

The Doctrine of Analogy among the Thomists: A Debate Renewed

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KARL BARTH famously says in his *Church Dogmatics* that the analogy of being is an invention of the Antichrist.¹ Anyone who has tried to sort through the complex debates on this topic among Thomists in the second half of the twentieth century might well agree. Participants to the debates are generally agreed that analogy involves identifying similarity among difference and the predication of terms, somewhere between sheer equivocation and metaphor, on the one hand, and univocity, on the other. As to how exactly analogy functions beyond this though, there is little agreement even among many Thomists—not about (1) whether analogy is merely a logical and semantic doctrine, nor about (2) the different types of analogy, nor about (3) the type of analogy operative in metaphysics and natural theology, nor even about (4) the ontological foundation for analogy itself. Until the mid-twentieth century, the interpretation of Aquinas's famous commentator, Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan (1469–1534), held sway. But beginning with the work of various scholars in the mid-twentieth century, Cajetan's interpretation fell under attack. Since then, there has been no

¹ Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, trans. G. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936–77), 1/1: x. For discussion of Barth and his followers on analogy, see Thomas Joseph White, O.P., ed., *The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Anti-Christ or Wisdom of God?* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010).

shortage of critics of Cajetan.² Cajetan came to be seen as an unreliable interpreter of Aquinas on the issue of analogy. In this revised assessment, Cajetan “misread” certain texts of Aquinas in his famous *De nominum analogia. De conceptu entis* (1498).³ In his latest book, Steven A. Long has bravely advanced into this Thomistic battlefield, and in doing so, is clearly, to no small extent, attempting to issue a rallying call back to various crucial elements of the Cajetanian interpretation of Aquinas on analogy, in particular, (1) the unity of the historical doctrine of Aquinas on the matter and (2) the priority given to the analogy of proper proportionality.⁴ The very title of Long’s book recalls Cajetan’s own view that the analogy of proportionality is the “analogy of being.”⁵ Long argues that what is ultimately at stake in this debate is the very possibility of a philosophical theology that avoids the extremes of

² H. Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas Aquinas* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1952); George P. Klubertanz, S.J., *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960); Cornelio Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Louvain, 1961); Ralph McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961); McInerny, *Aquinas and Analogy* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996); Bernard Montagnes, *The Doctrine of Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas*, trans. E. C. Macierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004; orig. publ. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1963); John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), chaps. 3 and 13; Gregory P. Rocca, O.P., *Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004).

³ Thomas de Vio Cajetan, O.P., *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, trans. Edward A. Bushinski (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1953).

⁴ Long is not alone in defending certain positions of Cajetan. Rocca lists a number of midcentury adherents and their publications: Antonin Sertillanges, O.P., Maurilio Penido, Gerald Phelan, Charles Journet, Eric Mascall, James Anderson, Jacques Maritain (Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God*, 115n58). A more recent study of Cajetan is: Joshua P. Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De nominum analogia* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). Hochschild interprets Cajetan's theory as focused on trying to respond to questions raised by John Duns Scotus, rather than on trying to provide an historical account of Aquinas's theory.

⁵ Long's title also evokes the work of the same title by the twentieth-century Jesuit theologian Erich Przywara: Erich Przywara, S.J., *Analogia Entis: Metaphysik* (München: Josef Kösel & Friedrich Pustet) 1932.

either agnosticism (concerning the nature of God) or a sort of rationalism that would hold that our concepts apply univocally to God (apart from whether this univocity is overt or covert). In Long's view, only an analogy of proper proportionality avoids these extremes while also securing the important goal of justifying the ways that believers speak about God. And so, the many contemporary scholars who have cast aside this delicate tool, whether among various contemporary theological schools, or even among Thomists, have managed to "mislay many central doctrinal tenets of the Angelic Doctor."⁶

Perhaps the first question in the debate has been, what is the teaching of Aquinas on this issue? The answer to this question is complicated by the facts that Aquinas never wrote a systematic treatise on analogy and that he may have changed his mind on analogy in fundamental ways, as many scholars now think, from his early teaching in the *Commentary on the Sentences* and in *De veritate*.⁷ Long does not. He argues that Aquinas's position remained substantially unchanged throughout his career and that the way to perceive this unity of doctrine is through a systematic study of the issue in the light of the principles of the entire Thomistic synthesis. Long's method attempts to avoid getting lost in the details of a chronological consideration of individual texts, which are often addressing very specific and different issues. Long insists that Aquinas never abandons the doctrine of *De veritate* 2.11, and so argues that the analogy of proper proportionality is the analogy grounding metaphysics, as *De veritate* implies, and is thus "the analogy of being."

Long's book is divided into four chapters and an appendix: chapter one sets the metaphysical context for the consideration of analogy by discussing the challenge of Parmenidean monism and the first principle of being and thought; chapter two concerns the specific, important texts of Aquinas on the issue of analogy; chapter three takes up some of the more famous recent objections to the view that the analogy of proper proportionality is the analogy of metaphysics; chapter four discusses the importance of analogy for the act of faith; and finally, an appendix dis-

⁶ Long, 1.

⁷ See Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, chaps. 3 and 11, for a detailed discussion of the relevant primary texts across the range of Aquinas's career on both the predicamental and transcendental levels.

cusses important issues concerning the epistemological starting point of Thomistic metaphysics.

According to Long, the two important primary texts for understanding the foundational role of the analogy of proper proportionality in Aquinas are *Scriptum super Sententiis* I, d. 19, q. 5, art. 2, ad 1, and *De veritate*, q. 2, a.11. In the former, Aquinas says that something is said according to analogy in three ways: according to the notion (*intentio*) only and not according to being; according to being and not according to the notion; and according to the notion and according to being. In the first way one notion is referred to several things but has being only in one, such as when we speak of “healthy” animals and “healthy” food. In Long’s (and Cajetan’s) view, this is the analogy of extrinsic attribution. In the second type (according to being but not according to the notion), Aquinas uses the example of “body” as predicated of heavenly and earthly bodies. This meaning would be univocal for the logician but merely analogical for the physicist or metaphysician, in that “body” refers to radically unequal substances, in one case to incorruptible bodies and in another to corruptible bodies. The third type is analogy according to the notion and according to being; the example given is when “being” is said of substance and accident, or when “truth” and “goodness” are said analogically of God and creatures. The notion and being are the same “proportionally.”

Aquinas’s presentation of analogy in the *Sentences* becomes the basis for Cajetan’s division. Cajetan calls the first type an analogy of attribution (and he regards it as strictly extrinsic);⁸ the second type he calls an analogy of inequality, and is according to being only, “because the analogates are considered equal in the formality signified by the common name but are not held equal with respect to the ‘to be’ of this common formality”;⁹ the third type he calls an analogy of proportionality. He distinguishes proportion from proportionality, the former being “a definite relation of one quantity to another,” the latter being a similitude of two proportions.¹⁰ “This analogy excels above the others mentioned

⁸ Cajetan, *Analogy of Names*, 16: “This analogy is according to extrinsic denomination only, so that only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally, whereas the others have it only by extrinsic denomination.”

⁹ *Ibid.*, 12–13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

above both by dignity and name. By dignity, because it arises from the genus of inherent formal causality, for it predicates perfections that are inherent to each analogate whereas the other analogy arises from extrinsic denomination.”¹¹

The second definitive text for analogy, according to Long, is from Aquinas’s *Disputed Questions on Truth* (*De veritate*), q. 2, a. 11. This text, dated to the school year 1256–57, unambiguously rules out the univocal or equivocal predication of names for God and creatures: univocal because there is no common nature; equivocal, “for, unless there were at least some real agreement between creatures and God, His essence would not be the likeness of creatures, and so He could not know them by knowing His essence.”¹² In this text, Aquinas proceeds to distinguish two types of analogy: an analogy of proportion: “a certain agreement between things having a proportion to each other from the fact that they have determinate distance from each other or some other relation to each other;” and an analogy of proportionality: “the agreement is occasionally noted . . . between two related proportions—for example six has something in common with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times two.”¹³

Even though the analogy of proportion implicitly includes the likeness of effect to cause, Long argues that this analogy is not applicable to God and creatures because “the divine cause does not of itself contain any determinate order to the effect.” The reason there is no determinate order in the case of God is that “nothing about the divine cause is of itself determinately ordered or has real relation to the creature.”¹⁴

If we now turn to what is arguably the most important text of Aquinas that seems to run counter to Long’s interpretation, we find this one from the *prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae* (*ST*):

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example “healthy”

¹¹ Ibid., 27.

¹² Thomas Aquinas, *Truth* (*De veritate*), trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1954), q. 2, a. 11.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Long, 58. See also, Mark G. Henninger, S.J., *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus “healthy” is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently.¹⁵

This text distinguishes two types of analogy—many-to-one and one-to-another—and then seems to identify the latter as the analogy of natural theology. Furthermore, this one-to-another analogy is grounded in causal relation. Long wants still to interpret this text in light of Aquinas’s earlier texts and to understand the proportion of one to another and of effect to cause as “analogies of transferred proportion that are always as it were convertible into analogy of proper proportionality.”¹⁶

It is when we turn from individual texts to a consideration of the larger context of certain crucial insights of Aquinas’s synthesis that we can achieve considerable clarity about his doctrine of analogy. Long argues that in order to understand Aquinas on analogy, we ought to begin with the first principle of all thought and being, the principle of noncontradiction (PNC). In Long’s account, this principle is the key that unlocks the door of metaphysics and that eventually culminates in a natural theology that establishes the intelligibility of the act of faith. As Long puts it very clearly: that “act is not self-limiting is another form of the judgment that being is not nonbeing.”¹⁷ Act is limited only by virtue of its relation to potency and not by virtue of anything absolutely necessary to act as such.¹⁸ Thus implicit within the PNC there is a distinction between act and potency. The PNC prompts us to the insight that act

¹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 5, resp.

¹⁶ Long, 59.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

itself is unlimited and that there is a principle that is not nonbeing, nor mere possibility, nor act. This principle is potency.¹⁹ Potency is not act, because it is a real, subjective capacity founded on act but distinct from it; potency is not nonbeing, because it is a capacity; and it is not mere possibility, because it is always dependent on a prior act to which it is related. It is these insights that flow from a firm grasp of the principle of noncontradiction. Of course, the height of development for the act-potency distinction is then in the further insight that existence and essence are really distinct, that existence (*esse*) is the act of essence, and thus that existence is superformal and not self-limiting.²⁰ If I have understood Long correctly, the classic problem of “the one and the many” must be addressed before any analogy can be posited, for the simple reason that analogy involves identification of similarities among the many, which is a vain exercise if it is not clear how one can even first admit the existence of the many in any way at all. The fuller answer to the problem of the one and the many is found in the dual distinctions of act-potency and *esse*-essence. “The answer is the fundamental truth that created essence is to *esse* as potency to act. That is, when we ask formally for the cause of limit, manyness, and change, the answer is ‘potency,’ for to have a created essence is to have a potential principle vis-à-vis *esse*.²¹ This same principle then has crucial significance for natural theology, for “*esse* is truly act in both creature and God but in creature as proportional to the limit of potency and in God as proportional to the full perfection of act unlimited by potency.”²²

Long is not disregarding Aquinas’s teaching on participation, nor is he denying that “potency limits the participation in being and establishes the degree of remotion from the first cause.”²³ But he is arguing that prior to the notion of participation are the notions that act is itself unlimited, that act is distinct from potency, and that potency is a cor-

¹⁹ Ibid., 16–17.

²⁰ Ibid., 25.

²¹ Ibid., 67.

²² Ibid., 59.

²³ Ibid., 26. Cf. W. Norris Clarke, S.J., “The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?,” in *Explorations in Metaphysics: Being–God–Person* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 65–88. (Long cites this text but wishes not to enter fully into its argument; see Long, 26n13).

relative, limiting principle that determines the degree of being. Long argues that both the proofs for the existence of God and the doctrine of participation are preceded by the division of being by act and potency. "Hence the Aristotelian answer to Parmenides is the necessary condition for any ontologically pluralist doctrine of participation."²⁴

Long is rejecting the thesis that analogy is properly speaking merely a logical and semantic theory concerning the functioning of words or terms.²⁵ As such a theory, analogy involves a use of terms to speak about related realities, even though the realities and their relations themselves are not analogical—they simply are, or in other words, they are what they are. As Benedict Ashley, who follows Ralph McInerny on this issue in his recent textbook on Thomistic metaphysics, states, "It is only the processes of human thought and the inadequacy of human language in which we express thought that leads us to understand something we do not understand through what we know better, and consequently to express it by analogical terms."²⁶ The crucial point, Ashley argues (making use of McInerny's work), is to keep distinct the linguistic and logical question of how words are used univocally, equivocally, metaphorically, or analogically, from the ontological question of "how the realities named by such texts are related to each other."²⁷ Analogy is a logical theory about the significance of terms, not an ontological theory about things and their properties.

In Ashley's account of "one-to-one analogy," a word is transferred "from its proper use for A to name something else B similar enough to A so that the knowledge of A helps to understand B in a way useful for critical thought, yet not similar enough to B for A and B to be reduced

²⁴ Long, 28.

²⁵ See Ralph McInerny, *Aquinas and Analogy: Studies in Analogy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); "The Analogy of Names Is a Logical Doctrine," in *Being and Predication* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986); also John Deely, "The Absence of Analogy," *Review of Metaphysics* 55, no. 3 (2002): 521–50. Cf. Lawrence Dewan, O.P., "St Thomas and Analogy: Logician and the Metaphysician," in *Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, C.S.B.*, ed. R. E. Houser (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 132–45.

²⁶ Benedict Ashley, O.P., *The Way toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Introduction to Metaphysics* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 135.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 284.

as species to a single univocal genus.”²⁸ In Ashley’s account, “many-to-one” analogy differs in that it transfers a word from its proper use for A to several other kinds of things with different relations to A but with the same name. Ashley says that Cajetan tried to distinguish analogies based on a single relation—that is, proportion—from those based on a comparison of the relations between two pairs of terms—that is, proportionality, or a similarity of one relation to another.²⁹ “But,” says Ashley, “this is not an essential difference, since any analogy can be displayed as a proportionality.”³⁰ Thus analogy is merely about determining how transferred uses are related to the one proper use. The proper sense of the word is the *res significata* and the differences are found in the *modus significandi*, which involve a relation of similarity.³¹

One of the other important issues that Long discusses concerns the foundational type of analogy for metaphysics and natural theology. A major alternative to the position Long takes on this issue is the view that would maintain that the analogy of one-to-another (*unius ad alterum*) (or what has been called “intrinsic attribution, based on the causal relation”) is the foundation for metaphysics and for our knowledge of God.³² The defenders of this latter position appeal especially to the text already cited from *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5, where Aquinas says that “whatever is said of God and creatures is said according to the relation of creature to God as its principle and cause.”³³ According to this view, it is this type of analogy that is of value in natural theology because this is grounded in the similarity of effect to cause found in the causal relation.

These defenders of analogy of one-to-another (or intrinsic attribu-

²⁸ Ibid., 286.

²⁹ Ibid., 187.

³⁰ Ibid., 287.

³¹ Ibid., 287. Herbert McCabe also regards “analogy” as a way of using words: “Too much has been made of St. Thomas’s alleged teaching on analogy. For him analogy is not a way of getting to know about God, nor is it a theory of the structure of the universe, it is a comment on our use of certain words” (McCabe quoted in Brian Davies, O.P., “The Limits of Language and the Notion of Analogy,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies and Eleanore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 397n8).

³² Charles D. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Enquiry into the Act of Existing* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1959).

³³ *ST* I, q. 5, resp.

tion) claim that the analogy of proper proportionality is inadequate for the purposes of natural theology because there is no clear similarity between a conceivable being whose essence is to exist and the beings of our experience where the real relations pertain. Trying to build a natural theology on this analogy ends in agnosticism, especially since the notion of being in metaphysics, as a transcendental, must always include all conceivable, as well as all actually existing, beings. Thus some form of analogy not based merely on a four-term “proportionality”—that is, the similar proportion of relations—is needed if we are to escape this agnosticism. Montagnes, for example, complains of Cajetan that he has separated the conceptual order and the real order. In Cajetan’s theory, the property of the concept’s encompassing its inferiors pertains only to our representation. “The all-encompassing supreme instance within which all beings are unified and under which they all are like each other is none other than the idea of being. The unity of being is that of a concept.”³⁴ Or, as Montagnes puts it, the difference between the two theories is the difference between “a metaphysics of the idea of being” and “a metaphysics of the degrees of being.”³⁵ The debate among Thomists over analogy will no doubt hinge, in no small part, on whether Long has defended the analogy of proper proportionality from this concern that Montagnes raises.

Montagnes argues that only the analogy of one-to-another can supply what is needed, namely, a grounding in causal relation, “in virtue of the relations of efficient and formal causality, and the sum of those relations constitutes participation.”³⁶ Essences are to be considered from two points of view—the predicamental and the transcendental. Here Montagnes is building on the distinction Fabro draws between analogy at the predicamental level—that is, how being can be applied analogically to substance and the other accidents, or predicaments—and analogy at the transcendental level, or vertically—that is, how being and other names can be applied to different kinds of substances, especially God and creatures.³⁷ From the transcendental point of view, essences are to

³⁴ Montagnes, *Doctrine of Analogy of Being*, 132.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 162.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 161.

³⁷ In Long’s view, the analogy of proportionality is equipped to handle both horizontal and vertical similarities while respecting differences. See also John Wippel’s discus-

be considered as degrees and modes of the perfection of being—that is, as participations of being—essence being inseparable from *esse*. “Essence is no longer primarily defined as the potency and limitation of the act of being. It is from the start its formal measure and this is so right up to and including the situation in God.”³⁸

Of course, those who defend the analogy of one-to-another try to defend themselves from the accusation of rationalism by appealing to the fundamental distinction between the reality signified by a name (*res significata*) and the name’s manner of signification (*modus significandi*). In this way, “while the absolute and analogical predicates of positive theology are affirmed of God as regards the reality they signify, they must be denied as regards their manner of signification.”³⁹

To a large extent, Long seems to be arguing over the foundation of metaphysics and, more specifically, of natural theology. He is arguing that the defenders of one-to-another analogy as the analogy of being are making a fatal move by thinking that we can discover a direct proportion between God and creatures, as in 1:2, rather than a proportionality, as is involved in 6:3:4:2, “God cannot be put into any determinate relation to the creature (although the creature is determined in relation to God).”⁴⁰ Long writes, “While the emphasis on analogy of proportion, of one to another, and of effect to cause are all to be found in Thomas’s later writings, there are no apparent grounds for holding that any strict analogy of proportion in the sense in which Thomas earlier denies it, or in any sense that does not presuppose analogy of proper proportionality, is countenanced by him.”⁴¹ There can be no direct proportion between God and creature because there is no relation of God to effect. He writes: “The analogy of effect to cause, of one to another, can be only an analogy of transferred proportion, for the divine cause has no determined relation or proportion to the effect, although the effect is wholly determined in relation to the cause.”⁴² Long argues that his opponents claim too much in establishing a proportion between effect and cause

sion of Fabro, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 73n30, 74.

³⁸ Montagnes, *Doctrine of Analogy of Being*, 161.

³⁹ Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God*, 334.

⁴⁰ Long, 58.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 59.

as the foundation. As Long concludes, "The distance from the nickel to the dime is the same as that from the dime to the nickel, but there is not such determinate proportion between creature and God."⁴³

It is the analogy of proper proportionality that safeguards the transcendence of the act of faith while not losing the intelligibility of that act of faith.⁴⁴ Transcendence is safeguarded because all that is said of God is proportioned to God as his own, without limit of potency and standing in no determined relation or direct proportion to the creature. Intelligibility is safeguarded because the middle term is the proportionate identity of perfection—a perfection limited by potency in creatures, and unlimited in God.

It is important to keep in mind that Long is not denying the importance of the analogy grounded in participation and the causal relation of effect to cause. His point is that, while this type of analogy is important, it is reducible to proportionality and, what is more, if I understand him correctly, that before there can be relation of one to another, there must be anything at all. "Analogy of relation is simply another term for what Thomas calls an improper analogy of proportion (for owing to the divine simplicity, God has no determinate relation to the creature)."⁴⁵ And the existence of anything other than unlimited, pure act is only possible if there is a correlative principle of limitation that limits act, that is, potency, since neither absolute nonbeing nor mere possibility could serve such a function. The existence of anything other than being itself can only be admitted if Parmenides is answered in his contention that being is self-identical and thus the many and change cannot be. The Aristotelian division of being in the act-potency distinction is the answer, for only this distinction makes possible the claim that any substance other than pure act exists, and implicit in this distinction is the notion that act is of itself unlimited.

This foundation provides Long with the firm footing to meet objections coming from two opposing ends of the spectrum. On the one hand, Long must meet the Scotistic objection to nonunivocity theories, namely, that analogous reasoning must be grounded in a simple, univo-

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 101–2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 68.

cal concept of being, which can apply to everything, at least insofar as it is, rather than is not, if one is going to avoid a whole range of claims in natural theology that involve one in sheer equivocation. In Scotus's view, at least some theological claims must be univocal for any subsequent analogous reasoning to avoid equivocation.⁴⁶ In a way, much of Long's book constitutes his implicit answer (as did Cajetan's book) and his attempt to safeguard the intelligibility of speech about God without positing a third thing for the middle term under which God and creatures fall.⁴⁷ By recalling Scotus's theory, however, we see how crucial is Long's extended argument that the concept of being is intrinsically analogous and possesses a "proportionate identity which is sufficient for reasoning" when applied to God and creatures.⁴⁸

On the other hand, Long's account of analogy also attempts to address more recent accusations made against St. Thomas's entire theological enterprise coming from the opposite direction, namely, the accusation that he has fallen into a sort of rationalism, or even ontotheology, in which God is understood as falling under the concept of being, as one being among many. Here, of course, one thinks of the Barth's famous accusation of analogy as the work of the Antichrist or the more recent accusation of Jean-Luc Marion in his *Dieu sans l'être* of Aquinas being a sort of "onto-theologian."⁴⁹ And although Marion later largely retracts this accusation, Long carefully shows the reader why any sort of rationalistic or ontotheological interpretation of Aquinas ought to be rejected.⁵⁰ He also clearly seems to intend to rescue the Cajetanian approach from the accusation that it involves a veiled univocal concept that ends in ontotheology.⁵¹

On this point Long defends the view that God is infinitely more

⁴⁶ See Richard Cross's discussion of Scotus's univocity theory: *Duns Scotus*, Great Medieval Thinkers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 33–39.

⁴⁷ Long, 102.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Jean-Luc Marion, *God without Being*, trans. Thomas H. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

⁵⁰ Jean-Luc Marion, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l'onto-théologie," *Revue thomiste* 95 (1995): 31–66; see also Brian Shanley, O.P., "St. Thomas Aquinas, Onto-Theology, and Marion," *The Thomist* 60 (1996): 617–25; Shanley, *The Thomist Tradition* (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2002), 63–66.

⁵¹ See Shanley, *The Thomist Tradition*, 54.

perfect and nobler than that of all limited being (i.e., proportionate and participated substances), and in such a way as to exceed all proportion.⁵² “In God there is no potency to limit the perfection of act, and act is not self-limiting.”⁵³ We are without direct proportion when it comes to God; we have only a likeness of proportions, that is, proportionality. “We know God as unknown, and the divine perfections are always cognized by us only as incomprehending God.”⁵⁴ Sertillanges, in his eloquent defense of the analogy of proper proportionality, makes a similar point quoting Albert the Great, “God is at once unnamable and all-namable, and ‘Unnamable’ is the most beautiful of all His names, for it raises Him at the outset above every endeavor to speak of Him.”⁵⁵ 

⁵² Long, 31.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 103.

⁵⁵ A. G. Sertillanges, O.P., *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy*, trans. Godfrey Anstruther, O.P. (St. Louis, MO: Herder, 1931), 83.