

Book Reviews

Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective by David Burrell, C.S.C.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), xxii + 266 pp.

DAVID BURRELL has brought together sixteen of his essays published over the past twenty years in diverse journals and *Festschriften* with the single explicit aim of supplanting today's dominant notion of freedom as autonomy with the more classical understanding of freedom as a response to the gift of being. He goes about this task by retrieving the metaphysical foundations of this richer notion of freedom in the creation theologies of Thomas Aquinas and his medieval Islamic and Jewish predecessors. Readers familiar with the Notre Dame professor's previous *Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions* will find a welcome continuation of that study in this new collection of essays.

The first chapter tackles the problems of divine eternity and simplicity. He shows how Aquinas used Avicenna to go beyond him, appropriating the latter's *esse/essentia* distinction while making the simplicity that proceeds from their identity in God the source of divine necessity, infinity, and eternity. Once present existence replaces timeless entities as the key analogue, God's eternity escapes the misconception of a static divine life. Turning to the problem of multiple acts of knowing and willing, the author proposes that the model of practical knowing allowed Aquinas to find a solution that remained beyond the grasp of his Jewish and Islamic predecessors. No distinct act of choosing one of several possible scenarios in the divine mind needs to be posited, for the object made is the term of God's creative knowledge. The essay concludes by suggesting that process theology's concerns about the unresponsiveness of a God who is infinite act are unfounded. Aquinas's God relates to creation "with an understanding love which is the quintessence of responsiveness" (18). While Aquinas's understanding of God is in some ways far from Aristotle's First Mover, the author does not show how Aquinas has a notion of divine responsiveness.

Chapter two introduces us to al-Ghazali's rejection of philosophy in the religious search for God and his subordination of the intellect to the heart, leading to comparisons with Augustine and Kierkegaard. Chapter three traces Maimonides's conclusion that we cannot go beyond equivocal divine names to the Avicennian reduction of divine knowledge to speculative knowing, which would make all events in creation necessary (as necessary conclusions in God's speculative intellect). Maimonides rejected such a model for the divine intellect, but since he failed to introduce the (biblical) artisan metaphor (as Aquinas did), he could not escape the equivocity of divine names.

Chapter four considers how Maimonides, Gersonides, and Aquinas approach the themes of providence and evil, especially in the Book of Job. The extent to which both Jewish philosophers appropriated Islamic thought to interpret Job is striking. Aquinas was able to overcome their struggles to synthesize providence and human freedom by his careful attentiveness to language and grammar. This fascinating chapter gives us a foretaste of the author's forthcoming theological commentary on the Book of Job (Brazos Press).

Chapter five proposes three key lasting contributions by Aquinas to philosophical theology regarding: 1) analogous language, 2) practical knowing and creation, and 3) the compatibility of providence and human freedom. For the second area, Burrell identifies *esse* in the sense of act as a key doctrine in the elaboration of divine transcendence and the creator-creature relationship.

The sixth chapter seeks to demonstrate how Aquinas's "actualism" and its relation to the doctrine of God's free creation exemplify the dialectic of faith and reason, especially how the faith horizon exercises a normative role over the believer's appropriation of an ontology. Burrell critiques the theology of possible worlds from which God freely chooses as rooted in a metaphysics that privileges possibility over actuality. The author identifies Aquinas's solution to the problem of possible worlds in the distinction between the exemplars used in divine practical knowing to create beings and God's simple understanding of non-existents. He then proceeds to show how the primacy of existence itself entails the creature's relation to its creator and overcomes a false dilemma between transcendence and immanence, thus providing the key to God's distinction from the world. Burrell's synthetic ability on this point is impressive. Yet it is not clear how this essay demonstrates the normative role of faith in the appropriation of an ontology. Finally, the author follows Norman Kretzmann in posing the dilemma between Aquinas's appropriation of the Neoplatonic axiom *bonum diffusivum sui* and God's free creation, suggest-

ing that Thomas offers no clear solution except for a Trinitarian one. But this assumes that the axiom's meaning in Plotinus and Aquinas is essentially the same, without recognizing Thomas's transformation of the axiom by its subordination to the finality of the good. (See Bernhard Blankenhorn, "The Good as Self-Diffusive in Thomas Aquinas," *Angelicum* 79 [2002]: 803–37.)

The seventh chapter again invokes the faith/reason dialectic, but now looks to demonstrate how one kind of philosophical approach, that of Aquinas, provides a "grammar" that is more amenable for the lived language of faith than another, that of Scotus. Burrell considers the themes of the understanding's proper object, the notion of existence, the mind's act of judgment, and human freedom in both medieval thinkers to carry out this task. He masterfully demonstrates how utterly intertwined these issues are for both thinkers.

Chapter eight takes up Ralph McInerny's work on analogy. The Notre Dame philosopher did not so much seek a restriction of the doctrine to the realm of logic, as he wanted to point to the need to pay careful attention to the analogous use of language. Such hard work bears metaphysical fruit, since the fact of creation assures a certain parallel between logic and "reality," an insight often missed by mind/world dualisms that create false epistemological problems. Burrell then turns to McInerny's treatment of participation. Participated perfections provide the bridge that makes analogous discourse about God possible, yet participation itself presumes creation, the proper conception of which is a faith-doctrine (*ST I*, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3). Such a faith-based discourse does not demand a firm conceptual grasp of the realities signified by the terms we use analogously, but simply an awareness of their status as perfections. Its ultimate justification is creation itself.

One wonders whether Burrell has considered the possibility of analogous discourse about God that does not already depend on revealed truths such as the Trinity. The very same *Summa* article that Burrell mines in this chapter includes the insistence that "those things which pertain to the unity of God's essence can be known through natural reason" (*ST I*, q. 32, a. 1). For Aquinas, such knowledge entails the possibility of true, analogous discourse about the first cause of the universe and its finite perfections, even if the free nature of God's creative act may be hard to reach through reason alone.

Chapter nine considers how Aquinas seeks metaphysical expressions of the revealed truth that God freely creates the universe as a response to Neoplatonic emanation schemes. Burrell identifies Thomas's transformation of Avicenna's *esse/essentia* distinction through the Aristotelian category of act

as a crucial accomplishment in this task, one that in turn leads to recognizing the immense ineffable nature of both the divinity and creatures, since act is not so much conceptualized as it is manifested through examples. Aquinas's doctrine of *esse* is thus inseparable from negative theology. The author proposes that emanation and artistic making are complementary models for creation, an insight exemplified by Thomas's own theological synthesis. Thomas attained this original synthesis through an inherent faith/reason dialectic whose traces remain difficult to discover.

Chapter ten argues that we may be on the verge of losing our trust in freedom, a situation which calls us to the urgent task of retrieving alternative notions of freedom and their underlying metaphysics from the three Abrahamic traditions.

Chapter eleven introduces us to al-Ghazali's understanding of created freedom, where God is the primary analogue for agency. In some ways, his notion of freedom seems closer to Aquinas's conception than to Scotus's voluntarism.

Chapter twelve proposes that the major divergence between Aquinas and Scotus on the themes of creation's contingency is rooted in their opposite approaches to language. Aquinas sought to root logic in language, while Scotus refined language to serve logic. Thus, Aquinas placed the life of faith (and its language) at the service of theology, while Scotus sought conceptual clarity well separated from a life of piety. The author offers a subtle demonstration of this thesis amidst an impressive array of insights on the inner logic of the Angelic and Subtle Doctors' metaphysics.

Chapter thirteen introduces the book's third section, "Interfaith Encounter." The author's main aim is to show how a dialogue among the monotheistic traditions on God and creation can illumine each tradition's blind spots. With John Milbank, the author insists that reason is always bound by tradition, and thus faith. The essay takes us on a somewhat disorganized tour that highlights the ways in which Aquinas, Maimonides, and medieval Islamic philosophers related to ancient philosophy and their religious contemporaries as they articulated the distinction of God from the world and his free creation thereof.

Chapter fourteen continues the discussion on the ways in which al-Ghazali and Maimonides related to their philosophical predecessors around the theme of creation as a free divine act. Chapter fifteen proposes ways in which the doctrines of creation and redemption are closely intertwined and, it seems for Burrell, interdependent. The end of the Sabbath rest in Christianity and Philip the Chancellor's distinction between grace and nature helped lead to the assumption that creation (unlike grace) is not a gift. The doctrine of creation continues to suffer from an oblivion

in contemporary theology, from liberal Christianity, to process thought, to recent theologies of the Cross (Jüngel, Moltmann). Instead, creation's profound ordering towards divinization and creation's place as a hermeneutical key for the Incarnation need to be recovered.

Chapter sixteen explores the function and purpose of faith statements in Augustine and the Auschwitz victim Etty Hillesum. Burrell rightfully warns against the danger of detaching religious affirmations from their traditions, against a de-contextualized comparison of doctrines from different faiths. He also integrates George Lindbeck's linguistic turn by proposing that doctrines primarily have a grammatical, and not a theoretical function, so that the authentic transformation of lives becomes a higher standard of judgment for doctrinal truth. This seems somewhat far from classical understandings of the nature of infused faith and the function of Christian dogma.

Burrell has convincingly demonstrated that a return to a more classical understanding of freedom is only possible through a doctrine of creation. He has also shown that, among the medievals, Aquinas's synthesis of creation and freedom was in fact the best of his era, yet only because he engaged in a rich dialogue with his Islamic and Jewish predecessors. Many of today's theological impasses stem from an inadequate understanding of creation, and the clearest solution seems to be a much more generous appropriation of classical (especially Thomistic) metaphysics than most contemporary theologians are ready to undertake. Burrell shows that contemporary theology desperately needs Aquinas, a considerable accomplishment. The author has also shown that medieval philosophy was profoundly enriched by a kind of inter-religious dialogue whose openness to the other offers a model for us today.

At times, the essays lack unity and clarity, yet the author's impressive grasp of the medieval sources and his considerable synthetic abilities make this somewhat laborious reading well worth the effort. My major concern remains what appears to be the author's consistently Bonaventurian understanding of the faith-reason relationship, one that he attributes to Thomas himself. While Aquinas probably underestimated the extent to which tradition and culture shape much of our thought, including philosophical inquiry, his own assertions about the capacity of pagan philosophy without the help of revelation cannot be reconciled with the Radical Orthodoxy position that the author seems to espouse, that all philosophy is always-already theological. In fact, philosophy's thorough dependence on theology seems to be more of a working assumption on the part of the author, for which he gives only occasional and incomplete arguments. One also wonders to what extent he has considered Aquinas's rather elaborate development of the grace/nature distinction.

Nevertheless, the present collection demonstrates that Burrell has made a significant contribution to the metaphysics and theology of creation in the past twenty years, while offering considerable stimulus to the dialogues with Judaism and Islam that may have paid far too little attention to the doctrine of creation and its profound relation to the entirety of the three great monotheistic faiths. N.V.

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The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea: A Synthesis of Greek Thought and Biblical Truth by Stephen M. Hildebrand (*Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007*), xiv + 254 pp.

WITH THE publication of *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea*, Stephen Hildebrand, who teaches theology at the Franciscan University of Stuebenville, has done students of the Church Fathers, and in particular of St. Basil of Caesarea, a wonderful service, both in furthering our understanding of the alleged “Hellenization” of Christian thought and in grappling with questions surrounding scriptural interpretation in the fourth century. Hildebrand’s study, which is a revised version of his doctoral dissertation, written under Joseph Lienhard at Fordham University, is a wide-ranging and at the same time careful technical, analytical study of St. Basil’s methodology in defending his Trinitarian theology.

The study is wide-ranging. It begins with an introductory chapter that outlines the various approaches to the relationship between Greek *paideia* and biblical truth, which Hildebrand classifies as “corruption theory,” “displacement theory,” and “hybrid theory.” Drawing on Basil’s *Ad adolescentes*, Hildebrand shows the importance of Greek learning for Basil’s theology, while at the same time insisting that this “in no way compromises the centrality of the Bible” (9). Thus, speaking in defence of a “hybrid model” of both Greek and biblical thought in Basil’s approach, Hildebrand insists that neither “holds a simple precedence over the other in Basil’s theology” (12), though the Bible does have “a certain priority” in his thought (14). The author concludes chapter one, in which he provides an overview of Basil’s life, along with its mixed accomplishments, with the suggestion that Basil’s career did not end in failure, but that instead the Cappadocian’s success lay “in his construction of a synthesis of Greek *paideia* and Christian truth” (29).

These first two chapters thus set the stage for the remainder of the book, which has two main foci: the development of Basil’s Trinitarian thought

(chapters two and three) and his scriptural exegesis in defence of Trinitarian doctrine (chapters four through six). Thus, in relatively quick pace (the discussion spans around 160 pages) we encounter discussions surrounding Basil's move away from a *homoian* position to a more strictly *homoousian* viewpoint, we learn of Basil's views about divine plurality and kinship (his use of the terms *prosōpon* and *hypostasis*), and we find out that up until the end, Basil retained a certain flexibility in his use of the various terms that one could use to speak of the Trinity: "Understanding the historical development of Basil's thought makes it evident that, although he clearly comes to judge some Trinitarian words better than others, his Trinitarian terms are not enshrined in formulae" (99). Moreover, Hildebrand provides the reader with discussions surrounding ancient rhetoric as reflected in Basil's writings, deals with the tension between allegorical reading in Basil's homilies vis-à-vis its disparagement in the *Hexaemeron*, discusses issues such as divine inspiration and the role of tradition, and demonstrates that Basil regards certain scriptural texts as particularly foundational to demonstrate the consubstantiality of the Son and the Spirit with the Father (John 14:9 in the case of the Son and 1 Corinthians 12:3 in the case of the Holy Spirit).

Hildebrand's study is not just wide-ranging; in various ways, its often careful analysis bears the marks of an in-depth doctoral study and sheds significant light on the development of Basil's thought and the structure of some of his works. Most notable, perhaps, is the intricate and helpful discussion of the four stages of the development of Basil's Trinitarian thought. The first phase constitutes St. Basil's "homoiousian years" (c. 360–65) (31). His correspondence with Apollinaris shows Basil's aversion to the term *homoousios*. While certainly opposing Arianism during this period—witness his *Contra Eunomium*—Basil "is still uncomfortable with the term" *homoousios* (45). The second phase dates from c. 365–72, years during which Basil undergoes his "conversion" to *homoousious* (76–82). Having "witnessed firsthand the abuses suffered by the word *homoios*" (79), Basil largely, though not totally, shifts away from using the latter term. Finally, in the third and fourth phases of his development, Basil begins to use the term *prosōpon* for divine plurality (c. 372), while the term *hypostasis* gets removed from divine oneness, being linked solely with the threeness of God instead (c. 375–79). In these latter phases, it is Sabellian modalism rather than Eunomian Arianism that is responsible for the development of Basil's theology. Again, however, Hildebrand concludes that "although he [Basil] clearly comes to judge some Trinitarian words better than others, his Trinitarian terms are not enshrined in formulae" (99).

The care that Hildebrand takes in his reading of St. Basil also shows in his discussion of allegorical versus historical interpretation, or, put differently,

the tension between the Alexandrian and Antiochian approaches to Scripture. Also here, the author resists simplification, rejecting a common understanding of Basil as Antiochian in his interpretation of Scripture (126, 133), refusing to classify it as either Alexandrian or Antiochian (170). Hildebrand presents a plea to move away from questions of allegory as such to Basil's use of spiritual interpretation and his view of the unity of the Old and New Testaments instead (127). Such an approach yields interesting results: clearly, Basil's reading of the Psalms is Christological, and despite the anti-allegorical comments in his *Hexaemeron*, also here Basil continues to make use of spiritual interpretation (138–39).

Further, the overall theme of the relationship between Greek thought and Christian doctrine, the main theme of the book, is traced with careful nuance, demonstrating, throughout, the interactive nature of the two in Basil's thought. Hildebrand's approach allows him to reject the still all too common "corruption theory" of Harnack and others. With regard to the term *ousia*, Hildebrand insists that while it is of course a borrowed term, it does not derive clearly from any of the philosophies of the day: Basil "does not appropriate any particular metaphysical system in toto" (46). Again, while it is certainly possible to trace Stoic categories in Basil's thought, the Cappadocian Father differs from Stoic philosophy in his rejection of materialism and in his insistence that the *ousia* of God transcends the world (50–51). Furthermore, the impact of his debates with opponents means that the naïve assumption of a capitulation to Greek philosophy ignores Basil's interest in maintaining scriptural integrity: "Thus, Basil's encounters with his contemporaries shaped his choice of Trinitarian words just as much or more than his eclectic borrowing from Greek philosophy" (100; cf. 188).

At the same time, the important strengths of the book—its broad range and its in-depth analysis—perhaps render it somewhat vulnerable as well. Within a relatively brief space, the author wants to do a great deal, on occasion perhaps too much. I am wondering, for example, about the need for the two appendices, particularly the second one, on the dating of Ep. 9 and of *Contra Eunomium* (193–222). The technical detail provided here, while interesting to some specialists, does take away from discussions on which the author could perhaps have been more forthcoming, such as Basil's methodology of spiritual interpretation and his use of allegory. Another point of interest, not really discussed in this book, is the role of spiritual interpretation as an important factor stimulating doctrinal development. The result is that the connection between the chapters on the development of Basil's Trinitarian thought and those on his exegesis of Scripture is not as tight as perhaps it could be. Further,

considering the technical detail of some of the Trinitarian discussions, a more relaxed or drawn-out description of Basil's thought would likely have been welcomed by many a reader.

All in all, Hildebrand's study is important in that it recognizes the intricate link between Greek philosophical thought and scriptural exegesis, while providing a helpful way into many of the contemporary discussions surrounding Basil's Trinitarian theology. N V

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From Holiness to Wisdom: The Nature of Theology According to St. Bonaventure by Gregory LaNave (*Rome: Istituto Storico dei Cappuccini, 2005*), 244 pp.

THIS VOLUME by Gregory LaNave concerns itself with a contemporary question, the solution of which is provided by Bonaventure of Bagnoregio. LaNave, citing several authors in the introductory chapter, and especially Hans Urs von Balthasar, believes that one of the problems of contemporary theology is its disjunction from holiness. Although one of LaNave's contentions is that all saints, because of their intimate union with God, can be sources of theology in one sense, he extracts Bonaventure from the "cloud of witnesses" as a unique source because of his scientific understanding of the nature of theology and because of his own dependence on a saint (Francis) for his theology. In his exploration of Bonaventure's theology, LaNave is interested primarily in the Seraphic Doctor's treatment of three topics: theology as science, holiness, and wisdom.

Chapter two addresses Bonaventure's treatment of theology as a science. Focusing primarily on Bonaventure's early *Sentences* commentary, LaNave discusses Bonaventure's views about the material cause, the formal cause, the final cause, and the efficient cause of theology. Theologians from the middle of the thirteenth century used these Aristotelian categories to discuss theology as a science, but LaNave wants to emphasize that for Bonaventure, theology is an affective science, based on the articles of faith, whose purpose is the beatitude of the theologian. A theologian can demonstrate further conclusions from the articles of faith so long as his or her orientation is towards the light of revelation and the faith which that revelation elicits. The beatitude of the theologian occurs principally through a consideration of Christ's humanity rooted in revelation and grace.

In chapter three, LaNave discusses Bonaventure's understanding of the relationship between holiness and theology. Holiness refers to the quality

of the soul informed by the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and LaNave examines Bonaventure's distinctive approach to how the gifts of the Holy Spirit relate to the virtues and the beatitudes. Turning to Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, LaNave discusses how the theologian, transformed by grace, learns to know God *through* and *in* things outside, inside, and above the soul, a cognitive and affective process which leads to a loving perception of the Trinity through conformity to the crucified Christ.

Bonaventure's emphasis on the crucified Christ as the expression of Trinitarian love leads LaNave in chapter four to consider the theological significance of Saint Francis. LaNave argues that Francis, because of his holiness (or better, because of the holiness manifested by his stigmata), is a theological source for Bonaventure, who turned from Peter Lombard to Francis to find the ideal theologian. Francis's own knowledge of God is expressed in the stigmata, and this knowledge, which is sapiential in nature, is what the theologian should be seeking, an intimate knowledge of God that involves one's whole being. The wisdom that perfects the intellect of the theologian and unites the will to God is the same wisdom that is expressed in the figure of the saint.

Chapter five discusses Bonaventure's doctrine of wisdom. This chapter is important because it clarifies the distinction between knowledge (*scientia*) and wisdom and how they relate to theology, and it discusses how knowledge, holiness, and wisdom relate to one another. In this chapter, LaNave draws from several sources, including the sermon "Christus unus omnium magister," the *De scientia Christi*, the *Sentences* commentary, and the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, and LaNave is sensitive to the differences among Bonaventure's discussion of wisdom in these works. LaNave's discussion of wisdom involves looking primarily at three things in Bonaventure's theology: the kinds of wisdom, the forms of wisdom, and the causes of wisdom.

Focusing primarily on the *Sentences* commentary, LaNave describes the four kinds of wisdom. The first kind is the general cognition of things either divine or human. When knowledge pertains to what is divine, it is wisdom (in some sense), and when it pertains to what is human, it is knowledge. There is nothing supernatural about this kind of knowledge, and it does not require any likeness of the soul to God produced by grace (*deiformitas*). In some sense, this knowledge is not wisdom properly speaking, but only by equivocation. The second kind of wisdom is philosophical wisdom, and this wisdom involves the knowledge of eternal things (as opposed to human things), but it still does not require the presence of grace. The third kind of wisdom is theological wisdom, and this wisdom involves knowing God "according to piety." This wisdom, which is

produced by grace, is the act by which the soul unveils the meaning of God's revelation. The fourth kind of wisdom is mystical wisdom, and this is the act by which the soul experiences God directly. This wisdom is both cognitive and affective, and it is the highest form of wisdom.

In addition to these kinds of knowledge there are also four forms of knowledge, which Bonaventure outlines in the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* (see Collation 2). The first form is uniform wisdom, which consists of the rules by which the mind knows things with certitude. The second form is multiform wisdom, which consists of the many signs and figures contained in Scripture. This form most properly corresponds to theological wisdom. The third form of wisdom is omniform wisdom, which consists of seeing the "vestiges" of God in all creatures. This form corresponds closely to philosophical wisdom. The fourth form of wisdom is nulliform wisdom. In this wisdom love effects a union between the soul and God. The union between the soul and God occurs because the soul abandons itself to God, who is incomprehensibly transcendent. Although this wisdom is not mediated by any creature, Bonaventure connects the cruciformity of Christ's wounds and Francis's stigmata with this form of wisdom, since Christ's crucifixion symbolizes the soul's abandonment to God (see *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* 7, 2).

Bonaventure also lists four causes of wisdom: the material cause (all things), the formal cause (the conformity between the expressive revelation in Christ and the action of grace in the soul), the final cause (nulliform wisdom), and the efficient cause (the saint). LaNave argues persuasively that the key cause here for understanding theology as wisdom is the formal cause, the conformity between the revelation in Christ and the soul's grace.

In the concluding sixth chapter, LaNave argues that for Bonaventure, theology as a science becomes wisdom only through holiness. Grace transforms how reason operates in theology, so that there is not merely knowledge of God as an object, but there is a sort of connatural knowledge of God effected by the likeness of the soul to God when filled with sanctifying grace. LaNave also revisits the concerns he described about contemporary theology in the opening chapter. In what seems almost like an appendix, LaNave considers the role of holiness in three modern theologians: William Thompson, François-Marie Léthel, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. He compares the importance of saints in their theology and concludes that, compared to Bonaventure, Thompson neglects the object of theology, Léthel rejects the scientific nature of theology, and Balthasar focuses so much on the self-abandonment of the saint that the reciprocal relationship of self-giving love is overlooked. Despite pointing out these

differences, LaNave shows several similarities between these authors and Bonaventure, but in the end LaNave offers Bonaventure as an exemplary model for how the contemporary theologian can learn to write theology.

For the most part, this study stays close to Bonaventure's texts. LaNave has studied the relevant texts carefully, sometimes even pointing out mistranslations in English editions of Bonaventure's works. He is keenly aware of the development in Bonaventure's thought, but because of his effort to treat theology as science, holiness, and wisdom individually by drawing from much of Bonaventure's thought (although biblical commentaries and many sermons are omitted from the study), this development is sometimes neglected in favor of an appropriation of the most relevant texts, regardless of their chronological placement. Also, the culling of texts from various sources sometimes omits the significance of their literary contexts. Regarding any of the three main topics, thorough engagement with even a majority of relevant passages would have been impossible simply because there are so many; still, although LaNave does a good job highlighting the most important passages, he could have filled out the discussion, especially of wisdom, by drawing from a greater variety of texts from the *Sentences* commentary.

LaNave engages a broad swath of the vast secondary literature on Bonaventure, and he also discusses how Bonaventure's theology compares with that of modern theologians, such as Karl Rahner, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Joseph Ratzinger, who also interpreted central dimensions of Bonaventure's theology. The engagement with contemporary theologians at times diminishes the engagement with the historical and literary contexts of Bonaventure's writings, but it does serve the larger effort to argue for a union of theology and holiness in contemporary theology.

Overall, this work is an excellent study of Bonaventure's understanding of theology. LaNave writes clearly, even when explaining technical scholastic vocabulary, and the structure of the book is simple and clear. Grounding his study in Bonaventure's work and bringing it into conversation with contemporary interpreters, LaNave offers both a penetrating study of Bonaventure's thought and a retrieval of this scholastic theologian, whose theology and spirituality manifest great profundity and together constitute an exemplar of what it means for theology to be transformed by holiness. N V

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Introduction to the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas by John of St. Thomas, translated and introduced by Ralph McInerny (*South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2004*), x + 182 pp.

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS (1589–1644) died just short of his fifty-fifth birthday. He had caught a fever while accompanying the Spanish King Philip IV, whom he served as priest-confessor, on a military campaign in Catalonia. For the important dates in the life of the man born John Poinsoot, see the well-annotated chronology established by John N. Deely in his interpretative arrangement of Poinsoot's *Tractatus de Signis, The Semiotic of John Poinsoot* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985). It was Professor Deeley who persuaded the Library of Congress to catalogue this seventeenth-century Dominican's works under his family name, Poinsoot, instead of the religious name that John Poinsoot received when, in 1612 at Madrid, he took the black and white habit of St. Dominic. Ralph McInerny follows the customary usage to present the *Isagogue* of John of St. Thomas to the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Throughout the centuries, the Thomist commentatorial tradition has produced a rich variety of approaches to the thought of the Common Doctor. This tradition also exhibits historical periods of waxing and waning. One revival that produced a spate of scholastic wunderkinds occurred in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain. Thomists waxed strong then. We even refer to an Iberian school (in part, because John of St. Thomas, whose mother came from the Portuguese nobility, was born in Lisbon). This group includes representatives of the major religious orders: Dominican, Franciscan, Carmelite, and Jesuit. To cite only the Dominicans of the Iberian school, we find among their number Francisco de Vitoria (1492–1546), Domingo de Soto (1495–1460), Melchior Cano (1509–1560), and Domingo Báñez (1528–1604). These men taught philosophy and theology. Their text books were principally the works of Aquinas, although McInerny notes that certain of these scholastics, especially the Jesuit authors, enacted “a progressive movement away from close exegetical readings of the texts of Thomas toward a looser and more commodious disputation in which contemporary issues could be more easily included” (ix). McInerny especially points to the Jesuit thinker Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), whose scholarly work epitomizes these heady intellectual disputations.

John of St. Thomas deemed Suárez an eclectic Thomist. By contrast, John himself, affirms McInerny, “sought to return philosophy and theology to a primary allegiance to the thought of Thomas Aquinas” (ix). This purpose helps us to understand the full title that John of St. Thomas gave

to this treatise, which now for the first time is published in English: *Isagoge ad D. Thomae theologiae. Explicatio connexionis et ordinis totius Summae Theologiae D. Thomae, per omnes ejus materias.*

Connections and ordering. John of St. Thomas describes best what he accomplishes in this short introduction when he writes, “[T]he chief and most efficacious way of entering into and grasping the mind of the Angelic Doctor in this wonderful edifice of theology is by first diligently seeking the order he followed in the disposition and treatment of his *Summa*, proceeding from one question to the next, from one matter to another, as if joined by golden links” (2). The *Summa* is not an encyclopedia. It is not a book to consult for the answers to specific questions in divinity. The *Summa* is not a socio-political tractate. Although the *Summa* has been at various times endorsed by ecclesiastical authorities, and while even today its author receives special recognition as the “master” of Catholic thought, Aquinas’s celebrated introduction to theology is meant to be accepted freely on its own internal merits. The *Summa* liberates. It is not a collection of mind-numbing propositions that, when needed, can be imposed by officialdom to stifle opposition to Catholic orthodoxy. The *Summa* presents a *scientia*, a sure knowledge through causes. “In order to establish a scientific procedure for theology, Saint Thomas,” writes this commentator, “was always careful to proceed from the more to the less common, from causes to the caused, and from the more known to the less known” (9). This methodology has been lost by some modern theologians who favor the use of metaphorical and literary approaches when expounding Catholic doctrine, as well as by those purveyors of transcendental philosophical methods whose less common starting point is other than the more common physical reality.

The *Isagogue* begins with a short prologue. The work is then divided into two books. The first examines the three parts of the *Summa* and the general theme handled in each: God as Efficient Cause, God as Final Cause, God as Savior. John of St. Thomas moves from the more known, creation, to the less known, the mysteries of Christ. The second book offers a detailed analysis of the three parts of the *Summa*: the first part (*prima pars*), the second part (*secunda pars*), which is subdivided into the first part of the second part (*prima secundae*) and the second part of the second part (*secunda secundae*), and the third part (*tertia pars*). The Latin titles for each section of the *Summa* have become traditional among practicing Thomists, as in the phrase, “This past year, I taught the *prima pars*.”

Book Two supplies more than a table of contents for the major divisions of the *Summa*. John of St. Thomas remains faithful to his purpose. He wants to show the connections and the ordering. The student of

Aquinas who wonders why the Angelic Doctor treats this topic in one part of the *Summa* instead of in another part will learn the answer from the great Iberian commentator's careful annotations of the *Summa*.

Here is one example. Why does Aquinas leave the sacraments until after his treatment of God as Savior? John of St. Thomas gives us an answer: "Having explained the Incarnation of the Divine Word, he [Aquinas] begins to treat of the means he left us to share in the efficacy of his blood" (168). That is, the sacraments share in the effective causality of Christ's human nature. We discover, in short, a unity in Catholic theology that escapes those modern authors who prefer to scatter rather than to unite. In *The Degrees of Knowledge*, Jacques Maritain writes: "To scatter and to confuse are both equally inimical to the nature of the mind. 'No one,' says [the Dominican, John] Tauler, 'understands true distinction better than they who have entered into unity'" ("Preface to the Original French Edition," in *Distinguish to Unite or The Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. Gerald B. Phelan [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959], ix). Thus, Maritain's axiom: "distinguish to unite." No surprise that Maritain often quotes John of St. Thomas.

McInerny says that he first saw this little gem of Thomist learning in French translation more than half a century ago and he thought that it would be useful to have an English translation. He was right. Students coming fresh to the *Summa* will benefit from this translation of John of St. Thomas's *Isagogue*, and those who have been reading the *Summa* for a long time will also find that their glimpse of the internal ordering and connections of the parts grows into an understanding of the whole. John of St. Thomas shows us what his patron was about. N V

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Apologetics as Meant by Newman by Stanley L. Jaki, O.S.B. (*Port Huron, MI: Real View Books, 2005*), xv + 419 pp.

FR. STANLEY JAKI is perhaps most famous in this country for his contributions to the study of the relationship of science and religion, which resulted in the winning of the Templeton Prize in 1987. In recent years, however, Fr. Jaki has turned his attention to the thought of John Henry Cardinal Newman. *Apologetics as Meant by Newman* is Stanley Jaki's fourth full-length treatment of Newman, if one does not include his republication of four of Newman's works with scholarly introductions exceeding over one hundred pages of text. In this work, Fr. Jaki sets out to demonstrate that for Newman the central element in his apologetics is the enormity of sin.

Fr. Jaki's work begins with a survey of the last century of research on Newman's apologetics, noting various *lacunae* in the contemporary scholarship which he seeks to fill. The remainder of the work is then divided into three parts. The first part is an extended discussion of perhaps Newman's greatest apologetic work, *Essay in the Aid of the Grammar of Assent*. Fr. Jaki argues that the "sense of sin" is critical to understanding Newman's apologetic. Most scholars have focused to a great extent on the philosophical underpinnings of the work, such as the illative sense or probabilities. Indeed the treatments by Sheridan Gilley and Ian Ker do just that. Fr. Jaki, on the other hand, emphasizes that the culmination of the text is really Newman's proof for religion based on "the great teacher of religion": conscience, which provides man with a sense of sin and guilt. This is why Newman refers to any apologetics that do not take into consideration man's sin as simply "counterfeit and hollow" (53), and he feels that the apologetics in Giovanni Perrone's *Praelectiones* is virtually absurd since the work "knew nothing of the reality of heretics as realities" (10). After all, men are more "inclined to sit at home" than to stir themselves to inquire about whether revelation has been given at all (100).

The second part is concerned with Newman's treatment of the four notes of the Church in the *Anglican Difficulties*. After his previous discussion of sin, Fr. Jaki, with a flair for the dramatic, begins with the note of holiness, noting that Newman devoted two lectures to the note of holiness and one to each of the other notes. For Newman the note of holiness is concerned more with a principle than with the behavior of Catholics. Newman argues that it would be better "for all the many millions" on earth "to die of starvation in extremist agony . . . than that one soul . . . should commit one single venial sin" (182), and in this way the Church takes her stand against sin and ultimately conquers sin by lifting them "out of the mire," by providing a supernatural solution to sin, forgiveness. The citations offered by Fr. Jaki are so powerful and plentiful that they cannot be dismissed. One can only wonder how the vast cadre of Newman scholars could have failed to address the matter. For each of the three other notes—catholicity, apostolicity, and unity—Fr. Jaki emphasizes that Newman begins with sinful human nature.

The third part of Fr. Jaki's work concerns itself with various topics: the development of doctrine, Christian culture, and Catholic universities. Here Fr. Jaki reminds the reader that Newman's *Essay on Development* is apologetic in nature. Fr. Jaki notes that the function of Newman's seven tests is to discern a true development from a corruption, and in this way the reader is brought back to the sense of sin.

Fr. Jaki has shown how Newman's seemingly disparate apologetic works are centered around a common theological theme of sin. Many of the recent

treatments have neglected this apologetic perspective of Newman's thought, which is unfortunate; for as Fr. Jaki demonstrates, often with evident delight, Newman identified himself not as a theologian, but rather as an apologist. The strict historian will find Fr. Jaki's frequent references to contemporary theologians needless digressions; but for those who are concerned not only with Newman as a historical figure but with Newman's contemporary relevance will find these "digressions" thought-provoking. One criticism might be offered. Fr. Jaki fails to discuss whether Newman saw a fundamental distinction between apologetics and controversial theology. It may be that Newman himself never made this distinction, since he was simply engaged in a practical *apologia* rather than in making fine distinctions about the nature of related fields. Fr. Jaki's work is a welcome addition to the field. **N V**

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Deification and Grace by Daniel A. Keating (*Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2007*), ix + 142 pp.

AMONG CHRISTIAN scholars and even among the wider Christian public there is a renewed interest in the topic of "deification," also referred to as "divinization." Not surprisingly this interest is evident among Eastern Orthodox theologians, where *theosis* (the Greek term employed within Eastern Orthodox theology) was and continues to be at the heart of the Orthodox notion of grace. What may be surprising is that many Catholic theologians, Dr. Daniel A. Keating of Sacred Heart Major Seminary in Detroit being one of them, have also shown a marked and enthusiastic interest in this topic. These Catholic theologians do not wish simply to revive and so import into Western theology a renewed understanding of and appreciation for the Eastern Orthodox view of grace as found within the Greek Fathers, though they certainly do want to do that. Rather, what is significant here is that they also wish to demonstrate, Keating himself being a foremost example, that deification is very much a part of the Western understanding of grace, as found, for example, in the writings of Ambrose, Augustine, and Aquinas. Thus, the notion of deification is shared by the universal church and so is not a concept that exclusively belongs to the Greek Fathers and Eastern theological tradition, as is often assumed, especially among the Orthodox themselves.

While deification may have caught the imagination of many, yet, as Keating points out at the outset of his book, there is often a great lack of

clarity as to its biblical foundation and its exact theological meaning, both of which hinder a full appreciation of its salvific import. Within this context Keating aims, in his short but exceptionally well researched and skillfully written book, *Deification and Grace*, to examine the biblical basis for the notion of deification as well as provide a clear theological exposition founded upon the Fathers of the Church as well as the Church's doctrinal and later theological tradition.

The first topic Keating covers is what is commonly called the "formula of exchange," for it concisely expresses the theological principle upon which the mystery of human deification is established. While there is no one set formula, many of the Fathers articulate the same truth in various manners. Irenaeus was the first to articulate it: the Son of God became "what we are, that he might bring us to be even what he is Himself" (12). Athanasius succinctly stated: "For he [the Son] was made man that we might be made God" (12). In the West, Augustine wrote: "God wanted to be the Son of Man and he wanted men to be the sons of God" (13–14). Keating finds such expressions even in our own day, for example, in the person of then Cardinal Ratzinger: "This exchange consists of God taking our human existence on himself in order to bestow his divine existence on us" (16). Keating recognizes that such formulae were not arbitrary theological constructs, but arose out of the New Testament proclamation. For example, in 2 Corinthians 8:9 Paul proclaims that Christ became poor that we might share in his riches, or in Galatians 4:4–6 he states that God sent forth his Son "so that we might receive adoption as sons." The "formula of exchange" gave rise to the more specific theological concept of deification primarily under the influence of Psalm 82:6 ("You are gods"). Surprisingly, however, 2 Peter 1:4 ("You . . . become partakers of the divine nature") only played a marginal role in the early development and exposition of the theology of deification, though it did become more prominent within the later theological tradition of both the East and the West (cf. 29–37).

Keating also notes that, in the past, many scholars often interpreted this "formula of exchange" as though the Fathers who championed it held that the mere act itself of the Son of God assuming our human nature brought about its divinizing effect within our own individual humanities, and so criticized it for making redundant the cross and resurrection. Keating rightly points out that this is a false interpretation. "For them [the Fathers], the Incarnation is the inauguration of one united work, which encompasses the whole of Christ's life, passion, death, resurrection, ascension as Lord to the right hand of the Father" (23). Moreover, having demonstrated the biblical origin for the concept of deification, Keating

also easily fends off the false accusation of hellenization, exemplified in Harnack, that is, that the Fathers derived their understanding from Greek philosophy and the mystery religions prevalent at the time.

In chapter two, Keating addresses the issues of how “we receive divine life and become deified in Christ” (39). We can only share in God’s divine life through his agency. “No creature can accomplish this. It is only through the effective *indwelling* of the Son and the Spirit that human beings are regenerated, sanctified, adopted as children of God, and deified” (40). But what means does God employ for our deification? Drawing upon many Fathers, Keating wonderfully shows that “[t]he consistent position adopted by the Fathers, both East and West, is that God comes to dwell effectively in us especially through baptism and the Eucharist” (41). It is through baptism that we become children of the Father, having become conformed to the likeness of Jesus, the Son, through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and so are deified. The Eucharist, in turn, becomes “the primary means for ongoing participation in the life and power of God” (44). As Keating summarily states: “The appeal to the sacraments in the Fathers, then, reflects an emphasis on God and what he does for our sake in the redemption of the whole of our nature” (47). Having presented the patristic teaching on how we enter into the divine life through baptism and continue to be divinely nourished through the Eucharist, Keating returns to scripture to corroborate what the Fathers taught. In doing so Keating, once again, illustrates how the Fathers’ teaching, both of the East and of the West, is imbued with biblical thought and so how their notion of deification is itself an expression of the authentic Gospel.

Having focused on the divine actions by which God deifies us through the sacraments, in chapter three, Keating takes up the topic of how we humanly respond to God’s deifying actions so as to conform ourselves more and more to the image of Christ himself.

First, all progress in deification—in its various manifestations—is grounded in divine grace and the prior indwelling of God. Second, the New Testament presents us with—and beckons us to—transformation into full maturity in the image of Christ, expressed especially by faith, hope, and love. Third, our progress in deification has a baptismal and Eucharistic shape. We are called to share progressively in the communion of Christ’s suffering, death, and resurrection. These aspects of our deification have been selected because they help us to see the continuity in our path to deification from its beginnings to maturity of this life. (63)

Again, calling upon a wealth of patristic, medieval, and contemporary sources, Keating fleshes out each of these three aspects. He, for example,

provides a brief but masterly account of the biblical notions of “image” and “likeness” and proceeds to develop what it means to grow in the divine image and likeness of Christ. “The Incarnation of the Son of God presents us with a double disclosure. Not only is the glory of God revealed in the face of Christ (2 Cor 4:6; Jn 14:9), but the true glory of the human race is also revealed. . . . We are to become what we behold, and we are to make progress in Christ, the image of God, into whom we have already been baptized” (76). This assuming of the image of Christ is fostered through the living out of a virtuous life. Virtuous actions are the fruit of the divine life within us, so they are, by their very nature, divine-like actions. Thus, by performing virtuous acts—acts of generosity, forgiveness, courage—we conform ourselves to the divine likeness of Christ.

While Keating, in the previous chapters, presented a biblical, historical, theological, and doctrinal account of deification, he rightly recognizes that there is one crucial question yet to be addressed. “Does the doctrine of deification, by means of its elevated and potentially exaggerated rhetoric, effectively compromise the fundamental distinction between God and the created order, and so lead explicitly or implicitly to a form of pantheism?” (91) Again, subpoenaing a courtroom full of patristic, medieval, and contemporary witnesses, Keating proves beyond reasonable doubt that such an allegation is false. Athanasius leads off the testimony: “Wherefore [the Word] is very God, existing one in essence with the very Father; while other beings, to whom he said ‘I said you are gods’ (Ps 82:6), had this grace from the Father, only by participation of the Word, through the Spirit” (92). On behalf of the Latin tradition, Augustine states: “It is evident, then, as he has called men gods, that they are deified by his grace, not born of his substance. . . . If we have been made sons of God, we have also been made gods: but this is the effect of grace adopting, not of nature generating’ (95). Keating shows that while the Fathers and subsequent tradition of both the East and West speak of the Son and Holy Spirit participating in the very same divine nature as the Father and so are God as he is God, they consistently speak of human beings participating in the divine nature by the grace of adoption. Human beings are adopted into the Trinitarian relationships in that the Spirit conforms them into the likeness of the Son and so, in union with the Son, become children of the Father. This understanding, Keating also highlights, is consistent with the New Testament proclamation.

While both the East and West speak of deification as participating in the divine, Keating notes that they express this differently.

The Western tradition, following Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century), speaks about the goal of deification as participation in the divine

essence, and as culminating in the Beatific vision (the vision of God as he is). The Eastern tradition, following Gregory of Palamas (fourteenth century), claims that we participate not in the very essence of God himself, but in the divine energies of God. (104–5)

The West wishes to emphasize that human beings are divinized in that they relate to God as God is in himself—as a Trinity of persons. The East, wishing to ensure the transcendent nature of God which is always beyond human reach and comprehension, emphasizes that it is through the divine energies, that is, the manner in which God manifests himself in the world, that human beings participate in the divine life. While Keating sees the difference here to be one of emphasis, I think he is too kind to the East. The very notion of divine energies, which has no biblical foundation, means that human beings are not related to God as God is, but are related to God through the mediating, and so through the medium, of divine actions other than the very acts by which God is a Trinity of persons. What Gregory of Palamas did not grasp is that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are able to relate human beings to themselves as they are in themselves without the loss of their transcendence, for they are not “lowered” by such a relationship, but rather human beings are “elevated” by such a relationship, a relationship which ensures that the mystery of the Trinity is fully revealed but never fully comprehended. The irony is that while deification has always been recognized as the heart of the Eastern Orthodox understanding of grace, yet it is the West that actually possesses a more robust theological conception of it.

Keating concludes his study by once more summarizing the biblical, patristic, and doctrinal warrant for the theological notion of deification. In so doing he once more emphasizes that it lies at the heart of the Gospel message.

In concluding this review, I would like to underscore a number of specific points. First, while this is a brief study, concisely and clearly written, it treats, nonetheless, all of the relevant issues in a scholarly and informed manner. Secondly, Keating employs all of the primary sources—the patristic, medieval, reformation, and contemporary—in a creative and imaginative manner. It is the masterful use of these sources that gives theological depth and spiritual gusto to this book. Thirdly, Keating is well acquainted with all of the contemporary literature on the topic, which allows the reader to obtain a broad knowledge of the subject. Fourthly, while Keating quotes many sources, yet his own explanations and insights add freshness, originality, and character to this study. Fifthly, while this book cannot be criticized for its lack of scholarship, it

is, nonetheless, thoroughly readable and so accessible to a large audience. It would make an excellent text for seminary, undergraduate, and graduate courses on grace. Lastly, above all, this is an exceptional book, for the reader not only obtains theological knowledge and scholarly insight concerning the Christian understanding of deification, but the book also lifts up the heart and mind to the glory of what God has done for us as human beings—raising us up into the very life of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit so that we share in their very own divine life of love and joy. **N·V**

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