

Book Reviews

Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call: Francisco Marin-Sola on Sufficient Grace by Michael D. Torre (*Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2013*), xxxiv + 404 pp.

DR. MICHAEL TORRE, former president of the American Maritain Association (2012–2016) and professor of philosophy at the University of San Francisco, has done a great service for Catholic theology in the English-speaking world by: (1) translating three pivotal articles written on “the Thomist system regarding the divine motion” by the largely (unfortunately!) forgotten Spanish Thomist Francisco Marin-Sola, O.P.; (2) arguing effectively in favor of such while providing a detailed review of all the theologians and philosophers who have utilized or critiqued Marin-Sola’s work on grace in one form or another; and (3) sharing his encyclopedic knowledge of the context of Marin-Sola’s articles, both historical, theological, and polemical.

The structure of the book is simple: (1) introduction to Marin-Sola’s life and work; (2) a chapter comprising the three articles themselves (in English); (3) a chapter on the reception of these articles by other theologians and philosophers since their publication in the 1920s, called “Conclusion;” (4) an afterword on how Aquinas understood the salvific will of God, utilizing the particular Dominican tradition of which Marin-Sola’s work formed the capstone, and bringing it into congruence with modern magisterial developments; and (5) a set of appendices, one of which is a translated compilation of selections from Marin-Sola’s unpublished *Concordia Tomista* (equivalent to some 1500 pages), which were already made available in the original Spanish in the 2009 published version of Torre’s dissertation, *God’s Permission of Sin: Negative or Conditioned Decree? A Defense of the Doctrine of Francisco Marin-Sola, O.P., based on the Principles of Thomas Aquinas* (Fribourg Academic Press), which Reinhard Hütter reviews in *The Thomist* 76 (2012; pp. 305–11 in no. 2). Although I am sure he would dispute this, Torre’s own original contributions to the volume are almost as significant as the articles themselves written by Marin-Sola. Not only is the context he provides indispensable, but also perhaps most impressive is the extremely thorough chapter on the reception of Marin-Sola’s theses and his own recapitula-

tion of the Dominican tradition leading up to the controversy in tandem with more recent magisterial teaching on the salvific will of God, not to mention the appendix that details the vast swath of Thomists cited by Marin-Sola with invaluable annotations.

Hence, it is impossible to give an adequate summary of this work in a few pages due to the extreme complexity and depth of the topic—this is probably why Marin-Sola has been so neglected (most of his work concerned this issue, with the notable exception of his also very laudable work, *La evolución homogénea del dogma católico*), and why Torre has not yet received the recognition he deserves for this mammoth scholarly accomplishment. Most theologians steer clear of the vexed questions surrounding the (in) famous *de auxiliis* controversy because they either assume the debates are intractable or fear entering them would require dedicating their entire careers to the topic. The Dominican professor at Fribourg, successor to Norberto del Prado, O.P. (a theologian of grace on whom Reginald Garrigou-Lagrangé, O.P., relied heavily), was courageous enough, indeed, to take on Reginald Garrigou-Lagrangé, the longtime chair of dogmatic and mystical theology at Rome's University of St. Thomas Aquinas (the Angelicum) on this key issue. Torre has demonstrated in an article published in *Nova et Vetera* 4, no. 1 (2006): 55–94 that Jacques Maritain's more well-known treatment of this topic was largely indebted to Marin-Sola via correspondence with Charles Journet.

Michael Torre's research in this arena is simply unparalleled. Hopefully, this volume will encourage others to consider Marin-Sola's arguments against the understanding of *praemotio physica* with respect to moral evil in terms of infallible antecedent permissive decrees. The fundamental arguments of this volume are: (1) there is no metaphysical or Thomistic exegetical ground for consigning sufficient grace to inevitable extrinsic inefficacy, but rather much reason to assert the reality of impedible divine motion and the true *sufficiency* (i.e., fallible efficacy) of "sufficient grace;" and (2) there were Thomist commentators before Cajetan and especially in response to the Jansenist controversy who understood Aquinas in the same manner as Marin-Sola, who sought to explicate this interpretation against the pre-Jansenist articulation of Bañez (in line with Cajetan) stridently defended, even if slightly mollified, by Thomists of his time like Garrigou-Lagrangé. Torre expands especially on the latter as "the way of Gonet," as opposed to "the way of Bañez" (62). The two ways diverge on the nature of the divine permission of moral evil because they understand sufficient grace differently. According to the "way of Gonet" defended by Marin-Sola and Torre, only the grace of justification need be infallibly efficacious, but the imperfect preparatory graces leading to justification and subsequent

actual graces may be impeding motions, that is, efficacious on the condition that they are not resisted, a negative condition that is within the range of fallen human freedom, the ultimate source of moral evils.

Some Thomists are particularly concerned about the implications of this line of interpretation (which they would call revisionist) for Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity. But it is no more difficult for Marin-Sola or Torre to reconcile their position with divine simplicity than it is for Garrigou-Lagrange to reconcile the distinction between divine mercy and justice with the same doctrine or the latter with the non-necessary *de facto* choice of God to be a Creator (as he does beautifully in his 1914 *Dieu, Son Existence et Sa Nature: Solution Thomiste des Antinomies Agnostiques* [Paris: Beauchesne]), or to reconcile with divine simplicity the Incarnation of only one divine person alone or even the very distinction of *relatio* between three divine persons identical to one divine essence. None of this is to undermine divine simplicity, but to admit that it is a challenge for human reason to unify this truth of natural theology with the truths of divine revelation. Maritain addresses the question of divine suffering that relates to this doctrine of divine permission that he defends in his famed essay ("Quelques réflexions sur le savoir théologique," *Revue thomiste* 69 [1969]: 5–27).

Others may be concerned with the potential implications for spiritual theology. I am certainly no expert in that field (although I suffered through four years of novitiate and religious life in the now largely defunct Legion of Christ), but I do not see how one who believes God plans every moral evil is better equipped to entrust one's life to the Lord than one who believes moral evil is always (or almost always) introduced by finite creatures acting "outside of" the provident realm of pure goodness. Put differently, one who believes that every evil must "cross the Master's desk" is as well equipped not to demand anything from the Creator (or to presume upon his goodness) as one who believes that God is not reluctant, as it were, to permit moral evils. In fact, it would seem one who thinks God abandons human beings to their own inevitably deficient devices prior to any demerit on their part professes a God who does not wish to exercise his infinite love toward them (except insofar as punishing them for their inevitable faults could qualify as love). How is it spiritually healthier to believe that God plans out every evil that occurs in my life and in world history than to believe that he merely permits moral evils by not preventing them from being committed (for a greater good in the end)? It is hard enough to understand why God does not prevent certain evils. Good metaphysics does not contradict the revelation of an infinitely loving Father, and equally, divine revelation does not require a metaphysics of symmetry

between the lines of good and evil, as Marin-Sola and Torre make clear.

While Marin-Sola's answer to the perplexing problem of reconciling infallible divine foreknowledge with non-infallible permission of each particular moral evil and divine simplicity is satisfactory to my eyes, there is always the possibility of improving upon the articulation, or at least addressing the issue from slightly different angles, as various figures from Maritain to Lonergan (see 237–38), to William Most, Robert Joseph Matava, Harm J. M. J. Goris, W. Matthews Grant, Brian Shanley, O.P., Michal Paluch, O.P. and others have attempted already, not to mention Torre himself in this volume (especially in the afterword). Accordingly, slight differences from Torre and Marin-Sola himself—even Torre diverges from Marin-Sola on limbo, for example—are valid for Thomists who are nonetheless opposed to the Bañezian (or Cajetanian) account on this question.

Particularly eye-opening for me was the very well substantiated claim that there has long been a lesser-known school of Thomistic interpretation regarding sufficient grace and the related notions of the antecedent–consequent will distinction and the manner in which God permits moral evils, especially since the Jansenist controversy, but also to some extent evident in commentators prior to and contemporaneous with Cajetan (e.g., Capreolus and Sylvester Ferrara). But regardless of where Aquinas ultimately landed on the question, it does not matter as much as does the truth itself. I think there is still some work to be done not merely in Aquinas's own potential historical development on this issue (e.g., is his later position significantly different from his earlier one, as Cajetan argues, or is it substantially the same on this question, as Ferrariensis argues?), but more so on how precisely to draw the diverse lines of interpretation that developed before and after the Jansenist controversy (particularly with respect to the nature of concupiscence), which perdure to this day, and perhaps also how to adjudicate the significance of the differences in the living figures I have named. With all that said, Torre's marvelous volume is well worth its cost for anyone who desires to be a scholar (or student) in the theology of grace. 

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Women, Enlightenment and Catholicism: A Transnational Biographical History, edited by Ulrich Lehner (*London: Routledge, 2018*), xi + 248 pp.

ULRICH LEHNER, one of the premiere historians of early modern Catholicism, brings together biographical essays of sixteen extraordinary women of the European Catholic Enlightenment. Over the last half-century, historians have amply demonstrated the existence and vitality of an eighteenth-century Catholic Enlightenment that fused the dogmatic and spiritual traditions of Roman Catholicism with the values and methodologies of the moderate and religious Enlightenments. It now falls to scholars to fill in a number of lacunae in the historiography of the Catholic Enlightenment. While some of the great female Catholic rulers of this era, such as the Habsburg empress Maria Theresa (1717–1780), have received a great deal of attention, the story of the Catholic Enlightenment is often narrated too exclusively as one of modernizing statesmen, reforming bishops, and scholarly male religious.

An impressive group of scholars have gifted us with a new point of departure for the study of Catholic women and the Enlightenment. Lehner's introduction situates these contributions in the historiography of the Catholic Enlightenment and gender studies. While research on women and the Enlightenment has "dramatically increased" in the last two decades, "women who were to a varying degree committed to their Catholic faith and the trends of the Catholic Enlightenment have . . . not gained much attention" (1). This neglect is all the more surprising since many of these women were famous during their lifetimes and some left very strong literary marks well into the nineteenth century.

While all sixteen of these short studies are of great value, I will expand upon several in what follows (while at least mentioning all). I have tried to select essays which give a good sense of the overall thrust of this project and of the vitality and diversity of women's contributions to the Catholic Enlightenment. These sixteen women are organized, roughly, into five geographical/linguistic regions: France, the Iberian peninsula, the Italian states, the German-speaking lands, and Britain.

Carolina Armenteros highlights the playwright, pedagogical theorist, and educator of royal children Félicité de Genlis (1746–1830) as "the French Catholic Enlightenment's foremost woman representative" (8). In her best-known work, the educational manual *Adelaide and Theodore*, de Genlis offered an "exceedingly erudite educational method that was an exact opposite of Rousseau's" (13). A friend of Voltaire, Rousseau, and d'Alembert, de Genlis broke with the *philosophes* over her "unwavering

habit of defending Christianity and attacking ‘false philosophy’” (9). Because of this, while de Genlis had an enthusiastic public following, certain circles of enlightened French elites were less enthusiastic about her work. Nevertheless, de Genlis’s scholarship on education was “secretly indebted” to Rousseau and she risked reducing religion to social utility and propagating a quasi-deism (13). De Genlis, famous in her day, should be remembered for “eclips[ing] previous educational methods” and contributing “influential pedagogical approaches” which endured well into the nineteenth century (13). Alicia C. Montoya and Therese Taylor also contribute essays (respectively) on French women: Marie Leprince de Beaumont (1711–1780), also a pedagogue, and Adélaïde d’Orléans (1698–1743), the Abbess of Chelles. It should be noted that, in a study of 254 catalogues of private libraries sold by auction before 1800, the works of Leprince de Beaumont appeared second in frequency only to Voltaire (32).

Moving south to the Iberian peninsula, Mónica Bolufer profiles the contributions of the Aragonese noblewoman Josefa Amar y Borbón (1749–1833), whose life and work opens “a window into the world of the Spanish Catholic Enlightenment” (50). Amar y Borbón, author of the 1786 *Discourse in Defense of Women’s Talent*, approached enlightenment from a practical, proto-feminist, and religious perspective. As with other Spanish enlighteners, the influences on Amar y Borbón cannot be reduced to a “passive assimilation” of foreign (particularly French) influences, but were grounded in “solid autochthonous roots” (53). Amar y Borbón’s views on rational devotion, social utility, and egalitarianism were rooted in Catholic and Spanish thinkers like the remarkable Benedictine scholar Benito Jerónimo Feijoo (1676–1764). Indeed, a consistent mark of the Spanish Catholic Enlightenment, which is also made apparent in other essays in this volume, was a civic commitment to the practical improvement of society at all levels (73–74).

María Gertrudis Hore (1742–1801), a Spanish nun and poet of Irish parentage, is studied by Elizabeth Franklin Lewis. Catherine M. Jaffe contributes a study of María Lorenza de los Ríos y Loyo (1761–1821), and Raquel Bello and Elias Torres round out Iberian subjects with an essay on the Portuguese countess of Vimieiro, Teresa de Mello Breyner (1739–1798?).

Two famous scholars from the Italian states are then considered. Rebecca Messbarger explores the relationship between faith and science in the work of the anatomist Anna Morandi Manzolini (1714–1774). Paula Findlen highlights the remarkable *professora* Laura Bassi (1711–78), perhaps, with the possible exception of the mathematician and mystic Maria Gaetana Agnesi of Milan, the most famous female Catholic enlight-

ener. Both Morandi and Bassi were daughters of Bologna, the second city of the Papal States, which, under Archbishop Prospero Lambertini (1675–1758; Pope Benedict XIV from 1740 to 1758) boasted a rich culture of enlightened Catholic scholarship. The physicist Bassi was a cultured, learned, and deeply pious Italian in the mid-eighteenth-century mold of Lambertini and the scholar-priest Ludovico Muratori. She was also a devoted mother and one of the first European women to ever occupy a chaired professorship.

Four essays concern women from the German-speaking territories and Habsburg lands. The mix of cross-confessional Christianity with social action promoted by the sisters Maria Eleonora Sporck (1687–1717) and Anna Katharina Swéerts-Sporck (1689–1754) is explored by Veronika Čapská. Anke Gilleir introduces the enlightened Austrian Caroline Pichler (1769–1843), a novelist whose work was, in part, a counter to Edward Gibbon. Pichler's life was marked by the tumult of the aggressive Erastianism of Emperor Joseph II, the French Revolution, and the age of Restoration. Pichler's deep ambivalence with Joseph's project and its legacy highlights an enlightened voice critiquing the religious legacy of perhaps the most aggressive "enlightened despot" of the eighteenth century. Ute Kueppers-Braun chronicles the life of the princess-abbess of Essen, Maria Kunigunde of Saxony (1740–1826). Daughter of the King of Poland and sister to Elector Clemens Wezenslaus, archbishop of Trier (with whom she lived happily for much of her life), Kunigunde was a remarkably active enlightened reformer in her own right. In the tradition of imperial abbesses (*Fürstbittissinnen*), she was invested by pope and emperor with temporal authority in her small territory. A victim of misogynistic historiography, her accomplishments are too little-known. Andreas Oberdorf's chapter on Amalia von Gallitzin (1748–1806) is an investigation of an important figure and also illuminates the transnational character of Catholic enlightenment. Gallitzin, daughter of a Prussian field marshal and wife of a Russian prince, was an active contributor to the *Kreis von Münster* (Circle of Münster), a loose network of enlightened reformers. Her son, Demetrius, spent his career in America. Under the enlightened bishop John Carroll, Demetrius was ordained a priest for the nascent American Catholic Church.

Moving to the persecuted Catholicism of the British Isles, Michael Tomko profiles the thought of Elizabeth Inchbald (1753–1821), who occupied a political and intellectual place in between revolutionary Jacobinism and "Cisalpinism" (a patriotic, establishment form of English Catholicism). Much to the benefit of many future readers, a stutter pushed the beautiful young Inchbald from the stage to the desk. After a career as

a brilliant novelist and playwright, Inchbald (maddeningly) burned her memoirs, page by page, at the recommendation of Bishop William Poynter. Anna Battigelli's portrait of the convert Jane Barker (1652–1732) will be of great interest to students of Jacobitism (that is, supporters of the Catholic Stuart line against the reigning Protestant Hanoverians) and those interested in the fascinating debates which raged in English and French political and religious life in this period. In a counter-intuitive historical twist, explored recently in Gabriel Glickman's masterful monograph *The English Catholic Community, 1688–1745*, Jacobites were at the forefront of discussions of freedom of conscience and the acceptance of *de facto* religious pluralism in a tolerant public sphere. Barker, a romance writer who was "close to being the poet laureate of the exiled Stuarts" (204; Battigelli citing Paul Korshin), was one of the most important English appropriators of the thought of François Fénelon (1651–1715), one of the intellectual and spiritual giants of French Catholicism in this period.

Finally, in a fascinating essay, Agnieszka Whelan introduces Izabela Czartoryska (1745–1835), a learned Polish aristocrat whose engagement in gardening cultivated a sacred, religious place for local peasants and advanced "the ideas and aesthetic principles of the Enlightenment" (216).

This collection will no doubt be the first port of call for scholars and students of women Catholic enlighteners. One of the exciting elements of the volume is that one is left with a sense that many future paths have been opened up for more sustained consideration of women in the Catholic Enlightenment. What was the place of women, especially educated, enlightened women, in the exciting and internecine debates that rocked the eighteenth-century Church: the suppression of the all-male Society of Jesus? The controversies over "effeminate" and "novel" devotions like the Sacred Heart? The statist and pseudo-rationalist Erastian phenomena? Was there any enduring appeal of Jansenism to eighteenth-century women, a movement so shaped by female theological learning and resistance to ecclesial and state tyranny at least until the destruction of Port-Royal by Louis XIV in 1711? Did female Catholic enlighteners, especially women religious, have networks comparable to the many enlightened networks of male religious? Those who are intrigued by these questions, and by the story of Catholic women of great faith and learning will find in this volume an enjoyable and immensely useful launching point. 

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Kardinal Leo Scheffczyk (1920–2005): Das Vermächtnis seines Denkens für die Gegenwart, mit wissenschaftlichem Gesamtverzeichnis seiner Schriften, edited by Johannes Nebel, F.S.O. (*Regensburg: Pustet, 2017*), 416 pp.

Spanish translation without Scheffczyk's bibliography:

Cardenal Leo Scheffczyk (1920–2005): el Legado de su Pensamiento para la Actualidad, edited by Johannes Nebel, translated by José Ramón Villa (*Pamplona: EUNSA, 2017*), 295 pp.

WITHOUT LEO SCHEFFCZYK (1920–2005)—the student of the significant Munich dogmatician Michael Schmaus and along with the later cardinals Yves Congar and Alois Grillmeier editor of the multi-volume standard reference work *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte*—German-language Catholic theology is unimaginable in the second half of the twentieth century. In addition, he was co-editor of the six-volume and unsurpassed *Marienlexikon*. His bibliography lists more than two thousand titles, partially translated into twelve languages.

Now a conference volume is available, carefully edited by Johannes Nebel, F.S.O, with nine papers on various aspects of Scheffczyk's extensive *oeuvre*, which were delivered at an international symposium on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Scheffczyk's death (2015) in Thalbach Monastery, Austria.

Scheffczyk's former student and now Augsburg emeritus dogmatics ordinary Anton Ziegenaus spoke about Scheffczyk's understanding of history as constantly sustained by God's salvific will and therefore always a potential locus of divine truth (23–33; all references to the original German edition). The dogma spoken into history ennobles humankind—*pace* Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Rahner. The highest possible reason for this is the Incarnation of the Son of God as the "culmination point of history and revelation; the fullness of time (Gal 4:4)." Due to his comprehensive knowledge of the history of dogma, Scheffczyk succeeds in making the Christian dogma formulated in time, but standing above time, understandable for today. It is ultimately "God's Spirit" who makes this possible through sacramental mediation. Thus, Scheffczyk is able to protect the personal dimension of faith from Rahner's transcendental Thomism or Teilhard's evolutionism.

In material continuation of Ziegenaus's lecture, the contribution of Imre v. Gaál (Chicago; this reviewer) (34–55) roots Scheffczyk's thinking in his first work, his 1952 dissertation on the historiographical achievement in

the sweeping *History of the Religion of Jesus Christ* (1806–18) by Friedrich Leopold Count zu Stolberg. Since history is ultimately always participation in the divine, there can be no autonomous immanence—on this point he parallels de Lubac. This explains both the theologian Scheffczyk's deep optimism and his skepticism against any appropriation of the mysteries of faith through rigid systemic thinking (*pace* Rahner). Stolberg's historical context between Enlightenment and Romanticism sharpens Scheffczyk's own view of contemporary events (according to Hauke) and enables him to develop a theology that is actually "classical," à la John Henry Newman, Matthias Scheeben, Yves Congar, or Dumitru Stăniloae.

With ample philosophical accentuations, the Protestant theologian Harald Seubert (Basel, Switzerland) spoke about Scheffczyk's repeatedly translated key work *Katholische Glaubenswelt: Wahrheit und Gestalt* (*The Universe of Faith. Truth and Form*; published first in 1977) (56–78). In agreement with the Anselmic axiom *fides quaerens intellectum*, Scheffczyk is concerned with the integration of theology and metaphysics, thus contrasting the Catholic *et . . . et* with the Reformatory *solus*. Seubert sums up: "According to Scheffczyk, the structural moment of the [Catholic] universal is suited to unite the modern pluralities that otherwise threaten to stand either in relativistic indifference or in splinter-like and divisive conflict to one another" (63; all English translations are original to this review).

Scheffczyk's teaching on the Blessed Trinity is—at times critically—presented by Thomas Marschler, successor to Ziegenaus in the dogmatic chair in Augsburg (79–106). In particular, Scheffczyk's *Der Gott der Offenbarung* (*The God of Revelation*) is discussed. With profound knowledge of neo-Scholasticism, he shows how Scheffczyk, entirely in the spirit of the Second Vatican Council (*Optatam Totius* §16), follows a three-step approach when presenting dogmatic contents: exegetical findings first, followed by a presentation of the historical development, and thereupon speculative penetration. Completely *d'accord* with *Dei Verbum*, revelation is perceived as "self-communication of a personal God" (83). Rahner's apparent conflation of the economic and immanent Trinity is corrected by Scheffczyk through further differentiations. He clearly distances himself from a functional understanding of God à la Moltmann, Barth, and the death theology of God. Ultimately, the liveliness of a triune God *a se* is indispensable for asserting the dignity of the human person. Mary is *the* unsurpassable paradigm for a successful relationship between man and the Blessed Trinity. Parallels to Schmaus and Johann Auer are drawn. The congeniality with the most important theologian of the nineteenth century, Matthias Scheeben, is shown. Marschler states: "Scheffczyk is

thus a representative of a type of Catholic dogmatics in the 20th century that translates tradition into a new synthesis." (103).

The Freiburg (Germany) dogmatician Helmut Hoping reflects on Scheffczyk's Christology (107–20). The *point d'appui* is Bultmann's attempt to mythologize the birth of Jesus and Scheffczyk's rejection of his position and those of Hans Küng and Edward Schillebeeckx as well. Scheffczyk emphasizes the irreducible intertwinedness of "Christology from below" and "Christology from above" (109). With Walter Kasper Scheffczyk argues, so Hoping summarizes, "Jesus was not a god walking on earth, who would have clothed himself with the livery of a human body, but a true man" (110). On this point he also agreed with his Protestant Munich colleague Wolfhart Pannenberg. God acts *mediante natura*, via secondary causes. Therefore, the dogmas of Nicaea and Chalcedon do not contradict the laws of nature. The resurrection of Christ does not experience a plausibility crisis through the natural sciences.

The doctrine of grace experienced a period of neglect in the time between 1970 and 2010. Ursula Lievenbrück (Augsburg) competently explains how Scheffczyk took up the cudgels for the theological dimension of faith in this time (121–47), although this topic did not stand in the foreground of his writings. In dialogue with Scheeben, de Lubac, Rahner, and von Balthasar (*Apokatastasis*), Scheffczyk overcame the narrow manualistic understanding of grace; now personalized, grace is perceived "communicating divine love" (124). It is "the power that deeply affects man, touches his personal center and heals and elevates his innermost being" (126) which leads to the vision of God—according to Scheffczyk. New and groundbreaking is Scheffczyk's view of the "interaction of grace and freedom" (145), thereby echoing the charitological treatises of his teacher Schmaus and Regensburg colleague Johann Auer: of supernatural *gratia sanctificans* and natural *gratia sanans*. Lievenbrück apprehends Scheffczyk's proximity to the neo-Scholastic understanding of grace as a weakness. However, she confuses method and presentation with content. Actually, on this point, Scheffczyk is not inspired by Joseph Pohle or others like him, but by the speculative and original Scheeben.

The longest contribution comes from the Scheffczyk student and dogmatician Manfred Hauke (Lugano, Switzerland) (148–85). The Mariologist Hauke explains why Scheffczyk is the doyen of German-speaking Mariology. About 20 percent of the writings of this theologian are dedicated to Mariology, including his 1959 habilitation on Marian devotion during the Carolingian period, which "established Scheffczyk's fame as a Mariologist and dogma historian" (151). His final volume of *Katholische Dogmatik* sets standards in this discipline. Hauke describes knowledge-

ably the genesis of the six-volume Marian encyclopedia *Marienlexikon* (1988–1994). He also shows how Scheffczyk draws from the Mariology of Petrus Canisius. Against Rahner, he successfully takes exception with an “anthropocentric levelling of the Marian truth” (160). The *Ekklesia* is essentially Marian: the Marian and Petrine principles determine and enable each other. Scheffczyk is attached to the title *Coredemptrix*, but does not deepen it. In a balanced way Scheffczyk opts for Mary as Mother of God *and* companion of the Redeemer as “the Mariological fundamental principle.”

In a stylistically successful way Veit Neumann (St. Pölten, Austria) sheds light on the literary interests of the theologian Scheffczyk in the context of the grace–nature *problématique* (186–207). He read Georges Bernanos, François Mauriac, Ernst Jünger, Graham Greene, Feodor Dostoyevsky, Gertrud von Le Fort, and Dick Ouwendijk. In 1951 Scheffczyk gave a lecture entitled “Georges Bernanos: The Reality and the Mystery of Grace” in Königstein (near Frankfurt). On that occasion, he criticized that Bernanos did not integrate “the Catholic *et . . . et*” into his novel *Diary of a Country Priest*. Also in Königstein, he gave a lecture in 1952 on “The priestly Figure in modern Literature.” Scheffczyk’s language is presented as exemplary.

The editor, Father Johannes Nebel (Thalbach, Austria), writes the last paper about the personality of Scheffczyk in relation to his theology in a sensitive and knowledgeable way. Character traits appear which are normative for every priest and theologian. Notably in the 1980s, the Germanist and theologian von Balthasar considered Scheffczyk the most important German-speaking dogmatician of his time. His character was shaped by his Catholic faith, more precisely by his Upper Silesian parents (miners), by the Jesuit-led youth movement *Neudeutschlandbund*, and by Breslau Seminary (now Wrocław, Poland). He must have had a charisma that successfully united “leadership and solidarity” (217). Thus he became class president and *Obersenior* (key student representative) in the seminary. This combination of “character formation and faith orientation” logically led to the priestly gift of magnanimous surrender of self to Christ. In an epoch that (also) put the individual (theologian) in the foreground, Scheffczyk exemplified “self-denial in the service of Catholic universality” (225). This can also be seen in the “purity” of [his] linguistic articulation” (231) long before his time as a renowned theologian. To underscore this, Nebel quotes from three poems written by Scheffczyk in 1939, 1943, and 1944.

A special feature of this volume is Scheffczyk’s exhaustive bibliography, meticulously compiled by Nebel (241–416), which is systematically and chronologically ordered. All previous bibliographies are thus obsolete—

even that compiled by the German, otherwise stellar *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*! This volume is indispensable for everyone who wants to become familiar with the thinking and work of this important Catholic theologian.

The reviewer looks forward to the next Scheffczyk symposium in Lugano, Switzerland in 2020. N.V.

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A Saint for East and West: Maximus the Confessor's Contribution to Eastern and Western Christian Theology, edited by Daniel Haynes (*Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2019*), xxv + 281 pp.

THIS BOOK takes as a supposition that the contentious essence-energy problems between Gregory Palamas and Thomas Aquinas have reached an impasse in modern ecumenical discussion. In an effort to overcome that impasse, the book recommends turning to Maximus the Confessor as a common patristic source in which Christians of different stripes can recognize themselves and each other, behind and prior to the challenging theological differences between East and West that sharpened in the post-Photian and post-Schism period. The ecumenical significance of Maximus for Greek and Latin Christianity is rightly placed at the center of the collection. Still, the shadow of the Palamite controversy looms over many of its essays and appears to have been a part of the impetus for the volume. A number of contributions are implicitly or explicitly devoted to concepts that refer back to Palamas: participation, divine energy, metaphysics, and Maximus's theory of the *logoi*.

Along the way, Maximus is also brought to bear on other issues of ecumenical import (the papacy, the *Filioque*, and the concept of the natural and of human nature) and broad issues in moral theology (like the concept of the will and the imitation of Christ). The essays make various and not wholly consonant use of Maximus, which is to be expected from a cast of authors of different ecclesial backgrounds. Given the different uses of Maximus in the volume, I find it useful to distinguish the essays into two groups: those whose interest in Maximus appears subordinate to later receptions of his thought or to the author's own modern attempt to forge a path forward; and those whose interest in Maximus I take to be primarily

in understanding him as he would have us understand him.

Adrian Guiu's essay (chapter 1) focuses on Eriugena's reception of Maximus's thought regarding the neo-Platonic *exitus-reditus*. Guiu commendably demonstrates a great deal of care in presenting each of these thinkers accurately, especially when it comes to their differing conceptions of the central mediating cosmic reality in bringing about the *reditus*. For Eriugena, it is the human intellect; for Maximus, however, is it the incarnate Logos (28–29). Guiu, in my estimation, gives Eriugena's difference from Maximus on this point a relatively easy pass. I would have liked to see more critical examination of the anthropological and Christological stakes in this difference. Does the human mind, in fact, overcome all the "divisions" in the world, including that between created and uncreated (5–6)? Maximus would surely say no; only a Christological solution can adequately address this aspect of the *reditus*. Yet Guiu does not challenge Eriugena with a question at the heart of Maximus's theological vision.

Adam Cooper (chapter 5) reviews various well-explored areas of Maximus's Christology in good detail and accuracy. He is rightly concerned with the concept of the will and of natural desire that came to a climax in the dyothelite controversies. He brings to bear the action theory of Livio Melina (86–87), attempting to resolve the tension of Jesus's Gethsemane prayer by means of an analysis of filial relation (100). Cooper wants to avoid a solution to Jesus's prayer that places a struggle between Jesus's humanity and his divinity (89), yet I am increasingly convinced that the concepts of instinct and impulse that predominate academic discussion in this area (95–96; or "initial motions" on 94) are insufficient to either comprehend Maximus or resolve his claim that nothing natural resists God. Melina may help *clarify*, but *resolution* requires new parameters for discussion (which I note at the end).

Luis Granados (chapter 7) considers Maximus's pneumatology in relation to his Christology. The matter is well-worth consideration, as Maximus's pneumatology (apart from the *Filioque*) has not attracted a great deal of attention in recent scholarship. Granados's thesis presses into contentious ground in Maximian studies, as he stakes out a position in favor of a "progressive" deification of Christ's humanity. This position is often formulated as a way to encourage an *imitatio Christi* in Christ's followers, yet it runs into challenges in conceptualizing Christ's virtue. Such is the case for Granados as well: he speaks of Christ walking "toward" God's likeness (126), progressing "toward" virtue (127), and needing exercise to "attain the different virtues" (129). I would ask of Granados's account: prior to this walking, progress, and exercise, would Maximus maintain that Christ is in fact virtuous? If he was somehow lacking in virtue at some

earlier point in his life, how did Maximus (and how do we) maintain the *imitatio Christi* at all?

Christophe Erismann (chapter 3) does strong work in his articulation of the way that Maximus's view of universals fits into broader contemporary Aristotelian and neo-Platonic discussion. His article has much to commend it in setting the philosophical scene for Maximus's speculations. However, I worry that a certain anachronism is found in Erismann's identification of Maximus as a "philosopher" (50). One notices Erismann's hesitancy in this regard when he becomes circumspect about exactly how Maximus came to be aware of the relevant philosophical issues, especially universal deletion (59). Did Maximus read Aristotle or other neo-Platonic commentators? (54). Does it matter that Maximus's awareness of universal deletion seems to rise directly from its presentation in Nemesius's *On the Nature of Man* (ch. 43) and in the context (both in Maximus and Nemesius) of a *reductio ad absurdum* of Aristotelian claims, whose proponents are identified as the "outsider philosophers"? Maximus's ecclesial and monastic culture did not easily assign authority to non-Christian thinkers, and I suspect Maximus himself would have paused over a copy of the *Metaphysics* circulating under its author's name. Joshua Lollar's essay (discussed below) clears some of this air.

The final and most important (or perhaps egregious?) example of the first group is the contribution of John Milbank (chapter 10), whose sprawling essay (nearly one fifth of the volume) roams across centuries of neo-Platonic and Christian reflection on the pattern of *exitus–reditus* in order to arrive at a reading of Aquinas as more Byzantine—allowing greater participation in the divine—than Palamas (191). Along the way, Milbank enlists Maximus briefly as a champion of his cause (four mentions in total: 162; 172; 175; 184–87), but I left those portions of the essay with a much clearer sense of what Milbank thinks than what Maximus may have meant. In particular, Milbank tends to construe Maximus's *logoi* as created beings (162; 186), which stands, to say the least, in contrast to the way the *logoi* are discussed and construed in a number (all?) of the relevant essays in the volume (for example: 60; 207; 212). Methodologically, the shortcoming of Milbank's approach (and of Guiu's and Erismann's essays) is his apparent willingness to speak of metaphysics as a category separable from theology—and specifically from Christology—in Maximus's thought. If Milbank is correct that participation in God is imitation of God (193–95), he can hardly convey Maximus's approach to this issue without invoking the imitation of *Christ* along the way. Yet Christology appears in his essay only briefly in relation to Augustine and never in relation to Maximus.

In contrast, most of the essays in my second division place Maximus's

metaphysics in explicit relation to his central theological categories (like askesis, Christology, and Eucharistic participation). These linkages are indispensable to an accurate (and ultimately fully useful) account of Maximus's thought, no matter how various philosophical and ecclesial loyalties might narrowly benefit from a more denuded presentation of Maximus. The interdependence of Maximus's philosophical and theological thought is made explicit in Andrew Louth's excellent introduction (xxi) and in Lollar's essay (chapter 14), where his analysis of the *Ambigua to John* leaves little doubt that Maximus recognizes no distinct field of study that would constitute philosophy over against theology or vice versa (247). Maximus's analysis of the Transfiguration is directly opposed to such a division, seeing the world and Scripture as parallel and equal ways in an approach to union with the divine. While Lollar's analysis renders Maximus somewhat ecumenically ambiguous, Nikolaos Loudovikos's introduction to his essay (chapter 11) eloquently defends this "deep-dive" approach to Maximus (and all of historical and ecumenical theology): it is only by understanding Maximus and Aquinas *rightly* in their own modes of thought that we have a chance of understanding our (hopefully convergent) appropriations of the past in the present and in the future (204–6).

Edward Sicienski's contribution (chapter 2) is simultaneously explicitly focused on issues of ecumenical concern yet careful not to superimpose later theological trends onto Maximus's work. In so doing, he challenges Easterners and Westerners alike with a careful reading of Maximus's relatively terse commentary on the *Filioque* (32–40) and papal primacy (40–43). Instantiating the method proposed by Loudovikos, Sicienski provides a sense of the complexity of historical judgements about doctrine (43–49). In the West, his essay would almost surely have to be met with a careful reading of Newman's theory of doctrinal development.

Near the end of the volume, a trilogy of essays offer what I would categorize as reflections on Maximus's Eucharistic and Christocentric ontology, brought into conversation with the issues of participation that run throughout the volume. Loudovikos recommends an *ad fontes* to Thomas's sources, arguing that Maximus's theological categories help Aquinas say better what Aquinas already wishes to say. In Loudovikos's argument, Maximus's Eucharistic ontology "completes" Aquinas's conception of participation (216). Torstein T. Tollefsen (chapter 12) reads Maximus's conception of participation in explicitly Chalcedonian and Christological terms. His relatively brief essay offers useful Maximian reflection on the classic image of iron heated by fire as a metaphor for union with the divine (230), while keeping Maximus's Christological center in view (228). And Vladimir Cvetković (chapter 13) arranges Maximus's view of participa-

tion around a biblical salvation-history motif (234: a characteristically Maximian structuring of ontology around Scripture) in which the Eucharist becomes the icon of our eschatological participation in the Logos in heaven (244). In each of these essays, Maximus's idiom and voice shine through clearly. Further, these essays allow the reader to begin to imagine how theologians and philosophers might continue to imitate Maximus today.

Finally, I close with an emphatic nod toward Louth's introduction to the volume and the theological center of Maximus's thought to which it points: the ascetic and Christological issues that undergird Maximus's reflection on human nature (xxii). As already noted in relation to Cooper's and Granados's essays, modern academic literature often has a hard time maintaining Maximus's consistently optimistic account of the *logos* of human existence while also accounting for the role of ascetic struggle in his anthropology and Christology. If human nature is fundamentally good and oriented toward God, how is it that one (let alone Christ) could possibly be required to *struggle* against its inclinations (as Christ appears to do in Gethsemane)?

Other essays also wrestle indirectly with this difficult question. First, Rowan Williams's essay (chapter 9) argues for an intrinsic link between Maximus's ontology and askesis: even though natural contemplation is superior to the practical life, Maximus will not let us have the former without the latter. Further, askesis is bound to the struggle against passion, which Williams construes in his essay in the negative Stoic sense (145). But, I would interject, passion is not univocally evil in Maximus's thought: otherwise, how could Maximus describe Christ's assumption of passion in such positive terms? Though Williams certainly had no intentions of broaching this broader question, he has not fully inhabited here the thick web of askesis and human nature of which Maximus speaks in relation to Christ. Second, David Bradshaw (chapter 6) gives wonderfully insightful commentary on Maximus's conception of Christ's human will, including an analysis of Maximus's careful negotiation of intellectualist and voluntarist strains of thought in moral theology. Yet Bradshaw's interesting suggestion of a "democratic" form of choice that indwells the human will (114) will does not fully satisfy: what "voices" are heard in such a democracy and what kind of "vote" do they take?

Hints of Maximus's answers to these questions appear in the essay by Kallistos Ware (chapter 4) and, less directly, in Louth's introduction. Ware's essay focuses on Maximus's conception of the imitation of Christ. In the course of his argument, he considers the phenomenon of human temptation with special regard to Christ's exemplary experience of tempta-

tion (73–74). But Ware’s analysis does not stay within the anthropological bounds otherwise prescribed in the volume. That is, Ware does not lean solely on instinct, impulse, passion, and will to understand how Christ was tempted. No: for Ware (as for Maximus), Christ’s temptation was (and our temptation is) a confrontation with the devil (73–74). This recognition brings us to an important insight: the *demonological* is irreducible in understanding Maximus’s idiom on a wide array of theological issues raised throughout the volume and even in Louth’s introductory exhortation on Maximus’s conception of nature.

While Louth does not acknowledge the demonological component of Maximus’s askesis, anthropology, and Christology, the demonological is nonetheless buried in his analysis. Crucially, it is implied in Louth’s euphemistic use of the word “deceit” drawn from Maximus’s corpus: “It is only because of a deceit lodged in the soul that disciplined training and toil is necessary” (xxiii). Yet if human nature is oriented toward the divine as Louth insists, what is this embedded deceit and where does it come from? In my estimation, only reference to Maximus’s demonology suffices to fully unravel this knot in his view of human nature. The ripples from this fact radiate throughout Maximus’s corpus: back through passion, will, imitation, and nature and on to metaphysics, ontology, providence, and participation. As uncomfortable as Maximus’s realistic and practical view of the demonic may be in a modern demythologized cosmology, ignoring it will do no favors philosophically, theologically, or ecumenically in either the East or the West. The way forward requires an honest accounting of and a serious wrestling with these demons of the ascetic tradition. 

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God Visible: Patristic Christology Reconsidered by Brian E. Daley, S.J.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), xvii + 294 pp.

WE WHO MAKE OUR LIVING in Christology know that the work of Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., remains indispensable for understanding the Christology of the Church Fathers. As Brian Daley, S.J., reminds us, Grillmeier aimed to get *both* the history and theology of the Fathers right, especially the theology of the council of Chalcedon (5). These objec-

tives—and the erudition with which he met them—make him a teacher of perennial value for theologians who wish to do Christology in step with the Fathers and early conciliar teaching. Daley, Grillmeier's student, lauds his teacher's achievements; his book under review here, a heavily revised version of the 2002 Martin D'Arcy Lectures at Oxford, should be read as extending Grillmeier's analysis. But he thinks Grillmeier's work has limitations. Its main weakness is its interpretive grid. Grillmeier is famous for arguing in the first volume of *Christ and Christian Tradition* that patristic Christology begins with "Word-flesh" Christology and culminates in the "Word-man" Christology affirmed at Chalcedon. As a result, he tends to evaluate the Fathers—even pre-Chalcedonian ones—by whether their writings meet the conditions for the full reality of the two natures in Christ. His chief litmus test for this was to determine whether the Fathers made Christ's human soul a "theological factor." Daley argues that Grillmeier imposed a Chalcedonian grid on the Fathers, which led him to overlook what the Fathers were concerned about in many cases (8).

Daley tells us that Chalcedon is not the pinnacle of patristic Christology, but a "way station: one of several" in its development (22). For the teaching of Chalcedon was not universally and unambiguously received. Furthermore, to regard Chalcedon this way will have negative effects on theology: it will "narrow and distort reflection on the Mystery of Christ into an exercise in paradoxical metaphysics, an attempt simply to affirm that in Christ the infinite and the finite . . . are together a single individual—the wholly asymmetrical realms in and through which a single subject acts" (23). Daley does not spurn metaphysical teaching on Christ: far from it. But the balance of two natures in Christ "is not the whole of the Mystery" (23). If we read patristic Christology through the lens of the ontological lexicon of the Chalcedonian definition, we will surely miss a good deal of what the Fathers were concerned about. The solution, then, is to examine the patristic teaching on Christ "*apart* from the lens of the Chalcedonian definition, as well as *through* it" (24). In other words, we should let the Fathers' concerns guide our reading of their Christologies, without adopting the Chalcedonian definition as our only guiding hermeneutical principle. But Daley does not attempt to upend his mentor's work: reading the Fathers *through* the lens of the Chalcedonian definition is still beneficial. In this book, Daley complements Grillmeier's work with an account of patristic Christology that attends more closely to some of the themes the Fathers emphasized.

Some of these themes are surprising. Chapter 2, for example, focuses on second-century Christian texts that cut against the modern critique

that claims that second-century Christian teaching was thoroughly supersessionist. Some of these have been underexamined in Christology: *The Odes of Solomon* (ca. 100), a recently discovered set of Syriac poems, the letters of Ignatius of Antioch, *The Ascension of Isaiah* (an early apocalyptic text), Melito of Sardis's *On Pascha*, and the *Apologies* of Justin Martyr. For Daley, these texts are committed to the claim that Jesus reveals the God of Israel and that he fulfills his promise to Israel as foretold in the Hebrew Bible (63).

Chapter 3 is devoted to Irenaeus and Origen. Daley differs from Grillmeier clearly here. In his chapter on Origen, Grillmeier points out that Origen is not concerned with the ontological constitution of Christ. But he goes on to argue that Origen's Platonism kept him from striking a proper balance between divinity and humanity.¹ Daley deletes this Chalcedonian schema from his analysis of Origen. He attempts to show, instead, that Irenaeus and Origen are more concerned with how Christ reveals God to the human being (66). Both attend to Christ's central role in the biblical narrative of creation, fall, and redemption, and how he brings about salvation as the universal Savior of humanity mediated through the life of the Church and the sacraments. Scriptural exegesis and the life of prayer are the matrix for personal contact with Christ, and this is the most important thing Christology has to offer us (69, 91).

Daley moves to the fourth-century Trinitarian controversy in chapter 4. He argues that the Arian controversy was a crisis in how to understand divine mediation, that is, how God is related to the world and whether the Logos could be the subject of such a mediation while remaining fully divine (97). Arius, Marcellus of Ancyra, Eusebius of Caesarea, and Athanasius are the central figures of analysis. Interestingly, Daley defends Athanasius against Grillmeier's critique. For Grillmeier, Athanasius has a questionable Christology because he does not sufficiently mark off divine activity from human activity in Christ. Thus, the Logos thoroughly controls his humanity as its instrument (*organon*), overwhelming it (121–22).² Daley argues that asking Athanasius to conform to Chalcedonian standards this way misses his central concern: The Logos has become flesh to reveal God

¹ Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., *Christ in Christian Tradition*, vol. 1, *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, trans. John Bowden, 2nd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1975), 141, 147.

² Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 1:311–314. For another helpful rejoinder to Grillmeier along similar lines, see Khaled Anatolios, "The Body as Instrument: A Reevaluation of Athanasius' Logos-Sarx Christology," *Coptic Church Review* 18, no. 3 (1997), 78–84.

to us. This central concern is why Athanasius speaks of Christ's flesh as an instrument: it is the means by which the Logos reveals himself to us (122).

Chapter 5 examines the Christological controversies that escalated in the late fourth century with Apollinarius and his critics, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa. For Gregory of Nazianzus, the Word creates "communion" between divinity and humanity and paradoxically maintains both kinds of being in their full integrity in him. By transforming humanity in himself, the Logos brings humanity to its intended eschatological goal.

Chapter 6 offers a concise survey of Augustine's Christology. Daley covers well-trodden themes like the mediatorship of Christ, deification, and the basis for deification in Christ's "exchange of opposites," where Christ takes on the form of a servant to free us from pride and sin (168). Daley adds an intriguing discussion of Augustine's lesser-known *Epistle* 219 (to Leporius), where we see Augustine briefly address the ontological structure of Christ's person (156–58).

Chapter 7 considers the well-known scholarly distinction between the schools of Alexandria and Antioch. Grillmeier famously attributed "Word-flesh" Christology to the former and "Word-man" to the latter. Some of this is true, Daley argues, but the evidence presents a bit more complicated picture. He expounds the Christologies of Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius, and Cyril and argues they are concerned with answering more fundamental theological questions, like the relation of God to creatures, than pinning down the metaphysics of the Incarnation (195–98).

Chapter 8 covers major themes in post-Chalcedonian theology. Some of this material will be familiar to those who know Daley's work on Leontius of Byzantium and Maximus the Confessor. These theologians and John of Damascus are the central characters of this chapter. For them, Jesus Christ not only reveals God, but he also reveals *the way* God saves human beings. Maximus's famous distinction between *logos* and *tropos* in his *opuscula* is significant here: The Logos takes on the *logos* of human flesh, or human nature and its natural principles, so that his personal way (*tropos*) of existing and acting as man reveals his filial identity as the eternal Son, which also reveals the way we are saved in him (215–18). Christ displays in himself the goal for which God has intended all of us who belong to him. He is the beginning of the new creation and the first fruits of our redemption. Because we belong to him, we share in his divine life by participation. This chapter alone is worth the price of the book. It contributes to a growing body of scholarship on Leontius, Maximus, and John, and should be read by theologians who are trying to understand better what the hypo-

static union entails concerning the Logos's way of being and acting in the world and its effects on us.

Chapter 9 examines the competing Christologies of the iconoclastic controversies of the eighth and ninth centuries. The chapter moves in chronological order, beginning with the polemics of Eusebius of Caesarea and Epiphanius against icons in the fourth century through John of Damascus, Constantine V's eschewal of icons, the teaching of Nicaea II, and the *iconodule* arguments of Theodore of Stoudios. An epilogue follows. There Daley reflects on the nature of Christology, the metaphysics of the Incarnation, and the ongoing significance of conciliar statements in forming a Christology today.

This book bears some striking implications for contemporary Christology. I will mention one. Daley argues that, for the Fathers, everything about the life of Jesus Christ was saving; that is, there is no central event in his life of utmost importance that saves us, but rather "his very person that constitutes his saving meaning" (279). As readers of this journal may recall, Thomas Aquinas argues that all of what Christ did and suffered is saving because his humanity was an instrument of his divinity (*Summa theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 6, corp.). Daley's insight here can help us appreciate anew the genius of St. Thomas's retrieval of the Fathers in his Christology.

Daley's book displays the virtues of a scholar who has carefully and patiently labored over these ancient texts for many years. It is astonishingly comprehensive and erudite, managing to cover a wide variety of patristic texts while remaining relentlessly focused on the Christological concerns of the Fathers. Daley writes with his characteristic lucidity and economy, a virtue that makes this book stand out and will likely contribute to its enduring value. I expect it will be regarded as just as indispensable for understanding patristic Christology as *Christ in Christian Tradition*.

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N.V

Hope and Christian Ethics by David Elliot (*Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017*), 276 pp.

THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUE of hope is currently undergoing something of a revival in the field of Christian ethics. After a long period of relative neglect, largely due to anxieties about its supposed otherworld-

liness, theologians and religious ethicists have in recent years resumed the task of developing an account of Christian hope that is particularly suited to address our contemporary situation, marked as it is by waning trust in political, economic, and religious institutions and a growing anxiety about present and future global crises. Viewed by some as providing “crucial grounds for Christian humanism”¹ and by others as engendering the solidarity needed to sustain democratic political life,² hope has been the focus of a growing number of projects that seek to bring the insights of the Christian moral tradition to bear on present concerns.³ David Elliot makes a distinctive and important contribution to this conversation in the way that he employs Aquinas’s account of the infused theological virtue of hope and its corresponding vices of despair and presumption as a framework for his discussion. His book powerfully demonstrates that Aquinas’s account need not be detached from its metaphysical and theological context in order to be made serviceable for contemporary work. On the contrary, it is precisely those metaphysical and theological claims undergirding Aquinas’s discussion that Elliot finds useful for developing a “textured account of the hopeful life” that offers a resolute and penetrating response to contemporary challenges (2).

The book’s main argument is that far from undermining our temporal commitments and social identities, hope in God’s eschatological fulfillment of human longing empowers us to pursue earthly projects without giving in to the cynicism and dejection that so often arise in the face of tragedy and injustice. By providing meaning and purpose to our lives beyond the achievement of any particular temporal goal, eschatological hope can support us when such goals are rendered unattainable due to sickness, poverty, suffering, and death. However, Elliot insightfully argues that such hope is not exclusively focused on our eschatological perfection, but may also be directed to temporal goals as proximate ends that are referred to God as their ultimate end. Hope can therefore contribute to happiness in this life as well as the next by motivating and sustaining earthly activities that bring about genuine social goods.

Though heavily indebted to Aquinas, this argument is developed in conversation with a wide array of thinkers, ranging from Western theo-

¹ Dominic Doyle, *The Promise of Christian Humanism: Thomas Aquinas on Hope* (New York: Crossroad, 2012), 38.

² Michael Lamb, “Aquinas and the Virtues of Hope: Theological and Democratic,” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 44, no. 2 (June 2016): 300–332.

³ There are also dissenting voices. See, for example, Miguel A. De La Torre, *Embracing Hopelessness* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2017).

logical giants such as Gregory the Great and Dante to English literary geniuses such as Dickens and Graham Greene. Elliot's familiarity with not only the relevant theological and philosophical sources, but many literary and liturgical ones as well adds an impressive depth to this carefully argued book. Especially noteworthy is his critical engagement with other contemporary scholars working in the field of religious ethics who are for various reasons skeptical of the kind of eschatological hope he seeks to uphold. Elliot negotiates these conflicts with equanimity, using them to advance his argument without lapsing into dogmatic appeals to Saint Thomas. Although the book began as a doctoral dissertation, it has since been "heavily reworked" (xiii) and reads as an exceptionally well-crafted piece of theological ethics.

Following a brief introduction in which he lays out the argument and plan of the book, Elliot turns in the first chapter to consider what reason there is to care about theological hope in the first place, especially if one is not already disposed to believe in the provident and loving God who is its object. Elliot argues that such hope should be of interest not only to Christians but to everyone because of how it helps resolve a recurring crisis of the human condition, which he calls the "eudaimonia gap." As the name suggests, this crisis consists of our inability to overcome certain obstacles to attaining happiness in the present life, resulting in "a depressing gap between the kind of happiness that we want and the kind we can reliably get" (5). There are both negative and positive sides to the eudaimonia gap. Negatively, our pursuit of happiness in this life is often thwarted by various threats to our physical and psychological well-being, as well as to our most cherished relationships and life projects. Earthly existence exposes us to a variety of ills that can seriously—and in some cases permanently—limit our capacity to live a fulfilling life. However, even when we are relieved from such ills, Elliot contends that our desire for happiness still exceeds even the most fulfilling activities that earthly existence has to offer. Thus, the positive side of the eudaimonia gap consists of our inability to secure a permanent and lasting happiness in which our desire for the good can exhaust itself without remainder. While the first chapter focuses primarily on the negative side of the eudaimonia gap, the positive side (examined in greater detail in chapter 3) is equally important because it "helps show that hope is attractive *even apart* from impediments to happiness" (45).

Elliot intends this opening chapter to function as a kind of hook for curious readers who may be wary of the theological and metaphysical baggage that his account of eschatological hope will require them to take on. Drawing on debates in various schools of ancient and modern moral philosophy, Elliot shows how secular philosophers have themselves often

acknowledged the eudaimonia gap, and in some cases even admitted the attractiveness of something like theological hope as a way of overcoming it. However, in the absence of belief in a God who can guarantee the possibility of happiness beyond that which is attainable in this life, Elliot notes that such acknowledgement of the eudaimonia gap by secular philosophers “tends towards melancholy resignation” that threatens to undermine our moral motivation (5).

It may seem that Elliot is here adopting an apologetic strategy reminiscent of book 19 of the *City of God*, where Augustine argues for the superiority of eschatological happiness over against a multitude of deficient philosophical views. However, as Elliot makes clear, his argument is not meant to prove the inadequacy of any ethic devoid of the theological virtue of hope. Rather, it merely aims to show how such a virtue would help resolve a deficiency that secular philosophers themselves admit cannot be addressed adequately by human means. Far from demonstrating the truth of his account of eschatological hope, which Elliot thinks can be established only on theological grounds, the presence of the eudaimonia gap shows only why nonbelievers should be “disposed favourably to consider supporting reasons” for a view they might otherwise have considered inconsequential (42). In other words, an honest acknowledgement of the inevitable limitations and precariousness of earthly happiness might lead one who is otherwise indisposed to accept eschatological hope to see why its possibility would be not simply “curious news” but “good news” to believer and nonbeliever alike (43).

In the second and longest chapter of the book, Elliot lays out the basic structure of Aquinas’s account of theological hope. This includes sections discussing the distinctive functions of habitual and actual grace, the twofold object of hope, the relation between hope and charity, and what Elliot calls hope’s “moral entourage,” namely, the gift of fear and the vices of despair and presumption. The chapter also contains extensive analysis of Jürgen Moltmann’s *Theology of Hope* and Timothy Jackson’s *Love Disconsolated*. Elliot critiques Moltmann for his presentation of a “developing and disempowered God” who “cannot ensure that the eschaton ends happily rather than tragically” (6). Rather than strengthen hope by encouraging activism, Elliot argues that such a perspective instead undermines it by calling into question whether the eudaimonia gap will ever be entirely overcome. Moreover, by making revolutionary social change the paradigmatic act of hope, Moltmann seems to make hope inaccessible to certain vulnerable and disempowered groups who may be able to exercise only “spiritual and ascetic agency” (52). Elliot thus finds Moltmann’s theology of hope deficient in comparison with that of Aquinas, whose understand-

ing of God as the final and efficient cause of hope successfully avoids these problems. On Aquinas's view, God is the final cause of hope insofar as what hope seeks is the eternal enjoyment of God himself; whereas God is efficient cause insofar as his assistance (i.e., the grace of *auxilium*) provides the indispensable means for attaining such beatitude (63). In the concluding section of the chapter, Elliot aptly defends this view against Jackson's criticism that "hope taints charity with mercantile motives" (8), arguing persuasively that the opposition between hope and charity assumed by this view has no basis in Aquinas's account.

After developing some of his earlier claims about the positive side of the eudaimonia gap in chapter 3, Elliot goes on in chapters 4–6 to discuss various threats to the hopeful life that must be overcome by the Christian wayfarer. The first of these is the vice of presumption, which Elliot (following Aquinas) argues comes in two forms. One involves a refusal to seek God's help and forgiveness, resulting in a quasi-Pelagian self-reliance that masks an underlying self-righteousness. Elliot provocatively suggests that this type of presumption informs Jeffrey Stout's account in *Democracy and Tradition* of a kind of secular piety that consists in the grateful acknowledgement of "the sources of one's existence and progress through life" (9). In contrast with Aquinas's acknowledgement of our radical dependence on habitual and actual grace to elevate and heal us, Stout contends that "deference and dependence shown towards God are unnecessary and detrimental to piety's fitting and virtuous expression" (117). The other form of presumption consists of the refusal to repent or improve one's behavior because one believes that salvation is easy or guaranteed, a view that Elliot finds expressed in the contemporary religious attitude of "moralistic therapeutic deism" (125–26). Again following Aquinas, Elliot argues that the antidote to these two forms of presumption is nothing other than the gift of fear, which as Elliot helpfully explains is not necessarily focused on divine punishment, but is ideally "expressed through recoiling from the sins that might separate us from God, and by entrusting ourselves to God for the grace needed to do just that" (132).

In the fifth and sixth chapters, Elliot turns to the second threat to the hopeful life, namely, the vice of despair. It is here that Elliot begins to develop a line of argumentation continued throughout the rest of the book regarding what kind of imperfect beatitude hope makes possible in our earthly life. Elliot is intent on showing that hope is "invested in earthly projects and cannot adopt Stoic apathy to insulate us from human vulnerability and tragedy" (139). He thus seeks to distance his account from that of John Bowlin, who he argues overlooks Aquinas's acknowledgement of the ongoing susceptibility of the hopeful to the temptations of sloth and

despair in the face of suffering. On Elliot's view, hope does not serenely accept the existence of the eudaimonia gap, but rather "motivates the effort to overcome impediments to happiness in this world in preparation for the fully unimpeded happiness of the next" (142). While acknowledging that the eudaimonia gap can be completely overcome only in the next life, Elliot contends that we nevertheless have good reason to "engage in costly and difficult border skirmishes with [it], seeking to improve individual and social happiness where we may" (142). In this way, hope suppresses the temptation to view beatitude as an *impossible* future arduous good and thus despair of ever achieving it. However, as Elliot goes on to argue in the sixth chapter, there is also a more subtle form of despair that "denies that happiness is a future *arduous* good" (167). This despair is a kind of worldliness that involves absorption in temporal projects that consume our attention and diminish our interest in spiritual goods. Hope combats this threat to attaining beatitude not by disparaging the goodness of such projects, but by freeing us from our undue preoccupation with them, which has its source not in a correct appreciation of their value but in one's avarice and pride. When pursued with the poverty of spirit appropriate to the hopeful life, such projects can serve as proximate ends that are further directed to eternal beatitude.

In the seventh and final chapter, Elliot completes the argument he began in the previous two as he seeks to show that eschatological hope does not subvert but rather reinforces our identification with and commitment to our earthly communities. On Elliot's view, eschatological hope entails neither our alienation from human society in the present life, nor the destruction of our temporal social identities in the next. Rather, he maintains that "we wayfarers are dual citizens bound in piety to honour our native homeland" (181). As Elliot explains, this piety need not be self-aggrandizing, but may take the form of social criticism and thus serve as an act of fraternal correction (179). Elliot's goal is thus not to idolize national identity, but simply to point out that, as social beings, we have a stake in the virtue and happiness of any community of which we are a part, including our *patria* (197). Furthermore, Elliot suggests that "social reform at its best may not just move towards the perfect friendship of the beatified communion of saints, but constitute a foretaste or premonition of it" (199). Nevertheless, hope for a just society as a proximate end ordered to eternal beatitude "does not require the belief that things *will* get better, only the belief that important things *can* get better" (198). Thus, while hope may legitimately pursue social goods, it does not entail a facile optimism about their achievement.

This book deserves serious attention from anyone working in the fields

of Christian ethics or moral theology, and will be essential reading for anyone interested in Aquinas's virtue ethics or the topic of hope more broadly. Particular sections of the book will also be relevant to moral philosophers and other theorists concerned with how Christian faith can motivate social justice. Throughout the book, Elliot is quite disciplined in limiting his exploration of theological hope to those topics which form the basis of Aquinas's account. This makes for a compact and well-integrated study that nevertheless develops these topics to a degree that far surpasses Aquinas. However, this reader found himself wishing at various points that Elliot would have ventured further beyond the path forged by Aquinas to address questions that are perhaps more specific to our present situation. For example, Elliot's claim that eschatological hope may invest itself in earthly projects as long as these projects are directed to eternal beatitude invites further investigation into what kinds of earthly projects hope can legitimately pursue. Presumably, the mere intention to attain beatitude is not sufficient for making the pursuit of various social ideals an act of the virtue of hope, since it is always possible that these are only apparent and not genuine goods. It therefore would have been interesting for Elliot to examine how hope works in conjunction with infused justice and prudence to determine what kinds of temporal projects should be pursued. Of course, such a discussion would go beyond the specific task Elliot sets for himself in the book, which he accomplishes with deftness and style. Elliot has done everyone a great service by restoring the neglected virtue of hope to its place among the theological virtues, and his book will likely become a touchstone of Christian virtue ethics for years to come. 

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From Shadows to Reality: Studies in the Biblical Typology of the Fathers by Jean Daniélou, S.J., translated by Wulstan Hibberd, O.S.B., with new introduction by Michael Heintz (*Ex Fontibus*, 2018), 346 pp.

JEAN DANIELLOU'S *Sacramentum futuri*, first published in French in 1950, then released in English a decade later as *From Shadows to Reality*, is a landmark of the twentieth-century recovery of interest in the spiritual exegesis of the Fathers. Nearly seventy years later, it remains valuable and often remarkably fresh, and *Ex Fontibus* has done us a great service in making it once again available and affordable. It should be noted that the

text of the 2018 edition is identical to the original 1960 English translation and thus retains a handful of typographical errors, mainly but not exclusively in Greek. This edition, however, includes a new introduction by Michael Heintz (ix–xxvi). Heintz provides an excellent overview of Daniélou himself, his view of typology, and the work's continued relevance for ongoing debates about Catholic biblical interpretation. Among its best features is a detailed summary of Daniélou's "Qu'est-ce que la typologie?" This brief and infrequently read 1951 essay crystallizes Daniélou's convictions about typology's essential characteristics and thus furnishes useful background for the reader of *From Shadows to Reality*.

Daniélou's main purpose in *From Shadows to Reality*, stated forthrightly in his foreword, is to establish continuity between the New Testament's own typological exegesis and that of the early Church. The volume is divided into five "books," each dedicated to a narrative complex drawn from the Hexateuch (Gen–Josh): (1) Adam and paradise; (2) Noah and the flood; (3) the Isaac cycle; (4) Moses and the exodus; and (5) the Joshua cycle. For each of these, with some variation, Daniélou reviews the typological use of the unit within Scripture itself, explores the continuation and expansion of this typological interpretation in the Fathers of the second to the fourth centuries, then presents the "allegorical" distortions that crop up in (usually) Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Ambrose. In the final lines of the book's conclusion, Daniélou announces victory and indeed sharpens his claim. Despite "diversities and deviations," the "agreement of all schools upon the fundamental types" is so strong that it "proves that we are face to face with something which is part and parcel of the deposit of Revelation" (288). In other words, Daniélou argues, quite persuasively, that typology is intrinsic to Christian theology, and indeed to the Christian faith as such.

Daniélou writes early in the book that "the essence of typology . . . is to show how past events are a figure of events to come" (12). This crisp definition maps nicely onto 1 Corinthians 10:11, a verse Daniélou viewed as programmatic for patristic typology (see Heintz's remarks on xvii–xviii). (The verse appeared as an epigraph in the French original but was omitted from the English translation. Its restoration to the title page of the 2018 edition is a very nice touch.) Referring to the experiences of the Israelites of the exodus, Paul says that "these things happened to them as an example (*typikōs*), but they were written down for our instruction, upon whom the end of the ages has come." In keeping with Paul's "these things happened," Daniélou insists that typology is rooted in historical events, persons, and institutions, and not solely in a sort of divine literary genius. In a manner that seems almost calculated to discomfit latter-day proponents

of patristic exegesis who regard it as a way of circumventing the difficulties presented by historical criticism, Daniélou unabashedly declares the Fathers' commitment to the historical reality of the biblical accounts. Where modern readers might feel most squeamish, Daniélou shows the Fathers' resolve. For instance, when considering the creation of Eve from Adam's rib, Hilary of Poitiers "holds fast to the historicity of events, for the essence of typology lies in showing that it is history itself which is figurative rather than in replacing history by allegory" (52). Even Origen, who admittedly denies a historical Garden, "does not dream of contesting the historicity of the [building of Noah's ark]" (105).

These historical realities are "types" because they prefigure future realities. As 1 Corinthians 10:11 has it, they refer somehow to "the end of the ages." This helps explain the original title, *Sacramentum futuri*, a phrase Daniélou appears to have borrowed from Hilary (254). Daniélou shows that the Old Testament itself evinces a typological view of history. The prophets intimate that the inauguration of the messianic age will restore paradise, recapitulate the flood, and enact a new and greater exodus, and so these historical realities come to be recognized as types of eschatological realities. Christian typology perpetuates this eschatological tradition but brings something new as well. On the one hand, while Christians believe Jesus of Nazareth to have been the Messiah of Israel's God, they admit that the present age persists. The eschatological thread thus remains intact in Christian hope for the Parousia, at which the Old Testament types will be definitively fulfilled. On the other hand, as Paul teaches, "the end of the ages" has already begun with Jesus's resurrection. The eschaton is present to Christians in mystery already *hodie*, today. Daniélou insightfully observes: "This *To-day* [*sic*] is the very essence of Christianity" (16). The *hodie* of Christ means that typology is no longer merely eschatological: antitypes are also to be sought and found in the life of Christ. That life is present not only in the historical life of Jesus but also in his body, the Church, and so Daniélou further subdivides typological threads into the "Christological" and the "ecclesial," or "sacramental" or "mystical"—that is, the types are fulfilled in Christ's triple advent: "in the flesh, in our souls, and in glory" (277).

This threefold typology constitutes what Daniélou regards as the "normal" or "common tradition" of the Church. Unfortunately, it is not impervious to corruption, which comes in two forms. On the one hand, there is a Palestinian Jewish typology that sees the types as already fulfilled in the Old Testament and that will lead to the Antiochene underselling of Christological interpretation. Daniélou detects this here and there in Justin Martyr and Jerome, but he shows little concern over it. Far more serious is the Alexandrian error of "allegory," which Daniélou sharply

distinguishes from “typology.” Allegory is a foreign contaminant: “It is the presentation of philosophy and Christian morality under Biblical imagery analogous to the Stoic presentation of morality in a Homeric dress” (61). Daniélou lays some blame on Gnosticism, but the chief culprit is undoubtedly Philo, who philosophized and moralized every detail of the Pentateuch. Daniélou concedes that Philo’s “inspiration is truly biblical,” for he was a “devout and believing” Jew, but still, “he set out his biblical theology in an allegorical form, borrowed from Hellenistic culture” (202). Clement, Origen, and Ambrose are the main carriers who bring the infection into the Church. Daniélou remains confident that the cancer of allegory can be cleanly removed and the purity of normative typology restored.

As is well known, Daniélou’s simple opposition of typology and allegory was contested by his former teacher Henri de Lubac, who today seems to have had the better of the argument. (Those interested in the debate and its *Nachleben* can profitably consult the bibliography Heintz provides in note 42 (xxiii). Hans Boersma’s treatment in his 2009 *Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology* is especially to be commended.) Rather than exhaustively retreading this well-traveled road, I raise three issues, by no means original to me, that both highlight the lasting value of *From Shadows to Reality* and gesture at its limitations.

First, Daniélou is right to emphasize that the Fathers see typology as a function of divine authorship, not only of biblical *words*, but of salvation-historical *realities*. God’s historical activity—the unfolding of the divine *oikonomia*—is the central premise of patristic typology. At the same time, is it not equally true that the Fathers firmly believed in verbal inspiration as well, and thought it had important interpretative consequences? It is not clear that *From Shadows to Reality* attends sufficiently to the divine authorship of *Scripture*. The words of Scripture and the realities they represent are not so easily separated in patristic interpretation. Is it possible that recognizing that *these* inspired words grant us unmatched access to the divine plan makes room for the kind of “Alexandrian” attention to detail and lexical cross-referencing that Daniélou wants to shoo out the door along with Philo?

Second, the reader sometimes suspects that Daniélou assumes a more restricted scope for “exegesis” than the Fathers would have recognized. What counts as “interpretation,” and what is it for? Daniélou does not entertain such questions in *From Shadows to Reality*. In one place he notes: “For Philo, the Bible is not merely a source of doctrine, but also of spiritual nourishment” (216). This is a provocative admission, but Daniélou does not pursue it, perhaps understandably in view of his concern to secure typology’s place in the deposit of faith, with its public, doctrinal, and

liturgical implications. But the Fathers themselves are far more expansive in what they expect the Bible to supply. Scripture is not merely an *object* of interpretation; it is a lens through which we are invited to reinterpret the world, and a mirror in which we can permit the Spirit to reinterpret us.

Third, one might ask what Daniélou's typological, salvation-historical interconnections finally add up to. For Daniélou, part of the answer is the ability "to see in history the fulfilment of the divine plan, baffling from our human point of view, yet offering a coherence and inner harmony which allows man's faith to rest therein as upon an immovable rock" (165). In another book, Daniélou presents this as a unique feature of Christianity: "The great non-Christian religions know of an eternal world over against the world of time; but they know nothing of an irruption of one into the other, giving substance and form to the flux of time, making it into history."¹ Daniélou does recognize that the eternal has truly irrupted into time, that God has made his own Trinitarian life available to human beings for their healing and elevation. This belongs largely to the "sacramental" or "mystical" thread of typology. What Daniélou does not seem to grapple with is how wide an opening this creates for "allegory." In a telling passage, Daniélou excuses Origen's interpretation of Rahab as a type of the soul: "Basically, this exegesis legitimately continues the typology of the Church: the microcosm of each soul reproduces the macrocosm of the Church" (253). The reader might wonder why this is "legitimate" but Ambrose's consideration of the Christian soul renovated by grace as a "paradise of virtues" is not—except that the latter can be traced to Philo's influence, while the former cannot (see 239). Much of what Daniélou rejects as "allegory" might be seen just as easily as a description of the *magnalia Dei* being realized in the individual believer.

Again, I raise these questions not as negative judgments on Daniélou's work but as illustrations precisely of its value for sparking clearer thought and conversation about the contours of patristic biblical interpretation and its significance for today. *From Shadows to Reality*, in my view, gets far more right than it gets wrong. But, just as importantly, even where it gets things wrong, it does so in a way that provokes deeper reflection. It is indispensable for those beginning their study of patristic exegesis, and it remains an invaluable conversation partner for even the most seasoned students of the Fathers.

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¹ Jean Daniélou, *Lord of History: Reflections on the Inner Meaning of History*, trans. Nigel Abercrombie (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1958), 109.

T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, edited by Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), xix + 492 pp.

THE *T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac* is an excellent, wide-ranging study of the many aspects of de Lubac's theological thinking, important influences on his work, and his relation to various forms of Christian thought and life. In addition to a foreword by Rowan Williams, the volume comprises nineteen essays grouped into three major sections.

The essays in part 1, "Henri de Lubac in Context," consider significant theological, philosophical, and historical influences on de Lubac. In chapter 1, Jordan Hillebert provides a helpful introduction to de Lubac's life and thought (as well as the volume proper) by deftly integrating his theological contributions and important influences on his thought into a biographical account of de Lubac's life. Tracey Rowland (chapter 2) discusses de Lubac in relation to his contentious relationship with neo-Scholastic/Thomistic thinkers past and present. To do so, Rowland uses John Milbank's helpful framing of the contrast as between "classical" and "romantic" orthodoxy (47) and competing accounts of the origins of modern secularism.¹ She lays out the differences between these two visions of theological contents and approaches and situates them in light of twentieth-century politics (both European and ecclesiastical). Francesa Aran Murphy's wide-ranging essay (chapter 3) considers Maurice Blondel as a major philosophical influence on de Lubac. While many elements of de Lubac's theology are indebted to Blondel, particularly important is Blondel's philosophical anthropology and theory of human action. Indeed, she speaks of de Lubac's account of the natural desire for God as "a transposition into theological terms of Blondel's anthropology" (66).

Jacob Wood (chapter 4) treats de Lubac in relation to the broader *ressourcement* movement. He does so by tracing the development of the *ressourcement* impulse in the theology and politics of post-revolutionary France in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Wood calls attention to the influence of the Aegidian tradition of Augustinianism as being especially important for de Lubac. In an outstanding contribution, Aaron Riches (chapter 5) explicates de Lubac's relationship to Vatican II (before, during, and after the Council). He documents how many of de Lubac's theological contributions which appeared prior to the Council came to shape conciliar teachings. Riches also draws extensively on de Lubac's journals to show his subtle role in the Council proceedings. Furthermore,

¹ Rowland (47, n. 60) cites John Milbank, "The New Divide: Classical versus Romantic Orthodoxy," *Modern Theology* 26 (2010): 26–38.

Riches admirably shows the development and character of de Lubac's resistance to the so-called "para-council" (147), showing the intriguing parallels between pre-conciliar integralists and post-conciliar progressives.

Part 2, "Key Themes in the Theology of Henri de Lubac," focuses on the theological and historical contributions of de Lubac himself, with each chapter treating a different concern in his writings. Gemma Simmonds (chapter 6) treats de Lubac's sacramental ecclesiology and its implications for the Christian theology of transformation and mission. Attending largely, though not exclusively to *Corpus Mysticum* and *Catholicism*, Simmonds plots the interconnections which de Lubac discerns between Christ, the Church, and the sacraments. She thus articulates the heart of de Lubac's vision on these matters: "The mission of the Church is to be the social embodiment of grace, restoring and completing the unity of the whole human race lost by sin" (167). Nicholas J. Healy Jr. (chapter 7) takes up the complex and controversial topic of nature and grace. Healy explicates de Lubac's account of nature and grace and its various implications by attending to de Lubac's own writings as well as those of Thomas Aquinas. He charitably engages with some critics (past and present) of de Lubac's theory, and he helpfully clarifies the contrasting theories by reflecting on marriage as a test case.

De Lubac's writings on biblical exegesis are the topic of Kevin Hughes's essay (Chapter 8). Proceeding through de Lubac's essays, his book on Origen, and *Medieval Exegesis*, Hughes articulates the essential points of what de Lubac does (and does not) argue with respect to pre-modern Christian exegesis. For de Lubac, Hughes writes, the tradition of spiritual exegesis is of enduring importance because it constitutes "the principle and shape of Christian theological hermeneutics" (206). Especially illuminating are the connections which Hughes discerns between de Lubac's writings on biblical exegesis, his works on nature and grace, and his resistance to Nazism. Patrick Gardner (chapter 9) examines de Lubac's ongoing engagement with atheistic humanism. Gardner sets forth the substance of de Lubac's critique of atheistic humanism and explores how de Lubac's theological anthropology serves in part as a constructive (and more satisfactory) alternative to the atheistic vision of the human person.

David Grummett (chapter 10) considers de Lubac's writings on religion and the relationships between non-Christian religions and Christianity. Grummett argues that de Lubac resists reductionist accounts of religion's origins as well as theories which hold a "transcendent unity," binding all religions together (253). Rather, as he does with mysticism, de Lubac thinks that religion is an analogous category. Grummett goes on to explore de Lubac's thinking as regards the theology of religions and Christian

missions, the possibility of salvation for non-Christians, the unique relationship between Christianity and Judaism, de Lubac's work to oppose Nazism and anti-Semitism, and the prospects of his work for contemporary Christian-Muslim relations. D. Stephen Long (chapter 11) takes up de Lubac's thinking on the relationship between theology and philosophy under the heading of "theological epistemology" (269). He argues that de Lubac sets human reasoning—and philosophy specifically—within the theological horizon of the divine economy. Accordingly, de Lubac does not take philosophical reasoning as a methodological starting point and allow it to dictate terms for theology. This methodological move informs both his critique of *natura pura* as well as his claim that only in God do human reasoning, life, and culture find their perfection and authenticity (284, 287).

Cyril O'Regan (chapter 12) discusses de Lubac's theological thinking about history with attention to the interaction between his ecclesiology and eschatology. For de Lubac, the Church is an extension of the mystery of Christ, on route to its eschatological destiny. O'Regan also charts the essential elements in de Lubac's genealogy of Joachimite theology with its immanentization of eschatology. He identifies where de Lubac discerns evidence of Joachimite infection in both modern secularism and sectors of contemporary Christian theology.

De Lubac's overarching interest in Christian mysticism is mapped in the essay of Bryan C. Hollon (chapter 13). Rather than seeing mysticism as a uniform, cross-cultural phenomenon, de Lubac affirms the existence of a distinctly Christian form of mysticism. Rather than a generic form of human experience, Christian mysticism is a grace, grounded in the Trinity and ecclesial participation and sensitive to the course of lived life. Hollon also shows the mystical dimensions of de Lubac's theological account of nature and grace as well as his account of the fourfold sense of Scripture.

As de Lubac never wrote a focused work of Christology, Noel O'Sullivan (chapter 14) collates the various Christological elements given across de Lubac's works in an effort to synthesize a basic account of de Lubac's Christological thinking. He does this, for instance, by comparing parallel passages in *Surnaturel* and *Augustinianism and Modern Theology*, showing the introduction of more explicitly Christological language in his later works. O'Sullivan also makes use of some of de Lubac's unpublished, archived work on the figure of Christ. For de Lubac, O'Sullivan argues, the Incarnation is redemptive because it is "primarily revelatory": "Christ came not as restorer of lost innocence but to reveal *and be* Love incarnate, . . . [and his salvific death] transforms us from within through love" (347).

Part 3, "A Theological Legacy," contains five essays which discuss de

Lubac's relation to various Christian traditions and topics. Jean-Yves Lacoste (chapter 15) reflects on the nature–grace debate in light of the arc of modern philosophy. He argues that nature and grace are “correlative terms connected by a strictly theological grammar” (355). But the debates over *natura pura* shift the argumentative ground and categories by allowing philosophy to define nature apart from theological input. What emerges is an account of nature set solely within philosophy's own horizons, which theology was expected to adopt (354–55). He then counterposes de Lubac's (Augustinian) account of the natural desire for God, wherein human nature is desirous of an end beyond its reach: “Our sense of the present is dependent on a future beyond our control, but not beyond our desire, which is why we cannot enclose our being within its immanent teleologies” (366).

In his admirably charitable and well-structured piece, Kenneth Oakes (chapter 16) combs through de Lubac's writings to give an account of his interaction with Protestantism and individual Protestant thinkers. Oakes observes that de Lubac was primarily interested in intra-Catholic matters, and so his engagement with Protestants is neither direct nor extensive. De Lubac's engagement with Protestant thinkers appears mostly in his various genealogies. While de Lubac is sometimes critical of Protestant figures on disputed doctrinal matters, he can also be appreciative and laudatory of Protestant voices, especially when they help remind and teach Catholics of what it is to be fully and authentically themselves (382).

Simon Oliver (chapter 17) provides a lucid, informative discussion of the relationship between de Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy. As Oliver explains, Radical Orthodoxy gives a privileged place to de Lubac, for the movement sees itself as deeply indebted to his theology. Oliver sketches the basic sensibilities of Radical Orthodoxy and charts some ways in which it converges with de Lubac's thinking as well as places where the two diverge. Radical Orthodoxy, Oliver argues, extends de Lubac's thinking by integrating it robustly into a participatory ontology of creation and teasing out its implications for a broad array of areas (e.g., politics, society, and human intellectual endeavors).

De Lubac and political theology is the topic of Joseph S. Flipper's essay (chapter 18). According to Flipper, “De Lubac's overarching theo-political concern was to discern the vocation of the Church in present history in light of the ultimate calling of humanity” (427). He goes on to explore four different ways in which politics and theology interact in de Lubac's work: the impact of World War II and the Vichy government on de Lubac's writings against Nazism and anti-Semitism; the political implications of the nature–grace debate; a brief consideration of the works of D. L. Schindler,

Bryan Hollon, and John Milbank, all of whom recognize and variously develop de Lubac's account of the supernatural for the Church's role in society; the potential of de Lubac's ecclesiology as the context and catalyst for the transforming of society from within. In the final chapter, Nicholas M. Healy (chapter 19) considers de Lubac and Christian spirituality. The Christian life, according to de Lubac, is a progressive movement of the believer into the love of God. Drawing on de Lubac's essay "Tripartite Anthropology," Healy articulates this movement as progression through three "domains" (448): the religious (where people learn the articles of faith and obedience of life); the moral (the ongoing transformation of life through the assimilation of faith and practice); the spiritual/mystical (the movement toward deeper union with God within the historical form of the Christian life). Healy closes with some reflections on how de Lubac's thinking can contribute to issues related to the decline in Church membership, as well as some areas in which de Lubac's thinking can be critiqued.

This volume is an outstanding and very important contribution. The essays variously place de Lubac and his works in context, provide rich analyses of his theological contributions, and comment on de Lubac's relation to various groups and trends. Especially helpful are the ways in which authors draw thematic connections between separate works of de Lubac as regards a particular topic (e.g., the interrelation between his analyses of atheistic humanism and his theological anthropology). Other authors (e.g., Hollon, O'Sullivan, and Oakes) provide the valuable service of bringing together de Lubac's remarks on topics like mysticism, Christology, and Protestantism which are scattered across his various writings. Moreover, the essays are uniformly learned, readable, and charitable in tone.

While many of the essays deal with the theological positions which de Lubac himself critiques (esp. regarding nature and grace), the volume does not contain a rejoinder contribution which sets forth critiques of de Lubac's theology. A single treatment which sets forth why some take issue with de Lubac's theological claims would help fill out the larger theological and ecclesiastical picture. Moreover, given de Lubac's work to make the Greek Fathers more widely known in Western circles through means such as *Sources Chrétiennes*, an essay on the relationship between de Lubac and Eastern Orthodoxy would have been a welcome addition to part 3.

Regardless, this is a very thorough and even-handed study of de Lubac's theology and an extremely helpful resource for all who engage the thought of this important Catholic theologian.

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