

Routes toward Personhood: Response to Markus Rothhaar

RICHARD SCHENK, O.P.
Albert-Ludwigs Universität
Freiburg, Germany

Markus Rothhaar has provided us with well-thought-through reflections on what is obviously one of the central themes of his own philosophical calling. As he notes at the start of his essay in this volume, the path of reflected recognition is not the sole *via inventionis* of personhood, but it is in its implicit forms universal and in its explicit forms a well charted and accessible path, arguably the *via manifestior* toward personal identity. I will begin my response by recalling two recent figures familiar with the topography of the recognition-approach to affirming human dignity as a basis for just laws: Robert Spaemann, whom Dr. Rothhaar references several times, and Paul Ricoeur, who here has yet to be heard from. Let me begin with the second figure. After both of these voices, some texts of Thomas Aquinas will be brought into the discussion as well.

In his final work, *The Course of Recognition*,¹ Paul Ricoeur, for all his studious avoidance of the concept and problematic of “person,”² addressed many of the same issues with many of the same argumentative goals as those thematized by Markus Rothhaar in his essay, regarding what several interconnected forms of recognition could tell us about subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Once these parallels are seen, it will be evident that other

¹ Paul Ricoeur, *Parcours de la Reconnaissance* (Paris: Stock, 2004), cited here in the English translation of David Pellauer, *The Course of Recognition* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2005).

² Compare his cautious remarks on “person” already in his studies of 1990, Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1994), especially in the First Study, 30–39.

dimensions of recognition thematized by Ricoeur can augment Rothhaar's more explicit reflections on personhood.

Recognition (the German *Anerkennung* as referenced by Ricoeur) is meant by all these roughly contemporary thinkers as something more than, say, the acknowledgement and recognition of a sovereign nation by other sovereign nations, more than the acknowledgement of being recognized by the chair at a conference as a speaker given the floor for a time, or again, as Rothhaar shows in what he argues convincingly is in agreement with Spaemann, more, too, than simply the acknowledgement or recognition of a juridically protected status as the claimant of rights. And yet there is another side of this phenomenon, recognition, because at the same time recognition is also meant to remind us that the recognition of personhood is also something less than direct, certain cognition, less than indisputable knowledge of an evidentiary kind. For this reason, Spaemann can say: "The recognition of being-a-self is always an act of freedom."³

Ricoeur returns in his cited work on *The Course of Recognition* to the idea of "attestation," which as "scattered" or "broken" (*brisée*) attestation had been what he described as the "watchword" of *Oneself as Another*.⁴ There he had explored diverse and—due to circumstantial evidence—necessarily partial "witnesses" to selfhood that are found in instances intrinsically related to and yet "other" than subjectivity, witnesses which could be ignored or denied only at the price of losing oneself. The three exemplary witnesses identified and examined in that earlier work (not as an exhaustive list) are (1) my body, as not always in life and certainly not in death compliant to the inclinations of the subject; (2) other persons, who, as Levinas had insisted, have always already bound us by obligations, even before we might ask them to; and (3) the conscience, insofar as its voice can differ even from the good intentions of the moment. The reader might be reminded here of what Thomas Aquinas includes among the many voices of the conscience: obligation (*ligare*), inspiration (*instigare*), accusation

³ Translated here according to the text of Robert Spaemann, *Personen: Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen "etwas" und "jemand"* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996), 191, at the beginning of the chapter on "Anerkennung" or recognition, 191–208. This essay was not able to consult the translation by Oliver O'Donovan in Spaemann, *Persons: Studies on the Difference between 'Something' and 'Someone'* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁴ Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 318 and 289n82: "Bezeugung, which signifies 'attestation,' the watchword for this entire work." See also ix: Ricoeur had developed his initial text with the Schelling Lectures, which he presented 1986 in Munich at Spaemann's invitation. From the beginning of these studies onward, Ricoeur is attentive not just to the strength, but also to "the weakness of attestation" (22).

and self-accusation (*accusare*), regret or remorse (*remordere*), and even excusing (*excusare*), all calls of the conscience to become other than in fact we already are.⁵ The list of three witnesses was not meant by Ricoeur to be exhaustive and might easily be extended to include further witnesses such as non-revisionist history (a key topic of his *Memory, History, Forgetting*⁶), tedious work (*labor improbus*⁷), and in certain contexts the body of the other.⁸ Common to all of these categories of witness is that they are given a hearing because the full sense of personhood is not self-evident a priori. Anticipating all but the initial step in the course of recognition, a robustness of the self is needed for its robust relation to the other, without which it would atrophy as a self. Ricoeur traced his sense of witness back through Levinas to Heidegger's *Bezeugung* in *Being and Time* (1927),⁹ but we might suspect here as elsewhere that Ricoeur had profited philosophically also from the best heritage of his Calvinist tradition. In attestation, synonymous with movements toward recognition, Ricoeur can include that affirmation of human capacities that forgets neither the many reasons to doubt them nor the cost of discounting their credibility.

In the final passage of this final work, Ricoeur warns against the construction of a rivalrous opposition between readings of two of his principal sources of this kind of recognition of the dignity of the self: "that of Husserl, which takes the ego as its pole of reference, and that of Levinas,

⁵ See Richard Schenk, "Perplexus supposito quodam: Notizen zu einem vergessenen Schlüsselbegriff thomanischer Gewissenslehre," in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 57 (1990): 62–95.

⁶ Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁷ For the affinity between Theodor Haecker's exegesis of Virgil's *labor improbus* and Ricoeur's phenomenology of work see Richard Schenk, "Work: The Corruption or Perfection of the Human Being?" *Nova et Vetera* (English) 2 (2004): 129–45.

⁸ This is clear in many cases of concern for the vulnerability of others, including the unborn, the newly born, the ailing, and the aged. Further examples could be identified in the convergence of Pope Benedict XVI's Christmas encyclical of 2005, *Deus Caritas Est*, with Jean-Luc Marion's 2003 studies, *The Erotic Phenomenon: Six Meditations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

⁹ See P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 289, and Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, especially §§ 54–60, cited here according to the 19th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2006), 267–301. The second chapter of the second division is dedicated to the kind of witness to the fullness of existence, including but not limited to authenticity, which can never be simply experienced empirically as a realized state but whose possibility comes to the fore in a troubled conscience. The witness which is summoned to testify here provides "a reliable, if indirect attestation" ("untrügliche, obzwar 'nur' indirekte Bezeugung"; in the edition cited, 266).

which proceeds from the other person to the ego.”¹⁰

Proceeding somewhat more resolutely than Ricoeur or Spaemann from the intersubjective sources of subjectivity, with reference not to Levinas but to Fichte, Markus Rothhaar has avoided the temptation to antithetic polarization by making his own several of the emendations of Fichte’s thought on the connection of subjectivity and intersubjectivity offered by Dieter Henrich, Robert Spaemann, and others, drawing our attention to the actualization and development of a subjectivity already implicitly intersubjective in its structure. One is reminded of analogous attempts in the past to integrate into a new whole the substance-oriented definition of person in Boethius¹¹ and the relation-oriented notion of person in Richard of St. Victor.¹²

The interplay of subjectivity and intersubjectivity is evident in the linguistic capabilities of what traditionally was described as the *zoon logikon*, whose primordial ability to speak makes it possible for other speakers to elicit in the self its own acts and habits of speech. Robert Spaemann goes one step further in the chapter on “Recognition” in his 1996 work on *Persons*: Describing a kind of return to the other, he writes: “We do not know whether we ourselves understand a language, until we know whether others understand it.”¹³ We note here what is characteristic for Spaemann of the proximate end of the dynamics of intersubjectivity, not just that I recognize my own dignity but that I recognize the dignity of others, and within many of the same limits. As Spaemann puts it in this chapter, “There is no privileged access to one’s own personhood. . . . Rather our own personhood is not a given for us any earlier than the personhood

¹⁰ Ricoeur, *The Course of Recognition*, 260; cf. Spaemann, *Personen*, 169.

¹¹ “naturae rationabilis individua substantia” (Boethius, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis*, *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium* 3.5, in *The Theological Tractates*, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1978 (1918)], 84).

¹² Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate* 4.16–22, in *De Trinitate: texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, ed. Jean Ribailier (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1958), and Gaston Salet, *Sources chrétiennes: Série des textes monastiques d’Occident*, no. 3 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1959): “incommunicabilis existentia divinae naturae.”

¹³ Spaemann, *Personen*, 193.

of others.”¹⁴ Both my personhood and that of the other remain ineffable.¹⁵ Had Thomas Aquinas applied his caution about the degree to which we can know ourselves more even explicitly to his analysis of Proclus, he might well have spoken of the transcendental apperception as a kind of *reditio incompleta in seipsum*.¹⁶ Where Martin Heidegger’s famous integration of hermeneutics into phenomenology in *Being and Time* had rejected the conceit of presuppositionless thought for any existent by recommending that we instead find ways to “enter in the right way” into the already living, inexhaustible, non-vicious, hermeneutical circle between our understanding and its interpretation,¹⁷ Rothhaar, Ricoeur, and Spaemann all seem to suggest, if in slightly different ways, that we enter by reflection the already

¹⁴ Spaemann, *Personen*, 192–193; see also Robert Spaemann, *Schritte über uns hinaus: Gesammelte Reden und Aufsätze II* (Stuttgart: Klett-Kotta, 2011), and the translation of a representative collection of Spaemann’s essays in *A Robert Spaemann Reader: Philosophical Essays on Nature, God, and the Human Person*, ed. D. C. Schindler and Jeanne Heffernan Schindler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). A bibliography of Spaemann’s earlier publications, prepared by Rita Ries, can be found in *Oikeiosis: Festschrift für Robert Spaemann*, ed. Reinhard Löw (Weinheim: Acta Humaniora VCH, 1987).

¹⁵ Spaemann, *Personen*, 196; and Spaemann, *Love and the Dignity of Human Life: On Nature and Natural Law* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011).

¹⁶ See Therese Scarpelli Cory, *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), which documents the consistent but progressively insistent link in Thomas’s writings between exteriority and a necessary (especially regarding the “existence” of the self as distinct from its objects) but limited (especially regarding the “quiddity” of the self, which is ever only partially fathomed) self-knowledge as the dual condition of subjectivity and (as a subset of exteriority) intersubjectivity. On Proclus and the *Liber de causis* with its axiom of *reditio completa in seipsum*, see 2, 23–24, 57–60, 135, 195–98. The systematic innovation of Thomas, the thematization of an abiding but partial self-opacity which did not conceal the importance of (limited) self-knowledge, was missed by most readings of the *reditio completa* in transcendental Thomism and its more angelic paradigm of human knowledge, while Thomas’s attention to self-opacity misled many empirically minded Thomists into a neglect of their master’s insistence on spontaneity and self-knowledge in his epistemology. For Thomas’s use of the phrase “reditio incompleta” to examine sense perception cf. Therese Scarpelli Cory, “Reditio completa, reditio incompleta: Aquinas and the Liber de causis, prop. 15, on Reflexivity and Incorporality,” in Alexander Fidora and Nicola Polloni, ed., *Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism: Philosophical Exchanges Between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 185–229.

¹⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 7–8, 152–53, 314–15; and John C. Maraldo, *Der hermeneutische Zirkel: Untersuchungen zu Schleiermacher, Dilthey und Heidegger* (Freiburg: Alber, 1974).

established—not circle, but—ellipse of subjectivity and intersubjectivity with its twin *foci* of selfhood and alterity. Even on “this side” of identifying the absolute starting point of all finite subjectivity or intersubjectivity, there is a sufficient basis in this lived elliptical dynamic, the temporal and narrative course of emerging identity and alterity, to serve as a basis for ethical norms and laws, in the pursuit of what Ricoeur described as “a good life with and for others in just institutions.”¹⁸ Our denial or misrecognition of the dignity and freedom of others comes at the price of a misrecognition of the dignity and freedom of ourself, just as the suppressed or unrecognized sense of the dignity and responsibility of the self will prove detrimental to society as well.

Without claiming that this sense, scope, and normative “course” of recognition exhausts the meaning of person, Rothhaar argues that the practical dialectic of subjectivity and intersubjectivity is what is at the core of much of the modern language of persons and is the chief place where the normativity it spawns becomes tangible and institutional. Granting his reference to the provenance of the modern discourse around personhood in practical or ethical reason, Rothhaar could easily have added to his frequent references to this interpersonal dynamic in the thought of Robert Spaemann an additional argument for our particular attention to “recognition.” The guiding thesis of Spaemann’s 1989 study on “Happiness and Benevolence”¹⁹ is that a well-rounded ethic needs to complement its “Aristotelian” starting point in the pursuit of one’s own happiness with something like a “Kantian” dimension of the recognition of and benevolence toward others as a good in and for themselves. In this contrast, Aristotle appears as the more idealistic thinker (striving first and foremost for one’s own happiness, including the joy the *megalopsychos* takes in organizing society and benefiting others), and Kant, the more realistic one (with his obligatory recognition of exterior persons).²⁰ Spaemann’s doubts about an exclusively eudaimonistic approach to ethics, even one complemented by reflections on the opportunities provided by generous and politically responsible friendship, are strengthened by what Rolf Schönberger has described as a central theme of Spaemann’s thought: the

¹⁸ See Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, especially from the seventh study onwards, 169–202.

¹⁹ Robert Spaemann, *Glück und Wohlwollen: Versuch über Ethik* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1989), translated into English by Jeremiah Alberg as *Happiness and Benevolence* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000).

²⁰ See Richard Schenk, “The Ethics of Robert Spaemann in the Context of Recent Philosophy,” in *One Hundred Years of Philosophy*, ed. Brian J. Shanley (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 156–68.

critique of functionalism and instrumentalization.²¹ Already evident in Spaemann's initial works with his analysis of the instrumentalization of tradition by the counter-revolutionary restoration in France,²² and then in his reconstruction of the debate between Fénelon and Bossuet on selfless love,²³ Spaemann would extend his critique of instrumentalization to the iterations of ethical consequentialism, even while rejecting the adequacy of a purely deontological *Gesinnungsethik* or of hybrid versions of the two. The recognition of oneself and others as persons, in one of many "steps beyond ourselves" and beyond the weight of my immediate perceptions and desires, is a kind of distance that leads to unique forms of nearness. Such distance makes possible what Levinas would intend with the term exteriority.²⁴

If Markus Rothhaar's and Robert Spaemann's reflections on persons show parallels to Ricoeur's path toward mutual recognition, we might ask in this response, if Ricoeur's *The Course of Recognition* could also concur with a discussion of soul, the third figure in this conference, but one which was beyond the scope of Ricoeur and Rothhaar's explicit presentations. Even in Spaemann's book on *Persons*, the chapter on the soul is limited to an extension of the expectation of immortality as an unthematic or habitual postulate of practical reason from the affirmation on one's own morality to the affirmation of others who are loved.

Those much discussed passages, such as at the beginning of Thomas Aquinas's *De regno* and its parallel texts, especially in the *Summa theologiae*, which Joseph Pieper would share with an approving Arnold Gehlen only well after the first publication of Gehlen's main work in 1940,²⁵

²¹ Rolf Schönberger, "Robert Spaemann," in *Philosophie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen*, ed. J. Nida-Rümelin (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1991), 571–75, and in the 2nd ed. (1999), 706–11.

²² Robert Spaemann, *Der Ursprung der Soziologie aus dem Geist der Restauration: Studien über Louise-Gabriel de Bonald* (Munich: Kösel, 1959; Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998).

²³ Robert Spaemann, *Reflexion und Spontaneität: Studien über Fénelon* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963).

²⁴ A watchword of his programmatic "first philosophy" from 1961 onward: Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969). See also Richard Schenk, "The Place of Mimesis and the Apocalyptic: Toward a Typology of the 'Far and Near,'" in *Apocalypse Deferred: Girard and Japan*, ed. Jeremiah Alberg (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2017), 215–41.

²⁵ Now as Arnold Gehlen, *Der Mensch: Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2016). See also John Thomas Mellein, "Deficiency and Possibility: Thomas Aquinas and Arnold Gehlen on Technology and Anthropol-

point to the many native deficiencies in human beings that are more than compensated for by familial and communal assistance, especially thanks to language, where the communication made possible by many other speakers across time more than compensates initial ignorance.

No human being on his own is able to provide sufficiently for his life. It is therefore natural for human beings to live in the company and society of many. Moreover, to other kinds of animals already equipped with external advantages lacking in the human body there has also been placed within them an innate spontaneous sense of all that is useful or damaging to them, as for example sheep naturally consider the wolf their enemy. Some animals recognize by an innate spontaneous sense certain plants as medicinal and still other plants as necessary for their lives.

But human beings have an innate knowledge of what is needed for life only in a general sense, as if by the power of discursive reason it can move from universal principles to the knowledge of the singular things needed for human life. Yet it is impossible for any one human being to attain to all the things of this kind merely by his own reason. Rather, it is necessary for a human being to live in a multitude, so that the one might be helped by the other, as different persons can be occupied with discovering different things by reason, e.g., one in medicine, a second in this and a third in that.

This is made clear most evidently [*evidentissime declaratur*] by this, that it is unique to human beings to use speech, by which one human being can express to another the whole of what he is thinking. True, other animals express to one another their passions in a general way, as for example dogs express anger by barking and other animals express their passions in various ways. But the human being is more communicative with others than is any other animal living in society, such as the crane, the ant or the bee. Considering this fact, Solomon says in Eccl. 4:9: "It is better for there to be two than one. For they have the benefit of mutual companionship and society."²⁶

ogy" (master's thesis, Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, Graduate Theological Union, 2003). Gehlen cites the correspondence with Pieper in his later editions of the work.

²⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *De regno ad regem Cypri*, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. 42 (Rome and Paris: Leonine Commission, 1979), 447–71. An English translation of the authentic sections of the tradi-

But, while here the necessity of community for the person is stressed, Thomas knows as well of the other focus of this ellipse: He notes, for example, that mercy, the consideration of another's sufferings as one's own with a view toward overcoming them, can be rendered impossible by two false stances toward oneself: those who have no robust sense of their own fallibility or who have no firm hope for themselves, will not be able to consider another's sufferings as their own with a view toward overcoming them; qualified selfhood is here the condition of qualified alterity.²⁷ Only a being who is *incommunicabilis* is capable of the mutually recognized *communicatio* that makes friendship and genuine statecraft possible.²⁸

As was noticed by Thomas's contemporaries and their immediate successors (say, in the official censures from 1277 on and in the correctories disputes), the later *Doctor communis* had formulated initially uncommon positions on the body and the unicity of the intellectual soul as the sole substantial form.²⁹ Such a form gears the body toward spiritual and interpersonal goods, but at the same time it also underscores both the limitations and the necessary assistance that the exterior and interior senses and the passions imply. The human soul, as the least of all intellectual beings in itself also the most "empty," needs the exteriority provided by the body with its external and internal senses, even as its limited sense of self and, more generally, its limited spontaneity, is a condition of its ability to be receptive. That is so much the case that, even in the newer disputes in the controversy between what crudely and misleadingly have been labeled the "corruptionist" and "survivalist" attempts at a retrieval of Thomas's thoughts on this matter, no one could deny with comprehensive historical arguments that Thomas, in ways controversial in his own time and inasmuch with verifiable programmatic intentions (if not entirely thoroughgoing), raised objections to calling the "separated soul" a substance (that is, a person in the full sense of Boethius). The soul after death, if left to itself,

tional text was prepared by Gerald B. Phelan and I. Th. Eschmann and is available as Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship to the King of Cypress* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949 [2014]), 5–7, as well as at dhspriority.org/thomas/DeRegno.htm.

²⁷ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* [ST] II-II, q. 30, resp. and ad 2.

²⁸ Cf. Joseph Bobik, "Aquinas on *Communicatio*: The Foundation of Friendship and *Caritas*," *The Modern Schoolman* 64 (1986): 1–18.

²⁹ See Theodor Schneider, *Die Einheit des Menschen: Die anthropologische Formel "anima forma corporis" im sogenannten Korrektorienstreit und bei Petrus Johannis Olivi, ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Konzils von Vienne*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters n.F. 8 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1973).

is more wounded than enhanced by its loss of bodiliness. Recent attempts to establish resurrection-in-death or death-as-resurrection as the standard of Catholic eschatology and pastoral practice have been challenged both by the magisterium and by the legacy of Thomistic thought. Beatitude is not simply the fruit of the soul's maturation. Thomas argues in ways both philosophical and, if less discussed in today's dispute, theological, that death is not perfective but calls for Christian mourning and for a hope for the resurrection that Platonism, Stoicism, and Pelagianism in their older and newer versions cannot comprehend.³⁰ The need of the soul in Thomas's view for what Levinas would later call exteriority³¹ finds important complements today in discussions of human intentionality outside the thematic of interpersonality, such as in Günter Figal's recent phenomenology of our sense of external space as a condition of all knowledge³² but also throughout Spaemann's work on *Persons* (for example, in the chapter on time). The exteriority of other persons intensifies but does not substitute for the exteriority of non-personal otherness. Even for Heidegger's *Being and Time*, which lacks a programmatic consideration of the exteriority of the body and plays down the analysis of the social world (chapter 4 of the first division is one of the shortest), the forms of exteriority include the manifold possibilities of my being other than I am and other beings being different than they are (avoiding the collapse of past and future into the present), including among the priorities of possibility over actuality famously the one unsurpassable possibility, death, the becoming impossi-

³⁰ For "exegetical" and systematic discussions prior to and at points outside the parameters of the current English-language debate, see Richard Schenk, *Die Gnade vollendeter Endlichkeit: Zur transzendentaltheologischen Auslegung der thomastischen Anthropologie*, Freiburger theologische Studien 135 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1989), esp. ch. 4 (443–513); Schenk, "Tod und Theodizee: Ansätze zu einer Theologie der Trauer bei Thomas von Aquin," *Forum Katholische Theologie* 10 (1994): 161–78; Schenk, "And Jesus Wept: Notes Towards a Theology of Mourning," in *Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology*, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 212–37; Schenk, "Factus in agonia: Zur Todesangst Christi und der Christen," in *Christus—Gottes schöpferisches Wort: Festschrift für Christoph Kardinal Schönborn*, ed. Georg Augustin, Maria Brun, Erwin Keller, and Markus Schulze (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2010), 401–28.

³¹ For the necessary interplay of interiority and exteriority according to Thomas himself, see Scarpelli Cory, *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge*.

³² See the important studies by Günter Figal, *Unscheinbarkeit: der Raum der Phänomenologie* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2015), and *Gegenständlichkeit: das Hermeneutische und die Philosophie* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2006).

ble of properly human possibilities. In Thomas Aquinas's own eschatology, understood as novel both by his opponents (such as Robert Kilwardby or William de La Mare) and by his supporters (such as Bernard of Trilia), the post-mortal soul does not cease to be a "part" of the now lost whole. It does not itself begin to be a whole on its own. It retains an order to the unique bodiliness it once co-constituted. The human spirit is not advanced simply by shedding materiality; of itself, human knowledge tends to become more "general and confused," as Bernard of Trilia argues, unless these deficiencies be compensated for by exterior powers. The Scholastic term for the sense of alterity or exteriority of this kind is *timor reverentiae* or *timor filialis*, which both before and after death is needed in order to recognize the otherness of the Giver and the gracious character of the Gift. Because resurrection cannot be deduced as likely from reflection upon one's own desires and powers, and is not evident, humans can at most live like Job *ex fiducia veritatis manifestandae*. The implicit recognition of personhood, often first made explicit by the pain of its misrecognition or loss, is a hope not to become persons in the future, but a hope that in the future the personhood and mutual recognition already given will be manifested and perfected. Like the hope that we are already in grace, there is room for the hope that we are already indeed persons, a hope which strengthens the witness of other persons that made such hope possible and in the best cases plausible. The mutual recognition of persons, as called to the fullness of knowledge, love, and life, calls as well for a protreptic defense of hope for oneself and others.