

## Friendship Degree Zero: Aquinas on Good Will

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WHEN WE FIRST meet someone, or first see someone, or even just first hear about someone, we are rarely indifferent. A new person is usually the occasion of a new liking or dislike, a new sense of harmony or discord. The liking or dislike may soon be forgotten, of course, but it seems to promise a development into something more, namely, friendship or enmity respectively. What sort of promise is this?

### Introduction: Thinking, Wishing, and Willing

The initial response of liking someone new can become differentiated into a thought and a wish. To like someone is to think well of him, as we say, and *think well of* is close to the root meaning of the ancient Greek word *eunoia*, which literally suggests something like being *well-minded* toward someone. *Eunoia* is the subject of a chapter in the treatise on friendship in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. To like someone is also to wish him well, if only in the silence of our thoughts, and *well-wishing* corresponds to the etymology of the Latin counterpart of *eunoia* used by Cicero, *benevolentia*. Liking someone is both *eunoia* and *benevolentia*, both a thinking and a wishing. It begins with thinking well of him, and the wishing follows closely, in the realization that the thought puts us on his side, as it were, and makes us prefer that things go well rather than badly for him, although we are not yet prepared to do anything for him. We are simply, again as we say, well disposed toward him, in a condition of what Aristotle calls idle friendship.

The subject of being well disposed toward someone has two "places" in ancient philosophy, as the Aristotelian corpus indicates. One, just mentioned, is in ethics, in the context of the theme of friendship. The other is in rhetoric, in the context of the theme of the prologue, exordium,

or introduction of a speech. In both places, the subject of being well disposed toward someone is associated with beginnings. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says that being well disposed toward someone is the beginning of friendship; in his *Rhetoric*, he says, in keeping with rhetorical tradition, that the beginning of a speech aims at making the audience well disposed to the speaker.<sup>1</sup> Later in this tradition, Cicero, in his *De inventione*, describes this aim as *benevolentiam captare*, the “winning” of an audience’s *benevolentia*. The term *captatio benevolentiae*, which is still sometimes used as a name for the introduction of a speech, echoes Cicero’s discussion of how to win over an audience in an introduction. The double setting, ethical and rhetorical, for the theme of being well disposed toward someone invites comparison between beginnings of friendships and beginnings of speeches.

On the question of how to compose an introduction with a view to making an audience well disposed, Cicero is both more elaborate and more influential than Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> The introduction, Cicero says, should make the mind of the hearer ready to hear the rest of the speech, and this is done by making his mind *benivolum*, *attentum*, *docile*: well disposed, attentive, teachable. Cicero does not expect the introduction to bring about all three dispositions in the hearer. Rather, the different kinds of case (Cicero is thinking of judicial rhetoric) call for different kinds of introduction that aim at one or another of these effects, depending on the demands of the case. He distinguishes five kinds of case. (1) One is the surprising kind (*admirabile*), which is the kind from which the hearer’s mind is alienated at the outset. In such a case, the speaker may begin by trying to win *benevolentia* as long as the audience members are not completely hostile; but if they are vehemently alienated and angry, any transparent attempt to win their *benevolentia* will only increase their hatred. (2) Another is the lowly kind of case (*humile*), which seems to the hearer unworthy of his attention; this calls for an introduction that will make him attentive. (3) The ambiguous kind of case (*anceps*) either involves some doubtful point, and then the speaker should begin with the

<sup>1</sup> *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.5.1167a3, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); *Rhetoric* 3.14.1415a34 (ed. R. Kassel; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1976).

<sup>2</sup> *De inventione* 1.15.20–16.22, in *De inventione, De optimo genere oratorum, Topica* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 40–46; cf. Pseudo-Cicero, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1.5.8, in *Ad C. Herennium De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium)* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 14–16. Parts of *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, including the discussion of the exordium, closely resemble and are apparently based on parts of *De inventione*. In the present discussion, I will refer exclusively to the treatment of the exordium in *De inventione*, and ignore the very similar treatment in *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Aquinas was familiar with both works.

point; or it seems to have both something honorable and something disgraceful about it, and then it is necessary to win *benevolentia*, in order to turn it into a case of the honorable kind (*honestum*). (4) In the honorable kind of case, one may omit any introduction and get straight down to business; or, if it is desirable to have an introduction, one should use it to increase the *benevolentia* that is already present. (5) The fifth kind of case is the one that is hard to understand (*obscurum*), either because the audience is slow or because the issue is complicated; in this kind of case, the introduction should make the audience teachable.

Cicero describes four topics (*loci*) on the basis of which we can win an audience's *benevolentia* in an exordium. (1) We do so on the basis of our own person (*ab nostra persona*) if we speak without arrogance of our good deeds and services, or remove accusations against or suspicions about us, or describe difficulties we have had or are still having, or make a humble request. (2) We do so on the basis of the person of our opponents (*ab adversariorum persona*) if we turn them into objects of hatred, envy, or contempt. (3) We do so on the basis of the person of the judges or hearers (*ab iudicum persona*, *ab auditorum persona*) if, being careful to avoid excessive flattery, we say how they have acted with courage, wisdom, or gentleness, and show in what great esteem they are held, and how much their judgment is awaited. (4) We do so on the basis of the case, or of the matters under discussion (*a causa*, *ab rebus*), if we extol our case with praise, and put down that of our opponents with contempt.

Cicero's advice on the winning of *benevolentia* in an exordium was common knowledge among the learned during the long "age of rhetoric" that lasted until the eighteenth century.<sup>3</sup> To Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, the advice was a "trivial" matter, in the sense that it was something he and his educated contemporaries knew from their elementary studies in the liberal arts, which included the *trivium* of speech arts consisting of grammar, rhetoric, and logic. Etymologically,

<sup>3</sup> In 1828, Thomas De Quincey announced that "the age of Rhetoric, like that of Chivalry, has passed amongst forgotten things," echoing Edmund Burke's famous statement, in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), that "the age of chivalry is gone." Perhaps De Quincey intended his remark to evoke the figure of Burke himself (1729–97), whose "superb orations" he admired. See *Selected Essays on Rhetoric by Thomas De Quincey*, ed. F. Burwick (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), 97, 334. Walter Ong also indicates the late eighteenth century as an end point, arguing that "[u]ntil the modern technological age, which effectively began with the industrial revolution and romanticism, Western culture in its intellectual and academic manifestations can be meaningfully described as rhetorical culture." *Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), 1.

however, *benevolentia* implies the noun *voluntas* and the verb *velle*, and between the time of Cicero and that of Aquinas these words underwent a momentous transformation of meaning in Christian theology. *Voluntas*, and the corresponding Greek word, *boulēsis*, became technical names of a God-like power in the human soul of choosing freely; and *velle*, which originally meant simple wanting, came to mean—in a strong sense, eventually to be inherited by modern philosophy—*willing*.

The positing of will as a human power with this radically new meaning is attributed by some to Augustine's account of the origin of sin in human beings, by others to Maximus the Confessor's response to the monothelite controversy.<sup>4</sup> Writing well before this positing, in any case, Aristotle had used *boulēsis* with the meaning of *wish*, in the straightforward sense of "the kind of wanting that rational animals, human persons, are capable of."<sup>5</sup> Writing well after it, Aquinas took the word *voluntas*, both in Latin translations of Aristotle and in his own usage, to refer to *willing*, or to the *power* of will, the "rational appetite" that is the subject of the act of willing.<sup>6</sup> For us, there is a difference in meaning, not just tone, between the tentative

I wish to take a walk; my wish is to take a walk

and the peremptory

I will to take a walk; my will is to take a walk

—but it's not clear that Aristotle or Aquinas could so easily express the difference. Aristotle's *boulēsis* seems to be wish that is innocent of what we mean by will; Aquinas's *voluntas* seems to be will that has subsumed what we mean by wish. Perhaps, if acquainted with the distinction in

<sup>4</sup> Albrecht Dihle, in *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), makes the case that the concept of will derives from the biblical tradition, but is not fully articulated until Augustine. Sarah Byers, in "The Meaning of *Voluntas* in Augustine," *Augustinian Studies* 37 (2006): 171–89, at 173, takes issue with Dihle on the originality of Augustine's notion of will. R.-A. Gauthier, in the introduction to R.-A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque: Introduction, traduction et commentaire*, 2nd ed. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires-Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1970), 1.1: 255–67, argues that Maximus is the source of the new understanding of will.

<sup>5</sup> This description of wishing is formulated by Robert Sokolowski in the course of working out a distinction between *needing*, which is common to plants, animals, and human beings; *wanting*, which is common to animals and human beings; and *wishing*, which is peculiar to human beings. *Phenomenology of the Human Person* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 239.

<sup>6</sup> See David Gallagher, "Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 29 (1991): 559–84.

English, Aquinas might say that *voluntas* is an ordinary language word meaning a wish, but that it also has deeper senses according to which it means an act of willing, or, at the source of this act, a power of will.

Yet such a power of will is an *arduum arcanum*, “not a normal phenomenon in human action.”<sup>7</sup> It is not obviously distinguished among powers of soul in Aristotle’s *De anima*, and it certainly seems far from his mind in the chapter on *eunoia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>8</sup> But *eunoia* became *benevolentia* in the Latin translation of the chapter, with the result that Aquinas, who had an ear for the roots of words, could not read the chapter without hearing *voluntas*, with its specifically Christian import. Between the chapter as it came from Aristotle, then, and its Latin translation as it was received by Aquinas, the phenomenon of being well disposed toward someone was relocated, so to speak, from *nous* to *voluntas*, from Greek mind to Christian will, and the subordinate philosophical theme of being well disposed toward someone came to contain in miniature the great theological theme of will.

The following discussion is an examination of some texts of Aquinas on *benevolentia*. The discussion is divided into three parts, corresponding to the ways in which good will, as Aquinas understands it, is considered in ethics, theology, and rhetoric. In the first two parts, I attempt to isolate, and bring out something of the significance of, the overtone of *voluntas* that Aquinas heard in *benevolentia*, by considering two passages in which he builds on Aristotle’s chapter on good will: one is his exposition of the chapter in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he closely follows Aristotle’s phenomenological analysis of the experience of being well disposed toward someone; the other is an article of the *Summa theologiae* in which he introduces this analysis into the rarefied atmosphere of Christian theology.<sup>9</sup> In the third part, I point out some passages in which Aquinas makes use of Cicero’s rhetorical account of good will. I include this third part as a theoretical, not just a historical, complement to the first two parts. In the

<sup>7</sup> Cajetan on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 4:232), quoted by Lawrence Dewan in “The Real Distinction between Intellect and Will,” in *Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 125–50, at 125; Robert Sokolowski, review of Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*, in *The Review of Metaphysics* 37 (1984): 625.

<sup>8</sup> In his commentary on the *De anima*, Aquinas finds Aristotle referring to the power of will at 414b2 and 432b3; see *Sententia libri De anima* 2.5, 3.8 (Leonine ed., 45.1: 89.155–57, 240.99–115). On the absence from Aristotle’s thought of the notion of will in the scholastic sense, see Gauthier and Jolif, *L’Éthique à Nicomaque* 2.1: 170, 192–94, 205, 218–20, 249.

<sup>9</sup> Both *Sententia libri Ethicorum* and *Summa theologiae* II–II seem to have been composed in 1271–72. See R.–A. Gauthier, *Quaestiones de quolibet*, “Index scriptorum et operum” (Leonine ed., 25.2: 495–96); and J.–P. Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin*, 2nd ed. (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 2002), 48.

passages on good will in the commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas, under the guidance of Aristotle's chapter, presents good will as an event internal to the will of an individual. In contrast, the Ciceronian account of how good will can be produced when one person addresses others is concerned with speech as a cause of good will and with the public context in which speech occurs. The combination of the two perspectives, one private, the other public, will allow us better to see how Aquinas understood good will than would the former just by itself.

Usually I translate *voluntas* as *will*, but where it seems appropriate, I translate it as *wish*. I regularly translate *benevolentia* as *good will*, to reflect the presence, to Aquinas, of *voluntas* in *benevolentia*. Sometimes, however, I speak of *thinking well* of someone, to suggest the sense of Aristotle's *eunoia*; or, more indeterminately, I speak of being *well disposed* toward someone, to indicate a large area of understanding common to Aristotle and Aquinas.

I do not by *good will* mean goodness of will, as in the scriptural *men of good will*, or Kant's remark that nothing can be conceived as unqualifiedly good except a good will. Nor do I mean by it the virtue of benevolence, the cultivated habit of good will by which one is well disposed toward human beings in general.<sup>10</sup> Rather, I mean the well-wishing, the willing of good, that arises when we first merely like someone, and that also persists as the central feature of any friendship that ensues.

Occasionally I refer to, quote, or use terminology of, two phenomenological authors who share a way of seeing things, Thomas Prufer and Robert Sokolowski. I do so because they also share a gift for presenting ancient themes, including some themes touched on here, with fresh insight and in engaging language.

### **Ethics: Good Will as Idle Friendship**

What is the intention of Aquinas the expositor of Aristotle? Are his Aristotelian commentaries works of exegesis that simply present his understanding of what Aristotle says, or do they also imply agreement with what he takes Aristotle to be saying? Where they seem to go beyond what Aristotle says, do they do so in order to draw out what he thinks Aristotle means, or in order to add to what Aristotle says? Is their purpose pedagogical or speculative? Philosophical or theological?<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> On this virtue, see Robert Spaemann, *Happiness and Benevolence*, trans. Jeremiah Alberg (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 92–105.

<sup>11</sup> For discussion of these questions see: Joseph Owens, "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," in *St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens*, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980),

At least in passages of the commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* dealing with good will, the identification of Aquinas's thought with that of Aristotle seems fairly complete: the Latin translation accurately reflects what Aristotle says about being well disposed to someone; Aquinas closely paraphrases Aristotle without disagreement or major digression; and he seems to second Aristotle's principal points in his own treatment of good will in the *Summa theologiae*. On the other hand, small divergences between expositor and author may be noted in these passages of the commentary, both because of semantic shifts of the sort that occur in even the most faithful translation—noteworthy here in this respect being the shift from the thinking implied by *eunoia* to the wishing or willing implied by *benevolentia*—and because of brief comments that Aquinas inserts into what seem, at first sight, to be little more than restatements of what Aristotle says.

I am going to paraphrase in English Aquinas's paraphrases in Latin of what Aristotle says in Greek about being well disposed toward someone. It is customary to distinguish Aquinas's expositions *ad litteram* from the looser and fuller form of commentary that is sometimes called commentary by paraphrase, and that is used, for example, by Albert the Great; but it is simply accurate to call the passages of Aquinas's commentary I am going to consider *paraphrases*. Paraphrase is an important part of Aquinas's technique of *expositio*, which involves the saying of something again, with a difference, in order to clarify it. But to *paraphrase* suggests a greater degree of difference in restatement than does to *rephrase*, and greater scope for bringing out what the original statement obscurely implies, and even for importing what it merely allows.

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1–19; James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works*, with Corrigenda and Addenda (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 272–85; Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 327–60; Christopher Kaczor, “Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on the *Ethics*: Merely an Interpretation of Aristotle?” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 78 (2004): 353–78; Mark D. Jordan, “Thomas as Commentator in Some Programs of Neo-Thomism: A Reply to Kaczor,” *ibid.*: 379–86; Jordan, “Thomas's Alleged Aristotelianism or Aristotle among the Authorities,” in *Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after His Readers* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 60–88; John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,” in *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 240–71; and Leo Elders, “The Aristotelian Commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 63 (2009): 29–53.

The epithet *Expositor* was assigned to Aquinas as commentator on Aristotle in the late thirteenth century, in part, it seems, to distinguish him from the *Commentator*, Averroes; see A. Dondaine and L. J. Bataillon, “Le commentaire de saint Thomas sur les *Météores*,” *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 36 (1966): 81–152, at 100.

I will note the divergences mentioned as they come up, but I should say at once that I think Aquinas, by and large, accurately understands what Aristotle, on the other side of the linguistic divide, says about being well disposed toward someone. I also think that, in commenting on the passages in the *Ethics* about being well disposed, Aquinas is taking what Aristotle asserts to be true. My aim is to state what—with the exception of small shifts and additions that I will flag by mention of Aquinas's name—Aquinas and Aristotle together take to be the truth about being well disposed toward someone. For what it's worth, I, too, take this to be the truth—the obvious and interesting truth—of the matter.

In his prologue to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aquinas introduces the work under the heading of *order*, of which he says there are two kinds: order of parts to one another and order of things to an end. Moral philosophy, he says, considers the order reason produces in properly human actions, which are actions proceeding from the will of man; it considers such actions as ordered to one another and to an end. The subject of moral philosophy may be said to be either human action ordered to an end, or man himself, acting by will for the sake of an end.<sup>12</sup> On this account, then, the *Ethics* is centrally concerned with the human will and its acts.

Friendship is treated late in the *Ethics*, after happiness, choice, and virtue have been considered. Explaining its place in the work, Aquinas says that friendship is founded on virtue as an effect of it.<sup>13</sup> The discussion of friendship contains three chapters that deal with good will: Chapter 2 of Book 8, which mentions good will as a constitutive part of friendship; Chapter 4 of Book 9, which includes good will among the workings of friendship; and Chapter 5 of Book 9, which shows how good will is different from friendship.<sup>14</sup> Thus good will is gradually distinguished from friendship and shown to have an intelligibility of its own. Let us consider each of these chapters.

### *Good Will as Essential to Friendship*

In the second chapter of Book 8, Aquinas says, Aristotle investigates four parts of a definition of friendship.<sup>15</sup>

1. The first part is taken from the object of friendship, which Aristotle calls the *amabile* (*philēton*) (1155b17–26). Aquinas explains that the

<sup>12</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 1.1 (Leonine ed., 47.1: 3.7–54).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.1 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 442.5–6).

<sup>14</sup> Aquinas's chapter divisions of an Aristotelian text do not always match the modern divisions, but there are happy coincidences in the cases of *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.2, 9.4, and 9.5.

<sup>15</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 8.2 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 445–47).

*amabile* (“the lovable”) is the object of *amatio* (“loving”), from which the word *amicitia* (“friendship”) is derived. As we will see when we come to Aquinas’s commentary on *NE* 9.5, *amatio* can connote for him a passion and an intensity that make it mean what we call *being in love*; but here he uses it as the nominal form of *amare*, the name of any loving of anything.<sup>16</sup> Aristotle says that the loveable is something either good or delightful or useful, but that, since the useful is that by which a good or a delight is brought about, only the good and the delightful are loveable as ends. What Aristotle simply calls *good*, Aquinas calls *per se good* or *honorable* (*honestum*). Aquinas says that if *good* and *delightful* are taken as they usually are (*communiter*), they differ in *ratio*, but not in subject; for it is the same thing that is called good according as it is in itself perfect and desirable, and delightful according as appetite comes to rest in it. But here, Aquinas says, *good* refers to the *true* good of man, that is, to what is congenial (*conveniens*) to man according to reason; and *delightful* refers to what is congenial to man according to sensation, namely, the pleasures of the body.

Aristotle raises the question whether people love what is good *simpliciter* or what to them is good; sometimes these are not the same, and the ambiguity extends to the delightful. Aquinas illustrates with examples: philosophizing is good simply speaking, but not to one who lacks the necessities; what is sweet is delightful simply speaking, but not to one whose sense of taste is infected. Aristotle’s answer to his question is that each person seems to love what to him is good: as what is simply speaking good is simply speaking loveable, so what to someone is good, to him is loveable. Aristotle mentions some who say that what anyone loves is not what to him is good, but what *appears* to him to be good; but he finds the difference hard to see. The loveable is the apparent good. The point might be expressed in phenomenological terms: anyone who loves anything or anyone is eminently what Prufer and Sokolowski call a *dative*—that is, a recipient—of manifestation.<sup>17</sup> What is manifested to him is the goodness of the thing or person.

2. The second part of the definition of friendship, Aquinas says, pertains to the quality of love in friendship (*pertinet ad qualitatem amationis*) (1155b27–31). Aristotle says that love (*amatio* [*philēsis*]) of something inanimate is not called friendship, first, because there is not the return

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Expositio libri Peryermenias* 1.5 (Leonine ed., 1.1: 26.56–72).

<sup>17</sup> Prufer, *Recapitulations: Essays in Philosophy* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 75; Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 32, 65, and 161.

of love (*redamatio* [*antiphilēsis*]) that friendship requires; and secondly, because when we love something inanimate, we do not wish for its good. It would be ridiculous to say we wish wine well. If we wish some wine to be protected, it is so that we may enjoy it; but we wish a friend well for his sake. This contrast between love of inanimate things and love of persons is the basis of a scholastic distinction that we will meet with later between, on one hand, love of concupiscence and, on the other hand, love of friendship or love of good will.

3. The third part of Aristotle's definition, Aquinas says, pertains to the interchange of love in friendship (*pertinet ad vicissitudinem amandi*) (1155b32–34). One who wishes to another what is good is said to be good-willed, but not a friend, if the other does not do likewise, for friendship consists in reciprocity. Aquinas adds the interesting comment that friendship involves an exchange of love "according to the form of commutative justice." Friendship is commutative, not distributive. If it is something higher than justice in buying and selling, it, too, has the form of an order governing exchanges between private persons.<sup>18</sup>
4. The fourth part of the definition is taken according to a condition of the mutual love (*sumitur secundum condicionem mutui amoris*), namely, that it not be hidden (1155b34–1156a3). Many, says Aristotle, are well disposed toward someone they have never seen, because—on the basis of what they have heard, Aquinas suggests—they think that the person either is virtuous or might be useful to them. Two people might be well disposed to each other in this way, but they cannot be called friends if they are unaware of their mutual good will.

In short, friendship is (2) a well-wishing that is (3) mutual, (4) not unnoticed on either side, and (1) due, on each side, to the appearance of someone who seems in some way good. On the assumption of (1) the appearance of such a person, (2) a wishing of good to him is the first requirement of, even if insufficient to constitute, friendship. The further requirements of (3) reciprocity and (4) mutual awareness presuppose and build on the wishing of good, which is the first principle of friendship in one who is to become a friend.

In the Latin translation of this chapter, Greek words that signify the *wishing* of good are rendered by *voluntas* (*boulēsis*) and *velle*

<sup>18</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 8.2 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 446.96–97): "habet enim [amicitia] quandam commutationem amoris secundum formam commutativae iustitiae." On commutative justice as an order between two private persons, see *Summa theologiae* II–II, q. 61, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 9:34).

(*boulesthai*); and Greek words that suggest *thinking* well of someone are rendered by words that are cognate with *voluntas* and *velle*, namely *benevolentia* (*eunoia*), *bene velle* (*eunoein*), and *benivolus* (*eunos*). The Latin, then, is even more insistent than the Greek on wishing, or, as a scholastic reader would take it, on willing.

### *Good Will among the Workings of Friendship*

From another point of view, in Chapter 4 of Book 9 Aristotle presents good will as one of the features of friendship (*amicabilia* [*ta philika*]), which Aquinas variously calls friendship's effects, acts, and works or "workings" (*opera*).<sup>19</sup> These *amicabilia* toward friends, Aristotle says, seem to have come—to have proceeded, Aquinas says—from those that are directed toward oneself, a statement that Aquinas in other works repeats as axiomatic.<sup>20</sup> Here he rephrases it by saying that one man seems to be friend to another if what he does for the other is the same as what he would do for himself.<sup>21</sup> An act of friendship that comes naturally to one who, for example, likes sports—say, getting a ticket to a game for someone—is just what he would do for himself. This implies that friends tend to be the same kind of people, that is, people who like the same kinds of things.

Aristotle discusses three principal features of friendship: beneficence, good will, and concord (9.4).<sup>22</sup> Concerning the first, he says that a friend is held to be one who wills and does what is good, or what appears to be good, for the sake of his friend (1166a2–4). Both wills and does, Aquinas comments, because one without the other is not enough for friendship. Beneficence as a feature of friendship is not present if one either benefits

<sup>19</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.4 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 512.10–14): "primo point originem effectuum sive actuum amicitiae. . . amicabilia, id est amicitiae opera" (emphasis added). Daniel Schwartz discusses the *amicabilia* in *Aquinas on Friendship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6–21.

<sup>20</sup> *Scriptum super librum III Sententiarum*, d. 29, quaestio unica, a. 1, ad 3 (ed. Mandonnet-Moos, 3:930); *Summa theologiae* I, q. 60, a. 3, s.c. (Leonine ed., 5:102); I–II, q. 99, a. 1, ad 3 (7:199); II–II, q. 26, a. 3, obj. 1 (8:211); II–II, q. 44, a. 7, obj. 2 (8:336); *De caritate*, q. 2, a. 4, obj. 2 (*Quaestiones Disputatae*, Marietti ed. 1949<sup>8</sup>, 2:762); q. 2, a. 7, ad 11 (2:772); *Quaestiones de quolibet* V q. 3, a. 2 [6] (Leonine ed., 25.2: 370.26–28).

<sup>21</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.4 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 512.13–18): "Dicit ergo primo quod amicabilia, id est amicitiae opera, quibus aliquis ad amicos utitur et secundum quae determinantur amicitiae videntur processisse ex his quae sunt homini ad se ipsum; sic enim videtur esse unus homo alteri amicus, si eadem agit ad amicum quae ageret ad se ipsum."

<sup>22</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.4 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 512.19–513.59).

someone without wishing to, or fails to carry out into action one's good will toward someone.<sup>23</sup>

As to good will, a friend is said to be one who wishes his friend, for his friend's sake, to be and to live, which is how mothers feel about their children. It is also how friends who have quarreled still feel about each other; desire for the friend's good continues during the alienation caused by the quarrel (1166a4–6). Aristotle refers to the status of mothers as exemplars of love and friendship in an earlier chapter, where he says that friendship consists more in loving than in being loved. A sign of this, he says, is the pleasure mothers take in the very act of loving. Some mothers even give away their children to be brought up by others. They love their children in just knowing them to be their children, and do not seek to be loved in return if this is impossible. It seems to be enough for them to see that their children are doing well, and they love them even if they, in their ignorance, are unable to give back what is due to a mother (1159a27–33).<sup>24</sup>

The third of the *amicabilia*, concord, undergoes a shift of meaning between the Greek *homonoia* and the Latin *concordia* comparable to the shift from *eunoia* to *benevolentia*. Like *eunoia*, *homonoia*, which suggests *like-mindedness*, seems to name something cognitive; like *benevolentia*, *concordia*, which suggests *a joining of hearts*, seems to name something affective. Aristotle reports three opinions concerning concord (1166a6–9), which Aquinas paraphrases as follows. With respect to external common life, some say a friend is one who lives with his friend. With respect to choice, some say a friend is one who chooses the same things as his friend. With respect to passions, some say a friend is one who rejoices and is pained by the same things as his friend. All these are things which, again, are noted in mothers in relation to their children.<sup>25</sup> As Aquinas does not say, this sequence of the signs of concord—common life, common choices, common emotions—proceeds from outer to inner.

<sup>23</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.4 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 513.24–28): “Dicit autem ‘volentem et operantem’, quia unum sine altero non sufficit ad amicitiam; neque enim videtur esse amicabile beneficentia si unus alteri beneficiat invitatus vel si voluntatem opera explere negligat.”

<sup>24</sup> *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.8.1159a27–33; *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 8.8 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 469.65–84).

<sup>25</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.4 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 513.47–55): “Quae quidem potest attendi quantum ad tria: primo quantum ad exteriorem convictum; secundo quantum ad electionem; tertio quantum ad passiones ad quas omnes sequitur gaudium et tristitia. Unde dicit quod quidam determinant illum esse amicum qui convivit, quantum ad primum, et qui eadem eligit, quantum ad secundum, et qui condolet et congaudet, quantum ad tertium. Et haec etiam considerantur in matribus respectu filiorum.”

In this initial survey of the *amicabilia* on the basis of opinions, Aristotle also proceeds from outer to inner; that is, he starts with beneficence, perhaps because it is the most visible of the *amicabilia*, involving as it does both wishing and doing good. In the following chapters, however, he gives a separate account of each of the *amicabilia*, and in doing so he starts with good will, and then goes on to concord and beneficence. Aquinas explains the progression from inner to outer in these chapters in terms of *affect* and *effect*: good will consists in an inner affect with respect to a person; concord also consists in an affect, but with respect to something belonging to the person—presumably the shared life, choices, and emotions just mentioned; and beneficence consists in the exterior effect of the interior affect, namely, the doing of good to the friend.<sup>26</sup> Good will is an affect directed to an effect. It is the innermost of the workings of friendship, but it is pointed outward, in the direction of doing good.

### *Good Will Distinguished from Friendship*

Aquinas divides the chapter distinguishing good will from friendship (9.5) into two parts: Aristotle shows what good will is not, then what it is. In commenting on each part, Aquinas speaks of *amatio*. In commenting on the first part, he discusses a distinction Aristotle makes between good will and *amatio* (*philēsis*). In commenting on the second part, he himself introduces the term *amatio* while discussing a comparison Aristotle makes between friendship and *amare*.<sup>27</sup> Throughout Aquinas's commentary on this chapter, *amare* and *amatio* do not, as they do in his commentary on NE 8.2, refer to just any act of loving anything, but rather to the condition we call *being in love*. The suggestion is that consideration of this condition is helpful for clarifying both what good will is not and what it is.

<sup>26</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.5 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 517.7–518.12): “Primo quidem de benivolentia, quae consistit in interiori affectu respectu personae; secundo de concordia, quae etiam in affectu consistit, sed respectu eorum quae sunt personae . . . ; tertio de beneficentia, quae consistit in exteriori effectui.” The chiming antithesis of interior *affectus* and exterior *effectus* seems to derive from twelfth-century discussions of charity; see Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III, d.29, in *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. I. Brady [Grottaferrata, 1971–81], vol. II: 172.21–23 and note.

<sup>27</sup> *Amare* is the Latin translation of the Greek verb *erān*, which is related to the noun *erōs*. Moerbeke translates *philēsis* and *erān*, Greek words with different roots and connotations, by two Latin words that are cognate with one another, *amatio* and *amare*.

On *amatio* as implying passion, as distinct from friendship, which implies habit, see *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 8.5 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 458.102–4), on 1157b29. On *amatio* as the act of friendship, see *ibid.* 8.3 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 450.31). On *amatio* as adding to love an intensity that is like a fervor, see *Scriptum super librum III Sententiarum*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, resp. (ed. Mandonnet-Moos, 3:874–75).

Aquinas subdivides the first, negative part of the chapter in two: good will is neither the *habitus* of friendship (1166b30–32) nor the *passio* of being in love (1166a32–1167a3).<sup>28</sup> Aristotle says that good will seems to be something like friendship, inasmuch as friends must have good will toward one another. But he gives two reasons why it is not friendship: we can have good will toward people we do not know, and people toward whom we have good will need not be aware of the fact. Neither is good will being in love, again for two reasons. One is that it involves neither the distraction of mind nor the desire that follow from being in love. Aquinas says that the desire is a passion in the sense appetite that, by its impetus, distracts the mind and moves it toward something as if by a kind of violence; and that this does not happen in good will, which consists in “a simple movement of will.”<sup>29</sup> It is Aquinas, not Aristotle, who introduces *will* and its *simple movement* here. The other difference between good will and being in love that Aristotle mentions is that the latter originates and grows through habituation—because, Aquinas adds, the mind is not usually moved in such a vehement way all at once, but is brought from lesser to greater only by degrees. We might think of a car or airplane accelerating from stillness to great speed: it can happen quickly, but not instantaneously. Aristotle, and Aquinas with him, seem, in their contrast between being in love and good will, to be excluding the possibility of what we call *love at first sight*, but only to introduce the possibility of what we might call *good will at first sight*. Referring to will and its simple movement a second time, Aquinas explains that it is because good will implies “a simple movement of will,” that it can, as Aristotle says, arise suddenly.<sup>30</sup> To illustrate suddenness of good will, Aristotle gives the example of spectators at a fight who immediately have good will toward one of the fighters. They would be pleased by his victory, but they would not do anything to help him win, because those who quickly come to have good will love only superficially. Introducing will and its movement into the discussion a third time, Aquinas glosses the adverb *superficially* as follows: according to an isolated and weak movement of will that does not break forth into action.<sup>31</sup> With all these distinctions, good

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.5.1157b29.

<sup>29</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.5 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 518.36–42), on 1166b33–34: “Quarum prima est quod benivolentia non habet distensionem animi neque appetitum, id est passionem in appetitu sensitivo, quae animum suo impetus distendit quasi cum quadam violentia ad aliquid movens, quod quidem accidit in passione amationis, non autem in benivolentia, quae consistit in simplici motu voluntatis.”

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* (Leonine ed., 47.2: 518.49–50), on 1166b35: “Sed quia benivolentia importat simplicem motum voluntatis, potest repente fieri.”

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* (Leonine ed., 47.2: 518.55–58), on 1166b35–36: “homines fiunt repente benivoli et diligunt superficialiter, id est secundum solum et debilem motum

will is coming to light as something different from established friendship, with its awareness of mutuality, and from falling in love, with its feeling of attraction. Good will is self-contained, not reciprocal; and it is content to admire from a distance.

Aquinas subdivides the second, positive part of the chapter in two: Aristotle shows that good will is the beginning of friendship (1167a3–12), and he shows the kind of friendship of which it is the beginning, namely, friendship of virtue (1167a12–21). To clarify the way in which good will is a beginning, Aristotle presents an analogy and a metaphor. The analogy is that good will is the beginning of friendship as delight in someone's appearance is the beginning of being in love. Aquinas specifies that the object of being in love is a woman, and he speaks of her beauty and form.<sup>32</sup> No one begins to love a woman, he says in his paraphrase, who has not first taken delight in her beauty; but even then, one does not love her immediately, as soon as one enjoys the appearance of her form. (Here, it seems, is another argument against love at first sight.) Rather, the sign of being completely in love with her, *signum amationis completæ*, is that one longs for her when she is absent; one finds her absence hard to take, as it were (*quasi graviter ferens*), and desires her presence. Analogously, it is impossible for people to become friends unless they have first come to have good will toward each other, but those who have mutual good will cannot thereby be called friends. Their only distinguishing feature is that they want or wish or will (*volunt [boulontai]*) good things for those toward whom they are well disposed; they would not do anything for them or undergo any trouble on their behalf.

Aristotle says that one might metaphorically call good will idle friendship, *amicitia otiosa (argē philia)*, a transfer of meaning to the point of paradox, for friendship is by nature active. Aquinas speaks of an activity, or active condition, that is specific to friendship (*operatio amicabile*). Then he mentions will a fourth time. When one persists in good will toward someone for a long time, he says, and gets used to wishing him well, one's mind "grows strong" in willing good, so that the will is no longer *otiosa*, idle, but becomes *efficax*, efficacious or effective, and friendship comes into being.<sup>33</sup>

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voluntatis non prorumpentem in opus." Note the flexibility of the term *opus*: good will is an *opus* of friendship, but one in which the will does not break forth into an *opus*, that is, a bodily action (*Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.4, 9.5 [Leonine ed., 47.2: 512.20, 518.57–58]).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Albert the Great, *Super Ethica Commentum et Quaestiones* 9.6.802 (Cologne ed., 14.2: 667.38).

<sup>33</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.5 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 518.82–86), on 1167a10–12: "sed, quando diu durat homo in benivolentia et consuescit bene velle alicui, firmatur

Aquinas takes the adjective *idle*, which Aristotle had attached to friendship in his figure of speech, and applies it instead, literally and systematically, to the power of will that he finds implicit in *benevolentia*. This allows him to distinguish good will from friendship in a way that Aristotle did not, namely, by the difference between an idle and an efficacious *will*.

At this point in his chapter on good will, Aristotle so emphasizes the idle character of good will, and therefore, by implication, the contrastingly active character of friendship proper, that he neglects to mention the reciprocal character of the latter. The crucial point about friendship proper here is not its mutuality, but its energetic activity. Aquinas, in his commentary, follows suit.

Incidentally, Aquinas's choice of *efficax* as the adjective opposite to *otiosa* is interesting in light of the Augustinian view, widely known in the thirteenth century from the *Book of Sentences*, that the will of God is "most efficacious" (*efficacissima*) and "always efficacious" (*semper efficax*).<sup>34</sup> God could not have mere good will, good will without effect, toward anyone. He could not merely *like* someone. The possibility we have of an idle friendship that might or might not become efficacious is evidence of our limited and temporal way of being.

Aristotle concludes his chapter on good will by saying that the kind of friendship of which good will is the beginning, and to which it can lead, is friendship not for the sake of the useful or the pleasurable, but for the sake of virtue. Aristotle says nothing more about friendship of pleasure here; but Aquinas adds that absence of good will is especially evident in such friendship, in which what each wants is pleasure from the other for himself. Aristotle does say that, in friendship of utility, there can be good will in one who has received a benefit, and who, out of justice, returns at least good will for what he has received; but someone who wishes another to do well because he hopes to enjoy some of the profits evidently has good will not toward the other, but toward himself; and someone who

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animus eius ad volendum bonum ita quod voluntas non erit otiosa, sed efficax, et sic fit amicitia."

<sup>34</sup> *Sententiae* I, dd. 43, 46, 47, ed. I. Brady, vol. I: 303.3, 313.17, 321.18. Of occurrences of *otiosus* and *efficax* elsewhere in Aquinas's work, note in particular *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 23, a. 4, ad 15 (Leonine ed., 22.3: 664.371–74); and *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, q. 16, a. 4, obj. 18 (Leonine ed., 23: 297.148–49). The former of these texts indicates a progression, in our understanding of willing, from mere willing to willing efficaciously ("Primo enim intelligimus voluntatem velle aliquid; deinde ex hoc ipso quod vult illud, intelligimus quod producat ipsum in rerum natura si voluntas sit efficax"); in the latter text, an objection states what is apparently an axiom, namely, that the nobler anything is, the less idle it is ("Quanto aliquid est nobilius tanto minus est otiosum").

cares for the good of another because it is useful to himself is evidently not a friend. In general, good will toward someone seems to arise because of his virtue and character, that is, when he seems to be good or courageous—or, Aquinas adds, to have some such quality for which people are usually praised. This mention of praise, like Aquinas's earlier suggestion that good will can result from hearsay, is a reminder of the importance of opinions of third parties as causes of good will. Aristotle ends by returning to his example of the fighters; Aquinas adds that it is because of their courage, or some such quality, that we are caused to have good will toward them.<sup>35</sup>

The identification of an appearance of virtue in someone as the cause of good will toward him invites us to revisit the analogy given earlier in the chapter. Both pleasure at the sight of a woman and good will toward someone are caused by sudden and arresting glimpses of what we might call the admirable, to so name the genus of which virtue in action and beauty are species.<sup>36</sup> In both cases, the effect of the admirable is to produce a condition that is the beginning of something. But the two conditions require completion by further developments that are, in a way, opposites, inasmuch as being in love arises from difficulty and desire in the absence of the beautiful, but friendship from growth of strength in willing good to the deserving. This difference between difficulty and desire, on the one hand, and strength, on the other, shows why a lover is a petitioner, but a friend is a benefactor.

Aquinas makes explicit the notion of *voluntas* implicit in *benevolentia* four times in his commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.5. His mentions of *voluntas* are no doubt made possible, if not actually provoked, by the translation of *eunoia* as *benevolentia*. Still, he is a willing participant in the process of making Aristotle speak of good will. These mentions of *voluntas* share a family resemblance. (1) Good will is not the passion of being in love, because passion involves a forceful impulse in the motion of appetite, and good will is a *simple* motion of will. (2) Good will is, again, not the passion of being in love, because being in love requires habituation, and good will, as a *simple* motion of will, can occur suddenly. (3) Spectators who want a fighter to win would not do anything to help him, because they love with

<sup>35</sup> *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 9.5 (Leonine ed., 47.2: 519.115–23), on 1167a18–21: “Et dicit quod universaliter benivolentia videtur esse ad aliquem propter aliquam eius virtutem et epiikiam, cum scilicet alicui videatur quod ille ad quem est benivulus sit bonus aut fortis aut aliquid huiusmodi, propter quae homines consueverunt laudari, sicut dictum est de agonistis, quibus efficitur benivoli propter fortitudinem quae apparet in eis vel propter aliquid huiusmodi.”

<sup>36</sup> See Sokolowski's discussion of the admirable in *Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 186–89.

an *isolated* and *weak* motion of will that does not break forth into action. (4) In the transition from good will to friendship, a will that is *idle* becomes efficacious. So the will in good will is *idle*, and its motion is *simple*, as well as *isolated* and *weak*, four adjectives that convey negations. Good will is free of the disturbance of passion, but it lacks the active character of friendship. Neither disturbing nor active, neither passionate nor energetic, good will is of itself a pure and inefficacious willing, a willing and nothing more, a *velleity*.

In a formulation that is as Aristotelian and Thomistic as it is phenomenological, Sokolowski describes friendship as the taking of the good of another as one's own.<sup>37</sup> In the idle friendship that is mere good will, one indeed takes another's good as one's own, but not seriously enough to do anything about it. One takes the great good of another as a small good of one's own—nice if it happens, but nothing to trouble oneself about. But when “the mind grows strong” in willing the other's good, as Aquinas says, and friendship is born, one comes to take the other's good as seriously as the other does, as seriously as if one *were* the other.

We might speak of the growth of friendship proper out of good will as a change of *dramatis personae* in the drama of willing someone's good. In simple good will, one says, “I wish him well; I will good to him; but I do not want to be the one to do it.” In friendship, one says, “I will good to you, and I myself want to do you good.” Yet a third case of willing another's good is that of the virtue of justice, which is more impersonal than the case of one who is well disposed or a friend. In justice, one wills a good not merely to a “him” or a “you,” but, in principle, to anyone; and the good is specified as a *iustum*, something objectively due to a person regardless of how one feels about him.

### Theology: Good Will as a Simple Act of Will

In the foregoing, I have for the most part left aside Aquinas's status as a theologian and considered him simply as a philosophical expositor of the philosophical Aristotelian text, even while suggesting that some of what he says in this role can be traced to the language of theology.<sup>38</sup> I now turn to an article of the *Summa theologiae* in which, speaking in the first person and as a teacher of the truth of the Catholic faith, Aquinas recapitulates Aristotle's chapter on good will. I must begin by acknowledging that I am moving beyond the philosophical into explicitly theological

<sup>37</sup> “Friendship and Moral Action in Aristotle,” *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 35 (2001): 355–69; “Phenomenology of Friendship,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 55 (2002): 451–70; *Phenomenology of the Human Person*, 267–68.

<sup>38</sup> See notes 26 and 34.

territory, where philosophical materials are transformed in being given a new setting and a new mode of presentation. The issues I have been discussing, which have been subtle enough so far, become even more nuanced and complicated. New distinctions appear; new terminology must be introduced to accommodate them.

In this part, I discuss the new theological setting for the subject of good will, the *Summa theologiae*'s article on good will, and some differences in detail between the account of good will in the commentary on the *Ethics* and that in the *Summa theologiae*.

### *The Theological Setting for Good Will*

In his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*, Aquinas metaphorically characterizes the alteration of philosophical materials in theological discourse as a transubstantiation. The question is whether it is permissible to use philosophical arguments and authorities in theology. On the negative side, an objection is made to teachers of theology who, like dishonest bartenders, mix the "water" of philosophical proofs into the "wine" of divine wisdom. Aquinas answers that those who use philosophical proofs in sacred doctrine, bringing them into the service of the faith, are not watering down wine, but rather changing water into wine.<sup>39</sup> How, then, does the water of Aristotle's account of good will taste, so to speak, on being changed into the wine of theology in the *Summa theologiae*?

The *Summa theologiae* is a classic treatment—some would say the classic treatment—of what Sokolowski calls "the Christian distinction," which he describes as follows:

Christian theology is differentiated from pagan religious and philosophical reflection primarily by the introduction of a new distinction, the distinction between the world understood as possibly not having existed and God understood as possibly being all that there is, with no diminution of goodness or greatness.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 3, obj. 5 and ad 5 (Leonine ed., 50: 97.36–41, 100.213–16). Note in particular: "illi qui utuntur philosophicis documentis in sacra doctrina redigendo in obsequium fidei, non miscent aquam uino, set aquam conuertunt in uinum." On the significance of Aquinas's metaphor of transubstantiation, see R. E. Houser, "Trans-Forming Philosophical Water into Theological Wine: Gilson and Aquinas," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 69 (1995): 103–16.

<sup>40</sup> Robert Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 23; cf. Pruffer, *Recapitulations*, 40.

Aquinas says that the subject of the *Summa theologiae* is God, or, alternatively, all things considered under the *ratio* of God, because “all things” either are God, or are ordered to Him as their beginning and end.<sup>41</sup> In the context of this vast subject, the philosophical understanding of virtue, friendship, and good will is transformed.

The natural human goodness of naturally acquired moral virtue is clearly an inadequate response to God’s infinite goodness, in particular, to His infinite generosity toward human beings in the creation and the incarnation.<sup>42</sup> Christianity teaches that a more adequate response is made possible by yet another divine gift, that of the supernaturally infused theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Drawing on Aristotle’s account of friendship, Aquinas explains charity as friendship between man and God. There are dangers of distortion in the shift from the natural perspective to the theological one, and particular dangers with respect to understanding natural human friendship and virtue in the new context. Charity is both the greatest of friendships, namely, friendship with God, and the greatest of virtues, the one that in the highest degree brings to bear on human actions the highest rule of action, which is God Himself.<sup>43</sup> While this sublime friendship and virtue is properly understood to enhance natural friendship and natural virtue, it can easily, in its sublimity, seem to do the opposite, that is, render its natural counterparts worthless by comparison.

Aquinas argues that charity is friendship at the beginning of the treatise on charity in the *Summa theologiae*, making reference both to *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.2 and to the scholastic distinction, based on this chapter, between love of good will or love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. The terminology of this distinction is misleading. *Love of concupiscence* does not mean disorderly sensual desire, or even sensual desire as such; and *love of good will* or *love of friendship* is more than good will (as we will see, it involves an additional “union of affection”), but less than friendship (it does not imply mutuality). As Aquinas understands it, the distinction is between love of goods to be used or enjoyed, and love of persons for their own sake.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 7 (Leonine ed., 4:19): “Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei: vel quia sunt ipse Deus; vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem.”

<sup>42</sup> See Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, 69–87.

<sup>43</sup> *Summa theologiae* II–II, q. 23, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 8:170).

<sup>44</sup> See Guy Mansini, “*Duplex Amor* and the Structure of Love in Aquinas,” in *Thomistica*, ed. Eugène Manning, *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale. Supplementa* 1 (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), 137–96; and David M. Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude and Love of Friendship in Thomas Aquinas,” *Mediaeval Studies* 58 (1996): 1–47, at 13–18.

Not just any love has the *ratio* of friendship, Aquinas says, but only love accompanied by good will, which occurs when we love someone in such a way that we will good to him. There are some things we are said to love, such as wine and horses, *to* which we do not will good, although we will the good of them *for* ourselves. This is not love of friendship, but love of concupiscence, for it would be ridiculous to say that someone has friendship for wine or a horse. (Perhaps Aquinas adds the example of the horse as a more plausible friend than the wine mentioned by Aristotle.) But good will is not enough for the *ratio* of friendship, which also requires that love be mutual. A friend is friend *to* a friend: *amicus est amico amicus*. The mutual good will of friendship is founded on a *communicatio*, a sharing of something; and there is a sharing of something between man and God, inasmuch as God, as has been revealed, shares his blessedness with us.<sup>45</sup> The strangeness of this friendship is shown by the fact that it is friendship not only with God, but, by extension of the friendship with God, also friendship with angels, friendship with the unvirtuous, and even friendship with those who, in the natural dimension, do not cease to be one's enemies.<sup>46</sup> On the

<sup>45</sup> *Summa theologiae* II–II, q. 23, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 8:163): “Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, in VIII *Ethic.*, non quilibet amor habet rationem amicitiae, sed amor qui est cum benevolentia: quando scilicet sic amamus aliquem ut ei bonum velimus. Si autem rebus amatis non bonum velimus, sed ipsum eorum bonum velimus nobis, sicut dicimur amare vinum aut equum aut aliquid huiusmodi, non est amor amicitiae, sed cuiusdam concupiscentiae: ridiculum enim est dicere quod aliquis habet amicitiam ad vinum vel ad equum. Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiae, sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio: quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliquam communicationem.

“Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hanc communicationem oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. De qua quidem communicatione dicitur I ad Cor. I: *Fidelis Deus, per quem vocasti estis in societatem Filii eius*. Amor autem super hanc communicationem fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum.” Here Aquinas seems to imply that *benevolentia* and *amatio*, good will and the activity of loving, are the same, but a few questions later, in q. 27, a. 2, he distinguishes the two.

On the sharing involved in love of friendship, see Mansini, “*Similitudo, Communicatio*, and the Friendship of Charity in Aquinas,” in *Thomistica*, ed. Eugène Manning, *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale. Supplementa* 1 (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), 1–26. On the use of Aristotle's account of friendship in Aquinas's account of charity, see Mansini, “Charity and the Form of Friendship,” in *Ethics and Theological Disclosures: The Thought of Robert Sokolowski*, ed. Guy Mansini and James G. Hart (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 31–43.

<sup>46</sup> *Summa theologiae* II–II, q. 23, a. 1, replies to objections, and q. 25 (Leonine ed., 8:163–64, 197–208).

other hand, the continuity of charity with natural friendship is shown by what Aquinas, following Augustine, calls the order of charity, according to which we are to have greater charity for those whom we naturally love more in any case. In charity, we are to love God more than ourselves, as we naturally do; the command to love our neighbor as ourselves implies that we should love ourselves more than our neighbor, as we naturally do; and among our neighbors, we should love more those who are closer to us, for instance in the order of family relations—again, as we naturally do.<sup>47</sup>

If friendship is by nature active, and charity is a kind of friendship, what are the acts of charity? Aquinas distinguishes between a principal act of charity, which is love, and secondary acts that follow from this love. Of the secondary acts, three are interior acts, namely, joy, peace, and mercy (*miser cordia*), and one is exterior, namely, beneficence. In addition to beneficence in general, Aquinas discusses acts of corporal and spiritual “almsgiving,” or “works of mercy,” which are a special kind of beneficence, and fraternal correction, which is one of the spiritual works of mercy. All these acts, we might say, are the *amicabilia* proper to the friendship that is charity, and they include the three principal *amicabilia* discussed by Aristotle: good will, which Aquinas says is included in love; concord, which he says is part of peace; and beneficence, which he says is a consequence of good will.<sup>48</sup>

### *Good Will Distinguished from the Love That Is the Principal Act of Charity*

Aquinas’s discussion of the love that is the principal act of charity begins by asking whether charity consists in loving or in being loved. He argues that charity, as a virtue, essentially has an inclination to its corresponding act, which is an act of loving, not a state of being loved. To emphasize the point, he takes two examples from Aristotle. Friends are praised more for loving than for being loved, and in fact are blamed if they are loved but do not love in return. And mothers, who love to an outstanding degree, seek more to love than to be loved; Aquinas repeats Aristotle’s remark, which we noted earlier, that some mothers give their children away, still loving them, but not seeking to be loved in return.<sup>49</sup>

Aquinas’s second question concerning the love of charity is whether it is the same as good will (q. 27, a. 2). It might seem that, in devoting an

<sup>47</sup> *Summa theologiae* II–II, q. 26 (Leonine ed., 8:209–23).

<sup>48</sup> *Summa theologiae* II–II, q. 27, a. 2; q. 29, a. 1; q. 31, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 8:226, 236, 245).

<sup>49</sup> *Summa theologiae* II–II, q. 27, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 8:224).

article to this question, he is simply following Aristotle's lead: as the philosopher has distinguished good will from friendship in general, so the theologian will distinguish good will from the supernatural friendship that is charity. But perhaps there is a special reason for making the distinction in theology. In a recent study of medieval thought about friendship, Bénédicte Sère proposes that good will functions as a sort of stand-in for charity in the commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Albert the Great, Aquinas, and later medieval commentators.<sup>50</sup> At least in the case of Aquinas's commentary on the *Ethics*, I do not think that her proposal is correct, but she does make some interesting observations that suggest why other commentators on the *Ethics*—why anyone, in fact, whether medieval or modern, and whether Christian or non-Christian—might identify the love of charity with good will. As she points out, good will, as described by Aristotle, seems to possess attributes of Christian charity. Because it does not require reciprocity, it can remain hidden and is marked by interiority; and because it does not require intimate knowledge of, or life in common with, its object, it can be extended to anyone and even to everyone. She goes too far, however, in saying that Aquinas, in the *Summa theologiae*, “systematizes the *equivalence* between good will and charity more explicitly” than had previously been done (*italics mine*), a claim that ignores the evidence of II-II, q. 27, a. 2.<sup>51</sup>

I said earlier that Aquinas recapitulates Aristotle's chapter on good will in this article. I had in mind the title of Prufer's *Recapitulations: Essays in Philosophy*, as well as remarks by Sokolowski that generalize from this title.<sup>52</sup> These remarks shed much light on the way in which the thought of Aristotle comes to life again in the thought of Aquinas:

It seems to me that ‘recapitulation’ is a better category to use than ‘hermeneutics’ or ‘interpretation’ when we speak about the thought of

<sup>50</sup> Bénédicte Sère, *Penser l'amitié au Moyen Âge: Étude historique des commentaires sur les livres VIII et IX de l'Éthique à Nicomaque (XIIIe–XVe siècle)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 252ff. This section of the book is titled “*Dans l'ombre de la bienveillance, la charité . . .*”

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 258: “Une génération après Albert, saint Thomas systématise l'équivalence entre bienveillance et charité d'une manière plus avouée. Il se trouve autorisé par le cadre théologique de la *Somme* à écrire: ‘Ergo sicut benevolentia non est alia virtus a caritate, ita nec beneficentia.’” The *sed contra* of *Summa theologiae*, q. 31, a. 4 that Sère quotes here says that good will is not a virtue that is other than charity, but this is not to say that it *is* the virtue of charity. Good will as such is not a virtue at all, although a certain good will is included in the virtue of charity.

<sup>52</sup> For Prufer, see note 17 above; Sokolowski, *Phenomenology of the Human Person*, 78–79, n. 10.

one person or one age coming to life again in another. . . . *Recapitulation* is a fresh word, and it connotes public activities and syntactical action. To recapitulate is to repeat, but also to select, to summarize, and to put into hierarchic order, with the more important distinguished from the less. We place the old material into new chapters or headings, *capitula*. . . . When something is said to be recapitulated, it is obvious that it is still there in the recapitulation, but it is also obvious that it has been abridged, rearranged, and inevitably slanted.

Aristotle's chapter on good will, according to Aquinas's division of it in his commentary, has this order of headings:

- what good will is not:
  - friendship
  - being in love
- what good will is:
  - the beginning of friendship
    - analogically, it is to friendship as enjoyment of a woman's beauty is to being in love with her
    - metaphorically, it is "idle" friendship
  - in particular, the beginning of friendship of virtue

In the article of the *Summa*, Aquinas recapitulates as follows:

- what good will is:
  - the act of will by which we will good to someone else
- what good will is not:
  - “actual” love
    - in the sense appetite
    - in the intellectual appetite, i.e. the will

Aristotle begins with what good will is not. Aquinas in the *Summa* begins positively, and with a definition based on etymology, saying that what *benevolentia* properly means is the act of will by which we will good to someone else: *proprie dicitur actus voluntatis quo alteri bonum volumus*.<sup>53</sup> This proper sense of a Latin term unknown to Aristotle is presented in the *Summa* as the basis of everything else to be said on the subject.

In the *Ethics* commentary, Aquinas calls good will a *motion* of will; here, less metaphorically and more formally, he calls it an *act* of will. He says that this act of will differs from “actual” love, whether in the sense appetite or in the intellective appetite or will. He implies that good will is, in contrast, unactual or potential. Aristotle distinguishes good will from

<sup>53</sup> *Summa theologiae* II–II, q. 27, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 8:225).

friendship and from being in love. Aquinas distinguishes good will from love in the intellectual appetite and love in the sense appetite; and he reverses the order of Aristotle's discussion, proceeding not from higher to lower (from friendship to being in love), but from lower to higher (from love in the sense appetite to love in the intellectual appetite).

Aquinas restates what Aristotle says about being in love as follows. Love in the sense appetite is a passion; a passion inclines toward its object with a certain impetus; and love in the sense appetite arises not immediately, but through careful examination of the thing loved. He says that this is why Aristotle, in order to show the difference between good will and the love that is a passion, says that good will is without intensity and desire, that is, without any impetus of inclination; rather, it is from an isolated judgment of reason, *ex solo iudicio rationis*, that one wills good to someone else. Aquinas gives the impression that Aristotle draws this contrast between passion and an "isolated" judgment of reason, but in fact Aristotle says nothing about a judgment of reason in his chapter on good will; it is Aquinas who introduces judgment into the discussion. He does not say what this judgment of reason that is the source of good will is; perhaps he takes it for granted that it is the judgment that the object of good will is deserving of the good willed to him. Returning to his paraphrase of what Aristotle does say, he adds that love in the sense appetite arises from a habituation, but that good will sometimes arises suddenly, as when we see people fighting, and want one of them to win.<sup>54</sup>

Aquinas's shift from Aristotle's *being in love* to *love in the sense appetite* is a terminological precision. His other shift, from Aristotle's *friendship* to *love in the intellectual appetite or will*, is more than that. Love in the intellectual appetite, he says, implies a uniting in affection of one who loves to what he loves, inasmuch as he regards what he loves as one with himself, or as something belonging to himself, and is moved accordingly. Good will, by contrast, is a simple act of will by which we will good to

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.: "Hic autem voluntatis actus differt ab actuali amore tam secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo, quam etiam secundum quod est in appetitu intellectivo, qui est voluntas. Amor enim qui est in appetitu sensitivo passio quaedam est. Omnis autem passio cum quodam impetu inclinatur in suum obiectum. Passio autem amoris hoc habet quod non subito exoritur, sed per aliquam assiduam inspectionem rei amatae. Et ideo Philosophus, in IX *Eth.*, ostendens differentiam inter benevolentiam et amorem qui est passio, dicit quod benevolentia *non habet distensionem et appetitum*, id est aliquem impetum inclinationis, sed ex solo iudicio rationis homo vult bonum alicui. Similiter etiam talis amor est ex quadam consuetudine: benevolentia autem interdum oritur ex repentino, sicut accidit nobis de pugilibus qui pugnant, quorum alterum vellemus vincere."

someone, even without the supposition of any such affective union on our part with the one to whom we will good.<sup>55</sup> This “affective union” that is the principal act of charity is not a union made up of the affection of the one who loves and the affection of the one who is loved. Rather, it is a sense of oneness occurring entirely within the affection of the one who loves. Mutual love involves two such affective unions.

Love as an affective union is a Platonic, not an Aristotelian theme. Earlier in the *Summa* (I–II, q. 28, a. 1), Aquinas introduces it under the authority of a remark by the neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius that love is a *virtus unitiva*, a force of union. Aquinas explains that union is, in different senses, the cause, the essential nature, and the effect of love. (1) The union that is the cause of love is either one’s substantial union with oneself, in the case of love of self, or union by resemblance, in the case of love of what is not oneself. (2) The union that is the essence of love is union with respect to an “adjustment of affection” (*coaptatio affectus*). This is the “affective union” Aquinas mentions in the article on good will. One who loves is related to what he loves either as he is related to himself, in love of friendship, or as he is related to something belonging to him, in love of concupiscence. (3) The union that is the effect of love is the “real” union of living and speaking together that Aristotle, in the *Politics*, suggests is a milder alternative to the total, melding union described by Aristophanes in Plato’s *Symposium*.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. (225–26): “Sed amor qui est in appetitu intellectivo etiam differt a benevolentia. Importat enim quandam unionem secundum affectus amantis ad amatum: inquantum scilicet amans aestimat amatum quodammodo ut unum sibi, vel ad se pertinens, et sic movetur in ipsum. Sed benevolentia est simplex actus voluntatis quo volumus alicui bonum, etiam non praesupposita praedicta unione affectus ad ipsum.”

<sup>56</sup> *Summa theologiae* I–II, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 6:197–98): “Ad secundum dicendum quod unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum: quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est.—Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui.—Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris: ut enim Philosophus refert, II Politic., Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum: sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi, quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur.”

In the article on charity and good will, Aquinas concludes by saying that good will is included in the love that is the act of charity, but that the love adds an affective union; and that this is why Aristotle calls good will the beginning of friendship.<sup>57</sup> He apparently means that Aristotle does so because good will provides the basis for the subsequent addition of affective union. He does not note that he himself has introduced an un-Aristotelian intermediary between good will and friendship, namely, love in the will, in particular the love called love of good will or love of friendship, which goes beyond the detachment of good will, but does not imply the mutuality and mutual recognition of friendship. Aristotle identifies two degrees in the willing of good to another: idle friendship and friendship proper. Aquinas indicates three degrees: good will, the affective union of love in the will, and friendship. Aquinas's point that good will fails to achieve the affective *union* of love indirectly draws attention to the significant residue of duality in mere good will. This duality is clear in the valedictory remark "I wish you well," which inevitably reminds us that you and I remain two, not one.

One of the objections in II-II, q. 27, a. 2 quotes the statement in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* that to love is to will good to someone, which would seem to mean that the love that is the act of charity is good will. Aquinas answers that the statement does define *amare*, but does not give its complete *ratio*. What it describes is the part of the *ratio* in which the action of loving is most manifest.<sup>58</sup> Since good will need not be executed in an act of beneficence, he might mean that good will is, of all the aspects of love, the one that is most manifest to the one who loves, in a very interior sort of "manifestation." Or perhaps he means that when love is manifested to others, what *most* manifests it to them is evidence of wishing well, of willing good, to the one who is loved.

### *Aspects of Good Will*

There is no theoretical disagreement between Aquinas's accounts of good will in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 27, a. 2 and in his commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.5, but there are a few differences in detail, three of which are worth noting.

<sup>57</sup> *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 27, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 8:226): "Sic ergo in dilectione, secundum quod est actus caritatis, includitur quidem benevolentia, sed dilectio sive amor addit unionem affectus. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit ibidem quod benevolentia est principium amicitiae."

<sup>58</sup> *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 27, a. 2, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 8:226): "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus ibi definit amare non ponens totam rationem ipsius, sed aliquid ad rationem eius pertinens in quo maxime manifestatur dilectionis actus."

1. In the commentary, Aquinas applies the term *idle* to the will that he takes to be the subject of good will. He says that when a man continues for a long time in good will toward someone and gets used to wishing him well, his mind grows strong in willing good, so that the will is no longer idle, but effective, and friendship comes into being.

In the *Summa*, Aquinas does not speak of idleness. After defining good will as the act of will by which we will good to another, he says that this act of will differs from “actual love,” whether in the sense appetite or in the will, implying that the act of will that is good will is unactualized or potential love. He shifts the focus from the *idle friendship* that good will, according to Aristotle, is, to the *actual love* that it is not. Unactuality replaces inactivity as the distinguishing feature of mere good will. By introducing the notion of actuality in the article of the *Summa*, Aquinas makes the discussion of good will more metaphysical; and by opposing good will to “actual love,” rather than to the “effective will” of friendship, he moves the discussion further inward, so to speak. In the commentary, he compares good will with something external, the deed into which good will does not “break forth.” In the *Summa*, he compares good will with something else that is internal, actual love in the will.

Combining the points made by the two texts, we might say that good will is both unactual and inactive. It is both a potentiality waiting to be actuated and an idleness in which one has yet to act.

2. In the commentary, Aquinas calls the motion of will in good will *isolated* and *weak*. In the *Summa*, he does not apply either term to the act of will in good will, but he does call *isolated* the judgment of reason at the origin of good will, meaning that it is a judgment uninfluenced by, and so isolated from, passion. This mention of a judgment of reason at the source of good will is a brief reminder that Aquinas understands any movement of appetite, such as good will, to follow on a prior act of apprehension.

Again, the commentary and the *Summa* may be seen as complementing one another: good will comprises a clear judgment, “isolated” from passion, but also a weak movement of will, “isolated” from action.

3. In the article of the *Summa*, the adjective *simple* is applied, as in the commentary, to good will, but for a different reason. The commentary says that desire is a passion in the sense appetite that, by its impetus, moves the mind toward something as if by a kind of violence; but that this does not happen in good will, which is a *simple* movement of will. The simplicity is freedom from passion. In the *Summa*, good

will is said to be the simple act of will by which we will good to someone, without presupposition of the affective union with the object that constitutes love in the intellective appetite or will. Here, the simplicity is absence of such affective union.

Once more, the commentary and the *Summa* make complementary points. The act of will in good will is simple because it is nothing but the willing of good to someone; it involves neither the violence of passion nor the affective union of spiritual love. Being without admixture of impulse or of affection, it stands apart from both the lower and the higher kinds of love.

As he does in the commentary, Aquinas elsewhere distinguishes passions, which involve physiological change, from acts of will, which do not, and which are, in that sense, "simple."<sup>59</sup> But good will is also simple among acts of will, in the sense that it is a mere willing, that is, an act of will entirely directed to an end, as distinct from acts of will that also involve consideration of means, acts such as the choosing of means, the consenting to means decided on by deliberation, and the intending of an end in intending the means to it. David Gallagher explains Aquinas's view of the difference between intending and simple willing as follows:

The difference lies in the fact that intention is not "simple." Intention is not directed to the end *simply*, but rather to the end *as that which will be achieved by means*. Or, expressed less formally, in intending an end a person is committed to actually carrying out the actions needed to achieve that end. Simple willing, on the other hand, is simply the willing of some good as perfective of me (or those united to me by love) without any necessary reference to whether I intend actually to acquire that good.<sup>60</sup>

This description of simple willing evokes the indolence of will in simple, non-intending good will. Good will need not even go as far as to determine what the good of its object is; and if it does, it need not consider means for achieving it, although it might do so, in an idle sort of way. Aristotle mentions the good will of spectators at a fight, but anyone who is merely well disposed to someone else has the Olympian detachment of an onlooker. A friend, on the other hand, is someone who joins in the action.

<sup>59</sup> For example, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 22, a. 3, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 6:171).

<sup>60</sup> David M. Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, q. 6-17)," in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002): 69-89, at 81. See *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 8, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 6:70-71).

### Rhetoric: The Winning of Good Will with Speech

Both as an expositor of Aristotle, then, and as a teacher of Christian theology, Aquinas developed an understanding of good will as the simple movement or act of will by which we simply will good to others, a movement to be compared and contrasted with the more forceful appetitive movements of sensual love and intellectual love. He did so against the background of the very different consideration of good will that he had encountered in his early study of Ciceronian rhetoric, which taught him the importance of taking the exordium of a speech as an occasion for evoking good will, as well as the topics suitable for this purpose that I mentioned at the beginning.

In this part, I point out some passages in which Aquinas makes use of this rhetorical doctrine to comment on introductions to books and beginnings of prayers, and then I compare the ethical and the rhetorical perspectives on good will.

#### *Introductions to Books*

Aquinas inherited medieval habits of extending Cicero's directions on the composing of public speeches to two other forms of composition in words, books and prayers. Application of the art of rhetoric to these forms brings similarities and contrasts to the fore. A book, like a speech, is a prepared monologue. (Socrates compares long-winded speeches to books at *Protagoras* 329a.) But a speech involves a lively presence of speaker and audience to each other, whereas a book—whether a book read aloud by a lector or, all the more, one read alone and silently—proclaims its author's absence. (Electronic transmission and recording of speech complicate and obscure the distinction between presence and absence.)

The exordium of a speech, according to Cicero, should make the audience good-willed, teachable, or attentive. In applying this principle to introductions to books, Aquinas construes it to mean that an introduction must have all three effects, and that an introduction must accordingly be divided into three parts, one for production of each effect. At the beginning of his career, he understood the form of the three-part introduction to be a matter of custom (*mos*). In one of his earliest writings, a commentary on Jeremiah, he says that Jerome, the translator of Jeremiah, adds an introduction at the beginning, in which, "in the customary way," he makes the audience attentive, teachable, and good-willed.<sup>61</sup> Later, he came to see

<sup>61</sup> According to the nineteenth-century editions of Aquinas's *Super Ieremiam Expositio* (Vivès 19:68; Parma 14:578), his commentary on Jerome's prologue to Jeremiah begins as follows: "Hic autem libro Ieremiae, qui librum de hebraeo in latinum transtulit, praemittit prooemium in quo *more theorico* tria facit. Primo

the three-part structure not just as a matter of custom, but as an essential feature of introductions. In his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, he says that Aristotle in his introduction does the three things that are *necessary* in *any* introduction, because one who composes an introduction intends three things, namely, to make the audience good-willed, teachable, and attentive.<sup>62</sup> This way of putting it implies that Aquinas composed his own introductions in three parts, and in this regard, it is interesting to compare, for example, the three sentences that make up the prologue of the *Summa theologiae* with the three effects of an exordium described by Cicero. The first sentence expresses concern for the audience as beginners in Christian doctrine, a gesture suited to winning good will. The second sentence itemizes difficulties posed by current teaching practices, which would seem to be a good way to make the beginners ready to be taught by the new *ordo disciplinae* that Aquinas implicitly promises to follow. In the third sentence, he expresses confidence in divine assistance, and then says he will proceed briefly and clearly as far as the material will allow—a mix of hopeful promise and cautionary reminder of limitation that would be likely to make an audience attentive.

In commenting on Jerome's introduction to Jeremiah and on Aristotle's introduction to the *De anima*, and again in commenting on Peter Lombard's introduction to the *Book of Sentences*, on Boethius's introduction to the *De Trinitate*, and even on a verse of Psalm 33 that he calls a

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reddat attentos: secundo dociles facit . . . ; tertio benivolos" (emphasis added). It's not clear what *mos theoreticus*, "theoretical" custom, would be. Adriano Oliva, O.P., President of the Leonine Commission, has discovered evidence suggesting that the *theorico* in the nineteenth-century Parma and Paris editions of the *opera omnia* may derive from a misreading of the morphologically similar but, in the context, more intelligible word *rhetorico*. In an e-mail communication of March 5, 2005, he indicates that the earlier editions (Rome 1570, t. 13, f. 1v; Paris 1660) and the manuscripts (Firenze, Laur. Plut. 26.25, f. 233va; Sevilla, Capitula y Colombina 7.6.3, f. 191vb; Vaticano, Urb. lat. 472, f. 2ra) of Aquinas's commentary on Jeremiah that he has been able to consult all have *rhetorico*, not *theorico*, at this point.

Among biographers of Aquinas, there is general agreement that his commentaries on Jeremiah, Lamentations, and Isaiah are very early works, probably composed at Paris in the early 1250s. See Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin* (634 [46]); and Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la Sacra Doctrina: avec l'édition du prologue de son commentaire des Sentences de Pierre Lombard* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), 225–26.

<sup>62</sup> *Sentencia libri De anima* 1.1 (Leonine ed., 45.1: 4.25–29): "primo ponit prohemium, in quo facit tria que necessaria sunt in quolibet prohemio. Qui enim facit prohemium tria intendit: primo enim ut reddat beniuolum, secundo ut reddat docile, tercio ut reddat attentum" (emphasis added). The commentary on *De anima* was written in 1267–68; see *ibid.*, "Préface," 287.

sort of prologue (*quasi prooemium*) to what follows it, Aquinas proceeds in the same way, explaining the introduction by explaining how it is composed: he divides it into three parts, assigns production of one of the three effects to each part, and identifies the strategy by which each effect is aimed at.<sup>63</sup> This range of texts tends to support the view Aquinas expresses in his commentary on *De anima* that any introduction to a book must have three purposes and three corresponding parts.

Aquinas occasionally mentions one or more of the topics Cicero identifies for evoking good will—our own person, the person of our adversaries, that of the judges or hearers, and the case itself—and even particulars of Cicero’s advice concerning what to say about each of these. In his discussion of Jerome’s prologue to Jeremiah, for example, he says that Jerome makes the audience good-willed on the basis of his own person (*ex persona sua*). He says that Jerome does this by means of three topics, and his description of these is taken straight from the *De inventione*: first, he says, Jerome speaks of “the good deeds done by him without arrogance” (*de bonis a se factis sine arrogantia*); then he “removes an accusation against him” (*crimen illatum diluit*); finally he “shows the difficulties he is having” (*ostendit quae sibi difficultates instant*).<sup>64</sup> Elsewhere, Aquinas’s explanation of how an author wins good will is more loosely related to Cicero’s advice. Lombard, he says, wins good will in the prologue to the *Book of Sentences* by explaining the causes that move him to compile the book, causes that show his affection toward God and his neighbor. Boethius wins good will in the prologue to the *De Trinitate* by explaining and excusing the difficulties and the imperfection of the book. Aristotle wins good will in the prologue to the *De anima* by showing the usefulness and dignity of the knowledge conveyed by the book.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> *Prologi Sententiarum diuisio et expositio* (Oliva ed., 332.1–2); *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, Expositio Prohemii (Leonine ed., 50: 77.1–6); *Postilla super Psalmos* 33:12 (Parma ed., 14:267).

<sup>64</sup> *Super Ieremiam Expositio* (Parma ed., 14:578). Cf. Cicero, *De inventione* 1.16.22 (Harvard ed., 44): “Benivolentia quattuor ex locis comparatur. . . . Ab nostra (sc. persona), si de nostris factis et officiis sine arrogantia dicemus; si crimina illata . . . diluemus; si . . . quae instant difficultates, proferemus.” (I have emphasized the words of Cicero repeated by Aquinas in his commentary on Jeremiah.)

<sup>65</sup> *Prologi Sententiarum diuisio et expositio* (Oliva ed., 332.4–5); *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, Expositio Prohemii (Leonine ed., 50: 77.3–5, 78.117–20); *Sentencia libri De anima* 1.1 (Leonine ed., 45.1: 4.29–30, 34–35).

I discuss the points made in the last three paragraphs at greater length in “St. Thomas Aquinas on Prologues,” *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 98 (2005): 803–13.

### *Beginnings of Prayers*

The same Latin word, *oratio*, means both a speech or *oration* and a prayer or (as Hamlet might say) *orison*.<sup>66</sup> In ways different from books, prayers are also both like and unlike public speeches. Like the delivery of a prepared speech or the reading of a book, the saying of a prayer such as the Our Father is the recital of a pre-established composition. Like judicial oratory in particular, prayer is the stating of a case and the making of a plea before a judge. In a speech, on the other hand, a speaker stands conspicuously before a group that is also visible to him, whereas in prayer, whether private or public, a speaker presents himself to an invisible but all-seeing audience of one. (Again, electronic transmission and recording blur distinctions, to say nothing of the *bizarrie* of electronically projecting prayer to God through a microphone.)

Augustine is a great exemplar both of rhetoric and of prayer for the Latin middle ages. In *De doctrina Christiana*, he argues for the relevance of the art of rhetoric to Christian preaching, saying that defenders of truth should be no less armed than defenders of falsehood with the art that knows how to use a prologue to make an audience good-willed, attentive, or teachable; he also quotes from Cicero's *Orator* the remark that one who is eloquent should speak so as to teach, to delight, and to "turn" or persuade (*ut doceat, ut delectet, ut flectat*).<sup>67</sup> In the *Confessions* Augustine provides a model for the medieval understanding of prayer as a strange rhetoric with a divine "audience." Prufer spells out the rhetorical situation in which Augustine, with acute awareness of the divine omniscience, finds himself in the *Confessions*:

<sup>66</sup> With reference to *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 83, a. 1, Lawrence Dewan comments: "Citing the saying of Cassiodorus '*Oratio dicitur quasi oris ratio*,' which can be rendered in somewhat Joycean English as 'Orisons are oral reasons,' St. Thomas uses this as a cue for discussing *ratio*, reason, and more precisely, the causal character of practical reason." "St. Thomas and the Ontology of Prayer," in *Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics*, 365-73, at 368-69.

<sup>67</sup> "Nam cum per artem rhetoricam et vera suadeantur et falsa, quis audeat dicere adversus mendacium in defensoribus suis inermem debere consistere veritatem, ut videlicet illi qui res falsas persuadere conantur, noverint auditorem vel benevolum vel intentum vel docile proemio facere, isti autem non noverint?" "Dixit ergo quidam eloquens, et verum dixit, ita dicere debere eloquentem ut doceat, ut delectet, ut flectat." *De doctrina Christiana* 4.2.3, 4.12.27 (ed. W. M. Green, CSEL 80: 118.20-119.2, 137.11-12) The latter remark is quoted by Aquinas in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 177, a. 1, obj. 1. See also Henri Marrou, "L'éloquence chrétienne," in *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris: Boccard, 1983), 505-40; and Ernest L. Fortin, "Augustine and the Problem of Christian Rhetoric," in *The Birth of Philosophic Christianity: Studies in Early Christian and Medieval Thought* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 79-93.

There is no longer any privacy: man is because he is manifest to another. But this publicity to God is as hidden as God Himself, unless God's eloquence manifests Him as our public.<sup>68</sup>

That God has so manifested Himself is, of course, both the premise and the argument of the *Confessions*. Prufer goes on to characterize Augustine's rhetoric in the *Confessions* as follows:

The *Confessions* are a dialogue between one man and God; they have the form of solitary prayer overheard, not of speech with others about being as it shows itself through city and cosmos. The Psalms are the origin of the rhetoric of the *Confessions*, a rhetoric whose form is *caritas*: *mutua redamatio cum quadam mutua communicatione et familiari conversatione*. . . . God is spoken to with words first spoken by God to us (prayer as quotation and appropriation of Scripture) and in the Word spoken in common with us (Christ, human and divine, Mediator).<sup>69</sup>

The *Confessions* begin by invoking God in an elaborate exordium, initiating a strain of address that continues throughout the work. Both the Psalms and the reciprocal friendship of *caritas* contribute to the rhetoric, as Prufer says, but so does the Ciceronian art of rhetoric, of which Augustine was a master.

Scholasticism makes explicit and systematic what the *Confessions* imply about the bearing of Ciceronian principles on speech addressed to God. As we have seen, Aquinas's early commentary on Jeremiah explains Jerome's prologue to the book with reference to Cicero's topics for winning good will from his readers. Aquinas uses these same topics to analyze an address by Jeremiah to God in Chapter 12, where the prophet, Aquinas says, "disputes" the justice of the Lord's punishment in three stages, each of which contributes to winning good will. First the prophet uses the topics of the person of the judge (*captat benevolentiam ex persona iudicis*) and the honorable character of his case (*ex honestate causae*); then he presents his case with reference to his adversaries (*proponit causam quantum ad adversarios*), and with reference to himself and his justice (*Ex parte autem sua dat intelligere iustitiam*); finally he makes a petition to show the punishment due to his adversaries (*ostendit poenam per modum imprecations*).

<sup>68</sup> Prufer, *Recapitulations*, 28–29.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 29. Prufer quotes the *Summa theologiae*'s Aristotelian description of charity as "a mutual return of love with a mutual sharing and a common way of life" (I–II, q. 65, a. 5). *Redamatio* translates *antiphilēsis* in the Latin version of *Nicomachean Ethics* at 1155b28.

tionis), appealing to the Lord's justice (*quasi dicat: Quia iustus es . . .*).<sup>70</sup> Aquinas here touches on all four of Cicero's topics for winning good will, suggesting that a prophet begins to address God in the way that a skillful public speaker begins to address a human audience, that is, by winning good will.

Aquinas also understands ordinary Christian prayer to God in rhetorical terms.<sup>71</sup> As an objection in his commentary on the *Sentences* says, however, God is not to be "turned" by words: *non est verbis flectendus*.<sup>72</sup> What, then, becomes of the art of *captatio benevolentiae* in prayer? Aquinas addresses this question in discussing the "prologues" to the two outstanding instances of Christian prayer, the Mass and the Our Father.

In the *Sentences* commentary, Aquinas says that just as the *oratio* of public speakers has as its first part an exordium, so does *oratio* directed to God—which is why the introit at Mass is sung. He distinguishes the two kinds of exordium as follows. In the *oratio* of public speakers, the exordium is included because of those to whom the speech is made, that is, with a view to making them good-willed, teachable, or attentive; in *oratio* addressed to God, an exordium is sometimes required, but for the purpose of arousing in the one praying a desire to make his petition devoutly. Aquinas says that, according to Cicero, there are four ways of proceeding in an exordium meant to win good will: on the basis of the person of the judge (*ex persona iudicis*), when he is praised; on the basis of the business at hand (*ex negotio*), when its dignity is shown; on the basis of the person of the petitioner (*ex persona petentis*), when his merit in the eyes of those he is addressing is shown; and on the basis of the person of his adversaries (*ex persona adversariorum*), when the minds of the hearers are moved against them. But in *oratio* addressed to God, Aquinas says, we speak only in favor of ourselves, and not so as to make any adversaries disliked; and "the business for which we pray" (*negotium pro quo oramus*) is God Himself, to whom all our desires

<sup>70</sup> *Super Jeremiam Expositio* 12.1 (Parma ed., 14:608). Another of Aquinas's early Scripture commentaries, on the Lamentations of Jeremiah, contains a similar passage. In Chapter 3, he says, the author makes a prayer, in which he begins by winning *benevolentia*, in three stages, using the topics of his own person and that of the complaining people (*ex persona sua, et populi conquerentis*), the person of his adversary (*ex persona adversarii*), and the person of the judge (*ex persona iudicis*). *Super Threnos Jeremiae Expositio* 3.14 (Parma ed., 14:680).

<sup>71</sup> Commenting on 1 Timothy 2:1, he says that, when we pray, we should do what orators do when they make a case that a benefit should be granted: "sicut rhetores faciunt, sic et nos in orando debemus facere." *Super primam epistolam ad Timotheum lectura* 2.1 (*Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura*, ed. P. R. Cai [Marietti, 1953], 2:223).

<sup>72</sup> *Scriptum super librum IV Sententiarum*, d. 15, q. 4, a. 3, obj. 1 (ed. Mandonnet-Moos, 4:743).

are to be ordered. There are no “adversaries” in prayer, and there is no “business” apart from “the judge.” In prayer, then, we may be moved to devotion by “a sort of prologue” (*quasi quodam exordio*) on the basis of two topics: God (the judge), when we praise him, and ourselves (the petitioners), when we call to mind our weakness.<sup>73</sup> The four rhetorical topics normally used for winning good will are reduced to two, and these two have the purpose of affecting the speaker, not the hearer.

An article in the *Summa theologiae* on the petitions of the Lord’s Prayer includes an objection to the words of invocation that precede the petitions, the words *Our Father, Who art in heaven*. The objection is that it seems pointless to try to win the good will of one who “goes before us” with his good will; and since God does go before us with His good will, in the sense that He has loved us first, these first words of the prayer seem superfluous. Aquinas answers that *oratio* is offered to God not in order to “turn” Him (*ut ipsum flectamus*), but in order to arouse in ourselves confidence to make our petition; and this we especially do by considering two things, namely, the charity toward us by which He wills our good, and his exaltedness (*excellencia*), by which he is capable (*qua potest*)—capable, that is, of accomplishing the good He wills us. In saying *Our Father*, we consider his charity toward us; in saying *Who art in heaven*, we consider his exaltedness.<sup>74</sup> In this “prologue,” then, the speaker’s concern for the

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., a. 2 resp. (ed. Mandonnet-Moos, 4:744–45): “Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum quod sicut oratio rhetorica habet exordium partem sui, ita et oratio ad Deum fusa. Unde et introitus in Missa cantatur.—Sed hoc interest, quia in oratione rhetorica exordium ponitur propter illos ad quos oratio fit, ut benevoli, dociles, vel attentī reddantur. Sed in oratione de qua loquimur, exordium requiritur quandoque ad excitandum orantis desiderium ad devote petendum.—In exordio autem quod ad benevolentiam captandam inducitur, quatuor modis secundum Tullium . . . proceditur. Quia vel captatur benevolentia ex persona iudicis, dum laudatur; vel ex negotio, dum ejus dignitas ostenditur; vel ex persona petentis, sicut dum ostenditur meritum ejus in quos alloquitur; vel ex persona adversariorum, dum contra eos audientium animos concitant.—In oratione autem quam ad Deum fundimus, pro nobis tantum intercedimus, non ut alii offensam incurrant. Negotium etiam pro quo oramus, ipse Deus est, ad quem sunt omnia desideria nostra ordinanda.—Unde dupliciter orantis affectus ad devotionem quasi quodam exordio excitatur: scilicet ex parte Dei, dum ipsum laudamus; et ex parte nostra, dum nostrum infirmitatem recogitamus.” On the basis of these remarks, Aquinas goes to offer a rationale for St. Ambrose’s distinction of the different kinds of prayer.

<sup>74</sup> *Summa theologiae* II–II, q. 83, a. 9, obj. 5 and ad 5 (Leonine ed., 9:201–2): “in vanum videtur captare benevolentiam eius qui benevolentia sua nos praevenit. Sed Deus nos sua benevolentia praevenit: quia *ipse prior dilexit nos*, ut dicitur I Ioan. IV. Superflue ergo praemittitur petitionibus, *Pater noster, qui es in caelis*, quod videtur ad benevolentiam captandam pertinere.” “Ad quantum dicendum quod

good will of the hearer remains; but whereas the public speaker must have the art to *win* his audience's good will, one who prays the Our Father begins with words that remind *himself* of the great good will that his Audience *already* has toward him.

### *Beginnings of Speeches and Beginnings of Friendships*

What does comparison of the ethical and the rhetorical perspectives on good will suggest? On one hand, there is Aristotle's speculative account of what it is to be well disposed toward someone, which Aquinas interprets in terms of will as a power of soul and introduces into his discussion of charity in the *Summa theologiae*. On the other hand, there is Cicero's practical account of how to win good will from an audience at the beginning of a speech, which Aquinas uses to comment on introductions to books and beginnings of prayers. Taken together, do the two accounts result in a more comprehensive view, a logic or a metaphysics of good will, so to speak, beyond ethics and rhetoric?

To return to a point made at the outset, in both accounts good will has to do with beginnings. Itself the beginning of friendship, good will, according to Aquinas, is one of three effects of a well-made prologue. Related to the theme of beginnings is the suddenness with which good will, according to both ethics and rhetoric, sometimes arises. Aristotle suggests only that good will can occur immediately, at first sight of someone doing something; Cicero indicates that it must, in some cases, be produced early in a speech, if it is not already present. Aristotle's example of the experience of coming upon people fighting, and immediately wanting one of them to win, is perhaps more significant than it first seems. Good will is especially provoked by sight of a contest. Cicero is entirely concerned with a fight, specifically a verbal contest; but unlike Aristotle, who is interested in how a spectator at a fight comes to have good will, Cicero takes the point of view of a contestant, a contestant, moreover, who competes precisely for the audience's good will, and who does so by using as topics the elements of his situation. There are no adversaries, Aquinas says, in prayer; but prayer is an unusual sort of speech, and opposition, contest, and competition for good will would seem to be normal, rather than exceptional, in speeches and in speaking in general.

What rhetoric can contribute to philosophical reflection on good will is its practical understanding of a situation in which good will is of paramount

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oratio non porrigitur Deo ut ipsum flectamus: sed ut in nobis ipsis fiduciam excitemus postulandi. Quae quidem praecipue excitatur in nobis considerando eius caritatem ad nos, qua bonum nostrum vult, et ideo dicimus, *Pater noster*; et eius excellentiam, qua potest, et ideo dicimus, *qui es in caelis*."

importance, namely, the beginning of a public address. Rhetoric analyzes this situation into speaker, adversaries, audience, and case, any of which may be brought to explicitness at the start of the speech and articulated in such a way as to evoke the audience's good will. The situation might seem to be so exceptional, and to involve so artificial an exercise of speech, as to be of little use to consideration of good will as such; but perhaps the formal character of the situation is in fact advantageous for this purpose.

The art of rhetoric is keenly attuned to what Sokolowski calls *reason as public*. Phenomenology, he explains, opposes the *egocentric predicament* of modern philosophy, according to which the mind is closed in on itself and its ideas. Phenomenology proposes instead the theme of *the publicness of mind*, that is, the mind's opening onto a world held in common with others, in a life of shared reason, evidence, and truth.<sup>75</sup> The distinctive act by which one person addresses many obviously arises out of such a public life of the mind and takes place in such a world held in common. It also vividly dramatizes two of Sokolowski's related themes: that predication, the central activity in thinking, originally occurs between a speaker and a listener; and that an exercise of grammar is both a signal *that* the speaker is thinking and a signal to a listener *to* think.<sup>76</sup>

If one man is addressing a multitude, the one flow of grammatically ordered words, the one articulated wave of sound, signals that the speaker is thinking, and it signals everyone in that crowd to think, to articulate the world, in the same way. The one stream of sound is the basis for a chorus of thinking.<sup>77</sup>

This stream of sound and chorus of thought are the materials of rhetoric, an art that implicitly acknowledges, as the background to its particular concerns, the radical publicness of thinking. Among these particular concerns of rhetoric are concerns about its publics or audiences, about the public square of social and political life in which it operates, and, today, about the publicity and public relations that are its contemporary modes. It is out of such concerns that the art of rhetoric reflects on the public way of being that is constituted by one person addressing many and develops an account of the public evocation of good will that such a person must attempt.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 8–16.

<sup>76</sup> Sokolowski, *Phenomenology of the Human Person*, 58ff., 68ff.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>78</sup> Confirmation of the public reality and importance of good will is provided by accounting practices, according to which good will is listed among the intangible assets of a business. I thank Alyce Ann Bergkamp for pointing this out to me.

Aristotle's spectators at a fight come to have good will because of what they see one of the fighters doing. Aquinas says that many have good will toward persons they have never seen, because of what they have heard about them.<sup>79</sup> The rhetorical analysis of the exordium brings to the fore the point that good will toward someone can be caused by what he himself says. It is, in fact, often on the basis of something someone says, often on the basis of one of the first things he says in our hearing, and often on the basis of what he says about himself, or us, or someone he differs with, or some matter of dispute, that we begin to like or dislike him. Suddenly liking or disliking someone can be almost indistinguishable from liking or disliking something he unexpectedly says. Unusual and artificial though it is, then, the rhetorical situation is, recognizably, a stylization of a very ordinary one. Heidegger calls the treatise on the passions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* "the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another."<sup>80</sup> The art of rhetoric illuminates essential features of our being and our being together, and among these features are not just "passions," but also the good will by which we first incline toward another person while remaining yet detached.

### Conclusion

Theology considers human nature with respect to its extreme limits and conditions: its creation and final end, its salvation and damnation. In the presence of theology, philosophy can be moved to intensify its own search for ultimate horizons, but it can be conversely provoked, in a kind of reaction, to intensify its contrary penchant for the everyday and the overlooked. Even in such reaction, however, philosophy can benefit from the company of Aquinas the theologian. The philosophical reader of Aquinas may bring to his reading interests remote from those of his author, but on many subjects, even such minor subjects as the one we have been discussing, Aquinas responds generously, transmitting portions of a common ancient wisdom, making refinements to that wisdom, and providing points of departure for further reflection.

Philosophy, theology, and rhetoric consider good will on their way to greater themes. What is it, after all, to will good, but not even want to contribute to its accomplishment? Compared to friendship, whether natural or supernatural, the simple motion of will in mere good will is a small

<sup>79</sup> *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.5.1167a18–21; *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 8.2 (Leonine ed., 45.2: 446.103–4).

<sup>80</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 178.

thing. Still, in the life of a friendship, it is a beginning. Good will is friendship degree zero, the null state of friendship, like absolute zero in temperature: not the first unit, but the base from which units start.<sup>81</sup> **N-V**

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<sup>81</sup> I am grateful to Robert Sokolowski for this image, for the Barthesian phrase I have also used for my title, and for his comments on the foregoing. An earlier version was read at a session on the thought of Aquinas held on May 9, 2009, during the 44th International Congress on Medieval Studies at Western Michigan University. I would like to thank the organizer of the session, R. E. Houser, of the Center for Thomistic Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas.