Book Reviews

The Roman Mass: From Early Christian Origins to Tridentine Reform by Uwe Michael Lang *(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022)*, xi + 445 pp.

When Uwe Michael Lang discusses the search for the early origins of Christian worship in his work *The Roman Mass*, he contrasts the perspectives toward this search embodied in two quotes: one by Erasmus of Rotterdam and the other from John Henry Newman. According to Erasmus, "it is at the very source that one extracts pure doctrine" (47). Newman, on the other hand, highlights the development of doctrine using the image of a stream: "It is indeed sometimes said that the stream is clearest near the spring. Whatever use may fairly be made of this image, it does not apply to the history of a philosophy or belief, which on the contrary is more equable, and purer, and stronger, when its bed has become deep, and broad, and full" (48). These two quotes also characterize two distinct approaches of liturgical historians in the twentieth century and help situate Lang's own contribution.

The first approach, represented by eminent liturgical historians such as Joseph Jungmann and Theodor Klauser, advocates a "corruption theory" of liturgical development whereby the living and vibrant liturgy of the patristic era gave way to the dissolution of liturgical community, with the laity reduced to silent spectators estranged from the liturgical action in a language they no longer understood. The second approach, pursued by scholars such as Alcuin Reid, sees this development in terms of the organic growth of tradition and more deeply appreciates the contributions of the medieval period. Shaped by Pope Benedict XVI's "hermeneutic of continuity in reform," these scholars believe the corruption theory privileges the patristic period as a golden era and has resulted in the pursuit of archeologism in twentieth-century liturgical reform. Lang identifies himself among this "new generation of scholars" encouraged by the liturgical

writings of Joseph Ratzinger to "question the prevailing narrative that the Roman liturgy moved from early dynamic development through medieval decline to an early modern stagnation" as well as "reflect critically about twentieth-century liturgy reforms" and articulate "their unease about the present state of Catholic worship" (3). While such an identification might lead more critical readers to question whether what follows will simply be liturgical history read through the lens of the "reform of the reform," Lang instead offers in this text a balanced, magisterial account of the development of the Roman liturgy using the most recent, up-to-date scholarship.

The first three chapters survey the Roman Mass in the early Church, including an introductory chapter on the roots of the Eucharist in the Last Supper and an account of early anaphoral development. The next two chapters highlight the formative period of the Roman Mass and the significance of the stational liturgy in the early Middle Ages, followed by three chapters on the contributions of the Carolingians and Ottonians and the development of the liturgy in the later Middle Ages. Lang concludes by examining the impact these late antique and medieval developments made on the early modern period of Trent and the Counter-Reformation. Throughout this history, Lang adopts a number of interpretations that often vary from the standard narratives of what might be called the liturgical history establishment.

For example, while liturgical scholars are often skeptical as to the extent to which the Last Supper tradition shaped early Christian liturgical practice and instead highlight the diversity of early Christian meal practices, Lang draws on more recent New Testament scholarship on the historicity of the Last Supper tradition and its "regulative force of the Eucharist in the midst of a variety of liturgical forms" (51). While scholars of early liturgy strongly affirm the "irreducible pluriformity of early Christian worship" (48), Lang sees how such approaches can lead "towards deconstruction and fragmentation" (49) and offers a timely reminder of the normative and regulative influence of the apostolic kerygma. Beyond the Gospel accounts of the institution narratives, Lang also traces the implications of the books of Hebrews and Revelation for understanding the shape and theological underpinnings of the Eucharist. Throughout his reading of early sources, Lang pursues the leitmotif that the Eucharist is a priestly and sacrificial act fulfilling the "pure offering" prophesied by Malachi 1:11. This is rooted not only in the sacrificial meaning of the Last Supper but also in newer research on the influence of "Temple piety" on early Christian worship.

This theme is enhanced through Lang's examination of the material settings of early Christian worship, which reveals early Christians as

profoundly interested in sacred time and place. Here again Lang reveals an expert familiarity with trends in more recent scholarship, drawing on the sacrality of early Christian altars in Stefan Heid's recently released *Altar und Kirche*. Lang's description of the social and cultural contexts of late antiquity and his attention to the "context" of the Roman Mass in its musical, architectural, and artistic settings is a distinctive strength of this study and a notable improvement on approaches that simply focus on the textual continuities of the Mass.

In his study on the early anaphoras, Lang again offers avenues of newer research that challenge the standard narratives of liturgical scholarship claiming certain elements such as the institution narrative and epiclesis are merely fourth-century interpolations. It is likely that Lang will be criticized by some liturgical scholars as being motivated primarily by dogmatic concerns here; yet, a close, irenic reading of the text simply finds Lang following the possibilities and limitations of the historical evidence.

In addition to certain positions on early liturgical sources, Lang adopts a number of interpretations of the medieval evidence that differ from traditional scholarly narratives of the corruption theory of liturgical development. Building on his research background in the orientation of liturgical prayer, Lang explores what *ad orientem* celebrations might have looked like in the Roman basilicas. While earlier scholarship often viewed them as models of *ad populum* celebration, Lang concludes that "Christians in the late ancient and early medieval periods would not have associated liturgical participation with looking at the celebrant and his sparse ritual actions" (210). Lang echoes the trends of recent scholarship by emphasizing the distinction between prescriptive vs. descriptive texts and the fragmentary nature of early evidence concerning the origin of certain rites such as the kiss of peace, the offertory procession, and the fermentum. In this way he provides helpful scholarly updates to Jungmann's account of the origins of these parts of the Mass in his classic two-volume work *The Mass of the Roman Rite*.

While liturgical scholarship of the mid-twentieth century often presented the synthesis of the Roman and Franco-Germanic traditions in disparaging terms and advocated a return to the pure "noble simplicity" of the Roman Rite, Lang argues that the Carolingian reforms brought a gradual, local enrichment of the Roman Rite that was coupled with the liturgical education of clergy and laity alike. Lang believes too much has been made of the contrast between the personal, emotive register of the Gallican imagination and the sober and straightforward nature the "classical Roman Rite" made by earlier scholars. Instead, Lang highlights lavish

and dramatic elements of the classical Roman Rite drawn from imperial ceremonial tradition and the organic development of the "soft spots" of the liturgy (introductory, offertory, and concluding rites) made during the Romano-Germanic synthesis. Likewise, Lang seeks to foster a deeper study and appreciation of the private apology prayers as a valuable interiorization of priestly spirituality, rehabilitating their reputation from their often harsh dismissal in earlier scholarship. Nevertheless, amid his more appreciative analysis of medieval developments, Lang maintains a balanced assessment, noting that there is "some foundation for the oft-repeated charge that the early medieval period saw a clericalization of the Mass and a detachment of the laity from its liturgical enactment" (267).

Lang is simply keen to point out, particularly regarding the later medieval ages, that there are not merely signs of decline but also often unacknowledged vitality. For example, regarding popular participation in the Mass, Lang concludes that "the prevailing use of Latin as a sacred language certainly removed the liturgy from the vast majority of the lay faithful, but it did not raise an impenetrable barrier to popular participation, as is often assumed" (313). Instead, Lang highlights the faithful's participation in the bidding prayers (prayer of the faithful), nonverbal symbols such as the pax board, and the sensory dimensions of the liturgy that made participation in the Mass a synesthetic experience and rendered it a social institution in medieval culture. Lang's use of contemporary ritual studies on religion as a "system of symbols" challenges the reductive understanding of participation viewed simply in its external or textual dimensions. Phenomena such as the spread of Eucharistic devotion and developments in medieval music and architecture are given an appreciative and sympathetic treatment, even as Lang frankly acknowledges the implications of the spread of private masses on the nature and form of the liturgical celebration. Overall, Lang provides a more complex and nuanced picture of the Mass in the Middle Ages than older scholarship without elevating the medieval period into a new golden age.

Lang concludes with an examination of the Tridentine reform, and here again he wishes to nuance our understanding of Tridentine standardization and uniformity by highlighting the presence and persistence of local traditions and customs. Likewise, while the Baroque period is often derided for its conception of liturgical space as "sacred theatre," Lang challenges us to see how this was aimed above all at the visibility of the liturgical action to facilitate the participation of the faithful.

In light of its extensive bibliography and ample notes, Lang's work will find a welcome reception with scholars and graduate students of liturgical history, although his lucid and elegant prose renders the work eminently readable for the educated audience. Lang wisely concludes his study before the Liturgical Movement and twentieth-century liturgical reform, periods whose wealth of material and ongoing debates might unduly lengthen the text and render it unwieldy. However, this means that teachers seeking a complete history of the Mass for students would need to supplement this material elsewhere. Furthermore, Lang's account attends less to theological shifts in understanding and would be complemented nicely by Helmut Hoping's more theological recent work *My Body Given for You: History and Theology of the Eucharist*.

Earlier liturgical historians often wanted to study the liturgy in order to reform it. Lang's work reveals to us the shifting sands of scholarly consensus and compels us to reflect on the uses (and abuses) of liturgical history as a basis for contemporary liturgical reform. Above all, he has performed a valuable service by illustrating how Pope Benedict's hermeneutic of reform in continuity offers a fruitful lens through which we may view the historical development of the Church's liturgy. In so doing, he avoids ideology, polemic, and romanticization of the past, which too often mar discussions of the liturgy. Here is a timely reminder that the Holy Spirit is alive and active in the liturgy of every time and place, even in periods that have been dismissed and judged harshly. N&V

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The Incarnation by Timothy J. Pawl *(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020)*, 70 pp.

Within the Cambridge Elements series, which seeks to present introductions to topics concerning the philosophy of religion, Timothy Pawl gives us in this recent volume an exposition of the coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation. This book aims to respond to what Pawl calls "the Fundamental Philosophical Problem" of the Incarnation, which he summarizes in this question: "How can one person be both God, having all the perfections of divinity, and human, having all the limitations of

humanity?" This problem opens the way for Pawl to present his response and illustrate the doctrine of the Incarnation as a whole. As a note on my presentation of this book, due to its brief and carefully divided nature, I will refer to the section numbers rather than the page numbers unless I quote Pawl directly.

Pawl begins this work by laying out his methodology. In responding to the "Philosophical Problem" Pawl does not seek to do so in a "historical vacuum" (1.1). Therefore, he uses the texts of the Christological Councils as the basis of his presentation of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Hence, he assumes the validity of these councils as the principles of his arguments. The manner of his argumentation is analytical, engaging widely with current Christological thought, especially in the world of analytical theology (1.4). Pawl structures the book in two parts: sections 2–6 illustrate the contents of the doctrine of the Incarnation, while section 7 addresses the "Philosophical Problem" directly.

For the sake of this review, I would like to focus on the seventh section of this work, in which Pawl addresses the "Philosophical Problem" in detail. The question is how to understand, for example, the statement "Jesus is passible and impassible" without falling into a contradiction. Pawl gives the reader four possible options of resolving this difficulty. Firstly, one can "revise standard logic" (7.2). In "revising" standard logic, one can either, following Luther, claim that syllogistic reasoning does not apply to theology, or one can follow Jc Beall in affirming that contrary predicates of Christ are contradictory, yet they are still true (7.2.1). One can also employ the "relative identity strategy." Using this strategy, one can clarify that the assertions "Jesus is passible" and "Jesus is impassible" do not apply passibility and impassibility to Jesus in the same respect (7.2.2). Given the possibility of a revision of standard logic, Pawl notes that those who reject standard logic to resolve this problem are in the minority, and hence he employs classical logic in this work.

Another possibility is to "deny some predicates of Christ" as always applying to him (7.3). An easy way of resolving this problem is to simply deny that Christ is either God or human (7.3.1–7.3.2). Another way of denying these predicates of Christ is to hold that, since both contradictory predicates cannot exist together, one must deny one of them (7.3.3). However, according to Pawl, this method is not compatible with a traditional understanding of the Incarnation. This prompts him to turn to the possibility of denying these predicates of Christ at different times. Citing the *kenosis* in Philippians 2:6–8, one can argue that even though Christ before the Incarnation was impassible, by becoming incarnate, he emptied

himself of this predicate. Pawl notes two difficulties with this position. First, as some theologians claim, this *kenosis* is not permanent. Christ regains, for example, impassibility at his exaltation. Furthermore, this understanding of *kenosis* goes against the teaching of "Conciliar Christology" as articulated by Cyril of Alexandria and Leo the Great (7.3.4).

The third possible response to the "Philosophical Problem" is the use of "qua" responses (7.4). This method, in saying that Jesus is *impassible-qua-God* but *passible-qua-human*, rejects that these contrary predicates are applied to Christ in the same respect. They can "modify the assertion," where the statement *Jesus is passible-qua-human* is to use the "qua" "to point out that in virtue of which the subject has the predicate" (p. 46). With this usage of "qua" responses, to say that *Jesus is passible-qua-human* and *impassible-qua-God* is to assert that these two predicates are used in different respects as indicated by the "qua" (7.4.1). Pawl notes a recent objection to this method, where these "qua" responses still resolve to a predication of identity: *Jesus is passible-qua-human* is still to say that *Jesus is passible*. Hence, this does not resolve the difficulty. Another way of understanding "qua" responses is that "qua" modifies the subject (7.4.2). As opposed to indicating in what respect the subject possesses the predicate, this method argues that "qua" responses modify the subject such that "it is Christ-qua-divine that is impassible; it is Christ-qua-human that is passible" (p. 47). However, this raises the question as to whether "Christ-qua-divine" and "Christ-qua-human" are identical. If they are identical, then this method does not resolve the problem, but if they are not, then one contradicts the Communication of Idioms and Conciliar Christology. The third way "qua" responses can be understood is that they modify the copula such that "Christ is-qua-divine impassible" means "Christ is-divinely impassible" (p. 49). This strategy resolves the problem by diversifying the respect to which these predicates refer (7.4.3). However, according to Pawl, "standard formulation of logic has no means of demarcating various copulas" (p. 50). Lastly, "qua" responses can modify the predicate (7.4.4). In this instance, to say that *Jesus is passible-qua-human* is not contradictory with *Jesus is impassible-qua-divine*. Pawl notes various issues with this method. First, this would entail that univocal predicates are impossible. Furthermore, this method would render the statement *Jesus is two-natured* incomprehensible.

After this lengthy discussion of "qua" responses, Pawl turns to the final possible response to this problem: One can "revise the truth conditions of the predicates in question" (7.5). This response challenges the premise "that nothing can be both passible and impassible at the same time, in the

same respect" (p. 51). This is done by affirming that passible and impassible are not contraries but subcontraries. With this understanding, impassible is not to be understood as not being able to be "affected," but it means "to have a nature that is not able to be causally affected" (p. 52). Hence, predicating them of the same subject does not run into contradiction. However, as Pawl notes, this response runs into the objection that this "requires us to understand natures such that they can be causally affected" (p. 53).

Over the course of his presentation of these different possible responses to the "Philosophical Problem," Pawl does not give overt preference for one solution over another. Rather, he presents each possible response on its own terms while giving the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. However, he seems to give preference to the final response where one revises "the truth conditions of the predicates in question," noting that it is in line with the understanding of the Christological Councils, which treat natures as concrete rather than abstract.

Pawl's presentation of these responses, however, poses difficulties. In Christopher Tomaszewski's review of Pawl's previous book, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, Tomaszewski notes the deficiency of Pawl's presentation of "qua" responses understood as revising the truth conditions of the predicates. I would like to build upon Tomaszewski's critique of Pawl's understanding of the fourth response of revising the truth conditions of the predicates. Pawl's understanding of this response is built upon his presentation of natures as concrete in section 4.1.3. Here he cites Cyril of Alexandria and Leo the Great, who refer to Christ's human nature as being a concrete subject, where it is the natures themselves that are subjects of actions such that "The councils say of the human nature of Christ that it can hang on a cross, be pierced, weep, feel pity . . ." (p. 15). He argues that Christ's human nature understood as concrete is best understood as a "human element," "meaning the ontological component parts of a human" composed of body and soul (p. 15). While this understanding of natures as concrete might resolve the "Philosophical Problem," it results in a reification of Christ's human nature and hence divides his person. Based on this understanding, to say that "Christ is passible" is to say that "Christ is passible because Christ's human nature can be causally affected." In this case, the predicate "passible" in the statement "Christ is passible" does not refer to the subject but to the nature. If this is the case, then the Communication of Idioms is rendered impossible since the diverse predicates applied to Christ are not predicated of his subject but of his natures. This results in a dividing of the subjects in Christ and has the same deficiency as "qua" responses in modifying the subject. This issue can be avoided by having recourse to the

understanding of "qua" responses as "modifying the assertion" combined with an understanding of natures—following Aristotle, John Damascene, and Aquinas—as principles of operation. With this understanding of natures, one avoids reifying natures while at the same time denying that natures are merely abstract, logical, entities. To say, then, that *Christ is passible-qua-human* points to the principle by which Christ possesses this attribute—his human nature. Hence, it diversifies the respect by which Christ is "passible" and "impassible," thus avoiding a contradiction.

Methodologically, the weakest aspect of this volume is the way Pawl uses conciliar texts. Pawl treats the texts of the Christological Councils as the premises of his arguments. For this reason, he does not see the need to demonstrate their truth. While it is undoubtedly true that divine revelation, a part of which is articulated by ecumenical councils, supplies the principles for theology, Pawl's use of conciliar texts verges on a conciliar positivism that leaves the reader thinking "this is true because such-and-such council said so." Considering that this work is part of a series with a wide focus on philosophy of religion, its readers may not accept the authority of ecumenical councils. As a result, the methodology used is not suitable for the book's target audience. Rather than showing the reasonability of the Incarnation, the reader is left with an understanding of the Incarnation that is grounded on a positivistic assertion of the truth value of the teachings of the Christological Councils. It is possible that Pawl assumes his readers are familiar with his work *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, where he presents the historical and theological background of these councils. However, he does not state this in this book. This work could have been greatly improved by presenting the discussions, either in the text or through references to other works, that surrounded these conciliar texts to show the philosophical and theological background in their formulation. Pawl frequently cites works dealing with contemporary Christological issues, but he rarely cites the major and extensive treatments of the development of the thought behind these Christological Councils. By giving the reader the resources to examine the background of these councils, Pawl would not compromise his treatment of the Christological Councils as the premises of his arguments, but he would show their reasonability.

However, there is a positive side to how Pawl treats conciliar texts. In assuming the truth of the Councils and building his arguments upon them, Pawl can show the diversity of possible theological and philosophical positions that remain within the bounds of orthodoxy. Moreover, despite its deficiencies, perhaps the greatest treasure of this work is Pawl's meticulous

presentation of "qua" responses in section 7.4. Pawl's exposition offers a clear and concise explanation of the logical meaning of these clauses, which are essential to Christological thought. In only seventy pages, this work offers an excellent introduction to the logical coherence of the Incarnation and the diverse ways of considering its rationality, which will be helpful for any student of theology as well as the seasoned theologian.

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Lying and Truthfulness: A Thomistic Perspective by Stewart Clem *(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023)*, xiv + 207 pp.

Stewart Clem has written a multifaceted book in which he furnishes a historically informed account of Aquinas's position on lying and puts forward his own, broadly Thomistic, proposals regarding various aspects of the moral question of lies. The author states that the primary aim of the book is "to rehabilitate Aquinas's position on lying and demonstrate its contemporary relevance" (3). Clem contends that conventional portrayals of Aquinas as one "absolutist" amongst many fail to reflect properly the nuances of Aquinas's perspective on the moral status of lies. Such misrepresentations have caused Aquinas's view on lying to be summarily dismissed, argues Clem, who also takes issue with certain apologists for Aquinas who, equally, have failed to do justice to the complexities of Aquinas's analysis, misattributing to Aquinas a lack of differentiation between different kinds of lies. Accordingly, the author sees the need to "rescue Aquinas from his own defenders" (3). In particular, Clem argues that many of Aquinas's modern critics and defenders alike have failed to take into account the centrality to Aquinas's moral thought of the distinction between mortal and venial in sin—a distinction, argues Clem, the importance of which can "hardly be overstated" (5). In these regards, the central argument of the book is highly compelling.

In the first chapter, Clem surveys various proposals from contemporary authors on the morality of lies, noting and responding to some of their criticisms of Aquinas. He groups contemporary proposals into those on the one hand which are "absolutist" in simply condemning all lies with little or no qualification, as in the rather extreme case of Paul Griffiths,

and authors on the other hand who are "soft-absolutist" in their attempts to maintain a prohibition on lying while narrowing the scope of what constitutes a lie in order to render certain contested speech acts permissible. Clem outlines some reasons why he finds both types of solution wanting, chiefly with regards to these authors' treatment of Aquinas. Perhaps it would have been more appropriate here for Clem merely to sketch briefly these contemporary views he rejects and to reserve his counterarguments for later on in the book.

The second chapter furnishes an overview of the history of the question of lying in the Christian tradition, from the biblical data and the patristic authors through to Thomas Aquinas. Clem's account is deft and illuminating. He notes the complexities of the biblical material, including knotty questions thrown up by episodes such as Abraham's speech in Genesis 20:12, and the lack of a patristic consensus on whether lies can in certain circumstances be morally justifiable. The author outlines the decisive impact of Augustine in establishing a more absolute prohibition against lying, tying this prohibition firmly to the eighth commandment against false witness. Clem does well to acknowledge that even Augustine differentiates the culpability of lies according to intention and, in the case of Abraham in Genesis 20:12, allows for speech which conceals the truth in an equivocal manner. Clem proceeds to a brisk account of the perspectives of Aquinas's medieval scholastic predecessors on the moral status of lies, noting both the centrality of Augustine in medieval Latin scholastic settings as well as the scope for creative appropriations of his legacy.

The virtue of this historical overview is, as the author states, to situate Aquinas in his own intellectual context. This is a move that enables Clem to identify the areas where Aquinas drew upon well-established positions, thereby clarifying the distinctive arguments Aquinas made that set him apart from his contemporaries and near predecessors. Accordingly, there follows in the third chapter an account of Aquinas's own writings on "sins of speech" and, in the fourth chapter, Aquinas on "the virtue of *veracitas*." Clem shows that although as a medieval Latin scholastic theologian Aquinas was deeply influenced by Augustine, in certain important regards Aquinas reenvisaged lying in a way that departed from both Augustine and preceding scholastic authors such as Peter Lombard. Above all, in his survey of a broad range of Aquinas's works, Clem shows how, especially in his later works, Aquinas decoupled lying from the eighth commandment. According to Aquinas, only malicious lies and certain other unjust speech acts violate the eighth commandment directly; lying *simpliciter* is not directly opposed to justice but rather to the virtue of truthfulness

(*veracitas*). Such a conclusion is of a piece with how Aquinas shows an "exceptional willingness" (105) to contend that not all lies are mortal sins, and, accordingly, to differentiate the culpability of different types of lies. Indeed, Aquinas argued that, by its genus, lying per se is only venially sinful; a lie must be modified by malicious intent or some other aggravating factor in order to be a mortal sin. Aquinas maintained, furthermore, that beneficent lies, such as the lie told by the Hebrew midwives in order to save the infants' lives in Exodus 1, are only venially sinful and, as such, are compatible with charity. Clem brings out the significance of Aquinas's tactful disagreement with Gregory the Great's claim that the beneficent lie of the Hebrew midwives robbed them of an eternal reward.

The author shows how, while Aquinas maintained that all lies are intrinsically disordered as being opposed to the virtue of truthfulness, he also goes further than most in the previous tradition in being prepared to minimize the culpability of certain lies. Clem makes a compelling case that Aquinas's comparative leniency in this regard is not adequately reflected in recent renderings of Aquinas which strip him of his own context, often attempting to "translate" his position on lying into the foreign idiom of analytic philosophy and, in the process, excising the crucial distinction in his account between mortal and venial lies. As a result, Clem argues, characterizations of Aquinas simply as a rigorist fail to take into account his marked sensitivity to the importance of circumstances and intention in assessing the status of an individual lie. The author notes that while Aquinas is no consequentialist, Skalko's attribution to Aquinas of an equivalency between a beneficent lie and murder falls wide of the mark.

The fifth chapter focuses upon equivocation. As an example, the author notes the case of when Athanasius was pursued by persecutors, who asked him for the whereabouts of Athanasius, not realizing that they were speaking to the man himself, who replied to them: "Athanasius is not far." The hope of Athanasius was that his interlocutors would continue in their ignorance that the man to whom they were speaking was Athanasius himself, while avoiding telling them a lie, as Athanasius was indeed not far from them. Clem contends that equivocal speech such as Athanasius's is a species of lying and, as such, is sinful. He draws on Wittgenstein's notion of "private language" to argue that words in themselves do not possess meaning—it is the shared context that determines the meaning of an utterance. For Clem, equivocation and the related concept of mental reservation ignore the intrinsically communal nature of language as ordered toward the interpersonal communication of truth. Since in equivocal speech the intention is that one's words be understood by the listener in a

sense the speaker knows to be false, Clem argues that they constitute lies. According to Clem, the meaning of explicit statements also depends upon implicit premises; for example, the phrase "once upon a time" signifies by convention that the following account is fictional, such that falsehoods contained in the tale do not constitute lies. He also argues that equivocation constitutes lying due to the implicit premises it seeks to exploit. In the case of Athanasius, Clem argues that his statement "Athanasius is not far" contained the implicit premise "and I am not Athanasius" (129) or regarding Abraham, that his statement in Genesis 20 concerning Sarah, "She is my sister," contained the implicit statement, "and she is not my wife" (130). With the aim of taking into account the importance of implicit premises and focusing on the intended meaning of utterances rather than the words per se, Clem proposes a new definition of a lie as a lack of correspondence between one's thoughts and that which one intends to assert (91).

Subsequently, the book turns to the familiar dilemma posed by the Nazi who asks someone sheltering Jews if there be Jews in their house. Clem surveys various attempts at solutions to this problem from recent authors such as Peter Geach. He finds all of these proposals dissatisfactory: To remain silent in the face of such a question amounts effectively to a betrayal of the Jews, while misdirection tactics are unlikely to work, and equivocation constitutes a form of lying. Clem's envisaged solution is to recast the problem by arguing that the dilemma is, in effect, insoluble: There is no choice available in this situation that is morally faultless. He argues that the best course of action is simply to lie to the Nazi, even though this act remains a venial sin. Clem contends that, as a result of the Fall, one may find oneself in tragic situations such as this in which venial sin is unavoidable.

The fifth chapter on equivocation and the "Nazis at the door" scenario is, to my mind, less convincing than the other sections of the book. The author notes that since Aquinas did not address such questions at any great length, it remains a disputed question in the Catholic tradition and amongst Thomists whether equivocation may be permissible in some circumstances. He nevertheless claims that his proposals merely make explicit what is implicit in and indeed logically demanded by Aquinas's account. With this claim in view, it is not ideal that Aquinas's discussion of Abraham's equivocal speech in Exodus 20, in which he essentially follows Augustine in denying that Abraham sinned, finds itself confined to the footnotes. Conversely, the main body of the text contains some extended quotations from modern sources that would have been better relegated to the footnotes. For example, on page 101, an analysis of Aquinas's position

on truthfulness turns slightly abruptly to a block quotation from Thomas Jefferson.

While Clem discusses in chapter 2 some perspectives of Aquinas's scholastic predecessors on whether it is permissible to lie in order to protect the life of a fugitive, this material does not feature in Clem's discussion later on in the book of what is essentially the same dilemma in the case of the "Nazis at the door." This reflects how, although Clem argues that we ought to locate Aquinas in his own context rather than ours, and furnishes excellent material in this regard in the earlier chapters of the book, this historical approach is much less discernible in his consideration of the "Nazis at the door" problem, in which Aquinas is a lone medieval voice alongside modern interlocutors. Clem presents his conclusions that all equivocation is a species of lying and that one can find oneself in situations in which it is impossible to avoid venial sin, as in the case of the Nazis at the door, as areas in which he makes explicit what is implicit in Aquinas. Yet, in order to try to substantiate this claim more satisfactorily, Clem would have had to undertake a more extensive analysis of Aquinas and his sources on related points. This would require a discussion of Augustine's articulation in *De Mendacio* of the problem posed by a situation in which someone hiding a fugitive is asked by their pursuer if they are in the building. Augustine's framing of the problem is remarkably similar to that of Clem's discussion of the "Nazi at the door" dilemma, and, like Clem, Augustine contends that to remain silent is tantamount to betraying that the fugitive is in the building. But unlike Clem, Augustine counsels that the person sheltering the fugitive respond by saying: "I know where he is, but I will not tell you," thus avoiding telling a lie while deliberately intending to misdirect the pursuer by falsely suggesting that the fugitive is elsewhere. Thus, Augustine recommends an equivocal response as a guiltless way out of the dilemma.

Clem would, in addition, have to reckon with the compelling case Michael Dougherty makes in *Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas* that, apart from a situation caused by the agent's own previous sin, Aquinas consistently maintained that a dilemma never arises in which sin is unavoidable—Clem names Dougherty's work in a footnote, but does not discuss it. A more thorough examination of whether Aquinas held sin to be unavoidable would also involve spelling out the distinction Aquinas makes in *De Malo* between sin as a generically disordered act and personal guilt (*culpa*). This would, in turn, introduce a consideration of involuntary ignorance and the passions of the soul into the assessment of the culpability of someone in the "Nazis at the door" situation. Clem

maintains that only someone who responds to this situation with spontaneous "stunned silence" is free from guilt, but the presuppositions of which this idea is suggestive are not drawn out.

Several of the chapters of this book are adapted from articles that were originally published separately, and that is not necessarily a bad thing, as the result is reminiscent of the academic format of a book containing chapters on a broad theme written by different authors. Clem acknowledges in the introduction that different audiences will likely be interested in different sections of his book. However, the book does not necessarily comprise a single, connected argument that progresses naturally from chapter to chapter. Perhaps for this reason Clem enumerates eight of his key conclusions in chapter six. This provides important clarifications, as Clem states that equivocation occurs when there is a binary between two distinct meanings and one of them is asserted; other forms of vague and evasive speech do not count as equivocation.

The same chapter also furnishes "vignettes," which serve as helpful test cases for Clem's arguments, such as the case of the lie told to children about the existence of Santa Claus. One or two of these examples suggest limitations to Clem's contention that premises kept implicit and unspoken in real life can be explicitly identified and spelled out in written form. For Clem argues that if someone who feels sad says "I'm fine," they do not thereby commit either a lie or equivocation. This judgement seems open to debate, at least. This may suggest that, while there is undoubtedly much that is illuminating in Clem's account of the interpersonal nature of language, there may be a need for more apophatism when it comes to identifying implicit premises and what exactly counts as equivocation in complex and often ambiguous real-life interactions.

In the seventh chapter, Clem offers a valuable Thomistic perspective on the rather profanely named societal vice opposed to truthfulness which was coined by Harry Frankfurt in 1986, and which Clem proposes redesignating as "truth indifference" (170). Clem provides some interesting parallels to the works of Aquinas. Arguably, these could have been taken further with reference to Aquinas's mention in *ST* I-II, q. 87, a. 8 of parents passing down a sinful example that is imitated by their children.

In the conclusion to the work, Clem identifies the great Thomistic insight, and the "cornerstone" of his own project (191), as the dual thesis that (1) all lies are sins against the truth, and that (2) many lies are so minimally sinful that they can only be considered evil in a highly qualified sense. In unearthing the combination of these two features—previously neglected by detractors and defenders of Aquinas alike—as key to Aquinas's position,

Clem has furnished an extremely valuable contribution to the field of Thomistic scholarship. Although I find the positions he proposes on equivocation and the "Nazis at the door" scenario less compelling and less firmly rooted in the writings of Aquinas, the core thesis of Clem's book remains a significant advance in studies of Aquinas on lying. As an insightful reappraisal and rehabilitation of Aquinas's position on lying that is both historically contextualized and conversant with contemporary thought, students of the ethics of lying and truthfulness would do well to take note of this book. N·V

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Pierced By Love: Divine Reading with the Christian Tradition by Hans Boersma *(Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2023)*, xviii + 255 pp.

Hans Boersma's *Pierced by Love* introduces the reader to the practice and effects of lectio divina through rich patristic literature. While the book does trace the steps of lectio divina, it is not a how-to guide. Rather, it means to preserve and perpetuate the way that the fathers of the Church understood the practice of reading Scripture.

In his introduction, Boersma argues that the fathers of the Church make no distinction between lectio divina and ordinary Bible reading; therefore, lectio divina is the ordinary, standard way of reading the Scriptures (3). It is ordinary insofar as it is a believer who reads in order to encounter Christ, who is "the source, the content, and the meaning of the Scriptures" (3, quoting Raymond Studzinski). This implies that the standard way of reading the Bible is for the sake of an encounter with the living God who through his inspired words stirs the imagination and heart of the reader to encounter Christ. Lectio divina is therefore sacramental because the words lead to the reality who is God. In Boersma's words, this sacramental process "transfixes or pierces us, and in so doing it transfigures us" (8).

In the first chapter, Boersma likens lectio divina to the Transfiguration because it is a reflective or meditative reading that leads us to encounter Christ face-to-face. Boersma uses the Transfiguration as a motif for lectio divina throughout. In the Transfiguration, Moses and Elijah, who yearned to see the face of God, finally see him face-to-face in the person of Christ,

who is the Sacrament of God. In a similar way, sincere reflection and meditation on the sacramental words of Scripture bring us face-to-face with the reality of Love, who transfixes and transfigures us (11, 13).

Framed by this sacramental view of the words of Scripture, Boersma makes a case here for the importance of the literal sense of Scripture. "The initial stages of lectio divina are indispensable. . . . Flesh on the cross and words on the page" are the matter of God's sacramental love (13). "Jesus is God's sacrament. Scripture too is God's sacrament, since both make present the reality or the truth of the love of God" (14). The eternal Word is really revealed through temporal words, and we are given access to the "capital-W" Word through the "small-w" words of Scripture (14). The gnostic impulse tempts the reader to bypass the biblical words, luring us with the prospect of knowing the reality "without having to bother with particular rites, texts, practices, or commitments" (28–29). This, however, does not take seriously that God actually does come to us through "particular words (the Bible) and in a particular person (Jesus Christ)" (20).

In the second chapter, Boersma calls lectio divina a ladder and invokes the biblical and iconographical images of the spiritual ladder; it is the sacramental means by which we ascend to God (43). According to Boersma, "ladders are everywhere among the spiritual writers in Christian tradition. . . . Even where the ladder imagery is not explicitly invoked, the idea of going up toward perfection in steps or stages is ubiquitous in patristic and medieval literature" (35). The ladder of perfection is ascended by humility and descended or forfeited by self-exaltation and pride (41, citing St. Benedict). The steps of the ladder of lectio divina prepare the reader to receive the grace of God, acknowledging that "we can do nothing without Him. It is He who achieves our works in us . . . and yet not entirely without us'" (47, quoting Guigo II).

Lectio divina is medicinal and healing. Precisely by holding the reader in place, divine reading becomes a remedy against acedia and pride. It partakes in the wisdom of the monastic vow of stability, which trusts in human fulfillment beyond temporal whims and distractions (54–55). Evagrius of Pontus, for example, explains that this demon of acedia "compels the monk to look constantly towards the windows, to jump out of the cell," tempting the monk with the idea "that he will never be well while he stays in that place, unless he leaves his cell" (56). Stability is a precondition for healing the sickness of the fallen, wayward human spirit (57–59). God's Word becomes the reader's true home (69). The prodigal, granted worldly freedom, was lonely instead of solitary; and according to monastic wisdom, "one is never less alone than when alone [with God]" (187).

Lectio divina purifies the heart. The heart in Scripture means the whole depth of the human person—mind, memory, will, and affections. Because God's words are written for our hearts and can suffuse the humble heart, lectio divina can therefore purify the whole heart. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 are dedicated to explaining how lectio divina heals the whole human person—mind, memory, will, and affections respectively.

For Boersma, "the point of lectio divina is not to rid ourselves of speech but to be shaped by divine speech" (194–95). It is taking seriously God's true words and the mind being shaped according to them. The role of memory plays an important part in the shaping of the mind because memories, in a sense, shape who we are (71). For many of the fathers, the second step of lectio divina—meditation—included committing that biblical text to memory (73, 106). Lectio divina relies on the memory's role in shaping who we are because lectio aims not only at knowing the words of Scripture but also at making us a "living concordance" of those words. Only when the biblical text has entered the mind in a permanent way can it shape and organize the mind and make us into a "living concordance" with God's word, harmonizing us into his rhythm and pattern of living love (72, 75, quoting Jean Leclercq).

In the seventh chapter, Boersma insists that the reader who is serious about lectio divina must not be afraid of suffering because divine reading brings us face-to-face with ourselves, our wayward wills, and the secrets of our hearts. It calls the reader to self-examination, to consider and change his life (142, 159). The mind is "wounded" in this reflection as the reader experiences the pain of compunction. In order for the heart to be purified, the will must be painfully conformed to Christ. What occurs in the believer is this pain of compunction followed by an inward joy and gladness. John Climacus likens this to children who can laugh and cry at the same time, a mingling of joy and grief. Climacus creates a new word for this graced phenomenon—*charmalypē*, a combination of the Greek words for joy and grief. In "joyful grief," the reader experiences simultaneously the misery of his own brokenness and the comfort of the love and mercy of God (144–45).

Boersma brings St. Bonaventure to the fore to insist that our affections also unite us to Christ. Through reading, memorization, and imagination, lectio divina purifies the affective life of readers as the stories of the Gospels become one's own. Feelings and affections augment contemplative union with Christ, with whom we have an experiential union (133, 136–37). The encounter with Christ shapes the imagination as the love of Christ, beyond all understanding, pierces the soul (138–39).

This being said, lectio divina cannot be a purely subjective enterprise. It is not driven solely by emotion, and it is also not driven only by genre, grammar, or historical context. While it takes all of the above seriously, none of them are mutually exclusive (210–11). Boersma further argues, quoting Pope Benedict XVI, that "lectio divina . . . is not a method or technique, which gives us guaranteed, easy access to psychological well-being . . . 'the love of God . . . is a reality which cannot be "mastered" by any method or technique'" (15).

The prodigal son, for example, sought only good feelings, yet he was not "with himself" (*secum*). He only "returns to himself" (*in se . . . reversus*) when he returns home and encounters his forgiving father. Lectio divina therefore presupposes not a seeking primarily for good feelings but a seeking for encounter with the living God. Good reading is relational and longs for encounter.

"Lectio divina is a means of grace" (207). It is the privileged means by which God brings the reader face-to-face with himself. In chapter 8, Boersma draws attention to Hugh of St. Victor adding the step of *operatio*, or performance, into the process of our transfiguration, which is reminiscent of Aquinas's teaching that the highest type of life is an active life that shares the fruits of contemplation (173, 176). Yet Boersma returns to insist that the desire to see God face-to-face is what "haunts any authentic Christian spirituality" (176).

In this vein, Boersma's final chapter holds out solitude and silence as the ideals not only of lectio divina but of Christian life as such (183). In the final analysis of lectio divina, "silence and humility save the world" (200): silence because we are ultimately creatures, "listening beings" (194–95), and humility because "the words of the divine Scriptures cannot be mastered; they want to master us. God's purpose with them—that which sets them apart as holy or divine—is that they would change or transfigure us" if we would let them (200).

The contribution of Hans Boersma's book is not only that he reaffirms the historical practice of lectio divina in the Christian tradition but also that he recovers the experiential, affective dimension of lectio divina that always suffused the tradition. Boersma proportionately emphasizes the steps of lectio divina in tandem with the gifts of compunction, tears, and joy that accompany those steps as the reader comes face-to-face with God, who has condescended to be our friend. In this way, Boersma captures the *whole* spirit of the lectio divina tradition.

Pierced by Love features twenty-four figures throughout the chapters. These figures feature helpful charts such as the steps of lectio divina

themselves (44–45); how the steps of lectio divina sacramentally lead the reader to the reality of God (19, 27); how memory, attention, and expectation work together in divine reading (62); the eating metaphor of lectio divina (100); and the difference between loneliness and true solitude (184). The rest of the figures are icons and images from the lectio tradition, including the Ladder of Divine Ascent (36), Ezekiel eating the scroll (94), and the Tree of Life (120–21, 125–26, 130).

In the first chapter, Boersma likens Plato's participatory philosophy to lectio divina's sacramental character of leading us from sacramental words to the reality of God. This also constitutes the first figure of the book, which is a table comparing Plato's ladder to the steps of lectio divina (19). While the comparison is one that has been made throughout the Christian tradition, Boersma exposes his sympathy with Platonism and leaves himself vulnerable to a criticism not only of Christianizing Plato but also of framing the rest of his text in terms of Plato's philosophy.

Pierced by Love also includes "Eight Theses on Lectio Divina" at the end of the book (208–13). While functioning as a clear and helpful summary of his thought throughout, the theses unfortunately do not neatly map onto the nine chapters of the book. Not having encountered the outline of the theses before the end of the book, they might leave the reader disoriented and wanting for citations or a guide as to how the previous chapters contribute to each of the theses.

Boersma's endnotes (215–46) cite both the images and quotations used throughout the book and offer some context and explanation. For one familiar with the depth of Boersma's patristic knowledge, the notes leave a student of Hans Boersma looking for more of his commentary on the quotations used. As always, while endnotes are helpful for streamlining the text of the work, they come at the expense of being less often referenced than footnotes and used with more difficulty by the reader.

One might be disappointed to see that the book highlights only a handful of Church fathers from each era of the Christian tradition. While Boersma invokes a number of fathers such as Augustine, Benedict, Anselm, and Bernard in order to support his theses on divine reading, *Pierced by Love* could not be called a comprehensive history of the lectio divina tradition. Nor is it, as mentioned above, a how-to guide to lectio divina. It therefore occupies a (much-needed) niche in recovering the spirit of the lectio divina tradition without surrendering its genre to either empirical history or self-help. NV

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Liturgical Theology in Thomas Aquinas: Sacrifice and Salvation History by Franck Quoëx, translated and edited by Zachary J. Thomas *(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2023)*, xv + 277 pp.

English readers are indebted to Zachary Thomas for his translation of the late Rev. Franck Quoëx's *Liturgical Theology in Thomas Aquinas*. Quoëx's book is an examination of the *Summa theologiae*'s [*ST*] teaching on the nature of external worship, and it is organized chronologically in accord with the "cultic regimes proper to the various stages" of salvation history (7–9). Hence, Quoëx analyzes Aquinas's teaching on the nature of worship in the natural law (chap. 1), the Old Covenant (chap. 2), the life of Christ (chap. 3), the life of the Church (chap. 4), and especially in the Eucharist (chap. 5). The appendices examine Aquinas's commentary on the rite of the Mass and are substantial chapters of their own. This order of proceeding has two benefits: first, it renders each chapter worthwhile on its own terms as a treatment of worship at a particular stage in salvation history; second, it fruitfully contextualizes the liturgy of the Eucharist in light of the natural law, Jewish ceremonial precepts, the sacrifice of Christ, and the nature of the sacraments.

Chapter 1 focuses on worship as a moral act that flows from the natural law. It begins by drawing upon contemporary religious anthropology to show the universal tendency of humans to express their interior sense of the transcendent through external rituals that feature "the handling of sacred things, language, action, and word" (14). This provides a broad basis to support Aquinas's teaching that ritualized acts of worship are natural to man and are a matter of the virtue of religion. The bulk of the chapter details Aquinas's account of religion as found in *ST* II-II, qq. 80–100. The tendency of fallen man is to degrade external acts of worship to superstition, magic, or idolatry, but Aquinas emphasizes the necessary link between internal and external acts of worship. External acts such as sacrifice render honor to God when they function as tangible signs that both express and foster the internal worship of prayer and devotion.

Chapter 2 proceeds from this natural law foundation to an examination of Aquinas's treatment of the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law as found in *ST* I-II, qq. 101–3. These precepts can be seen as merely "pharisaical" (45), but Aquinas argues for their goodness on the basis of both their literal and spiritual senses. God instituted these precepts following the Fall to deter Israel from participation in idolatrous rituals and to turn their minds repeatedly to him (50–51). For instance, animal sacrifices taught "absolute dependence" on God and complete offering of self to him (58).

The spiritual senses of the ceremonial precepts resided in their capacity to prefigure the mystery of Christ, morality, and eternal life (55). While good, the ceremonies of the Old Law were nonetheless imperfect and so would cease when Christ instituted a perfect cult (64–68).

The third chapter turns to Christ to consider the nature of the worship he offers to the Father as both priest and sacrifice. This chapter focuses on Aquinas's teaching in *ST* III, q. 22, where he defines a priest as one who mediates between God and man. Due to the hypostatic union, Christ's mediation involves the "descending" offer of divine precepts and gifts to humanity and the "ascending" offer of man's satisfaction and prayers to God (72). Christ satisfied for sinners by the voluntary, charitable offering of himself in sacrifice. He interiorly offered his will in love and obedience to the Father from the moment of his conception, and he handed over his body to immolation on the Cross (76). Christ's sacrifice was "one unique action" that he offered at every moment of his life, but he "consummates" this sacrifice on Calvary (82). Then, in heaven, Christ "continues to offer the Father the homage of his cult" and "continues to offer himself entirely in sacrifice, presenting the stigmata of his Passion in his glorified flesh to the Father" (86–87). The perfection of Christ's sacrifice does not eliminate the human need to practice external acts of religion; rather, it heals and elevates that natural tendency of man. As Aquinas put it, Christ's Passion "inaugurated the Rites of the Christian religion" (*ST* III, q. 62, a. 5).

These rites consist principally of the sacraments, which are the subject of chapter 4. Focusing upon Aquinas's treatise on the sacraments in general (*ST* III, qq. 60–65), Quoëx emphasizes the distinction between the *sanctifying* and *cultic* aspect of the sacraments and connects both to the priesthood of Christ. Through the sacraments, which are like extensions of Christ's humanity in the world, God descends to sanctify man. At the same time, the sacramental rites themselves are external ritual signs through which the Church shares in Christ's ascending worship of the Father (95–98). Through the words, deeds, objects, and ministers of the sacraments, Christ the high priest offers acts of external worship to the Father. The sacramental characters imparted through Baptism, Confirmation, and especially Holy Orders enable the members of Christ's mystical body to participate in those external acts of religion and thus in the priestly ministry of Christ (104). Christ himself is the "principal minister of the Sacraments," and those possessing sacramental character(s) "are only extrinsic instruments of his sovereign and eternal priesthood" (113).

Chapter 5 details how the Eucharist is "Christ and the Church's act of worship *par excellence*" (118). Quoëx begins by summarizing Aquinas's

teaching on the Eucharist as a sacrament, a *holy thing* that sanctifies its recipients precisely because it is the substantial presence of Christ himself (118–22). He then devotes the majority of the chapter to analyzing how it is that the Sacrament of the Eucharist is also a sacrifice, or an *action* in which something is offered up to God (125–26). For Aquinas, this sacrificial action "takes place essentially through the double consecration" (127): "the sacrifice of this sacrament is offered by consecrating" (*ST* III, q. 82, a. 10) (128). Aquinas identifies two reasons why the consecration of the Eucharist is called a "sacrifice" (130). The first is that "the celebration of this sacrament is an image representing (*imago repraesentativa*) Christ's Passion" (*ST* III, q. 83, a. 1). Quoëx argues that the double consecration of Christ's flesh and blood is not merely a symbol of Calvary but rather makes the sacrificial victim and offering of Calvary "present . . . in an immediate and contemporary manner" (131). The second reason, following from the first, is that the Eucharist makes the "effect" of Christ's Passion present and applies its fruits to those for whom the sacramental immolation of Christ is offered. These fruits are received primarily through Holy Communion (135). Finally, the Eucharist is a participation not only in the worship Christ offered on Calvary but also in "the liturgy of heaven" (140). For from heaven Christ continues to offer to the Father the visible sacrifice of his crucified and risen flesh as well as the invisible sacrifice of his love and obedience, and this sacrifice is the eternal source of grace for both the Church Triumphant and Militant (140–41).

The conclusion recaps the primary arguments of the book and provides a link to the appendices, which follow by observing the "two levels of 'rituality'" in the sacraments: As acts of external worship, the celebration of each sacrament involves an essential rite that is "of divine institution" as well as an additional set of rituals that are of "ecclesiastical institution" (155). The former are the words, actions, and things that constitute the form and matter of the sacraments, while the latter express the Church's infused virtue of religion (157) and "belong to the solemnity which is added to the sacraments in order to arouse devotion and reverence in the recipients" (*ST* III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 1). As Aquinas points out, these ecclesially instituted rites also instruct the faithful and refrain the power of the devil from hindering the effects of the sacraments in their recipients (*ST* III, q. 66, a. 10). The Church's liturgy consists principally in the former, but even the latter participate in the sanctifying worship Christ offers to the Father.

The appendices illustrate the nature and purpose of rites of ecclesiastical institution within the celebration of the sacraments by examining Aquinas's commentary on the various prayers and actions of the Mass as provided

in *ST* III, q. 83, aa. 4–5. Appendix I is devoted largely to contextualizing Aquinas's analysis of the Eucharistic rites. Quoëx further details the distinction between the sacraments themselves and the solemnity (or sacramentals) that surround them (168–77). He considers the medieval genre of *expositio missae* and identifies sources that may have influenced Aquinas (177–82 and 192–95). He then argues that Aquinas's own *expositio* is noteworthy for its attention to *both* the literal and spiritual senses of the liturgical rites, even if at times he falls into excessively allegorical interpretations (183–92). The final contextual piece summarizes the nature and historical development of the specific *ordo* of the Mass that Aquinas used (196–201).

The remainder of Appendix I and all of Appendix II provide a detailed analysis of the content of Aquinas's *expositio missae*. Appendix I identifies the four parts that Aquinas sees in the Mass: the Preparation (penitential rite), the Instruction (liturgy of the word), the Mystery (Offertory, Consecration, and Communion), and the Thanksgiving (Conclusion). It also summarizes Aquinas's understanding of the "Actors" (205) of the celebration (priest, ministers, people, and *schola*), and the "Actions" (209) at the altar, including the frequent signs of the cross by the priest during the Canon (214–17). Appendix II walks the reader step-by-step through Aquinas's interpretations of the various prayers and actions in the Mass's four parts and includes a brief but helpful history of the Roman Canon (235–37) as well as an explanation of the meaning of the word "Mass" (*Missa*) (247). The appendices may be particularly helpful to those who find the Traditional Latin Mass (TLM) to be obscure and cold; while Quoëx's purpose is not to provide a defense of the TLM, his analysis of Aquinas's *expositio missae* nonetheless sheds welcome light on the basic intelligibility and logic of the structure and parts of that form of the Mass.

Quoëx's book is thoroughly researched, well organized, and written in a clear and direct manner. While of obvious interest to Thomists and liturgists, I would also recommend the book to all well-read priests and laity who are looking for principles that can inform the American Church's efforts toward Eucharistic revival. Quoëx shows that external acts of worship are a natural response of man to God meant to express and foster reverence and gratitude. Further, the rites of solemnity that surround a particular sacrament should reflect the essential reality of that sacrament. The essential rite of the Eucharist, instituted by God himself, consists of the sacrificial offering and double consecration of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, followed by the consumption of the sacrificial victim. The essence of the Eucharistic rite is thus to sacramentally commemorate and make present the flesh and blood of Christ that was sacrificed for us on Calvary. Consequently, the rites of ecclesial institution that surround the divinely instituted rite of the Eucharist should

contribute to the faithful's recognition of and response to the essence of the sacramental rite. Do our words and deeds in the Mass express and foster reverence for Christ's Eucharistic presence, the grateful memory of his Passion, and worthy participation in his sacrificial flesh? Regardless of the form of the Eucharistic liturgy that someone attends or presides at (TLM, Novus Ordo, Byzantine, etc.), Quoëx's book invites us to examine our consciences on this point. N&V

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