

Intractable Disputes about the Liturgical Reforms of Vatican II: Renarrating a Defense of the Reform

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RECENTLY MASSIMO FAGGIOLI has sketched the history of the reception of *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, the first constitution of the Second Vatican Council approved by the overwhelmingly favorable vote of 2147 to 4.¹ This reception, as Faggioli correctly notes, has been marked by growing hesitations and doubts about the wisdom of the reforms that the council initiated. In fact, it has taken on the appearance of an intractable dispute, one in which none of the parties to the dispute is able to convince the others of the correctness of their position. Setting out to defend the reform in the face of calls for a “reform of the reform,” a call that has assumed in some quarters the appearance of a “new liturgical movement,” Faggioli argues that *Sacrosanctum Concilium* and its accompanying reforms provide the essential hermeneutic key to understand correctly the broader meaning of Vatican II, and that any call for the reform of the reform is simply a stealth way of undermining the council itself.² To assess the correctness of this view, I purpose to compare the arguments

¹ Massimo Faggioli, *Vatican II: The Battle for Meaning* (New York: Paulist Press, 2012); “*Sacrosanctum Concilium* and the Meaning of Vatican II,” *Theological Studies* 71 (2010): 437–52 (hereafter “The Meaning of Vatican II”); “Vatican II: The History and the Narratives,” *Theological Studies* 73 (2012): 749–67 (hereafter “The History and the Narratives”). The vote tally is from Annibale Bugnini, *The Reform of the Liturgy 1948–1975* (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1990), 37.

² Faggioli, “The Meaning of Vatican II,” 451–2.

used by Faggioli with the arguments used by one of the reform's most articulate critics, James Hitchcock, in his book, *Recovery of the Sacred: Reforming the Reformed Liturgy*.³ This essay will first briefly examine the dynamics of an intractable dispute as analyzed by Alasdair MacIntyre, and how each of our two authors understands the reform that he is defending or proposing. This section will conclude with the identification of three issues that appear to me to be the core of the disagreements between the defenders of the reform and those calling for a further reform. Secondly, I shall examine the first of these issues: the problem of how to understand history. Thirdly, I shall examine the second issue: the problem of how to understand theology. Fourthly, I shall consider the last issue: the problem of how to understand theological anthropology. Fifthly, I shall briefly consider the history that needs to be overcome if consensus is to be reached. Sixthly, I shall attempt to lay the foundation for renarrating a defense of the reforms of *Sacrosanctum Concilium*. Seventhly, I shall focus on those elements of the constitution which contain possible resources for the reconciliation of both sides. Finally, I shall draw some modest conclusions. In the interests of full disclosure, however, I want to preface this essay by saying that I think the calls for a fundamental reform of the liturgical reforms of Vatican II are misguided. In my view, the case for their fundamental reshaping has not been persuasively made. At the same time, however, I have serious reservations with the approach that Faggioli has adopted in their defense for reasons that I hope to make clear.

I. The Intractable Disputes about *Sacrosanctum Concilium*

According to MacIntyre, rational disputes occur when there is a fundamental disagreement over what constitutes the proper way to think rationally. Disputes become intractable when those who hold to incompatible views that employ different concepts of rationality believe that they have answered successfully all the objections coming from the other side and consequently find no grounds for believing that the other side has been able to contradict successfully the positions that their side has defended. And since there do not exist neutral standards to judge objectively which side has the better arguments, they have no other standards but their own to judge who has triumphed over the other competing view.⁴

In stating the problem in these terms I have already indicated two of

³ James Hitchcock, *Recovery of the Sacred: Reforming the Reformed Liturgy*, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995) (hereafter *Recovery of the Sacred*).

⁴ Lawrence Cunningham, ed., *Intractable Disputes about the Natural Law: Alasdair MacIntyre and Critics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2009), 32–52.

my own premises: that there is more than one way to think, and that neutral, independent standards by which to judge the adequacy or superiority of one way of thinking over another do not exist. I shall assume for the purposes of this essay that both of these premises are correct. The very fact that intractable disputes occur seems to require the plurality of rationality and that the standards of rationality are internal to the mode of rationality employed by either side. In situations such as these, MacIntyre holds that the only hope for making such disputes tractable is to focus on the premises of each position to show how one or the other side is incoherent according to its own standards of rationality that each side employs to defend its positions.⁵

The conditions that result in intractable disputes seem to be fulfilled with regard to *Sacrosanctum Concilium*. Both sides are confident that they have not only the better of the argument but that they have defended their positions without falling into incoherency. For example, Faggioli holds that, since *Sacrosanctum Concilium* was the first of the conciliar documents, it was also the theological starting point for Vatican II, “the first and most undisputed common ground of the council fathers.”⁶ From it derived all the other documents produced by the council. As a consequence it is the hermeneutical key to understand all the other conciliar documents, together with their accompanying reforms. The change that it provoked in the liturgy, frozen for centuries, “sponsored a new awareness within the Roman Catholic Church that things change.”⁷ The council made change not only imaginable but also acceptable.⁸ In its underlying ecclesiology, says Faggioli, the constitution opened the door to further reforms of Church structures. Conceding that the details of the reform are not above criticism, Faggioli has no argument with those who simply seek a recovery of an esthetics of the rites under the title of a “reform of the liturgical reform.”⁹ He sees, however, a danger that such a call will ignore “the basic fact that the liturgical debate at Vatican II was the first and most radical effort of modern Catholicism to cope with the dawn of the ‘secular age’ and the ‘expanding universe of unbelief.’”¹⁰ Indeed, the real aim of such calls on the part of those who were on the

⁵ Cunningham, *Intractable Disputes*, 52.

⁶ Faggioli, “The Meaning of Vatican II,” 445.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 452.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, 439–40, citing John Baldovin, *Reforming the Liturgy: A Response to the Critics* (Collegeville MN: Liturgical Press, 2008), 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 440, citing Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), 352–418.

losing end of the debates at the council, he claims, is to gain a belated victory by frustrating the council's attempt to introduce a more progressive ecclesiology. In describing the "political" implications of a conciliar historiography controlled by the institutional center of power, Faggioli refers us to John W. O'Malley's account of what happened at Vatican II.¹¹ According to O'Malley, post-conciliar events have served to obscure the conciliar recovery of the periphery, energized by the teaching of collegiality, and to substitute for it the pre-conciliar dominance of the center. According to this view, as articulated by Faggioli, the conservative minority, having lost the initial battle on collegiality at the council, is now trying to stifle the implementation of the council and thus reverse its losses by indirectly attacking the perceived faulty implementation of *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, so as to discredit the broader agenda of reform.¹² The attempts by liberal reformers, he says, to encourage further structural changes in the Church during the 1970s and 1980s by emphasizing collegiality has provoked by way of conservative reaction an increasingly technical-liturgical reading of *Sacrosanctum Concilium* that restricts the reforms to rubrical changes as a way of muting its broader implications.¹³ Thus, in his view, those who agitate for the reform of the reform are really concealing the desire to subvert the council itself. Instead, the focus of our present discussion should be, according to Faggioli, the theological and ecclesiological implications of the constitution so as to clarify what is at stake in defending the reform.

James Hitchcock has a very different view of what is at stake in the debate over *Sacrosanctum Concilium*. His call for a reform of the reform does not focus on the theological reasoning of the constitution or on any broader program of reform that the council might have had in mind. Instead, he wants restored the sense of the sacred that would ensure a restoration of the coherence and stability of the liturgy that Vatican II sought to reform without at the same time reclaiming its time-acquired rigidity. He complains that the implementation of the reform overstepped itself to the point of destabilizing Catholic life in general. Instead of making the Roman rite more approachable, the reform effected a desacralization of the liturgy, a loss of the sense of the sacred, which for him is the core issue. Hoping to reach our secularized contemporaries

¹¹ Faggioli, "The History and the Narratives," 750, note 7; see John W. O'Malley, *What Happened at Vatican II* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008), 311 (hereafter *What Happened*).

¹² Faggioli, "The Meaning of Vatican II," 443, 451.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 444.

who no longer considered liturgy relevant to life, the reformers deprived the historical symbols of the liturgy of their capacity to convey a sense of the sacred.¹⁴

According to Hitchcock's account, the initial success of the liturgical movement led quickly to the discovery of a pre-existing crisis of faith. No longer having the old liturgy as the focus for their discontent, "liturgical innovators" quickly discovered that they no longer shared the core beliefs which underlay the traditional liturgy.¹⁵ In surveying the literature of the immediate post-conciliar period, Hitchcock finds it curious that a frequent term of dismissal applied to the revised liturgy by self-proclaimed liturgists was "meaningless," a term which, he maintains, had rarely been used "even in the days of the Latin Mass."¹⁶ Hitchcock credits Harvey Cox with introducing secularist thinking into the popular culture at the time the reforms were being introduced.¹⁷ According to Hitchcock, Cox advocated a form of desacralization that told believers that religious practices were secondary to secular practice.¹⁸ Accepting Cox's diagnosis of the contemporary culture, liturgists and theologians, says Hitchcock, drew the conclusion that "liturgy could obviously have little meaning unless drastically revised."¹⁹

Hitchcock also blames the way the bureaucracy of the Church implemented the initial reforms by focusing on the rubrical changes without giving a clear rationale for the changes. Were the changes, he asks, aimed at accomplishing a recovery of the past (some form of *ressourcement*), or were they simply attempts to come to terms with modern culture (some form of *aggiornamento*)?²⁰ This question never received a clear answer. If the reform was aimed at a recovery of the past, he says, it resulted in the unnecessary and disastrous destruction of the Church's liturgical heritage.²¹ If, however, the desire was to make the liturgy relevant to modern culture, an equal or worse disaster was at hand: the discovery by the reformers that the liturgy, in its traditional form, was irreformable and had to be replaced with something else.²²

¹⁴ Hitchcock, *Recovery of the Sacred*, 168.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 92.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁸ James Hitchcock, *What is Secular Humanism?* (Harrison, NY: RC Books, 1982) 63.

¹⁹ Hitchcock, *Recovery of the Sacred*, 23.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 145.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 75.

²² *Ibid.*, 28.

Hitchcock sees any liturgical reform that disregards what history has made of the liturgy and that attempts to recover the original based on a return to the sources as doomed to be irrelevant both to those who are naturally religious and those who are already secularized.²³ For Hitchcock, liturgical symbols and rituals carry within themselves the capacity to engender a sense of community among those who value them. Once, however, the historical symbols were altered by ill-advised attempts at renewal, their ability to foster community was likewise altered. Instead of delivering a greater sense of community as promised, the new liturgy only further weakened whatever sense of community had already existed.²⁴ In his judgment, the old liturgy succeeded because the knowledge and familiarity of the traditional rites formed an "objective" community even among worshippers who possessed little personal knowledge of one another.²⁵

Hitchcock deftly points out that those who had advocated lay participation engineered the reform of the liturgy without consulting the laity as to their wishes. Instead, he says, "lay resistance to change was dealt with by a combination of condescending persuasion and authoritarian commands."²⁶ In the face of this resistance, the "innovators" (as Hitchcock condescendingly calls them) increasingly believed that what was radically wrong with the Catholic Church was "the people themselves and their benighted attitudes."²⁷ And what were these attitudes? Hitchcock points to the phenomenon of folk religion in Catholicism as the most easily identifiable culprit.²⁸ The consequent misguided attempt of the reform to eliminate from the liturgy all elements that had their origin in natural religion, says Hitchcock, led to its being secularized.²⁹ These puritanical attitudes towards natural religiosity, he claims, were at variance with the Church's historical attitude of acceptance. "Historically Catholicism has accommodated itself more to the magical, primitively pagan tendencies of human culture than to puritanism, sensing that puritanism is often a prelude to secularization."³⁰

Hitchcock is of two minds regarding the introduction of the vernacular. On the whole, he judges it positively because it allowed for a degree of participation that the Latin did not. But, due to his concern for the

²³ Ibid., 75.

²⁴ Ibid., 103–4.

²⁵ Ibid., 105.

²⁶ Ibid., 111.

²⁷ Ibid., 114.

²⁸ Ibid., 128.

²⁹ Ibid., 129.

³⁰ Ibid., 128.

experience of sacrality, he thinks that something was lost. "The old ritual," he says, "conveyed the sense that much more was happening than met the eye; the new asks to be accepted purely in its own terms."³¹ "Liturgy," he says, "should assume that the worshiper is *Homo religiosus*."³² By not taking into account the clear distinction that natural religiosity makes between sacred and profane (or the secular), the reforms, which were based on another world view (one in which the dichotomy between sacred and profane did not exist), swept away many traditional subordinate rituals that functioned in the past to protect the sacrality of the Eucharist from contact with the profane of daily life. "Traditional solemn Masses affected worshipers with a sense of awe, of personal insignificance before the Almighty, and even routinely celebrated 'low' Masses took place in an atmosphere of hushed reverence, of timidity about entering the holy place."³³

In summary, it appears to me that there are three interrelated issues that constitute the core of the disagreements between Faggioli and Hitchcock and the other advocates of a reform of the reform. The first is the problem of how to understand history. Is there one history with competing narratives? Or are there simply competing narratives? The second is how to understand theology. This is the problem of doctrinal development or the problem of continuity versus discontinuity in the teachings of the Church as they appear at Vatican II. The third is the problem of how to understand theological anthropology. This is the problem of secularization and desacralization. Any hope of making progress in opening both sides to reconsider their positions, which by now have become intractable, seems to depend on the ability to identify points of incoherency.

II. A Critical View of the Problem of How to Understand History

MacIntyre insists that there is only one way to dialogue with conflicting points of view that have become intractable—by narrating historically how the argument has fared up to this point.³⁴ This narrative of history encompasses the telling of what had to be denied and why it had to be denied before any contrary proposition could be asserted as true. Only in this way does the plurality of rationality have a chance to appear along

³¹ Ibid., 146.

³² Ibid., 170–1.

³³ Ibid., 11.

³⁴ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 8–10 (hereafter *Whose Justice*).

with the opportunity to compare the advantages that any given mode of rationality has over the others.

The first step in initiating this dialogue requires a change in our way of thinking about history and rational inquiry. The telling of history has to be understood as having a history of its own, a step not easily taken. Western culture has been deeply affected, says MacIntyre, by the Enlightenment notion of rational inquiry as singular, impartial, and universal.³⁵ Enlightenment thinkers understood rationality as lacking any intrinsic history of its own and therefore capable of transcending history and securing for itself the impartiality that would make philosophy (and theology) a discipline distinct from history. This view appears to underlie Faggioli's account of the conflicting views of the meaning of Vatican II. For him, there is, on the one hand, the one account of history (derived from the scientific study of the sources and gradually being clarified and perfected by the work of historians), and, on the other hand, the various narratives produced by competing ideological interests, which he identifies as the ultratraditionalist, the ultraliberal, and the neo-conservative narratives.³⁶ "What we have seen emerge in the last few decades," he writes, "is a new prominence for narratives about Vatican II and the shape of contemporary Catholicism that take no account of the historical research on the council produced during this same period. We are left with narratives innocent of historical studies and even inimical to them."³⁷ The assumption here is that the historical researcher has transcended the historical limitations of all the narrators who surround him and is able to judge which of them are harmless and which are inimical to true history. His narrative, instead of being just one more narrative

³⁵ MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?*, 6: "It was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment, an aspiration the formulation of which was itself a great achievement, to provide for debate in the public realm standards and methods of rational justification by which alternative courses of action in every sphere of life could be adjudged just or unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened or unenlightened. So, it was hoped, reason would displace authority and tradition. Rational justification was to appeal to principles undeniable by any rational person and therefore independent of all those social and cultural particularities which the Enlightenment thinkers took to be the mere accidental clothing of reason in particular times and places. And that rational justification could be nothing other than what the thinkers of the Enlightenment had said that it was came to be accepted, at least by the vast majority of educated people, in post-Enlightenment cultural and social orders."

³⁶ Faggioli, "The History and the Narratives," 763.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 751–2.

amid a plethora of others, stands apart as normative for all the others.³⁸

If MacIntyre is correct in rejecting the possibility of such impartiality, as I believe he is, then there is no division between history and the narratives. There is rather a fourth and hidden narrative that Faggioli uses to structure his defense of the reforms, one that we might call the “liberal” narrative, one that is hiding in his account in plain sight under the tag of history. According to this narrative, the council was a struggle between two forces: a conservative group (made up of the Curia and the *Ultramontanes*), which turned out to be a minority, and a progressive group (made up of the *Cisalpines*) but which in the end turned out to be the majority.³⁹ This struggle continued after the council, and still controls the debate over the fate of the liturgical reforms. According to Faggioli, not all of those who have participated in the debate over the reforms grasped what is at stake. Some seem to think that “liturgical reform is just one issue among many.”⁴⁰ Faggioli’s thesis, on the contrary, is that the liturgical constitution is the source of all the reforms of the council, and that therefore the liturgical constitution is (to borrow a phrase) the “*articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae*.” Those who call the liturgical constitution into question are really calling the entire council into question. As

³⁸ Ibid., 764. “Already in 1997 members of the entourage of the Roman Curia, feeling more secure in the decline of John Paul II’s pontificate, began expressing more vocally their prior criticism of the volumes of *History of Vatican II* edited by Giuseppe Alberigo, because *History of Vatican II* challenged the favored narrative. This initially quiet reaction against the international, multiauthored, and respected historiographical work on Vatican II (polemically labeled ‘the Bologna School’) became gradually more visible over time and especially after 2005, but it never acquired a real scholarly standing as an alternative to the international research on Vatican II.”

³⁹ A competing narrative of the same events sees the council as deeply divided over the nature of the renewal it envisioned. At the opening of the first session, the “progressives” defeated the “conservatives,” when a majority of the council fathers rejected all of the schemas that the preparatory commissions, representing principally the Roman Curia, had initially proposed. Then a curious thing happened. The “progressives” found that they did not have a common program to present in place of what had been rejected. Two opposing parties appeared both during the remaining sessions and more dramatically after the council ended. Each represents competing views of the nature of the challenges facing the Church. Each has their prescription for the renewal that was the theme of the council. One of the two has been called the party of “aggiornamento,” and the other the party of “ressourcement.” Each has claimed to be the true heir of the council. See John M. McDermott, “Did That Really Happen at Vatican II?” *Nova et Vetera* (English Edition) 8 (2010): 425–66.

⁴⁰ Faggioli, “The Meaning of Vatican II,” 437.

he puts it: “any attempt to relativize the liturgical debate at the council, the liturgical constitution, and the liturgical reform originating from the constitution entails diminishing the significance of Vatican II and its role in the life of the Catholic Church.”⁴¹ If this latter statement is to be taken at its face value, then Faggioli is in the ironic position of accepting the underlying premise of the most extreme followers of Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre. They do not “relativize” the relations between the constitution *Sacrosanctum Concilium* and the council that promulgated it on the one hand, nor the revisions of the liturgical books of the Roman rite and the post-conciliar commission that revised them on the other hand, nor the implementation of both on the level of the parish. They reject the council in its entirety as a resurgence of Modernism and wish no part in any reform, however reformed. By their schism, in the most intractable dispute of all, the Lefebvrists have signaled dramatically that they are not interested in reforming the reform because they want no part of any reform. If there is to be any dialogue over the reform, it could only happen with those who have enough loyalty to the Church to form the loyal opposition to the promulgated reforms. But for dialogue to happen there must be room enough to for a narrative of the council that distinguishes (i.e., “relativizes”) the relationship between the council, the post-conciliar commission, and the implementation on the local level. To critique one of the latter two does not logically imply a rejection of the first. After all, only those who accepted the constitution and the authority of the council that wrote it would ever think of calling for a reform of the reform. But for Faggioli to grant the legitimacy of “relativizing” Vatican II and its reforms presents him with a problem. His central thesis—that an attack on the reform is an attack on the council itself—will be undermined. In which case, the need to defend the thesis will usurp the priority of the need to defend the reform. His prioritizing of the thesis over the defense of the particulars of the reform seems to be proven by his willingness to grant that there is a basis to the “serious critique of the reform—both in its formulation in the Liturgy Constitution and in the subsequent reformed liturgical books and their implementation.”⁴² In making such a sweeping accommodation to the critics of the reform, Faggioli declines the opportunity to counter the critique of the reform offered by Hitchcock. In which case, Faggioli’s defense of the reform is really a defense of change, not primarily in the liturgy but whatever other (ecclesiological) changes he sees as being prompted by that initial

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 440.

change. The need to defend the possibility of such broader changes has in fact usurped the priority of defending the liturgical reform itself. The consequence is that Faggioli's defense of the liturgical reforms of Vatican II—precisely as reforms of the liturgy and not simply as a prelude to broader ecclesiological changes—has become incoherent as a defense of the reform.

III. A Critical View of the Problem of How to Understand Theology

The way one theologizes is determined by the way in which one understands how history and the truth in general (including the truth about what happened at Vatican II) become available to us. If history is understood as singular (i.e., as not having a history), theology will be seen in much the same way. There will be only one way to think theologically, and that way will be to think non-historically. But if history is to be told from a specific point of view, theology also will have to be understood historically, that is, as having multiple narratives and thus a history.

In intractable disputes, it is important to understand theology as historically conditioned for two reasons. Firstly, theology must be narrated historically (i.e., as having a history) if the issues that have become intractable are to have a chance to be advanced. Due to the rise of historical consciousness, the issue of development of doctrine became a burning issue for the theology of the nineteenth century. The crisis for theology then was to explain how the notion of the historical development of dogma could be reconciled with the abiding truth of the Church's dogmatic tradition. Describing this dilemma Neil Ormerod writes:

Whereas the Scholasticism of the day was metaphysically strong, it had remained immune to the issues raised by an emerging historical consciousness. Its ahistorical conceptionalism left it unable to deal with history in any serious sense, a problem that would reach crisis proportions in the era of Modernism at the turn of the century, another 50 years after Newman's groundbreaking work.⁴³

Ormerod correctly notes that John Henry Newman's explanation of

⁴³ Neil Ormerod, "Vatican II—Continuity or Discontinuity? Towards an Ontology of Meaning," *Theological Studies* 71 (2010): 609–36 at 615. Also see David L. Schindler, "The Catholic Academy and the Order of Intelligence: The Dying of the Light?" *Communio* 26 (1999): 722–45 at 733, note 10.

dogmatic development⁴⁴ had gained acceptance by the eve of the council, even as it “was fiercely resisted in some circles, in particular among senior curial officials who remained largely untouched by the impact of historical consciousness.”⁴⁵ Development, however, was often conceived as linear, going in one direction, progressing in a continuous, coherent line. This understanding of doctrinal development encountered a difficulty when the fathers of Vatican II took up, among others, the question of religious liberty. As O’Malley explains, the position that the council was asked to sanction in the draft on religious freedom seemed to negate positions that the Church had held for centuries. “The problem [John Courtney] Murray ran into in the council was that the doctrine of Church-state relationships that he and his colleagues advocated seemed to critics not a further step along the path but an abandonment of the traditional path for a different (and, indeed, forbidden) path.”⁴⁶ How was this to be explained?

Both O’Malley’s account of the “Roman” theology’s resistance to the notion of doctrine development⁴⁷ and Ormerod’s account of the non-historical character of nineteenth-century Catholic theology are united by the fact that the counter-narratives that they promote do not

⁴⁴ See Ian Ker, “Newman, the Council, and Vatican II,” *Communio* 28 (2001): 708–728 at 716. Kerr notes how Newman famously considered the definition of papal infallibility by the First Vatican Council to have been one-sided and ill-advised. “Considering that Newman had consoled himself with the thought that there were advantages in popes doing what Councils had normally done in the past, and considering that after Vatican I it was widely believed that there would be no need of future Councils, this letter [which Newman wrote shortly after the close of Vatican I] is a remarkable prophecy of Vatican II. And, of course what Newman says about the way in which the Church moves ‘alternately in contrary directions’ has application not only to Vatican II, which was hardly a linear process of movement from Vatican I, whatever the extreme Ultramontanes of the time may have assumed or hoped about the eventual reinforcing and strengthening of the definition. It may also apply to Vatican II and subsequent developments. Post-Vatican II progressives may find that their scenario for the future is as unrealistic as any Ultramontane hopes that may have been entertained for the development of the definition of papal infallibility.” See John Henry Newman, *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, eds., Charles Stephen Dessian et al., (London: Nelson, 1961–72; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 310.

⁴⁵ Ormerod, 615. See Martin Brüske, “Is Newman’s Essay on the *Development of Christian Doctrine* a Theory of the Development of Dogma? Suggestions for an Alternative Interpretation,” *Communio* 28 (2001): 695–707.

⁴⁶ O’Malley, *What Happened*, 40.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 39.

acknowledge their own non-historical character.⁴⁸ By framing apart from the historical context the admitted short-comings of the neo-scholastic establishment who were unable to come to terms with historicity, O'Malley and Ormerod demonstrate that their own understanding of history presumes the Enlightenment view of history as universal, impartial, and singular. The standards by which they judge the rationality of the neo-scholastic "Roman" theology's rejection of the applicability of historicity to theology are not the standards of neo-scholastic Roman theology. They are the standards of their own theology. In so doing they unwittingly set up the conditions of possibility for an intractable dispute. They may think that they have vindicated their position, but they do not realize that their Roman and neo-scholastic opponents remain unconvinced since they too are judging by the standards internal to their own mode of rationality. Neither side is able to enter into the thought world of the other side. The result is an intractable dispute.

Secondly, theology must be narrated historically due to the type of science that theology is. According to MacIntyre, there are two types of sciences. The first is a science in the state of having already been perfected, one in which all the problems have already been encountered and solved. In such a science, one reasons from the already established first principles of that science to conclusions. The argumentation is deductive, starting with first principles and arriving at its conclusions.⁴⁹ No development occurs because none is needed; the science is already perfected. This is not the reasoning embedded in the scholastic method, but it is the reasoning typical of the post-Tridentine manualist theology that had absorbed the rationality of the Enlightenment.⁵⁰

The second type of science is one that has not yet been perfected. In this type, not all the problems have been solved or even necessarily identified. In this type of science, one reasons *to* first principles, rather than *from* first principles. Here the reasoning is necessarily inductive and

⁴⁸ Excellent examples of historically conscious narrations of theologically contested issues can be found in Gerard Kelly, "The Roman Catholic Doctrine of Papal Infallibility: A Response to Mark Powell," *Theological Studies* 74 (2013): 129–37, and John T. Ford, "Infallibility—Terminology, Textual Analysis, and Theological Interpretation: A Response to Mark Powell," *Theological Studies* 74 (2013): 119–28.

⁴⁹ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 88 (hereafter *Three Rival Versions*).

⁵⁰ See Rudolf Voderholzer, "Dogma and History: Henry de Lubac and the Retrieval of Historicity," *Communio* 28 (2001): 648–68.

the argumentation is dialectical.⁵¹ The arguments used by those sciences that are not yet perfected are exploratory. This mode of rationality moves from particular facts to general conclusions, but conclusions that remain open to revision in the light of further developments.

Not all frameworks of thought are equally capable of advancing the search for the truth (including the truth of what really happened at Vatican II). At some point the inherent weakness of one will manifest itself.⁵² The appearance of discontinuity in the dogmatic tradition of the Church points to the possibility of incoherency in the theological narrative. The notion of discontinuity first requires for its intelligibility the notion of continuity; otherwise there would be no way to identify something as discontinuous with what went before it. If there were no expectation for continuity in the Church's dogmatic tradition, nothing, no matter how discontinuous, would appear disruptive. The very fact that discontinuity is identifiable as a theological crisis is a witness to the needed singularity in the magisterial tradition.

Faggioli attempts to resolve the appearance of discontinuity by distinguishing *traditio* from *historia*, and, in the process, attributes multiple narratives to *traditio* rather than (as MacIntyre does) to *historia*.⁵³ According to Faggioli, there are various narratives of *traditio*, anyone of them capable of being the "established" one at any given time while the others are consigned to be part of the Church's "repressed memory," kept alive by historians waiting for the moment of a possible restoration to favor. Thus Faggioli sees "conciliarism" as such a "repressed memory" of a still live option waiting for its moment of vindication rather than as a former theological opinion that has been definitively rejected by the magisterium.⁵⁴

Is *traditio* the same as theology for Faggioli, or is it different from theology? If he understands *traditio* as theology, then he has made theology plural. And if history is singular while theology is plural, then theology must be thought of as distinct from history if history is to remain thought of as singular. In which case, theology will have to be understood non-historically. Moreover, if *traditio* is the same as theology, what norm could be used to judge the various theologies? Moreover, *who* could critique the many theologies? Would this not have to be one of the functions of the center? Without the authority to critique theology, there

⁵¹ MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions*, 88.

⁵² For an explanation of a classic example of this phenomenon in the crisis of Modernism, see Ormerod, 623–4.

⁵³ Faggioli, "The History and the Narratives," 763.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 763.

would be no way for the center to remain the center and not simply slide into being just another member of the periphery. In the end, without the center there would be no periphery because everybody would end up being their own center. At least that seems to be the experience of a Baptist ecclesiology.

The need to account for the discontinuity in the teaching of Vatican II with earlier magisterial teachings puts the assertion of continuity in Catholic dogmatic teaching into crisis as long as the history of that teaching is conceived along the lines of the Enlightenment's understanding of history. While it is true that the Church has a *traditio* that is singular and that transcends history by being universally valid and thus binding for the work of future theologians, she does not have a singular narrative of theology. *Traditio* is not the same as theology. Rather the dogmatic statements of the various councils that are passed on by the magisterium are the dots that have to be connected by theology. The fact that this connecting of the dots is done differently by different theologians is what gives rise to the various schools of theology.

By seeking to preserve the Enlightenment's view that history is singular, Faggioli, if he identifies *traditio* with theology, renders his account of theology both singular and non-historical, and, in the process, manufactures an unnecessary *crux theologorum*. The Enlightenment's non-historical view of history (and hence of theology) is itself responsible for the appearance of discontinuity *versus* continuity as a theological problem. Change the view of *historia* to one that is multiple and the problem of having to explain discontinuity in theological thought disappears.

The unfortunate result of narrating the history of Vatican II as singular, as Faggioli does, is that there is no way to respond to those who offer a different "narrative" of the council and demand a reform of the reform except by arbitrarily dismissing them, as Faggioli does, as being ideologues.⁵⁵ Since an ideology is a thought system which allows all its assertions to be questioned and examined with the sole exception of the premise upon which the entire system is built, the absence of any reference in his text to the missing liberal narrative suggests the presence of ideological thinking. The unwitting, yet predictable, result of this way of thinking is regrettably an intractable dispute.

To assert the radical historicity of theology, however, is not to embrace,

⁵⁵ Ibid., 766–7. "But it is clear now, at 50 years from the opening of Vatican II, that those not interested in recovering the past—as well as tradition in its entirety—are actually the ideologues of the 'narratives' on Vatican II, and certainly not Church historians."

as MacIntyre insists, a theological relativism that would deny the possibility for any claims to timeless truth. "It is rather that such claims are being made for doctrines whose formulation is itself time-bound and that the concept of timelessness is itself a concept with a history, one which in certain types of context is not at all the same concept that it is in others."⁵⁶

Faggioli's assertion that *Sacrosanctum Concilium* is the key to understanding Vatican II implies that one document can function as the fountainhead of all other conciliar reforms or themes. The ecclesiology found in the constitution on the liturgy, he maintains, has shaped all the other conciliar documents. He thus advocates shifting the debate about the reform from one that is focused on the "historical memory" of the post-conciliar period as contained in the various narratives of the council to a debate that would be focused on the theological implications of *Sacrosanctum Concilium*.⁵⁷ This implies, however, that the elaboration of theological implications is something distinct from the "historical memory" of the various narratives. To speak in this way implies that it is possible to make such a distinction between history and theology. Denying this possibility, MacIntyre argues (as I have already noted) that such a view is a (discredited) leftover of the Enlightenment.

Finally, to consider *Sacrosanctum Concilium* as the hermeneutical key to understand the entire council is to assume that the council had the possibility of grasping the nature of the needed reforms and to explicate it in such a way that all other documents were derived from this theological synthesis. But this view would attribute to the council a view of theology that can belong only to God. What the council had at its disposal were various historically conditioned theological narratives, none of which had yet reached the divine grasp of things, but each of which had its unique limitations. History has not ended; we are still *in via*. No single hermeneutical key of Vatican II is possible. For these reasons, I maintain that Faggioli's defense of the reform—a goal for which I have every sympathy—needs to be rethought, or better yet, re-narrated.

IV. A Critical View of the Problem of Theological Anthropology

Theological anthropology is the study of the foundational relationship that human beings have with their creator. There are two issues that appear under this heading: secularization and desacralization. Secular-

⁵⁶ MacIntyre, *Whose Justice*, 9.

⁵⁷ Faggioli, "The Meaning of Vatican II," 445.

ization is the cultural phenomenon that results in a culture that does not find any evidence of God in the world and views the reports of his presence as a threat to human advancement for one or another reason. These conclusions stem from the fact that “being” has been predicated univocally before any other metaphysical consideration so that “being” is predicated in the same way of God and of the world. Thus, when “being” is predicated univocally, the categories of creator and creature do not have a chance to appear. All beings have the same kind of “being.” Man is no longer viewed as dependent on a creator. He has acquired autonomy from God. When “is” can be applied with equal ease (univocally as opposed to analogously) to God and to the world around us, it no longer appears any more irrational to ask if God exists than it would be considered irrational to ask if the Easter Bunny exists. The existence of the world no longer appears to demand the existence of God for its explanation since the “being” of the universe is understood as no longer implying the dependence that the analogous notion of “being” would imply.

This denial of God’s existence then shapes the way in which the question of human suffering is posed and answered. If all that exists is this world, then the reasons for human suffering are to be sought in the external world. Suffering according to the Marxist analysis is the result of social injustice. The solution proposed is to change the social structures of the world in a struggle for social justice. When, on the other hand, the biblical analysis that human unhappiness is the consequence of the original sin that does not allow us to love the enemy finds no listeners within the Church, the process of desacralization has taken place among believers.

Desacralization (in this framework) is the internalization of the secular worldview by those who belong to the Church in which they seek to harmonize faith and reason by striving to harmonize faith and the expressions of faith (e.g., the liturgy) with secular culture. A reference to secularization only appears once in Faggioli’s accounts, in a reference to the subtexts of the liturgical debates that were, he says, the council’s “most radical effort” to address “the expanding universe of unbelief.”⁵⁸ I believe that Faggioli is correct when he says that the council is addressing the pressing cultural problem of secularization, but how the liturgical reforms are meant to do that is not explained. However, the companion issue of desacralization, the issue that is so dominant in Hitchcock’s critique

⁵⁸ Ibid., 440.

of the reform, never appears in Faggioli's account. The absence of any consideration of desacralization in his account appears to be—to borrow an image from Sherlock Holmes—a case of the hound that failed to bark. Since a dog only barks at strangers, it appears that Faggioli's account of secularization as a loss of faith outside the Church does not imply the problem of the loss of faith internal to the Church.

Hitchcock's hound, however, knows no silence when it comes to desacralization. The charge that Hitchcock makes, however, that the reforms of Vatican II led to a desacralization of the liturgy requires a closer scrutiny. As early as 1942, twenty years before the Second Vatican Council first met, Henri de Lubac had used the term desacralization to describe what he called the loss of the sense of the sacred.⁵⁹ For de Lubac, desacralization was a negative phenomenon brought about in the popular culture as a consequence of a perceived clash between faith and the empirical sciences. He attributed this loss to a failure to educate properly the laity, itself a result of an inadequate theological response to the earlier crises of nominalism and the Protestant Reformation.⁶⁰

In 1949, Yves Congar published his seminal work *Sacerdoce et laïcat* in which he undertook to distinguish the fundamental difference between natural religion and biblical faith.⁶¹ In natural religion there is a distinction drawn between the sacred and the profane, a distinction which does not exist in biblical faith.⁶² According to Richard Beauchesne, Congar

⁵⁹ Henri de Lubac, "Internal Causes of the Weakening and Disappearance of the Sense of the Sacred," *Josephinum Journal of Theology* 18 (2011), 37–50. Originally published in *Bulletin des aumôniers catholiques. Chantiers de la jeunesse*, 31 (august 1942). See *Résistance chrétienne à l'antisémitisme*, 116 [English translation: *Christian Resistance to Anti-Semitism* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1990) 110ff].

⁶⁰ See Francis Michael Walsh, "The Villain Who Confused Moral Theology" *Heythrop Journal* 51 (2010): 268–87, at 272–7.

⁶¹ Yves Congar, *Sacerdoce et laïcat* (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1949); English translation: *A Gospel Priesthood* (trans. P.J. Hepburne-Scott) (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), 87. "It is useless, then, to look in the Gospel or the apostolic scriptures for any trace of all that 'religious' material described, for example in M. Éliade's admirable manual, and of which some traces may still be found in the Old Testament. The worship of the New Testament is a worship 'in spirit and in truth': *veri adoratores*. It consists of the offering of men themselves. The priests who celebrate it are neither pagan magicians nor even levites of the law of Moses."

⁶² See Yves Congar, *Sacerdoce et laïcat*, 106, as cited by Richard Beauchesne, "Worship as Life, Priesthood and Sacrifice in Yves Congar," *Église et Théologie* 21 (1990): 79–100 at 86; see Congar, *A Gospel Priesthood*, 89 n. 35: "But from a biblical point of view the comparative position inherent in this [Éliade's] type of study is deceptive and seems to me to be most inadequate."

sees natural religious cult as “an activity that goes up from us to God, [whereas] faith is the relationship that comes down from God to us.”⁶³ The task of natural religion is to supply a way to sacralize what is profane so that it becomes acceptable to God. In this description of the function of natural religion, Congar is borrowing from the earlier work of Mircea Eliade.⁶⁴ For Eliade, the naturally religious person, whom Eliade terms *homo religiosus*, makes a clear distinction between the sacred and the profane both with regard to space and to time: “For religious man, this spatial nonhomogeneity finds expression in the experience of an opposition between place or space that is sacred—the only *real* and *real-ly* existing space—and all other space, the formless expanse surrounding it.”⁶⁵ The same is true of time. “Hence,” says Eliade, “religious man lives in two kinds of time, of which the more important, sacred time, appears under the paradoxical aspect of a circular time, reversible and recoverable, a sort of eternal mythical present that is periodically reintegrated by means of rites.”⁶⁶ According to the naturally religious mentality, says Eliade, the entire cosmos is capable of being what he calls a *hierophany*, a manifestation of the sacred, a point at which humanity is able to have contact with God. “The sacred tree, the sacred stone are not adored as stone or tree; they are worshipped precisely because they are *hierophanies*, because they show something that is no longer stone or tree but the sacred, the *ganz andere*.”⁶⁷ When the sacred and the profane are experienced as two separate spheres of life, religious rites and magic are resorted to in order to accomplish the sacralization of the profane so as to gain access to God so that the worshipper can become acceptable to him.

In this context, the term “desacralization” would imply a process that gives rise to a world view that does not distinguish between sacred and profane. Such a view is that which is found in the Bible. Thus, Congar, with his biblical world view, sees no distinction between sacred and profane. “When the sacred and profane are experienced as one,” says Beauchesne, “the profane itself is experienced as already sacred. It has already been made acceptable by God, and therefore, acceptable to God.”⁶⁸ Since in the biblical view God takes the initiative in searching

⁶³ Beauchesne, 86, note 23.

⁶⁴ Mircea Eliade, *Traité d'Histoire des Religions* (Paris: Payot, 1949); English translation: *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1996).

⁶⁵ Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: the Nature of Religion* (New York: Harcourt, 1987), 20.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶⁸ Beauchesne, 88.

for humanity, there is no need for the profane to be sacralized in order to reach God since the initiative always comes from God down to us. The biblical tradition thus radically redefines the meaning of *homo religiosus* even as it affirms the validity of the category against the image of the fool who lives as if he were not to die or that God did not exist.⁶⁹ *Homo religiosus* (in this context) had been desacralized, but not secularized.

That latter step was given an intellectual expression in 1965 in Cox's book, *The Secular City*, that Hitchcock describes as one of the most influential books of the decade.⁷⁰ His description of Cox's thesis is, however, somewhat one-sided. For Cox, secularization is a positive phenomenon since it refers to an historical process which began with the desacralization of the political state and the emergence of a distinction between the state and society.⁷¹ According to Cox,

No one rules by divine right in secular society. In pre-secular society, everyone does. Just as nature is perceived by tribal man both as a part of his family and as the locus of religious energy, so the political power structure is accepted as an extension of familial authority and as the unequivocal will of the gods. The identification of the political with the religious order, whether in a primitive tribe where the chief is also both political ruler and *pontifex maximus*, betrays the same sacral legitimation of political power.⁷²

This identification was first broken in the biblical account of the Exodus. Instead of being justified by religion, political power and leadership was now "based on power gained by the capacity to accomplish specific social objectives."⁷³ Cox carefully distinguishes between political secularization, marked by separation of Church and state, from cultural secularization.⁷⁴ The former, says Cox, is a liberating development that delivers society and culture "from tutelage to religious control and closed metaphysical world views."⁷⁵ The latter (cultural secularization or secularism) is a closed system that is an ideology that, according to Cox, functions in some ways like a natural religion. He writes:

⁶⁹ See Lk 12:20.

⁷⁰ Hitchcock, *Recovery of the Sacred*, 23.

⁷¹ Harvey Cox, *The Secular City* (New York: MacMillan, 1990), 22.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 22.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 22–3.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 17–8.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

While secularization finds its roots in the biblical faith itself and is to some extent an authentic outcome of the impact of biblical faith on Western history, this is not the case with secularism. Like any other ism, it menaces the openness and freedom secularization has produced; it must therefore be watched carefully to prevent its becoming the ideology of a new establishment. It must be especially checked where it pretends not to be a world view but nonetheless seeks to impose its ideology through the organs of the state.⁷⁶

A salutary warning!

Hitchcock's desire, however, to accommodate the reform of the liturgy to the various manifestations of folk religion (natural religiosity) will ultimately make it impossible to heal the dichotomy between religion and life. The naturally religious person has a magical approach to life in which God exists in order to take away the cross and to fix life's problems. What he shares in common with the hard-nosed rationalist is a lack of a sense of the providential care by God for his life and a dependency instead on his own wits to fix his own problems. Both lack the mature faith that alone can enable them to enter into the cross daily after the manner of Jesus who trusted his Father to turn the cross to his good. Christianity is not about running from the cross, and no reform of the reform is possible that does not take cognizance of the fact that the liturgy's fundamental purpose is to accommodate us to the pattern of Christ's death so that we might share in his resurrection. Catholicism is not structured to be a home for natural religiosity. The power that engenders community is the announcement of the kerygma (the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ), not the traditional symbols of the liturgy however faithfully preserved. Hitchcock's diagnosis that the Church's liturgical malaise has been caused by a desacralization of the liturgy only leads down a blind alley if the solution is a return to a liturgy more receptive of natural religiosity.

V. The History to Be Overcome before Arriving at Consensus about Liturgical Reform

To understand why the liturgy needed to be reformed in the first place requires of us an understanding of the history of the deformation of the

⁷⁶ Ibid., 21. David L. Schindler argues a similar point in "The Repressive Logic of Liberal Rights: Religious Freedom, Contraceptives, and the 'Phony' Argument of the New York Times," *Communio* 38 (2011): 523–47.

liturgy. Neither the Church nor its liturgy exists in a vacuum. Both are subjected to the vagaries of history that have resulted in the need for reform. Liturgical reform is only one aspect of deeper problems that have plagued the evangelization up to the present day and cannot be understood separated from them. These problems have interacted with each other compounding the complexity of conducting any reform. Only the briefest of overviews is possible here.

The exclusion of the Christian communities from the synagogue forced them to become a synagogue unto themselves, leading to the joining of the synagogue service of the Word to the celebration of the Lord's Supper. This move is at the heart of the controversy of how the Roman liturgy should be celebrated (*versus populum*, as in the synagogue, or *versus aspidem*, as in the Temple). The stunning news that Gentiles had received the good news and had been baptized led to the presence in the Church of a growing majority whose cultural background lay outside the experience of the Jewish liturgical celebration of the Exodus and Passover. This growing cultural alienation from Judaism was exponentially increased when, within the space of one lifetime beginning with the proclamation of toleration by the Emperor Constantine, the dominance of that form of Christianity professed by the bishops of Rome and Alexandria had advanced to the point of being imposed as the official religion of the empire by decree of the Emperors Gratian and Theodosius the Great in February 380.⁷⁷ Eusebius of Caesarea had already given voice to a political theology that oriented the Church to look to the state to achieve its mission to evangelize, unwittingly giving rise to the advent of Christendom.⁷⁸ Francis Martin says that "[t]here was thus created, to use Peter Berger's expression, a 'plausibility structure,' a socially constructed world that gave meaning, as both objective expression and subjective appreciation, to individual and social existence."⁷⁹ The Church in this arrangement became a department of the state and the clergy its civil servants. "Obviously," as Martin is quick to point out, "it requires much less individual effort and decision to live within a prefabricated social

⁷⁷ Sozomen, *Ecclesiastical History* VII, 4 in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1957), ser. 2, vol. 2, 378.

⁷⁸ Eusebius of Caesarea, *The Life of Constantine* in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1961), ser. 2, vol. 1, 481–559.

⁷⁹ Francis Martin, *The Feminist Question* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1994), 44. See Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969); also, written with Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967).

world than it does to commit to an alternative view. Thus, as Christianity became a socially established plausibility structure, it could be a cultural inheritance rather than a life-changing discovery.”⁸⁰

As the state increasingly assumed the care of the Church, the surviving manifestations of paganism were progressively repressed. By 388, the Emperor Theodosius, in his role of bishop of the bishops, sent a prefect to Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt to destroy pagan temples including the famed Serapeum in Alexandria and to break up pagan religious association, violations of the human rights that Vatican II's declaration on religious liberty would later condemn.⁸¹ These harsh measures had their intended effect. The pagan cults, at least in their outward expression, were abolished. As an added insurance measure Sunday observance was enforced by law and civil disabilities were legislated against pagans, Jews, and heretics.⁸² These measures, however well-intended, were not exempt from the law of unintended consequences. The liturgy suffered multiple wounds; no longer being perceived as the act of a voluntarily gathered assembly, it became a state function imposed from without. Within short order the Church was overwhelmed by the influx of people who were coming directly from a pagan environment into the liturgical assembly.⁸³ Their presence had a powerful impact on the shape of the liturgy, an impact augmented by the public character it achieved in virtue of the presence of the Roman-Byzantine court. Theodore Klauser notes that the similarities between the ceremonial etiquette of the court and the rules for pontifical masses of the seventh century are such that no other conclusion can be reached except that the latter derives from the former.⁸⁴

More importantly, the mass “conversions” undermined the traditional catechumenal process by which newcomers were traditionally initiated to adult faith in which one abandons oneself to the will of God, trusting in his providential care. Marcel Metzger notes that in those situations where the “conversion” of the peoples to Christianity originated in a

⁸⁰ Ibid., 45.

⁸¹ Socrates Scholasticus, *Ecclesiastical History*, V, 16, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1957), ser. 2, vol. 2, 126.

⁸² Adrian Fortescue, “Theodosius I,” *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Volume XIV (New York: Robert Appleton, 1912), 578.

⁸³ See Albert Mirgeler, *Mutations of Western Christianity* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968); Richard Fletcher, *The Barbarian Conversion: From Paganism to Christianity* (New York: Henry Holt, 1994).

⁸⁴ Theodor Klauser, *A Short History of the Western Liturgy*, trans. John Halliburton (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 33.

political act decided by their leaders, baptism and “all liturgical institutions were pressed into service as means for the unification of the Carolingian Empire.”⁸⁵ The Church saw herself forced by events or the desire to assist in unifying the empire to baptize *en masse* naturally religious people whose natural orientation was to relate to God as an instrument to secure their lives. Their entrance into the Church in such great numbers led to a profound transformation of the liturgical assembly from a community with close bonds into a crowd with no such bonds. The need to adapt the liturgy to the greater numbers meant that the small communities, where everyone knew one another, had to give way to the more impersonal crowd. This fact alone meant that the network of friendships, which are critical in the religious and moral formational process, was lost. The horizontal aspect of liturgy disappeared and with it the personal sense of belonging; only the vertical aspect remained. In time liturgy came to be thought of as embracing only the vertical. The absence of the horizontal was no longer noticed.

This infiltration of natural religiosity into the liturgy damaged the Church at the very core of her life. Natural religiosity changed the way in which the faithful perceived and experienced liturgy. The awareness of being an assembly disappeared because the liturgy was celebrated in largely anonymous crowds in a language that was no longer understood by the vast majority of the people. The result was that the liturgy was deprived of its ability to form the participants in adult faith. As a consequence the Church was left leaning on the culture to pass faith to the next generation. Those who were entering the Church directly from paganism and bringing with them their natural religiosity only had the general religious culture around them to guide their formation. Since the culture still was naturally religious, Christianity soon became invested with the forms of folk religion. It was perceived as simply another way to gain divine help in the never-ending struggle to secure one's life. In addition, Metzger finds the roots of the institutional separation between clerics and laypeople not in antiquity, but in the Western Franco-Carolingian Church: “The Byzantine Church does not know it under the same form.”⁸⁶ It is not an accident, therefore, that the problem of the use of vernacular languages would be a typically Occidental rather than an Oriental one. However, in modern times the liturgies of the Oriental Churches, which have not had the experience of a renewal of the liturgy,

⁸⁵ Marcel Metzger, *History of the Liturgy: The Major Stages*, trans. Madeline Beumont (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997), 116.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 115.

have tended to ossify due to their inability to resolve issues of Church authority. Is there a better candidate for a needed *aggiornamento* than the Julian calendar?

The decline of the ability of the state to perform its civil functions and the willingness of the Church to step into the void led to the disappearance of a clear demarcation between Church and state. This blurring of the boundaries led in turn to civil authorities assuming control of episcopal appointments by means of lay investiture. The ensuing struggle to reestablish the independence of the Church under Gregory VII in the eleventh century eventually was settled by ceding to the Church the control of the clergy and to the state the control of the laity.⁸⁷ Thus the Church ended up dichotomized with the Church's mission to evangelize now seen as the task of the clergy, while the only responsibility of the laity, who constituted the state, was to pray, pay, and obey. The Gregorian solution to the question of how the Church ought to relate to the state resulted in an increasingly passive laity with a liturgy increasingly clericalized and marginalized in the life of the people.⁸⁸ This struggle to free the Church from the control of lay lords led to the papal claims of supremacy of the spiritual authority over the temporal, setting up the struggles of popes and emperors during the Middle Ages.⁸⁹ This stress on papal authority not only centralized the direction of further developments in the liturgy, but also unwittingly contributed to the disruption of full communion between Rome and the Eastern Churches.⁹⁰

Since the health of the liturgy is linked to the health of theology, and since theology is dependent on faith for its vitality, and faith is dependent on the liturgy for its vitality, the crisis in which the Church found itself by the end of the fifteenth century can be traced to the loss of the liturgy as its source of nourishment. The rejection of the Thomistic synthesis by those who sought to reestablish the dominance of Augustinian theology led to the appearance of nominalism.⁹¹ The shift from

⁸⁷ See Yves Congar, "The Sacralization of Western Society in the Middle Ages," *Concilium* 47 (Sacralization and Secularization) (New York: Paulist Press, 1969), 55–72.

⁸⁸ Martin, 52–4.

⁸⁹ Aidan Nichols, *Rome and the Eastern Churches* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1992), 233.

⁹⁰ Aidan Nichols, "A Catholic View of Orthodoxy," at <http://www.christendom-awake.org/pages/anichols/orthodox.html> (accessed March 20, 2013); Klauser, 94–5.

⁹¹ James K. A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 96–103; MacIntyre, *Three Rival*

an analogous notion of being to a univocal notion as the starting point for metaphysical thinking set in motion the intellectual revolution that was—over time—to allow for the appearance of secularism in Western culture. If there is only one act of being, then everything that exists in the same way. The material universe around us exists in the same way as God exists. Each has its own independent act of being. The world became unhinged from its dependence on God in such a way that the existence of the universe does not of itself settle the question of God's existence. The stage was set where questioning the existence of God no longer was incomprehensible.⁹² The seeds of disbelief were sown in the process, leading de Lubac to see in these events the origins of the estrangement of faith and culture which he was later to call desecralization. The methodology of leaning on the culture to pass faith had worked as long as the culture supported faith. But it left the Church vulnerable and unprepared to face the time when the culture would no longer be so hospitable. In meeting the short-term needs of one crisis, it sowed the seeds of another long-term crisis, the crisis of secularization that we are now facing.⁹³

The Great Western Schism was to prove to be another root for the crisis of the liturgy by leaving in its wake an ecclesiology of conciliarism, the theological attempt to rationalize the methods used to solve the schism.⁹⁴ This theory was quickly incorporated into French law in the form of the Pragmatic Sanctions of Bourges that ultimately became the political basis for Gallicanism and its German twin, Febronianism.⁹⁵ Eventually, these attempts to assert the periphery at the expense of the center provided the

Versions, 155–56.

⁹² Walsh, 272–7.

⁹³ See Martin, 54–62.

⁹⁴ Nicholas Lossky, "Conciliarity-Primacy in a Russian Orthodox Perspective," in *Petrine Ministry and the Unity of the Church*, ed. James Puglisi (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 127–136 at 134. Lossky is at pains to distinguish the Orthodox notion of communion expressed in synodical action from the Western notion of conciliarism. He writes: "It should clearly appear from all that has been said that conciliarity should be understood in terms of communion at all levels: among the members of the body of Christ, among the local Churches in the person of their bishops who voice the faith of the Church; in other words, it is profoundly eucharistic. It is not to be understood in terms of the 'conciliarism' of the Great Schism of the West which raised a question that has no place in true conciliarity: 'Is the pope above the council or is the council above the pope?' 'Conciliarism' also tended to introduce a certain form of 'democracy' in conciliar decisions."

⁹⁵ Klemens Löffler, "Pragmatic Sanction," *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Volume XII (New York: Robert Appleton, 1911), 333.

motivation not only for the suppression of the Jesuits but also became the cradle for early expressions of the liturgical movement, but one that was influenced by one of the moderate forms of the Enlightenment.

The rise of the empirical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries provided the occasion for the predictable crisis of faith. Without the foundation of a mature faith, the leaders of the Enlightenment saw themselves faced with having to choose between faith and reason. Faith, which by then had been reduced to the status of opinion, appeared to them as irrational in the light of the new knowledge, whereas reason appeared as the only source of knowledge. Aidan Nichols considers this movement of reform to be a precursor of the Second Vatican Council by trying “to move in two directions simultaneously: toward Christian antiquity (*ressourcement*) and toward satisfying modern needs (*aggiornamento*).”⁹⁶ Nichols notes that various measures advocated by reformers of this period had striking similarities to those of the post-conciliar period even as the reasons for them differed.

The liturgists of the *Aufklärung*, so [Waldemar] Trapp thinks, engaged in a process of *ressourcement* to the early Church only when it suited them: only when, that is, patristic practice happened to coincide with what enlightened people would desiderate anyway, with, above all, the removal of obstacles to the plain religion of Enlightenment man. They sometimes wanted the right thing, but they did so generally for the wrong reason. Thus, for instance, their demand for the active participation of the laity had more to do with democratization than with a mystical view of the Eucharistic feast—and indeed they avoided the language both of sacrifice and of priesthood whenever possible. Their plea for the vernacular was intimately linked to nascent nationalism.⁹⁷

A nascent conciliarism, lurking in the bosom of the Enlightenment proposals for liturgical reform, Nichols argues, had to be overcome before the fruit of reform could appear. These and many more conflicting narratives of what needed to be reformed in the liturgy and why it needed to be reformed underscore why the historical tangle of issues, each

⁹⁶ Aidan Nichols, *Looking at the Liturgy* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 34, citing Waldemar Trapp, *Vorgeschichte und Ursprung der liturgischen Bewegung vorwiegend in Hinsicht auf das deutsche Sprachgebiet* (Regensburg: Pustet, 1940; Münster: Antiquariat Stenderhoff, 1979).

⁹⁷ Nichols, *Looking at the Liturgy*, 27.

impacting the liturgy in its own way, had to be addressed before serious liturgical reform could be undertaken.

VI. Laying a Foundation for Renarrating the Defense of the Reforms

Theologians have not been slow to grasp the applicability to theological discussion of Thomas Kuhn's work on how the natural sciences advance.⁹⁸ Kuhn coined the term "paradigm" to describe two linked phenomena: "On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it devotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science."⁹⁹ But paradigms, in addition to advancing sciences, can also stand in the way of advancement. Sometimes, because a given fact does not fit into a pre-conceived theory, its significance can be initially discounted. In addition, because the world in which we live is governed by different paradigms at any given moment, not all of our contemporaries should be expected to grasp the nature of the clues. Some will be better at that than others.

One such clue, I suggest, is the fact that the figure of Jesus Christ does not figure any more prominently in the narrative for the reform of the reform than it does in the defense of the reform. In the late 1960s, Francisco Agüello, one of the initiators of the Neo-Catechumenal Way, strongly influenced by Congar's distinction between faith and natural religion, proposed a paradigm shift to explain why the figure of Jesus is missing. He borrowed Cox's description of the two secularized mentalities that have come to dominate modern culture. The one is the pragmatic mentality that rejects any ideology; and looks simply to science and its progress to solve human problems.¹⁰⁰ The other is the Marxist view that attributes the world's problems to unjust social structures, and that consequently pins its hopes for a solution on social revolution. Then he took de Lubac's notion of desacralization and used it to describe the

⁹⁸ See Charles Morerod, *Ecumenism and Philosophy: Philosophical Questions for a Renewal of Dialogue* (Ann Arbor, MI: Sapientia Press, 2006) at 14–19; John W. O'Malley, "The Hermeneutics of Reform": A Historical Analysis," *Theological Studies* 73 (2012): 517–46 at 524 and 542.

⁹⁹ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 174, as cited by Morerod, 16.

¹⁰⁰ Cox, 54.

internalization of secularization within the Church. Confronted with secularization in Western culture, says Argüello, zealous priests and religious in the mid-twentieth century proposed to reach out to catechize those who had become secularized and had abandoned the faith of the Church.¹⁰¹ Clearly with the experience of the French worker priests in mind, Argüello argued that many of those who originally set out to evangelize the alienated masses had, due to their own immature faith, been instead evangelized by the very ones they had set out to evangelize. The would-be evangelizers have accepted the view that the suffering of the masses was due to the lack of proper food, shelter, jobs, etc., and that revolution was the only way to overthrow unjust structures which were oppressing them.¹⁰² According to this analysis, desacralization is a response to secularization made by the would-be evangelizers who, mistakenly embracing the presuppositions and methods of the secularized, became convinced that the only worthwhile thing to do in order to evangelize would-be to pour their religiosity into changing the oppressive social structures. "And each group," says Argüello, "understands this in its own way because there are extremist groups and others less extreme. But all of them gather around action and substitute social action for the risen Jesus Christ – the only one who unites and calls the Church together, who makes all of us Servants of Yahweh, the Just One. In these groups Christianity is only a varnish."¹⁰³ In this type of environment, liturgy appears progressively irrelevant to citizenship in the real world and is quickly abandoned. "The liturgy vanishes since it's a waste of time. There's no singing, because we are not in a time of feast, we are mourning for the injustice suffered by the oppressed brothers and sisters."¹⁰⁴ This notion of desacralization differs from that of Hitchcock, however, because it does not understand desacralization as being in the liturgy as a result of the reform. Rather, desacralization, in this view, occurs in those with an immature faith who have encountered secularization apart from the reform.

Likewise, the origins of the community which supplies the horizontal element of liturgy are conceived differently. Argüello sees Christian

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 79.

¹⁰² See John Mannion, "The Making of a Dissident," *Commonweal* (January 19, 1973), 346, as cited by Hitchcock, 38.

¹⁰³ Francisco Argüello and Carmen Hernandez, *Neocatechumenal Way Catechetical Directory for Teams of Catechists*, vol. 1: *Phase of Conversion or Initial Catechesis* (Pasadena, CA: Hope, 2012), 41.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 42.

community with “bonds of iron” arising from an encounter with the risen Lord in his Paschal Mystery rather than from the common experience of historical symbols and rites as does Hitchcock.¹⁰⁵ For Argüello, once the risen Lord has been experienced, changes in the rubrics of the liturgy cannot mute the power of the liturgy to speak to those who have encountered him. For the liberals, however, the realization of the need to address or even to acknowledge the phenomenon of desacralization, however it may be understood, simply does not appear in their defense of the reform. With their outward focus toward the world in need of liberation, neither do they have any traceable awareness of the need to identify any other basis for the liturgical community.

In a later work, however, Hitchcock finds himself in strikingly substantial agreement with Argüello’s diagnosis of the present state of affairs. “Liberal Christianity,” Hitchcock writes, “now inexorably gives rise to attitudes which are basically secularist in nature. Some Christians devote most of their energies not to converting nonbelievers but to attacking alleged deformities within the Churches themselves. Often these ‘deformities’ are the heart of the Christian message.”¹⁰⁶ Although he does not use the word desacralization to describe internalization of secularization within the Church, Hitchcock agrees that it has found a foothold in the Church: “What is objectionable about so many contemporary Christians is not their political involvement but their virtual deification of politics and their apparent failure to bring a truly Christian perspective to bear on political questions. Rather than being missionaries from the churches to the world, they are the reverse.”¹⁰⁷ This internalization has taken place for the most part unnoticed. “This is important that orthodox Christians also notice that secularism invaded the Churches for what were essentially good motives. In almost every case, the root of religious secularization can be found in an idea which is authentically Christian—compassion for the oppressed, respect for human reason, acknowledgement of one’s own failings. Good but naïve Christians are sometimes confused by appeals to their better natures in ways which distort genuine Christianity subtly but seductively.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ See Hitchcock, *Recovery of the Sacred*, 105.

¹⁰⁶ James Hitchcock, *What is Secular Humanism?* (Harrison, NY: RC Books, 1983), 134.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 132.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

VII. The Untapped Resources of *Sacrosanctum Concilium*

The council set the framework of liturgical reform within the broader mission of the Church to evangelize. It underscored the necessity for faith and conversion if the contemplated reforms were to bear fruit. In *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, the fathers of the council wrote:

Before men can come to the liturgy, they must be called to faith and to conversion: “How then are they to call upon him in whom they have not yet believed? But how are they to believe him whom they have not heard? And how are they to hear if no one preaches? And how are men to preach unless they be sent?” Therefore the Church announces the good tidings of salvation to those who do not believe, so that all men may know the true God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent, and may be converted from their ways, doing penance.¹⁰⁹ To believers also the Church must ever preach faith and penance, she must prepare them for the sacraments, teach them to observe all that Christ has commanded,¹¹⁰ and invite them to all the works of charity, piety, and the apostolate. For all these works make it clear that Christ’s faithful, though not of this world, are to be the light of the world and to glorify the Father before men.¹¹¹

In addition, the council set the stage for the restoration of the ancient process of adult initiation to faith. “The catechumenate for adults, comprising several distinct steps, is to be restored and brought into use at the discretion of the local ordinary,” directed the council fathers, adding that “the time of the catechumenate, which is intended as a period of suitable instruction, may be sanctified by sacred rites to be celebrated at successive intervals of time.”¹¹² One of the voices raised in support of this proposal was that of the archbishop of Cracow, Karol Wojtyła. In the debate he insists that Christian initiation is not restricted to the act of sacramental baptism, but includes the entire process of the catechumenate that is geared to giving the formation necessary to live the Christian life in its fullness. The restoration of the catechumenate was of “the greatest importance above all in our age, when even people already baptized are not sufficiently initiated into the full truth of Christian life.”¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ See Jn 17:3; Lk 24:27; Acts 2:28.

¹¹⁰ See Mt 28:20.

¹¹¹ *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, §9.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, §64.

¹¹³ Karol Wojtyła, *Acta Synodalia* 1/2, 315.

The commentators on these passages have invariably assumed that those who needed to be evangelized were those who lacked baptism, not those who lacked faith. It was also assumed that those who were already baptized had the mature faith needed for living the Christian life and fruitfully participating in the Eucharist. For example, Pamela E. J. Jackson, in a commentary favorable to the constitution, notes that “*Sacrosanctum Concilium*, §9, explains that the Church must preach the gospel of salvation to unbelievers, so that they can believe and repent in order to enter into the liturgy. The Church also prepares believers for the sacraments and teaches them how to live as faithful disciples of Christ.”¹¹⁴ Believers are assumed to be in need only of instruction in the sacraments and mystagogia. In her generally balanced defense of the reform, Rita Ferrone makes scant reference to the catechumenate, observing simply that “[i]n many parts of the world the adult catechumenate is still rarely seen or used incompletely.”¹¹⁵ To what extent the fathers of the council shared the view of the commentators regarding the pastoral possibilities of the catechumenate as an answer to the problem of desacralization is an open question. They may very well have; nonetheless, the proposal to restore the catechumenate for adults contains within itself the possibility of realizing it in a post-baptismal setting. This possibility was recognized as early as May 1974 by Paul VI.¹¹⁶ Giuseppe Gennarini has pointed out the rapid development in this intuition: “In the space of a few years, there has been a progression from Chapter IV of the RCIA, which merely suggested the possible use of some parts of the catechumenate for adults already baptized but not sufficiently catechized, to a formulation which establishes the necessity of a post-baptismal catechumenate for all the baptized.”¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Pamela E. J. Jackson, “Theology of the Liturgy,” in Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering, eds., *Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 101–28 at 103–4.

¹¹⁵ Rita Ferrone, *Liturgy* (New York: Paulist Press, 2007), 99.

¹¹⁶ Paul VI, Address to Neocatechumenal Communities, 8 May 1974, *Notitiae*, 95–96, (July–August 1974), 228–30. See Annibale Bugnini, *The Reform of the Liturgy 1948–1975* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1990), 594, note 26.

¹¹⁷ Giuseppe Gennarini, “The Rediscovery of the Catechumenate and the Approval of the Neocatechumenal Way,” in *Neocatechumenal Way: Statute* (Pasadena, CA: Hope Publishing, 2003), 102–110 at 106. See John Paul II, “Visit to the Parish of Canadian Martyrs,” *L’Osservatore Romano*, 3–4 November 1980; “Meeting with the Neocatechumenal Communities in the parish of Santa Maria Goretti,” *L’Osservatore Romano*, 1–2 January 1988; see Chapter III of the *Lineamenta* for XIII Assembly of Synod of Bishops, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20110202_lineamenta-xiii-assembly_en.htm

Writing twenty years after the promulgation of the Constitution, Joseph Cardinal Cordeiro of Karachi, Pakistan, noted that the sense of community initiated by the reforms “is in most cases still inchoative and hesitant at the big parish level—but it has blossomed impressively in many parishes and diocese throughout the world, in small communities at prayer, and in particular in movements like the Focolari, the Neo-Catechumenate and the Charismatic communities.”¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, Cordeiro concluded, “[i]n spite of all its achievements in the past twenty years, and all the resounding successes the *Sacrosanctum Concilium* has gained, humbly I feel that the dichotomy in our lives still remains: there still remains much of that separation between liturgy and life.”¹¹⁹ If Cordeiro was right, which I believe he is, in pointing to the failure of the reforms to heal the gap between liturgy and life, it is only because a change in rubrics by itself cannot heal the dichotomy between life and faith. Something more is needed.

VIII. Conclusions

Liturgy is so linked with the historical situation through which the Church has had to pass that no reform of the liturgy that is true to the Church’s inner constitution as the light of the nations will be possible if it outpaces the rectification of many historical missteps. Perhaps it is more correct to say that, rather than *Sacrosanctum Concilium* being the key to understanding the other documents, many of the other conciliar documents that attempted to address some of the historically problematic issues provide the keys for understanding *Sacrosanctum Concilium*. Just to mention a few, *Dei Verbum* was needed to recover a notion of revelation that had been destabilized by nominalism. *Unitatis Redintegratio* was needed to renarrate the Reformation and to free the Church from the necessity of a defensive posture which caused the liturgy to be frozen in time. *Ad Gentes Divinitus* was needed to restore the laity to its proper role in the evangelization (including the liturgy). And there are some keys that are still missing. The theological explanation of how the Church and state are to relate never appeared at the council, nor did the account of

l#CHAPTER_III (accessed April 11, 2013); Ralph Martin, “The Post-Christian Sacramental Crisis: The Wisdom of Thomas Aquinas,” *Nova et Vetera* (English Edition): 11 (2013) 57–76.

¹¹⁸ Joseph Cardinal Cordeiro, “The Liturgy Constitution: *Sacrosanctum Concilium*,” in *Vatican II Revisited by Those Who Were There*, ed. Alberic Stacpoole (Minneapolis, MN: Winston Press, 1986), 187–94, at 190.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 194.

a Judaism internal to Christianity, an account that would cast much new light on the inner meaning of Catholic liturgy.

What often unites those who want the reforms to stand as they are and those who want a reform of the reform is the assumption that the liturgy itself is the issue that divides them. The need to evangelize and to recuperate the liturgical assembly as a community which celebrates the liturgy and which initiates to faith does not seem to have been given prominence by either side. Even in the constitution, although the fathers of the council were clear about the need to encourage the active participation of the people in the liturgy, the need to recover the believing liturgical assembly is missing. There is an assumption that those who have assembled for the liturgy already have been initiated to faith. Those who already believe in the good news are assumed to have that mature faith without which the sacraments remain fruitless. Rita Ferrone has done us a service by pointing to an analysis by John Paul II that contains an intuition of what more is needed.¹²⁰ She writes: "The future prospect for liturgical renewal he described were these: liturgy in service to the new evangelization, recovery of the art of mystagogic catechesis, appreciation for silence, developing a 'taste for prayer' through broader use of the Liturgy of the Hours, and the exercise of pastoral guidance and in following the norms of the Church faithfully and creatively."¹²¹

Where Hitchcock sees the problem with the reforms of the liturgy as one of the desacralization of the liturgy due to a misguided attempt to reach the secularized, Argüello sees the problem as one of the desacralization of the Catholic faithful due to lack of a serious formation in faith in the face of the challenges of our contemporary culture. For Faggioli, the issue of desacralization simply does not appear, not surprisingly given the narrative that shapes his approach. Where Hitchcock sees the pre-conciliar liturgy as capable of holding together the Church without the need for the horizontal in the liturgy, John Paul II has insisted on the need to counter the anonymity that characterized the pre-conciliar liturgy. In his remarks to the Canadian bishops he pointed to the need for the experience of community on a human scale: "The anonymity of the city cannot be allowed to enter our Eucharistic communities. New ways and structures must be found to build bridges between people, so that there really is that experience of mutual acceptance and closeness which Christian fellowship requires. It may be that we need to celebrate the

¹²⁰ John Paul II, *Apostolic Letter on the 25th Anniversary of the Promulgation of the Conciliar Constitution Sacrosanctum Concilium on the Sacred Liturgy*, 25.

¹²¹ Ferrone, *Liturgy*, 87.

Eucharist, and have the catechesis accompanying it, in smaller Christian communities within the parish structure.”¹²²

Sacrosanctum Concilium has already provided the Church with the ideal structure for initiating the faithful into the adult faith needed to foster and sustain the experience of community of which the pope speaks. But the caveat that should accompany this suggestion is that adult faith is not to be equated with sacramentalization. Just because someone has been initiated into the sacraments does not guarantee that he or she has matured in faith to the point of being able to overcome the dichotomy between liturgical practice on Sunday with the values that it presupposes and the ability to take up one's cross daily, bearing one another's burdens. The faith that evangelizes is the faith that produces forgiveness without effort.

If the liturgy is to fulfill its promise, attention must first be directed to restructuring pastoral practice so that a catechumenal formation is available to all, whether received before baptism as in the case of those who are baptized as adults, or after baptism for those who were baptized as infants. Utilizing the tool of this type of catechumenate, the parish has the possibility to develop, as John Paul II suggested it should, into a community of communities that are capable of living in such a counter-cultural way that it raises a huge question mark in the minds of non-believers: what do they know that we do not? How can they be happy with such a cross in their lives?

The Shabbat was made for Man; not Man for the Shabbat. Liturgy is in the function of faith, not the other way around. To be concerned that the liturgical reforms of Vatican II be reformed so that the beauty of the liturgy may more clearly shine forth is commendable. But only when the fostering of a faith that draws others to see the beauty and desirability of following Jesus Christ becomes central to the discussion of the reform of the liturgy is the horse before the cart. N V

¹²² John Paul II, “Address to the 2nd Group of Canadian Bishops on their *Ad Limina* Visit,” May 4, 1999, in *L'Osservatore Romano Weekly English Edition*, N. 1912, May 1999, 5; See Louis J. Cameli, “Do You Need to Be Smart to Be a Priest Today? Meeting the Intellectual Imperative,” *Seminary Journal* 12.3 (2006): 43–50 at 47.

