much fruitful study has been done of late to dispel any notion of a lack of theological continuity between the age of the Fathers and that of the Schoolmen, and the subject of deification is not least among such shared concerns. For instance, one has only to peruse the writings of the great twelfth-century Cistercians and Victorines to see that the theme of rectification of the soul and the restoration of the image and likeness in man was taken quite seriously. Even closer to our own time, we see, for example, in the person of Blessed Columba Marmion, O.S.B., someone whom Saint John Paul II deemed to be the "Doctor of Divine Adoption."

REV

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