

Book Reviews

Aquinas on Transubstantiation: The Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist by Reinhard Hütter (*Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2019*), viii + 129 pp.

ONE OF THE MOST PROLIFIC and gifted systematicians of our time has revised and expanded two of his essays on the Eucharist in Aquinas and shaped them into a marvelous little book. Reinhard Hütter divides his work on the twin doctrines of transubstantiation and the corporeal, substantial presence of Christ into five chapters. These chapters ponder (1) the biblical foundations for Aquinas's theology, (2) modern magisterial teaching on the Eucharist, (3) Eucharistic conversion, (4) Christ's substantial presence as a way to avoid the intellect's deception, and (5) friendship with Christ in the Eucharist. The third chapter forms the heart of the book. This work presents a passionate, metaphysically robust, detailed argument that only a Thomistic vision of Eucharistic conversion and Christ's substantial presence in the gifts on the altar can account for the mystery of this sacrament. Hütter primarily engages in a close textual commentary of Aquinas, and also advances systematic arguments that the Thomistic path offers the most fruitful account for the teaching of Scripture and Tradition. The author's aim is both apologetic and contemplative: to show that the Church needs Aquinas's theology today, and to gaze upon the mystery with Aquinas as guide.

Hütter begins with Thomas's reading of Scripture and Tradition as the foundation for the doctrine of Christ's substantial presence in the Eucharist, a reading that provides the entryway to the theology of transubstantiation, or the manner in which the gifts change. The author expounds on Thomas' exegetical method and vision of *sacra doctrina*. He lauds Aquinas's interpretation of the New Testament texts on the Last Supper. Surprisingly, the first chapter does not engage with contemporary biblical studies on the Eucharist, as it focuses on a commentary of Aquinas. The author dismisses modern quests for the historical words of Jesus at the Last Supper, as he appeals to Tradition's insistence that these words be taken as God's very own speech. This approach seems to overlook some larger questions, namely, how the historical study of Scripture, the theology of the Holy Spirit's post-Easter interior teaching of the apostles and evangelists,

as well as Tradition's claim of Gospel historicity can be synthesized anew. Perhaps a fuller engagement with an interpretive method such as that of Brant Pitre would have helped.

The second chapter takes up nineteenth- and twentieth-century magisterial teachings on transubstantiation. Hütter also briefly touches upon Trent here: he will return to that Council in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. This part of the book primarily shows the magisterium's consistent, implicit or explicit appeal to what the author calls "pre-philosophical knowledge of substance," in other words, the common-sense philosophy of various twentieth-century Thomists (such as Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Ambrose Gardeil, Yves Congar). This theme becomes central for the rest of the work.

The third chapter puts the author's metaphysical skills as an interpreter of Aquinas on full display. His main concerns are to show that bread and wine are natural substances and not artifacts, to expound in detail on the relation between substance and quantity, and to demonstrate how the doctrine of concomitance solves multiple theological problems. For Hütter, Thomas's teaching on substance and accidents emerges from a "natural hearing" of reality around us: it is not just a theory. The author's method is not to read Aquinas in his historical setting, but to approach him in view of modern and contemporary controversies, from nominalism to Descartes, Schillebeeckx, and beyond. Overall, chapter 3 offers an outstanding companion to some of the most difficult passages of Aquinas's Eucharistic theology. I would consider this chapter an indispensable guide for any in-depth study *Summa theologiae* III, questions 75–77.

The fourth chapter takes up the sacramentality of the Eucharist, as it highlights (1) Thomas's return to an Augustinian doctrine of the sacraments as signs, and (2) Aquinas's insistence that substance is known by the intellect and not the senses. Both themes allow the author to show the centrality of faith in Aquinas's Eucharistic theology. Hütter nicely locates Thomas's Eucharistic doctrine within his Christology and general sacramental theology.

The fifth chapter concerns Eucharistic communion. The chapter title signals the centrality of friendship with Christ in Aquinas's Eucharistic theology and piety. In fact, this chapter focuses more on the link between the Eucharist and the mystical body: in this section, Hütter mostly draws upon Matthias Scheeben, Henri de Lubac and John Paul II. Here and elsewhere, Hütter's own Eucharistic spirituality comes out. The writer's passion for his topic is an inspiration. Indeed, the reader expects to find the fruits of his connatural knowledge of the Eucharistic mystery that he sets forth.

The work concludes with three appendices, as well as extensive endnotes with lengthy citations and commentary. Appendix 4 may present the author's most controversial claim. He proposes that Aristotle has definitively established the science of being, and that it is probably impossible to receive the Church's faith in Christ's corporeal presence in the Eucharist without the metaphysical notions of form and matter, substance and accident. The previous chapters suggest that only the Thomistic formulations of these notions are ultimately coherent in the realm of Eucharistic theology. The author sees his position as an application of Paul VI's 1965 encyclical *Mysterium Fidei* (see esp. 54–56). It would seem that Hütter largely identifies Paul VI's (and by implication, John Paul II's) teaching on the function of metaphysics in theology with Garrigou-Lagrange's version of common-sense philosophy. One wonders whether this is a completely accurate reading and application of the magisterial texts. Perhaps Paul VI and John Paul II are more cautious than the "Sacred Monster of Thomism" in their description of the content of "implicit philosophy," even as they posit the necessity of a certain common-sense philosophy for the possibility and coherence of Catholic dogma.¹ The author's work might also be fructified by a more direct engagement with contemporary metaphysicians, especially those working on various Scholastic traditions.

Overall, Hütter offers the most penetrating textual commentary of questions 75–77 of the *tertia pars* published in recent decades. He also renders accessible to an Anglophone audience many riches of the early-modern Scholastic tradition. He provides a much needed, first-rate companion for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and teachers engaged with Aquinas's Eucharistic theology. N.V

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¹ I recently studied this topic in my essay, "Implicit Philosophy and Hermeneutics: Metaphysics and the Historicity of Thought in Light of *Fides et Ratio*," *Angelicum* 95 (2018): 201–18.

Embracing Wisdom: The *Summa theologiae* as Spiritual Pedagogy by Gilles Mongeau, S.J. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2015), xi + 221pp.

GILLES MONGEAU, S.J., is professor of theology at Regis College at the University of Toronto. His book ties together three threads in recent scholarship on Saint Thomas Aquinas's theology. First, it examines its sapiential and spiritual character, expanding on the work of Jean-Pierre Torrell. Second, it joins recent studies that attempt to give an account of *sacra doctrina*, particularly its meaning and function in the *Summa theologiae* [ST]. Third, it explores Aquinas's rhetorical and pedagogical methods that constitute the form of his theology. At a basic level, the book is an analysis of Aquinas's rhetorical methods in the *Summa theologiae*, and it focuses on those formal patterns of memory, repetition, and affect that Saint Thomas used to train student pastors and lectors in *sacra doctrina*. For Aquinas, as Mongeau claims, *sacra doctrina* is ordered to Christian practice, or the spiritual life, since revealed doctrine is the highest wisdom (ST I, q. 1, a. 4, corp.). For Mongeau, these formal structures tell us that the *Summa* is a series of "spiritual exercises" that Aquinas designed to teach students the way of spiritual wisdom.

The first part of the book (chs. 1–4) provides the historical context that grounds the study of the *Summa theologiae*'s rhetorical strategies in the second part (chs. 5–10). In chapter 1, Mongeau observes the ways his own argument differs from the recent rhetorical studies of Aquinas's theology. Unlike Mark Jordan, whose important work focused on dialectic in Aquinas's theology, Mongeau's book "points to the anchoring of Aquinas's text in the symbolic, the aesthetic-dramatic, and the affective elements of meaning, as well as the way in which the rhetorical form of the text mediates religious meaning" (5). For him, the *Summa theologiae* is a "deliberative rhetoric" that is designed to elicit actions on the part of its readers (5). It does so precisely by means of these symbolic and affective elements of meaning. Through this formal pedagogical quality, the *Summa* reorders the student's acts of knowing and willing to God in Christ.

In chapter 2, Mongeau explains how rhetoric conveyed meaning in ancient and medieval contexts. Drawing on the work of Alain Michel, Kathryn Tanner, and Bernard Lonergan, Mongeau argues that every culture is the product of "the dialectic of 'human-centered' and 'cosmos-centered' meaning" (36). In every culture, agents attempt to negotiate and renegotiate the relation of these two poles as new social and economic contexts arise. One way Christians did this in the ancient and medieval world was through teaching rhetoric, the "science of aesthet-

ic-dramatic meaning" (39). Mongeau observes that if this recent proposal about culture is correct, then we will surely find evidence that "Thomas in the *Summa* is concerned with forming persons to exercise a certain cultural agency," that is, to renegotiate the way the Church mediates its teaching about Christ in the thirteenth century (29). Chapter 3 addresses the historical context that informed Aquinas's pastoral concerns and pedagogy. Drawing heavily on Mary Carruthers's studies of medieval memorial practices, Mongeau argues that Aquinas adopted memorial schemes in his writings. These memorial strategies were often based on the movements of the liturgy. Teachers of rhetoric described them as a *ductus*: the movement of the student's mind through the rhetorical and literary contours of a composition (43). Then Mongeau surveys some of the social, cultural, and economic changes in the medieval world that drove intellectual developments, including the reforms of the monasteries of Cluny and Cîteaux and the rise of the merchant class: these, along with the problems of a poorly catechized peasantry, drove the need for the reforms of the Fourth Lateran Council and the Dominican order's concern for preaching and education.

Aquinas understood his own vocation as a theologian within this context and became involved in the educational reforms and spiritual renewal of Lateran IV (80). Chapter 4 covers the literary and rhetorical tools he deployed to these ends. Mongeau examines some of Aquinas's underappreciated *opuscula theologica*, where Aquinas is theological consultant, explaining Lateran IV's reforms to a bishop. Mongeau explores Aquinas's role as a preacher and catechist by examining his sermons. Aquinas was also a polemicist who defended the rights of mendicants to be in the universities, and a teacher whose office participated in *sacra doctrina*, God's self-knowledge given to us (79). He also aimed to reform pastoral education to meet the aims of Lateran IV's goals. After being assigned to begin a personal *studium* at Santa Sabina (1265), he became dissatisfied with the Lombard's *Sentences* as a theological textbook, and began to dictate the *Summa* to replace it. In this process, Thomas developed a poetics and rhetoric to aid student memory for preaching and pastoral care.

Chapter 5 presents some of these rhetorical stylizations; it also begins the second part of the book, which contains the exposition of the *Summa*'s rhetoric. By the use of prologues, Aquinas determined the scope of a theological inquiry with precision. His use of short, simple sentences maximized the efficacy of his words for communication with clarity (87–89). Furthermore, Aquinas designed metonymic devices to instill his teachings in memory. The structure of the *Summa* as a whole is, on Mongeau's reading, designed to induce the same effect. That structure upholds three points of contemplation derived from Augustine's *De Trinitate*: the *vesti-*

giae Dei in creatures (the *prima pars*), the *imago Dei* in human beings (*secunda pars*), and the fully realized *imago Dei* in Christ (111). Thus the climax of the *Summa* is in the person of Christ, “whom we seek to imitate and who is our most perfect way into God” (125). In chapter 6, Mongeau claims that Aquinas used a pedagogy developed in *Super Ioannem* to argue that the Word is the ordering principle of the spiritual exercises in the *Summa* (118). He canvasses the entirety of the *Summa*, tracing the Augustinian progression outlined in chapter 5.

Chapters 7–9 attend to the rhetoric of Aquinas’s Christology in the *tertia pars*. Mongeau does not expound the doctrinal content per se. Rather, he explores “the transformations of the person intended by the theologian’s collaboration with God’s teaching activity in history” (145). To this end, chapter 7 examines questions 1–6 of the *tertia pars* and argues that the *convenientia* arguments of the first question and his reference to Christological errors in the second are pedagogical tools that increase the student’s participation in *sacra doctrina*. Chapter 8 provides a close reading of the mysteries of Christ’s life (*ST* III, qq. 27–45) and how Aquinas used of rhetorical tools to imitate Christ. Chapter 9 argues that Aquinas intended his presentation of the mysteries of Christ’s Passion, death, resurrection and Ascension to help students hold the mysteries together in the mind as a single whole. Aquinas follows Scripture and the Church Fathers closely in these sections, and he does so to instill theological wisdom in the student. Chapter 10 concludes the book.

Rhetorical readings of theological texts can be useful for theologians because they force us to attend to “the way the words run” patiently. Chapters 8 and 9 in particular are exemplars in this regard. Mongeau convincingly shows that Aquinas structured his presentation of the mysteries of Christ’s life in the *Summa* to instruct the memories of his students and to form them as imitators of Jesus Christ. Moreover, Mongeau’s use of recent research in memory studies and cultural studies illumines Aquinas’s text in a profound way. This book is a contribution to our understanding of the spirituality of Aquinas’s theology precisely because of this interdisciplinary research program.

Yet the book’s rhetorical reading of Aquinas raises questions for me, particularly with some interpretive claims Mongeau makes. I will note one example. Drawing on Eugene Rogers’s *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth*, Mongeau claims that the *sed contra* is a “metonymic device.” That is to say, it quotes a “part” of a text which bids the student to recall the whole of that text which should have been committed to memory (98). Aquinas was able to use this device to create an interpretive horizon for his arguments in the *respondeo*. This horizon would solidify key theological teachings from

the authorities that Aquinas wanted the *fratres* to remember. Thus, for the students, as Mongeau observes, “what was previously known according to the order of a *catena* or *florilegia* is now reappropriated according to the *ordo doctrinae*” (98).

With this in mind, Mongeau analyzes Aquinas’s pedagogical use of Augustine’s *De Trinitate* in the first question of the *Summa*. Aquinas cites *De Trinitate* 14 in the *sed contra* of the second article of that question. Since the *sed contra* was a metonymic device intended to invoke the whole of a memorized text, Mongeau claims that Aquinas in this *sed contra* identified *scientia* with the person of Christ as Augustine did, even though Aquinas does not explicitly make this connection there. Mongeau’s reason for this is that Aquinas was certainly aware of the whole of book 14, and so he would have known that Augustine makes this argument. The upshot, then, is that *ST I*, q. 1, a. 2, anticipates the Christological climax of *sacra doctrina* in the *tertia pars*. But there is a doubt to be raised here. It is unclear just how much of *De Trinitate* Aquinas had available to him. As Bruce D. Marshall has noted (and Mongeau recognized), most of Augustine was available to Aquinas through the Lombard, the *glossa ordinaria*, other *florilegiae* and *catenae*.¹ Mongeau seems to assume that Aquinas directly engaged the whole of the *De Trinitate*, but he does not provide historical evidence for this. Since we do not know the range of Augustine’s texts Aquinas possessed, Mongeau’s interpretation of the *sed contra* here may be underdetermined historically.

This concern notwithstanding, this book is a perceptive and illuminating reading of the *Summa* as a whole and the *tertia pars* in particular. Every student of Aquinas’s Christology should take up and read it; Catholics and Protestants alike will benefit from it. But what makes this book truly a gift is Mongeau’s pastoral concern for the Church. Like Aquinas, Mongeau desires that priests, pastors, and lay leaders study Aquinas’s teaching so that they too might follow Christ in the way of wisdom. N·V

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¹ Note the similar concerns of Bruce D. Marshall with D. Juvenal Merriell’s confidence that Aquinas mastered the *De Trinitate*, in “Aquinas the Augustinian? On the Uses of Augustine in Aquinas’s Trinitarian Theology,” in *Aquinas the Augustinian*, ed. Michael Dauphinais et al. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 41–61, at 48n17 and 49n18.

Lo Spirito Santo “anima” del Corpo Mistico: Radici storiche ed esempi scelti dell’ecclesiologia pneumatologica contemporanea by João Paulo de Mendonça Dantas (*Lugano, CH: Eupress FTL, 2017*), 607 pp.

THE TITLE QUOTATION of de Mendonça’s *The Holy Spirit, “Soul” of the Mystical Body* is our first indication that complexity is afoot. Augustine’s Sermon 267, given on the feast of Pentecost, is the first appearance of the perennial axiom “the Holy Spirit, soul of the Church.” Along with the “complementary analogy” of the Church as “temple of the Spirit,” the expression recalls both the Church’s mysterious Trinitarian origins and how the Spirit continues its work of “unifying and vivifying” (528, 521). Nonetheless, the axiom must be distinguished, as a divine person does not (strictly speaking) inform the created reality of the Church. De Mendonça’s work takes up this question, by first studying the axiom’s historical roots and then reviewing selected examples from the last century.

The Brazilian-born author completed his dissertation in Lugano, Switzerland, under Manfred Hauke in 2009. While his research enabled him to engage the Christological dimension of ecclesiology, he was only able to “touch on pneumatology” (9). Thus for his *Abilitazione (Habilitationsschrift)*, he heeded the call of John Paul II to “breathe with both lungs” and undertook the present work of pneumatological ecclesiology (9). The 607-page Italian work is truly exhaustive, though intermittently repetitive. It consists of four chapters: biblical foundations, historical-theological development, seven contemporary authors, and lastly, de Mendonça’s own systematic observations.

The expression “Holy Spirit, soul of the Church” is not explicitly scriptural, but does have biblical “foundations” (545). After reviewing a series of Old and New Testament passages, de Mendonça concludes that the image of the Holy Spirit as the soul of the Church is principally based in the somatic ecclesiology of Paul (128).

He then turns to the historical development of the axiom, explaining that, long before Augustine, Irenaeus and others had already begun to theorize between the Spirit’s presence and activity in the Church and that of the soul of a body. Along this same line, Origen first concluded Christ to be the soul of the Church. But the medieval tradition appropriates Augustine’s formulation, most especially in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Here we find the axiom both qualified and complemented; *qualified* by the refined Aristotelian understanding of soul (i.e., principle of unity), and *complemented* metaphorically with the Spirit as heart and personality of the Church.

The axiom declined following Robert Bellarmine until it was featured

in the nineteenth-century ecclesiological renewal of Johann Adam Möhler and Matthias Joseph Scheeben. These two men helped lay the foundations for the ecclesiology of the mystical body, one that provided a conducive framework for the expression. Magisterial appearances then followed; first in the encyclicals of Leo XIII (*Divinum Illud Munus* [1897], §1309) and Pius XII (*Mystici Corporis* [1943], §§205–6), and followed thereafter by the Second Vatican Council's *Lumen Gentium*, §7, and the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, §797.

The second half of the volume features seven twentieth-century authors: Heribert Mühlen, Charles Journet, Yves Congar, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Joseph Ratzinger, Leonardo Boff, and Leo Scheffczyk. The final author, though perhaps the least-known, is one worthy of attention. Scheffczyk, a seminary friend of Ratzinger and long-time professor in Munich, continues to gain attention in Italy; one hopes that his writings will soon be accessible to the English-speaking world.

De Mendonça's selection of contemporary authors is indeed striking. Mühlen and Boff, along with the late Congar, strongly highlight the pneumatological dimension of the Church, to the detriment of the Christological (503). Journet, von Balthasar, Ratzinger, and Scheffczyk, as well as the early Congar, continue the more traditional Christological emphasis, to the detriment of the pneumatological (503). The proper balance lies in the right relationship of these two dimensions: for within the Church, the action of the Holy Spirit always "originates from Christ and leads to Christ" (524).

Louis Bouyer once remarked that the Second Vatican Council's Dogmatic Constitution of the Church had a "lacuna" of the Holy Spirit (*Church of God*, 178).¹ If this is indeed so, it bespeaks of a western penchant to overlook the pneumatological. All the more then is de Mendonça's study timely and appreciable, a helpful contribution to the ecclesiological exigency of our day. N.V

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¹ Louis Bouyer, *The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit*, trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2011), 178.

Soundings in the History of Hope: New Studies on Thomas Aquinas

by Richard Schenk, O.P., Faith and Reason: Studies in Catholic Theology and Philosophy series (*Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia, 2016*), x + 332 pp.

CONSISTING LARGELY of a series of essays and articles previously published elsewhere, Richard Schenk's *Soundings in the History of Hope* engages a variety of current theological conversations by making use of the resources presented by Saint Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries. The book unfolds in three parts, all variously attempting to point the way forward for Catholic theology through a discerning retrieval of the Church's rich theological past. Thematically uniting the whole, however, is Schenk's manifest desire to take up that past in a way that avoids any and all theological oversimplification, whether that be in repristinationist or progressivist directions. Schenk brings the past and present into conversation in such a way that the cherished ideas of both are challenged and made better for the exchange.

The first part, coextensive with the book's opening chapter, is a case in point. Here Schenk suggests specific ways in which Catholic theology, in general, and both Thomism and the Dominican Order, in particular, might best utilize and stay true to the multi-faceted past communicated to them, and this precisely by bringing that past into an open two-way conversation with the present. What Schenk says with respect to Thomism there proves programmatic for the book and his vision of Catholic theology overall: "Thomism as a whole cannot live without a vibrant communication with what is outside it, nor will it flourish without a reflective diversity of methods within it. Genuine Thomism is necessarily collaborative" (25). The rest of the book is the concretization of just that conviction.

The second part of the book, then, opens with a chapter that takes up anew the question of how faith's interiority—what is proper to the faith itself—should engage with those truths experienced as exterior to, or only "indirectly expressive" of, the faith. Beginning with Melchior Cano and moving to Saint Thomas's treatment of how all Christ's acts are variously instructive for us, Schenk proceeds to make the case that properly neither "interiority" nor "exteriority" should be pitted against one another, as has too frequently occurred in recent theology. Rather, "faith lives in its own way from a basic sense of exteriority (here the *donum Dei*) that makes a qualified interiority of human understanding and its openness to the other possible." (68)

In the book's third chapter, Schenk explores what he takes to be the occasionally underplayed Platonic elements in Thomas's thought, espe-

cially with respect to Thomas's alleged "realism" and the idea that "grace builds on nature." In so doing, he shows how Saint Thomas was able to bridge the divergent Proclean and Porphyrian streams of Platonic thought as they had been taken up in the West by Dionysius and Saint Augustine, respectively. Father Shenck opines that only by shedding light in this way on how Saint Thomas deployed and developed the Platonic tradition can one truly grasp "the programmatic nature of Thomas's own thought" (70). What is more, such retrievals have added theological benefit in terms of helpfully addressing present concerns, such as, for example, perhaps providing "an alternative to today's antithesis between demythologizing doctrine into our prior experience of humanity and remythologizing as the more genuine faith allegedly new experiences of the Trinity drawn from private revelations" (83).

Continuing to seek new convergences where divergence has been presupposed, Father Shenck moves in chapter 4 to reexamine the question of whether or not human labor is chiefly to be seen as a perfecting participation in divine blessing or an ongoing degenerative, post-lapsarian curse. As before, Schenk enters into conversation with Saint Thomas and the broad historical tradition to problematize potential answers to that question which would minimize any aspect of work's theocentric, anthropocentric, or cosmocentric character, or slight its function as avenue for grace.

Schenk's fifth chapter makes use of Saint Thomas's commentary on the Gospel of John to sketch a theology of mourning which means to avoid the imbalance in much contemporary practice between a stoic profession of resurrection hope in the face of death, on the one hand, and despairing in the hard reality of loss and pain, on the other. Schenk highlights how when commenting on Christ's tearful reaction to Lazarus's death (John 11:35), Thomas attributes feelings of sadness, anger, and even fear to Jesus, stressing the first of these as having been most prominent. Saint Thomas's account of the significance of Christ's sadness, argues Schenk, helped the Angelic Doctor develop a theology of mourning that advanced beyond the ambivalence of death, and did so in a manner that serves as a helpful model for present growth in a Catholic approach to hope and suffering.

Part 2 ends with Schenk's speculative engagement with a question arising from the popularity of Hans Urs von Balthasar's universalist hope: "What are the [theological] costs of bracketing out the likelihood of final loss?" (142). While entering into conversation with Karl Rahner, Schenk provides an analysis of what he takes to be at least four methodological alterations that result from adopting (something like) Balthasar's position.

The first has to do with the indirect and deleterious effects such a view has on other theological doctrines (e.g., God's antecedent and consequent will in relation to the good of creation). Relatedly, the second effect is to undercut the Catholic tradition of affirming both sides of apparent doctrinal antinomies (in this case, the real possibilities of both final loss and universal salvation) by the functional denial that "hope" could ever truly be compatible with both tensed affirmations. The third has to do with properly relating narration and argument, something Schenk suggests Balthasar failed to achieve insofar as he reinterpreted the texts of Scripture and Tradition selectively for purposes of bolstering his position. And, finally, bracketing off the possibility of final loss limits and directionally overdetermines any related arguments one might attempt to make on the basis of Anselmian "fittingness."

The third part of the book begins in chapter 7 with a turn to certain medieval accounts of "the discipline of ambiguity" (wherein "the allowance to theological language of as much ambiguity as necessary for theological objectivity" was held in tension with "restricting theological language to as little ambiguity as possible in the interests of conceptual precision" [165]) as a guide for thinking through the continuity and discontinuity existent between the Old and New Testament. Drawing on the related work of Robert Kilwardby, Robert Grosseteste, and Saint Thomas, Schenk appreciatively but soberly concludes that "a view must be sought that can show the two covenants to be in only partial continuity with one another" for genuinely fruitful interreligious dialog between Jews and Christians to occur, the best hope for which depends perhaps on a studied pursuit of the discipline of ambiguity (190).

Continuing the more programmatic theme of the previous chapter, Kilwardby is featured again in chapter 8, wherein Schenk compares the English Dominican's understanding of circumcision with that of Saint Thomas, showing how both began with similar footing in the thought of Saint Bonaventure but then variously moved in differing directions. Given the common medieval view that circumcision served as a rite of initiation into the old covenant oriented to the removal of original sin, Schenk argues Aquinas and Kilwardby sought to answer three interrelated questions: "Why such a difficult demand, with all its regulations? What did it actually accomplish when removing original sin? How did it differ from the Christian dispensation?" (195). Here as before, Schenk's aim in presenting this bit of historical theology is to draw from the past in order to signal new theological avenues for the present, in this case towards helping Christians better to acknowledge the "otherness of the older company within God's encompassing providence" (231).

With an eye to improving ecumenical relations, Schenk's ninth chapter takes up the debate between Erich Przywara and Karl Barth regarding the analogy of being (*analogia entis*). The chapter's stated purpose is to assist in better locating paths of theological divergence and convergence between Christian traditions as these both affirm and admonish self-critically and across the aisle. As a start, Schenk explores how Przywara's theology of the *analogia entis* both was and might now be variously thought harmonious with a theology of the Cross (*theologia crucis*), the driving issues at base being how one understands grace's nondestructive perfection of nature, on the one hand, and the distinction between law and gospel, on the other. After discussing the contributions to this query by Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure, Gottlieb Söhngen, and Balthasar, Schenk concludes, in large measure, that the blurring of the distinction between nature and grace in more recent Catholic theology along these lines has made ecumenical conversation with Protestants more difficult. If a more productive "fugal theme" in ecumenical discussion is to be realized instead, more reflective work will need to be done on both sides in reevaluating and distinguishing what each brings to the table on topics like the *analogia entis*.

The book's penultimate chapter engages a number of different theologians in its analysis of the ways in which the Eucharist may rightly be thought a sacrifice. In presenting the current configuration of the question of how to think of the Eucharist as a sacrifice, Schenk first presents the thinking of Eberhard Jüngel as it relates to ecumenical conversation on the topic, following this with a word about how theodicy and René Girard's theses on scapegoating have shaped the discussion. Schenk then turns to Richard Fishacre, Kilwardby, and, at greater length, Thomas Aquinas to uncover the historical "prefiguration" of current thought on sacrifice. For Schenk, a studied look at these leads to one's embracing an ambivalence about sacrifice that consciously downplays neither its negative nor positive elements. Because of this need to avoid single-mindedness, Schenk argues, Rahner's and Balthasar's "refigurations" of the notion of sacrifice prove insufficient precisely for their softening of its negative aspects. Pope John Paul II's ecumenically informed encyclical *Ecclesia de Eucharista* (2003) is proffered as a better way forward for its refusal, like Saint Thomas's, to sideline either the positive features of sacrifice (as Fishacre and Kilwardby did) or its negative dimensions (like Rahner and Balthasar).

Concluding the book is a chapter focused on the ways in which interreligious dialog and one's understanding of "non-Christian religions" influence and shape one's thinking on both Christology and Christianity itself. Kilwardby again makes an appearance, this time serving as the primary

lens through which Schenk means to show how better understanding this relation of influence might aid in grasping the current instability with respect to systematic thinking about Christianity and non-Christian religions, especially given the recent problematization of the “inclusivist” and “pluralist” positions of recent decades. Medieval theologies treating non-Christian religions, in fact, display an ambivalent mixture of ideas that might be thought exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist, something Schenk shows is evidenced in the development in Kilwardby’s theological work. While situating Kilwardby’s thinking among his contemporaries in their broader medieval context, Schenk traces the specific ways in which Kilwardby’s changes in thought regarding non-Christian religions directly impacted his views on a variety of Christological matters. Here, as elsewhere, Schenk takes up the task of historical theology in ways both instructive and suggestive with respect to the current situation.

As to the work overall, it must be said that Schenk’s writing style often makes his argumentation more difficult to follow than it needs to be. And he tends to assume no small amount of relevant background knowledge on the part of his readers, a particular challenge for those engaging his work from contexts less attuned to the happenings of the theological scene in Germany or of modern Catholic theology. For these and related reasons (e.g., copious amounts of untranslated Latin, French, and German), Schenk’s book is not well-suited for undergraduate applications, though advanced graduate students and professional theologians will find it a useful, if occasionally unwieldy, tool. That said, *Soundings in the History of Hope* is almost always worth the effort necessary for plumbing its depths. Its emphasis on diachronic and synchronic development, its consistent use of a hermeneutic of charity, and both the openness it displays with respect to the present and the faithfulness it exudes in terms of the past are a model not simply for Thomists or Catholics, but for the practice of Christian theology in general. N.V.

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Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Lecteur du Cantique des cantiques, by Serge-Thomas Bonino (*Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2019*), 284 pp.

IN RECENT DECADES biblical Thomism has become one of the most vibrant perspectives on the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Its aim is to draw attention to Saint Thomas's primary occupation as a reader of Sacred Scripture and his biblical commentaries as a result. In doing so, biblical Thomism further aims at contributing to overcoming the typically modern gap between exegesis and speculative theology.¹

The new book by the French Dominican Serge-Thomas Bonino, who currently serves as the president of the Pontifical Academy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, adds a new perspective to this line of research. Saint Thomas's biblical commentaries are limited to a few Old Testament books (Job, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Psalms 1–54), the Gospels of Matthew and John and the Pauline corpus. What would happen if one wanted to extend this list by going through all the references to one particular book of the Bible in the writings of Saint Thomas on which he did not write a commentary? This is precisely what the author sets out to do. His choice of the Song of Songs, one of the most enigmatic books of the Bible, is well founded because some of Saint Thomas's earliest biographers, as well some medieval catalogues of his works, ascribed precisely such a commentary to him and two versions were printed in his opera omnia. Volume 14 of the Parma edition (1863), for example, contains both these commentaries: *Salomon inspiratus divini spiritu* (14:354–386) and *Sonet vox tua* (14:387–426). Although these commentaries are now regarded as inauthentic, their supposed presence contains a grain of truth according to Torrell, insofar as it shows Saint Thomas's keen interest in this book of the Bible. Consequently, Bonino has analyzed all 314 explicit references to the Song of Songs in Saint Thomas's writings, and a large part of his book (145–263 [annex I]) consists of a full list of these references placed into their context. Given that for Saint Thomas a biblical verse reveals its full meaning within the whole of Scripture, the majority of these can be found in his other biblical commentaries.

The systematic part of the book starts with an introduction outlining the author's method and Saint Thomas's reading of the text as a celebration of the union of love between Christ and his Church, a reading which shows the influence of the Glossa Ordinaria, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Origen via his (Origen's) commentary on Matthew. It should be noted

¹ For more on this, I refer the reader to my "Biblical Thomism: Past, Present and Future," *Angelicum* 95 (2018): 263–87.

that for Saint Thomas the Song of Songs is in its literal sense a description of the relation between Christ and his Church. Moreover, and inspired by Origen, Thomas sees the three books Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Songs as a unity, attributed to king Solomon, and describing a three-stage path: Proverbs informs the beginners on the acquisition of the virtues, Ecclesiastes next instructs the more learned about the true value of this world, and finally the Song of Songs leads the perfect to the self-gift in love to God.

In order to assess the general sense of the biblical text, the author felicitously analyzes Hugh of Saint Cher's prologue to his commentary on the Song of Songs (a transcription is given in annex II [265–68]) as the interpretative context of Saint Thomas's reading. The remaining four chapters (45–144) arrange the references topically. First, there is the beauty of Christ, following "Behold thou art fair, O my love" (Song 1:16; Douay-Rheims) and manifesting itself primarily in the Incarnation and the Passion. Next, there is the Church in support of which the Song of Songs is able to establish that she maintains a "constitutive connection to Christ and the Spirit," that she is one, that this unity is a hierarchically organized whole and finally that she will consist of good and evil members until the end time (65). Apart from an ecclesiological interpretation, the Tradition has also given a Mariological interpretation of the Song of Songs. "Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee" (Song 4:7) does lend itself to an immaculist reading. Song 4:4 ("a thousand bucklers hang upon it [thy neck; *collum tuum*]") supports Mary's universal mediation. In support of this, I would add the following: Later Thomists such as Peter of Godoy (1677) and Vincent de Contenson (1674) used the image of Mary as *collum Ecclesiae*, an image that already appears in Hermann of Tournai (1137), *De incarnatione*, to argue that, as all movement and energy reaches the rest of the body from the head only by going through the neck, so the life of Christ reaches the faithful only by passing through Mary, the supernatural organ which connects the mystical head with members of the body. The final and largest chapter is entitled "L'âme fidèle" (89–134) and discusses the ways in which the Song of Songs is used to analyze the nature of love and charity and its influence on the specifically Dominican adage *contemplata aliis tradere*. One notable reading concerns Song 5: 1—"eat, O friends, and drink, and be inebriated, my dearly beloved"—a verse which Saint Thomas reads as referring to the Body (eat) and Blood (wine) of Christ which, consumed by Christ's friends, as it were inebriates them. Or as Saint Thomas writes in the *Summa theologiae*, referring to the same biblical verse: "Hence it is that the soul is spiritually nourished through the power of this sacrament, by being spiritually gladdened, and as it were inebriated with the sweet-

ness of the Divine goodness, according to Cant 5:1: ‘Eat, O friends, and drink, and be inebriated, my dearly beloved’” (*ST* III, q. 79, a. 1, ad 2). We may also think of the popular prayer *Anima Christi*, in which one prays: “Sanguis Christi, inebria me.” This Eucharistic reading seems to be particular to Saint Thomas. One could add that this reading figures prominently in Albert the Great’s *De corpore Domini*.² Another typically Dominican reading occurs when reading Song 7: 11: “Come, my beloved, let us go forth into the field, let us abide in the villages.” As a Dominican preacher, Saint Thomas emphasizes the duty of the preacher to let that which has been contemplated shine forth to the people.

In the conclusion, Bonino summarizes his findings by way of four aspects of the spiritual doctrine of Saint Thomas which come to the fore in his use of the Song of Songs: (1) a “dynamic tonality” of his doctrine insofar as it describes a way towards union with God; (2) the eschatological dimension of the spiritual life; (3) the affective dimension of a theologian who is sometimes regarded as “too intellectual,” and finally (4) the intimate connection between contemplation and predication.

In giving us a concise but penetrating analysis of Saint Thomas’s use of Song of Songs through the use of a meticulous investigation of all the references, Father Bonino has given us another demonstration of the fact that Saint Thomas is not a rigid, rationalistic thinker but a passionate theologian and exegete! He has given Thomistic scholarship, moreover, a new method and a new impetus which promises to bear more fruits in the future. In this regard, I would like to make three brief observations which point to possible future research.

While the inauthenticity of the two commentaries mentioned above is now a settled matter, both Pierre Mandonnet and Martin Grabmann³ still considered the possibility that *Sonet vox tua*, which is attributed to Gilles of Rome, contains Gilles’s revision of Thomas’s commentary. While I am not aware of any recent work⁴ being done to refute this claim, it becomes highly unlikely given the fact that the two typically Dominican readings of Song 5:1 and 7:11, mentioned by Father Bonino, are entirely absent from Gilles’s commentary. Gilles is entirely silent on a Eucharistic reading of 5:1 and he reads 7: 11 (“Come, my beloved, let us go forth into the field [*in*

² See Albert the Great, *On the Body of the Lord*, trans. Albert Marie Surmanski (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2017).

³ Martin Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1949), 257.

⁴ See Wilhelm Vrede, *Die beiden dem hl. Thomas von Aquin zugeschriebenen Kommentare zum Hohen Liede* (Berlin: Germania, 1903).

agrum], let us abide in the villages”) as a plea to Christ to come to the aid of the Jews “who are an uncultivated field” (*qui sunt ager incultus*) and, as little ones in the field, unable to ascent to Christ (*quia Judaei adhuc parvuli in fide non possunt ingredi ad te, et ascendere*).⁵

This brings me to my second observation. The Municipal Library of Salins (France) contains a manuscript (Ms 3, *incipit*: “Donum sapiens poscens . . .”) with a third commentary (fols. 1–86) on the Song of Songs attributed to Saint Thomas (*Explicit postilla super Cantica Canticorum edita a S. Thoma de Aquino*). Although discovered by Grabmann already in the early twentieth century and acknowledged by Mandonnet and Palémon Glorieux,⁶ an analysis of its content still remains a *desideratum*. All the more interesting is the fact that the *explicit* notes that the transcription of the commentary was done in 1339 “per manum fratris J. Berlueti, provinciae Turoniae, ad usum fratris Joannis de Raffola.” At that time, however, there existed only a Franciscan province with that name. Moreover, and based upon my own preliminary look into the manuscript, it seems the *explicit* is written by a different hand than the commentary, which could cast further doubt on its authenticity.

A final observation: the same method employed by Father Bonino could be used to focus on the presence and use of the book Ecclesiastes in Saint Thomas’s writings. With almost one thousand references, such a project would constitute a much more elaborate one, in particular when the outcome would be compared to Bonaventure’s commentary on Ecclesiastes.

N.V

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⁵ Gilles of Rome, *In Cantica Canticorum Commentarii* (Rome, 1555), 16

⁶ Palémon Glorieux, “Essai sur les Commentaires scripturaires de saint Thomas et leur chronologie,” *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 17 (1950): 237–66.

In Defense of Conciliar Christology by Timothy Pawl (*Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016*), xiv + 251pp.

IN THIS DELIGHTFULLY well-researched book, Timothy Pawl aims to defend the logical consistency of “Conciliar Christology” from the allegations of inconsistency which have been made against it, mostly in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. By “Conciliar Christology,” Pawl means the conjunction of all Christological propositions solemnly taught by the first seven Ecumenical Councils of the Christian Church, which Catholics, the Orthodox, and many Protestants accept as authoritative Tradition. Pawl aims not to show that this conciliar Christology is true, or even possibly true (2), but only to defeat arguments which attempt to show some contradiction in conciliar Christology.

The organization of the book is straightforward: after examining the content of conciliar Christology (ch. 1), the definitions of key terms used therein (ch. 2), and fleshing out the integrated Christological theory in a broadly hylemorphic fashion (ch. 3), Pawl examines “The Fundamental Problem” for conciliar Christology (ch. 4), and examines three ways of avoiding this allegation of fundamental contradiction (chs. 5–7), before concluding with an examination of additional metaphysical objections which aim to show that conciliar Christology is inconsistent with divine immutability, impassibility, or atemporality (ch. 8), or that conciliar Christology is committed to just one nature, intellect, or will in Christ (ch. 9).

Pawl’s book has many merits to recommend it, perhaps the most important and praiseworthy of which is his slavish commitment to the conciliar texts which constitute conciliar Christology. As Pawl himself notes, it is an unfortunate and far too common occurrence in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion to “discover articles wherein a view condemned as outside the fold in days of yore is propounded as a novel answer to a theological problem, with apparent ignorance on the author’s part that the view has such an ignoble history, or any history at all” (3). This phenomenon has the unhappy consequence that a significant fraction of the work being produced in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is dead on arrival amongst Christians who are well acquainted with the history of the Church and take seriously the Tradition contained therein. Pawl’s book is a refreshing and outstanding exception to this lack of engagement with the doctrinal history of the Church: he has appeals to the conciliar texts and careful interpretation of them sprinkled generously throughout the entire book, and certainly seems to take them to constitute the Christology that must survive scrutiny, thereby setting himself a significantly harder task than those less devoted to these doctrinal authorities, while also position-

ing his book to be more useful to Christian philosophers who take these Councils as a definitively authoritative rule of faith.

On the other hand, Pawl also demonstrates an excellent facility with the logical analysis which is the hallmark of contemporary analytic philosophy. At places, his book is full of page after page of careful deduction and explanation of the arguments against conciliar Christology which he is attempting to refute. One never wonders exactly which premise Pawl is denying or which inference he thinks is fallacious. For philosophers familiar with the most common forms of argument, this will likely border on the tedious. But it will be very advantageous to the lay reader or the theologian without a background in logic.

I am a believer in conciliar Christology, and therefore in its consistency, but I do have some worries about Pawl's solution to "The Fundamental Problem." It would take too long to set up this problem here in the same way or with the same precision as Pawl does in the book, but basically, the claim is that the predicates which are true of Christ in virtue of his divine nature are inconsistent with the predicates which are true of Christ in virtue of his human nature. But conciliar Christology asserts that many pairs of such predicates (e.g., "passible" and "impassible" or "mutable" and "immutable") are indeed all true of one and the same supposit, the eternal Word. Therefore, conciliar Christology posits contradictions, and is false. This is the basic thrust of this fundamental problem as understood by Pawl. One of my worries about Pawl's solution to the fundamental problem is that it is unnecessary; the other is that his solution does not work for all the predicates we must predicate of Christ. I will take these worries in that order.

Before arriving at Pawl's favored solution, I have a concern that Pawl's solution is unnecessary. On his way in the book to his own solution, Pawl rejects a multitude of variations on the famous *qua* strategy that has been historically employed to avoid Christological contradiction. This strategy qualifies the assertions we make of Christ in such a way that contradiction is avoided. So, for example, we may say that Christ is passible *qua* man, but also that Christ is impassible *qua* God. To Pawl's great credit, his treatment of this strategy occupies the longest and most thorough chapter of the book (ch. 6), in which he examines four ways in which *qua* clauses might be interpreted. He ultimately judges them all either to fail in solving the fundamental problem, or else to have a prohibitive high theoretical cost to adoption.

But it seems to me that Pawl gives somewhat short shrift to the "modifying the assertion" interpretation of the *qua* clause (121–23). Pawl claims that, on this interpretation of the *qua* clause, "the 'qua' functions as a

tool for noting that nature in virtue of which a certain predicate is apt of Christ" (122). Given that this is all the *qua* clause is doing on this interpretation of it, Pawl concludes that it cannot save conciliar Christology from inconsistency, since, "If the 'qua' merely tells us in virtue of what it is that the thing is a certain way, then the thing's being that certain way follows" (122). This conditional is true, but I do not see why we should interpret the *qua* clause in such a way that it does nothing more than tell us in virtue of what it is that the thing is a certain way. Rather, we should interpret the *qua* clause as specifying *the respect* in which the assertion is true. This shall be sufficient to save conciliar Christology from contradiction, for we have a contradiction if and only if we have the same predicate being both affirmed and denied of the same subject at the same time and *in the same respect*.

Now, one might reasonably object here: yes, if we can distinguish the respects in which a Christological assertion is both true and false, we will have avoided contradiction, but what exactly are the metaphysical mechanics behind such *qua* clauses? In other words, what are the truth-makers for assertions containing such *qua* clauses? This is a sensible request. But it can be resisted by the one who seeks nothing more than the avoidance of contradiction, for two reasons. The first reason is that the refutation of an attempted demonstration of inconsistency in a theory is an exercise in *logic*, not in metaphysics. We need not give the metaphysical picture that our theory paints if all we seek to do is show that an attempt at showing the theory to be inconsistent fails. We need only show that our theory does not contain any pair of assertions both affirming and denying the same predicate of the same subject at the same time and in the same respect. The second reason is that, insofar as an opponent of conciliar Christology pleads ignorance and demands further explanation of what the theologian means by the qualification of the claims of conciliar Christology using *qua* clauses, to precisely that same degree the opponent of conciliar Christology also loses the ability to make a credible allegation of inconsistency against conciliar Christology, for one must understand a contradiction to recognize it as a contradiction.¹ But I will not dwell any further on this point, since this is really just a longwinded way of saying that Pawl's project is at least implicitly more metaphysical than perhaps he realizes and tells us in the introduction to the book. He seeks to give us a metaphysics of the Incarnation, and not merely to defend conciliar Christology against

¹ Of course, this is not to endorse obfuscation as a strategy for refuting accusations of inconsistency against conciliar Christology. It is simply to note that accusations of inconsistency and accusations of unintelligibility cannot be made simultaneously.

charges of inconsistency, for these charges are easily and adequately met by the distinctions in respect traditionally made by *qua* clauses. The hard job, and the one Pawl is undertaking at least in part in this monograph, is that of explaining the metaphysical *import* of such clauses.

So what is Pawl's preferred solution to the "fundamental problem"? He thinks we should reinterpret the truth conditions of the problematic predicates (154–59). So, for example, rather than "passible" being true of a subject just in case it is possible that at least one other thing casually affect that subject, Pawl argues that we should instead understand "passible" to be true of a subject just in case that subject *has a concrete nature* that is possibly causally affected by at least one other thing. And likewise for every other problematic pair of predicates that we might apply to Christ: rather than understanding such predicates of being true of Christ just in case Christ has the property to which that predicate refers, Pawl believes we should apply such predicates to Christ just in case *at least one of Christ's natures* has the property to which that predicate refers. This is quite clever, for it removes even the *prima facie* appearance of inconsistency when we say that Christ is both passible and impassible. For on Pawl's interpretation of the truth conditions of these predicates, this is to say nothing more than that Christ has at least one passible nature and one impassible nature, which of course presents no specter of inconsistency. One might object here that it is only *supposita* and not natures to which predicates apply, but Pawl argues persuasively in the early chapters of the book that the early Councils and Fathers of the Church did routinely speak about Christ and his natures in a way that entails, for example, that Christ's human nature literally suffered on the Cross, and not just the Person of Christ.

But Pawl's revised truth conditions for the Christological predicates do seem to lead to some unintended consequences that Pawl does not address. For example, Christ is eternally begotten of the Father, but neither of his natures is eternally begotten of the Father. The divine nature is not begotten by the Father because it is the same nature which he already possesses. So here we seem to have a predicate apt of Christ, "eternally begotten of the Father," but on Pawl's truth conditions, this can only be true if one of Christ's natures is such that it was eternally begotten of the Father, and yet this is true of neither of his natures. Here is another problem case for Pawl's revised truth conditions: Christ is identical to exactly one divine Person, but neither of his natures is identical to exactly one divine Person. His human nature is not identical to any person, divine or otherwise, and his divine nature is identical to

three divine Persons, not one.² My purpose here is to illustrate that there certainly seem to be predicates which are apt of Christ, but not in virtue of either of his natures possessing the property to which that predicate refers. And Pawl gives us no principle by which to distinguish which Christological predicates' truth conditions get revised and which do not. A selective revision of just some of the Christological predicates' truth conditions might seem *ad hoc*.

My reservations about the necessity and success of Pawl's solution aside, his book represents a compelling argument for the consistency of conciliar Christology supported well by copious research in ecclesiastical history. It should prove a fruitful read for logically curious theologians and historically curious philosophers alike. N.V

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The Indissolubility of Marriage & the Council of Trent by E. Christian Brugger (*Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2017*), xiii + 295 pp.

ON FEBRUARY 21, 2014, in the presence of Pope Francis, Cardinal Walter Kasper gave the opening address to the extraordinary consistory of cardinals held in Rome. The talk, intended as background for the upcoming synod of bishops concerning pastoral challenges to the family, was titled "The Gospel of the Family." Toward the end of his talk, Kasper proposed a solution to the "problem of the divorced-and-remarried" in the Church. While admitting that sacramental marriages are indissoluble, he nevertheless suggested that the Catholic Church could adopt the Eastern Orthodox Church's custom of dispensing with the first marriage and blessing a second, non-sacramental marriage. Kasper anticipated the obvious objection that such a position is tantamount to Church-sanctioned

² At least, this is true on Catholic theology (because of divine simplicity). Given only the first seven ecumenical councils with which Pawl is working, one might think that the divine nature is not identical to any of the divine Persons. But the point remains that no plausible theological framework, either current or historical, posits an identity between the divine nature and exactly one divine Person.

adultery; but he defended his position by asserting that, while the Council of Trent had intended to condemn Luther's teaching on the dissolubility of marriage, it intentionally avoided condemning the pastoral practice of the Eastern Church. Kasper concluded that since the Council avoided condemning the Eastern practice, the Catholic Church could make use of this practice.

Kasper's permissive reading of Trent, however, is almost entirely dependent on the work of the relatively little-known Flemish theologian Piet F. Fransen, S.J. (1913–1983). In the late 1940s, Fransen had written his dissertation at the Gregorian University on Trent's teaching on the indissolubility of marriage, and he went on to publish eight articles on this topic, arguing that Trent's teaching on indissolubility has been misread for nearly four hundred years. Central to Fransen's account was the development of canon 7 of Trent's decree on marriage. On August 11, 1563, a delegation from the Republic of Venice asked that the Council not define the indissolubility of marriage in such a way that the customs of the Orthodox would be directly condemned. The Venetian legates explained that within Venice's control were Greek Christians who were in union with the Catholic Church. Their Catholic bishops permitted them to follow the Eastern custom whereby they could dismiss one wife and marry another. The delegation feared that anathematizing this custom could potentially cause these Greek Christians to break from Rome, so they pleaded with the Council to modify canon 7's language. The Council accepted this proposal, changing the original direct condemnation—"If anyone says, that on account of the adultery of one of the spouses a marriage can be dissolved . . . let him be anathema" (8, 95)—to an indirect condemnation: "If anyone says the church errs, when she has taught and teaches, in accordance with the evangelical and apostolic doctrine, that the bond of marriage cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of a spouse . . ." (9, 112). Fransen argued that the change in the wording of canon 7 has two important implications. First, the Council did not intend to condemn directly the Orthodox practice. Second, canon 7 was not doctrinal, with the intention to define the absolute indissolubility of marriage as a matter of faith, but merely disciplinary. Therefore, Fransen's argument leaves open the possibility that the Eastern practice remains a possible pastoral solution in the Catholic Church. Fransen's arguments were influential and were adopted even by International Theological Commission's 1977 *Propositions on the Doctrine of Christian Marriage* (14).

Brugger's book, *The Indissolubility of Marriage & the Council of Trent*, directly challenges Fransen's central thesis and his interpretation of historical events. Brugger's work has five chapters and three appendices in which

he seeks “to determine what the Council intended to teach on the question of indissolubility and with what authority it intended to teach it” (xi). His book is primarily concerned with tracing the development of canon 7. In chapter 1, Brugger examines Luther’s and Calvin’s teaching on the indissolubility of marriage and the Council fathers’ knowledge of the Reformers’ teachings. Fransen had argued that in *The Babylonian Captivity* (1520) Luther’s principal objection to the Church’s teaching on marriage was that the Church had exceeded its competence in dealing with the marriages of Christians. Fransen’s reading of Luther was important to his account, since he then used it to argue that the Council fathers were concerned with replying to Luther’s rejection of the Church’s competence over marriage rather than to Luther’s rejection of the indissolubility of marriage as such. Brugger clearly demonstrates that before the Council met at Trent, Luther not only had denied the Church’s authority over marriage, but he had also clearly rejected the indissolubility of marriage (23–25). Moreover, Brugger also shows in this chapter and in chapter 3 that the Council fathers were well aware of Luther’s errors on indissolubility (53–54). This is clear from the inclusion of Luther’s errors on indissolubility in the list of Reformers’ errors presented to the *congregatio theologorum* on April 26, 1547, which formed the basis of the canons drawn up and presented to the Council fathers (29–30, 53). In effect, Brugger demonstrates that Fransen had seriously distorted both the nature Luther’s error concerning indissolubility and the Council fathers’ understanding of it.

In chapter 2, Brugger outlines the development of the Orthodox custom and doctrine with respect to indissolubility. Relying on the work of the patristics scholar Henri Crouzel, Brugger notes that the early Church was unanimous in teaching on the indissolubility of marriage (38). Eventually under the influence of imperial law, the Eastern Church came to hold that there were, besides adultery, other legitimate causes for divorce, including enmity between spouses, heresy, and desertion (46). The “first unambiguous evidence” for the Orthodox rejection of indissolubility was the collection of laws attributed to the schismatic Patriarch Photius of Constantinople in 883 (44). Brugger’s point is that in effect the Eastern position was not merely a disciplinary accommodation to a pastoral challenge, but it also involved some of the same doctrinal errors later seen in the Reformers.

In chapter 3 Brugger treats the Council’s first discussions of the indissolubility of marriage, which took place not at Trent but in Bologna where the Council had temporarily transferred due to an outbreak of typhus at Trent. Brugger chronologically examines the views of both the congregations of theologians and the congregations of bishops. His history breaks

off when Paul III decreed a suspension of the Council's deliberations on February 16, 1548. Throughout this examination, Brugger contests Fransen's characterization of the Council's meetings during its time in Bologna. First, he rejects the claim that the Council fathers were only concerned with defining "intrinsic indissolubility," that is, the authority of the spouses to dissolve their marriage, and not with "extrinsic indissolubility," the Church's ability to dissolve a sacramental marriage. He demonstrates that at every turn the fathers did not make this distinction and rather affirmed the absolute indissolubility of marriage (74). This is made clear in the three successive drafts of canon 3 (the content of which become incorporated into the later canon 7), which condemned Luther's view on the dissolubility of marriage. Second, Brugger challenges Fransen's thesis that the Council fathers were principally concerned with a disciplinary matter rather than a dogmatic matter, persuasively concluding that "the vast majority of Council fathers" believed that indissolubility was a "dogmatic truth, revealed by God" (88).

Chapter 4 picks up in the third period after the Council returned to Trent in 1563 and began working on marriage again. At this point the original draft of canon 7 contained a direct condemnation: "If anyone says, that on occasion of the adultery of one of the spouses a marriage can be dissolved . . . let him be anathema." After the intervention of the Venetian delegation, 71 percent of the Council fathers (106) accepted the Venetian delegation's indirect formulation: "If anyone says the church erroneously taught and teaches, . . ." Brugger correctly notes, however, that the Council fathers did not simply accept the delegation's proposed canon; they changed it in two important ways. First, the Council added "in accordance with the evangelical and apostolic doctrine" (112). Second, they changed "one *should* not contract another marriage" to "one *cannot* . . . contract another marriage" (113). Brugger rightly concludes that both of these changes show that the Council clearly intended canon 7 as doctrinal and not just disciplinary. These two changes survived two subsequent drafts of canon 7 and made their way into the final version of the canon.

Brugger calls chapter 5 "the heart" of his book (20), and he even suggests that readers only interested his conclusions "may happily skip" over chapters 3 and 4 and go directly to 5 (20). Brugger's work to this point has focused on the historical development of canon 7, but here for the first time he offers a treatment of the doctrinal chapters which precede the canons, affirming that they too teach the absolute indissolubility of a consummated, sacramental marriage as a divinely revealed truth. He concludes, however, that the doctrinal chapters are not solemn definitions (128). Brugger then moves to a detailed exposition of the doctrinal content

of canons 5 and 7 and interprets Trent's indirect formulation as defining that even in cases of adultery the marital bond cannot be dissolved and that this teaching is part of "evangelical and apostolic doctrine" (132). This insertion makes it clear that the Council thought that this teaching is dogmatic. He also tackles the meaning of the indirect formulation: "If anyone says the church erroneously taught and teaches . . ." Fransen had argued that the term "error" was best understood as "to exceed one's competence" rather than as a doctrinal error. Brugger argues that Fransen's reading is completely unwarranted given the context. For Brugger, then, when the Council used the term "error" it used it in the sense of "cognitively going wrong" (136).

Finally, Brugger also includes three appendices. Appendix A contains all the scriptural, patristic, medieval, and early modern authorities referenced by the theologians and Council fathers during the discussions on indissolubility. This is particularly useful since the *acta* often contain either mere allusions or simple summaries of the supporting text. Brugger helpfully provides lengthy quotations so that the reader may better see the full context of the debates and discussions. He also includes texts not cited in the *acta* but which are relevant to the issue, as well as commentary on a number of difficult or controversial passages in the authorities. Appendix B is the longest of the appendices and is divided in two parts. The first part contains the Latin text and an English translation of the Venetian delegation's intervention in 1563. The second part contains in both English and Latin the three successive drafts of the doctrinal preface. These are followed by nine tables that summarize the statements of the Council fathers on each of the four successive formulations of canon 7. Fransen had frequently ascribed various positions to the "majority" of the Council fathers. Brugger's tables are incredibly useful since they allow one to see clearly what precisely the view of the majority of the fathers on indissolubility was and that Fransen was often incorrect. Appendix C is entitled "Schedule of the Council of Trent," but this title is misleading, as it is actually a schedule only of the public sessions of the Council.

While Brugger successfully demonstrates that Fransen's thesis regarding the Council's position on marriage's indissolubility is erroneous, his work suffers from a number of historical and theological defects. Even though Brugger states at the beginning that he offers his book "as a theologian, not a historian" (xi), a number of his decisions make the work difficult to follow historically. I will give only three examples of historical problems which can be frustrating to the reader. First, Brugger often describes the working of the Council incorrectly. He frequently misuses the term "session" when speaking of meetings of the bishops and theolo-

gians. "Session" (*sessio*) is a technical term for a public meeting of bishops in which some important event takes place, such as the opening or closing of a council, subscription to the creed, or the promulgation of a decree. He repeatedly speaks of the "Bologna sessions" (20, 50, 51), but sometimes he is speaking of the sessions and other times he seems to be principally referring to meetings of the congregation of bishops (*congregatio generalis*) and the congregation of theologians (*congregatio theologorum*). He also speaks of "the third Bologna session" which took place on September 14, 1547 (77). There was actually no session (*sessio*) that day; instead, a general congregation (*congregatio generalis*) was held which prorogued—that is, postponed—the session that was to be held on the next day to some future time.

Second, Brugger is maddeningly inconsistent in how he refers to Council fathers. He identifies the bishops sometimes by their vernacular names, sometimes by their Latin names, sometimes by their vernacular names followed by their see names, and sometimes merely by the names of their dioceses. He refers to Charles de Guise the Cardinal of Lorraine, for example, sometimes as "Lorraine" (48, 98), sometimes as "Charles de Guise, cardinal of Lorraine (Lotharingus)," (97), sometimes as "Lotharingus" (110), sometimes as "the cardinal of Lorraine" (28), and finally sometimes as "the cardinal of Lorraine (Lotharingus)" (104, 129). Even in the index there are two separate entries for Charles de Guise with different page references, one under "Guise, Charles de" (289) and one under "Lotharingus" (290). Moreover, in Appendix B, Brugger claims to give the "Latin name" of the bishops, but this is not so; he identifies them by their see names. It is common in literature on Trent to identify bishops by either their name in the vernacular or as the bishop of their see given in its vernacular. This label becomes even less clear when he records the heads of the represented religious orders. This appendix is arranged by title of office with the office holders' "name" given next. Brugger identifies the various heads of religious orders' title as "General" even though the various orders have different titles for their heads. Strangely, he then gives their names as "Dominicans," "Franciscans," "Augustinians," "Jesuits," and so on rather than using their Christian name or surname. For Diego Laínez (1512–1565), the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, for example, his title becomes "General" and his name becomes "Jesuits." Laínez is not found by name anywhere in the book. If Laínez had been the only Jesuit present at the Council in the third period, this perhaps would be forgivable. Other Jesuits, however, were present in the third period, including St. Peter Canisius, S.J. (1521–1597), Jean Couvillon, S.J. (1520–1581), Jeronimo Nadal, S.J. (1507–1580), and Juan de Polanco, S.J. (1517–1576). It is

unclear to whom Brugger is referring when he uses the name "Jesuits," let alone orders such as the Dominicans or Franciscans, who had many more members present.

Third, Appendix C was intended to be useful by providing a basic timeline of the Council, specifically when the question of marriage was discussed. Unfortunately, it is really a list of the public sessions and the months in which marriage was discussed. Brugger should have provided not only a list of the months in which marriage was discussed but also a chronological list with reference to the general congregations, the congregations of prelate theologians, and the congregations of minor theologians as they discussed the absolute indissolubility of marriage.

Brugger also makes a number of questionable claims concerning both dogmatic theology and ecclesiology. He gives, for example, two reasons why the doctrinal chapters on marriage which preceded the canons are not solemn definitions. First, he argues that the doctrinal chapters of the twenty-fourth session cannot form dogmatic, solemn definitions since they use hyperbole and metaphor (128). Second, he argues that these doctrinal chapters cannot contain solemn definitions since the Council did not discuss the doctrinal chapters but voted only on the whole text (128).

There are a number of problems with Brugger's argument. First, even if it were true that the use of hyperbole and metaphor rendered magisterial propositional claims not solemn definitions, it would only follow that those portions of the text which used either would not be solemn definitions. In fact, the presence of "hyperbole" ("senseless men") and "metaphor" in themselves do not render magisterial texts not solemn definitions. Second, what Brugger labels as hyperbole, "senseless men," is actually an epithet. There is no good reason that a solemn definition could not include epithets, nor is there any good theological reason epithets could not be employed in a dogmatic definition. Recall that the primary object of infallibility includes the content, extent, and meaning of Sacred Scripture and Apostolic Tradition. Now, Sacred Scripture repeatedly employs analogies to explain divine realities, and it also contains large numbers of epithets. In the Psalms, for example, David wrote, "The fool has said in his heart: 'There is no God'" (Ps 14:1), and Jesus calls Pharisees and scribes "fools" (Matt 23:17). The magisterium could dogmatically define that atheists are indeed fools or that the Pharisees were fools. In these contexts, these epithets serve as a type of theological censure. Moreover, the magisterium can also dogmatically define the language in which the truths of divine revelation can best be expressed; consequently, it could decide to use proper or improper analogical language in its decrees. The magisterium has in fact issued

dogmatic definitions in documents that contain “metaphor.” Take, for example, Boniface VIII’s *Unam Sanctam* (1304), which contains at least one dogmatic definition and repeatedly uses the metaphor of the two swords in order to describe the relationship between ecclesiastical and temporal power.¹

Brugger’s second argument is that the Council fathers failed to discuss the doctrinal chapters and therefore they cannot be solemn definitions. It is, of course, better for the bishops to consult one another and thoroughly discuss doctrinal declarations before their promulgation. Theologians like Melchior Cano, O. P. (1509–1560), and St. Robert Bellarmine, S. J. (1542–1621), state that the magisterium indeed has a moral obligation to do so. There is, however, nothing that obliges the Council fathers as a strict condition for the exercise of either papal or conciliar infallibility to discuss or study drafts of the solemn definitions before approving them. The only conditions necessary for the exercise of conciliar infallibility are that the Council intends to speak (1) in union with the pope, (2) for the universal Church, (3) on a matter of faith or morals, and (4) to be held definitively (*Lumen Gentium* §25).

Brugger suggests that the canons contain solemn definitions but the doctrinal chapters do not (128). This assumption is completely unwarranted for several reasons. First, there are a number of canons even in the Council’s doctrinal decrees which are clearly not solemn definitions. Second, the Council itself does not privilege the canons over the doctrinal chapters. In its other decrees Trent has given us its thought on the relationship between the doctrinal chapters and canons. In session 6 on justification, for example, Trent is quite clear that adherence to the doctrinal content of the chapters is just as necessary as adherence to the canons. Thus, Trent states,

No one can be justified unless he faithfully and firmly accepts [*fideliter firmiterque receperit*] the Catholic doctrine of justification, to which the holy council has decided to add the following canons, so that all may know, not only what they should hold and follow, but also what they should shun and avoid.²

Thus, to use the technical terminology of dogmatic theologians, the doctrinal chapters are in *forma positiva* while canons are in *forma negativa*.

¹ Heinrich Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* [DH], ed. Peter Hünermann; 43rd ed., no. 875.

² DH, no. 1550; cf. nos. 1650, 1700, 1770.

The difference between the chapters and canons, as Trent itself teaches, is not one of authority but rather one of a positive versus a negative doctrinal formulation. One may notice, moreover, that adherence to both the doctrinal decrees and the canons is required for one's justification and ultimately one's salvation. The individual propositions within the doctrinal chapters and canons must be examined one by one in order to determine whether they are solemn definitions or not. Brugger's error on this point is rather unfortunate, since it caused him to neglect the doctrinal weight of an aspect of Trent's decree that would have substantially strengthened his argument.

There are other problems with Brugger's method, especially in light of his larger corpus on moral issues, particularly capital punishment. Take, for example, Brugger's treatment of the teaching of the Fathers of the Church in this work. Brugger repeatedly notes that the Fathers of the Church were virtually unanimous in their teaching on the absolute indissolubility of marriage (3, 38). Indeed, he cites approximately twenty-two Fathers of the Church and anonymous patristic texts in support of his position (38). Later in Appendix A, he is at pains to show that those few patristic texts which others read as supporting toleration of divorce and remarriage in fact do not support this. In his earlier work, *Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral Tradition* (2nd ed.), however, Brugger devotes an entire chapter to discussing approximately twenty-two Fathers and anonymous patristic texts. The title of the chapter on the Fathers is entitled "The Patristic Consensus," in which he demonstrates that this consensus was "unanimous" (94) in teaching that capital punishment is permissible. Despite this admission, he concludes that the patristic consensus on the permissibility of the death penalty can simply be swept aside. One must ask why the consensus of twenty-two Fathers is sufficient in the case of the absolute indissolubility of marriage, while the consensus of twenty-two Fathers is not for the permissibility of the death penalty. The answer lies in the fact that Brugger is principally driven by his adherence to the New Natural Law theory rather than by a concern for the purity of Catholic doctrine.

In any case, Brugger's argument is that Trent's doctrine cannot change, since canon 7 is a solemn definition, and therefore proposals like Kasper's are moot. It is hard to understand how Brugger could make such a claim given his own work. Kasper freely admits that Trent's doctrine on indissolubility cannot change. In this he agrees with Brugger. Instead Kasper argues that his proposal would be a "development of doctrine" rather than a change. Brugger in effect makes exactly the same argument as Kasper in his work on capital punishment. Brugger admits that the tradition is one

in affirming the permissibility of capital punishment but goes on to argue that a rejection of this unanimous consensus is really just a development of doctrine. Brugger describes this development concerning capital punishment as “a reasoning process from *A* to *B* (that is, from pro to con vis-à-vis the morality of capital punishment).”³ Of course, this is not a process of *A* to *B* but rather a process from *A* to not *A*, that is, a contradiction just like Kasper’s. Vincent of Lerins warned that in a development, “the Church of Christ, the careful and watchful guardian of the doctrines deposited in her charge, never changes anything in them, never diminishes, never adds.”⁴ It is difficult to see on what principle Brugger can reject Kasper’s argument of the development of the Church’s teaching on the indissolubility of marriage and yet accept and employ the argument of development in Church teaching to support a change in the traditional teaching of the admissibility of the death penalty. In the end, the basic problem is that Brugger is a moral theologian, not a dogmatic theologian.

These weaknesses, however, do not fundamentally undermine Brugger’s main thesis that the Council of Trent intended to define the absolute indissolubility of a ratified and consummated marriage. Indeed, Brugger’s thesis would be strengthened by recognizing the dogmatic importance of the doctrinal chapters. Theologians such as Cardinal Kasper and the International Theological Commission, who have tendentiously adopted the view of Piet F. Fransen, would do well to rely no longer on Fransen. Brugger’s timely and important book has replaced Fransen’s as the standard work on the doctrine of indissolubility at the Council of Trent. **NV**

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³ E. Christian Brugger, *Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral Tradition*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 163.

⁴ Vincent of Lerins, *Commonitorium* 23.59, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 2nd series (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994), 11:148.