

Book Reviews

Catholicism and America: Challenges and Prospects edited by Matthew L. Lamb (*Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2012*), 174 pp.

A BOOK THAT ADDRESSES the relationship between Catholicism and America must do three things. First, it must be mindful of the fundamental relationship between the city of God and the earthly city. Second, it must address the relationship of the Catholic faith to modernity, since America is a regime formed in and formed by modernity. Third, it must address those characteristic features of America as a modern regime that provide particular challenges and opportunities for Catholicism in America. Father Matthew L. Lamb has brought together an impressive body of contributors to address precisely these things in his new edited volume, *Catholicism and America: Challenges and Prospects*. They come from many different disciplines and from several different backgrounds: there are members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, such as Cardinals Francis George and William Levada; university professors, such as Peter Augustine Lawler and Daniel J. Mahoney; university administrators, such as Thomas S. Hibbs and Michael Dauphinais; and public intellectuals and denizens of the world of think tanks, such as George Weigel and Michael Novak. They can all be identified as broadly conservative, although they represent a reasonably broad range of conservative Catholic thought.

For the most part, the contributors to the volume understand the relationship between Catholicism and America as in tension but with the possibility of rapprochement. The relationship bears tensions common to all relationships between earthly cities and the city of God, but it also bears features peculiar to the American regime. The contributors are distinguished by the degree to which they think such a rapprochement

likely or possible, and what form such a rapprochement would take. The book therefore addresses the challenges America poses to Catholics in remaining faithful to the Catholic faith, and the challenges Catholicism poses to America in remaining true to herself and true to the natural and divine law.

The book has three sections. The first section addresses the challenges that Catholicism issues to America in order to improve American life; the second reassesses the project of John Courtney Murray to think about Catholicism and America together and tries to place that project in context today; the third section deals with Catholic higher education. The challenges that Catholicism issues to America are rooted in what the authors regard as imperfections in the theoretical inheritance of America, so it is fitting to end the book with a section on the university, which is where the work of cultivating the intellectual virtues in young citizens takes place in the highest degree.

The opening chapter of the volume by Cardinal George is a reflection on Pope Benedict XVI's ecclesial thought on the hermeneutic of reform within continuity, as it applies specifically to Vatican II and the Church's social doctrine. The Church, George reads Benedict as teaching, characteristically applies her teachings to new historical circumstances in such a way that the truths of the faith do not change, although the applications to different circumstances must. In every age, therefore, the Church must formulate new accommodations, so as to enculturate the faith without the faith ceasing to be itself. The western phenomenon of secularization, however, in its particularly American instantiation, provides a hefty challenge according to George. The question must be asked, is there a point at which the Church needs to stop accommodating a culture that is increasingly hostile to anything that represents a standard of transcendent judgment beyond itself? In George's words, "Are Catholics' commitments not compatible with the demands of American democratic philosophy and practice, at least in some sense?" George rejects the solution of liberal Catholicism as confusing the Church and the world and identifying the earthly city with the city of God. He does not give a direct answer to the question in his chapter, but the tone of his contribution betrays his pessimism: secularism proceeds apace to the detriment of the relationship between America and the Church. He

has elsewhere predicted, "I expect to die in bed, my successor will die in prison and his successor will die a martyr in the public square."

The lingering question posed by Cardinal George is taken up directly by Daniel J. Mahoney and George Weigel in their contributions later in the volume; Weigel is followed and supplemented by Michael Novak. Both Mahoney and Weigel criticize, implicitly and explicitly, Cardinal George's pessimism; both allege there to be more resources to draw on in America for the harmony of Catholicism and America than they understand the Cardinal to admit, but both proceed on very different grounds.

Weigel offers his contribution by way of a reflection on John Courtney Murray's *We Hold These Truths*. In that work, the great twentieth-century theologian attempted to think together Catholicism and America, arguing that the American founding and resulting national character is far less alien to the Catholic faith than previously had been thought by most. Weigel's chapter, entitled "Truths Still Held?" includes a helpful summary of Murray's book. His argument is that the particularly American problem of secularization is the result of discontinuity in the American tradition itself, encapsulated especially by the recent abandonment of the natural, moral law by elite American institutions on which the American founders relied. The challenge that Catholicism issues to America, therefore, is the challenge to be true to her deepest self, which is founded on authentic, natural rights and the natural, moral law. The implication of Weigel's argument seems to be that what is most deeply American is not fundamentally in tension with Catholicism.

Michael Novak concurs with Weigel, but presses Weigel (and Murray) even further. Novak argues that Murray cherry picks from the American founding to make his points. What Murray leaves out, however, would only help his argument. Novak does not say why Murray cherry picks, although his almost parenthetical association of Murray with Leo Strauss's reading of the American founding may be instructive. Strauss and Murray, Novak avers, may not have been as completely on board with America as their surface arguments indicated. Although Novak only calls Strauss and Murray's omissions "odd," it does seem that Novak's own embrace of America is far less critical than either of the two twentieth-century greats. For instance, Novak says that "the sharp line Strauss drew"—and by extension Murray, as well?—"between the an-

cients and the moderns seems far too severe, for example—more Continental than Anglo-American.” Strauss and Murray both acknowledge the American debt to the very Anglo-American Locke, although he was transmitted with a Jeffersonian flavor. The degree to which Novak views American secularism as problematic, then, is the degree to which America strays from her Lockean—and therefore more Catholic-friendly, in Novak’s view—founding and toward more virulently anti-Catholic European strains of thought.

Daniel J. Mahoney agrees with Weigel and Novak that Cardinal George is “right to criticize the excesses of ‘American culture,’” but “it is another thing to identify them with our regime principles as such.” Unlike Weigel and Novak, Mahoney does not see the challenges posed by America to Catholicism necessarily to be the result of a rupture or an infidelity to her founding principles, although certain historical factors have exacerbated the tensions between the two; rather, Mahoney argues that philosophic liberalism as such is incompatible with Catholicism. Liberalism’s notion of liberty as pure indeterminism is what is problematic, rooted as it is in the voluntaristic moral theory of autonomy. Philosophic liberalism, especially in its instantiation as modern democracy, provides many good things, including, as Marc D. Guerra mentions in his chapter, “civic peace, religious freedom, self-government, and constitutionalism.” But it also cultivates indifference to the truth and therefore gives way to despotism, both the soft despotism Tocqueville worried about and the hard, late modern despotisms of fascism and communism. The Church can, however, provide a bulwark against the nihilistic self-enslavement of man toward which philosophic liberalism, in either its Anglo-American or Continental forms, perversely and helplessly leads. Christianity can help marry freedom, sought in a harmful way by liberalism, and communion, sought in a harmful way by fascism and communism, in a liberty under God. After all, Mahoney reminds, human beings are free only when they understand that they themselves are not God. Mahoney therefore does not understand Christianity and America in terms of “essential compatibility”; rather, drawing on the thought of the French philosopher Pierre Manent, he calls for “a fulsome prudential accommodation between the Church and the liberal order.” Through this accommodation, the Church would help to preserve the various good things that have been secured by liberalism

that liberalism cannot preserve on its own; also by this accommodation, liberalism's tendency toward harmful voluntarism and isolating individualism would be moderated.

Matthew L. Lamb, Peter Augustine Lawler, and Marc D. Guerra concur with Mahoney in essentials. These three contributions, combined with Mahoney's chapter, provide the most valuable part of the book. Taken together, they are able to situate the challenges posed by America to Catholicism in a long intellectual history.

Matthew L. Lamb, in a manner reminiscent of the arguments of Bernard Lonergan, shows how the advent of nominalism and voluntarism in the late medieval period and the work of the Reformers sundered faith and reason, and thereby led to a cycle of decline that has ended in massive moral and political problems, including wars on a scale never seen before, the Holocaust, and the dictatorship of relativism. What is obscured along the way most significantly, for Lamb, is the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, so crucial to the birth of philosophy and to adequate theology. (Thomas S. Hibbs later takes up this refrain in his criticism of modern American education, arguing that, like the Athenians addressed by Socrates at his trial, universities now care more for the body than for the soul.) As Lamb continues to show, nominalism ends up elevating the will over the reason, with the resultant separation between science and morality. The Church's task at the beginning of the third millennium, which constitutes her challenge to America, echoing Pope Benedict XVI, is to recover "the full sweep of intelligence and reason," from the narrowness and self-limitations of modern thought.

Lawler's chapter provides a contribution to the task that Lamb outlines. What is needed, Lawler argues, is the science of theology; that is, a theology ordered to the *knowledge* of God; but not just any God. The particular Christian contribution to the science of theology, which, after all, Aristotle also practiced, is that the God who is *logos* is also personal and erotic. Both the Greeks and Christians, therefore, ridiculed and argued against the unreasonable religions of the pagans. Yet, Lawler argues, the difference between Aristotelian and Christian theology is that, for Aristotle, "the realm of human freedom, finally, is a mythical idea, one that must be rhetorically supported but for which there is no scientific evidence." The Christians respond that this does not correspond to

what we experience and know about ourselves and our lives. As a matter of fact, we know of no instance of minds functioning to know the truth except for the minds of free persons. The philosopher or the physicist, therefore, cannot be accounted for through Aristotelian theology or on the basis of modern natural science, which attempts to be just as impersonal as Aristotelian theological science. Similarly, for John Locke, Lawler argues, the word (*logos*) is just a weapon “we use to secure our being against nature and without God.” Locke teaches that nature is finally indifferent to us, and God is merely a past-tense, deistic, impersonal, unerotic God who exercises no care for us. The problem for Americans is that they are taught by Locke but also formed by Puritan Christianity. Defending our freedom and autonomy against the encroachment of impersonal science, Puritanism has successfully de-Hellenized religion; Lockeanism and its accompanying de-Christianization have simultaneously “emptied our freedom of any real or ‘transcendent’ content.” But Christian theology, by virtue of its anchor in *logos*, is able to oppose the unreason of the pagan Greek and Roman religions as well as the sheer voluntarism of modern political philosophy. The wholesome teaching of the Christian science of theology, therefore, is that *logos* is most deeply personal. In light of Christian theology, freedom comes to light as deeply personal and as teleologically directed toward the transcendent God whom men can really know. The Catholic Church can therefore help to moderate and harmonize the complementary deficiencies in the two legs of the American Founding: Lockeanism and Puritanism.

Marc D. Guerra addresses and builds on Lawler’s observation of the perils of impersonalism in science, especially when it is coupled with a flight from reason toward voluntarism and nominalism in morals and politics. Guerra echoes and expands on Mahoney’s call for a “*prudent* way of coming to terms with democracy’s discontents and modern philosophy’s disenchantment of the world.” Catholic political thought is able to identify what is good in any given, concrete political order and defend it because of its transcendent viewpoint, including the good things of modernity and America. Nevertheless, Catholic political thought is also well-suited to critique what is harmful. It sees, Guerra says, the dehumanizing effects of modernity’s complacency about truth and of modernity’s claim that nature is indifferent to human persons; it sees also philosophic liberalism’s reduction of human beings to ab-

stract, rights-bearing individuals with no natural ties to family, friends, and God. Natural limitations and obligations, which are imposed on us without our consent, far from enslaving us or constricting our freedom, humanize our lives and help us to live well as the kinds of beings we really are.

Guerra's criticisms are not reserved solely for non-Christians, however. He argues that the flight "from the concrete, limiting realities of citizenship and political life can have its Christian analogue." Christians need greater reflection on the fact that the political order is a limited good, incapable of realizing the perfection of the human being, but that it is nevertheless good, and not to be despised for its limitations. Christians are too often tempted to skip the concrete particularity of political life for the justice and peace of the kingdom of God, or to delude themselves into thinking that the full blessings of justice and charity—rightly understood to be an eschatological reality—can be had on earth in what Pope Paul VI called a "civilization of love." The problem is that "[b]y directing the political and international order to an eschatological horizon where justice is perfected by charity, such statements put unrealistic weight and expectations on the limited but genuine good that can justly be achieved in political life." Christians need the moderating virtue of prudence to situate political life properly.

Catholicism in America is a delightful volume to read. It is a dialectical journey through many different phases of the argument about the place of Catholicism in America and the challenges posed to America by Catholicism. The diversity of the contributors and the artful arrangement of the chapters gives the reader the opportunity to be swept into the ebb and flow of the arguments. The forcefulness of the arguments, along with their depth, manages to preserve both the sense of urgency about what is at stake and the contemplative distance necessary to consider the matter well. All of the contributors are deeply concerned to provide a firm basis for Catholics to be good Americans, but more especially to allow Americans to be good Catholics while carrying out their duties and obligations as Americans. There is obviously room to criticize what has been omitted; after all, this is a relatively short book. Could there be room for a more libertarian entry? Or for a proponent of the New Natural Law? Or for a more Chestertonian localist? Perhaps. But ultimately the book is about the exercise of prudence in the relation-

ship of Catholics to America, and the editor has managed to assemble a group of Catholics dedicated to the proposition that Catholicism and America are neither incompatible nor fully compatible, and therefore the tension-ridden relationship must be navigated carefully lest the Catholic citizen be guilty either of despising the world or of capitulating to it. The volume succeeds, therefore, as a moderate, Catholic defense of America, while also leveling trenchant yet friendly criticisms. In Guerra's words, the Catholic can, as the volume's contributors demonstrate, "affirm what is genuinely good about liberty and democracy and simultaneously refuse to affirm, in contrast to the modern state, that these are the highest or only human goods." 

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Orthodox Readings of Aquinas by Marcus Plested (*Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012*), xi + 276 pp.

MARCUS PLESTED has written a very important book. *Orthodox Readings of Aquinas* is a study of the past 650 years of Eastern Orthodox engagement with Thomas Aquinas, and more broadly with the western, Latin tradition that Aquinas embodies. But this is no merely descriptive, dispassionate history; Plested tells us at the start that he is writing to question the dominant "grand narrative" current in Eastern Orthodoxy today: "This book exists to explore the strange divergence between Byzantine and modern Orthodox readings of Aquinas and, more generally, to probe the whole question of East versus West in modern Orthodox theology" (4).

In this finely researched and winsomely written survey, Plested begins with a word about method. He proposes to use the *icon* as the lens through which he will examine the relevant texts and figures. Applying the technique of what he calls "multiple perspective" to the two figures who serve as the opposing archetypes of the East and West, Plested opens the study with two fascinating chapters, the first on Thomas Aquinas and his reception of the Greek East, the second on Gregory Palamas and his reception of the Latin West. His goal is to show that

“the Christian East is not quite as ‘Eastern,’ nor the West as ‘Western,’ as is generally assumed” (5).

Noting the “historical turn” in Thomist studies, Plested unveils a picture of Aquinas that shows his Byzantine stripes: his “love for and grounding in the Greek Fathers” (15), his Christology which is “Greek in character and emphasis” (20), and his work overall as “bathed in this *orientale lumen*” (17). Historical studies of Aquinas have shown decisively that he can no longer be judged as an “out and out rationalist,” as many Orthodox assume.

Plested praises Aquinas for his theological achievement: “His was a blindingly original theology. But it was original in the best sense of the word, plumbing the depths of the tradition, reaching back to the sources and origins of faith in order to underpin a truly creative, truly original, theological vision” (21). Even more importantly, Plested sees in Aquinas an approach to East-West issues that can serve as a paradigm for us today: “Thomas is a fine example of one who, without doctrinal compromise, sought to bridge the gap between the competing traditions through greater knowledge, understanding, and respect” (28).

The study of Gregory Palamas’s reception of the Latin West is equally illuminative. Pointing to the “significant encounter with Augustine in Palamas’s works” (29), Plested shows how Palamas was as “essentialist” as Augustine in his trinitarian theology and made positive use of Augustinian trinitarian analogies, even while rejecting Augustine’s account of the Filioque. Still, in Palamas we can find what Plested calls the “Orthodox Filioque” when it comes to the “extension to human beings of the uncreated grace of the Spirit” (38). The conclusion is that there is “an underlying congruity” between Palamas and Augustine, and that Palamas himself showed a genuine openness to Latin theology.

Plested takes special aim at the modern Orthodox rejection of the scholastic method as somehow foreign to true Orthodox theology. Citing the scholastic method found in such Eastern giants as Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, and John of Damascus, Plested poignantly demonstrates that scholasticism is not only not foreign to the East, but is *rooted in* the Eastern theological tradition: “If by scholasticism we understand not some caricature of untrammelled reason but rather the careful and ordered use of reason to explicate and define revealed truth, bolstered by an appeal to patristic and philosophical authority (strictly in that or-

der), then it is undeniable that this method is perfectly proper to and indeed rooted in the Byzantine East" (46).

In the long central section of this study (chapters 3-6), Plested surveys a wide variety of Orthodox readings of Aquinas. He divides his account into three stages: (1) the Byzantine stage, from the first full encounter with Aquinas until the fall of Constantinople (1354-1453); (2) the Ottoman era, from 1453 until the mid-late nineteenth century; (3) and the modern era (late nineteenth century to the present). This makes for fascinating reading, and we are greatly in Plested's debt for opening this window onto a much-neglected narrative. Here we discover the degree to which Aquinas's main writings were circulated and (often) appreciated, even if critically, in the Greek East throughout most of this period. And here we encounter a set of figures (e.g. Nicholas Kabasilas and George Scholarios) who stand as models for the kind of sympathetic but critical engagement of the West by the East that Plested wishes to recommend.

The survey of the modern period is most instructive for the present state of East-West relations. Plested points to the Slavophile school in particular as momentous for the development of Orthodox thought. Championing an East-West theological polarity, and nurtured on German idealism and romanticism, "Slavophile theology represents the emergence of something rather new: a dialectic construct of Orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is defined by the Slavophiles not so much for what it is, but for what it is not—that is, as non-Western" (181). This "theology of opposition" then came to characterize much of Orthodox theology throughout the twentieth century.

With nuance and balance, Plested offers summary evaluations of the great Orthodox figures of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, among whom are Vladimir Soloviev, Pavel Florensky, Sergius Bulgakov, Vladimir Lossky, Georges Florovsky, John Meyendorff, John Romanides, Christos Yannaras, Philip Sherrard, Kallistos Ware, John Zizioulas, and Olivier Clément (one could have wished for a brief word on Frs. Alexander Schmemmann and Thomas Hopko). In Plested's narrative, Bulgakov and Lossky are held specially responsible for championing an oppositional theology, while Romanides and Yannaras are credited with taking up the most extreme form of this all-out assault on the West. On the other side of the ledger, Florovsky and Ware are specially com-

mended for avoiding an oppositional approach to the West. Florovsky, with his project of a neo-patristic synthesis, is identified as “something of a hero of this study” (203), and Ware is named “perhaps the most unimpeachably balanced and nuanced expositor of the Orthodox tradition in modern times” (215). Notwithstanding their efforts (and those of others), Plested sums up the present situation as one in which “the East-West paradigm remains deeply entrenched in Greek Orthodox theology and Aquinas definitely *persona non grata*” (213).

In his concluding chapter, Plested sharpens his arguments and offers new perspectives for us to consider. His first and chief conclusion concerns the long-entrenched paradigm of the fundamental incompatibility of the East and West: “Preeminent among those stereotypes ripe for rejection is the hoary assumption of theological dichotomy between Christian East and West” (220). The entire volume’s effort in multiple perspective provides one long argument against the truth of this supposed dichotomy. Second, Plested wants to overturn the assumption that from the beginning there was a pitched battle between Aquinas and Palamas in the Byzantine world: “The widespread assumption that there was a clear-cut confrontation between Palamism and Thomism in the Byzantine world is certainly overdue for revision. There was no such confrontation” (221). Finally, he submits that a “critical but constructive mode of reception,” found among many Orthodox interpreters of Aquinas, remains open for Orthodox theologians to emulate in the present (222).

Orthodox Readings of Aquinas is a critically important book for Orthodox and Catholics alike. To the Orthodox, Plested throws down the gauntlet, calling for an end to a theology of opposition in favor of a generous and confident Orthodoxy that recognizes kinship with the West: “The oppositional theologizing that has dominated Orthodox discourse in the twentieth century is, then, a sign of weakness rather than strength. . . . A self-confident Orthodoxy has no need of a caricature of the West against which to model itself in reaction. . . . A self-confident Orthodoxy can afford to be generous” (226). Plested sees “no contradiction between an uncompromising Orthodoxy and a positive but discerning appropriation of Aquinas” (227).

For Catholics, Plested’s presentation of “a distinctly Byzantine image of Thomas” who is “as much at home on the shores of the Bosphorus

as by the banks of the Tiber or the Seine" (224), calls for a new awareness of the Eastern influence upon this most Western of theologians. If the West is less guilty of a "theology of opposition" than the East, it can certainly be charged with sometimes practicing a "theology of ignorance" regarding the East in general, and the East's influence upon Aquinas in particular. Moreover, Catholics can learn the same lesson about a generous, open, and critical engagement with the East, especially with the late Byzantine period and the theology of Gregory Palamas.

The main thrust of *Orthodox Readings of Aquinas* could be summed up as a plea, directed especially to the Orthodox, to leave behind a theology of opposition and to engage the West and Aquinas with openness and respect, all the while holding fast to the Orthodox tradition. But the arguments—so effectively laid down—point to a further goal, a goal touched on by the author at one or two points, but not developed. This is the goal of healing the long schism between East and West. The author observes, when commending the example of Aquinas, that "the conscious pursuit of catholicity and consistent hermeneutic of orthodoxy evidenced in Aquinas provides a paradigm for any serious approach to healing the ongoing schism" (28). And he concludes the study with moving words that speak of the congruity and even consanguinity of the two traditions: "Such an appropriation would serve to demonstrate the fundamental congruity and, so to speak, consanguinity of Greek and Latin theological traditions. Such an appropriation would . . . enable Orthodoxy to be true to itself, true to its inherent catholicity and to an orthodoxy neither occidental nor oriental but 'one in Christ Jesus'" (228).

The proximate goal is a renewed engagement by both East and West, beyond the polemics of opposition, grounded in a recognition of a "consanguinity of theological traditions." But the true and final goal is not merely positive engagement; it is "the healing of the schism" that has lasted a millennium and more. Marcus Plested's study, and the wise perspectives that he commends, move us down the road toward that final goal.



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Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship by Eric Gregory (*Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008*), xv + 417 pp.

TOWARD THE END of his rich and insightful monograph, Eric Gregory proffers an equally insightful statement from one of his mentors, Oliver O'Donovan, in which the latter describes modernity as "a great carcass around which a shoal of shark-toothed narratives forever wheels and hovers" (365). The quote is descriptively powerful. For decades now, the task of narrating the genealogical accounts of our present situation has fallen to the philosopher and the theologian, with the somewhat understandable result that both blame and credit have subsequently fallen to a number of key historical figures. Few figures, however, have received as much of this attention as St. Augustine.

Yet Gregory's book stands in a relatively newer tradition of inquiry: that increasingly prominent school of thinkers who have plumbed the depths of Augustine's works with a fresh eye toward generous and careful exegesis of the texts and a desire to appropriate them in fruitfully constructive ways. Thus, rather than simply add to the countless narratives and genealogies that seek to unqualifiedly defend or upend modernity and its troubled offspring (including liberal democracy), Gregory's *ressourcement* effort simultaneously identifies and exhibits what he takes to be a central feature of Augustinian political thought—namely, ambivalence toward concrete political orders, which are construed as necessarily contingent realities. This ambivalence is premised upon a dialectical tension between an affirmation of any political order's capacity to facilitate the procurement of certain genuine goods and criticism of its capacity to stifle such procurement.

In this vein, Gregory has sought to re-envision liberal democracy as a laudable development in the modern world, and one that finds its most meaningful resources in the thinking of Augustine. Thus, the book serves as a dual defense of liberal democracy and of the fifth-century bishop whose thought is credited/blamed with spawning some of its central tenets. This dual defense proceeds by way of charting a *via media* between political theories constructed in either positive or negative engagement with Augustine's thought: those which prioritize sin and, therefore, the penultimate need for constraining measures (e.g. Rein-

hold Niebuhr); those which prioritize love, especially in terms of its expression in the confessional Christian community (e.g. John Milbank); and those which fear that the insertion of love into the dialogue of political engagement necessarily engenders unjust coercion and paternalism (e.g. Hannah Arendt). In particular, Gregory attempts to navigate this middle way with a rudder he has fashioned out of robustly theological readings of Augustine in conversation with the Bishop's historical context. Yet the defense is truly more than a defense, in that it does not merely ward off those who object to liberal democracy as a worthwhile endeavor; rather, Gregory takes an offensive stance by actively envisioning a civic posture that is fully Augustinian, precisely by being fully attentive to the love side of the love-sin dialectic.

Thankfully, it is with the same exegetical care and irenic tone shown toward Augustine that Gregory also treats his modern interlocutors. The first half of the book mostly rehearses, critiques, and appropriates the school of (broadly) Augustinian political "realism" (e.g. Niebuhr), along with its cognate in social contract theory (e.g. John Rawls). This allows Gregory to own the heritage bequeathed by a theological anthropology that is serious about sin, while also suggesting that this narrowness of emphasis fails to do justice to the human condition, to civic engagement, and to Augustine's more complex vision for the cultivation of human flourishing within the *civitas terrena*. In their acceptance of a dichotomy between love and justice, Gregory argues, the realists and social contractarians fail to see the role of love as motivation for political action, sometimes even within their own theorizing (109). This assessment of realist political theory begins to crescendo positively as Gregory highlights what he takes to be somewhat modest movements toward a healthy affirmation of love in the civic realm (e.g., Jean Bethke Elshtain, Edmund Santurri, and Timothy Jackson). Yet the crescendo reaches its fullest expression when he points to political theorists and activists whom he identifies as broadly Augustinian because of their simultaneous attention to the realities of sin and to the necessary place of love in theoretical dialogue and in action: Paul Ramsey, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Gustavo Gutierrez. Yet what makes Gregory's effort to highlight these exemplars particularly interesting is that it is set within his engagement with feminist critiques of modern, "rational" conceptions of justice and morality that do not rightly attend to an "ethic of

care" (151ff.). In a way, King, Gutierrez, and Ramsey sketch for Gregory a path toward taking up this critique in what he understands to be a roughly Augustinian manner. Still, he mostly takes for granted their ties to the thought of Augustine rather than bolstering his argument by making explicit references to Augustine's texts.

Before considering Gregory's engagement with another liberal critique of an Augustinian civic liberalism motivated by love, it is necessary to mention that he must also address still another set of interlocutors, represented most notably by John Milbank and Stanley Hauerwas. Unlike nearly all others, these discussion partners offer a critique from outside the project of liberal democracy, at least ostensibly. Gregory rightly points out that Milbank in some ways anticipates Gregory's own constructive proposal—namely, the revival of love as a (the?) central principle in a robustly theological political theory—even though Milbank's approach is in some ways starkly at odds with that of Gregory. It suffices to note that, in Gregory's final assessment, Milbank and Hauerwas's distrust of the secular tends to force these thinkers into an almost exclusively ecclesiological framework. In this way, he suggests, they struggle to realistically and relevantly affirm the possibilities of engagement between the Church and the world by envisioning either a form of theocracy or a form of secession (141, 148).

In the final chapters, Gregory ventures to show why a significant dose of love in the realm of civic engagement is not an inevitable invitation to paternalism and unjustifiable coercion, *contra* Arendt. Gregory's primary task is to show how Augustine's conception of love as desire is not eventually swallowed up by the harmful self-love it aims to ward off, and, relatedly, how the relationship between loving the neighbor and loving God—with explicit reference to the (in)famous *uti/frui* distinction—does not end up meaninglessly sublimating the former to the latter. This he does mostly by references to what he understands to be Augustine's mature position on *uti/frui*, in which love for God is non-competitive with love for neighbor and, instead, *protects* one's neighbor from the self's inordinate (and otherwise inexorable) desire for destructive forms of possession (343ff.). This argument relies heavily on a reading of Augustine provided by Raymond Canning but is also funded in part by Gregory's appropriation of Augustine's Christologically-driven theology of kenotic Trinitarian love (324). Thus, acknowledgment of the

necessarily dynamic nature of human love *qua* desire, checked against the *forma Servi* of *amor Dei*, gives rise to a civic form of engagement that does not fear launching off the safe shores of mere respect and into the deep but plentiful waters of love, where it expresses itself as friendship (350ff.). This rather basic antidote is meant to begin filling in the gaps that an ostensibly thin or cold conception of justice inevitably leaves behind. Friendship also works to overcome the harsh public/private distinction born out of Arendt's skepticism concerning love, and it returns Gregory to what he had cited as central to the work and thought of Gutierrez, King, and Ramsey.

Even if Gregory has made some headway in the face of Arendtian concerns by the means of richer exegesis of Augustine's animating theological principles, he nonetheless faces the challenge of making sense of the Bishop's misstep with respect to the Donatist controversy and the use of force therein. In this Gregory readily concedes the indefensibility of Augustine's position regarding coercive force under such circumstances, while nonetheless offering some contextual explanations (not to be confused with excuses). These explanations include his recognition that, on account of imperial safety and unity, Augustine viewed the situation as sufficiently "political" or civic—rather than merely ecclesial—such that he thus deemed state intervention to be necessary (301–2). In the end, Gregory rightly points out that Augustine's proto-liberalism suffered in some way from the lack of a principle he may well of helped to spawn—namely, the distinction between civic and ecclesial powers and jurisdictions (299).

Attention to the title of this book is important for those concerned with political theory and its systemic implications or implementation. Citizenship is truly at the heart of Gregory's constructive project and the utilization of a distinctly theological anthropology afforded to us by Augustine. What serves at times as an apology for liberal democracy in the face of staunch post-liberal critiques is to a greater extent a summons to (witting and unwitting) adherents of liberal democratic ideals to meet the challenges posed both by critics and by concrete circumstances, primarily through a revival of loving civic engagement. As such, the argument focuses on casting a vision for precisely what it claims: an ethic. Those who are looking for more technocratic or structural assessments and suggestions from Gregory will mostly come up short, save

for the few occasions when he points to grass roots organization and to the principle of proximity in terms of the “distribution” of love; however, this may be due to the fact that an ethic is something one expects individuals, not bureaucracies, to adopt. It is by no means unreasonable to hope that such an ethic could be embodied in the concrete decisions of policymakers, who do not cease to be citizens when they begin to act “officially”; however, the limited audience of Gregory’s argument must be noted, given that it resides in the ambit of theological discussions and seems designed to engage the (Augustinian) Christian citizen and not all civic liberals.

This raises a range of questions, some of which go mostly unanswered in Gregory’s monograph. Some readers may be vexed by critical concerns about how the Augustinian civic liberal is to conceive of love and virtue within the *civitas terrena*, especially with respect to the roles of grace and the sacraments. Or, to put it in terms more specific to Augustine’s own conceptual lexicon, these concerns touch upon rather difficult questions regarding Augustine’s final assessment of pagan virtue. However, lack of explicit attention to this theme is partly mitigated by the book’s more modest aim: an apology for a civic “ethic” to be adopted in the concrete lives of Augustinian (Christian) citizens. Furthermore, a general take on the matter is offered implicitly or at least along the way, using Augustine’s matter-of-fact affirmations of the (limited) integrity of natural love and using more general affirmations of the goodness of Creation. Other readers may wonder about the place of the Church within Gregory’s vision for a civic ethic of love. No doubt, personal responsibility is a non-negotiable factor in the cultivation of a corporate ethic. Yet Gregory does not buttress his critiques of Hauerwas’s and/or Milbank’s ecclesial maximalism with his own conception of *how* the Church *qua* unified, sacramental, confessional body plays a role both in forming faithful and loving civic liberals and in representing, corporately, the loving ethics of Augustinian civic virtue. More narrowly, much more could be said concerning the place of Trinitarian and Christological doctrine in the life of the Church *qua* political community. With respect to the exemplary roles that the Incarnate Christ and the intra-Trinitarian bond of love play in the life of the individual, Gregory is helpful (178–79, 239–40); however, one wonders in what ways personal and corporate liturgical/contemplative practices play in the

formation of a community animated by love. Other critiques might center on whether the rather simple, even if profound, thrust of the book's constructive proposal—namely, the necessity and viability of cultivating an ethic of loving friendship in the civic sphere—represents a significant achievement. Yet in today's world one would be hard-pressed to show that it is not.

Gregory's irenic style and mostly careful exegesis of all discussion partners is certainly winsome. At times it feels like a friendly dialogue carried on with O'Donovan by means of numerous references to his thought. However, one can get almost lost in the brisk movement of the argument as it skips along through a dizzying array of interlocutors and secondary sources, even to the end of making a few related points several times over. Still, these deficiencies are far outweighed by the erudition and clarity of Gregory's book, as well as its commendable aims. **N&V**

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Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit by Anthony Briggman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 320 pp.

IRENÆUS OF LYONS has long been viewed as a pivotal figure in the history of Christian doctrine. With Origen of Alexandria, he is esteemed as an early theological "systematizer." Like Origen's later *On First Principles*, Irenaeus's *Against Heresies* is frequently hailed as a "systematic" work. It exhibits a captivating intellectual coherence unparalleled by its predecessors. Often, however, such praise fails to offer more than uncritical fawning. Furthermore, Irenaeus's trinitarian theology is liable to the criticism that it is actually "binitarianism" masquerading as trinity-talk. Against both quasi-hagiographical and binitarian readings of the Bishop of Lyons, Anthony Briggman's monograph documents Irenaeus's role in the rise of early Christian pneumatology.

A number of historical commitments regarding second- and third-century pneumatology present themselves as Briggman's story unfolds. The book begins and ends by setting Irenaeus within a larger narrative framework—namely, the "three-stage" pneumatological narrative proposed by Michel Barnes. In the first stage (100–200 A.D.), ear-

ly Christian pneumatology is “Jewish-Christian.” With the second stage (Tertullian and Origen), the Jewish “superstructure” of Christian pneumatology is rejected. That rejection generates a “low” pneumatology. The third stage is a late-fourth-century revival of “high” pneumatology. Irenaeus’s action in this drama is to have set out the most sophisticated and robust account of the Trinity on offer at the end of the “first stage.”

The monograph comprises seven chapters. The first chapter begins prior to Irenaeus, with Justin. We learn that Justin’s trinitarian convictions were hamstrung by his persistent binitarian orientation: Justin failed to differentiate the identities and activities of the Word and the Spirit. Justin’s failure leads to a soft (my term) Spirit-Christology. Irenaeus, on the other hand, was no mere “binitarian.” Briggman draws an intellectual-historical boundary line through the middle of *Against Heresies*. By the time Irenaeus sat down to write *Against Heresies* 3, he had produced a pneumatological account that “supersedes that of *Against Heresies* 1 and 2 by so large a degree that it may be best to regard his reasoning in the first two Books as the most advanced theology of the Spirit of the previous generation” (45). Briggman’s attribution of development to Irenaeus on this score is significant. If he is right, we will need to speak of an “early” and “late” Irenaeus when it comes to the question of pneumatology.

The monograph’s later chapters delve more deeply into Irenaeus’s trinitarian theology. By Chapter 5, we have reached Irenaeus’s well-known deployment of the “Two Hands” model for the divinity of the Spirit and the Son. With this model, Irenaeus unites the Son and the Spirit to the Father-Creator, thereby subverting the gnostic claim that the flesh is created by a lesser deity. The model originates as a Jewish tradition from Asia Minor that was also known to Theophilus of Antioch. Irenaeus’s identification of the Spirit with Wisdom enables him to out-narrate the gnostic myth of Sophia and her impassioned fall. As we might expect, Irenaeus might have thanked his polemical poise against the gnostics for his trinitarian proto-orthodoxy.

The first half of Chapter 6 is devoted to dismantling John Behr’s account of Irenaeus’s theological anthropology. According to Behr’s reading, Irenaeus taught that the Holy Spirit is present not only to those who believe in the Son, but to all human beings, as an essential component of the human being. Briggman sifts through each of the texts to

which Behr appeals for support, wresting them away with meticulous argumentation. In fact, Irenaeus held to a strictly bipartite anthropology (body and soul), and, Briggman argues, the Holy Spirit gives life to all not by its presence, as Behr claims, but only by dint of its instrumentality in creation. The Holy Spirit *is*, however, an essential component of the *perfect* human being, the human being in Christ. In Chapter 7, Briggman shows why Irenaeus cannot be charged with “Spirit-Christology” or angelomorphic pneumatology. This demonstration finally distinguishes Irenaeus from Briggman’s initial account of Justin as “binitarian.”

One of this book’s strongest features is that it is an excellent book on Irenaeus that does not stop at Irenaeus. Briggman’s skillful analysis of Justin Martyr is sympathetic but not naïve, and his evaluation of Theophilus of Antioch as Irenaeus’s source is shrewd. His placement of Irenaeus within a narrative that includes Justin, Origen, Tertullian, and Novatian is illuminating but not overstated. Briggman explains how Irenaeus’s Two Hands model provided a stronger account of the Spirit’s identity as Creator than Origen’s could. Origen’s anti-monarchian attribution of “Wisdom” to the Son weakened the Spirit’s role in creation and thereby undermined the Spirit’s divine identity. Tertullian and Novatian likewise failed to identify the Spirit with Wisdom. After Irenaeus, an age of “low” pneumatology would persist until the middle-to-late fourth century.

Briggman’s attention to detail and forceful argumentation give teeth to his reading of Irenaeus. His contestations of John Behr’s account of Irenaeus’s pneumatology give those teeth an edge. Though the word “rich” is cliché in reviews of academic books, a better descriptor for Briggman’s monograph is hard to find. Students of the history of the doctrine of the Trinity in late antiquity will discover in this book a resource worth knowing—even if Oxford’s prices keep them from knowing it without access to a research library! 

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Compendium of Creeds, Definitions, and Declarations on Matters of Faith and Morals, 43rd edition, edited by Peter Hünermann, Helmut Hoping, Robert L. Fastiggi, Anne Englund Nash, and Heinrich Denzinger (*San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012*), 1399 pp.

HEINRICH JOSEPH DENZINGER'S (1819–83) *Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum*, first published in Würzburg in 1854, was intended to be a compendium of creeds, definitions, and declarations on matters of faith and morals. His work has served theologians well and is now in its 43rd edition. Under the editorship of first Schönmetzer and now Hünermann, the text was greatly expanded and brought up to the reign of Pope Benedict XVI, but these expanded editions were available to the theologian only in Latin, German, French, Italian, and Spanish. For the last 55 years, English speakers have had to make do with the 30th edition of 1957, translated by Roy J. Deferrari. This new English translation, therefore, is indeed most welcome.

This edition, like former editions, contains two parts. The first contains creeds, and the second part contains documents of the Church's magisterium, beginning with Pope Clement I and concluding with documents from Benedict XVI's pontificate. These documents are presented in the original language with an English translation in a parallel column. Many of Deferrari's translations are retained, and the English translations of those texts that have been added since the 30th edition come from a variety of sources. Most notably, Robert Fastiggi has provided a number of excellent translations of these newly added older documents, while many of the translations of recent magisterial texts have been taken from the Vatican website. Those who have been using the 30th English edition will find that one of Schönmetzer's revisions was to add to each document a short historical introduction and a brief section describing the various editions of the work. Hünermann has continued to expand this addition.

This edition contains a number of useful aids that the editors have added to make the volume easier to use. A helpful introduction taken from the 37th edition explains the history of Denzinger's *Enchiridion* and its various editors and critics. The work also contains "suggestions for the theological use of 'Denzinger.'" This section contains a brief theological reflection on the nature of the Church's magisterium, which for-

tunately situates the Church in the context of its mission to bear witness to the gospel. It then discusses the authentic teaching role of the magisterium as well as the various criteria by which one can recognize an authentic act of the magisterium. This introductory section ends with the now obligatory warning against engaging in “Denzinger theology.” At the end of the text, a systematic index covers the various areas of dogma, and an index of scriptural references is particularly helpful. An appendix to the marginal numbers of the 1963 edition and the earlier editions is included to make cross-referencing easier. Finally the editors included a list of translators and translations used for the various texts.

It must be noted that a number of problems with the text have plagued the work since Adolf Schönmetzer, S.J., almost doubled it in size. Hünemann’s additions are similiar. First, a disproportionate amount of space is devoted to the documents since the start of the Second Vatican Council. The years 1962-2008 are covered in pages 846-1185; thus 29 % of the text is devoted to only 2.3 % of the Church’s history. Is it really the case that more than one quarter of the authentic acts of the magisterium occurred between 1962 and 2008? Second, much of the new material is of limited doctrinal use, and the editors seem to have lost sight of the original *raison d’être* of the Denzinger text that its title suggests. As noted, Heinrich Denzinger’s intent was to provide the theologian with a compact yet complete sourcebook of doctrine. No longer is this book simply a collection of creeds, definitions, and declarations on faith and morals, since much of the material added since the 36th edition does not fit into these categories.

Consider, for example, the inclusion of the following lines from *Sacrosanctum Concilium*: “The revision of the liturgical books must carefully attend to the provision of rubrics also for the people’s parts” (DH 4031), or “Besides the commission on the sacred liturgy, every diocese, as far as possible, should have commissions for sacred music and sacred art” (DS 4046). Neither of these quotations is a doctrinal statement; they are simply statements directing that some particular act take place. Now if the council asserted that these acts were moral acts and that, as such, the objects of the acts were good, then one could understand their inclusion in the text. This is not, however, the case. Also included are texts that are rather obvious prudential judgments, such as: “Because liturgical laws often involve special difficulties with respect to adaptation, par-

ticularly in mission lands, men who are experts in these matters must be employed to formulate them" (DH 4040). Prudential judgments have always been included in the text, including the decisions of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, but these were prudential judgments about doctrinal or theological issues.

A similar problem appears in Hünemann's inclusion of certain texts from *Gaudium et Spes*. Consider, for example, the following lines from *Gaudium et Spes*: "As for the family, discord results from population, economic and social pressures, or from difficulties which arise between succeeding generations, or from new social relationships between men and women" (DH 4308), and "Now many of our contemporaries seem to fear that a closer bond between human activity and religion will work against the independence of men, of societies, or of the sciences" (DH 4336). These statements do not even pertain to faith and morals; they are merely historical or sociological statements about the state of affairs in the 1960's.

This problem is compounded by the curious omission of portions of texts that either are of a doctrinal character or are immediately relevant to determining the doctrinal qualification of a text. One such qualification, for example, is missing from Chapter One of *Dignitatis Humanae*: "Indeed, since people's demand for religious liberty in carrying out their duty to worship God concerns freedom from compulsion in civil society, it leaves intact the traditional catholic teaching on the moral obligation of individuals and societies towards the true religion and the one church of Christ" (Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 1:1002). Why would one leave out a council's qualifying intention with respect to previous doctrinal statements? Another example of an important omission is footnote 1 to *Gaudium et Spes*. "The constitution is termed "pastoral" because, while dependent on principles of doctrine, its aim is to express the relationship between the church and the world and people of today . . . The constitution should therefore be interpreted according to the general norms of theological interpretation and with due regard, especially in the second part, for the naturally changing circumstances of the matters treated" (Tanner 2:1069). This critique also holds true with regard to older texts: often important parts of documents are neglected that help the theologian determine the intention of the magisterium. For example, the Council of Constance's condemnation of the errors of

Wycliffe (DH 1151–1195), as recorded in the Denzinger text, contains only the list of condemned propositions, leaving out the council's important introductory material. (See Tanner 1:408 to 1:411.) Without this type of information, the current text fosters the very thing that it tried to avoid in its prefatory essay, i.e. "Denzinger theology."

Both Schönmetzer and Hünemann have done the Church a great service by adding the historical matter, which helps to contextualize the magisterial pronouncements, and by bringing the text up to date through the papal magisterium of Benedict XVI. But the editors need to decide what they want the purpose of Denzinger to be. Do they simply want a collection of documents that are historically interesting from a theological perspective? Or do they want what the text was originally intended to do: to provide the theologian with a handbook of authentic acts of the magisterium? In either case, the future editions need to undergo a thorough revision. One hopes that they return to the original intention of Denzinger. Despite these drawbacks and limitations, this text is decidedly welcome. 

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