

Book Reviews

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind by James D. Madden (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2013), xiii + 307 pp.

IF BOLDNESS is the quality that ought to characterize Catholic philosophizing after *Fides et Ratio*, then this work deserves hearty applause and a wide audience. For in *Mind, Matter, and Nature*, Professor James Madden has attempted not one but two great labors: critically to survey “the basic lay of the land in contemporary philosophy of mind” and earnestly to propose “a version of Aristotelian hylomorphism.” Either subject would suffice for a book; the two are here joined in a most spirited effort that embraces “the whole breadth of reason” (Benedict XVI, Regensburg Address).

Mind, Matter, and Nature is an argument back to the principles, the principles in this case being matter, privation, and form, and the particular forms that are the soul of the living thing and the rational soul of man. Madden begins where he expects to find his audience: awash on the sea of contemporary philosophical and scientific opinion and worrying that some form of naturalism might be true. After a helpful preface, he takes the reader on a journey through the landscape of the philosophy of mind in six clear and well-organized chapters. The work’s final two chapters contain his explication and defense of Aristotelian principles, with the work as a whole coming to a close with a series of responses to foreseeable objections and also “some tentative conclusions.”

That the contemporary struggle for the mastery between naturalists and dualists may have reached an impasse on the terrain of analytical philosophy was suggested by John Haldane over a decade ago (see “The Breakdown of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind,” in Haldane, ed., *Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic Tradition and Analytical Traditions* [University of Notre Dame Press, 2002], pages 54–75). The first six

chapters of Madden's book are an able unfolding of that predicament and lead up to a similar judgment: "given the way the debate about the mind-body problem is typically framed, it is unlikely that we can ever avoid the dead ends we have encountered" (219). Proponents of even sophisticated versions of naturalism cannot account for the facts that we know, that we make inferences, and that we direct our actions in light of our knowledge and reasoning. Dualists, on the other hand, regularly tie themselves up in knots when confronted with the data of neuroscience and, moreover, can find it difficult to distinguish between the souls of animals and of human beings. As for the third-way naturalists and emergentists—with John Searle and Thomas Nagel being his prime exemplars—their dialectical contortions display equal amounts of inventiveness and sheer willfulness. As Madden drily observes, when such eminently thoughtful philosophers back themselves into indefensible corners because of their determination to avoid an appeal *praeter naturam*, one is led to conclude that "broader philosophical commitments seem to play a role" (202).

What is needed, Madden argues in his final chapters, is a return to an earlier starting point: the consideration of change. That things move is an indubitable facet of our experience of the world. Like Aristotle, Madden would have us begin our inquiry with that truth. He ably works through the Aristotelian analysis of change, the problem of Parmenides, the doctrine of prime matter, and, in several deft pages, the virtual presence of the elements in the bodies of living beings. Although he pens the proviso that he "make[s] no pretense to offering a compelling defense of this philosophy of nature" (221), it is indeed a presentation of the common doctrine that is both clear and intelligible. When he comes to the subject of the soul, he rightly warns his reader that "there is nothing 'spooky' going on here; the soul just is whatever accounts for something's being an actual organism" (253–54). And that sentence is a faithful representative of the plain, straightforward speech that characterizes the book. From the soul, Madden rises to a consideration of mind, choosing the argument from the universality of our thoughts as his preferred demonstration of the immateriality of the intellect. Along the way, and throughout the volume, he writes sensibly and capably about sensation.

A book that so generously tries to bring together the tools and the conversational preoccupations of analytical philosophers with the ways and means of Thomists does run the risk of pleasing no one. Madden has, perhaps, made his challenge even more difficult by attempting to make his reasoning available to the general reader. Not only was *Mind, Matter, and Nature* plainly intended to be intelligible to the advanced undergrad-

uate—and Madden is to be warmly commended for his success in that regard—it is also in places explicitly addressed to just such a reader. The “tentative conclusions” as well as the preface do so, as in this statement of his aspiration: “I have fallen far short of giving compelling support” to Aristotelianism as such; “all I can do here is to offer hylomorphism as a proposal bolstered by its strengths in the philosophy of mind . . . hopefully I have made this proposal a live option even to those of you who have pre-philosophical intuitions that point in other directions” (285). How can such candor be anything other than a refreshing invitation to further dialogue? The book is, as he declares in the subtitle to his preface, “another opinionated introduction to the philosophy of mind” (ix). This genial tone indeed characterizes the dialectical sparring of the volume’s innards: Madden is even patient with those who make arguments based on thought-experiments about zombies.

An introduction aimed at youthful readers ought to take particular care to be pedagogically astute. With what is most essential in that regard—clarity of speech—Madden is exceptional. There are complicated arguments, to be sure, but Madden does not hide behind jargon. Where he could perhaps have attained some additional precision or helpfully expanded the account would have been at the level of method. Consider this passage from near the end of the volume: “My hope . . . is that you can see on the basis of this discussion that the Aristotelian-hylomorphic view is coherent and does solve important philosophical problems, even if I have fallen short of making a demonstrative case for it” (245). It is the last phrase that raises an eyebrow, for to what prior principle would we appeal in an attempt to demonstrate that form and matter are the principles of natural things? And, in general, in *Mind, Matter, and Nature* there is a curious theme of philosophical convictions reposing upon the will. Thus Madden at times speaks of belief rather than knowledge (e.g., the mind is the “vehicle of beliefs,” 49; dualism is “hard to believe,” 86; that trees should have “nothing in common” is “hard to believe,” 208; non-emergent dualism is “believable” and thus a “live option,” 217–18), and in such a way as to suggest that he considers the concept of belief to be prior in our understanding to that of knowledge. Yet it must also be said that in other parts of his argument he displays a more direct, no-nonsense style of affirmation, as in his reply to Daniel Dennett on the subject of sensations, when he observes that “having a confused experience is nevertheless having an experience” (146). Perhaps the wavering on this point—if it is wavering, and not merely a question of philosophical style—is one of the prices of doing business with contemporary philosophers of mind.

Madden so ably charts a path through that vanity fair that it seems more than forgivable that he should have occasionally felt the need to pay them in their own coin.

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N V

Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis by Sarah Catherine Byers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 262 pp.

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM John Rist and James Wetzel (among others) in the 1990s reopened the question of Augustine's indebtedness to and baptism of philosophical sources, particularly with respect to elements of his moral psychology. Augustine, once thought merely to have pilfered Plotinus's legacy, was reconsidered and reconstructed as agreeing with certain aspects of Stoicism. Byers's recent work continues this general trajectory of scholarship by arguing for a coherent "Stoic-Platonic synthesis" in Augustine's moral thought, simultaneously buttressed and amended by his Christian anxieties.

Byers frames her careful analysis with a dramatic caveat: Augustine's recollection of his agony in the Milanese garden (*Confessions* 8). There, Byers finds remnants of Augustine's Stoic ethical vocabulary: he recalls his old loves whispering to him, impelling him to throw off continence and put on licentiousness. Byers picks up on Augustine's metaphors of sight and interior language and traces them into the deepest recesses of Stoic psychology. Talk of internal exhortation betrays Augustine's considerations of, as Byers puts it, "how motivation motivates" (23). Suggestion and temptation language link up with talk of hormetic impression, standard in Stoic ethical theory, sustaining and widening the scope of Augustine's reflection on sin.

Byers insists that Augustine "knew a doxography of Stoic action theory" which served to supplement a general approximation of a Platonic hierarchy of goodness (39ff.). The key to this synthesis comes in Byers's discussion of how precisely this Stoic-Platonic wedding occurs. One could take the Platonic notion of loves, she admits, and Stoic thought on *hormē* or impulse, and show their mutual exclusivity. But in Augustine, Byers insists, Stoic-inflected vocabulary pertains primarily to action, while its Platonist counterpart, to things or perceived states of affairs (49). The former is the how of action, the latter, the why.

This fusion allows personal attachment and emotions to affect moral judgment. Delight, in other words, emerges in Augustine's thought as a distinctly teleological phenomenon.

Byers's work branches out from the representative passage in *Confessions* 8 to reveal how Augustine's other writings, particularly his sermons, exploit Stoic terms. Perception, mental language, and *phantasia* feature prominently in Augustine's homilies, as worry over how well one sees, motivates oneself to action, and responds to the contingencies of the world are of utmost importance. For instance, the Stoic notion of "hormetic impression" as the cause of moral action can be seen just under the surface of Augustine's talk of love's motivation in deeds virtuous or base. Byers's search beneath Augustine's non-technical language should not surprise, since most of the faithful under his care were untrained in the intricacies of classical moral grammars. Instead, Augustine reverts to the moral struggle depicted in the scriptures to wean even the most astute "off the snobbery that can accompany specialized vocabulary" (88). Hence, the sermons, for Byers, disclose the ways in which Augustine the pastor can be seen wrestling with the convergence of the biblical text and his philosophical and theological lineage.

To read Augustine as offering a sealed and succinct conception of the "faculty of the will," Byers maintains, is simply to read medieval categories back into his writings (90). Instead, we should conceive of Augustine as always in careful conversation with his sources, a conversation replete with considerations of how emotions instigate behaviors of pursuit and avoidance. Byers's expertise is invaluable at this point. She offers a sophisticated reworking of the Stoic doctrine of "sayables" (*lekta*), connecting it to both the pre-passions and the emotions. In attempting to go beyond the Stoic model, Augustine allows for a wider range of emotions in response to both temporal and moral goods (72). The wise person can experience any emotion, provided it is caused by a true judgment. And while Augustine by and large thinks of pre-passions as a way station on the road to vice, he nuances the Stoic position by insisting that pre-passions can also be beneficial and life giving (*proeupatheia*). Byers's recognition of Augustine's subtle position betrays his occasionally overlooked Hellenistic philosophical heritage and shows him capable of moving beyond Stoic psychological categories (131–5).

That preliminary passions result from a past wound caused by doubt, Byers insists, places Augustine in Philo's debt (139). The solution to the process of doubt to pre-passion to assent is a series of therapies, a self-reflexive process of pre-rehearsals, remembering past wrongs, and medi-

tating on the law as a source of life (151–171). For instance, meditating on the potential for divine (and possibly human) justice can both trim anger's shoot and begin to kill its roots. Key to this moral progress is the honing of one's attention on moral virtues rather than temporal goods, of how delight outshines use (152).

For all his attempts to move away from Stoic ideals, Augustine's "affinities with Stoic austerity remain strong" (160). These affinities are prevalent in his understandings of grace and freedom throughout his corpus. Augustine is vexed, Byers argues, as to how behavior and emotional patterns are shaped by habits, and what it means that habit determines perception. As those east of Eden, the possibility of seeing clearly and accurately is generally a futile fight in Augustine's mind. Indeed, the habit of original sin bears down so significantly that one cannot simply be rehabilitated to excellence. Conversion must occur. Byers argues that over the course of his life Augustine changes his description of how this conversion happens, what effects it leaves, and the difference it makes in choosing the good. The emergence of the question resides in whether God causes action indirectly or directly. In the early stages of his priesthood and bishopric, Byers argues that Augustine's view is primarily the former: that is, God's grace is mediated to us by examples of moral goodness and excellence. Later, embroiled in the Pelagian controversy, the tone is that of the latter: God works within us, driving, rather than persuading, our pursuit of the good. In both cases, God offers a motivating impression; the quandary is in what way that impression comes (185).

Byers shows that this give-and-take between directly and indirectly caused impression returns in the early-modern "*De Auxiliis*" controversy of Bañez and Molina, between Dominicans and Jesuits (190–206). Their disagreements over the connection of freedom, grace, and the necessary minimum for virtuous consent should be read, she contends, as a contestation over legitimate interpretations of Augustine. Yet neither has the corner on his doctrine of grace, because of the doctrine's metamorphosis over the course of Augustine's career. Neither fully represents him: Molina's insistence that freedom is always the ability to do otherwise shirks the eudaemonism so important to Augustine (195), and Bañez's account lacks specificity, grace being given without the individual in mind. In the end, neither adopts Augustine's emphasis on grace as medicinal for the sake of healing one's moral vision (196).

The difficulty of locating the "true Augustine" complicates speaking of a straightforward "doctrine of grace." In early texts, God acts from outside the individual, in an indirect causal relationship with the person.

However, this “dialogue model” of justification, where the agent is in constant interaction with God’s gracious remedy, is made more complex by Augustine’s post-418 writings. There, Byers claims, only God makes a cooperative relationship between God and us possible by providing the sustaining energy and power for the actual pursuit and performance of virtue. On this reading, even morally indifferent or evil actions require divine agency. Still, Augustine came to recognize the challenge present when two hear the same word in a sermon, say, and have different reactions. This then leads him to hold ideas of both exterior and interior causality. And still later, this interior causality is depicted as “driving” the moral vision, and grace becomes necessary for virtuous action. As Byers puts it, for the late Augustine, “faith is made in us” (211). This journey shows Augustine doubling back on himself by (twice) asking similar questions of grace’s relationship to free choice.

To round out a fine monograph, the two appendices include an adapted version of Chadwick’s translation of *Confessions* 8.11.26–7 and an extended reflection on Augustine’s use of *voluntas* and its connection to a Stoic understanding of *hormē* (impulse). Placing Augustine in conversation with Stoic action theory (especially Cicero) serves to clarify his language of “free will.” *Voluntas* in short is depicted as “a rational being’s impulse toward action,” something distinctly “in our power” (226). Byers shows how and for what ends Augustine adopted this technical vocabulary from the books of the Stoics (Cicero’s *De fato* and Seneca, in particular) and his Latin Christian progenitors (230–1).

While Byers’s work will serve specialists in Augustine studies and those interested in early Christian moral thought quite well, two points are worth noting. First, Byers frets over reading medieval categories back into Augustine, but she is nevertheless guilty of this very thing in her discussion of Bañez and Molina’s early-modern controversy on free choice. Talking of how “infused virtue can be a habit” (187), for instance, appears to be a distinctive medievalism and not something native to Augustine. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, this reader wonders if a “theory” of moral motivation can be (or should be) extracted out of Augustine’s writings. To be sure, Augustine was notably self-reflective in his judicious use of philosophical sources, but disservice might well be done if his thought is crystallized in “theory” form.

In her discussion of the “De Auxiliis” controversy, Byers contends that to say that either party had the “true Augustine” nailed down is mistaken, and that it is mistaken because Augustine had no “monolithic account” of grace and its effects upon human agency (212). While helpful

in analyzing the bounds of Augustine's heritage, this piercing insight fails to see what is right in front of its face. Namely, that if a "true Augustine" cannot be determined by this or that theory of grace, what sense does it make to speak of a discrete "theory of moral motivation" or "theory of affectivity"? In other words, the thorniness Byers identifies between the "true Augustine" and his early-modern interpreters is present even in Augustine himself. If that is so, then we must begin to ask at what point certain "developments" or "shifts-in-thought" frustrate the language of a coherent "theory." At day's end, neither of these quibbles is meant to question Byers's precision in dealing with ancient sources. Her care is remarkable given the technical challenge presented.

Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine is meticulously cited and argued. Byers's analysis lays bare her technical facility with very difficult, often-confusing texts. By arguing for Augustine's consonance with ancient philosophical and rhetorical traditions, she brings those same traditions into conversation with one another. A great deal of work is done in her footnotes, aligning and critiquing dominant strands of secondary literature, while placing her arguments within this interpretive skein. The work is occasionally slow-going and challenging, asking the reader to balance several working "theories" in her mind concurrently. Perception does seem at times, as mentioned above, to be over-burdened by the desire to put theories to paper, hitching Augustine up to almost-procedural methodologies one wonders if he would have accepted. However, working through this complex monograph is worth the effort. Byers reconfigures Augustine in ways that broaden the base of an important trajectory undertaken some twenty years back. Only such care and rigor give such a debated figure as Augustine his due, and for that we are in debt to Byers.

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N Y

Learning Christ: Ignatius of Antioch and the Mystery of Redemption by Gregory Vall (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2013), xii + 401 pp.

IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH has suffered consistent buffetings at the hands of scholars over the past century. His theology of grace has been found wanting, his ecclesiology judged too authoritarian, and his longing for martyrdom considered as bordering on the psychopathic. In *Learning*

Christ, Gregory Vall sets out to give a different reading of Ignatius. Adopting a rigorous historical-critical reading of the seven genuine letters of Ignatius, he describes his project as seeing what he “can get from the letters by giving Ignatius the benefit of the doubt, morally and intellectually,” employing “not a hermeneutic of suspicion, but one of understanding and empathy” (11). He hopes to rehabilitate Ignatius’s reputation as theologian and exegete and to demonstrate that the authentic letters of Ignatius “contain a sophisticated, cohesive, and substantially complete theology” (372).

Learning Christ, however, is much more than a close, sympathetic study of Ignatius’s theology. It is also an expansive exploration of the economy of redemption in light of the wider Christian tradition. Vall confidently reads Ignatius in the light of the whole tradition, in terms of the *analogia fidei*, and seeks to place Ignatius within this wider context. In his own words, he has written “a work of historical theology, rather than merely a historical work about theology” (5, emphasis his). The reader is treated, not just to a thoroughgoing discussion of Ignatius’s theology, but to a deep exploration of the mystery of Christ through the lens of Ignatian thought. For Ignatius, Christ is both our only true teacher and at the same time the truth we are to learn. “Learning Christ,” then, is an apt summary of Ignatian theology and at the same time “the sum and substance of Christianity” (14).

Vall elects to study the Ignatian writings, not according to the individual letters in sequence but by theological theme. Ignatius’s fondness for fixed pairs of terms (e.g. faith and love, flesh and spirit, word and silence, Christ and the Church) function as chapter headings and define the main topics areas. Throughout the study, Vall carries on a lively debate with other scholars over central questions of Ignatian theology, making the volume a valuable reservoir for the history of Ignatian scholarship across a broad spectrum of questions.

Given the wide-ranging dogmatic scope of *Learning Christ*, a neat summary becomes nearly impossible. Each topic area has its own questions that are pursued in considerable detail. The conclusions reached by Vall across these topic areas are then linked together to show the coherence and excellence of Ignatian thought. The study begins with a consideration of Ignatius’s handling of Scripture. Rejecting the low opinion of Ignatius’s exegetical abilities held by some, Vall concludes that Ignatius has a sophisticated approach both to the Old Testament (the “archives”) and to the emerging texts of the New Testament canon he was familiar with (Matthew, the tradition of John, and several of Paul’s letters). For Ignatius,

Christ himself is God's definitive self-revelation; the Scriptures as the word of God bear witness to and participate in the mystery of Christ.

Among the contested topics in Ignatian thought explored by Vall, his findings in three areas will be noted here: in Christology, in the relation of Christianity to Judaism, and in ecclesiology. No one who reads Ignatius's seven letters can fail to recognize his highly Christocentric approach. What Vall provides is a penetrating reading of this Christocentricity by displaying the three stages of the Word in Ignatius's thought (pre-Incarnate, Incarnate, and Resurrected), and by showing that for Ignatius the Word Incarnate is the definitive self-revelation of the Father. Vall considers Ignatius's clear statement of this "a significant moment in the history of theology" (108) and fully consistent with later Trinitarian and Christological clarification. Further, Vall deflects the charge of Gnosticism levelled against Ignatius, a charge grounded in his claim that the Word has "come forth from silence." Judging this expression to refer to the Incarnation, Vall proposes that the language of "silence" refers to "the eternal mystery of God's life and being" (266), to "the unfathomable mystery of the Trinity, the mystery of the Father who eternally brings forth his Word in the union of the Spirit" (283). In Vall's hands, the figure of Christ emerges with clarity and power as the fulcrum of Ignatian theology, as the source and center of unity by which the world is brought back to God.

In a chapter entitled "Judaism and Christianity," Vall wades into the vexed question of how Ignatius and other early church writers viewed the relationship between Israel and the Church. He helpfully and persuasively places Ignatius on a spectrum of early Christian views by considering his approach to "Judaism" in comparison with *The Epistle to Diognetus*, *The Epistle of Barnabas*, Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho*, and Irenaeus's *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*. The burden of Vall's argument is that Ignatius is unfairly pigeonholed as "supersessionist" without a careful assessment of his nuanced thought regarding Israel and the Church. Vall acknowledges that Ignatius clearly rejects ongoing Jewish practice within the Church and concedes that his views involve "the rejection of non-Christian Judaism too" (208). But he demonstrates that Ignatius has genuine respect for the Law and the prophets and for the place of Israel in preparing the way for the coming of Christ. Vall takes Ignatius to task primarily for failing to do full justice to the Old Testament in its own context, by reading it simply as a preparation for Christ (247).

While Vall treats Ignatius's relationship to Israel and Judaism with sympathy and clarity, it is less clear that his treatment succeeds in modify-

ing the charge of supersessionism against Ignatius (and against the majority of the early Church teachers). Vall seems to be working with the view that supersessionism involves a devaluing of Israel and the Law before and up to the coming of Christ, such that if Ignatius is recognized as showing appreciation for the Law and the continuity between the Old and New Covenants, somehow supersessionism is blunted and modified. He rightly recognizes that for Diognetus and Barnabas, there really is no question of “supersessionism” because in these writings there is a tacit denial of God’s blessing on Israel in the first place (229). It is only when Israel is truly seen as the chosen vessel of God’s plan of redemption that that place is capable of being “superseded.” But the core of supersessionism is the question of the ongoing role of Israel after the coming of Christ and the birth of the Church. To be precise, supersessionism concerns two issues: first, whether any ongoing Jewish identity and practice is fitting to life in the Church; and second, whether Israel *kata sarka* (according to the flesh) has any positive ongoing role and significance in the history of salvation. Quite clearly, Ignatius judges negatively on both counts. Israel had its role in preparing for Christ, but now that Christ has come there is no real role for Israel as such—this role has simply been taken over by the Church. Nor is there any room for ongoing Jewish identity or practice within the Church—this is tantamount to denying the nova that Christ has ushered in. In fact, by coining the word “Christianity” and pitting it against “Judaism” (211), Ignatius signals that the parting of the ways is already deeply established and sets the terms for the ages-long contest between Church and synagogue. It is noteworthy that in recent times the Catholic Church has been re-thinking and re-expressing both these aspects of traditional supersessionism: Israel is now granted an explicitly ongoing theological role as God’s covenant people and some measure of Jewish identity and practice is carefully being allowed expression within the Church, opening a breach in the wall that insisted “Judaism” and “Christianity” were simply incompatible and opposing ways of life.

The longest chapter of *Learning Christ* is given over to a multi-faceted study of Ignatius’s ecclesiology, arguably the subject for which Ignatius has been both most praised and criticized. In sum, Vall is ready to grant the modifier “catholic” to Ignatius’s ecclesiology, but he argues that this “catholic” approach is entirely consistent with the New Testament, not a deviation from it (313). But Vall rises above the typical polarizing readings by showing how Ignatius includes and integrates the various dimensions of the Church: “Ignatius’s ecclesiology amounts to a vision of ecclesial unity, between past and present, visible and invisible, hierarchy and laity,

universal and local, those who have attained God and those who are still living in hope" (315). Further, Vall draws out the pneumatological aspect of the Church and wonderfully succeeds in untangling Ignatius's perplexing typologies of how bishops, presbyters, and deacons are related to God and Christ. We tend to read these typologies in a flat, linear manner, and so conclude that Ignatius was simply confused; Vall offers a new way of reading what he calls an "elaborately conceived series of analogies" (342) that reveal in fact a sophisticated Christology applied to the life of the Church. One of the major contributions of this study is the elaboration of what Vall calls "an ecclesiology of continuity" in Ignatius of Antioch.

Reaching the end of this lengthy study, the reader is obliged to grant that Gregory Vall has successfully accomplished his goal: *Learning Christ* is both a significant and valuable addition to Ignatian scholarship, opening up delightfully new ways of seeing old issues, and at the same time a profound exploration of the mystery of Christ.

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N V

Vatican II: The Battle for Meaning by Massimo Faggioli (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2012), 199 pp.

FOR THE EDUCATED and interested layperson, an accessible yet scholarly survey of the debate over the proper implementation of the Second Vatican Council would be most welcome. Massimo Faggioli has attempted this, but while his work, *Vatican II: The Battle for Meaning*, does indeed offer an accessible account of the historic council, the delivery of the book's theological content sometimes suffers from a lapse in scholarship.

Faggioli's plan for the book is, no doubt, well-conceived because it addresses the important issues necessary to get a grasp of the post-conciliar theological divisions, debates, and polemics. The first chapter (of six) surveys the history of the debate over Vatican II. The second discusses various strains of anti-conciliar movements that questioned the legitimacy of Vatican II, while the third chapter elaborates on the reception of the Council "beyond Rome," both geographically and ecumenically. The fourth chapter seeks to analyze the post-conciliar Catholic theological divide between "Neo-Thomists" and "Neo-Augustinians," and the fifth chapter then treats a few concrete theological cases in ecclesiology and liturgy in which a "clash of narratives" has a distinct impact. The last

chapter, finally, considers some of the various approaches to reading and interpreting the Council and its texts.

There is no question that the book has merit: indeed, the entirety of Chapter 3, for example, with its survey of the ecumenical impact of Vatican II in the eyes of the observers and of the worldwide reception of the Council, especially in Africa and Asia, is laudable for bringing readers' attention to neglected perspectives. Faggioli's sources and bibliography are diverse and impressive. And while the narrative he tells must be probed, he does raise important questions about recent theological determinations such as the status of episcopal conferences and the ever-perplexing *subsistit in* of *Lumen Gentium*, §8. (I will address these and other issues in the course of this review.)

Despite this solid plan to touch all the relevant bases, and despite the book's intentions to overcome "clashing interpretations" and to move beyond the struggles between "spirit" and "letter," between "discontinuity" and "continuity," Faggioli's assumptions, historical analysis, and proposal for the way forward are all one-sidedly "progressive" (to use the political terms that Faggioli himself uses). The picture Faggioli sketches of the post-Conciliar Church is a familiar one: the ecclesial reforms envisioned by the spirit of the Second Vatican Council have been increasingly stifled. The theological-political rift begins, according to Faggioli's history, in the late 1960s, which materializes in the *Concilium* and *Communio* journal split in 1972. Then the Council is "celebrated and enforced" from 1980 to 1990, historicized from 1990 to 2000, and is now undergoing a renewed fight, especially since Benedict XVI's pontificate. Faggioli seems to find Benedict's *Summorum Pontificum* (105) and his lifting of the excommunications of the Lefebvrist bishops (142–143), as evidence of a general pessimism towards the post-conciliar period that was expressed in his *Ratzinger Report*, and which ultimately prevailed over John Paul II's "fundamentally positive view of the council" (106; cf. 141–142).

Benedict's 2005 defense of the hermeneutic of "reform" (109–110) has re-catalyzed the debate between the parties of rupture, on the one hand, and continuity (or "revisionism" [108] and those who give the Council a "reductionist interpretation" [151]) on the other. According to Faggioli, the party of continuity "does not accept the idea of any historical discontinuity occurring between" the Constantine era, the Tridentine era, and the twentieth century (135). While briefly acknowledging the existence of a "para-council," the focus of Faggioli's criticism is on "the self-deluding illusion of the possibility of a perfect linearity between pre-Vatican II theology, the texts of the preparatory phase of

Vatican II, and the final texts” (136). (It should be noted that, in alleging this, Faggioli offers here no concrete example of an author who alleges this.) In short, for Faggioli, if one wants to take Vatican II seriously, one must acknowledge that it, like previous councils, was discontinuous with its past (137). The narrative ends with Benedict’s pontificate, as Francis had not yet been elected.

It is not this narrative that I wish to question. That has already been done (cf. Neuhaus, *First Things*, Oct. 2008). It is the lack of theological foundation and nuance in Faggioli’s book, coupled with his consistent neglect of the concerns and arguments of his theological opponents, that deserves to be highlighted, if only to challenge the assessment of the highly influential and respected John O’Malley, S.J., and Mark Massa, S.J., who endorse the book on its back cover and believe that the book is “carefully researched,” “subtle,” “indispensable,” and “required reading” for anyone interested in Vatican II in relation to the Church today.

At a time when polarization in the Church is so palpable, Faggioli’s book could have risen above the two sides and attempted a rapprochement by treating important issues and concerns in a methodical and theologically considered way; instead, Faggioli rarely engages with theological arguments and takes for granted the truth of his own position. This review will illustrate, then, a dual shortcoming on the part of Faggioli: first, he fails to take his opponents seriously; and second, he fails to exhibit the theological acuity necessary to grasp the theological stakes of the issues he treats. The impact that these two shortcomings have on his analysis is exacerbated by what I consider to be a faulty diagnosis of the ideological divide. Given this approach, Faggioli not only fails to transcend post-conciliar divisions, but inadvertently reinforces them.

Before we address the theological issues that Faggioli treats, let us first consider how he conceives of post-conciliar ideological divisions. His historical assessment of these divisions helps illuminate his narrative that the legacy of Vatican II is threatened by revisionists obsessed with “continuity,” and who fear change.

Faggioli’s misdiagnosis of the ideological divide is perhaps most striking in Chapter 2 and can be attributed to a general inability to sympathize with his opponents. Here, Faggioli focuses on traditionalist opposition to, and rejection of, Vatican II, which culminates in schism (24–35). For Faggioli, the counterpart to the Lefebvrists are not liberal or progressive Catholics, such as extreme liberationist and/or feminist theologians. They, explains Faggioli later in the book, never contested the Council or questioned its legitimacy (57). The Lefebvrist counterpart

is, rather, the “Christians for socialism,” and the *gauchisme catholique* (35–36), a movement that faded in the 1970s from history and also from the rest of Faggioli’s book. Hence, the only “real challenge to the legitimacy of the council” that still exists today are the traditionalists (20). Insensitive to his opponents’ concerns, Faggioli does not grasp that, while many progressive theologians may claim to accept wholeheartedly the legitimacy of Vatican II, many of them use the Conciliar texts in a strikingly selective manner, thereby ignoring swaths of the entire Catholic doctrinal tradition that preceded the Council and that are affirmed time and again in the conciliar texts. The substantial and popular theological backlash against *Dominus Iesus* (2000) is just one example. Instead, what the reader is left with is an ideological division between, on the one side, those critical of the Council (Lefebvrists and “ultra-traditionalists” and “revisionists” and “pro-minority interpreters” whom Faggioli closely associates together [108]), and everyone else, on the other.

Faggioli shifts the ideological goalposts also when he positions Hans Küng in the mainstream. According to Faggioli, those historians and theologians who spoke at Notre Dame’s conference, “Preparing for Vatican III,” in 1977, including H. Küng, J.B. Metz, and E. Schillebeeckx represented “the mainstream of Vatican II Catholicism.” Faggioli continues: “The Swiss theologian Hans Küng did not seem as disappointed with the accomplishments of the reception of Vatican II in the first decade after 1965 as he later became” (23). One wonders what caused Küng’s future discontent. If Faggioli’s narrative is correct—that subsequent pontificates, starting with Paul VI’s, increasingly impeded the Conciliar reform—then one can only assume that Küng’s tempered and “mainstream” opinions in the 1960s and ’70s remained constant; Küng was always “mainstream,” and became disappointed and, hence, perceived as extreme only when the Church began pivoting to the right. The problem with this explanation is that, from the point of view of Faggioli’s own yard-stick for gauging the “mind” of Vatican II, namely Yves Congar, Küng was already a radical early on.

Congar, for Faggioli, is “one of the most important, if not the most important theologian of the council” (78). Congar “presents well the attitude of the theologians of Vatican II together with the bishops, and he is probably the most important theologian to look at the theological background and drafting of the council documents” (22). With this assessment, I couldn’t agree more. I think Faggioli and I would agree that, in this respect, it is Congar who represents the “mainstream” of Vatican II Catholicism. The problem is that Faggioli fails to realize the

theological, but also the temperamental, distance between someone like Congar and Küng. Theologically, one need only be aware of their debate over the doctrine of papal infallibility in the 1970s. On the personal level, consider these words of Congar's during the Council from his Diary about Conciliar tactics in 1963: "Küng charges at things, he goes straight ahead like an arrow . . . Küng demands insistently, like a revolutionary." A bit further down: "Küng is to some extent an impatient man. He has to be. It is a dangerous position. He worries me a bit . . ." (370). And later in 1965 in the context of discussions about the journal *Concilium*: "Küng is always very radical. He says some true things, but in which the critical research into what is true is not sufficiently tempered by concern for concrete situations" (861). If Congar is indeed representative of Conciliar thought (which I think he is), then the assertion that those at the 1977 conference, including Küng, were "mainstream" seems untenable.

Faggioli's misunderstanding of theological camps is punctuated by his comparison between "Neo-Thomists" and "Neo-Augustinians" in Chapter 4. There Faggioli asserts that David Tracy's distinction between the "Analogical Imagination" and the "Dialectical Imagination" "paraphrases" the theological tension between the "progressive" Neo-Thomists (e.g., Congar, Chenu, Schillebeeckx) and Neo-Augustinians (i.e., Von Balthasar, de Lubac, Ratzinger). The Neo-Thomists, for Faggioli, are "analogical," which means they are associated with the Catholic emphasis on "metaphor, sacrament, and image," while the Neo-Augustinians are "dialectical," with their "emphasis on the Protestant idea of God's inaccessibility" (89). Such an application of this stark juxtaposition is historically and theologically problematic; it implies that any understanding of how God is accessible to creatures in a way that would be acceptable from a Catholic point of view is somehow lost on people like Ratzinger and de Lubac. Faggioli applies this same Neo-Thomist/Augustinian divide to the bifurcation of *Concilium* into *Communio*, according to which the Neo-Thomists at *Concilium* espoused a "more comprehensive updating," whereas the Neo-Augustinians at *Communio* were focused on *ressourcement* (51–53). Such a simplistic application of an already questionable juxtaposition not only fails the test of the multiple counter-examples that could be marshaled forward (e.g., was Congar a stranger to *ressourcement*? And was de Lubac, who warned against "archaism," uninterested in *aggiornamento*?), but also misses the precise dynamic that historically existed between the two movements: *ressourcement* was never pursued for its own sake, but was always at the service of *aggiornamento*. One step toward healing post-conciliar divisions would be to avoid

pitting these two theological postures—*ressourcement* and *aggiornamento*—against each other. While Faggioli puts his finger on something valid, namely, the difference in theological temperament (manifested in, say, the general optimism or pessimism that a theologian felt vis-à-vis the world and human “progress”), it is clear that Faggioli takes the Neo-Thomist/Augustinian juxtaposition too far.

Although they help explain much of what Faggioli alleges in his book, such reflections on labels and ideological spectrums within Catholic theology are, ultimately, not only uninteresting, but quibbles next to the way in which Faggioli assesses certain theological debates in ecclesiology, liturgy, and moral theology. Issues in many of these areas have been intensely debated with a view towards a true and authentic reception of the theology of Vatican II, and yet, Faggioli’s treatment of them does not do justice to the time and energy theologians have dedicated to them—on both sides of the debate. Let us take them in the order in which they appear in the book.

Consider, for example, Faggioli’s take on the status of episcopal conferences in Chapter 1 (14–15). Having written before the election of Pope Francis, Faggioli can feel vindicated that revisiting this question is now on the agenda (see *Evangelii Gaudium*, §32). Nevertheless, his treatment of the issue sees no rationale behind the status quo except for the political desire of centralizing power: “From the standpoint of the post-Vatican II governance of the Catholic Church,” writes Faggioli, John Paul II’s *Apostolos suos* “reinforced one of the basic assumptions of the International Theological Commission chaired by Cardinal Ratzinger.” What is this assumption of the ITC that John Paul II’s apostolic exhortation reinforces? According to Faggioli, it is “the need to scale back some aspects of the post-Vatican II decentralization and empowerment of national bishops’ conferences.” This is, to put it mildly, a rather theologically uncharitable motivation to attribute to an opponent. Pace Faggioli, others might say that the assumption that *Apostolos suos* was reinforcing was the supposition that bishops can exercise their authority either individually or by virtue of their collegial status in union with the pope, and hence, cannot properly exercise it any other (i.e., intermediate) way. What is potentially at stake is the way in which we conceive of episcopal jurisdiction and whence episcopal power is exercised. Agree or disagree with the theological rationale, not addressing it makes the whole presentation of episcopal conferences a caricature. Francis Sullivan, S.J., who is no traditionalist and who ultimately questions the reasoning behind *Apostolos suos*, at least engages with the arguments and provides ample nuance (see Sullivan,

“The Teaching Authority of Episcopal Conferences,” *Theological Studies* [2002]: 474–492).

In Chapter 3, the question of inculturation emerges. In his noble endeavor to highlight the impact that Vatican II had in Africa, Asia, and Australasia, Faggioli writes the following sentence:

Thanks to the theology of Vatican II on the local Church and on non-Christian religions, a theology of adaptation and inculturation took the place of the traditional theology of *salus animarum* (the “salvation of the souls”) and the purely missionary theology of *plantatio ecclesiae* (the “expansion of the Church” and its structures) (59).

It is one thing, if what Faggioli means is simply that reflection on *salus animarum* and *plantatio ecclesiae* no longer happens to be in vogue in post-conciliar Catholic theology; it is quite another to attribute this to the “theology of Vatican II.” Presumably, Vatican II’s teaching on the local Church is found chiefly in *Lumen Gentium*, and its teaching on non-Christian religions in *Nostra Aetate*. How the contents of these two documents replace *salus animarum* and *plantatio ecclesiae* is unexplained. What is more, however, anyone at all conversant in Catholic missiology would know that these two categories—*salus animarum* and *plantatio ecclesiae*—represented two opposing poles in what became the most theologically substantive missiological debate in the twentieth century—the former position made famous by the “Münster School” and the latter by the “Louvain School.” The former argued that the ultimate end of mission is the conversion and salvation of souls for which reason one establishes the Church, while the Louvain school argued that the proper end of mission was establishing the Church, for the souls of the un-evangelized could ultimately be saved with or without an established mission (and, in the long run, a local Church) in the area. Both theological tendencies were present at Vatican II, and, in typical conciliar fashion, instead of deciding between the two, the Council included both tendencies in its Decree on Missionary Activity, *Ad Gentes*. (For planting the Church, see *Ad Gentes*, §6, 10, 15, 18, 19. For the relationship of missionary work to conversion and salvation of souls, see *Ad Gentes*, §3, 5, 6, 39, 40, and §7, 10, and 12.) The notion that Vatican II somehow replaced these two theological categories is theologically erroneous, and cannot be passed over as mere oversight on some theological minutiae. Salvation and its means are at the core of theology.

Another ecclesiological issue appears in Chapter 5, when Faggioli's simplistically presents the debate surrounding the "*subsistit in*" passage from *Lumen Gentium*, §8 (100–102). For Faggioli, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is obstinate in the face of historical and theological refutations that are beyond reproach. Yet, most tellingly, Faggioli never mentions—let alone engages with—the opposing views, either in his text or in his notes: for example, no mention is made of Welch and Mansini's article in *New Blackfriars* (2009), or Christopher Malloy in *The Thomist* (2008). Among the many ultimate conclusions at stake here is whether the Church of Christ is fully realized in history (or simply an eschatological reality); and whether a Church (in the theological sense of the word, that is, with valid orders, succession, and Eucharist) can exist concretely and independently of the Petrine ministry. Faggioli registers none of these issues and makes no attempt to do so. What is even more puzzling in Faggioli's method, however, is that without distinction, he blocks together all the interventions of the CDF (from 1992 to 2007) on the subject. Yet those, such as Francis Sullivan, who would be sympathetic to Faggioli's position, base their arguments precisely on the differences between the CDF's interventions in, say, *Dominus Iesus* (2000), on the one hand, and "Responses to some Questions Regarding Certain Aspects of the Doctrine of the Church" (2007) and its "Commentary," on the other. Again, Sullivan, who is no friend of the continuity line, sees *Dominus Iesus*—unlike other CDF interventions—as faithfully interpreting *Lumen Gentium*, §8 in a way that satisfied concerns both to maintain that the Roman Catholic Church is the one true Church and to affirm the existence of particular and true Churches (and not just elements of the church) outside the boundaries of the Roman Catholic Church (e.g., the Orthodox churches) (see Sullivan's articles in *Theological Studies*, 2006, 2008, and 2010). Ironically, Faggioli not only ignores the arguments of his opponents, but also fails to do justice to his own ally (i.e., Sullivan) when the former lumps all the CDF interventions together. (It is Faggioli's opponents who seek to harmonize them.) The upshot of all this is that for Faggioli, the case is settled. Such a position—especially in the way that it is advanced in this book—does little to advance a constructive and informed exchange.

In the same fifth chapter, the same lack of sympathy for his opponents is manifest in Faggioli's treatment of liturgical matters. Many who advocate a "reform of the reform," says Faggioli, exhibit "haste and aggressiveness—rather than intellectual command" (102–103). In contrast, those

who “defend the liturgy as reformed by the Council” are “advocates of Vatican II,” (103); as if the *Novus Ordo*, which was promulgated four years after the Council concluded, is uniquely the result of the conciliar reform, and those who do not “defend” it cannot be “advocates” of the Council. Thusly does Faggioli fail to adequately distinguish between Vatican II’s Liturgical Constitution and the actual liturgical reform carried out by the Consilium that Paul VI had organized to implement it (as well as the concrete pastoral implementation of the *Novus Ordo* in subsequent decades whose abuses and experimentation are not taken up by Faggioli). Had he distinguished between these stages adequately, the “reform of the reform” movement would not need to be held responsible for the “tragic destiny” of *Sacrosanctum Concilium* (cf. 102–105). Faggioli’s concern is, no doubt, to safeguard the achievements and intended reforms of the Council, whether it is the use of the vernacular, a liberalization of liturgical orientation, etc. The consequence of Faggioli’s conflation, however, is the following position: because the current Roman Missal is the only authentic implementation of *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, any attempt at a “reform of the reform” is inherently anti-conciliar. Again, such a position does little to bridge the divide.

Similarly, in discussing the new English translation of the Roman Missal, Faggioli gives only a negative assessment: it is a “dead stop to the composition of new texts for the English liturgy that might have been inspiring examples of inculturation” (105). That the previous English translation was at the very least idiosyncratic (and many would say, deficient) relative to other vernacular translations—such as the German, French, and Spanish—is apparently of no account for Faggioli. That a translation, for all its shortcomings and occasional stiltedness, gives voice to a Latin text that had been previously truncated in places, offers no perspective for Faggioli. With the “liturgical wars” already so replete with polemic, this opportunity could have been used to respond thoughtfully to those who welcome the new translation. Instead, Faggioli isolates them as a group that frustrates inculturation.

Finally, in the last chapter, Faggioli’s assessment of the theological implications of *Humanae Vitae* is delusive. In the beginning of the book, Faggioli claims that “*Humanae Vitae* . . . greatly impacted the Church, took its toll on the reception of Vatican II, and produced the first ‘revisions’ of the council’s interpretations” (10). In the last chapter Faggioli writes this striking sentence:

The history of the debate about *Humanae Vitae* explains why that landmark papal teaching of 1968 inaugurated the disillusionment of the post-Vatican II era, and symbolized the beginning of a fracture between the magisterium and a theology that had left metaphysics as its center of orientation and increasingly become a theology of “salvation history”, where human history also becomes a real source for theological work (133).

Faggioli then continues to assert that making history a locus theologicus “is by far the most important factor in the parting ways of Catholic theology after Vatican II” (134), and then links the “discontinuity” party with this turn to history. According to Faggioli, then, when one ventures to take salvation history seriously (at the expense of metaphysics, it seems), it is inevitable that the Church’s teaching against artificial contraception is problematic, not least because it somehow impedes Vatican II reception. Apparently, the proliferation of contraception in the last seventy years and its current ubiquity are part of a “human history” that deserves theological consideration by virtue of its being—in addition to the covenants of the Old Testament and the Incarnation—a part of “salvation history.” But surely not all happenings of human history can be included in “salvation history” in such a way that merits a theological affirmation. To enumerate examples here would be superfluous. “Signs of the times,” says Vatican II, must be “scrutinized in light of the Gospel” (*Gaudium et Spes*, §4). And so a naked appeal to the events of human history—even if that history is a part of salvation history—is insufficient grounds to criticize *Humanae Vitae*. While major dissent from *Humanae Vitae* poses a real crisis for the Church, as Faggioli correctly diagnoses, his analysis betrays an uncritical appropriation of “salvation history,” a seminal category for systematic-theological reflection on the divine economy.

At the end of the book, Faggioli espouses a “non-originalist” reception of Vatican II (137). For someone who so thoroughly supports the historical research into the genesis of Vatican II, its debates, drafts, and final texts, it seems slightly odd to espouse an interpretive theory that does not give primary importance to the plain meaning of the words and their author’s intentions, something (among many other things) which historians of the Council seek to uncover. Paradoxically, it seems that post-conciliar magisterial clarifications on *subsistit in* are criticized precisely on the supposition that an “originalist” interpretation of the *Lumen Gentium* should be normative. Faggioli presumably bases this

need for a “non-originalist” interpretation on what he calls the “gaps” that exist between the council fathers’ pre-conciliar intentions, the final drafts, and the post-conciliar “unintended consequences,” or between the “expectations,” on the one side, and the “results,” on the other (136–139). It should be noted, however, that an “originalist” approach—whether the correct one or not is here irrelevant—also assumes the existence of these gaps. The only reason one would have to dedicate effort to retrieving, for example, the intentions behind certain conciliar formulae is precisely because the life of the Church has kept moving since the Council. It seems ironic that such strong support for investigating the history of the texts is coupled with a hermeneutic that relativizes the normativity of those same texts. To my mind, it would seem that an effort—however difficult—at “originalism” would take more seriously, and do greater justice to, the “event” that was the Second Vatican Council and its teaching.

It must be said that Faggioli’s book has failed to overcome the clashing interpretations of the Council. Faggioli’s agenda is mediated not by polemic, but by a presentation that ignores the concerns of his opponents. Faggioli, furthermore, struggles to reveal the nuance of the theological positions at stake in discussing them and does not provide adequate evidence for the generalized claims that he makes.

Faggioli no doubt has contributed much to the historiography of Vatican II and its reception. He is right to insist that the Council be faithfully implemented and that to do so, the Conciliar achievement relative to what immediately preceded it must be acknowledged. Indeed, ecumenical councils are called in order to address something(s), and it would strain the imagination to think that a pope would call an ecumenical council when there were no challenges that needed to be met, nothing to reform, nothing to renew, nothing to recover. And the suggestion that conciliar intentions, drafts, and final texts all look the same is, we can agree, spurious. The key problem, I suggest, is that in the “battle” Faggioli analyzes, very little place is given to those participants who, like him, seek to be ever-loyal to the Council and affirm that something did indeed happen at Vatican II, but who nevertheless disagree with Faggioli’s theological and historical assessments.

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Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation by Jerry L. Walls
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xiv + 211 pp.

THERE ARE MORE AND MORE SIGNS indicating that an ecumenical doctrine of purgatory is an idea whose time has come. Perhaps none of these signs is more promising than the publication of Jerry Walls's *Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation*. In it, Walls has given us an irenic and thorough investigation and recommendation of the doctrine of purgatory from an explicitly Protestant point of view. According to Walls, every coherent theological system must deal with the problems that purgatory was developed to deal with, especially the fact the Christians are routinely seen to pass from this life far from fit for the morally perfect heaven affirmed by Christian faith. Throughout his seven chapters (a nod to Dante, *nota bene*), he is always careful to analyze the various aspects of purgatory within the broader context of basic Christian affirmations about eschatology, soteriology, and the doctrine of God.

Because of purgatory's interconnectedness with other doctrines of the faith, the reader will not be surprised to learn that Walls himself is a Methodist. That a robust Protestant doctrine of purgatory should emerge from within the Wesleyan tradition, with its traditional focus on sanctification and holiness, is quite understandable. Nevertheless, Walls does not write this book as a Methodist (he never mentions the fact), but as a Protestant, and it is his conviction that a doctrine of purgatory, properly understood, can become a theological resource for all Protestants. All the same, he is aware that certain Protestant positions, such as a strict Calvinist doctrine of election or a penal substitutionary view of the atonement, fit less smoothly with a doctrine of purgatory than his own views (or those of C. S. Lewis, for instance) on such questions.

This book represents the third in a trilogy for Walls, who has also written books on heaven and hell. As such, he is well positioned for this investigation of purgatory. And Walls wisely begins this book with heaven. Any clear thinking about purgatory must start with heaven and work backwards, so to speak. If heaven is the place of the morally perfect, how, exactly, are we made morally perfect? Purgatory is an attempt to answer just this question, but with the awareness that such perfection is not always achieved in this life. (As an aside, it is an odd lacuna in the book that Walls never explicitly addresses the question of whether purgatory is necessary for all the saved or if some are indeed perfected this side of death, or perhaps, as has been understood of the martyrs, in death itself.)

Walls begins with a modest history of purgatory. It is modest in the sense that Walls readily acknowledges that history is always written from

a given perspective and that his own account is no exception. A history of a theologically contentious doctrine like purgatory is bound to raise questions of interpretation and source selection. Walls is, nevertheless, evenhanded and thorough. He looks at the key passages in Scripture, the theological development of the idea in the patristic period, its systematization in the medieval period, and its rejection and reaffirmation in the sixteenth century. But he is not merely concerned with theology. Walls also considers social factors and the arts. Purgatory's "success" as a doctrine, along with some of the misunderstandings surrounding it, was abetted by a lively pious literature stretching as far back as St. Perpetua (through figures like St. Gregory and the Venerable Bede) and reaching its apex in the masterwork of Dante.

In the next chapter, Walls looks at Protestant interaction with the doctrine in more detail. There are two key reasons for the Protestant rejection of purgatory, he notes: its lack of explicit support in Scripture, and the fear that it detracts from the saving efficacy of Christ's cross. It is important to remember, of course, that these concerns emerged during a time when the doctrine was deeply entangled with the indulgence trade and often articulated in ways that could seriously misconstrue the doctrine's genuine content. As Walls notes, in his *Ninety-five Theses*, Luther does not object to the doctrine itself, but rather to distortions and abuses of it. Though Luther would later, along with the rest of the Reformers, reject the doctrine outright, there has existed a thread throughout Protestant history that suggests perhaps the baby had gone out with the bathwater.

Indeed, in Walls's various engagements with Protestant authors throughout the book, one notes an interesting dynamic: while many Protestant thinkers throughout history have concluded that something at least like purgatory is theologically desirable, even necessary, such conclusions tend to be accompanied by pro forma assurances that what is being proposed is certainly not "the Romish doctrine." What this Romish doctrine actually is is left unspecified, and though what is articulated often appears quite amendable to a Catholic understanding, there appears to be an identity issue that prevents separated Christians from being able to admit agreement, even when it is there. One of the great breakthroughs of Walls's book is that, in proposing a doctrine of purgatory to Protestants, he genuinely engages the Catholic view in a way that is neither dismissive, nor uncritical, but ecumenical in the best sense of the word. Walls's concern for the truth is never clouded by issues of ecclesial identity.

In this light, I suggest that chapter 3 might be the most important in the book. In it, Walls carefully assesses different models of purgatory that have emerged in the doctrine's history. He highlights what he calls "satisfaction" and "sanctification" models, and notes the existence of a kind of "satisfaction/sanctification" hybrid. Satisfaction models tend to use metaphors of debt and punishment to explain the logic and the suffering of purgatory, while sanctification models prefer the metaphors of cleansing and healing. More important, in my mind, than the preferred metaphors is whether the sufferings of purgatory have an extrinsic or intrinsic relationship to the condition of the sinner undergoing the suffering. Walls rejects any model of purgatory that makes the suffering of the sinner into an arbitrary punishment. Such models do, in fact, obscure the sufficiency of Christ's cross and Protestants are right to reject them. Sanctification models, however, simply acknowledge that the process of overcoming sin and its effects in our lives can be slow and painful. Walls argues that "Protestants can affirm sanctification models without in any way contradicting their theology, and may find that it makes better sense of how the remains of sin are purged than the typical Protestant account that it happens instantly and immediately at or after death" (90). Some Catholics might press Walls, however, that his rejection of the hybrid satisfaction/sanctification model, the view he ascribes to Aquinas, among others, is perhaps premature. It seems to follow from his distaste for metaphors of debt and punishment. Now, one can certainly grant that a one-sided application of such metaphors can be distorting, and that the metaphors may indeed be tarnished by an association with descriptions of purgatory that make its suffering into arbitrary punishments which ignore the cross. Nevertheless, metaphors are only that. If, as in the case of Aquinas, such metaphors are used in a way that does not make the suffering of purgatory extrinsic, they may need to be balanced, but it is not clear to me that they need to be rejected.

Chapter 4 begins with an exploration of different models of personal identity. Walls's goal is to demonstrate that a doctrine of purgatory is compatible with any number of theories of the relationship between body and soul or the intermediate state between death and resurrection that Christians have posited over the years. The real crux of the chapter, however, is when Walls reverses course and argues that, more than being simply compatible with how Christians have tended to view certain obscure eschatological questions, purgatory actually increases the intelligibility of how Christians view the afterlife. Of particular importance is the notion that it is difficult to maintain a theory of personal identity

in which a person is morally perfected without reference to his own freedom and, furthermore, that any kind of perfecting that does not simply override human freedom is necessarily temporal in nature (i.e., it is a process). Walls follows Ratzinger in asserting that the transformation of purgatory “cannot be quantified in earthly time measurements,” but he does not reflect further on how the “time” of purgatory is related to earthly time or to God’s eternity.

Walls’ fifth chapter puts forth an argument that may, at first blush, make Catholics nervous. Walls notes that Protestants have often mistaken the Catholic doctrine of purgatory as a kind of second chance for salvation after death, but that this is not, in fact, Catholic teaching. Walls, however, wants to argue for a modification of the traditional teaching that would allow purgatory to function this way, and he offers some pointed counterfactuals that make this modification appealing. Which of us would want to affirm that the God revealed in Jesus Christ damns people who have never had a full exercise of freedom in their earthly life and consequently had no real opportunity to hear and accept the gospel?

But I found that Walls’s moving counterfactuals were based on a notion that Walls himself does not actually hold: viz., if I may put it this way, that the default setting for human beings is damnation. If, on the other hand, one believes, as Walls states in a footnote, that “those in hell separate and distinguish themselves by definitively and decisively rejecting the love of God and his offer of salvation,” (#14, 195) then we need not imagine purgatory as giving a second chance to those whose freedom was so compromised in this life as to make their acceptance of the gospel impossible. If, in other words, the work of Christ has changed the default setting so that damnation is what requires a conscious and deliberate act, we may well imagine purgatory as a second chance for many people to be healed of the wounds of this life that impaired their freedom, without seeing it as a second chance for salvation *per se*. In any case, Protestants in general are not agreed about where to set what I have called the default switch. It may be that calling purgatory a second chance is one way for those with the default switch on damnation to solve the theological problems, highlighted by Walls’s counterfactuals, that do not emerge for those with the switch flipped the other way. Catholics, on the other hand, can use the unease that Walls’s counterfactuals induce to think about just how their own tradition understands the assent to grace that salvation requires in instances of radically compromised freedom.

My own view is that Walls actually provides a more coherent treatment of this delicate issue in his next chapter on C. S. Lewis. This penul-

timate chapter functions as a kind of capstone for the whole book and is executed with aplomb. In it Walls takes up the views of Lewis on purgatory with an eye to articulating an ecumenical version of the doctrine amenable to Catholics and Protestants alike. Walls notes Lewis's stature in evangelical Protestantism and the fact that Lewis provides a kind of cover for any evangelical thinker who wants to explore the idea of purgatory. One of the best things Walls does in the chapter is to thoroughly discredit those who have argued that purgatory was rather peripheral for Lewis and, in fact, out of step with his larger theological project (163). Through a careful look at the structure, and particularly the soteriology, of Lewis's classic *Mere Christianity*, Walls demonstrates how carefully integrated Lewis's thought on purgatory is with his larger corpus. Lewis's more explicit teaching on purgatory, found in *Letters to Malcolm*, is easily seen to be in conformity with his picture of the gospel in general. Finally, in his investigation of Lewis's theological fantasy *The Great Divorce*, Walls provides a more satisfying resolution to the question of purgatory as a second chance than he had in the previous chapter: there is no way out of damnation because the truly damned do not desire salvation. Anyone who is saved after death was never really damned in the first place. God's love and offer of forgiveness remain, but it is possible to set oneself against that love so that it is experienced as eternal torment.

This book fills an essential niche in both contemporary Protestant eschatology and in ecumenical theology. A study of this depth and seriousness, but also openness, of a Catholic doctrine by a Protestant scholar is sure to have ecumenical ramifications. It will allow separated Christians to revisit this contentious doctrine with new eyes, even as it raises eyebrows from the skeptical and voices from those who have no interest in reaching agreement in the first place. I have made note of several small issues I have with the text, but they are points for continued conversation more than condemnations. I want to note, now, one further lacuna in the text. Walls is aware throughout the text of the relationship between purgatory and prayer for the dead in Catholic thought and practice. He even acknowledges its prominence in the development of the doctrine. He does not, however, anywhere engage the question of its propriety. Should Protestants pray for the dead? What should they think of their Catholic brethren who do? Walls notes Lewis's view that "the action is so spontaneous, so all but inevitable, that only the most compulsive theological case against it would deter me" (155). Does Walls's endorsement of purgatory, then, include an endorsement of prayer for the dead? And, if so, how might that look

in a Protestant context? Walls has made an important, nay, essential, contribution to the ecumenical conversation, but there is more to say. With such a dialogue partner, there is reason for hope.

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