

Book Reviews

Searching Her Own Mystery: *Nostra Aetate*, the Jewish People, and the Identity of the Church by Mark S. Kinzer (*Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015*), 262 pp.

MARK S. KINZER HAS a long and intimate experience of Catholicism. He is currently Rabbi of Congregation Zera Avraham in Michigan and President Emeritus of the Messianic Jewish Theological Institute. He authored *Postmissionary Messianic Judaism* (2005) and *Israel's Messiah and the People of God* (2011). *Searching Her Own Mystery* develops his vision. He boldly challenges Catholics to rethink their ecclesiology and their relationship to the Jewish people. Kinzer's strength is lucid prose and penetrating biblical exegesis, making his a voice in the wilderness that is as unsettling as it is insightful. His book is strategically aimed at Messianic Jews and Roman Catholics. Kinzer's excellent autobiographical second chapter makes the book particularly engaging, but without hubris. It also helps to place Kinzer on a very complex map in relation to other Jewish groups who follow Jesus the Messiah, all of whom resist assimilation into gentile groups that follow the same Messiah (i.e., Christian churches). Kinzer's novelty is in challenging both Catholics and Messianic Jews to take each other more seriously, as each, he argues, is central to the self-identity of the other. Catholics are called into this partnership by the advances of the Second Vatican Council. Kinzer draws on many Christian sources, including three cardinals and a Pope (Lustiger, Cottier, Schönborn, and St John Paul II). Catholics need to listen.

Kinzer's begins with the Second Vatican Council and its two key documents *Nostra Aetate* (NA) and *Lumen Gentium* (LG). Kinzer argues that the Council was a turning point for Catholic perception of the Jewish people. After thousands of years of persecution underwritten by supersessionist theologies (the covenant with Christ meant

that the Jewish covenant was invalid), theological invalidity led to socio-racial liquidation. The Council fathers lived in the shadow of such supersessionism—the Holocaust. In *NA*, Catholicism revoked the teaching of deicide and the guilt of the Jewish people for this alleged crime. For Kinzer, it went further: it affirmed the Jewishness of Jesus, his disciples, his mother, and the deep roots of Judaism onto which the gentile Church itself is grafted. The use of Pauline citations in the Council documents are read by Kinzer as: (a) affirming the validity of the Israel's covenant, which God never goes back on, and (b) affirming the enduring covenant that Israel of the flesh continues to enjoy. This clearly repudiates supersessionism. Kinzer argues that the Council teachings began to push open a door that was boldly walked through by Saint Pope John Paul II. He possibly took the further step of affirming the “validity” of present day Judaism as part of God's covenant without renouncing the idea that the fulfilment of that covenant lies in Jesus Christ. Fulfilment indicates deep continuity with and affirmation of the validity of Israel, whose telos is its Messiah and his messianic rule.

Kinzer argues that *LG* §16 failed to take the steps that *Nostra Aetate* managed because it externalised genealogical Israel rather than seeing it as part of the Church's “own mystery” (*NA* §4). It did this despite using key terms such as “People of God,” of the Church, and “priest,” “prophet,” and “king” of the Messiah, Jesus Christ, all of which belong to Israel's history. *LG* used the terms as if Israel was discontinuous with the new People of God. It thus echoes a supersessionism revoked in *NA*. *NA*, and later John Paul II and the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (§§63, 839–40, 528), pushed in another direction: the Jewish role in the salvation of the world. Kinzer argues that God is faithful to his covenanted peoples, both gentile followers of the Messiah (the gentile *ecclesia*) and Jewish followers of the Messiah (the *ecclesia* of the circumcision). Both groups existed in harmony in the early Church, but the Jewish *ecclesia* was slowly written out of the narrative once Constantine established his unified Church in his unified empire. As the Byzantine church emerged, being religiously Jewish and Christian at the same time became increasingly impossible, and eventually “mortally sinful.” Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* I-II, question 103, article 4, is cited as evidence. Unsurprisingly, Rabbi Abraham Heschel would write after the Holocaust, when he understood that the Vatican Council might make a declaration regarding mission: “I am ready to go to Auschwitz any time, if faced with the alternative of conversion or

death.” For him, conversion meant death “as a Jew,” for Catholicism had no place for the Jew as Jew.

Kinzer then develops a map of the new country in which a bilateral ecclesiology is the logic of Vatican II and post-conciliar teachings: the mystical unity of a gentile and Jewish ecclesia, both of whom are witness to the arrival of Israel’s messiah and the salvation of the world. Each has a particular vocation and path of honoring Jesus Christ, but their paths are not independent, but rather interdependent, each thus intrinsic to each other’s identities. To flush this out, the rest of the book looks at the Catholic sacraments from a Messianic Jewish perspective, commenting on the gradual eradication of Jewish identity that was vital to the primitive understanding of each sacrament. In this process, Messianic Jews are called to take Catholic sacramental practices far more seriously—they are part of the messianic Torah; and Catholics are called to recognize that they can learn from these Jewish messianic readings, as well as honor and learn from their practice within the church of the circumcised. How many of the Protestant oriented messianic groups will react to Kinzer’s Catholic sensibilities remains to be seen.

It would be difficult to do this part of the book proper justice, so a single example must suffice: baptism. Kinzer interprets baptism through what he calls “Israel-Christology” (i.e., focusing on the particular historical setting), rather than an “Adam-Christology,” which is valid but deals with universal types that are in danger of subjugating the former Christology rather than growing out it. He shows how Jesus’s baptism is his way of fulfilling Ezekiel 36 and Malachi 3 so that Israel’s Messiah will purify and restore. He shows how Matthew 2 presents Jesus’s infancy in terms of Hosea 11:1. “Out of Egypt have I called my Son” is now applied to Jesus’s return with his parents from Egypt. As these prophets had understood it: Israel’s eschatological renewal would allow the gentiles, along with Israel, to praise the true God together. The particular of Israel’s restoration and the universal of the gentile entering into this communion are held together. This overturns a history where: “Christian baptism has constituted for Jews the official exit from Jewish communal life and identity. The Church insisted on it, and the Jewish community ratified the decision” (101). Kinzer’s argument challenges both communities head on: “For gentiles, rebirth signifies rupture, for Jews, rebirth signifies eschatological self-realization” (103). All of the chapters in this section are equally biblical, challenging, and illuminating.

Kinzer’s thesis is genuinely prophetic and calls the Catholic

Church to reflect on her own mystery, her ecclesiology. I have some minor questions to ask of this major thesis. I do not find Kinzer's explanation of the Council documents entirely convincing. *LG* did see the Jewish people as extrinsic but more closely related (*ordinantur*) to the Church (*LG* §16) than any other religion. *NA* explicated and developed the meaning of this special relationship and thus took steps beyond *LG*. Both documents draw on *Romans*. This biblical retrieval made one thing clear: God does not go back on his covenantal promises and is faithful to his people. The Council did not teach that the Jewish people had been faithful to God's covenant—as claimed by Kinzer. But neither did it teach the contrary. It left that issue open. The magisterium, especially John Paul II, and theologians and communities have begun to explore that issue with increasing vigor. From the debate in the *aula* and from the *relationes* on the two documents (none cited by Kinzer) there is no evidence that the fathers discussed or had in mind what Kinzer claims *NA* teaches regarding contemporary Jewry enjoying a valid covenant. But the Spirit led the Council. One implication of this is that the documents can generate discussion and discoveries that were not in the forefront of the drafters' minds, perhaps not unlike the Scripture that was being cited. The Council desired good relations with contemporary Jewish communities by striking out the deicide charge and reminding Christians of the Jewish roots of their faith. It was not until the millennium that the Catholic Church's made its *mea culpa* and asked for forgiveness. Since the Council, the embarrassing question of "mission" to the Jewish people has been unresolved, with various senior cardinals pointing in different directions. This is hardly unsurprising, given Heschel's dramatic reminder about Jewish perceptions of becoming Catholic and this issue being only recently reappraised. Likewise, I have reservations about his use of Aquinas. But all these questions of textual precision do not mitigate the main thrust of his argument, although getting the texts right is important.

Kinzer's argument addresses the unresolved question of mission with lightning clarity: if Jews must lose their Jewish covenantal identity to affirm Jesus as Messiah, something has gone drastically wrong, for such an affirmation is a fulfilment, not negation, of Jewish identity. Kinzer and the Council are in agreement on that point. Kinzer's bilateral ecclesiology develops this: allow Jewish followers to proclaim the Messiah through their own covenanted path and gentile followers of the Messiah to walk closely nearby, both in mystical unity around their common messiah. Witness to the Jewish people is natural to the

first group but not disallowed to the gentiles. If that throws genuine light on the question of witness and mission, it demands ecclesiological clarification. Is Kinzer's mystical unity a "visible unity," such unity as sought by the Council? Or does Kinzer's proposal amount to visible disunity? Can there be genuine fellowship around Christ, which is indeed to be cherished, but without a uniting visible Petrine ministry? Allied to this, and given Kinzer's sacramental focus, one might also ask, haltingly using terminology from *Dominus Iesus*: is the Jewish Messianic liturgy *de iure* or *de facto*? In my view, Vatican II and subsequent magisterial teaching sees non-Messianic Jewish Torah practices as participating in a genuine covenant given by God. The Council seemed to categorize these practices as *praeparatio evangelicae*, as leading to Christ and, thus, in the words of *Dominus Iesus*, as *de facto*. But when Torah practices are taken up by Messianic Jews, does their objective nature change, as Kinzer seems to imply, thus making them *de iure*? (For, Jesus Christ is their true origin and explicit goal.) In Kinzer's argument, apostolic succession exists within the Messianic Jewish community. So, his argument seems at times to drift toward something that is analogically not unlike the uniate status of different Christian communities. At other times it drifts towards the unity proposed by some evangelical Christian communities, from which many of the Jewish Messianic communities derive: mystical unity without a single visible head. Which is it, if any? Hebrew Catholics (who have just celebrated their sixtieth anniversary of their Latin Patriarchal Vicariate) do not push for such a clear Jewish *ecclesia* and are content with a Hebrew speaking mass. In Kinzer's terms, they have possibly become too assimilated. There are some very minor Catholic Jewish voices who push further, such as Fr Daniel Rufeisen, but whose voice is hardly heard in Catholic circles.

There is one irony: if the Catholic Church responds positively to this conversation, and Kinzer provides evidence that it is slowly doing so, its post-Conciliar fragile but hard-fought-for relationship with the Jewish community might become very fraught. Kinzer is clear that Israel's only *telos* is her Messiah, Jesus Christ, and his rule. Here is non-supersessionist theology, but it might not sound like good news to Jews. But it does to some Jews like Kinzer. It is timely for Jews to again remind the Catholic Church of its inherited biblical truth.

N&V

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The Heart of the Diaconate: Communion with the Servant Mysteries of Christ by James Keating (*New York: Paulist Press, 2015*), 79 pp.

WHEN MEDIEVAL CARTOGRAPHERS were drawing up a map of the world and came to a place where they knew there was a landmass but they could not circumscribe it because it had not been adequately explored, they wrote *terra incognita* at the edge of the map. Something was up there—perhaps something important—but they were not sure what to say about it. Their picture of the world was incomplete until more work could be done.

The *terra incognita* on the map of ecclesiology is a landmass called the Diaconate. We know that something is up there, probably important, but we cannot describe it for want of a more adequate explanation. We have heard reports from visitors to the area in the fourth or sixth centuries, but their reports are difficult to decipher. It would be useful to chart this territory because it is bordered by the laity on the one side and by the presbyterate and episcopacy on the other, and discerning it would give greater clarity to these two lands. Most of us do not know what life there is like: transitional guests visit for a year, but it would be nice to hear from someone who is both a permanent citizen and could theologically describe what life there involves.

James Keating is among the few possessing both these desired characteristics. Himself a permanent deacon, he is Director of Theological Formation at the Institute for Priestly Formation located at Creighton University. And he uses a spiritual compass to find his way around the Diaconate, thereby describing its theological meaning and not merely its practical activity. Understanding the identity of the permanent deacon requires going deeper than a list of functions. If he is understood only by a functional rubric, then he comes across as either an overqualified layman or an underqualified priest: “Diaconate ministry is not ‘essential’ in the sense that a priest is ‘needed’ to hear confessions, celebrate Eucharist, in anointing the sick, the deacon can be easily dismissed” (6); and “when an inquirer approaches the deacon director to initially discuss his attraction to the diaconate, he is filled with pragmatic questions. . . . He wants to measure the requirements of a “program” against his competencies in the quest to judge his own possible ‘success’” (14). Keating would bring us further inland and does so by three chapters that attempt to nudge the deacon candidate beyond these modern and masculine concerns about success and time and competency, beyond these initial and peripheral concerns and into

the heart of the diaconate, which is the servant mysteries of Christ.

The first chapter concerns the calling of the deacon. Christ asks, "Will you allow me to live my servant mysteries over again in your own flesh?" (8). The whole aim of diaconal discernment, suggests Keating, is to assist men in removing whatever hinders cooperation with the Holy Spirit. It makes the discernment process a crucible of intimacy with God. The challenge in discernment is developing one's availability to receive God. The reader can detect in this first chapter that Keating does not think being a deacon consists of being drawn into a certain set of activities, but of being drawn into Christ's own self-giving. This is the harder part because the male American mind is political, economic, and hedonistic (16). Therefore the voice of God must be attentively heeded as the deacon explores interiority, spiritual direction, how to make diaconal vows and marital vows work cooperatively, spiritual poverty, and celibacy (since a deacon whose wife dies must reckon with this). "That is what the diaconate is in its essence: the consent by a man to be drawn into Christ's very being for others" (19).

The second chapter turns to formation and ordination. Every baptized Christian is called to holiness, but the deacon's way to holiness is now through his clerical formation. One goal is to encourage a new diaconal imagination that connects the man to the actions of Christ the Servant. "It is mostly the imagination that has to be affected by Christ since the imagination is the reality that stores all symbols, and symbols contain effective power to ignite action" (40). Keating acknowledges that action is the ultimate end of discernment, but this is not a matter of busy activity; it is service that comes from a heart conspiring with Christ (breathing with him), just as Christ's own service flowed from his union with the Father's love. This can be seen in the ordination rite. "On the day of ordinations little is said about what a deacon should do. Rather, the rite focuses upon who a deacon should become. . . . The Prayer of Consecration makes it plain that the Church is not looking for another group of active men. . . . Instead, the Church is looking for a group of spiritual leaders" (44). For this purpose, a spiritual character is imprinted through Holy Orders different from the one imprinted on the priest. The deacon "acts *in persona Christi servi*, not *capitis*" (48). The priest makes himself permanently available to the sacrificial mystery of Christ, and the deacon makes himself permanently available to the servant mystery of Christ (51).

In the first two chapters, Keating has turned the deacon's eyes

inward to his identity so that the deacon does not get caught up in justifying his ministry by “having a lot to do.” But of course there is ministry to be done, and this is the subject of chapter 3. How and where is it done? The diaconate is the first degree of Holy Orders, so it is not a form of humanitarianism, but rather a supernatural vocation. Through ordination, the deacon has become permanently available to receive Christ’s servant mysteries. And since Christ is the primordial deacon, the deacon ministers where he finds Christ’s *diakonia* most powerful: at the two great founts of “liturgical service and the spiritual and corporal works of mercy, that is, service to the poor” (61). These two founts are sources of continual intimacy with Christ, both necessary lest the deacon suffer the noonday demon of sloth and discouragement or the modern demon of masculine narcissism. The diaconate is a grace, not given to a man as a reward to his natural gifts of leadership and ecclesial skills, but given to him because he is weak and needs a structured spiritual life. Keating therefore connects liturgical ministry with ministries of mercy: “The most accessible portal through which a deacon can remain vulnerable to the deepening of this character is his ministry of assisting at the Eucharistic liturgy” (66). He lives Christ’s worship and Christ’s healing. Like the servants in the parable of the wedding feast, the deacon runs from the altar to the secular culture in order to compel the lost and reluctant ones to come in to the feast. But this he can do only if he embodies the beauty of the kingdom in his own self. He must become a personal icon of the Servant Christ. By his ordination, the deacon is made a cleric of the Church who serves the charity of Christ as it was exemplified by the Good Samaritan: “His usual disposition is one of searching for those in need” (70).

We cannot understand the place of the deacon unless we improve our ecclesiastical taxonomy. Who lives in the land of the permanent diaconate? Are they overdeveloped laity or underdeveloped priests? Neither, answers Keating: “The diaconate exists as a vocation of creative tension—a cleric living a lay life—and must remain in this tension” (1; emphasis added). A future diaconate must involve a deeper appropriation of the servant identity of Christ because Christ is among his people as one who serves (Luke 22:27). Keating thinks the drama of each deacon’s call, formation, and ministry is whether the man wants this kind of spirit within him, defining him. **N.V.**

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The “Making of Men”: The Idea and Reality of Newman’s University in Oxford and Dublin by Paul Shrimpton (*Leominster, UK: Gracewing, 2014*), 652 pp.

AFTER PONDERING THIS STUDY of Newman’s work at Oxford to salvage, and in Dublin to create, a Christian and Catholic understanding of higher education, one is left with an appreciation of how difficult it has been for Christians to enter into the reality of what Newman understood. The difficulty in his own day was the failure of Anglicans to correspond to, and the failure of Catholics to want, what he aspired to. In the case of Oxford, the heart of the matter was the resistance to a tutorial system geared to educating the minds of the young in the service of “faith, chastity and love”: “These may be called the three vital principles of the Christian student . . . because their contraries, viz., unbelief or heresy, impurity and enmity, are just the three great sins against God, ourselves, and our neighbor, which are the death of the soul” (*Historical Sketches*, vol.3, p.189, n. 42).

Newman’s triple requisite for a life rooted in the great truths of Christian dogma, a life capable of living with loss for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, goes to the heart of the resistance to Newman’s tutorial presence at Oriel College Oxford. In the case of Dublin, it was the opposite: not the failure of the Church to understand the call to sanctification, but the failure of the clergy to understand the education of minds in “the making of men”; that and the fact that, as Newman realized, many Catholics did not want anything more than a secular education for secular advancement. The understandable failure of the laity to want an education not chartered by the government may be considered, by comparison, a significant but secondary reality.

Newman’s hopes for a charter may not have been as unreasonable as has been commonly assumed. What Shrimpton makes clear is that the failure of the government to offer a charter was rooted in its clear appreciation that the Church in Ireland did not want what Newman was proposing: a Catholic laity educated in the virtue of the intellect. The long and painful experience of Dublin shaped what Newman’s later experience confirmed: that the Church “must be prepared for converts”; not just converts for the Church.

Shrimpton reminds us that in “the making of men” there is “no reference to women at the university . . . for the simple reason that women were admitted only gradually into higher education towards the end of his life” (p. 478). One might add that women seem to have

understood Newman's *Idea* rather better than men. Women, after all, are the makers of men. The Oxford Movement was promoted to a very high degree by women in the parishes who recognized the help of male celibate priests in "the making of men." The movement became what it was because of that. Newman's vocation to the (arduous and difficult) celibate and virginal service of God was (and still) is the *sine qua non* of his commitment to the (arduous and difficult, Christian) love of family and friends—a commitment that Edward Short has profoundly illuminated in his study of Newman and his family. This calls for emphasis.

Newman as an adolescent recognized his calling by God to "such a sacrifice as celibacy might involve." The word to underline is "sacrifice." His commitment to that vocation was confirmed only under trial and temptation, as is every Christian vocation. His understanding of sacrifice in the service of God is essential to his understanding of the Idea of a University that might foster that commitment among adolescents. Men who could sacrifice sexual self-indulgence in fidelity to God's calling were men who could be trusted to a life of fidelity in face of the infidelity of the day. Women understood that. What Shrimpton's book does so well is to show us how Newman's *Idea* is intelligible only in the light of his dedication to a tutorial system educating adolescents in a residential setting through the "dangerous years" to a full and authentic Christian life in a world increasingly hostile to the specificity of such a life sustained by divinely imparted grace in faith and morals. This was the idea rejected both at Oxford and in Dublin.

In Dublin, it was resisted with the difference that the clergy imagined that sanctity and sacraments could be perpetuated in the Irish people without further need to nurture the virtue of the intellect. As Shrimpton so well illustrates, Newman found that the Irish Church was indifferent to its Catholic gentry and distrustful of the emergent middle classes. It imagined itself as a Church of the poor and the faithful, immune to the infidelity of the day. The experience of a hundred years and the catastrophe of the post-conciliar crisis in the Catholic Church, not only in Ireland, have wrought the humiliation of a long misplaced triumphalism. Readers sympathetic to its aim will find in this book a persuasion that, in the circumstances of defeat, there may reside a hope.

Through a vast range of manuscripts and printed sources, the reader is led to see again and again what has often seemed familiar. Newman emerges on every page with freshness and clarity. The genesis and

development of Newman's *Idea* comes to life and into the light of day, outside the text itself. What this book establishes is that *only* outside the text, in the day to day workings of human relationships, do we discover "the reality" of Newman's idea. More, we see that his defeat in Dublin was far from absolute. His *Idea* was perpetuated in persons: in scientists like W. K. Sullivan, in the practitioners who graduated from Newman Medical School, in lawyers and historians, in the arts and sciences, in the newly established National University after 1909, Newman's *Idea*, though far from institutionally reflected (there was no theological faculty in the National University), was a living influence among generations of teachers and students. This reviewer can testify that it remained so until the disappearance of Newman from the curriculum in the 1970s. As Shrimpton concludes:

"In dealing with Newman's legacy it would be a mistake to limit his influence to his educational classic, even if so much that he wrote there is endlessly suggestive, if not provocative; in fact the theme of education runs through many of his sermons and letters. To try to appreciate his rich understanding of education by reading the *Idea* alone would be impossible. Instead we should also admire what he achieved in Oxford and Dublin and learn from his efforts to reform education in these two cities, because his achievement shows the extent to which he was able to adapt his thinking to meet the requirements of a very specific time and place, while holding on to what is at the heart of education. . . . Unlike many modern commentators who merely catalogue social ills, Newman diagnoses problems, supplies reasons for why things have gone wrong, and then offers practical remedies" (pp. 479–80).

Page after page of this admirable book shows us "what is at the heart of education": Newman himself, not just a theorist, but a practitioner. He is the exemplar of what he writes. One of Shrimpton's most revealing citations is Newman's opening address to the students of his University. He asks them to consider the possibility of disappointment and adversity, of what the world calls failure, received in a spirit of faith—such a spirit, he insists, effects a personal influence out of all proportion to what might seem less than visible in the circles in which such a person moves. It is what makes for the mission of a Christian, the leavening and rebirth of Christian hope. Here is Newman *in nuce*, his meaning for us now, and for the Church of now.

This book fully justifies what seems at the outset a startling claim: Newman's *Idea* was not a failure. The present age, as Shrimpton maintains, is the age of the great failure: the failure of the universities to help the young in the enterprise of human living. Universities in the West, as Shrimpton remarks, may soon find themselves called to account. In contrast, he draws attention to three luminous citations from Newman in the Church's call to an education for life in John Paul II's *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*. Shrimpton's book gives us Newman as we need him. N·V

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Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis, edited by John Keown and Robert P. George (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xii + 615 pp.

THIS IS NO ORDINARY *Festschrift*. Comprising twenty-eight contributions and one hundred and twenty-five pages of detailed responses from Finnis, all on oversized paper in a diminutive font, *Reason, Morality, and Law* is a decidedly weighty tome. And if we include the publication in 2011 of the second edition of *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, and then in 2013 the five volumes of Finnis's collected essays, Finnis's position as the most important contemporary defender of the natural law tradition has now been powerfully, and deservedly, established for some years to come. Here, alongside the encomiums of former students, John Keown and Robert George have included a very broad range of important criticisms (how fun it is, for example, to read Joseph Raz's attack on knowledge as a basic good!), and for the adventurous of heart, I can think of no better way of coming to terms with Finnis's work than to read the whole thing straight through, flipping to Finnis's penetrating individual responses after each essay.

Reason, Morality, and Law, after Robert George's substantive and historical introduction, is divided into five parts: (1) Reasons, Goods, and Principles (Joseph Raz, Roger Crisp, John Haldane, Joseph Boyle, and Jeremy Waldron); (2) Intentions in Action (Luke Gormally, Anthony Kenny, Kevin Flannery, and Cristóbal Orrego); (3) Justice, Rights, and Wrongdoing (John Gardner, Matthew Kramer, Leslie Green, Christopher Tollefsen, Jacqueline Tasioulas and John Tasioulas, Patrick Lee, Gerard Bradley, Anthony Fisher, and John Keown); (4) Philosophy of Law (N. E. Simmonds, Timothy

Endicott, Timothy Macklem, Julie Dickson, Maris Köpke Tinturé, Richard Ekins, and Neil Gorsuch); and (5) Philosophy, Religion, and Public Reasons (Thomas Pink and Germain Grisez). These divisions repeat the five-fold division of his collected essays and, a little more loosely, the structure of *Natural Law and Natural Rights* itself. Helpfully included at the end is a detailed index and a complete bibliography of Finnis's published works, as well as the table of contents for each of the five volumes of his collected essays.

The remainder of this review will be woefully selective and tuned particularly to the interests of readers working within the Thomistic tradition. What follows is a development of three contentious themes in Finnis's work that reflect the first three of the five divisions.

Finnis has long argued that the primary principles of morality are self-evident in themselves and cannot be derived from any speculative account of human nature. John Haldane's essay raises this problem once again, though he begins with a sympathetic summary of Finnis's position: "[Finnis's] idea is that propositions regarding human goods are known not derivatively but by insight as self-evident, and that this is compatible with the objects-acts-power-essence principle since we come to know our nature through first knowing our acts, and the objects of human inclination and will are the primary goods. On the other hand, since acts flow from natures the value of human goods is derived from the nature whose realization and perfection they promote or constitute. In short, practical principles prescribing the pursuit of certain goods are *epistemologically prior* and underived, but *ontologically dependent* upon the nature of the agent" (46). Despite some sympathy with this view, Haldane argues that Finnis "gives insufficient consideration to the possibility that one might also invoke knowledge of natures to argue for certain directions of action, and that there may be circumstances in which this course is likely to be more helpful and a corrective to an overly aprioristic interpretation of understanding practical principles directly in virtue of their very content" (47). The point is an important one. Finnis thinks that an account of human nature unmediated by practical knowledge and experience is impossible. Haldane responds that intrinsically self-evident practical principles that have no grounding in a prior account of human nature are either "too thin and ambiguous to allow one to draw much from their deployment in the specification of human goods" or "too uncertain to resolve debates about their interpretation and application" (47). We should acknowledge, says Haldane, that "discovering that some-

thing pertains to the perfection of one's nature is learning where the target one was looking for actually lies and is like a traveler seeking a destination: the recognition of it is reason (rational cause) to direct one's course towards it" (47).

In his reply, Finnis doubles down: "Why should free human persons treat as foundationally directive for choice the natural goodness, or natural normativity, of the given-in-nature, even in 'human nature'? Why not strike out in new paths, and suppress or transform the immanent teleology, in ways perhaps cautious or perhaps far-reaching?" (469). Natural philosophy serves ethics by providing the minor (factual) premises of practical syllogisms but cannot provide the necessary foundational normativity. But if Finnis and others, such as Martin Rhonheimer, are right that our conception of human nature is always colored by our practical lives and that our practical lives are inherently normative, then would not our theoretical conception of human nature always itself be inherently normative? There would be no "is-ought gap" because there would be no naked "is" of human nature. For at least this reason, and despite the precision of Finnis's position and Haldane's careful probing, I am convinced that the relationship between theoretical and practical reason remains unresolved for Thomistic ethics.

A second long-standing theme is pressed, in different ways, by Luke Gormally, Anthony Kenny, and Kevin Flannery. Finnis's account of intentional action famously makes the practice of obstetric craniotomy (the crushing of an unborn child's head followed by the removal of the child from the mother in order to save the mother's life) morally acceptable under certain double-effect conditions. Gormally, following Anscombe (and publishing here for the first time a page-long, handwritten note by Anscombe that is germane to the problem), argues that considerations of "immediacy," contrary to Finnis, imply that the death of the child in a craniotomy must be intended and that, therefore, craniotomy is a form of murder. Because changing the shape of the child's skull is, *eo ipso*, killing the child, the doctor's intention cannot be merely to "change the shape." "By *eo ipso*," says Gormally, "I take Anscombe to mean in this case that the surgeon's chosen course of action is *in itself* a form of killing—not that the causation of death is a 'downstream' effect of what he proposes to do. . . . In craniotomy the death of the child is not a concomitant result of evacuating the contents of the baby's skull and then crushing and tearing off the baby's head: those actions are constitutive of killing the child" (100–01). Changing the shape of the child's head

just is killing the child, and so to intend to change the shape is to intend to kill.

But Finnis, unsurprisingly, will have none of it: "In the order of actions, causality, and events *in genere naturae*, this crushing and emptying (and even removing) the child's skull 'just is,' *eo ipso* harming and killing the child. But this crushing etc. is neither of those things in the order of intentions or, in Anscombe's idiom, of intentional acts or, in Aquinas's idiom, of acts *in genere moris*" (481).

We can distinguish the order of intention from the order of natural causality by speaking, like Anscombe, of acting "under a description." If I walk from here to there, the walking is intentional under the description "moving to open the door" but not "wearing down my shoes," even though in the order of natural causality I am indeed doing both. Finnis's opponents claim that, if my action is intentional under a certain description (changing the shape of the child's head), then the action must be intentional under at least one other description (killing the child). The two effects are so closely united (changing the shape is, says Anscombe, *eo ipso* killing the child) that we cannot pretend to intend merely the changing of the shape. Anthony Kenny's thoughtful criterion for the relevant form of "immediacy" is that the results can only be separated "as a result of a miracle" (115). It is easy to imagine moving to the door without wearing out my shoes (I have taken them off), but impossible, short of a miracle, to imagine crushing a child's head without killing the child. But Finnis might reply that, in my concrete act of moving to open the door, the exclusion of wearing down my shoes would indeed involve a miracle (after all, I am wearing my shoes and my shoes are making contact with the floor, and so, *in this particular case*, moving to open the door is, *eo ipso*, wearing down my shoes). In other words, if we say even in one case that considerations of immediacy imply that I must intend my act under a second description, then I have proven too much and we will be required to say that we intend things that we obviously do not (just as I obviously do not intend to wear down my shoes).

As Finnis's critics are quick to point out, if we could discriminate in our intentions as precisely as Finnis thinks possible, we could "direct our intention" wherever we wished (dependent of course on the order of intention determined by our end), and this would allow us to justify any concomitant effect by reasons of proportionality. (The best recent development of this objection, which also defends an interesting foundation for the relevant "immediacy," is Matthew O'Brien and Robert Koons, "Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic

Critique of the New Natural Law Theory,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 86 [2012]: 655–703.) It seems, therefore, that we must either choose a coherent account of intention (as Finnis does) and accept the surprising consequences expressed by the craniotomy example or exclude the craniotomy example at the cost of a coherent account of intention. Understandably, many critics choose to rework the account of intention rather than accept the practice of craniotomy, but even in the case of Koons and O’Brien, the problems with Finnis’s account are much easier to understand than the positive account of intention and “immediacy” that we also need in order to offer a coherent and persuasive alternative.

A final theme, raised by Leslie Green and Christopher Tollefsen, involves Finnis’s claim that the political community’s common good is a merely instrumental good. Finnis’s views on this have developed over the years. According to Finnis: “As for the political community’s common good, the 1996 essay [“Limited Government,” reprinted in vol. 3 of his collected essays] called it ‘instrumental’ because it does not as such instantiate any of the basic human goods. . . . In *Aquinas*, however, this way of conceiving the political common good was to be set aside” (512). In *Aquinas*, Finnis argues that there is a genuine common good of the political community that is “all-inclusive” and, as such, is certainly not instrumental. Nevertheless, “there is also a common good which is ‘political’ in the more specific sense that it is (i) the good of using government and law to assist individuals and families do well what they should be doing, together with (ii) the good(s) which sound action by and on behalf of the political community can add to the good attainable by individuals and families as such (including the good of repelling and overcoming harms and deficiencies which individuals and families and other ‘private’ groupings could not adequately deal with). This, and only this, specifically political common good is what the state’s rulers are responsible for securing and, by legislation and lawful governmental action, . . . should require their subjects to respect and support. This specifically political common good is *limited* and in a sense *instrumental*” (513–14). But here Finnis increases even more the subtlety of his position: “Even though property, produce and exchange, and the laws that establish and protect them are, like defense forces, instrumental goods, the restoration of justice . . . seems to be *an aspect* of the basic human good of *societas* or *philia*” (514). Further, the “human cooperative governance” that results in properly political governance “cannot be done well, or even adequately” without political friendship and a

broad understanding and promotion of the “all-inclusive common good” (ibid.). Therefore, “the term ‘subsidiarity’ . . . might, I now think, have been better than the term ‘instrumental.’ . . . Or perhaps ‘supplementary’ would do” (514).

Finnis’s shift here muddies the water significantly. Even if someone like Lawrence Dewan (whose criticism of the instrumentality thesis is one of the most sustained and thoughtful responses to Finnis on this issue [“St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Good,” *The Thomist* 64 (2000): 337–74]) would reject the idea that the properly political common good is in any way “subsidiary” to other social common goods (rather, he might say, it is certainly the other way around), there no longer seems any principled reason for thinking that the properly political common good does not, at least in part, instantiate an important basic good and, even more, can claim the use of force in the promotion of the “all-inclusive” common good. Finnis’s response to Tollefsen, whose essay defends Finnis against Robert George on this point, is revealing: although the state can promote the all-inclusive common good, “‘can’ does not entail ‘should’ or even ‘may (is entitled or permitted to)’,” and . . . the onus is on those who claim that state government and law are entitled to compel private virtue for its own sake to show why they are” (520). Given how easily political power is misused, I doubt anyone would disagree with that last sentence. But if the political common good is itself (at least in part) an intrinsic good and is capable of promoting the overall common good in ways that no other part of society can, then subsidiarity itself should lead us to conclude that, whereas the onus is certainly on those who would recommend the use of force, we have good reason to believe that sometimes we will be able to justify such use. And now, even if there is still deep theoretical disagreement between Finnis and those who would follow Dewan, there might no longer be any practical disagreement.

But I risk losing sight of the forest. We owe an enormous debt of gratitude to John Finnis, who has been, and remains, a tireless champion of the natural law, of St. Thomas Aquinas, and of the Church who is home to both. *Reason, Morality, and the Law* is a superb achievement, and a fitting tribute to this most inestimable of men. *Ad multos annos!* N&V

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God's Love through the Spirit: The Holy Spirit in Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley by Kenneth M. Loyer (*Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014*), 295 pp.

“DISTINCTIVE YET COMPLEMENTARY” is how Kenneth Loyer, in his learned study *God's Love Through the Spirit*, characterizes the theologies of Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley. Distinctive, in so far as Wesley's “practical theology” foregoes the gilding of scholastic Trinitarian theology. He does not consider the distinction between persons, processions, and relations, or essential, notional, and personal concepts, as does Aquinas. Yet, Loyer contends, Wesley's soteriology complements Aquinas's Trinitarian theology.

God's Love Through the Spirit is a work of Methodist theology. It is a retrieval of John and Charles Wesley's doctrine of sanctification, enhanced by Thomas Aquinas's teaching on the Holy Spirit. That is, it is a Methodist reception of St. Thomas. But it is also an offering of Methodism, and the Wesleys, to contemporary followers of the Angelic Doctor. As Loyer puts it, his Methodist soteriology “appropriates and amplifies” St. Thomas.

The text has three phases. First, two chapters outline challenges internal to Methodist theology, centering around the Wesleyan doctrine of sanctification. Next, Loyer gives a detailed systematic analysis of Aquinas's pneumatology focused around the concept of love. Finally, Loyer constructs a way forward for Methodist soteriology by appropriating Thomas's teaching on the Spirit and love. The result is a rigorously constructed Wesleyan soteriology and pneumatology in dialogue with Thomas Aquinas that should garner interest from both Catholic and Methodist theologians.

The provocation of *God's Love Through the Spirit* is a deficiency in Methodist pneumatology. Loyer discerns a twofold problem descending from the lack of a developed doctrine of the Holy Spirit in Methodist theology. First, while Methodists have long emphasized their doctrine of grace, in particular sanctifying grace, they have failed to connect that doctrine to the Holy Spirit. As a result, Loyer contends, Methodist language of grace has become generic and Methodist theology “tends to end up reflecting the human spirit and its multifaceted quest for liberation more than it reflects the Spirit of God, who as the source of all life actually gives the human spirit its true freedom” (3). This dilemma he refers to as the “secularization” of sanctification, which is attended by a reduction of pneumatology to politics.

The question, of course, is what to do. The dilemma derives, in part, from a related problem in the reception of John Wesley. Wesley left the theological “foundation” of his teaching on sanctification implicit or undeveloped. Thus, the reception of his teaching has been prone to several misreadings, which Loyer calls variously “perfectionist,” “static,” “anthropocentric,” or “individualist.” Whatever misreadings exist, Loyer finds a single solution: to render explicit the implicit theological foundation of Wesley’s soteriology. That is, he seeks to connect Wesley’s teaching on sanctification to Trinitarian theology: “Viewing (sanctification) through the lens of trinitarian theology clarifies its appropriately theological content and orientation while illuminating Wesley’s emphasis on the immediate and ongoing work of the Holy Spirit sanctifying those in Christ so that the image of God is more fully restored in their lives” (18).

Loyer ties this proposal to a broader concern in Wesley and Methodist studies for a recovery of Wesley’s teaching on holiness and perfection, most notably by William Abraham and Theodore Runyon. He therefore begins with a return to teaching of the Wesleys on sanctification and perfection. Weaving together the sermons of John and the hymns of Charles, in keeping with the best practices of Wesley studies, he shows an implicit trinitarianism. Loyer contends that making explicit, and augmenting, that Trinitarian theology promises to correct the misreadings he presents in chapter 2 and prevent the pneumatological deficiencies outlined in chapter 1.

In order to express and augment the implicit trinitarianism of John and Charles Wesley, Loyer turns to Thomas Aquinas. Chapters 3 and 4 follow the sequence of articles in *Summa theologiae* I, question 37. Loyer first considers Aquinas’s position in article 1 that *amor* is a *proprium* of the Holy Spirit or, as Loyer puts it, that the Holy Spirit is personal love (chapter 3). Here he follows closely Gilles Emery’s work on the *propria* and the Holy Spirit. Next, Loyer turns to Aquinas’s argument in article 2 that the Father and Son love one another by the Holy Spirit. As Loyer puts it, the Holy Spirit is mutual love (chapter 4). In this section, he shows a sensitivity to French debates over the relative significance of Aquinas’s affirmation of the Spirit as mutual love within the larger project of the *Summa theologiae*. In the end, he sides with Jean-Pierre Torrell and Gilles Emery’s “balanced” approach, producing a systematic reading of mutual love across the *Summa*. Chapter 5 then shifts attention from the *prima pars* to the *secunda pars* and beyond, to the *Summa contra gentiles* and the Scripture

commentaries and Pentecost sermon *Emitte Spiritum*. Here, Loyer's focus is on the connection between the Holy Spirit and *caritas* in the Christian life. Thereby, Loyer draws together an important systematic connection in Aquinas between the Holy Spirit and love. This in itself establishes *God's Love Through the Spirit* as a worthwhile study.

In a final chapter, Loyer draws together his reading of Wesley and Thomas. He demonstrates the great care and energy required for working such disparate sources into harmony. Sites of dissonance, such as Wesley's teaching on assurance and perfection and Aquinas on merit, are given careful scrutiny. Loyer distinguishes genuine disagreements from semantic differences and then offers ways for further dialogue. He also does much to rebut criticisms of Thomas's *Geistesvergessenheit* along the way. In fact, his argument suggests that the trope that Thomas has forgotten, neglected, or subverted the place of the Holy Spirit (a common trope in some criticism) is fallacious. If John Wesley, the great hero of Pentecostalism, complements so nicely the Trinitarian theology of Thomas Aquinas, the problem may not be that Thomas has forgotten the Spirit; perhaps we have simply forgotten where to look! On that note, Loyer's connection of the Spirit to love and grace and Thomas's connection of grace to the sacraments and the mystical body of Christ (i.e., the Church) are instructive as to where one might go looking for the Spirit in Aquinas. All this suggests that Loyer is right, if understated, to suggest that Thomists will find engagement with the Wesleys instructive and fruitful.

The greater achievements of *God's Love Through the Spirit*, though, are for Methodist theology. There is much to commend about the connection of Wesley's soteriology with a robust Thomistic Trinitarian theology. First, it integrates several Wesleyan themes: love, holiness, spiritual senses, sanctification, the *imago Dei*, and the Spirit. Second, it reorients Methodist debates over the instantaneous and gradual dimensions of grace that have occupied (not to say consumed) the past generation of scholars of John Wesley. Third, overlaying the Wesleyan vocabulary of perfection with the language of participation overcomes the reduction of pneumatology to politics by means of a "politics of participation in the life and love of God," *through the Spirit*.

Loyer lays out all these achievements in detail. But his greatest contribution remains implicit. We Methodists are a pragmatic flock. We celebrate John Wesley, our "practical" theologian. And we are prone to think we can solve our problems through a focus on prac-

tice. At times, this means an avoidance of the abstractions of academic theology. And at times we are right; practices beat academic abstractions. But what Loyer has shown us is that there are better options available. Instead of leaning into practice and out of academia, which has sometimes ironically led us into more entrenched forms of the latter, we might lean into doctrine and the speculative exercises of *fides quaerens intellectum*. At least, any serious reader of Loyer's text will have to consider this option. And for the clear presentation of that option, those of us inclined to find Thomas and his ilk instructive on the task of theology should all be grateful. N&V

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To Build the City of God: Living as Catholics in a Secular Age

by Brian M. McCall (*Kettering, OH: Angelico Press, 2014*), 290 pp.

THE CATHOLIC ANSWER to Juvenal's question "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"—"Who guards the guardians?"—has always been "the Church." She safeguards a transcendent rule or measure of goodness, the eternal law, which perfects human law by ordering it to human beatitude. Since law requires a lawgiver, it follows that Christ's reign extends to familial and civic society as well as over the Church. If our primary obligations as subjects of this King are to profess true religion and render due worship to Christ (see Pope Pius XI, *Quas Primas* and the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, §2105), good human laws will facilitate this, being "not a law unto themselves but rather the final stage of making concrete and particular the laws of Christ's kingdom, the eternal, natural, *and* divine laws" (McCall, 22).

This conclusion has many consequences for modern Catholics. First, it contradicts the liberal doctrine that civil government ought to be, in principle, "neutral" regarding competing visions of the good, whether this is understood as a Jeffersonian "wall of separation" or as Rawlsian procedural "neutrality." The Church holds that civil and ecclesial jurisdictions are distinct but not independent, being dynamically ordered one to the other as nature is to grace. Second, the social Kingship of Christ requires us to reject the authority of civil laws that cannot be ordered to the eternal law as acts of political violence.

Brian McCall's new book suggests a further implication: since democratic *procedures* presuppose liberal *political theory*, which cannot be ordered either to the common good or to the eternal law, Catho-

lics should reject the authority of ecclesial and civic associations that use such procedures, including the U.S. Constitution and the Second Vatican Council. “The Constitution,” he writes, “is a product of the errors of Enlightenment liberalism just as *Dignitatis Humanae* can be viewed as product of neo-modernism” (225)—that is, premised on the diabolical notion of popular sovereignty. This third supposed consequence of the social Kingship of Christ is problematic for many reasons, not least of which is the fact that *every* Church council from Nicea to Vatican II has made use of majoritarian procedures. This would suggest that voting at a Church council is neither a product of neo-modernism nor diabolical.

McCall’s book has many strengths, not least of which is its clear and powerful exegesis of central principles of Thomistic natural law and Catholic social teaching on matters of sexuality and family life, economics, and political authority. However, this exposition is marred in several places by the insertion of procedural objections against Vatican II into McCall’s application of these principles. Consider an example. After setting out the doctrine of the social Kingship of Christ in chapter 1, McCall turns to a discussion of marriage and family from the perspective of natural law in chapter 2. He defends marriage as an indissoluble, complementary union of the sexes for the purpose of begetting, rearing, and educating children and discusses modern challenges to each of these three ends in detail. So far, so good. Yet McCall then argues that “the Second Vatican Council is really the ultimate party to blame” for the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to strike down key sections of the “Defense of Marriage Act” in 2013 “and for Catholic’s confusion over the essence of marriage” (49). His argument for this claim is that, by utilizing majoritarian rather than monarchical procedures, the Council “adopted the idea that reality can become whatever a majority, no matter how nefariously procured, declares it to be” (49). This is so because, “if the majority of votes at a Council of the Church can declare that which has always been wrong to be right”—namely, demoting the primary end of marriage, procreation, to an end equal to or even secondary to the other ends of the marital act (50)—“then the will of the People must be respected to do the same” (52–53). To lay the sexual revolution and the capitulation of the American public to liberal mores at the feet of Vatican II, however, seems too simple by far.

Chapters 3–4 are the strongest of the book. They summarize and illustrate the central arguments of McCall’s previous (and highly recommended) monograph, *The Church and the Usurers* (Sapien-

tia Press, 2014). Chapter 3 articulates and defends the distinction between natural and artificial wealth and the unique conclusions the Thomistic tradition draws from the distinction. For instance, McCall highlights the thesis that the legal institution of private property has a prior, social purpose requiring individuals to use their wealth in just and charitable ways that contribute to the common good. He also defends the classification of “political economy” as a moral science against the positivists by attacking euphemistic descriptions to “economic laws” that omit that economic effects are the outcomes of human choices and, thus, subject to moral evaluation. Chapter 4 forcefully argues that, if the purpose of money is to measure and store value, the current “triple-power of paper currency, debt-based money, and the secretive private bank” known as the Fed undercut the stability of money and infuse structural forms of injustice into the American economic system (156). McCall carefully and accurately distinguishes between taking illicit (usurious) profit on loans from earning legitimate returns on capital invested for productive rather than consumptive purposes and illustrates how one might apply the distinction to current mortgage practices. Chapter 5 offers “Practical Advice for Surviving in an Immoral Economy.”

However, in chapter 6, McCall once again mars his presentation of the political implications of the social Kingship of Christ with further attacks on Vatican II. He begins with an exposition of Thomistic arguments for the view that, while a state might be directed to the common good by one, few, or many persons, there are prudential reasons to prefer monarchy to other forms of government (235–40). McCall then identifies and attacks three “deadly viruses” of Enlightenment Liberalism as inconsistent with traditional Catholic political theory: (1) “that sovereignty comes from the people and is delegated to the government by them”; (2) that federal authority is checked only by positive law and not by “higher law”; and (3) “an ultimate acceptance of the majoritarian fallacy” (225). The arguments that follow insightfully diagnose the American Constitution as infected with these viruses, but McCall interweaves these arguments with similar attacks on Vatican II. To take just one instance: “The problem is that the Constitution—like *Dignitatis Humanae*, *Sancro sanctum Concilium*, and other documents of Vatican II—contains time bombs in the form of ambiguous, equivocal, open-ended clauses clearly inserted by a liberal cabal in the process of drafting and approval by a committee in a setting where no unified intention or interpretation existed at the time” (221–22). No matter what the actual documents

claim, these ambiguities—and, McCall suggests, the democratic procedures used to produce them—“would undermine Catholic Social Teaching on Christ the King” (222).

These procedural attacks on Vatican II leave much to be desired. Although his basic arguments are always well grounded in Thomistic political theory, McCall’s exegesis decidedly privileges several nineteenth-century encyclicals in which embattled Popes fought the severing of European throne and Roman altar by the forces of liberalism and nationalism. The core doctrines of these movements—that political authority is grounded in the will of the people rather than eternal law; that a system of checks and balances within positive law, rather than appeal to natural law, is sufficient to limit inevitable abuses of political power; and that the results of majoritarian procedures rather than metaphysical insight into reality either constitute truth or are a reliable guide to it—all contradict central theses of the Catholic political tradition. This led a series of Popes, from Gregory XVI to Pius XI (roughly, 1831 to 1939), to reject democratic *political structures* on the grounds that the *political liberalism* that so often justified them was inconsistent with an “integralist” understanding of Church–State relations. It was only under the influence of Thomistic defenders of democracy, such as French philosopher Jacques Maritain (whose influence was also significant in Latin America) and John A. Ryan in America, that the Church eventually gave strictly qualified but positive approval to democratic regimes. While calling attention to democracy’s deficiencies, Pope Pius XII’s Christmas address of 1944 recognized that the dignity of the person requires that he have a voice in his government, both to chasten its abuses and to direct it to the common good. This evaluation, including approval of civic principles of religious freedom on grounds of human dignity, was reiterated in Vatican II’s *Dignitatis Humanae*. McCall, like other self-styled “traditionalist” Catholics, rejects these developments as inconsistent with the principles articulated in Leo XII’s *Immortale Dei* and Pius XI’s *Quas Primas*.

Now, as many worthy thinkers have argued (e.g., S. M. Hutches, Roger Scruton, and David Bentley Hart), no believer thinks of her faith as one *religion* among others. Disciples understand their faith from a committed, first-person standpoint as uniquely grasping reality—that is, as *true*—rather than from a disinterested, third-person perspective appropriate to sociology, which relativizes truth claims. To be “modern” is to be one who wrestles with the fact that both perspectives are in some sense legitimate, to recognize that we err

both by identifying faith with religion *and* by limiting the search for truth to one faith (cf. *Catechism of the Catholic Church* §2104). The first of these (identifying faith and religion), a typically Liberal error, understands religious freedom as a negative civic liberty to indulge religious preferences that are in principle unjustifiable, one that must be balanced by other positive civil obligations and sometimes overridden. This conception of religious liberty was rightly condemned by the nineteenth-century papacy as inconsistent with the sacred tradition. On the other hand, *Dignitatis Humanae* recognizes *both* that every human being has an obligation (and therefore a right) to search for truth about God *and* that people begin searching from different places. So understood, religious liberty is not a so-called “right to error,” as the traditionalists mock, but a right to search for truth consistent with one’s dignity as a person whose free, rational assent is a necessary condition of faith.

A better way to understand the nineteenth-century encyclicals is to focus on their insight that members of pluralist democracies tend to *internalize* the distinction between faith and religion. Too often, modern Christians view their faith as one religion among others, and thus fail to give Christ due worship as the one true God, while at the same time failing to recognize that competing religious claims are *claims about reality* being made by mutual searchers after truth rather than emotive expressions of liturgical preferences, a mistake that strips believers of their dignity by treating them as pretenders.

Similar concerns could be raised about the fate of moral and scientific truth in pluralistic democracies, but put that aside. The issue is whether democratic procedures *entail* relativism, as McCall suggests, or merely *encourage* the existence of relativists. If the latter thesis is true, many of McCall’s objections to Vatican II are unpersuasive. Nothing about relativism or the reversibility of doctrine follows from observations about the historically contingent, majority-dependent outcomes of Church Councils. Legend has it, for instance, that Athanasius’s men beat up some Arians on the way to Nicaea, preventing them from speaking (and voting) at the Council. If contingency makes for scandal by entailing relativism—a thesis McCall shares with the arch-liberal Immanuel Kant, by the way, and which led the latter to reject natural law in the *Preface* to the *Groundwork*—surely the use of violence to secure the divinity of Christ is more scandalous than voting itself, and we should reject the *Nicene Creed* along with Vatican II. That is absurd, of course, and so Christians must accept that the Spirit can work in unpredictable ways and trust Christ’s

promise that it will do so. One can agree with McCall that majoritarian procedures at Councils may sometimes be passively scandalous in so far as they give the appearance of contingency and reversibility to the weak-minded liberal and that particular churchmen may commit active scandal by publically encouraging such views. Nevertheless, we must remember that scandal also requires weak-mindedness in the one scandalized in order to work its evil and cannot be laid solely at the feet of democratic procedure.

My second major criticism of McCall's book involves standards of scholarship. McCall does not mention the significant scholarship about *Dignitatis Humane* produced by the *Communio* school, but rather brushes it aside as a futile debate about the original intentions of the document's authors (see 220–25).

The *status questionis* regarding *Dignitatis Humanae* is roughly this. The document famously shifts the discussion of religious freedom from the principle that error has no rights to a discussion of the civil rights of persons who may or may not be in error. Traditionalists and progressives disagree about whether this is a development or abandonment of traditional Catholic doctrine. Initial drafts of the document were influenced by Jesuit Fr. John Courtney Murray, who advocated a juridical notion of freedom widely viewed as at odds with the Catholic tradition. However, later drafts of the document incorporated significant revisions from French Catholics and the then Bishop of Krakow, Karol Wojtyla (the future St. Pope John Paul II). A second controversy thus concerns whether the final document presents a coherent understanding of freedom, and if so, whether the "juridical" or "ontological approach" is primary. Exacerbating the debate is the fact that the widely circulated English (Abbott) edition of the document was translated, footnoted and introduced by Fr. Murray, and many feel his work minimized, distorted, or ignored the French contributions.

Traditionalist ("Lefebvrian") objections to *Dignitatis Humanae* are grounded in a rejection of Murray's interpretation of the document. They assert that the teaching of *Dignitatis Humanae* contradicts the teachings of Gregory XVI, Pius IX, and Leo XIII regarding the primacy of Christ—the main sources of McCall's book. If that is true, significant declarations of the Second Vatican Council amount to heresy and their authority is null. McCall gestures in that direction, yet nowhere does his book mention the significant and extensive work of those, like David L. Schindler and the *Communio* school, who have argued that Murray's interpretation of the final council

documents is significantly flawed *and* who instead privilege John Paul II's defense of the document on the grounds that it roots the notion of freedom in truth, in our ontological relatedness to God—the very thing the Lefebvrians were originally concerned to defend.¹

This is a massive oversight. Schindler, for instance, recently argued at length that the excommunicated Bishop Lefebvre and Fr. Murray *share* an understanding of the human act that is “originally disjoined from, and thus yet-to-be-related to, truth and God,”² and that this mistaken thesis renders both Lefebvrian political *integralism* and Murrian political *liberalism* unpersuasive. Indeed, Schindler concludes that “Murray’s criticism of the argument of the final Declaration, therefore, as well as Lefebvre’s opposing criticism, are in the end warranted only if the ancient-medieval tradition’s idea of the spirituality of the free-intelligent human act and of the transcendental-ity of truth is false.”³ Schindler argues that *Dignitatis Humanae* does indeed incorporate new considerations by giving voice to the modern recognition of the *subjectivity* of the person, but also that this is consistent with the tradition’s insistence on the intrinsic relation between freedom and truth. The document legitimately *develops* doctrine by “drawing out more fully the interiority traditionally understood to be proper to the human act,” an interiority that “is first positively, not ‘negatively,’ related to the world and to God, and is necessarily presupposed by this relation.”⁴

In short, Schindler argues—and has argued for years⁵—that the traditionalist attack on the Murrian interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae* assaults a straw man using premises that are themselves foreign to the Catholic tradition. To overlook such arguments is a significant oversight for a book intended (in part) as the newest contribution in a long-standing debate over the status of the document. N&V

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¹ David L. Schindler, “Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity: and Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae* on the Right to Religious Liberty,” *Communio* 40 (2013): 208–316.

² *Ibid.*, 280.

³ *Ibid.*, 282.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 311.

⁵ See David L. Schindler, “Religious Freedom, Truth, and American Liberalism: Another Look at John Courtney Murray,” *Communio* 21 (1994): 696–741.

Introduction to the Mystery of the Church by Benoît-Dominique de la Soujeole, O.P., translated by Michael J. Miller (*Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 2014*), xxvii + 640 pp. (French original: *Introduction au mystère de l'église [Paris: Parole et silence, 2006].*)

IN THE PREFACE to the original edition, this introductory volume is presented modestly as something of a textbook for a course in ecclesiology that the author has taught at the University of Fribourg. In fact, the book amounts to more than an introduction and much more than a textbook. The author says that he intends to fill a lacuna in the enormous theological literature that followed after the Second Vatican Council. He observes, rightly, that much of this literature involved specialized studies on a point of doctrine or historical studies on the development of doctrine. These things are all valuable and necessary, but what are needed—especially if the Council's teaching is to be received—are synthetic studies of the doctrine on the Church situated in the continuity of the entire Catholic Tradition. The principal goal of the book is to present this kind of study, and the author succeeds admirably. He achieves a comprehensive systematic doctrinal synthesis that is rare in ecclesiological studies since the Council. The synthesis is nourished by Thomistic categories and resources, above all by the attention to the unity of theology. The Thomistic understanding of mediation informs the entire synthesis. The principles of St. Thomas's exposition of the New Law are employed to point out a fruitful way toward explaining the unity of the Church that conjoins all the elements of the Church as a complex being. The notion of a potential whole contributes to an understanding of the unicity of the Church and the relationship of separated churches and ecclesial communities to the one, unique Church of Christ, the Catholic Church.

The author says he has been guided by two principal recommendations of the Second Vatican Council: "Dogmatic theology should be based on a solid theology of sources (positive theology) followed by speculative theology that grasps the interconnection of the mysteries of salvation with the help of St. Thomas" (citing *Optatum Totius*, the Decree on Priestly Training, §16). The author understands a theology of sources as involving an overview of sources from Scripture and Tradition following a progressive order of discovery connected to the history of Church. Doctrinal history is seen as being characterized as having a unity, coherence, and continuity that present day dogmatic theology needs to enter into if it is to remain in continuity with it.

A great merit of the book is that the author gives an exceptionally clear explanation about what is required for achieving a scientific doctrinal synthesis. The theology of sources prepares the way for, but does not arrive at, a synthesis because it does not distinguish what is first from what is second. This is the task of speculative theology, which strives for knowledge of things by its causes. This means that speculative theology is an order of science and wisdom. It is not limited to asking whether a truth is revealed, but rather seeks to go further and ask what the revealed divine realities are in themselves. What can be discovered through analysis of the inner relations between revealed truths? What is the first truth fundamental to other truths of faith and how does it explain the rest? For the author, a rigorous speculative theology will try to attain “the highest understanding of *what is* and *how it is*” (10). It will aim toward a scientific synthesis “in which the partial and derived truths are reconnected to those that explain them (first truths or sources), and altogether these truths will make up the *supreme truth*.” A synthesis, the author insists, is not a summary, but something organic that is an “explanation of the whole showing the coherence of the constituent elements” (18).

The book is divided into two parts according to its methodology. The first part is a theology of sources which describes the reality that is the Church, and the second part is a speculative theology that strives to give an account of the essence of the Church—what is it? The plan the author follows is extremely clear. The first part describes the reality of the Church by identifying the constituent elements of the Church from the data of revelation. In the light of this information, the sacramentality of the Church rises to the surface. On the basis of the constituent elements that have been singled out in the theology of sources, the author moves to the second part of the book, where he inquires into the definition of the Church. He distinguishes a nominal definition that corresponds roughly to what everyone understands—the Church is a community—from a conceptual definition the name of which signifies the essence of a thing: the Church is the “sacrament of communion.” He proposes this conceptual definition as being capable of expressing the whole set of elements that make up the one reality that is the Church. From there, the author moves on to inquire whether the ontological status of the Church reaches the highest perfection, which is being a person. The last section of the second part reviews the essential properties of the Church as one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. The final chapter examines the question of the indefectibility of the Church.

In part I, the author traces the description of the mystery of the Church in scripture and tradition. He reviews the biblical images of the Church and the mystery of the Church in relation to the kingdom of God. The kingdom makes us know the mystery of the Church and is present in her in a certain way. The author gives an insightful presentation of the ecclesiological themes of Mystical Body of Christ, the Temple of the Holy Spirit, the People of God, and the Church as Mystery as they come down to us in Scripture and Tradition. He offers a penetrating review of these great themes in the fathers of the Church, in the thought of St. Thomas, and in the Second Vatican Council.

The author points out that the theme of the body of Christ, with its firm foundation in Scripture and Tradition, expresses the very heart of the Church as the supernatural community of Christian grace. In some seventy-two pages, the author gives a succinct and penetrating overview that is a tour de force. His treatment of the position and contribution of St. Thomas and his careful treatment of the encyclical *Mystici Corporis* advances the project of the book but could also stand on its own as a major essay. The author also discusses the meaning of the famous *subsistit in* passage of *Lumen Gentium* §8.2, and he comes to the conclusion that “the Roman Catholic Church actually is the one, unique Church of Christ; the separated communities potentially are the one, unique, Church, not by pure potentiality, but by a potentiality that is actualized progressively if they follow the ecclesial elements preserved within them” (128). The theme of the body of Christ expresses the Church in a way that relates to her essence and what she has been very from the first of her existence and what she will never stop being. The theme also raises speculative questions about the nature of mystical unity as well as the complexity of the being of the Church that will be treated later in the second part of the book.

The author lays out how the Church as the People of God appears first in its fundamental activities to which the members of the body are called as priests, prophets, and kings. The People of God theme situates the Church in a historical perspective, showing forth how the being of the Church develops in its potentialities over time. In every age, the author insists, it is always the same one being of the Church. His presentation is enriched with many insights. For example, his illuminating discussion of how St. Thomas received from the fathers the Christological triad of priest–prophet–king not only contributes to a deeper understanding of the Church as the People of God but

also corrects the claim encountered in some studies that the triad was forgotten in the Middle Ages only to be rediscovered by the work of the Reformers.

In the chapter on the Temple of the Holy Spirit theme, two principal characteristics emerge that are important for the author's speculative presentation. First, the Holy Spirit makes the Church one, since he is the Church's principle of unity. Second, the Holy Spirit constitutes the Church as a living organism because he is the principle of the Church's life. Therefore, the author identifies two pillars of pneumatology that pertain to his study of the Church: "the original gift and the continual gift, the permanence of Christ's work (*his* Gospel, his sacraments, *his* ministers) and their fruitfulness in every age that must meet ever-new challenges" (187).

The placement of the chapter "The Church is a Mystery" as last in the first part is intended to serve as a recapitulation of all of the positive data collected in prior chapters. The author gives a very helpful historical overview from Scripture and Tradition of two correlative senses of mystery: as truth grasped only in supernatural faith and as signifying the presence of the reality of God's gift in the world. The distinctive contributions of St. Augustine and St. Thomas are identified and described with precision. For Augustine, the Church is a mystery because she is a human community through which and in which the divine reality of salvation occurs. If Christ is the great sacrament, then his body and bride are too, by reason of the intimate unity between the head and members. St. Thomas's contribution is located in his speculative elaboration on the patristic idea of *sacramentum* and his explanation of *sacramentum Christi* as the prime analogate for the sacraments. It is argued that the angelic doctor made an important clarification and applied it to the *mystery-sacrament* that is the Church. Theologians after St. Thomas lost the analogical sense, and from the end of the Middle Ages to the modern era, the word *sacrament* was interpreted to mean first and foremost the seven acts of divine worship.

The nineteenth century marked the return to the idea of sacramentality, first to Christ, then to the Eucharist, and finally to the Church that is born from the Eucharist. This sacramental perspective is retrieved by the magisterium in chapter 1 of *Lumen Gentium*, entitled "De Ecclesiae mysterio," with its teaching that "the Church, in Christ, is in the nature of a sacrament—a sign and instrument, that is of communion with God and of unity among all men." Still,

Vatican II did not entirely develop the sacramental perspective, but with discernment, indicated a path forward. *Lumen Gentium* tried to display the unity of the different aspects of the Church through sacramentality, but this path was neglected by ecclesialogists after Vatican II. The author argues that the great ecclesiological question today remains the question of the conceptual unity of ecclesial being. It has not been adequately explained and is the cause of numerous difficulties. The tendency to speak about the visible institution of the Church as really distinct from the invisible communion of the Church is but one example. This problem of conceptual unity is the focus of the author's speculative efforts.

Part II of the book is a speculative theology that seeks to offer a definition of the Church. The mystery that is the Church is revealed in Scripture and Tradition as a complex unity having various aspects. These aspects can be condensed into two general ones: the Church is the means of salvation and the reality of salvation. The author not only affirms but also thinks out, rigorously, the meaning of the teaching of *Lumen Gentium* §8.1 that the two aspects of the Church are not to be thought of as two realities, "but rather they form one complex reality which coalesces from a divine and a human element." The challenge is to keep both aspects united together in such a way that they are mutually inclusive. It has proved a difficult task for Catholic theologians to do consistently. The predominant approach has been to think "binomially," conceiving of two antagonistic poles existing in a dialectical tension with one another. Opposition tends to be more fundamental than unity. In this way of thinking, there can be only a precarious kind of equilibrium between the aspects of the Church. This is not at all equivalent to the unity characteristic of the Church having to do with the composition of one complex reality, as *Lumen Gentium* §8.1 teaches.

Historically, the question about the nature of the Church was raised by the ecclesiological dualism of the Protestant Reformers and the distinction and separation they made between a visible Church and an invisible Church. The classic response of Catholic theologians was to stress the visibility of the Church. In opposition to the Protestant paradigm of either/or, Catholic theologians asserted that the Church is both realities, a hierarchical society and a supernatural communion. These realities were explained in such a way that they were, in effect, separable realities, even though normally combined. So Robert Bellarmine could speak of someone belonging to the body

of the Church but not to her soul, and vice versa. The Jesuit saint accepted unintentionally and implicitly the premise of the Reformers: the separation of the means of grace from the reality of grace within the Church.

The ecclesiological renewal of the first half of the twentieth century answered the one-sided emphasis on the Church as a visible hierarchical society with an emphasis on an interior, spiritual aspect of the Church without separating it from the external, juridical aspect. The author maintains that, in the 1920s, there was the first appearance of “binomials”: Church–Mystical Body and organism–organization. The ecclesiological renewal in theology made some valuable rediscoveries of important ecclesiological themes: Mystical Body, People of God, Sacrament, and Communion. These were needed and provided some corrections, but there was a failure to rethink the entire matter of the Church in a way that would surmount the fundamental error. In other words, the dualism of the Bellarmine’s societal concept still remained as it was, even though there were attempts to rebalance and supplement it. There was still the failure to grasp the *vinculum* uniting the complex being that is the Church. The author views the encyclical *Mystici Corporis* as a bright spot, whatever its limits, because its methodology tried to rethink the Church as a whole. *Lumen Gentium* and its teaching in §8 that “non ut duae res considerandae sunt, sed unam realitatem complexam efformant” pointed out the way forward of seeing “the fundamental unity of which the various elements are only aspects” (413). This means that *Lumen Gentium*’s invitation to think of the Church as a sacrament of communion can be properly understood only if its teaching that the Church is one indivisible complex reality is fully taken into account. The author believes that *Lumen Gentium* §8.1 has not been properly received because the prevalent Catholic ecclesiology after Vatican II has been stuck in binomial thinking. He argues that, when the sacramentality of the Church is approached in a univocal sense beginning from sacramental action, the separability between the *signum* and the *res* is then attributed to the Church. It is then all too easy to fall back into the sixteenth-century dead-end thinking that the visible and invisible Church form two realities normally united yet separable. The Church-society then becomes really distinct from the Church-communion. But the teaching of *Lumen Gentium* that the Church is one indivisible being should lead us to think that “the society is in the communion, and the communion is in society” (434).

Attending to the data from his review of positive theology, the author proposes defining the Church as a sacrament of communion, but his contribution lies in how he demonstrates the definition. He believes that St. Thomas points a way forward. There are fruitful implications for ecclesiology in St. Thomas's exposition of the New Law because it offers a suggestive example of a substantial unity of different elements. The New Law is one, but St. Thomas can distinguish two elements. The primary element is spiritual and invisible: the Holy Spirit (uncreated grace), together with the theological virtues and gifts (created grace). The secondary element is visible, having to do with those things that dispose toward the primary one: the written law, precepts, and those things that result from the primary (the Spirit and the theological virtues) bringing the gift of God to fruition in good works. "The New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that works through love (*Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 108, a. 1). This manifestation resides not only in internal acts but also and necessarily in external acts" (399). The author argues that the major point to be learned from the passages on the New Law is that it gives us an example of how the external, visible, sensible element comes together with the internal, invisible, spiritual element so as to be the means of its presence in the world. Applied to ecclesiology, this allows us to see that ecclesial visibility appears in the causes of grace and in the effects of grace. Thus, the distinction between the visible and invisible elements in the Church cannot be assigned to the distinction between the Church as means of salvation and the Church as the reality (fruit) of salvation because the visible element is present in both of these aspects.

The principles gleaned from St. Thomas's exposition of the New Law point the way for a sound explanation of the sacramentality of the Church in line with *Lumen Gentium* §8.1. The author insists this sacramentality of the Church has to be grasped in reference not to the seven sacraments, but rather to Christ in his created humanity overflowing with grace (his personal grace) and, thereby, communicating grace to humanity (his capital grace), especially in the Eucharist. His body and bride, the Church, "is inseparably the reality of grace and the sign-means of transmitting it, the reality being *in* the sign-means, constituting together with it only one being" (439). At this point, the author recognizes, there surfaces the problem of the relation of sin to the Church. If the sign-means of grace is the unity of the one subject that is the Church, it must be recognized that the Church below is a community of sinners. "Since the community sign subsists in a

group of sinners, how can the holy community reality be said to be *in* the sign to such a degree as to form only one being together with it?" (445). How can we be assured that, in this diocesan Church-community, there is infallibly the Church of grace that makes available the sanctification of Christ in the Spirit? What identifiable permanent element exists in the Church that assures us of her salvific identity and grace?

The author proposes that this difficulty can be resolved by understanding the Church according to the sacramentality of the Eucharist. He adapts the Church to the distinctive structure of the Eucharist in classical terms: the *sacramentum tantum* (the appearances of bread and wine and the words of consecration), the *res et sacramentum* (the true Body and Blood of the Lord), and the *res tantum* (charity). Each one of these moments must find a communal representation. The ecclesial representation of the *res* is "the community of those who live now the life of God that has been communicated to them" (442). This is the communion of the theological virtues. The ecclesial *sacramentum tantum* is the common life of Christians, the entire community, clergy and laity—this can be called the social communion: "In its signifying materiality, the ecclesial sign is the social fact—a community of persons distinct from others. In its proper signification, the ecclesial community is the manifestation in sign that it belongs to the reality of salvation" (443). It is perceived only with the eyes of faith. The reality of sin, though, can disrupt the "perfect correspondence between the sign—the human ecclesial community—and the reality—the communion of saints" (445). The ecclesial *res et sacramentum* is the preaching of the Gospel and the sacraments, what the author calls "diaconal communion." It is here that we are assured of the presence of sanctifying grace and the certainty of the Church's unfailing supernatural reality and identity. The sins of Christians harm and obscure the ecclesial sign, but they do not affect the holiness of the mystery. This is something that can be known only by faith. By nature, it is necessarily communitarian and grounded in each member of the ecclesial community, although at the level of the individual, sanctity maybe lacking. This way of understanding the Church addresses the problem of dialectical binomialism because the three communities constituting the *res*, the *sacramentum tantum* and the *res et sacramentum* are the one complex reality that is the one Church.

The author further explains his definition of the Church as a sacrament of communion by examining the notion of communion. He takes his readers through a succinct and thorough study of *ekklesia*

and *koinonia* in the New Testament and in Tradition. He offers the following formulation: "The ecclesiological notion of *koinonia-communio* expresses the divine community inasmuch as man participates in it according to a Christic economy that conforms individuals to Christ" (446). This *koinonia-communio* is, on the one hand, characterized by pilgrimage in the Church from below but, on the other hand, is perfect in the heavenly Church from above. Yet there are not two Churches, but one Church in different states. The implications of this understanding of the Church's unity are endless. It gives no space for divisive dualism. The Church is always a reality that is both visible and invisible. The author retrieves an older understanding of Church membership that includes the baptized belonging visibly to the Church but also those who do the visible works of love and those living belonging invisibly and spiritually, in grace, to the Church.

The author situates the question of the personality of the Church in the context of whether the ontological status of the Church reaches the perfection of being a person. His analysis has the merit of pointing out how crucial this question is for ecclesiology. How can we attribute certain acts to this Church as such? We seem to consider the Church as a person when we speak of the faith of the Church in the baptism of infants and in our belief that the Church is unable to err in the faith. The author argues for an analogy of attribution: just as the word "person" applies to God first and foremost and to human beings and angels by analogy of attribution, so too the word applies to the Church. The Church, though, is a mystical person that subsists in human beings in so far as they are in Christ by the supernatural virtues and gifts and because the Holy Spirit dwells in the members individually and communally. This mystical personality is very unique and very mysterious because it is a mode of union between God and the creature that is not hypostatic or moral. In this mystical union, there is, at the same time, both a profoundly strong relation of unity and a relation of clear distinction.

In four short chapters in the second part, the author discusses the Church as one, holy, catholic and apostolic. His discussion rests on the important distinction between notes and properties. To speak about the four notes of the Church is to engage in apologetics because these characteristics can be grasped by reason as a sign of a higher reality. When one does theology, though, the object is the mystery of the Church, and so one, holy, catholic, and apostolic must be considered as properties that only faith can recognize. The author also uses these chapters to discuss certain questions in ecclesiology that were

not treated earlier, such as ecumenical dialogue and the hierarchy of truths, the relation of the universal Church and the local Churches, collegiality and primacy, the dogma of the personal infallibility of the pope, and the question of the supreme authority in the Church. A final chapter takes up the indefectibility of the Church. The author concludes his work with the observation that there “is a major and pressing need for a definition concerning the mystery of the Church similar to the one that the Council Chalcedon (431) [*sic*] expounded concerning the mystery of the Christ” (628). While not claiming to provide a definitive answer to this need, the author hopes that his work might contribute to the research that a future magisterial teaching could depend on when it judges the time for a definition to be mature.

In comparison to the French edition that appeared in 2006, this English translation incorporates some additional material in chapters 2, 4, and 5. It also includes some enhancements to the very helpful bibliographies that appear at the end of each chapter.

This lengthy and profound study is the best introduction to ecclesiology that exists today and one that sets the bar high for future synthetic and systematic studies of doctrine on the Church. **N&V**

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