

Book Reviews

The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas: A Sketch by Stephen L. Brock (*Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015*), xix + 195 pp.

“RIGHT NOW,” Father Stephen Brock observes, “there does seem to be some confusion about nature” (34). At that point in his new book, Fr. Brock is engaged in the task of making intelligible Aristotle’s understanding of nature as a principle and cause that makes certain things move, and he has just finished explaining that Aristotle took the existence of nature, or of things that act from such a cause, to be evident. It must be admitted, however, that “we can get confused even about such obvious truths” (*ibid.*). This kind of confusion is vexing not merely because we are happier when our thoughts are clearer and more in harmony with our experience of the world, but also because our confusion about matters that should be plain has a way of hindering us from receiving the saving truth of the Gospel in its integrity. If philosophy is, in fact, a “way to come to know fundamental truths about human life” (Pope John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, §5), then its ability to keep us from confusion about matters as foundational as what is and what is not natural is indeed precious. We ought, then, to prize philosophy “as one of the noblest of human tasks” (*ibid.*, §3), and thus warmly welcome Fr. Brock’s invitation to consider it afresh through the eyes of one of its most appealing masters, St. Thomas Aquinas.

The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas: A Sketch offers readers a tour of the Angelic Doctor’s thinking about nature and the created order that culminates in what Fr. Brock refers to as “reason’s glimpse of God” (109). In less than two hundred crisp and clear pages, he has achieved a work that his colleagues will envy, for it is at once both a satisfying presentation of Aquinas’s thought and a personal engagement with him as a philosophical companion. This “sketch” is an introduction and a survey that is also, and eminently, a work of original reflection. At each step of the way, the reader is offered a look at

Aquinas's thought that is both from the point of view of metaphysical wisdom (and sometimes explicitly theological wisdom) and firmly rooted in common experience and ordinary language.

After an introduction entitled *Manuductio* that sets forth the work's essential theme, Fr. Brock dedicates the first of his six chapters to an overview of Aquinas's life and major works. The middle four chapters of the book are a march through the main topics of theoretical philosophy, beginning with nature and its principles, turning to the soul as a particular kind of nature, then examining the science of being and truth, and finally ascending to the consideration of "invisibles"—the human soul as subsistent form, the angels, and God. Only in the final chapter does Fr. Brock address Aquinas's practical philosophy, and then decidedly from a metaphysical point of view, attending in particular to the role played by speculative philosophy in the defense and elucidation of the principles of ethics and politics. Aquinas's considerable labor in the art of logic receives only a brief direct treatment in the chapter on metaphysics, but this is no omission. The art of arts is never far from view at any point in the book. To those readers who are broadly familiar with the literature on Aquinas as a philosopher, Fr. Brock's decision to privilege a treatment of the theoretical over the practical will not surprise. For while it would be too much to say that there are works aplenty to serve as introductions to Thomas's ethical thought, it seems fair to say that Fr. Brock has done a great service to the present generation of students by making the effort to introduce the features of Thomas's thought that are less well known and, almost certainly, more foreign to most of us.

The distinctive excellence of the book is captured in the introductory account of the nature and importance of *manuductio*, the "leading by the hand" of student by teacher that assists the one learning to pass from the knowledge of things more familiar to him, but in themselves less intelligible, to the knowledge of things further from the senses—even invisible—but more intelligible in themselves. This doctrine about the teacher's task, grounded in the account of the natural way that human beings come to know, familiar from Aristotle's *Physics* 1.1, shapes Fr. Brock's book in three important ways. First, and most evidently, it provides the order for the book's central, speculative chapters, which begin with a truth that is evident to the senses—namely, that things move, and progress in step-wise fashion to the truth that God is his own existence. Second, within those chapters, this doctrine guides Fr. Brock's work as an expositor of

Aquinas's thought, as again and again he labors to make the particulars of that doctrine intelligible in light of what he takes to be the experiences that we all share, and even what he thinks our common intellectual custom likely to be. Third, this account of "leading by the hand" sheds light on what he takes the task of philosophy to be within the context of a Christian intellectual life that is ordered to the understanding of Divine Revelation. By the work's end, philosophy—at least in the hands of Aquinas—has emerged as a most worthy and useful handmaiden to Sacred Theology.

It will be worth savoring an instance or two of Fr. Brock's art of teaching. An especially helpful one, to my mind, is his deft teaching-by-example of the difficult truth that the form of the thing known is present in the knower without its matter. Here he is exploring the general truth through an instance of sensation: "With your blue eyes you are seeing the black and white page. Nothing in you thereby is, or is even in the process of becoming, black and white. The blue in your eyes is only the blue of your eyes. But the forms of black and white in them are also the page's forms. They are the page's inasmuch as by them, the page itself is being seen" (65–66).

Another characteristic bit of his teaching comes early in the book, when he is speaking about Aquinas's tendency to be in dialogue with earlier thinkers. There he makes this distinction between the authority of a teacher and that of a commander: "Following a commander or lawgiver consists mainly in obeying, executing orders. This may sometimes require a clarification of the order's meaning, or even of its purpose; but the point is to obey. Of course following a teacher also involves performing assigned tasks. But the point is to learn. And learning is very much a matter of asking questions. A good commander will allow some questions, but a good teacher welcomes, even provokes them" (4). In each case, as in many other similar discussions throughout the book, Fr. Brock effectively ties an important distinction or realization back to an everyday experience. As a result, one can say with confidence that, although the book certainly has its difficult passages due to the nature of its subject matter, on the whole it is remarkably approachable.

It may, however, be worth saying something about what the book is not so as the better to locate its particular excellence. At the beginning of his fourth chapter, which is dedicated to Aquinas's metaphysics, Fr. Brock quotes a well-known passage from the *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* on the order of learning, a passage that begins

with the teaching that “boys should first be instructed in logical matters” (Brock, 83; *Sent. eth.* 6, lec. 7, no. 1211). He then offers a comment that helps to frame the whole of his book: “even though Thomas puts it [logic] first, I am only bringing it up now, because this book is not a course in Thomistic philosophy, but only a sketch of it, and because some of the (few) things that I want to say about his views on logic are easier to explain in light of things seen in the previous two chapters” (83–84). There is considerably more than meets the eye here. For, while there is, on the one hand, a plain admission that the book is not meant as a substitute for a course or curriculum in philosophy, there is, on the other, a gesture towards its essential characteristic: it is not at all an encyclopedic collection of Thomistic conclusions arrayed subject-by-subject for ease of reference. Quite the contrary, it is a deeply personal engagement with Aquinas as a philosopher that begins with our general experience of the world of moving things and proceeds to progressively more noble topics. And on every page, the concerns of the metaphysician are evident.

Taken as a whole, Fr. Stephen Brock’s *Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas: A Sketch* is an imposing achievement. He has been perseveringly in dialogue not only with Aquinas but also with all of his major interpreters from the past half century, as the footnotes and admirable bibliography amply demonstrate. It is the kind of book that one wants to put in the hands of seminarians, undergraduates nearing the end of their studies, and graduate students beginning theirs, not only because it conveys much truth but also because it provides an attractive model for how philosophizing ought to be done. The volume is especially strong in its treatment of nature, the principles of nature, and the soul as a kind of nature. In each case, the exposition begins with an explicit concern for our dominant intellectual custom, which is a materialism dominated by the imagination. Fr. Brock insists that his readers come to terms with the strangeness of Aquinas’s conception of nature, take note of what he means by form, and consider how attention to form—especially substantial form—opens up a vista upon the world that is different from the one gained from our physics, chemistry, and biology textbooks. His discussions of why animals are not best understood as machines, why the unity of living things needs to be contended with, and why sensing and knowing constitute new modes of being in the world are concise and compelling. Given all of the confusion about nature that surrounds us today, both outside and within the Church, this patient and accurate exposition of Aquinas’s view is timely indeed. And what makes it invaluable is

that Fr. Brock is not content merely to describe Aquinas's thinking; he also subtly but unmistakably argues for its truth. N&V

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Healing for Freedom: A Christian Perspective on Personhood and Psychotherapy by †Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. (Arlington, VA: *The Institute for the Psychological Sciences Press*, 2013), 352 pp.

AT THE FUNERAL MASS for Hans Urs von Balthasar, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger famously referred to the Swiss theologian named cardinal as the most cultured man of his time. A quarter of a century later, in surveying the work of Benedict Ashley, one wonders whether this Dominican priest might have been the most cultured man of our age. With his posthumously published *Healing for Freedom: A Christian Perspective on Personhood and Psychotherapy*, Ashley offers another parallel with the Swiss savant. Namely, Ashley provides a summary of his life's work. While lacking the straightforwardness of Balthasar's title—*A Resume of My Thought*—Ashley offers a no less comprehensive account of the central themes of his intellectual work. This accomplishment spanned three quarters of a century.

In *Healing for Freedom*, Ashley meticulously lays down the foundation for a proper understanding of the human person. This understanding of the human person—body and soul—offers the only adequate foundation for both a sound psychology and practice of psychotherapy.

As Romanus Cessario, O.P., has remarked: "There are no skyhooks for Father Ashley." That is, Ashley eschews the transcendent philosophical program. He avoids leaps, jumps, and grand inferences. Like a skilled stone mason, Ashley instead constructs piece by piece a methodically argued description of the human person and his place in the created world. No part of natural science—be it a description of the function of the occipital and frontal lobes of the cerebrum or an analysis of the human lymphatic system—falls outside the scope of his study. Ashley delivers a comprehensive description of the human person from a physical, psychological, and spiritual perspective.

The subtitle—*A Christian Perspective on Personhood and Psychotherapy*—requires proper interpretation. Admittedly, only the final of the nine chapters explicitly takes up the question of psychotherapy.

However, Ashley points out that a proper exercise of psychoanalysis requires a sound understanding of the human person. As *Veritatis Splendor* reminds us, the truth about the good of the human person offers the only path to our understanding authentic human flourishing.

Healing for Freedom unfolds in nine chapters. The first sets out three possible philosophical approaches to the human person: (1) dualist—such as found, to varying degrees, in Plato, Descartes, and Kant; (2) reductionist—found throughout the philosophical tradition in figures such as Zeno, Hobbes, Freud and, generally, behaviorists and determinists; and (3) the instrumentalist approach as found, most notably, in Aristotle and Aquinas.

Dualists hold that the human being is composed of two natures, material and spiritual. Innumerable difficulties arise when these authors try to explain how a composite produces a single human being. Reductionists—influenced greatly in the modern period by the work of Charles Darwin—argue that human activity can be explained simply with reference to material causes. Instrumentalists, for their part, affirm the human being is a body-soul composite, though a unified substance in which the body is the material cause and the soul is the unifying formal cause.

In the second chapter, Ashley pursues the human being as a body-soul composite. He discusses the range of scientific disciplines from those that concern man in his material nature to those that address man as a spiritual being. Ashley explains that many of the present confusions in psychology result from a misunderstanding of its place among the scientific disciplines. A key distinction for Ashley discerns comparative psychology from personal psychology. Comparative psychology ranks as the highest discipline of natural science; it studies—even with the help of advanced technology—man in his animal nature. By contrast, personal psychology studies aspects of human behavior as a properly human phenomenon. Because personal psychology touches the immaterial in man, Ashley asserts that this discipline requires a “properly metaphysical analysis.”

In chapters 3 and 4, Ashley describes what it means for the human being to be embodied. He provides a full description of the various bodily systems: circulatory, respiratory, lymphatic, digestive, endocrine, reproductive, skeletal, muscular, and integumentary. He does not take sides on the variety of evolutionary theories—for example, neo-Darwinian or the theory of punctuated equilibrium advanced by Stephen Jay Gould. In any case, Ashley holds that evolutionary theory explains only the material reality of man. No evolutionary

theory can address how Ashley describes the human being as a body-soul composite.

Chapter 5 offers a comprehensive refutation of the position that no essential difference can be found between human and animal intelligence. Man stands at the juncture of the material and spiritual orders. As a living being, the human person requires proper knowledge of his psychology. Such a psychology must embrace the true nature of man as a *per se unum*, a substance of body and soul (see *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, §365). Ashley explains: “The human person thus exists on the borderline between the physical and spiritual parts of the universe, and so it must be studied first by comparative psychology (which is part of natural science) and second by personal psychology (which works by analogy from the results of comparative psychology)” (216).

Ashley remains most well known in many quarters for his work in moral theology. In chapters 6 and 7, he summarizes his basic approach to moral matters: virtue-based moral reasoning, freedom viewed as a freedom for excellence, and a willingness to refuse accommodation to contemporary decadences. What is most consoling, Ashley provides a model for the healthy human person. Sound psychology depends upon such a model. Still, he explains: “Amazingly enough, one can read innumerable works on psychology and psychotherapy without ever running across any such model” (217).

While agnosticism, or sometimes even outright hostility toward religion, may be commonplace among those working in the field of psychology, Ashley holds that religious faith affords a benefit to psychological health. He counsels psychotherapists to leave questions of ethics or spiritual direction to those expert in those fields. He rather encourages therapists to aid patients by assisting them to adopt a healthy and realistic outlook about themselves and their surroundings.

In the final chapter, Ashley explains that the purpose of psychotherapy is “to heal the animal aspect of human psychology . . . so that it can normally serve the whole human person” (317). He insists on the need for all persons to adopt a worldview and value system that will strengthen their human psychological makeup. The elaboration of worldviews and value systems, however, properly belong to metaphysics and theology. The first principles of being and acting cannot be fabricated even by the best practitioners of psychotherapy.

Neurosis remains one obstacle to a healthy psychological makeup. Ashley distinguishes neurosis from vice. He explains that “neurosis is a distorted habit of behavior at a psychological level below that of

intelligence and freedom, which, however, limits and distorts intelligence and free behavior” (330–01). For this reason, sound psychotherapy—grounded in the truth about human freedom—offers the best possibility of healing neurosis.

To return to the theme of Ashley’s intellectual output, each of the nine chapters summarizes some aspect of Ashley’s impressive literary corpus. Chapter 1, on the different models of the human person, recapitulates his significant but insufficiently known work *Theologies of the Body: Humanist and Christian* (1985). The second chapter’s defense of some of Aristotle’s claims in natural science recalls Ashley’s dissertation, “Aristotle’s Sluggish Earth” (1958). Both of these initial chapters address the division of the sciences—including comparative and personal psychology—which finds detailed explanation in Ashley’s important text on the foundation of metaphysics, *The Way toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Introduction to Metaphysics* (2009). One also recalls his unrelenting defense of the River Forest position on the foundation of natural science as the basis for metaphysics.

Chapters 3–5, which treat issues of natural science, draw to mind Ashley’s *Choosing a Worldview and Value System: An Ecumenical Apologetics* (2000) and his *How Science Enriches Theology* (2012). Chapter 6, on morality, corresponds to his insightful *Living the Truth in Love: A Biblical Introduction to Moral Theology* (1996). This chapter also offers a brief synopsis of biomedical and sexual ethics, and the several editions of *Health Care Ethics*, authored with Kevin D. O’Rourke, supply a fuller treatment.

Ashley addresses issues surrounding gender roles and the diverse psychological makeup of men and women in his *Justice in the Church: Gender and Participation* (1996). His insights in this book inform chapter 7, on human communities, specifically in the discussion of gender. Chapter 8 analyzes the human person from the spiritual perspective. One thinks of Ashley’s works *Spiritual Direction in the Dominican Tradition* (1995), *Thomas Aquinas: The Gifts of the Spirit* (1996), and his short account of Dominican history in *The Dominicans* (1991).

Throughout the book under review, Ashley offers strong criticism of authors with whom he has sparred throughout his intellectual career. He challenges the work of Germain Grisez, who eschews both the hierarchy of the goods in human life and the ultimate end of man in contemplation (222), Charles Curran, who gainsays the immorality of inherently non-procreative sexual acts (251), and Henri de

Lubac, who, in Ashley's view, fails adequately to distinguish between the natural and supernatural orders (287).

Some insights in *Healing for Freedom* provide vintage Ashley. For example, as an outstanding Thomist, Ashley rightly states Aquinas's original contribution to theories of knowledge: "In Aquinas's own case it is often claimed that his original intuition, evident in his first philosophical work *De Ente et Essentia*, is the 'real distinction of essence and existence.' In my opinion, more fundamental still was his profound recognition that all our natural human knowledge rests on the senses, a point in Aristotle not clearly seen by earlier readings of the Stagirite, even by St. Albertus" (199).

Father Ashley worked on *Healing for Freedom* at the end of his long life (1915–2013). While he supplies references to contemporary psychological literature, students will also benefit from the bibliographical references found in his other works. All in all, one receives the impression of a master who has sought—and found—the truth in every corner of human learning.

For those seeking a grounding in a philosophy of the human person that addresses issues of psychology and psychological counseling, *Healing for Freedom* will serve as a welcome resource. Christians hold on good authority that the truth sets free (John 8:32). *Healing for Freedom* takes its cue from this biblical passage. Father Ashley teaches us that authentic freedom arises only when one embraces the full truth about the human person. N&V

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The Gospel of the Family: Going Beyond Cardinal Kasper's Proposal in the Debate on Marriage, Civil Re-Marriage, and Communion in the Church by Juan José Pérez-Soba and Stephan Kampowski, trans. Michael J. Miller (*San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2014*), 255 pp.

SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT by Pope Francis in 2013 of the Synod on the Family, the Church has found herself in the midst of a heated debate regarding a whole spectrum of issues pertaining to marriage and family. At the center of this debate stands Cardinal Walter Kasper's speech entitled "The Gospel of the Family," delivered on February 20, 2014. The speech was addressed to the Pope and some

150 cardinals gathered at the extraordinary consistory. Kasper's speech advocating change in the Church's practice regarding divorced and remarried Catholics caused an avalanche of responses centering on the Christian tradition of monogamous and indissoluble marriage, as well as on the nature of mercy, compassion, tolerance, personal identity, the common good, the purpose of theology, and so on.

Juan José Pérez-Soba and Stephan Kampowski, professors of pastoral theology and of philosophical anthropology (respectively) at the John Paul II Institute for Marriage and Family in Rome, join the discussion in this book. Their key question is not whether divorced and remarried Catholics should be allowed to receive sacramental communion, but rather the question of human happiness. If, as they emphasize, "the goal of the synodal work is to proclaim the Gospel of the Family in its total beauty" (33–34), one needs to ask a question: How can people find happiness and fulfillment in their lives? According to Pérez-Soba and Kampowski, monogamous marriage between a man and a woman answers the human quest for happiness and unlocks the mystery of divine mercy. The book, well researched and written in a forceful tone, examines the above-mentioned question in five chapters.

The first chapter, written by Kampowski, analyzes the cultural setting in which the Gospel of the Family is proclaimed. Kampowski approaches the topic from the perspective of heuristic of fear as spelled out by Hans Jonas in his book *The Imperative of Responsibility*. The fear that Jonas speaks about is not a fear *of* something but rather a fear *for* something, for a great value that is in danger of being extinguished. For Kampowski, the value that is threatened by Kasper's intervention is the exclusivity and durability of marriage. He locates Kasper's efforts within the movement of the sexual revolution. The sexual revolution has emphasized that "the core of happiness in life is sexual happiness" and that a "lasting relationship is a health hazard" (27). Consequently, a society that follows this philosophy promotes a radical anthropological revolution that attempts to cancel out the truth of creation that human beings are born male and female and that "celebrates the condom as the redemption of human sexuality" (41). Yet, in such a sex-saturated culture, the Church is still seen as a moral authority and an interlocutor in moral debates. The Church must then recover the sense of beauty and preciousness of the Gospel message by emphasizing how the deepest aspirations of the human heart for love and affirmation are fulfilled. According to Kampowski, the Church is in danger of committing "assisted religious suicide" by

giving up morally demanding aspects of her message, namely, that “sex is an expression of love,” that “true love wants to say forever,” and that love “requires constant labor.” Exclusivity, durability, and abstinence are not the means of stifling love and happiness, but rather the necessary means of the redemption of *eros* and of human beings.

The second chapter picks up where the first one left off. In it, Pérez-Soba studies the redemption of human love by presenting it within the context of God’s covenantal relationship in which truth and mercy meet. According to Pérez-Soba, Kasper’s understanding of mercy as tolerance and leniency flattens out the concept of mercy. Mercy must be presented within the context of the covenant. Within this context, mercy “springs from love for the person in order to cure him from the sickness of infidelity that afflicts him and prevents him from living in the relationship with God” (82). The root of mercy, then, is not tolerance, but rather God’s passionate desire to overcome human misery, primarily sin and death, through a new gift that unites the sinner with God. Thus, indissolubility, Pérez-Soba emphasizes, is not in the first place a juridical requirement, as Cardinal Kasper views it, but rather it is a direct expression of God’s merciful love. In other words, “indissolubility does not result from a divine mandate that is added to marriage, but rather it is a quality of the personal union” (85) that is, according to Pérez-Soba, at stake. In the case of failed marriage, what needs repentance is not the failure itself “but the fact of having broken the sign of the covenant and of fidelity to Christ” (John Paul II, *Familiaris Consortio*, §84). The change in practice advocated by Cardinal Kasper is not a simple juridical accommodation. Rather, the change of practice undermines the entire edifice of the Catholic doctrine based on God’s self-manifestation and his desire to lead his people to a more abundant life.

Having elaborated upon the sacramental bond of marriage, Pérez-Soba moves on in the next chapter (ch. 3) to examine the patristic data used by Cardinal Kasper to advocate his theology of tolerance and leniency. In examining the experience of the primitive Church, Pérez-Soba emphasizes, one needs to bear in mind six things: (1) the Christian believers of the first centuries found themselves in a society with a high divorce rate; (2) many converts came from very diverse situations of life; (3) the previous tradition was lacking; (4) there was no difference between religious and civil marriage; (5) the sacramental aspect of marriage was not developed; and finally, (6) the Church needed to withstand the civil power that desired to impose its views on the her. Bearing in mind these six factors, Pérez-Soba studies

the following texts: “Cannon 8 of the Council of Nicea,” Origen’s “Comment about the Matthean Exception,” St. Basil’s “Canon,” and some passing comments made by St. Gregory of Nazianzus and by St. Augustine.

According to Pérez-Soba, Kasper’s presentation of the above-mentioned texts is one-sided and erroneous. It is based on questionable and partisan scholarship that manipulates and fabricates the data. So, Pérez-Soba concludes that the primitive Church, rather than promoting any sort of tolerance, forcefully witnessed “indissolubility, in opposition to the social custom of that era” in “a realization of the prophetic value of Christian marriage” (123).

Chapter 4 considers the construction of the moral subject by means of action. In this chapter, Kampowski presents marriage as a remedy to the illness of “chronological atomism” so prevalent in contemporary liquid society (see the work of Zygmunt Bauman). Chronological atomism gives many people an impression of being the simple administrators rather than the artists of their lives. Yet, to “be an artist . . . one needs a project. To have a project, one needs a goal” (141). Quoting Maurice Blondel, Kampowski writes about that goal: “We do not go forward, we do not learn, we do not enrich ourselves except by closing off for ourselves all roads but one and by impoverishing ourselves of all that we might have known or gained otherwise. . . . I must commit myself under the pain of losing everything” (Blondel, *Action*, 4). Kampowski’s argument here resembles that made by Charles Larmore in his book entitled *The Practices of the Self*. For Larmore, authenticity means committing oneself and taking a stand. In other words, in order to be authentic, one needs a commitment. Marriage plays a preeminent role in making love a journey—a journey from affective union to real union. The journey of love heals as well as generates action, and consequently structures a Christian subject.

The final chapter, written by Pérez-Soba, crowns the argument by proposing an adequate pastoral care of marriage and family, which he calls “the pastoral approach of accompaniment” (164). In spelling out his pastoral proposal Pérez-Soba draws heavily on the view of marriage preparation found in Pope John Paul II’s 1981 *Familiaris Consortio*. A person prepares for marriage from birth. The Church, as the evangelizing community, “must teach every person to love” by “profoundly changing the structures, especially in regards to the catechesis of children, pastoral care in schools, and youth ministry” (202). According to Pérez-Soba, Kasper’s approach, rather than

analyzing the roots of the problem, tries to resolve the pastoral questions solely through a change of norm. This, according to Pérez-Soba, is an error. This approach breathes legalism. Paradoxically, Kasper, who accuses the Church of legalism, falls himself victim to it by presenting law as coming from authority (*bonum quia iussum*) rather than from the truth about the good of things (*iussum quia bonum*).

The book finishes with an appendix that, in a certain sense, summarizes the book's argument by providing answers to the thirty key questions that the authors have formulated for the members of the Synod on the Family.

This short summary does not do full justice to this well-researched and profound meditation on a host of issues. Pérez-Soba and Kampowski present their material in a very coherent way, sifting the wheat from the weeds of Kasper's argument. Their criticism of Kasper's approach, though sometimes overly sarcastic, is a passionate call to the Church not to throw the baby out with the bath water. The call to marriage and family, though difficult, is a call that guarantees human flourishing and fulfillment. Family based on the indissoluble bond of a man and a woman is indeed a pearl of great price, and one cannot sell it cheaply. N&V

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Memory in Augustine's Theological Anthropology by Paige E. Hochschild (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 272 pp.

IN *Memory in Augustine's Theological Anthropology*, Paige Hochschild seeks to recover "the neglected significance of memory as the foundation for Augustine's theological anthropology" (4). Indeed, it comes as a surprise to most of us in the field that Hochschild's work, a revision of her 2005 dissertation, is the first book-length study of Augustine's understanding of memory. As such, it is a useful resource for thinking about the main texts and the philosophical background related to this relatively under-studied topic.

Hochschild's main purpose in studying memory in Augustine is twofold: to contribute to the ongoing discussion of Augustine's theory of knowledge and, more importantly, to demonstrate that, for Augustine, memory is at the heart of what it means to be a human being made in the image of God. Memory, Hochschild argues, "unites the embodied and intellectual aspects of human existence,

and demands that the effects of grace pervade the whole person, both through the right ordering in relation to creation, and, prior to this, through a rightly ordered grounding in the divine" (167).

The book is divided into three major parts: part I deals with Greek philosophical antecedents; part II deals with Augustine's early works; and part III treats Augustine's mature work on memory (in particular, *Confessions* 10–13 and *De Trinitate* 12–14). Hochschild's approach in these three parts is both historical and exegetical. She wants to root Augustine's understanding of memory in a "history of ideas," primarily from the Greek philosophical tradition, but she also wants to give an account of Augustine's own development on this question. Rather than abstracting the main ideas of Augustine and the Greeks, Hochschild analyzes particular texts within the context they in which were written. She moves through the major passages from major works on memory and exegetes them with nuance.

In the first part of her study, Hochschild focuses on the "Platonist" influences on Augustine—Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus in particular. While Augustine certainly had other philosophical influences (the Stoics or Cicero in his mediation of the Greek tradition, for example) it is these three, Hochschild argues, who lay the groundwork, who set the questions, and who offer the range of possible answers. Hochschild does not argue for strict parallels between any of these philosophers and Augustine, but rather for resonances. This allows her to situate Augustine within the "history of ideas," arguing that, while Augustine is certainly most influenced by Plotinus (to whom he had the most access), many of his conclusions are closer to Plato and Aristotle.

Part II treats Augustine's early philosophical works from the time of his conversion up to his ordination in 391: the *Cassiciacum* dialogues, the treatises on the soul, and *De magistro* and *De musica*. In these, the topic of memory emerges gradually, first in relation to the nature of wisdom and then in thinking through how sense perception is related to wisdom. But it is in these dialogues that Augustine begins to realize the centrality of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, as well as "the incarnational rationale for an anthropology founded on memory" (110). These insights point ahead to Augustine's mature discussion in the *Confessions*.

In Part III, Hochschild discusses memory in the *Confessions*, what she considers the heart of her study, as well as in *De Trinitate*. Book 10 of the *Confessions* famously deals with memory, and most scholars isolate this text from its context. Hochschild situates it in the overall

work and ably shows how it is foundational for understanding the last three books, a perennial headache for Augustine scholars. Augustine's discussion of memory in book 10 raises questions of how the temporal, embodied soul can have union with the eternal. This propels the argument into books 11–13: book 11 takes up the question of the relation between the temporal and eternal through the discussion of the Incarnation and the analogy of the inspired word of Scripture, and books 12 and 13 complete the trajectory by bringing to the fore the necessity of the Church as the locus of the reconciliation of the tensions between body and soul and between the temporal and the eternal. Indeed, for memory to function as the unifying factor of body and soul, and of both with creation and God, it needs "the memory of the Church" (153). *De Trinitate* has a goal similar to that of the *Confessions*: "a harmony and unification of the temporal and eternal in Christ, for the sake of spiritual peace" (189). What *De Trinitate* adds is a much more developed understanding of the Trinitarian image of God in man and faith in the incarnate mediator as the means of union with the Trinity.

There is much to recommend in this book. The approach to Augustine's philosophical background in part I is helpful for bringing out resonances that are often overlooked, such as Augustine's continuity with Aristotle. Moreover, one appreciates any scholar who pushes back against the commonplaces that the Greeks were simple dualists and that Augustine follows them in this. Yet another benefit of the volume is it gathers most of the important passages on memory and analyzes them in one place, although the reader less familiar with Augustine's works will want to have the original texts at hand, since much of Hochschild's analysis presupposes intimate familiarity with the movements of the texts. Lastly, her contextual and exegetical approach to Augustine's works enables her to avoid many of the pitfalls common to the discussion of memory, particular the frequent treatment of book 10 of the *Confessions* as an isolated philosophical treatise. Hochschild helpfully shows how book 10 logically flows into (indeed, requires) books 11–13 and shows how memory is ordered toward, and so must be understood within, the context of the Church's memory. Throughout her discussion of Augustine's works, Hochschild continually emphasizes how creation and the Incarnation are fundamental principles for all of Augustine's thinking, especially on the question of anthropology. This, too, is a welcome change from other treatments of Augustine's "philosophical" ideas that so often distort his thought by separating it from its properly theological

context. All of this (and more) makes this volume a beneficial addition to the discussion of memory in Augustine.

By way of critique, let me highlight two lacunae in her treatment. First is the oversight of *Epistles* 3–14, especially 7, in which Augustine discusses his understanding of the Platonist philosophers with Nebridius, including an important discussion of memory. These are essential texts in the history of Augustine's developing thought on memory and the philosophical issues surrounding it. Moreover, they may very well modify some of Hochschild's arguments on how Augustine interpreted Platonic recollection.

Another oversight in Hochschild's discussion of memory that which would have bolstered her argument is book 9 of the *Confessions*. This book, too, could be called a treatise on memory. Augustine remembers all of his dead loved ones: Verecundus, Nebridius, Adeodatus, and most importantly, Monica. Indeed, book 9 ends with Augustine remembering Monica's plea that she be remembered at God's altar (9.13.36). By analyzing this book, Hochschild could have further developed what I think was her most interesting point—and the point that most discussions of Augustine on memory completely miss: for Augustine, it is the Church's memory that shapes memory and it does this by reminding human beings of God's mindfulness of them. We are reminded of this when we celebrate the Eucharist, the memorial of Christ's suffering and death. We are inscribed in God's memory; he remembers us, even when we forget him; and we become aware of this in the Church, particularly in the memorial sacrifice celebrated at the altar. Perhaps this is why book 10—the traditional locus for thinking about Augustine on memory—ends with Augustine the bishop, in a sense, standing before the altar dispensing the Eucharist to the “the brethren” (10.4.5–6) who are admitted to this part of the work: “I think about the price of my redemption and I eat it and I drink it and I dispense it to others” (10.43.70).¹

Addressing these lacunae would have strengthened her work considerably. Still, Hochschild has done a service by bringing together and carefully walking us through most of the major texts of Augustine on memory. N V

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¹ My own translation from the Latin in *Augustine: Confessions*, ed. James O'Donnell, 3 vols. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1992); available also online at www.stoa.org.

Nature and Grace: A New Approach to Thomistic Ressource-ment by Andrew Dean Swafford (*Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2014*), xi + 220 pp.

AS THE OPENING PAGES of this title appropriately recall, the topic of nature and grace touches virtually every theological and human question. Well aware of the implications of a doctrine so foundational to the Christian faith, Andrew Swafford's recent volume offers a careful summary of the debate and a welcome contribution to its resolution through the theology of Matthias J. Scheeben.

In his opening chapter, Swafford reviews the key schools at play in the nature-grace debate. *Intrinsicism* holds that man's fulfillment lies only in and through Christ, with the result that a purely natural beatitude is impossible (6). The most notable figure of this tradition, Henri de Lubac, argued that man has a natural desire for the beatific vision and that any other final end would result only in man's permanent frustration and suffering (14).

Extrinsicism, meanwhile, counters with the observation that important questions concerning God's justice and the gratuity of grace emerge if the beatific vision is taken to be man's only possible end. Significantly, Pope Pius XII's 1950 encyclical *Humani Generis* appeared to target de Lubac specifically in echoing the very lines of the extrinsicist tradition: "Others [de Lubac?] destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the Beatific Vision."¹ On the other hand, Swafford recalls that, by the very next decade, the Second Vatican Council would weigh in on this issue "undoubtedly in favor of de Lubac" (15) by teaching that man has a single final end: "All are in fact called to one and the same destiny, which is divine."²

Extrinsicism's solution to the nature-grace relationship proceeds by insisting that man has two final ends—natural and supernatural—the latter accessible only by grace. God's justice implies the *debitum naturae*, that he provide whatever is necessary for a creature to reach its natural end (10). Strictly speaking, God is not so much indebted to the creature as he is to himself and to the manifestation of his own divine wisdom in the natural order (10–11). Of course, the very creation of a thing is gratuitous, and in this way, one may speak of supernatural grace as "doubly" gratuitous because it elevates man over and above his specific nature (11).

¹ Pope Pius XII, *Humani Generis* (1950), §26.

² Second Vatican Council, *Gaudium et Spes* (1965), §22.

For the extrinsicist tradition, man's capacity for the beatific vision cannot be described as a natural inclination, since its actualization would be due to the creature according to divine justice without the further elevation of grace. For this reason, the extrinsicist tradition employs the concept of "obediential potency" to account for the relationship between human nature and the beatific vision (15). Obediential potency itself has two distinct acceptations. "Generic" obediential potency can be seen in the case of a miracle and necessitates no real relation between the specific nature of the creature and its transformation. Contrary to this, "specific" obediential potency is rooted in the very nature of the creature in question: such an elevation is perfective of that particular nature, albeit in a way that transcends its natural powers (15–16).

Chapter 2 offers an overview of de Lubac's nature-grace theology in its historical and theological context. Reviewing the principal features of the intrinsicist tradition discussed in the introduction, Swafford recalls that de Lubac's aim was to re-articulate a Christian humanism for post-war Europe (25). In de Lubac's mind, the unconscionable events of this period showcase the disastrous fruits of atheistic humanism and the inability of the pure-nature tradition to respond adequately in this secularist milieu. He further argues that the pure-nature tradition actually abetted the rise of modern secularism, on account of its excessive emphasis upon the independent integrity of the natural order (37).

Swafford exhibits great balance in his assessment of the various nature-grace schools in relation to St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor "was certainly no exponent of the pure-nature tradition" (37), yet on the other hand, "there is abundant support in Aquinas for the *intelligible* distinction between man's proportionate natural end and his disproportionate supernatural end" (40). As the author rightly observes, the exegetical question concerning Aquinas's position "is largely insoluble, since it all depends on which texts are interpretively privileged over others. One set of texts lends support to the legitimacy of the pure-nature tradition, while others clearly favor de Lubac" (37). Leaving aside the exegetical question, Swafford proceeds to outline the rudiments of the pure-nature tradition in Tommaso de Vio (Cajetan), Francisco Suárez, and the controversy surrounding Michael Baius that "perhaps more than all else . . . spurred the rapid rise and enduring hegemony of the pure-nature tradition" (41). On de Lubac's account, the pure-nature tradition may have offered a

solution to the problems posed by Baius, but in so doing it played right into the hands of modern secularism (49).

Concluding this chapter, Swafford notes that it is difficult to pin down de Lubac's position, since he wishes to affirm the principal theses of all sides of the nature-grace debate. In concert with the pure-nature tradition, de Lubac ardently defends the real distinction between nature and grace, yet he simultaneously denies foundational elements of the extrinsicist school that would seem necessary in order to ensure this distinction. De Lubac justifies his playing on both sides of the field through recourse to paradox, which Swafford describes as the centerpiece of his overall position, the legitimacy of his theology of nature and grace standing or falling on its legitimacy (65). Swafford, for his part, incisively weighs in on the matter: "For this reason, we must ask whether this category of paradox is sufficient to hold together all the elements of his thought—or whether it is merely a case of special pleading, a sort of intellectual panacea, against which no serious objection can ever really be brought" (65).

After a brief chapter (ch. 3) revisiting the foundational principles of the nature-grace debate, Swafford dedicates chapter 4 to reviewing Lawrence Feingold's defense of the pure-nature tradition. In popular piety, one may say that "all is grace," but Feingold asks whether this is not tantamount to affirming that "all is nature?" In other words, if the meaning of grace is extended to include all of creation, then the uniqueness of what is meant by "grace" loses its specificity (87). In an insightful citation from Edward Oakes—an author in whose thought this volume is deeply rooted—Swafford observes that the breakdown of the nature-grace distinction has led many to relativize the uniqueness of Christ by supposing that all religions give equal access to the transcendent (87–88).

At this point, Swafford revisits in more detail several issues addressed in the volume's opening chapter. In distinguishing "generic" from "specific" obediential potency, Feingold offers the story of Balaam's talking donkey (Num 22:21–39) as an example of the former. While this miracle does not violate the law of non-contradiction strictly speaking, "specific" obediential potency obeys the law of non-contradiction in a much more narrowly defined sense insofar as, here, the elevation of the creature does not result in a change in its fundamental nature (91). Feingold therefore alleges correctly that "de Lubac's neglect of this nuance shows his criticisms here to be largely unfounded, as they pertain only to generic obedi-

ential potency" (92). In the same vein, Feingold likewise shows that de Lubac is incorrect to allege that the notion of the *debitum naturae* undermines the gratuity of creation (100). The pure-nature tradition does not maintain that God is dependent on the creature, but rather indebted only to himself and to the order that he has freely willed to establish (101).

In a particularly poignant criticism of de Lubac, Feingold shows that he has drawn the guiding principle for his position not from Aquinas, but rather from Ockham, who shares his rejection of the *debitum naturae*. Presuming that God "can do with the creature whatever pleases Him" and that "God is not a debtor to anyone, but whatever He does to us is done from mere grace," Ockham's nominalism rejected nature's objective intelligibility. As Pope Benedict XVI similarly observed of Scotus's philosophy in his Regensburg Address, nominalism's rejection of metaphysical realism goes hand in hand with voluntarism's capricious God who is not bound by truth or goodness (103). Drawing on the thought of Servais Pinckaers, Swafford demonstrates that the *debitum naturae* precludes voluntarism—"not because God is dependent upon the creature or upon the categories of natural reason—but because He is the source of these very categories themselves" (105). For the pure-nature tradition, the debt of nature manifests and recognizes God's freedom rather than restricting it.

In the final section of his chapter on Feingold, Swafford rehearses the latter's arguments in favor not only of the conceptual possibility of pure nature but also of the actual possibility of a purely natural end in this economy. St. Thomas considered limbo to be established Church teaching, and it is on this basis that Feingold proposes that purely natural happiness may be found within the present economy. For his part, Swafford believes that, "had it not been for the customary acceptance of the doctrine of limbo, [St. Thomas] would not have come so close to affirming the possibility of man's purely natural end in the present economy" (115). Aquinas was well aware that pure nature has never actually existed due to the fact that the first man was constituted in a state of grace (115). Breaking with Feingold on this particular point, Swafford asserts that "the speculative question regarding man's purely natural end . . . is probably not best adjudicated by recourse to the final state of limbo, since such a premise is less universally

viable in the present context than it used to be in a previous era of the Church” (40; cf. 114).³

Chapter 5 turns to Steven A. Long, whom the author describes as “much closer to the spirit of St. Thomas than is his fellow pure-nature advocate Lawrence Feingold” (40). Whereas the latter employs limbo as a premise in his argument defending the possibility of man’s purely natural end, Long is “much more sensitive to the fact that the concrete ordination of the present economy necessarily modifies the hypothetical possibilities of pure nature” (40). A purely natural end in this economy is precluded for two reasons. First, man is subject to the providential ordering of the eternal law, and in this economy, God has ordered human nature to the beatific vision. Second, the condition of sin is such that man needs healing grace even for the attainment of the natural good (115–16).

According to Long, the root problem afflicting de Lubac’s nature-grace theology is the loss of the “theonomic” conception of the natural order (119). From a theonomic perspective, the natural order is hardly one of secular autonomy. Rather, the natural order is itself an expression of and always dependent upon the divine wisdom (120). That said, if one removes the full theonomic conception of the natural order and then attempts to utilize the pure-nature system of theology, then one will indeed end up reinforcing secularism, as per de Lubac’s charge (121). Long traces the origins of this deviant form the pure-nature tradition to Luis de Molina and the post-Enlightenment inheritance of the natural order as a causally closed system (121).

The third and final section of Swafford’s volume (chs. 6 and 7) contains his proposal for reconciling the extrinsicist and intrinsicist traditions. After an always helpful review of his foregoing argument, the author introduces the figure of Matthias J. Scheeben, whose uniqueness as a thinker he pauses to consider at some length. Particularly interesting, even if it is not essential to the book’s argument, is Swafford’s depiction of Scheeben as being at home not only with St. Thomas but also with the Greek Fathers, Jesuit theology, and the

³ While agreeing wholeheartedly with the author on this point, one may wonder here whether the rejection of limbo as a viable solution could be better documented. For example, Swafford’s point is treated at some length in the International Theological Commission’s 2007 *On the Hope of Salvation for Infants Who Die without Being Baptized*, a work he does not mention in this volume. Another important and fascinating work from the Catholic tradition, Dante’s *Divine Comedy* would also be worth a brief mention here for its position vis-à-vis the suffering of souls in limbo.

theology of Blessed John Duns Scotus, with whom he agrees in identifying the basis of the Incarnation in man's deification rather than in sin (145–46). As Swafford writes, the distinction between nature and grace “is absolutely essential, in Scheeben's mind, for the purpose of preserving the supernatural character of the Christian faith—a point which of course brings him squarely into accord with Feingold, Long, and the pure-nature tradition” (149–50). Like these thinkers, Scheeben describes man's capacity for the beatific vision in terms of a specific obediential potency (156). Similarly for Scheeben, the “natural” desire for the beatific vision must be viewed as a mere “wish” (*velleitas*), the non-fulfillment of which does not entail suffering, since its object lies beyond the powers of one's own agency (158–59).

While allowing that certain texts would support the view that Scheeben accepted the possibility of a purely natural end in this economy, Swafford argues that seeing the natural end as a hypothetical rather than concrete possibility “better align[s] with the internal logic of Scheeben's thought” (163). While he seems in certain passages to align with Feingold in being “at ease with the notion of limbo as a final state” (166), in other places he denies the possibility of man's realization of a purely natural end in the present economy for reasons “more or less the same as Long's given previously” (167). Swafford summarizes: “The divine ordination of the eternal law in this economy makes all the difference, since the failure to actualize God's concrete ordination necessarily results in some kind of frustration and suffering” (169). Like de Lubac, then, Scheeben rejects the possibility of a purely natural end being realized in the present economy, yet, with the pure-nature tradition, he affirms its hypothetical coherence (*ibid.*). It is for this reason that Swafford believes Scheeben's theology “is singularly poised to reconcile intrinsicism and extrinsicism” (194).

A highlight of chapter 6 consists in its survey of Scheeben's evocative theology of divine sonship. “For Scheeben,” Swafford writes, “this order of supernatural grace has such an ontological density that he goes on to speak of a certain ‘equality’ between man and God” (175).⁴ What de Lubac sought to secure by way of his teaching on man's natural desire, Scheeben achieves by means of the Incarnation: “For Scheeben . . . the Incarnation brings about a permanent relation between the Eternal Son and all of humanity, and this relation

⁴ For an outstanding more extensive presentation of Scheeben's theology of divinization, see R. Jared Staudt, “Substantial Union with God in Matthias Scheeben,” *Nova et Vetera* (English) 11.2 (2013): 515–36.

pertains to the entire human race” (186). This union exists even prior to baptism, which itself “perfects, seals, organizes, completes, and consummates this union; but its foundation had been laid previously” (190). With powerful spousal imagery, Scheeben maintains that “no less than a nuptial union has taken place in the Incarnation between the Logos and the entire human race” (188). This way of speaking aligns beautifully with the Second Vatican Council when it states, “For by His Incarnation the Son of God has united Himself in some fashion with every man.”⁵ In this light, Swafford is spot on in connecting Scheeben with the intrinsicist insight that reality is, at its core, unabashedly Christocentric (194).

In concluding, a final pair of noteworthy observations emerge from a reading of Swafford’s outstanding text. First, it has been remarked elsewhere that Swafford’s book should have stuck more closely to Scripture and Scripture’s categories for adjudicating the nature–grace debate.⁶ I believe that this is a rather simplistic objection, since Scripture itself no more resolves the precise relationship of nature and grace than it does the relationship of Christ’s two natures. That said, it would be outstanding if the author were to pursue additional work grounding the debate more thoroughly in the study of Scripture, “the soul of sacred theology.”⁷ Second, the author intends his work to be a synthesis of the intrinsicist and extrinsicist traditions, yet its sympathies lie much more with the latter on the whole. While I tend to agree with Swafford’s argument and conclusion, more work remains in order to account for the great extent to which de Lubac’s theology has been incorporated into the postconciliar magisterium. The author certainly acknowledges that much of de Lubac’s theology was adopted by the Second Vatican Council and that his teaching was echoed many times over by Pope John Paul (61). The next challenge is to articulate how Swafford’s account is compatible with what he acknowledges to be a broader shift in the Church from the extrinsicism of pure-nature theology to the more intrinsicist alignment of de Lubac (27). NEV

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⁵ Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes*, §22.

⁶ Peter Leithart, “Nature and Grace,” *First Things* (blog), July 18, 2014, last accessed August 6, 2016, <http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2014/07/nature-and-grace>

⁷ Vatican II, *Dei Verbum* (1965), §24.

Irenaeus of Lyons: Identifying Christianity by John Behr (*Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013*), xii + 236 pp.

FEW HISTORICAL FIGURES are as relevant as Irenaeus of Lyons for the developmental identity of the early Church. The late-second-century bishop stands at the pivotal juncture of ecclesiastical authority in the West, at the intersection of orthodoxy and heresy, and at the center of the melee of theological factions. Although much of his biographical information eludes historians, his singular location in Church history is viewed as a pinnacle among obscure ecclesiastical leaders and at the epicenter of controversial forces that shaped Christian orthodoxy. Since he stands out in singular fashion, he has become an emblem with many faces: the marginalization of diversity, the target of gnostic advocates, and the champion of the apostolic tradition. Father John Behr falls in the last of these camps of historical interpretation, and his subtitle captures the milieu of religious self-discovery in which this Church father participates.

Behr serves as Dean and Professor of Patristics at St Vladimir's Seminary, where he is well known in patristic circles for his work on Irenaeus. He composed the "Formation of Christian Theology" series, in which he expounded Irenaeus's ascetic and anthropological values. He provided a new translation of Irenaeus's *On the Apostolic Preaching* and regularly appears on projects related to second-century Christianity. In this new work, he provides a comprehensive treatment of the work and person of Irenaeus.

Throughout the book, Behr presents his subject as both an ancient and a contemporary figure, a truly catholic writer: "The context for the study of Irenaeus undertaken here has not only been the second century, but also our own times. . . . He is the most important theologian in the articulation of Christian orthodoxy to his time, and, arguably, thereafter" (206). In three large chapters, the work thoroughly condenses Irenaeus's historical and theological contribution. It clearly and fairly lays out the situation of contemporary critical scholarship that prioritizes inclusivity in the tension with a catholic "Great Church" that prioritized exclusivity. The work faithfully "negotiates the complex relations between history and interpretation, faith and reason, and ancient texts as historical documents and as Scripture" (12). Throughout, Behr unmistakably acknowledges a non-catholic sector in the hybridity of early Christianity, first typified in Marcion, that functions to define a writer like Irenaeus as a genuine emblem of catholicity.

In the first chapter, Irenaeus is considered for his roots in Asia Minor in the shadow of Polycarp and for his attention to the division in the West that sought leadership from Rome. Recently described as a “scion of the East” by J. A. Cerrato, Irenaeus is a crucial link in the early influence of the apostolic tradition between two halves of the Roman Empire, East and West. “If Rome, during the second century, was the crucible in which ‘orthodoxy’ was forged, it was Irenaeus, on the basis of the witness of the martyrs in his community and the tradition going back through Polycarp to John, who oversaw this process” (71). Behr posits Irenaeus as a figure who united a divided ecclesiology by advocating for both Quartodecimians who practiced a different dating for Easter and Montanists who promoted apocalyptic signs of the immediate return of Christ. While Irenaeus promoted them as members of the Church, he demoted gnostic leaders in his work *Against Heresies* through enunciating orthodoxy against them. The dual inclusion/exclusion approach is clearly centered on orthodoxy for Behr, who writes, “Irenaeus argues that his [gnostic] opponents, with their faulty exegesis and their myth-making, have substituted another hypothesis and so created their own fabrication” (119).

Behr positively compiles the pieces of Irenaeus’s elusive biography to construct a solid summary of his life, informed by the Moscow manuscript of *Martyrdom of Polycarp*, which places Irenaeus in Rome. He judiciously provides a chronology of the books of *Against Heresies* and the letters that is rarely seen. Perhaps surprising to some, he proposes that *The Demonstration of the Apostolic Tradition* is a later addition than Irenaeus “to reuse [*Against Heresies*] in the polemic against heresy” (68).

Chapter 2 examines the significant contribution of Irenaeus’s extant writings. The literary and rhetorical structures of *Against Heresies* receive much attention, beginning with the use of the term “refutation” or “exposure” as a technique to overturn the case of the heretics who deserve marginalization (75). Behr proclaims one sentence in *Against Heresies* to summarize Irenaeus’s task (5.36.3), a Trinitarian demonstration of the will of the Father to restore the human race through his Son as intended at the beginning of Scripture (77). The Church father’s efforts to establish a framework for articulating orthodoxy are not presented as simplistic or one-sided, recognizing for Irenaeus, “The Scripture is not read merely historically but as a thesaurus, a treasury of words and images that fit together as a mosaic depicting Christ” (10).

A significant contribution of Behr is the use of the primary sources to show an Irenaean intent to demonstrate orthodoxy as an epistemological hallmark for theological discernment. Rather than viewing heretics as victims of orthodox domination, Behr emphasizes a willful separation by heretics that allowed catholic churches to define boundaries with unity, peace, and toleration: "This was not a fellowship that tolerated anything and everything. . . . [Heretics'] self-chosen departure provided occasions for identifying the points at issue" (207). The rejection of this group was not only an issue of the deposit of faith, but of a community of interpretation. At the same time, Behr recognizes that catholic and gnostic thought develop simultaneously (47), both reacting to and conditioning each other. One would be remiss today either to ignore gnostic Christianity or to triumph "lost Christianities" as innocent nonconformists.

The third and final chapter assesses Irenaeus's theological vision. An apostolic understanding of Scripture, an application of the economy of God, the Christological activities in the Church, and the creation of humankind in the *imago Dei* all find predictable attention in Behr's analysis. Providing a chapter entitled "The Glory of God," he shows his own admiration for Irenaeus, letting the vein of the Church father's theology flow on its own complex terms. One God, one Christ, and the human being are three themes in Irenaeus's own exposition that course through this summary chapter on Irenaean theology. Sometimes overlooked in Irenaeus, the Holy Spirit is the agent who brings the original created order to redemption through the work of Christ, fulfilling a redeemed model of creation and anthropology. Just as Behr made the historical Irenaeus a contemporary figure, he could have related more Irenaean theology to the contemporary faith, as he does sometimes: "The life we now live in the body shows that the same body is indeed capable of receiving the eternal life of God himself" (153).

Like all Oxford series books, this work functions as a technical theological explication more than a worthy textbook below the graduate level. The most current scholarly summary of Irenaeus is found here, recognizing the most important contributors to the subject, while the bibliography is the best resource for Irenaean scholarship. Behr's Christocentric presentation of Irenaeus's theology is a model for all patristic scholars to remember that these ancient figures were driven by faith more than by political or ecclesiastical gain. **N V**

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