

Book Reviews

Theological Negotiations: Proposals in Soteriology and Anthropology
by Douglas Farrow (*Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2018*), 288 pp.

FRANK SINATRA’S “I did it my way” sums up a not too uncommon theme in contemporary culture. Arguably, this captures the end of Western classical liberalism and its infatuation with individualism (i.e., the view that a society should be justly governed on the basis of individual rights of which egalitarianism is at the heart). But, there is another problem endemic to the history of theology for which it is a fitting analogue, namely, Pelagianism (i.e., the heresy that humans are not affected by original sin and, in fact, are quite capable of choosing good or evil and satisfying the just demands of God). Pelagianism, at its core, places the utmost value in what we as humans do and what it is that we bring to God. However, and unmistakably, the Christian message is one where God the Son descends to give us the gifts of life and blessing from which Christ brings us to God. Both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism have rejected Pelagianism as an adequate feature of the Church Catholic’s soteriology and anthropology. If it could be shown that one of these sub-traditions led the way to Pelagianism, at least in practice, then the provoking question would inevitably follow: “Should I move my membership?”

This is one theme that is picked up throughout Douglas Farrow’s excellent foray into Protestant soteriological and anthropological issues. In *Theological Negotiations*, Farrow is convinced that Roman Catholicism is the one true Church and Protestantism is a deviation or aberration from the Tradition. He attempts to show that Protestantism leads to all sorts of deviations from the Church like antinomianism and Pelagianism. The first half of *Theological Negotiations* is concerned with the nature and tendency of Protestantism toward antinomianism. In it, Farrow offers the reader an excellent analysis of why philosophy has played an essential role in the process of clarifying biblical claims and an aid in systematizing the material aspects of the Bible so as to grant form to it. He recognizes that intrinsic to God’s revelatory process is an interpretive community that God not only providentially safeguards from error but also that God has provided mechanisms for which to preserve the Church from error (e.g., John 16:13; 1 John 4:2). In other words, the Church Catholic is necessary to the transmission of the Gospel

and intrinsic to the process. Call the relationship between philosophy and the Bible one of “faith seeking understanding” following Anselm, but it is the Church’s reception that is so crucial to the arrival at theological truth. In other words, philosophy and biblical truth (e.g., exegesis and biblical theology) are insufficient themselves. Systematic and practical theology are the goals interior to the Church’s function of proclaiming the Gospel to the next generation, so in this way Farrow has helpfully illuminated the “evangelical” nature of Roman Catholicism, when by “evangelical” we mean something to do with the Christological mission that is ancillary to the Church’s role in transferring the good news to the world, Farrow also gives the reader a careful analysis of nature and grace, but it is inaccurate to suggest this is unique to Roman Catholicism. Many theological authorities in the Protestant sub-tradition do not depart from the Thomistic framework on nature and grace. Excising nature and its attending creational realities including the moral law would render grace incoherent. But, like the Roman Catholic sub-tradition, Protestantism’s theologians have many complicated ways of working out the relation between nature and grace.

Chapters 3 and 4 are theologically robust and substantive to both Roman Catholics and Protestants. In these chapters, Farrow advances a case for both antinomianism and Pelagianism that unironically begins with Martin Luther—the great Reformer who challenged, or attempted to challenge, the Roman Catholic Church. Farrow does so, in part, by calling into question Luther’s understanding of justification (namely, the doctrine of Christ’s imputed righteousness) and sanctification, which either renders us Pelagians because sanctification is wholly the result of *our* actions after justification (as our justification is complete by Christ’s righteousness imputed, according to Luther), or, alternatively, renders us entirely passive in the process. I should simply note that the relationship between justification and sanctification is quite complicated in Protestantism after Luther, so a dismissal of what Protestantism has to offer on the subject might not be charitable. Chapter 4 is, in my opinion, the most sophisticated chapter theologically. Farrow does a masterful work in dismantling variations of penal substitution atonement where Christ assumes the debt of punishment on behalf of humans—a view of which has become commonplace in Protestantism after Calvin. Some variants of penal substitution, especially in contemporary evangelicalism, take it that the message of the Gospel is simply that God vents his wrath on his Son for us. Farrow does a wonderful job illuminating the complex distinctions of satisfaction versus punishment, temporal debts versus eternal debts, and private versus public offenses (although I do not recall him using that kind of precision in his language). In this way, Farrow exemplifies the virtues of

“faith seeking understanding” and he gives an implicit call to Protestants for clarity. Yet, while it is implicit, he seems to take this as an objection to Protestantism generally for which I must push back and say that this call should be a call to both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians. The Protestant tradition is not somehow beholden to Calvin’s penal substitution theory of atonement, nor is it beholden to the aberrations of the view that takes Christ’s principle act as one that bears the very fury of God. In fact, the Protestant tradition has a complex relationship to Anselm’s satisfaction theory, the moral government, and penal substitution. In other words, there is not one monolithic view of the atonement (although I should register that there are parameters, which rule out some models of atonement, e.g., the “moral influence” theory).

The most potentially damning of all challenges comes up in chapter 5. Farrow attempts to make the case that Protestants are beholden to a kind of Pelagianism he calls “doxological Pelagianism.” His argument is fascinating, but I find myself unconvinced. His concern is that Protestant liturgy is practically a form of Pelagianism precisely because Christ’s sacrificial offer is no longer accessible to us in the liturgy, but, instead, as James Torrance argues, it tends toward the idea that the Eucharist is our work that we offer to the Father in heaven rather than Christ’s actual work of which we partake. What is at stake, then, and as any student of Church history knows, is Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. And, his presence cannot simply mean that he is present to believers in their hearts or that in God’s general providence he is present, nor that God is somehow present to his material creation generically, but that Christ is present specifically and concretely (although I should register one more item and that is that many historical articulations of transubstantiation have failed to account for Christ’s particularity in the bread and wine and not simply those elements bearing the properties of body and blood—the generic problem). Without delving into the specifics of Farrow’s argument for transubstantiation, I find myself unconvinced that transubstantiation is the only way to make sense of Christ’s concrete presence. I agree with Farrow that any view that leans in the direction of memorialism is unsatisfying and neither Catholic nor catholic, but that still leaves consubstantialism and some version of impanation on the table (no pun intended) for discussion as views consistent with the earliest instances of the redemptive community in the first few centuries of Church history.

There are of course two pulsating questions to answer for which Farrow is deeply concerned. First, is transubstantiation a view of the Church which only later developments made clear? Second, is it the only way of making sense of Christ’s actual presence in the sacrificial meal? I will grant

that it is possible I have missed some nuance in Farrow's argument, but his claim amounts to the view that the "Christian" understanding of the meal as Christ's presence just is transubstantiation. This strikes me as extravagant. On a positive note, Farrow helpfully shows why Aristotelianism is not essential to transubstantiation—an assumption commonly made by Protestants.

I must state that I am Protestant, but I do not believe the term Protestant captures the best of the sub-tradition because it highlights a perceived reactionary movement in ecclesiastical history rather than notates a positive demarcation from other sub-traditions. I much prefer the term Reformed catholic, even Reformed Catholic as the theologian William Perkins would call it, and the best of what catholicism has to offer can be found in Anglicanism. I imagine my distaste for the term Protestant is parallel to the distaste that Catholics have for the term Romanism, but let me say a bit more about what I take to be catholic, or Reformed Catholic. By that term, I mean more than simply that my denomination signs onto the Nicene Creed or that it is doctrinally consistent with the creedal tradition. I also intend more than what is often called "mere Christianity" or the watered down ecumenism. In good Anglican spirit, historically speaking, Anglicans not only sign on to the ecumenical councils as authoritative, but they endorse a Tradition (with theological authorities intrinsic to that Tradition) as such that we receive. This is a clear contrast with the picture of the rebellious revolutionary Luther, warranted as it is. Rather, as a catholic (or Catholic), what Anglicans are after is continuity of tradition that preserves doctrine and transmits the incarnational presence of Christ in the Church's sacramental practice. It seems to me and others that Apostolic succession with conciliar authority and right liturgy are necessary, possibly sufficient, for the preservation of right doctrine and right practice. With this in mind, Anglicans agree with much of what is found in Farrow's critique of Protestant tendencies. We share the belief that mere symbolism and memorialism are liturgically insufficient and are outlying positions in catholic Christianity, but to suggest the stronger thesis that transubstantiation just is the Church's view is dubious. Undoubtedly, this sort of objection to all sub-traditions other than Roman Catholicism is one for which I will return in my reflection for years to come.

Theological Negotiations is a wonderful piece of systematic theology. It bears the fruit of *evangelical* theology while maintaining a substantive formal role for a traditional and confessional authority structure. Farrow is versed in the modes of reasoning of contemporary systematic theology exemplifying care and clarity of expression. Although Farrow is acerbic at times, his reflections are often refreshingly ecumenical. Roman Catholic

theologians and Reformed Christians will benefit from Farrow's seasoned reflections. Unconvinced that all of Protestantism yields doxological Pelagianism, Farrow helps us, Protestants, see the proclivity to do it "my way." On this, we are agreed that the preservation of the Gospel as we share in the heritage of our Fathers is of the utmost importance. N·V

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When Christians Were Jews: The First Generation by Paula Fredriksen
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 272 pp.

BY NATURAL DISPOSITION, I am inclined to follow the (now not so) New Criticism, but Paula Fredriksen has written a book that begs for a good old-fashioned Freudian reading: *When Christians Were Jews: The First Generation*. The title hides an autobiographical interest, for Fredriksen is herself a *Jew who was a Christian*. Still more: she is a former-Catholic Jewish historian of early Jewish Christians, who on her last page rejects her own catchy title as a distorting anachronism. "Christians" did not yet exist in that far-away first generation, she confesses, only misguided Jews who thought that they would be history's last. In the meantime, of course, when the world did not end, these misguided Jews somehow turned into misguided Christians, and the book ends as an ethical thrust aimed at "one of the West's most sustained fonts of anti-Judaism" (183), namely Christianity, a faith built on layer upon layer of illusion. Lamentable as Christian anti-Judaism surely is, one wonders if a moralizing font of vulgarized ex-Christian "Jewish" anti-Christianism, dispensing seductively packaged speculative historical reconstructions, is what better Christian-Jewish relations really needed.

At the base of the study stands a sharp variant on a perfectly benign first principle of historical reason: Jesus was a Jew. From here, with characteristic verve, the book—which is a kind of smashed-together summary of positions developed in her previous works (e.g., *Jesus of Nazareth, King of Jews* [1999] and *Paul, the Pagan's Apostle* [2017])—launches out upon Fredriksen's long-standing enterprise of rethinking and rewriting the entirety of Christian origins as a fully Jewish story. Such a project is obviously unobjectionable as far as it goes, though it takes many turns and pronounces many judgments that can and really should be disputed and resisted. A few

select issues will be evoked below. In essence, for Fredriksen, Jesus was a doubly duped victim, bilked by the failure of history to end and swindled by a mismanaged political game, a religious enthusiast who, by a bungled act of Roman plotting, unwittingly founded a new Jewish lunatic fringe: a crowd of mentally “marginal Jews” made in his image, a first-century sect of blundering and impervious prophetic dullness. Such a formulation freely sounds unfair and overstated. It is actually rather accurate, however, and at least serves to signal the problem of genre at the outset. Professionally responsible as it strives to be and personal as it inevitably is, the text is in every way a typical trade-book: meant for mass consumption (and mass sales) and thereby sold to (well-selling) sensationalistic views. In this connection it is merely the latest, well-paced and well-written iteration of the “Jesus the Failed Millenarian Prophet” series—which, like *Star Wars* books, at some point all start to look the same, with some minimal rearrangement of wookiees and death stars.

The genus is well-known. Atop the turn to apocalyptic Judaism and a misled Jesus—now classic with its Schweitzerean pedigree—comes the accustomed citation of Leon Festinger and company’s *When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World*. This combination of historical and sociological modeling then spins out the whole paradigm. Jesus was gravely mistaken in his expectation of the imminent end of the world and, on this point, his followers proved to be good disciples—even better than the master. For, again and again, they re-tried the same prophecy, repeatedly getting it wrong in their turn, reinterpreting and reviving the discredited view with a dense ingenuity born of complete and excitable delusion. In Fredriksen’s reconstruction, we thus trace the arc through four specific eschatological let-downs: Jesus at his final Passover; then again when the resurrection appearances stopped; once more during the tense showdown with Caligula; and finally, during the Great Revolt against Rome. This chronicle of an unrelieved string of the first generation’s end-time errors marks the way in which Albert Schweitzer’s original Jesus-centered vision has been expanded into a full, integral history of early Christianity’s incorrigible eschatological madness.

Fredriksen’s text mounts its argument through five chapters. The first is foundational in placing Jerusalem front and center and contending that Jesus, like most Jews of the period (Paul included and the Essenes at Qumran excluded) actually had nothing against the Temple. That this position further proves Jesus’s blithe contentment in general with the way things were in the Second Temple world *va de soi* for Fredriksen, it seems. All signs of halakhic friction, tensions, and other challenges to the system

from within fall out of view as irrelevant data. This is at root an E. P. Sanders-type move, privileging deeds over words and plotting the hero in serene relations to his Jewish surroundings.

The second chapter takes up the thread and works toward an interpretation of Jesus's turning over of the money changer's tables (Sanders!), which on the basis of chapter 1 can now signal no antagonism towards the religious establishment. Here Fredriksen makes a significant option for John's chronology, with the result that a giant hole is left in the (Synoptic) account of the reason for Jesus's crucifixion. As she hunts for the cause, she astutely observes that Jesus was arrested and killed, but not his disciples. Thus, she concludes, Pilate knew that Jesus and his followers posed no real practical political threat. This leads her to the provocative assertion that he was accordingly crucified as "King of the Jews" in order to disabuse, silence, and scatter the over-excited crowds who at this feast were suddenly claiming him as Messiah—an opinion of himself that Jesus never shared or entertained. Jesus was thus the direct victim of his own uncontrolled popularity, which fed on his own over-excited expectation of the end.

The conceit that Jesus had no messianic pretensions has a long (and dubious) history, of course. What is interesting to observe here is that what Schweitzer understood to be the forced *either-or* choice between his view and that of William Wrede—namely between an apocalyptically minded Jesus and one who never thought he was the messiah—is a *both-and* in Fredriksen's portrayal. Jesus oddly stumbles into his post-mortem messianic identity precisely because of his contagious eschatological fixation—yet not as the literary invention of Mark, as Wrede supposed, and still less to "turn the wheel of history," as Schweitzer preferred, but rather through a Roman prefect's miscalculated gambit. Pilate's mocking *titulus*, pure political invention for policing the crowds, is the true proto-Evangelium: the historical rock on which the Christian faith stands in Fredriksen's alternative vision.

One must admire the bravado of this anti-Gospel. Jesus had no enemies, only too much success; and he was never rejected on any side. He occupied no personal place within his kingdom proclamation, which had no place, in fact, for anything other than the end of the world. This alone sufficed, it seems, to make him madly popular. Demonstrations of moral authority and brilliant newness at most served to engender further unanimous excitement about something other than Jesus. No one imagined "perhaps this is the one" (at least prior to that final Passover) and no one ever countered that the old wine was good—not even in those fateful final days. Reading against the grain of the sources is too weak to describe this aggressive revisionist strategy. Fredriksen has somehow lifted Ernest

Renan's "Galilean Spring" and managed to make it the background for Jesus's Judean Passion. That all fault falls squarely upon Pilate's head and Roman hands will, of course, be reckoned as a well-measured corrective of the pernicious blood libel.

Chapter 3 must naturally confront the failure of Pilate's deadly *reductio ad absurdum* to disband the excited throng. This means addressing the disciples' experience of the resurrection and working to explain how this Jesus, whose (unwanted) messianic credentials had just been rather rudely undermined, nevertheless became "Christ." As Fredriksen recounts it, this process is essentially a double cycle of eschatological disappointment turned to glorious Christological profit, by the raising of Jesus and by the creation of the Parousia expectation. In a word, the resurrection appearances—the disciples' first efforts to hold on to Jesus' immanent kingdom dream after it was forcibly blunted by his crucifixion—worked nicely for a while; but then these experiences curiously stopped and the world went unobliquely on. The resourceful believers accordingly re-prophesied their way out of this new jolt of "cognitive dissonance" by creating the coming Son of Man.

At least theologically considered, the reduction of the resurrection to an *idée fixe* is certainly the most pivotal move that Fredriksen must make. Quite apart from the momentous assumption that the New Testament makes no claims upon this score that merit any serious historical interest or reflection, the notion that for the early believers the resurrection exclusively concerned a way to sustain hope in the *very* immanent end, and neither revealed nor confirmed anything special about Jesus's personal divinity requires quite a comprehensive jettisoning of primitive traditions. It also exposes a staggering insensitivity to early Christian experiences and expressions of realized eschatology. This is a major point and a major blind-spot in Fredriksen's whole narrow construction. Subsequently functionalizing the "Son of Man" sayings as concocted props for the maintenance of the happy eschatological illusion further fails to account for the variegated character of this tricky material, which is more complex than Fredriksen's opportunistic "coming on the clouds" motif would admit. That scholars (and non-scholars) should be permitted to not believe in the resurrection may be generously granted. Still, one begins to wonder whether in this one-dimensional reconstruction it is not perhaps Paula Fredriksen who is tenaciously clinging to a single stubborn idea.

The following two chapters continue the experience of *déjà vu* and it is not critical to trudge through every detail. We encounter additional Christological metamorphoses, like the scripturally resourced "Davidization" of Jesus (who by the *titulum* was made a king in spite of himself).

The phenomenon of mission becomes an apostolic “improvisation” that coopted Greeks who had a preexisting attachment to Judaism, entering them into the prophetic expectation of an end-time ingathering of the nations. Ultimately, two Roman face-offs close the show with fitting fireworks, but not of the sort sufficient to pull down history’s final curtain.

At the conclusion of the book, it is hard to know where precisely to engage. There are, in fact, great swaths of common ground and even useful formulations and insights along the way. Still, one wishes to jump off so often than it is probably best not to board this train of thought at all. At the level of “historical Jesus” methodology, I might gesture only to one major opening move, where another line should be taken: a clear vote for Dale Allison over Sanders. Discounting the huge bulk of sayings materials and ignoring the whole shape and role of memory in the Jesus the tradition, as Fredriksen à la Sanders does, is not the most likely approach to plant us on historical *terra firma*. It is quite certain to erase the key vestiges of the “Christology of Jesus.” Allison’s “gist” arguments also result in the familiar failed millenarian prophet, of course. Here I can only say that I have addressed this issue elsewhere (including recently in the pages of this journal). For me, without draining any apocalyptic sap, Jesus’s Judaism is much broader and more nuanced than the picture we conventionally get and has (among other things) much more rabbinism in its blood than these scholars of the radical Schweitzer school seem ready to see.

The deep heritage of Schweitzer’s specific brand of “Jewish Jesus” in an express nineteenth-century German Protestant loathing for rabbinic religion should not be simply bypassed in this connection. Christian (and ex-Christian) constructions of Judaism are not uncomplicated creations. Nor is Jewish identity sovereignly free of all influence from such Christian ideas (i.e., Peter Schäfer’s *Die Geburt des Judentums aus dem Geist des Christentums*). For those minded to get the story of Judaism straight, the lesson should thus be clear. Buying in on the premise of an apocalyptic disorientation in the deepest DNA of Christianity is quite certain to come back and bite Judaism in the end (all the more so, as those first Christians were Jews)—which is good reason to get this key question of expectation correct. After all, an acute state of readiness that God might at any moment intervene and bring salvation—the infamous Christian *Naherwartung* (which, *note bene*, was not dropped as a doctrine with the first generation)—is perhaps not, in the end, so structurally different from the notion of a *Tzadik Ha-Dor*, the idea that every generation might potentially be the one worthy to see the Lord’s Messiah. Ample room exists in both cases for fanatic paranoia, sluggish apathy, and various attitudes of alacrity in-between.

If a clarification of Jewish–Christian relations is accordingly at stake in these questions about Jesus and his first believers—and it is hard to avoid such ecumenical implications—it seems to me that Fredriksen has above all worked one monumental disservice to Jewish identity. In rejecting Jesus for herself, as she has every right in the world to do, she refuses to allow a historical “No” to be spoken by first-century Jews. In fact, she has not even allowed those first Christians who were Jews to speak their own robust “Yes.” Like Jesus himself, all they can do is cling to an illusion for which he himself is superfluous dressing. Is it not precisely the prime duty, however, in a genuine dialogue in these delicate matters first to acknowledge and respect the intellectual and spiritual space both to make and to refuse a real messianic claim about this particular Jew?

In the last analysis, Fredriksen’s project invites reflection on religious epistemology and specifically the relation between historical intelligence and confessional conviction. In a word: Are the sorts of reconstructions elaborated in this book reasons not to accept Christ as the Church proclaims him? Or is this tradition of scholarship instead so much historical cover for a decision inevitably made in conscience on different intellectual and personal grounds? For, whether Christian faith can co-exist in any meaningful sense should the essential view of this book be true is a very earnest question. At least since Schweitzer, both Liberal Protestants and Modernist Catholics have made strenuous efforts to assimilate Fredriksen-like visions into the Christian creed. For my part, I vigorously doubt that such theological acrobatics convince and Fredriksen’s conversion to Judaism should be taken as her own agreement and honest answer to the question.

The fundamental incompatibility of this book with the Christian account of Jesus is obviously not in itself a rebuttal for non-believers. Yet, the annihilation of the Christian faith by a pretended explanation should at least appear to interested outsiders as a serious obstacle in their right understanding of the phenomenon of this same faith. In the *City of God*, Augustine reports an oracle of Apollo recorded by Porphyry. It is the answer to a man inquiring how to dissuade his wife from her Christian belief. “Let her continue as she pleases, persisting in her vain delusions [*inanibus fallaciis*], and lamenting in song a god who died in delusions [*fallaciis*]” (*City of God* 19.23). That a modern Jewish scholar might heartily agree with an ancient pagan voice about the derisible character of Christianity and Jesus is permissible enough. (They are less likely to follow when Porphyry goes on to say that the Jews did well to condemn Jesus to a shameful death). Augustine responded by asking who was so foolish not to recognize that such words were “composed by a clever man with a

strong animus against Christians” (translation adapted from newadvent.org). In the same line, it is also permitted if a modern Christian scholar sees matters likewise and wonders whether this latest installment in the old “Failed Millenarian Prophet” series might not fit well under the title of a clever article Fredriksen also authored: “Mandatory Retirement: Ideas in the Study of Christian Origins whose Time to Go has Come.” N.V

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Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? by Frans de Waal (*New York: W. W. Norton, 2016*), 340 pp.

FRANS DE WAAL’S 2016 *Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?* is an exciting read into the baffling and brilliant world of what goes on inside non-human animal heads. Given the sheer number of studies published in the late twentieth century on animal cognition, de Waal does an amazing job presenting many of them in a highly readable fashion with just enough detail to understand the importance and rigorous facets of the research (or in some cases not so rigorous), but without making the detail overwhelming. The extensive bibliography at the end of the book provides ample material for any curious reader interested in further research regarding any of the scientific studies.

Much of what is presented in the book would present a big challenge for any contemporary Cartesians who may hold, as Descartes did, that animals are mere *automata*. If non-human animals are self-moving machines devoid of cognition, then how do chimpanzees learn to stack boxes high enough to reach objects overhead? De Waal tells the famous story of Sultan the chimpanzee who accomplished such a feat *without any prior training or teaching* (65). Further, if non-human animals have no emotions, then what of the two bottlenose dolphins who came to the rescue of a third after the explosion of a stick of dynamite (133)? De Waal’s book presents many challenges for the Cartesian mechanistic view of animals.

Most people today, however, need not be persuaded that that the Cartesian view is wrong. On a popular level the overwhelming view is that there is no significant difference in kind between the cognition of non-human

animals and that of man. It is this view that de Waal himself espouses throughout the book, and for which he provides much evidence, although at times his phrasing sounds a bit like dogmatic worship of Darwin. Nevertheless, if Darwin is right, he is right. And given the contemporary biological and psychological courses of study, Darwin appears to be the most reasonable view.

But an older, middle view, between the extremes of Cartesian *automata* and Darwinian cognitivism has been forgotten by many scholars. This is the view of the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle held a more nuanced view of animal cognition: animals are not mere machines devoid of cognitive states, but neither do they possess all of the same kind of mental faculties that man has—"In all animals other than man there is no thinking or calculation but only imagination."¹ In the footsteps of Aristotle, Avicenna and Aquinas also did much to develop a rich account of animal cognition. De Waal seems to be completely unaware of the middle ground of the Aristotelians concerning animal cognition.

Most of the case studies de Waal mentions remain perfectly compatible with the Aristotelian tradition (albeit, perhaps in its more developed forms): ravens have cognitive perspective-taking (147–48); apes imitate other apes (153–54); thrushes cognize ahead in gathering food for their young (205–6); rats remember in which part of a maze they encountered chocolate before (211); and wasps recognize the faces of other wasps (70–71).

But various challenges remain for the Aristotelian. De Waal provides various cases of what he takes to be reasoning in non-human animals. Many of these cases are not reasoning in the Aristotelian sense: *reasoning* (for the Aristotelian) is coming to know another proposition from two prior propositions that are known. De Waal mentions Sadie, a chimpanzee who could cognize when a box had a fruit in it and when another box did not:

[The experimenters] placed an apple in one [box] and a banana in another. After a few minutes of distraction, Sadie saw one of the experimenters munching on either an apple or a banana. This experimenter then left, and Sadie was released to inspect the boxes. She faced an interesting dilemma, since she had not seen how the experimenter had gotten his fruit. Invariably, Sadie would go to the

¹ Aristotle, *De anima* 3.1.433a11–12l, in *On the Soul*, trans. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 688. See also *Ethica nicomachea* 1.7.1098a1–5).

box with the fruit that the experiment had *not* eaten. (54)

De Waal takes this as evidence that Sadie engaged in disjunctive reasoning, but there are other explanations. Could it not just be that Sadie first cognized the presence of an apple in one box and the presence of a banana in the other? Then cognized that the apple in the experimenter's mouth had been removed from its box? Sadie could still easily cognize that the banana might be in its box just by memory without making any sort of disjunctive argument. What de Waal takes as reasoning can just as easily be explained by mere association and memory: Sadie just recalls the banana has not been removed from its box. Humans may arrive at the same result by means of disjunctive reasoning (e.g.: "It's either in the first or second box"; "It's not in the first box"; "Therefore, it's in the second box"), but the fact that humans arrive at the same result by disjunctive reasoning does not entail that disjunctive reasoning is the only way to arrive at the same result. As Aquinas says, higher faculties can do what the lower do, but in a more eminent way. So, just because something is done by man using a higher cognitive faculty does not entail that all similar cases must be done by the same faculty in other creatures.

De Waal, however, mentions one stronger case:

Years later the Spanish primatologist Josep Call presented apes with two covered cups. They had learned that only one would be baited with grapes. If Call removed the tops and let them look inside the cups, the apes chose the one with grapes. Next, he kept the cups covered and shook first one, then the other. Only the cup with grapes made noise, which was the one they preferred. This was not too surprising. But making things harder, Call would sometimes shake only the empty cup, which made no noise. In this case, the apes would still pick the other one, thus operating on the basis of exclusion. (54).

What is going on in the above case? It sure looks like the ape was engaging in reasoning of the form:

1. The grape is either in the first or second cup.
2. It's not in the first cup (because it doesn't make a noise when shook).
3. Thus, the grape is in the second cup.

This is a strong objection——one which Aristotelians and Thomists need to take seriously. Mere adamant insisting the ape is not reasoning will not do. We need to take a hard look at the data and ask further questions like: How many times did the ape fail? Did the ape choose the grape correctly on the first test? Do adult humans choose the grape correctly on the first test? Are human toddlers just as successful? Depending upon how these questions are answered, they may show some reason to doubt that the case really is proof of disjunctive reasoning in apes.

Besides the occasionally challenging case to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, de Waal also mentions other cases that should give reason to believe that, even if the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition is not mistaken about animal cognition, there is certainly a lack of adequate and consistent terminology to describe all the cognitive activities occurring within the animal's head. Some apes have a type of political life, having hierarchical social structures; others seem to be able to "understand" the perspective of other apes; and some animals seem to be able to cognize that they themselves don't cognize *x*. Under what act/s of the estimative power would these cognitive objects fall? These cases, among others, call for an expansion of the object of the estimative power beyond mere apprehension of particular intentions, or intentions of harm and benefit. I am not saying that such cognitive objects cannot fall under the aspect of particular intentions, or that none of these cases of cognitive awareness cannot be explained by reference to the harm/benefit binary, but that even if the standard Thomistic line is true that the estimative only perceives particular intentions under the aspect of harm/benefit, these particular intentions still have a deep multifaceted nature to them that requires further elucidation. In short, more detail ought to be added to the proper object of the estimative power, and more detail ought to be given to the steps of animal action. Just as Aquinas gave detailed steps to human action, so too ought we give detailed steps to non-human animal action (though not necessarily in the same manner).

As Thomists, we should not be afraid of sharpening our theories in light of sense experience. Aristotle did not arrive at his rich account of animal cognition (see *Historia animalium* 9) out of thin air or through mere armchair philosophy, but rather engaged in some active work with the animal world. If we wish to honor Aristotle and those following him in the Aristotelian tradition, we must not merely repeat what they said out of mere deference to their authority, but rather because we wish to see whether what they said is true. And to really know that we must engage in arguments, which ought to take full advantage of the world of sense experience. To that end, de Waal's book has done us a great favor in providing

us with a written testament of decades worth of experience. Perhaps, his interpretation of sense experience is not always accurate, but such is where we must start. N. V

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Paul, a New Covenant Jew: Rethinking Pauline Theology by Brant Pitre, Michael P. Barber, and John A. Kincaid (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2019), 253 pp.

THIS BOOK is a fabulous accomplishment. It is thoroughly ecumenical, making extensive use of ancient Jewish sources, as well as engaging contemporary Jewish scholars, such as Mark Nanos, Nahum Sarna, Jon Levenson, and Jacob Milgrom—in addition to interacting at length with contemporary Paul scholars from various backgrounds such as Michael Gorman, John Barclay, Doug Campbell, E. P. Sanders, James Dunn, and N. T. Wright. In fact, the foreword is written by Gorman, who commends this work heartily.

Taking as their starting point the scholarly consensus over the last generation that Jesus and Paul must be understood within their first-century Jewish context, the authors locate Paul along the axis of an “apocalyptic new covenant Jew” (38–42, 93–4). After all, Paul calls himself a “minister of the *new covenant*” (2 Cor 3:6). Referring to Paul as “new covenant Jew” seems to be a *novum* with these authors, as they put forth a strong case that this interpretive framework can synthesize the chief insights of other proposals (and leave aside their respective weaknesses)—proposals such as understanding Paul as a “former Jew,” an “eschatological Jew,” or a “Torah-observant Jew” (see 13–38). Each framework has passages that commend it: for example, Paul speaks on occasion of a life under the law which he has left behind (see Gal 1:13–14; hence “former Jew”); on the other hand, Paul speaks positively of the law (see Phil 3:4–6; suggestive of the “Torah-observant” position). Pitre, Barber, and Kincaid share perhaps the most affinity with Sanders, Dunn, and Wright, who encapsulate the “eschatological Jew” interpretive framework—though as we will see, Pitre and company clearly chart out their own path, not aligning with any one school of thought.

What Pitre, Barber, and Kincaid do affirm along with the eschatologi-

cal Jewish framework is that Paul did not reject his old “religion” and start a new one; rather, the chief difference between Paul and his former life lay in the fact that he came to believe that the new creation had dawned in Christ. That is, in Christ, the hope of the prophets—such as the new covenant and the gift of the Spirit found, for example, in Jeremiah 31:31–34 and Ezekiel 36:26–27 (both of which are alluded to in 2 Cor 3:6, where Paul describes himself as a “minister of the new covenant”)—has come to fruition in and through the Paschal Mystery of Jesus Christ.

On the other hand, Pitre, Barber, and Kincaid diverge from Wright and company, for example, with their analysis of Paul and Jewish apocalyptic thought. Pitre and company draw close links between various Jewish apocalyptic texts and Saint Paul’s teaching—not to suggest any kind of direct literary connection, but to propose that Paul “breathes the same air,” as it were (67). These authors part with the “eschatological Jew” framework in their thorough insistence that the “new covenant” in which Paul locates himself is not merely *chronological*—it is not just that Paul lives *after* the Cross which has now inaugurated the new age. Rather, for Paul, there is also a *vertical* dimension. Paul, as an *apocalyptic* “new covenant Jew,” believes the *heavenly* new creation has broken into the present order, a point Paul makes explicit in 2 Corinthians 5:17 when he describes anyone in Christ as a “new creation” (see 73 and 88), as well as in his teaching that members of the new covenant are children of the heavenly Jerusalem—the “Jerusalem above” (Gal 4:26). As we will see, these authors also diverge from Sanders and company in their treatment of grace in Paul.

Again, throughout this book with each theme, there is not just an exegesis of select Pauline texts; there is a rich feast of texts from ancient Judaism, where the authors judiciously demonstrate parallels with Paul. In this manner, the authors disclose the conceptual matrix of Paul and his Jewish contemporaries, showing the fertile context in which Paul came to understand the mystery of Jesus as the fulfillment of these Jewish hopes. As Pitre, Barber, and Kincaid draw out, one consistently finds in Saint Paul both *continuity* and *discontinuity*—continuity with respect to apocalyptic Jewish hopes and expectations, and discontinuity in the sometimes unexpected way these hopes are fulfilled in Jesus. For Paul, Jesus taps into the Jewish expectations of the time, and yet transcends them.

Chapters 3–6 respectively treat Christology, atonement, justification, and the Lord’s Supper. This pattern of continuity and discontinuity continues throughout.

With regard to Christology, the authors draw on Chris Tilling’s work, *Paul’s Divine Christology*, which engages the overall pattern of Christ’s relation to believers (and how it tracks with the way in which ancient Jews

thought of their relation to YHWH). Much like their own work, Tilling's contribution lies particularly in disclosing overall patterns and themes, instead of simply exegeting of a few significant passages. Pitre, Barber, and Kincaid write:

Chris Tilling has shown that the case for a "divine Christology" in Paul can be demonstrated not merely by examining specific passages such as the Christ hymn (Phil 2:5–8) but also by examining the *overarching pattern* of how Paul's depiction of Christ's relationship with believers consistently maps onto Jewish conceptions of God-relation. Instead of simply focusing on particular Pauline texts and their potential Christological implications, Tilling looks at larger patterns in Paul's thought, analyzing how they conform to the way Jews spoke about God's unique relationship with Israel. . . . In other words, Paul explicates Christ's relationship with believers in terms that Jewish readers would have associated exclusively with the one God of the *Shema* (Deut 6:4–6). (122–23, emphasis original; see also 124–25)

However, we should not get the wrong impression: Pitre, Barber, and Kincaid engage in very thorough and rigorous exegesis, particularly of key passages. But larger patterns are often highly instructive and can provide significant illumination when they are properly secured. Just to give one example, ancient Jews commonly held that the Old Covenant was mediated by angels; yet some contemporary scholars (e.g., Bart Erhman) hold to an angel Christology in Paul. However, this runs against the trajectory of Paul's thought: if Christ were merely an angel, how would the New Covenant be superior to the Old—since both would then have been mediated by angels? Accordingly, the authors write: "Paul identifies the torah of Moses as that which was ordained by 'angels' (Gal 3:19), and then contrasts it with the new 'covenant' of Christ (Gal 4:21–5:1). This would seem to indicate that Christ must be *greater* than an angel" (121; emphasis original).

Another more nuanced point that the authors unpack is that what sets YHWH apart for ancient Israel is not just that he is *worshipped*, but that he is offered *sacrifice* (see 114, where the authors cite 1 Chron 29:20–22 in support). Accordingly, the authors note that the Enochic Son of Man of *1 Enoch* is also "worshipped," which is part of the purported evidence for an "angel" Christology regarding Jesus. Yet the authors point out important differences between Jesus and the Son of Man of *1 Enoch*, which in the end show a greater similarity between Jesus and God ("Lord of the Spirits" in

the text discussed below) than with the angelic Son of Man in *1 Enoch*:

Though the Son of Man is “worshipped” (*1 Enoch* 48:4–6; 62:9), this takes place on earth, whereas Paul says that “at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, *in heaven* and on earth and *under the earth*” (Phil 2:10). In addition, the Enochic Son of Man is not somehow dynamically present on earth while also being in heaven, as Christ is for Paul. Nor do believers invoke the Son of Man figure directly as Paul speaks to and is spoken to by Christ. Rather, Tilling makes the case that the relational dynamic involving the Lord of Spirits is *more* like Christ than the Son of Man figure in *1 Enoch*. Strikingly, Paul even calls Christ the “Lord of glory” (1 Cor 2:8), the same term *1 Enoch* uses for “the Lord of the Spirits”—that is, God (cf. *1 En.* 40:3; cf. *1 En.* 22:14; 25:3; 27:3, 5). In short, if one were pressed to compare Paul’s teaching to what is found in *1 Enoch*, one would have to admit that his understanding of Christ-relation has far more in common with the Lord of the Spirits than with the Enochic Son of Man (125, no. 120, emphasis original).

Another key work utilized by the authors is that of Barclay, the Anglican scholar who has contributed tremendously to our understanding of “gift” in the ancient world—thereby providing background for Paul’s teaching on “grace,” the divine gift given in Christ (see 134–37). For example, in the modern era, we tend to think of a gift as having “no strings attached,” that is, having no expectations of reciprocity (see 134). Yet, Barclay has shown in *Paul and the Gift* that this notion actually stems from Martin Luther and was not the assumed sentiment of the ancient world (134). Pitre, Barber, and Kincaid explain:

The truth is Paul’s original audience would not have assumed that gift-giving was motivated by “pure altruism.” While ancient gifts were bestowed freely, it was also understood that they were imparted with certain *expectations*. . . . Consistent with ancient gift-giving, Christ’s gift—“grace”—also comes with expectations; in particular, it entails participation in the self-giving of Christ (which, as we shall see, grace also makes available). (135–36; emphasis original)

This analysis leads quite naturally to their treatment of justification, which they argue Paul understands ultimately with reference to *divine sonship*—sharing in the sonship of Jesus Christ. In fact, they understand

this feature as fundamentally what Paul's "Gospel" is about (see 251–53).

Drawing again from Barclay, the authors part company with the standard line of Sanders and covenantal nomism—namely, that “getting in” the covenant is a matter of grace, but “staying in” is maintained by works. Rather, for Pitre, Barber, and Kincaid, *it is grace all the way through*. That is, grace gets us in *and* grace empowers us to stay in:

In sum, Barclay shows that Paul avoids viewing the divine and human actors as somehow in competition with one another. Instead, the apostle believes God is doing nothing less than *transforming human agency*. The works believers perform are now truly *Christ's works*—but they are not *only* Christ's works since believers are “co-workers” with him by grace. (169; emphasis original).

The authors go on to speak of “cardiac” righteousness, the transformation of the heart wrought by the gift of the Spirit in the New Covenant, in fulfillment of key Old Testament prophecies (e.g.: Deut 30:6; Jer 31:33; Ezek 36:26–27). Thus, the authors understand justification to have a juridical component, but not to the exclusion of the moral and transformative dynamic: “For Paul, *justification is juridical, but the divine decree corresponds to the reality of the believer's character, which is changed by the power of grace*” (196; emphasis original)

What is particularly compelling about this book is how seamlessly rigorous exegesis (of which I am barely scratching the surface) slides into important aspects of the Catholic tradition. For example: “Paul identifies adoption as the ultimate *purpose* of the coming of the divine Son: ‘God sent his Son . . . so that we might receive adoption as children [*huiiothesian*’] (Gal 4:4–5)” (198; emphasis original). Grace, therefore, entails a share in divine life: “This union with Christ entails nothing less than being conformed to the image of God's Son (Rom 8:29), such that the believer is now empowered to live a life of *pistis*, faithfulness. . . . They [believers] do not simply *imitate* him but *participate* in his sonship” (209; emphasis original). (From the dogmatic tradition, I have tried to bring out these same ideas by retrieving the thought of Matthias Scheeben in my 2014 *Nature and Grace: A New Approach to Thomistic Ressourcement* [Pickwick], 170–79).

This rapprochement between detailed exegesis and the tradition continues especially in the last chapter, where the authors treat the Lord's Supper in Paul. Again, it should be stressed that this rapprochement of which I speak is in no way forced or artificial; as the non-Catholic Michael

Gorman put it in the foreword, this work is one with which Pauline scholars of all stripes will have to reckon. Nonetheless, it is extremely significant that the authors are able to demonstrate an organic continuity of Saint Paul's texts and the later tradition.

Here, the Catholic tradition in which these authors have been formed perhaps disposes them to be more attentive to matters which other generations of Pauline scholars have neglected—the classic example of which is the Lord's Supper in Paul. Given that 1 Corinthians 11 is one of our four key witnesses to the Institution narrative, it is surprising that it has received relatively little treatment in Pauline scholarship, a lacuna likely related to the anti-liturgical ethos in which modern biblical scholarship first arose (see 222–23).

Continuing to underscore Paul as an “apocalyptic Jew,” the authors begin this chapter by treating the *pneumatic* body of Christ's resurrection (see 1 Cor 15:44) and the Christian hope of sharing in this same reality (see 213–14). “In short: just as Christ was glorified, those who belong to him will also be glorified. The resurrected body is a ‘spiritual body’ because of the ‘life-giving spirit’ identified with Christ” (215).

For Paul, there is an ecclesial shape to salvation: “What Christ has done in his personal body he now accomplishes in his ecclesial body” (220). As Jesus enters into the eschatological suffering—as expected by ancient Jews to be the precursor of the new age—so, too, believers enter into his sufferings, and thereby his resurrection (see 216–20).

This is the context for understanding the Lord's Supper, as an entrance into the full mystery of Christ—both his sacrifice and resurrection. The authors provide extensive background of Old Testament resonances behind Paul's Eucharistic texts (e.g.: Exod 24:3–11; Isa 53:10–12; Mal 1:11), all pointing to the monumental significance of the Eucharist for Paul (see 229–35).

Yet, standard treatments of Paul's well-known comment about “being guilty of profaning the body and blood of the Lord” (1 Cor 11:27) contend that what is in view for Paul is simply the mistreatment of the poor (taking “body” here as a reference to the Body of Christ, i.e., the Church). While the authors acknowledge that the rich–poor divide is indeed part of Paul's point, there is more to it—a point made apparent by Paul's reference to being guilty of the body and the *blood* of the Lord (1 Cor 11:27). In other words—and here is another example of thematic exegesis that is not reduced to mere grammar and syntax—nowhere is the Church described corporately as the *blood* of Christ. The presence of “blood” in this passage is a clear Eucharistic allusion; thus, while the problem does concern the mistreatment of the poor, the passage in question is *also about receiving the*

Eucharistic elements unworthily:

The attempt to downplay the significance of the bread and wine itself minimizes the crucial fact that Paul warns against becoming “guilty of the body *and blood of the Lord*” (1 Cor 11:27). Notice here that Paul speaks not only of “the body”—which of course can be applied to the church as a whole—but also of the “blood of the Lord” [*tou haimatos tou kyriou*] (1 Cor 11:27). Nowhere in Paul’s letters does the apostle ever use the *blood of Christ* as an image for the church—a point that suggests that an offense against the elements of the meal themselves is his primary meaning (225).

The authors go on to describe how, for Paul, receiving the Eucharistic bread *actualizes* communion with Christ (226). As Paul states, “*Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread*” (1 Cor 10:17). The authors conclude:

According to Paul, participation in the elements of the Lord’s Supper is a participation in the body and blood of Christ (1 Cor 10:16–17), which is effected through the Spirit (1 Cor 12:13; 6:17). In other words, through the working of the Spirit, the bread and wine becomes “spiritual food” and “spiritual drink” (1 Cor 10:3–4), uniting believers to the body and blood of the risen Lord. *In the Lord’s Supper, then, participants have a foretaste of the resurrected body and the life of the world to come. . . .* While Paul does not (of course) use the language of “real presence” or “transubstantiation,” to insist that “spiritual” is merely a metaphor resists the *eschatological and Christological realism* of Paul’s language (246–47; emphasis original).

In sum, the command shown by these authors of contemporary New Testament scholarship and the corpus of ancient Jewish texts is astounding. For this reason, this book will continue to receive significant attention from leading Pauline scholars of all backgrounds for some time to come. A cursory glance at the endorsements shows this to be true, as they include such names as Craig Keener, Thomas Stegman, and Michael Bird, not to mention Michael Gorman’s having written the foreword.

If there is one complaint, it is that the authors could have more fully engaged the phrase “works of the law” and the way in which 4QMMT of the Dead Sea Scrolls seems to illumine Paul’s meaning. Read against

the backdrop of 4QMMT, the meaning of this important Pauline phrase appears to refer primarily not to the moral law, but to the ceremonial law.¹ The authors are aware of this connection, as they write early on: “For Paul, we would suggest, ‘the works of the law’ were *quintessentially but not exclusively* circumcision and other such markers” (53; emphasis original). Similarly, later on in the chapter on justification, the authors write: “What Paul wants to stress is that circumcision—or for that matter, any other work done apart from the Spirit’s power—is insufficient” (192).

Perhaps the reason for not taking up this connection more vigorously lies in the authors’ desire to distance themselves somewhat from Sanders and company, in order to ensure a more robust Pauline account of grace with the help of Barclay: again, grace is requisite not just to “get in” the covenant, but also to “stay in.”

Barclay’s work is exceedingly helpful (and theologically accurate), in that it shows that the gift of grace for Paul *empowers* one to live a life in the Spirit—in which case the supposed attempt to attain salvation merely by our own efforts is a moot point from the start. That said, the import of 4QMMT is also helpful for demonstrating that Paul is not critiquing a so-called Jewish works-righteousness or a proto-Pelagianism. Both of these avenues—Barclay’s account of the divine energizing power of grace and 4QMMT’s ability to show that Paul primarily pits faith against the ceremonial works (not good works pure and simple)—are helpful in reassessing what Paul means by justification by faith and how his teaching here is compatible with his insistence upon the necessity of good works for salvation (see Rom 2:6, 13).

That said, the work of Pitre, Barber, and Kincaid is extremely welcome and to be warmly commended. It is sure to get a wide and broad readership. Indeed, *Catholic* biblical scholarship has taken a significant step forward with this publication. N. V

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¹ See John Bergsma, *Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls* (New York: Image, 2019), 210–13.