

Book Reviews

Engaging the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit: Love and Gift in the Trinity and the Church by Matthew Levering (*Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016*), vii + 440 pp.

MATTHEW LEVERING'S *Engaging the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit: Love and Gift in the Trinity and the Church* advances the thesis that "the Holy Spirit should be praised and contemplated under the proper names 'Love' and 'Gift,' with respect both to his intra-trinitarian identity and to his historical work in Jesus Christ and the church" (2). Levering has it in mind to overcome "the disastrous separation of theology and spirituality along with the modern separation of philosophy and a way of life" (50n131). One reason for writing this book was that Levering wished to know God intimately now, and not just be a student of a God whose presence he would ward off (vii).

This volume comprises seven chapters, preceded by a substantial introduction (fifty pages) in which Levering lays out objections to his central thesis, devoting special attention by way of critique to three contemporary authors: Thomas Weinandy represents "trinitarian theology that seeks to retrieve and accentuate the role of the Spirit"; Sarah Coakley stands for "postmodern or contextualized trinitarian theology"; and William Hasker exemplifies social trinitarianism (16). Levering will embrace Aquinas's approach of naming the Spirit "biblically and analogously" (9). In the introduction, Levering focuses on the Old Testament and Paul in order to emphasize that the root of naming the Spirit "Love" and "Gift" is the "urgent love between God and Israel, the holy people" (49). And he observes a salutary sparseness about the names Gift and Love (35).

In chapter 1, Levering takes on the foundational question of the names Love and Gift. He begins by examining Hans Urs von Balthasar's contention that the Scriptures associate love with the Father and the Son perhaps even more than with the Holy Spirit. For instance, in John's Gospel, the Spirit is overwhelmingly associated not with love but with truth; and Paul's letters more strongly link the Spirit to power (*dynamis*), to God-given ability (*charisma*), and to God's salvific thoughts than to love (52).

Levering then moves on to St. Augustine's rich and dense exposition of the names Gift and Love. Admitting that Augustine's interpretation

of Scripture in support of these names for the Holy Spirit goes beyond what contemporary exegetes would allow, Levering reviews Augustine's arguments to show that while the Holy Spirit is not explicitly named Love and Gift, these names for the Spirit are based on Scripture (1 John 4:7–13; Rom 5:5; 1 Cor 13:2; Gal 5:6; and John 7:37–39). And he insightfully notes that patristic mindset admits of a more synthetic reading of Scripture, expecting God to speak to us in the sacred text about his triunity (54, 68). Augustine reads "love is of God" (1 John 4:7) in view of "God is love" (1 John 4:8) to infer the truth that a divine person proceeds as love from the Father. That is, since God is *love*, and love is *of God*, then *God is of God*, and this God of God is himself Love. But is this Love proceeding from the Father, the Son, or is he the Spirit? Since "if we love one another, God abides in us" (1 John 4:12) and "by this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of his own Spirit" (1 John 4:13), we can interpret John to be teaching here that Love names the Holy Spirit. And since God *has given* us of his own Spirit, the Spirit can be named Gift (56).

Levering traces out other scriptural themes that Augustine connects to the Spirit as Love and Gift, such as the love poured into our hearts (Rom 5:5), the living water (John 4:14, 7:37–39; 1 Cor 12:13), the gift of grace (Eph 4:7; Ps 68:18; 1 Cor 12:4; Heb 2:4; Eph 4:11), forgiveness of sins (Acts 2:38), and the gift of God (Acts 8:20, 10:45, 11:17) (59–62). Levering recognizes that Augustine's work is decisive in naming the Spirit Gift and Love, but he rejects the notion that the basis of this naming cannot be found in Scripture. He also draws our attention to the less well-known fact of Augustine's reliance on Hilary for this inspiration (54). Levering also discusses Augustine's understanding of the Holy Spirit as the communion of the Father and the Son, for which the Spirit is rightly associated with charity (63).

In his second chapter, Levering treats four eastern theologians, St. John Damascene, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Basil the Great, and Dumitru Stăniloae, as well as St. Thomas Aquinas, the lone western representative, to whom he devotes half of the chapter. He begins with the question of apophaticism, reporting on diverse opinions on whether Augustine's names of Love and Gift should offend eastern apophatic sensibilities (72). Levering finds that Balthasar and Robert Jenson speak overconfidently about the inner life of the Trinity (72–74) while Aquinas respects apophatic concerns (76).

Levering documents that eastern patristic apophaticism does not rule out discussion of the distinction of the Holy Spirit's procession. For instance, Damascene writes that "whatsoever pertains to the cause, proceeding, revealing, and perfecting power must be attributed to the

Holy Spirit,” the one “proceeding from the Father,” because “without the Spirit, there is no impulsion”; the Spirit is “the median of the Unbegotten and the Begotten,” who “proceeds unceasingly from the Father and abides in the Son” (79). This description of the Spirit as “the median of the Unbegotten and the Begotten” already appears in Nazianzen (80), who also speaks of the example of Eve who proceeded from Adam but not by way of birth (81). Basil, who uses more analogies and titles for the Spirit than Gregory, speaks of the Spirit’s character as the Perfecter in creation and draws a connection between the Holy Spirit and the gift of holiness (83). The Spirit “comes forth from God, not begottenly as the Son does, but as the breath of his mouth”; he is the Spirit of the Son by being related naturally to the Son (84). “The Spirit is glorified through the communion that he has with the Father and the Son” (84). Basil and Gregory were concerned to show that the fact that the Spirit is the “gift” of God in us does not suggest that the Holy Spirit was not truly God (84).

Levering observes that Stăniloae falls under his own condemnation of speculation about the Trinity, of which he accuses Augustine (85–89). Levering defends Aquinas against accusations of rationalism, pointing out that Thomas deploys the analogy of the Word and Love in order to manifest the intelligibility of revelation, aware of the analogy’s limitations and not pretending to grasp the Triune God (98, 103). Aquinas clarifies that the name “Love” tells us who the Spirit is: he is the fruit of the immanent procession in the divine will as the Father and the Son love themselves and each other (99–103); he is the radiance of divine communion (100), the bond of love between the Father and the Son (103). He proceeds not by way of similitude, as the Word does, but by way of imprint or impulse (107).

Levering observes that, arriving at the same conclusion as Augustine but from a different angle, Thomas teaches that because the Spirit proceeds as Love, he must proceed as Gift. This is because, whenever one gives a gift, he first gives love; so love is always the first gift (107). Thomas too deals with the suggestion that as a gift given to men, the Spirit’s true divinity might be called into question. He affirms that the Spirit himself, and not just created gifts, is given; and he clarifies that Gift is an eternal name not because the Spirit is given eternally to anyone, but because of his aptitude to be given (105–6).

Chapter 3 examines the *Filioque*—on which the names Love and Gift depend in certain ways (163). Levering notes numerous eastern figures who reject the *Filioque* from the fourteenth century on, and some contemporary Western authors who believe that it should be dropped from the creed in the Western Church (114–15). Levering points to the solution proffered

by St. Maximus the Confessor and taken up in 1995 by the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, which recognized that (a) the Greek verb *ekporeuesthai* means to proceed from an original source, that is, from a principle not from a principle, which could only be the Father, but (b) *proïenai* refers to procession in a more general sense that would be the equivalent of the Latin *procedere*. Thus a possible reconciliation would be to say that the Spirit *ekporeuetai* from the Father alone but *proeisi* from the Father *and the Son*—that is, he *ex Patre* Filioque *procedit* (118–19). In light of the *Filioque*, the Pontifical Council reflects on the Spirit as the Gift of Love that “characterizes the relation between the Father, as source of love, and his beloved Son” (121). The Council, notes Levering, argues that Gregory of Palamas’s theology of the Spirit is broadly in accord with that of Augustine and Aquinas, who understand the Spirit as Love and Gift.

Having established this background, Levering raises the question that will occupy the remaining pages of the chapter: is the *Filioque*, especially as formulated by Aquinas and taught by the Councils of Lyons II and Florence, the flowering of Augustinian rationalism? (123). Levering reviews the arguments of Sergius Bulgakov and Vladimir Lossky, who answer this question in the affirmative (133, 137), before turning to Thomas to show that the answer must be in the negative (157, 163).

Aquinas holds that the *Filioque* is present in Scripture not *per verba* but *per sensum* (141). Based on passages like John 16:15—“All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that [the Spirit] will take what is mine and declare it to you”—Thomas argues that the Son receives everything that the Father has, including the power to spirate the Holy Spirit (144). With Aquinas’s understanding of the divine person as a subsisting relation—advancing the concept of relation introduced by Basil the Great—the *Filioque* is an open and shut case (145). That is, the only possible way that persons who are each equally the divine essence can be distinct in the real order is by relative opposition, on account of one person proceeding from another; therefore, if the Spirit does not proceed from the Son, then there is no relative opposition between him and the Son, and he cannot possibly be distinct from the Son (154). The Father and Son are not two but one single principle of the Spirit; nevertheless, they are always two distinct persons: they are one Spirator but two supposita spirating (145, 161). This preserves the Father’s unique status as the one without origin, the Son’s total equality in power to the Father, and the Son’s intimacy with and distinction from the Holy Spirit. Regarding the pope’s authority to add the *Filioque* to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, Aquinas notes that previous creeds may not be contradicted, but they may be clarified, as in the case of Constantinople I’s adding to the Nicene Creed by way

of clarification, not revision (146). Levering comments that this indicates that the Church is alive today (146). Aquinas makes use of philosophical tools to lay hold of the intelligibility of revelation and show that faith in the Trinity is not irrational; this is the opposite of rationalism (163, 167).

In chapter 4, Levering considers the Holy Spirit and Jesus Christ. He goes out of his way to emphasize the central indispensable definitive place of the Holy Spirit in the life of Jesus Christ our Savior. One simply cannot understand Christ, his sonship, or his mission without understanding that he was a man filled with the Holy Spirit. Levering appeals to James Dunn's work on the Holy Spirit, because although Dunn does not subscribe to the divinity of the Son and the Spirit, he, more than any other contemporary biblical scholar, creatively explores the Holy Spirit's role in the life of Jesus (171–72). Levering's task in this chapter will be to show that Aquinas's account of the mission of the Spirit to Jesus agrees with and can be enriched by Dunn's research (172). Dunn concludes that Jesus was conscious of his eschatological power especially in his exorcisms, the prophecy of Isaiah 61 (about being anointed with the Spirit to bring good tidings to the afflicted), and his baptism. Dunn maintains that Jesus's "consciousness of his sonship and consciousness of Spirit are two sides of the one coin" (178). Dunn also points out that while there are other intercessors in Second Temple literature, such as archangels, Melchizedek, and Abel, only the ascended Jesus is the Lord and dispenser of the Spirit (181).

Aquinas teaches that Christ received the plenitude of the Holy Spirit's invisible mission at the moment of his conception; the visible missions of the Spirit that he received at his baptism and transfiguration are expressive of Jesus's unique power to communicate grace to make his people holy (188). Naturally, the mission of the Spirit causes no change in God but effects a new relationship in the one receiving the mission—that is, a new presence of and relation of intimacy with the Spirit (189). A mission signifies the divine person's eternal procession with the temporal effect of indwelling in the sanctified (190). Levering connects the Spirit's names of Love and Gift to this theme in recalling Dunn's observation that, in contrast to John the Baptist's foretelling of the Spirit-filled messiah through imagery of judgment, Jesus emphasizes grace and mercy (178). Levering explains that the mission of the Spirit to Christ attunes Christ supremely to Love and Gift precisely in the unfolding of his historical existence; it is most fitting that this be from the moment of his conception, given that, as Thomas teaches, the Son is not just any sort of word, but one "who breathes forth Love" (193). Aquinas understands the scriptural appropriation of the Incarnation to the Spirit to be on account of the Spirit's property as Love, as God became man on account of exceeding love (194). Levering concludes that

Dunn and Thomas agree on the radical and unique character of the Spirit's presence in Jesus for his eschatological mission (196).

Chapter 5, "The Holy Spirit and the Church," considers how we should understand the Holy Spirit's activity in constituting, building, and sustaining the Church. Levering notes that Jesus's eschatological baptizing with the Holy Spirit and fire should be understood "not only in relation to his cross, but also in relation to the community of believers united by the Spirit in Jesus's body—the temple 'not made with hands'" (210–11). Levering clarifies that the scriptural data that suggest that the kingdom is coming imminently may be reconciled with the data that suggest that the kingdom will come at some future time, by recognizing that even now, the Church participates in Jesus's "hour"—the moment of his eschatological fulfillment of all things by his Paschal mystery (211). So, during this time, Jesus's Spirit-filled Church lives by sharing in his holy self-offering to the Father (212). To make his case, Levering examines the portraits of Christ as an eschatological prophet of the kingdom of God drawn by N. T. Wright, James Dunn, and Dale Allison before turning to Aquinas for an understanding of the Church as the fruit of the missions of the Son and the Spirit—which understanding conveys the intensity and intimacy of the Church's reception of the eschatological Spirit (213). With Aquinas's help, we can properly value the work of the Spirit, who "having filled Jesus with his Love and Gift, now fills Jesus's Body, the church—the inaugurated kingdom of God—with 'the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ' (Phil. 4:23)" (215). Levering observes that we would do well to retrieve Thomas's detailed conception of the Spirit-filled Church, marked by radical participation in divine Love and Gift (234).

Aquinas understands the kingdom of God to refer to (1) the indwelling of Christ through the grace of the Holy Spirit, (2) Scripture (the law and the prophets) interpreted authoritatively, (3) the Church on earth, or (4) the heavenly court or banquet (234–35). The reason why there is a delay between Jesus's Pasch and the final consummation is that the preaching of the Gospel has not yet produced its full effect (239–40). The two visible missions of the Spirit to the Church—namely, Jesus's breathing on the apostles, giving them the power to forgive sins (John 20:23), and the descent of the Spirit on the disciples as tongues of fire on the Feast of Pentecost (Acts 2:2–4)—equipped the Church to celebrate the sacraments and to teach, respectively (243). In his invisible mission, the Holy Spirit comes to dwell in the soul in sanctifying grace, infusing theological virtues (which perfect our knowing and loving) and giving gifts of the Holy Spirit (which make us amenable to the Spirit's promptings) (246, 253). Finally, Levering explores Aquinas's theology of baptism, confirmation, the Eucha-

rist, and penance to show that the sacraments mediate the invisible Spirit in distinctive ways.

In chapter 6, Levering discusses the Holy Spirit as the cause of the unity of the Church. He deftly critiques the false oppositions set up between diversity within the Church and visible unity, and between an institutional order (e.g., a hierarchy) and charismatic inspiration. Not at all naive about sin within the Church, Levering insists on the Holy Spirit's power to successfully draw people together into a visible sacramental and institutional unity, as one Church and eschatological community of Jesus Christ, by filling them with the gift of love and a spirit of repentance. The Spirit as Love and Gift cannot fail to produce ecclesial unity (270–71). Levering assesses Kendall Soulen's exposition on the connection between the Holy Spirit and diversity, namely, that it is characteristic of the Spirit to cause a multitude of people to experience and proclaim the gift of divine blessing and to elicit a limitless variety of names for God from every sphere of life (277, 279). He then traces the theme of the Spirit's unifying role in Scripture (280–83) before turning to Aquinas's understanding of the Holy Spirit's work as unifying the Church—which, he judges, merits emphasis over the idea that the Spirit is associated with diversity. Unity in diversity is the mark of the Spirit (293).

For Aquinas, the Holy Spirit even has the aspect of a unifier within the Trinity. While the Father is the principle of unity as the one without origin, the Spirit unifies as Love proceeding, that is, as the mutual love or bond of love between the Father and the Son, who, as a single principle of the Spirit, breathe him forth as Love and Gift. In his very person, the Holy Spirit expresses the relation between the Father and the Son as lover to beloved and vice versa (287). This bond of unity within the Trinity is the basis of the unity and sanctity communicated to the Church (285; 292n80). The Spirit as Love unites the Church by causing us to love God and by giving us hope of forgiveness, through charity and our own imitation of God's giving of himself (291–92, 296). The Spirit's work is to unite us to the Father by conforming us to the Son, who is the head of the Church (293). The purpose of the Mosaic law was to form a united people, and with the coming of Christ, who fulfills the law, "the purpose of the eschatological grace of the Holy Spirit that Israel's Messiah pours forth" is to form a united people on a worldwide scale (299).

Chapter 7 takes up the question of the Holy Spirit's making the Church holy. Levering notes that even as early as the Acts of the Apostles, sin beset the inaugurated eschatological community (311). Acts and the Pauline corpus do not hesitate to affirm both that the Church is truly holy and that members of the Church sin gravely (312). To ponder this mysterious

tension, Levering examines the positions of Reformed theologians Kevin Vanhoozer, Todd Billings, and John Calvin himself, before consulting Saints Cyprian, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas. For Vanhoozer, the Spirit leads the Church toward holiness, but she is not yet the holy bride that she will be eschatologically (317). Billings finds the language of total depravity helpful (319): God imputes righteousness to us (318); even so, the Church is not simply unholy (319). For Calvin, wherever the Word and sacraments are found, the Church exists, despite defects (325). Christ sanctifies the Church even now through the Holy Spirit, but she is not without spot and wrinkle (330); the holiness of the Church is only perfect in God's eyes, as he knows the final Church of the elect (329). For the Reformers, the Church can and does err (331).

Cyprian connects the Church's holiness with unity in the Spirit's gift of charity (332, 335) and in the divine gift of worship, rooted in the sacraments (334). Augustine agrees with this (338–39) and maintains that the Church is holy because of her true doctrine, by which she remains in Christ (337); she is holy on account of being the bride of Christ, not on account of her members (337n110). According to Thomas (*Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 5), when we profess in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed that we believe in one holy Church, “this must be taken as verified insofar as our faith is directed to the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies the Church, so that the sense is: ‘I believe in the Holy Spirit sanctifying the Church’” (340). That is, the Holy Spirit is the primary object of our confession, and the Church as a human institution has no power to make herself holy (340). As the soul gives life and operation to the body, so the Spirit gives life and operation to the Church (341). The Church is without spot or wrinkle in the sense that her true members are not in mortal sin, and they do not have duplicity of purpose (348); while Calvin maintains that all sin is mortal (352), Augustine and Aquinas distinguish mortal sin—which cuts one off from the Church—from venial sin (337, 348). Levering extends Aquinas's understanding of condign merit to conclude that the Church may be said to be immaculately holy insofar as her works (such as baptism) flow from Christ and the Holy Spirit—and not from (imperfect) humans. Unlike the Reformers, the Catholic theologians hold that the Church is intrinsically holy in her definitive teachings and sacraments; this holiness is not merely imputed to her extrinsically by God, but given through transformation by grace (339, 353, 365).

Regarding possible improvements to this work, Levering could articulate his central thesis of naming the Spirit Love and Gift more explicitly in places, for instance, in chapter 3 on the *Filioque*. The arguments are in place, but some readers may in some places overlook the last step of

connecting Love and Gift with the observations being adduced. Also, in his discussion of the *Filioque* in chapter 3 (e.g., at 118), Levering could have introduced Gregory of Nyssa's assertion that the Son is a cause (*aitia*) of the Spirit; more pointedly, he could have brought it to bear on John Zizioulas's argument that the Pontifical Council should have gone further and denied that the Son is in any way a cause (*aitia*) of the Spirit (122n19). Levering only adverts to Nyssa's assertion in a quotation from Brian Daley in chapter 2 (76n19).

To his credit, Levering includes diverse modern authors who hold opinions quite different from his own. However, readers less patient than Levering himself could wish that the treatment of these authors were more streamlined. For instance, should we be that interested in whether Dunn considers Luke 4:18–21 to be authentic (176) or allows that maybe Jesus was a son of God before his baptism (201), or that N. T. Wright appreciates the possibility of Jesus's having had a particular intimacy with the one called "father" (206)? Modern Scripture scholarship undoubtedly offers a contribution to theology, but one might wonder whether Dunn's historical-critical reconstructions strengthen Aquinas's account of "the unique plenitude of Jesus's experience of the Spirit" as significantly as Levering proposes (205).

In this monograph, Levering offers capacious documentation of relevant authors, with helpful commentated summaries manifesting an enviably extensive knowledge of the secondary literature. He engages in a close—at times rigorously technical—reading of Aquinas with attention to background that will benefit even experts who have spent years poring over the *Summa theologiae*. And he supplies a rich dossier of Scripture in support of his arguments about the Holy Spirit. Levering ventures polite and insightful corrections to modern authors (63n38; 103n131; 105n141; 120n16; 125n26; 137n73; 213n9; 215n12; 232n70; 250n149) and is not afraid to part company with the Angelic Doctor concerning his assertion that Christ had perfect infused knowledge of all things (201). *Engaging the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit: Love and Gift in the Trinity and the Church*, scholarly but accessible, provides a solid contribution to pneumatology.

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The Root of Friendship: Self-Love and Self-Governance in Aquinas by Anthony T. Flood (*Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014*), xix + 164 pp.

WADING INTO the stormy waters where Thomism, personalism, and modern analytic philosophy meet, Anthony Flood's book is an interesting and robust interjection into the debate concerning self-governance. Though it has room for further development and a deeper exegesis of Aquinas, Flood's aim (to defend Aquinas against claims of irrelevance and outright heteronomy) is laudable and worthwhile.

Flood is clear about his theses and audience. He seeks to present Aquinas's account of self-governance as an antidote to impasses in modern debates concerning autonomy. In this he defends three theses: "Aquinas's account of proper self-love is a description of the nature and importance of a person's subjective self-experience, his notion of self-governance cannot be understood fully unless we grasp its basis in self-love, and his account both satisfies contemporary conditions of relevance for self-governance and offers attractive solutions to issues raised in analytic discussions on such matters" (xi). The six chapters of the book can be subsumed under these theses.

The first chapter seeks to defend the first thesis and outlines Aquinas's thought on the nature of self-love and subjectivity. Its central claim is that self-love forms the basis of experience and subjectivity. In this primal self-experience, we judge ourselves to be fittingly loved and choose to love ourselves out of *dilectio*. This self-love, when properly ordered and habitual is self-friendship (a unique combination between the union of similitude and the union of possession) and is the ongoing constituent of subjectivity—a person's ongoing *complacentia* for himself. In other words, all other love relations are based on this self-relation, and self-love creates the subjective pole of a person's experience of this world. In addition, self-friendship is based on true knowledge of oneself as a subject with interiority and precludes conflict. Because self-love plays such a role in Aquinas's thought, so too must a person's subjective experience of the self.

The second chapter elaborates the historical antecedents to Aquinas's account and introduces the central conditions of self-governance. Flood divides these conditions into psychological and authoritative. The psychological requirements for self-governance are epistemic (access to the moral law or whatever standard will guide acts) and motivational (the ability to bring oneself to perform an action principally from internal, not external, motivational sources). The authority condition requires that one have the authority to act. Flood's purpose in this chapter is to show that the eudae-

monist tradition (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine) satisfies these conditions. His central claim is that virtue is a sufficient condition for both the psychological and the authoritative conditions of self-governance. The Stoics are the first to outline this explicitly, but it is implicit in the other thinkers. The wise person lives under his own law. Flood also seeks to allay fears of heteronomy in Augustine. Contemporary accounts do not claim that an objective moral order threatens self-governance, so the same should be said for theists. A person governs his own life according to the standards set forth by God and motivates himself to act.

The third chapter ends Flood's defense of the first thesis and transitions to his defense of the second thesis. It also concerns the authority condition in Aquinas. For an account of natural law, Flood follows Stephen Brock but adds that it is not the person *qua* intellectual which apprehends the good, but the person *qua* self-experiencing and self-loving. Our most basic relation to the good is not of seeking or obtaining, but of possessing the good of ourselves. From this basic unity the natural law flows; humans self-promulgate the natural law through practical reason. In other words, Flood argues that, since the essential properties of self-love include the desire for and activity of pursuing goods and avoiding evils, self-love must be central to Aquinas's account of natural law. In this, Flood is arguing in a Thomistic way that the authority condition is reduced to the psychological conditions (virtues).

The fourth chapter fully transitions to the third thesis. It concerns Aquinas's satisfaction of the psychological conditions for self-governance. In this Flood focuses on prudence, which integrates all relevant aspects of action and represents the flourishing of self-governance. He also meets some imagined objections concerning the possibly heteronomous nature of docility and political prudence. In both cases, it is a chosen subordination due to lack of knowledge. In neither case is it blind obedience, and so it is not heteronomy. In addition, the subject always carries the trump card—for his reason promulgates the natural law. In the case of an unjust law, "he does not endorse or identify with the law, and thereby has no obligation to follow it" (84). In fact, Flood argues, not even humility involves heteronomy. Pride destroys one's subjection to reason, and so humility is a constitutive factor in self-governance. Pride is bad because it undermines self-governance—it is born of distorted self-love.

The fifth chapter revisits both the authority condition and psychological conditions in Aquinas, thereby continuing a defense of the third thesis. We all have access to the natural law, since it is promulgated by reason. What deprives us of this is consequent ignorance; it truly undermines psychological access. Therefore, Aquinas satisfies the epistemic require-

ments. He also satisfies the motivational requirements. We can self-motivate; it is our repetitive poor choices that ill form our capacities. The authority requirement is met by Aquinas's claim that virtue is a sufficient condition for authority. Since we have the resources psychologically to be virtuous, we have the sufficient conditions for moral authority. All of this is, in turn, based on Aquinas's account of self-friendship, fully flourishing self-love, which is the positive experience of oneself such that one wants to promote, the actualization of himself as a person through self-preservation, desiring of goods for oneself, pursuing these goods, and delighting from entering one's own heart (internal peace). One must begin by loving oneself rightly and then one will pursue the virtues, which in turn give one moral authority.

The final chapter, chapter 6, claims that Aquinas's thought is the solution to many contemporary challenges. In this, Flood is again in dialogue with Schneewind, but also Frankfurt, Dworkin, Taylor, Christman, and others. Flood identifies three problems typical in modern thinking about autonomy: manipulation (what if someone incepts you?), *ab initio* (how can autonomy be if it arises from non-autonomous sources?), and excessive individualism (how can autonomy consider all the social factors of agency?). In answering, Flood claims that Aquinas's account of autonomy is hierarchical and perfectionist but also allows for authenticity, wholeheartedness, and social factors. In addition, Aquinas's account can answer these objections. The desires of self-love are universal—nobody can plant these in you. The rational will is an extension of personhood, and so autonomy still arises from the person. Political prudence, docility, and exemplarism add a social element to Aquinas's account. While these allow for a social context and influence, a person never forfeits his authority to self-govern. In all these cases, there is a self-knowledge of ignorance and so submission makes rational sense. Even in friendship, there is no heteronomy, for nobody conforms to another's will, but only shares in a common end. Indeed, Aquinas's account is both the perfect blend of relational autonomy and naturalistic enough to appeal to all parties.

Despite the tightly knit argument, this account is not without its exegetical difficulties and prospects for development. The first of these stems from the paucity of contact both with Aquinas's wider thought and with other Thomistic scholarship. In places this omission (even if admitted) is just odd. For example, there is no extended analysis of Aquinas's thought on obedience or prudence as fully perfected (with the gift of counsel). In other places, the piecemeal contact gives a distorted picture of Aquinas. For example, Flood says multiple times that humans have the wherewithal to motivate, obtain virtue, and self-govern. Aquinas's thought on original

sin, grace, and the gift of perseverance make these claims suspect. In other words, more contact with Aquinas's thought could deepen the project and result in a more nuanced account of self-governance.

The second place for development concerns the root issues distinguishing Aquinas and modern analytic philosophy. There is a lot left in the background. Take freedom as an example. It is almost certain that the modern analysis of autonomy is assuming what Pinckaers calls a freedom of indifference and Aquinas a freedom of excellence. Yet the concept of freedom is not directly addressed. In addition, Flood regularly switches between the modern criteria for self-governance (which apply to both the good and the evil) and Aquinas's claim that only the good self-govern. Which is it? How do we know? Likewise, it is certainly the case that many moderns hold that God and created causes are in competition. It would have been good to treat Aquinas's thought on this point: we are only self-governing because we are first governed; we are only free because we are first not free. Finally, I wonder if what worries moderns about Aquinas is not that he posits the necessity for self-governance to conform to an unchanging objective standard, but rather that he requires ultimate conformity to a personal God. Friendship is much more than one party providing an impersonal rule; it is a communing. It makes us want to do and conform our wills to God's.

The third place for development concerns Flood's account of self-love. He admits that this is likely to be the most controversial part (at least for Thomists), and it is. Undoubtedly, he defends his interpretation in other works, but his analysis is incomplete here. The most conspicuous absence is any analysis of love of self and love of God. No doubt this is because the book is philosophical, but even natural self-love must be *propter Deum* (in our first free act). To have our self-love be well ordered, we must will ourselves for God's sake. In contrast, Flood seems to claim that, if we do not relate to ourselves rightly, we will not relate to God rightly (90). At the very least, orders of causality need to be clarified. In addition, I have difficulty understanding (at least on Thomistic terms) what subjectivity and self-experience even mean. It would have been helpful to explain these terms and their provenance for a reader less acquainted with personalism. Finally, it would benefit the book to have more contact with Aquinas's account of natural love and the metaphysics of the good. Flood needs to distinguish what is necessary about natural love and what can be chosen. His account requires that self-love be voluntary, but he does not deal with Aquinas's texts that suggest both love of self and the objects of our natural inclinations are necessary. Similarly, Flood needs to develop an account of how we judge ourselves to be fitting objects of love. What we judge a fitting object of love is an aspect of the good, and so perfective. Can we perfect

ourselves by loving ourselves? It would seem substantial unity precludes this. Aquinas suggests that self-love is willing something perfective for oneself. Flood needs to wrestle with this more.

The final area for development concerns the relation of authority and freedom. Flood regularly assumes that knowledge and authority are the same thing. As a corollary of this, the more virtue one has, the less one needs authority. Submission, docility, counsel, obedience, political prudence, and so on are all assumed to be due to defects in our knowledge. Yet Christ has the gifts of the Holy Spirit and exercises obedience. In addition, the great Thomist Yves Simon has shown that authority is needed even for the virtuous. Flood does not seem to take this into account.

Given the good structure, interdisciplinary nature, and robust proposal of this book, I would recommend it to anyone interested in Aquinas and self-governance. Flood has done us a service by wading into this contested area and giving us a proposal worth considering. N.V

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Paul's "Works of the Law" in the Perspective of Second Century Reception by Matthew J. Thomas (*Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018*), xv + 230 pp.

THE PRESENT VOLUME is a lightly revised doctoral dissertation written at the University of Oxford under the supervision of Mark Edwards, David Lincicum, and Jenn Strawbridge. It examines one of the most vigorously contested phrases of the New Testament ("works of the law" in the Pauline Epistles) from the standpoint of early patristic reception. Paul, in both Romans and Galatians, formulates a sharp antithesis between "faith in Christ" and "works of the law" (Rom 3:20, 28; Gal 2:16; 3:2, 5, 10). For the apostle, faith in Christ effects justification, while works of the law are denied a role in justification. But what are these works? What do they signify? On what grounds does Paul oppose them?

According to M. J. Thomas, modern debates over Paul's "works of the law" have long been impoverished by inattention to the earliest patristic evidence. His dissertation aims to address this deficiency by ascertaining (1) how Paul's earliest readers understood "works of the law," and (2) how these ancient perspectives relate to modern debates among proponents of the Old and New Perspectives on Paul.

The parameters of the study extend from the *Didache* to the death of

Irenaeus. The rationale for these endpoints is derived from the work of Markus Bockmuehl, who argues that New Testament scholars can profitably consider the first 150 years of Christian history as a privileged period of living memory in which a vital connection with the apostolic age remains. Methodologically, the author describes his work as a conceptual study of the Pauline phrase *ἔργα νόμου*, “works of the law,” rather than a purely lexical one. Instead of restricting analysis to occurrences of the expression, which is not attested in early patristic literature before Irenaeus, he identifies texts that evince thematic overlap with Paul’s discussions in Romans and Galatians, especially those that are marked by Christian–Jewish polemics and engage in parallel discussions of law, works, and justification. Evidence gathered on this basis is sorted into three categories, labeled A, B, and C. Works in category A (“direct evidence”) show clear signs of Pauline influence and reference specific Pauline passages dealing with works of the law. Works in category B (“supporting evidence”) have probable Pauline influence and engage Paul’s letters, but not specifically passages about works of the law. Works in category C (“circumstantial evidence”) show possible signs of Pauline influence and canvass debates that are similar to Paul’s in Romans and Galatians, although without reference to Pauline passages about works of the law.

Having set forth the scope and procedure of the study (part I), the author moves to examine the views of leading representatives of the Old and New Perspectives on Paul (part II). Once the contours of the debate are framed out, and their views on Paul’s “works of the law” are identified, he proceeds in chronological order through the early patristic sources with the aim of discovering what he calls the Early Perspective on Paul (part III). Finally, he brings the ancient evidence to bear on the modern controversy, comparing and contrasting the Early Perspective on “works of the law” with the Old and New Perspectives (part IV).

The Old and New Perspectives divide cleanly down the middle of Paul’s “works of the law” formula. For the Old Perspective (OP), which is represented in the study by Martin Luther, John Calvin, Rudolf Bultmann, and Douglas Moo, Paul primarily denies *works* the power to justify. For advocates of the New Perspective (NP) such as E. P. Sanders, J. D. G. Dunn, and N. T. Wright, Paul primarily denies *the law* the power to justify. (1) What then is the meaning of Paul’s “works of the law”? According to the OP, Paul is talking about any works that one might perform to earn favor with God and attain salvation. According to the NP, the apostle refers mainly to the ritual obligations of the Torah that identify Israel as God’s people, most notably circumcision, Sabbath observance, dietary laws, and a religious focus on Jerusalem and the temple. (2) What is the significance

of these works? According to the OP, works of the law represent trusting in one's individual ability to merit salvation by moral effort rather than trusting in the mercy of God. According to the NP, works of the law identify Jews as distinct from Gentiles and thus serve as communal badges of membership in the elect people of God. (3) And why does Paul oppose works of the law? According to the OP: to perform them is to make saviors of ourselves and thus usurp the role of Christ as Savior (Luther); owing to the sinful condition of humanity, perfect obedience to the law as God requires is impossible (Calvin, Moo); the very attempt to obey the law for salvation is a boastful assertion of self-righteousness (Bultmann); to observe these laws, which belong to the penultimate stage of salvation history, is to deny that Christ has come (Moo). According to the NP: Christian experience shows that Gentiles received the Spirit apart from Torah observance (Sanders); these works embody an attitude of exclusivism, of social boundary-drawing, that contradicts the Gospel mandate to love others (Dunn); these works have been relativized precisely because the separation between Jew and Gentile has been relativized now that God has fulfilled his universal promises to Abraham in Jesus (Wright).

The Early Perspective (EP) on works of the law emerges from different patristic sources with different levels of clarity and explicitness. Direct evidence (category A) is found in the writings of Justin Martyr and Irenaeus of Lyons. These authors hold virtually identical views on the meaning and significance of works of the law and broadly agree on the reasons for opposing them. (1) At the level of meaning, Paul's "works of the law" are thought to be works of the Mosaic law specifically. For Justin, these are mainly the ritual obligations that were laid upon Israel in the aftermath of the golden calf apostasy at Sinai, for example, Sabbath observance, Israel's festal calendar, the food laws, and the cult of animal sacrifice. Irenaeus adopts essentially the same position, namely, that the works of the law are the Mosaic ceremonial laws, which he views as a yoke of bondage. (2) At the level of significance, Justin and Irenaeus both contend that works of the law function to identify the Jews as a people distinct from the Gentiles. For Irenaeus, observance of these works also places one in the intermediate period of salvation history between Abraham and Christ. (3) Among the reasons for opposing these works, Justin offers an array of arguments: the Hebrew prophets foretell an end to the Mosaic law and a future salvation of Gentiles as Gentiles; Christ has brought a new law and a new covenant that retires the Mosaic law as binding for the people of God; Christ has accomplished a transformation of human hearts that gives living proof of prophetic fulfillment; Christians, like Abraham and the patriarchs, are justified apart from ritual observances; the purpose

of the Mosaic law was to identify Israel and to restrain Israel from sin, not to impart righteousness. Interestingly, as M. J. Thomas shows, Justin the Christian and Trypho the Jew agree that Israel's messiah is expected to seal a new covenant and implement a new law; it is only a question of whether Jesus of Nazareth is this awaited figure (Justin's position) or not (Trypho's position). For Irenaeus, Christ has brought a new and universal legislation, a law of liberty, that does away with the yoke of bondage imposed upon Israel at Sinai because it resolves the problem of hardheartedness that made that yoke necessary.

Supporting evidence (category B) is found in Ignatius of Antioch, the *Epistle to Diognetus*, and Melito of Sardis. These sources likewise exhibit a broadly consistent perspective on works of the law. (1) At the level of meaning, the works in question are the cultic obligations of the Mosaic law: circumcision, Sabbath observance, dietary laws, the Levitical priesthood, and Jewish feast days (Ignatius, *Diognetus*), including Passover and a religious attachment to Jerusalem and the temple (Melito). (2) At the level of significance, works of the law represent a Jewish way of life that precedes the coming of messianic grace (Ignatius); they serve as markers of Jewish identity (*Diognetus*) and forge an association with Israel (Melito). (3) Among the reasons for opposing these works: they implicitly deny the arrival of messianic grace and thus devalue the work of Christ (Ignatius); the teachings of Christ take priority over the teachings of the Mosaic law (Ignatius); the universalism of Christianity moves beyond the nationalism of Judaism (Ignatius; *Diognetus*); God has no need of sacrifices (*Diognetus*); and the practices of Israel are shadows and types of Christian realities (Melito).

Circumstantial evidence (category C) is found in the *Didache*, the *Epistle of Barnabas*, and the *Apology of Aristides*. Here too, even where Pauline dependency is disputed, one finds an outlook on works of the law that harmonizes with the evidence in categories A and B. (1) At the level of meaning, these works include the Jewish practice of fasting twice a week (*Didache*), as well as circumcision, sacrifices, festal days, food restrictions, and Sabbath observance (*Barnabas*, *Aristides*). (2) At the level of significance, these works identify practitioners with the Jewish people, either as a race (*Aristides*) or as a religious community in general (*Didache*, *Barnabas*). (3) Among the reasons for opposing them: the Jewish works of the law have been replaced with Christian works (*Didache*); the new law takes precedence over the old (*Barnabas*); Christ has accomplished the circumcision of the heart promised in Scripture (*Barnabas*); and Jewish works are directed to angels (*Aristides*).

Having explored the early patristic evidence in detail, M. J. Thomas

notes the “striking degree of cohesion” that emerges on the issue of Paul’s “works of the law” (215). Variation is clearest when the question of opposition is posed, but on the more fundamental questions of meaning and significance, *the earliest Christian witnesses share the conviction that “works of the law” are ritual observances of the Torah that associate their adherents with the Jewish people* (19–20). On these points, there is unanimity in the early patristic writings. Even the nonorthodox Ebionites agree; they simply affirm the position that Paul denies, namely, that Christian justification depends on observing the cultic and ceremonial rites of the Torah (136–39).

The conclusion is inescapable, once this evidence is introduced into the modern debate, that the Early Perspective on Paul’s “works of the law” aligns more closely with the New Perspective than with the Old Perspective (219–26). For both the EP and the NP, Paul’s antithesis relativizes the rituals of the Mosaic law that distinguished Jews from Gentiles and once identified the covenant people of God. Conversely, the author finds no substantial correspondence between the EP and the OP. In the earliest reception of Paul’s letters: works in general are not problematized; Jews are not faulted for trying to earn salvation by moral effort; the dangers of legalism and self-righteous boasting appear to be nonissues; and anthropological deficiencies that make obedience to God’s law impossible are treated very differently (e.g., the problem is remedied not by an imputation of Christ’s righteousness in place of obedience but by a transformation of the heart with Christ’s grace that makes obedience possible).

The dissertation is a stellar example of careful historical scholarship. M. J. Thomas has produced an even-handed account of the earliest patristic testimony on “works of the law,” and he has done so without overstating or understating his case. The volume is clearly written, its conclusions are consistently sober, and the ancient texts are allowed to speak for themselves without undue interference from the dissertator. One can imagine scholars quibbling over judgments about the dates assigned to certain patristic sources or about the degree of Pauline influence to be found in them, especially if they subscribe to the “Pauline Captivity” hypothesis or adhere to a perspective on Paul that is unrepresented in the sources reviewed, but the overall impact of the study is compelling.

Does the dissertation have implications for exegetical or theological scholarship? To me this seems beyond dispute. If the reception history of Paul’s letters is allowed to contribute to an exegesis of the apostle’s letters, then the New Perspective brings us much closer to Paul’s intended meaning of “works of the law” than the Old Perspective. This is not to say that modern debates over Paul’s intentions in Romans and Galatians have now

been settled. It is rather a question of historical probability. Clearly the burden of proof weighs heavily on the Old Perspective to explain how its reading of Paul's "works of the law" fails to register in any of the earliest patristic sources (227–28). If the "smoke" of Pauline reception in the first and second centuries is preoccupied with the expiration of Jewish laws and practices in the messianic age, then only a radical hypothesis of discontinuity can explain how this smoke billows from a "fire" other than the Pauline letters. It is more convincing on historical grounds to posit continuity between Paul and his earliest Christian readers.

I look forward to future publications from this bright young scholar.

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Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas: Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (*Turnhout: Brepols, 2015*), xvi + 601 pp.

ONE OF THE CURIOSITIES of Thomistic scholarship is that Aquinas's primary role as a Dominican master was to lecture on Scripture, yet until recently there has been relatively little attention paid to his engagement with Scripture. Scholarship on Aquinas's biblical commentaries has been neglected relative to the size of its presence in his corpus. A positive contribution to redressing this imbalance is in this recent text edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen, who provide us with a collection of essays that investigate Aquinas's use of Scripture. Including the introductory essay, in twenty essays from international scholars we are presented with a variety of ways of understanding the role of Scripture in Aquinas's theology, the tools he used, how he thought about Scripture, and how his use of Scripture illuminates a variety of theological and philosophical questions.

As with any other good collection of essays, the editors provide a thematic guide and summary of the work in their introduction, beginning by reiterating Étienne Gilson's claim that Aquinas's "entire theology . . . is a commentary on the Bible" (vii), and making their own argument that "the thought of Aquinas undoubtedly operates within a biblical horizon" (viii), a claim that is further strengthened by the variety of ways the other nineteen essays reinforce the primacy of Scripture in Aquinas's thought. The contribution of this book, however, is not just to describe the primacy of Scripture in Aquinas's thought, but to take into account his hermeneu-

tical perspective as we understand it now while pointing to future research directions. Likewise, the essays do not just look backward historically, but also provide fruitful links to contemporary issues.

After the introduction, the next eleven essays are organized around the theme of hermeneutical tools. In these essays the authors attempt to provide an understanding of the Aquinas's basic exegetical approach, both in his theology of Scripture and in the variety of exegetical tools and methods he used. Several themes emerge out of these essays.

One theme that is taken up is that of the multiple senses of Scripture and how Aquinas deploys them. On one hand Gilbert Dahan (50–52) argues that, while Aquinas speaks of the four senses of Scripture inherited from Stephen Langton, he also engages with the threefold sense of Scripture from Hugh of St. Victor. But, contrary to Aquinas's description in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 10, Dahan argues that the four senses of Scripture are not really functional in Aquinas's exegesis (52) and that "the backbone of his hermeneutical system" is engaging with the texts through narrative, parabolic, and poetic modes (58). On the other hand, Elisabeth Reinhardt, in an essay describing how Aquinas's inaugural lectures programmatically shape his future exegesis, shows how the four senses of Scripture are operative in his exegesis of the Book of Romans (80–82). Likewise, Roszak shows how Aquinas's use of scriptural citations tends to have a more spiritual sense when used in his commentary on the Psalms (135–37), and Jeremy Holmes shows how Aquinas reads the Old Testament primarily through the spiritual sense, a reading based on a participation metaphysics that allows Aquinas to preserve the theological value of the Old Testament through a Christological reading of those texts. These essays helpfully point to a possible difference between Aquinas's theory of the senses of Scripture and how he actually deploys that theory in his actual exegetical practice, a difference that deserves further study.

A second theme that emerges from these essays is the Christological shape of Aquinas's exegesis. Contrary to modern forms of exegesis, Aquinas sees Christ as the "center and summit of Sacred scripture and ultimately the reason for its unity" (Reinhardt, 88), so much so that, as Dahan points out, it is Christ who "gives the text its truth" (70). For instance, Roszak shows how Aquinas's use of biblical citations is not random, nor a means of proof-texting, but rather is a means of building a scriptural imagination that is ordered Christologically (125). That Christological imagination, especially as it approaches the Old Testament, is what Holmes argues allows Aquinas to read the Old Testament Christologically. Daniel Keating, taking a slightly different approach, shows how Aquinas uses ancient Christological errors, and their conciliar corrections, to lead to the correct

reading of difficult texts in the Gospel of John and Philipians.

If it is Christ who gives Scripture its truth, it is Aquinas's pursuit of exegetical truth that emerges as a third theme of the book. Mauricio Narvaez argues that, for Aquinas, hermeneutics is primarily about grasping "the truth of the text" (142) and shows that, in pursuit of that truth, Aquinas uses various axioms, logical and hierarchical structures, and biblical citations to help achieve meaning (151–57). Reinhardt extends those ideas by claiming that Scripture functions as truth, authority, and utility (78). The root of Aquinas's confidence in both the truth of Scripture and his ability to grasp it, as Roszak argues, is based on Aquinas's "conviction about the unity of truth and the holistic understanding of the history of salvation" (119). All of this is predicated, as Enrique Martinez argues, on a theological anthropology in which the object of human knowledge is truth (383); we are by nature and desire inclined to search for the truth of Scripture, a point that Miłosław Miróz reinforces in his essay on virtue epistemology and grace in Aquinas's Pauline commentaries. In fact, Keating argues that Scripture itself has three roles with regard to truth in Aquinas's exegesis, "to establish the truth, to support the truth already established, and to beautify and illuminate the truth already firmly fixed in place" (515). Lest we mistakenly think that truth is only obtained through propositional thinking, Olivier-Thomas Venard argues that Aquinas's use of metaphor provides a key link between theology and Scripture, as Aquinas's exploration of a metaphor can provide divine meaning that is not always available in other ways, which Venard demonstrates by showing how Aquinas derives meaning through a metaphorical exploration of the dove in Jesus's baptismal scene.

As several of the articles mention in a fourth theme, Aquinas shares this pursuit of truth and its scriptural basis with his contemporaries, as well as a shared set of tools to assist in exegesis. As the editors explain in their opening essay, Aquinas's thought operates within a biblical horizon (viii), but Keating extends that claim to argue Aquinas is "drawing on a deep understanding of the text shared by his readers to establish, support, and illuminate the argument" (527). This shared understanding is ecclesial in nature because interpretation belongs to the Church (Reinhardt, 88; Elders, 257). But it is also made possible by a set of shared sources, tools, and practices that enabled Aquinas and other medieval exegetes to interpret the text. Roszak's entire essay is dedicated to showing the variety of ways that Aquinas uses scriptural citations to exegete a passage. Dahan points to Aquinas's use of scriptural glosses and Hugh of St. Cher's revised Latin text of the Bible as important exegetical tools. Leo Elders describes how Aquinas uses the Church Fathers as mediated in various *tabulae* and

glosses to guide his exegesis, and Margherita Maria Rossi demonstrates the importance of the *divisio* of the text for structuring his exegesis. And Timothy Bellamah describes how the development of the prologue/*accessus* served as a key structure for the exegete to provide foundational information on a text.

While Aquinas benefitted from this shared understanding of Scripture and had a variety of tools at his disposal for seeking the truth of the text, the first essay of the collection points out that modern tools may help us better understand the different ways that Aquinas uses Scripture. Marco Passarotti describes the development of the *Index Thomisticus Treebank* (itreebank.marginalia.it), a project that works from the *Index Thomisticus* to annotate Aquinas's texts with semantic and syntactic information in a way that allows researchers to query the data to analyze similarities and differences in Aquinas's use of language across his works. Passarotti provides a helpful introduction to the field of computational linguistics, as well as examples of how the *IT Treebank* works, but also explains that the data still require a certain level of theological analysis in order to be meaningful. Given how little has happened in the digital humanities among Thomists since Fr. Bosa's groundbreaking work, Passarotti points to some future directions for how Thomists might continue to use and develop digital tools to better understand Aquinas's ideas.

While the first half of the essays primarily describe the tools and approaches of Aquinas's hermeneutical work, the second half provide descriptions of how Aquinas's exegesis illuminates a variety of theological and philosophical issues. It is well known, for instance, that the *Summa theologiae* does not have a treatise on the Church, but as Christopher Bagelow argues, a careful and holistic reading of Aquinas's commentary on Ephesians provides a substantial discussion of the nature of the Church. Matthew Levering extends the work of Servais Pinckaers by showing how important the Old Testament is as a source of Aquinas's ethics in the second part of the *Summa theologiae*.

Matthew Ramage puts Aquinas into conversation with Joseph Ratzinger on the exegesis of the opening chapters of Genesis. Even though Ratzinger is not a Thomist, Ramage recognizes four points of intersection in their exegesis of Genesis in seeking an open philosophy, recognizing salvation history's Christological teleology, searching for a text's essential point, and the need for a rich doctrine of the spiritual sense of Scripture. Both Aquinas and Ratzinger, according to Ramage, keenly attempt to determine "the sense or senses according to which a given text ought to be read" (505). Keating, as previously mentioned, shows how Aquinas uses Scripture, especially the prologue to John and the Christological hymn of Philip-

pians 2, to develop a robust Christology in conversation with conciliar decisions and ancient heresies.

One would certainly expect Aquinas's exegesis to produce interesting theological positions, but several essays also describe how Aquinas's exegesis contributes to philosophical thinking. Robert Wozniak compares the exegetical approaches of Aquinas and Bonaventure and shows how Aquinas's willingness to find a place of cooperation between Scripture and metaphysics, though a metaphysics shaped Christologically, creates a means to actually preserve metaphysics, so that the more biblical our theology, "the more it will be able to recover metaphysics and restore it to its own place" (434). Lluís Clavell argues that Aquinas's reading of Exodus 3:14–17 provides a place where Scripture and philosophy most fruitfully collaborate (457) as we come to know and think about the names of God. Both Miłosław Mróz and Martínez provide epistemological considerations that are manifested in Aquinas's exegesis. In case one were to think that Aquinas's scriptural commentaries were devoid of philosophical sources, Vijgen shows the role that Aristotle plays in the commentaries and even provides a useful chart of all 164 instances of Aquinas's citations of Aristotle in the biblical commentaries.

In concluding this review it would be helpful to return to Rossi's essay, which provides a useful description of the overall contribution of this book. In her essay she explores the idea of medieval exegesis as a form of intellectual architecture, with the *divisio* as the primary structure upon which Aquinas's exegesis is structured. In lesser hands, it has become something of a standard trope to think of medieval theology along the lines of the medieval cathedral, but Rossi provides a more robust exploration of how the intellectual architectural structures Aquinas used provided him an opportunity to become an attentive listener to the word of God (176). Scholars' treatment of Aquinas's theology and use of Scripture is too often limited to one article in the *Summa theologiae*, but these essays provide an in-depth exploration of the entire architecture of Aquinas's exegesis. Instead of a narrow and one-dimensional understanding, the contributors to this book provide a thorough tour of Aquinas's hermeneutical building, from its foundations to its heights, from its beginnings to its enduring implications. 

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