

Book Reviews

Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law by John Rziha (*Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009*), x + 300 pages

WHETHER an intellectual tradition descends from the ancient, the medieval, or even the modern period, its doctrines find no easy entrance into the muddled musings that occupy the minds of postmodern collegians. Alas, the Thomistic traditions of philosophy and theology afford no exception. Classical Thomist doctrines may capture the attention of today's theology students, but Thomist categories seldom shape the students' overall comprehension of things. An alien-to-Aquinas worldview has already made of their minds its dwelling place. Faced with this difficulty, what can a twenty-first-century Thomist do? One professor, who holds a chair at a prestigious university, engages head on his students' hipster sensibilities. He recommends that they have tattooed on their wrists, as a sort of permanent *aide-mémoire*, the words "analogy" and "participation." Professor X drives his point home. He insists that to understand both the sum and the parts of St. Thomas's moral doctrine, his students must master the way in which analogy and participation inform the whole of St. Thomas's teaching. Otherwise, students bring to Aquinas's texts their own postmodern suppositions, which exclude analogical thinking and emphasize atomistic autonomy.

In light of the inhospitable circumstances that Thomism encounters both in the United States and abroad, two recent publications supply promising resources for professors and students of St. Thomas's moral theology. One treats the topic of analogy; the other, participation. For the much-debated topic of analogy, Steven Long's well-received *Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2011) merits special attention. This recently published work complements the excellent study by John Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law*. Rziha provides his reader a broad and thorough overview of St. Thomas's moral doctrine as seen through the philosophical optic of participation.

The light that guides the substance of Rziha's work returns us to the sources of the moral life. We are reminded that participation in the eternal law furnishes the hermeneutical key—the Rosetta stone, if you will—for reading and interpreting St. Thomas's moral theology. The author warns his readers: "No single created principle of morality (whether it be reason, nature, virtue, law, happiness, grace, or the gifts) acts as a proper foundation of Thomas's theological moral theory" (281). Rziha goes on to argue that certain presentations of Aquinas's moral doctrine falter because they focus inordinately on one or another of these created principles. That is to say, contemporary authors attempt to explain these principles without relating them to the uncreated foundation in which St. Thomas locates them. "All of these principles work together in Thomas's moral theory because," so the author insists, "they cause different modes of participation in the eternal law" (281). *Perfecting Human Actions*, as the title suggests, affords the careful reader the outline for a course in Thomistic moral teaching. The author sets forth the principles and divisions that control what Thomists teach about the moral life. The human person's participation in the eternal law sets the norm for determining which actions perfect the subject and which do not.

To buttress his argument regarding participation, Rziha recalls the moral riddle that Plato ponders in the *Euthyphro*, and he illustrates how the Judeo-Christian philosophical tradition solves Plato's dilemma. Unlike the student of the Academy, Rziha notes, the Jewish or Christian moral theorist begins his inquiry into the goodness of human actions with the observation that "God by nature is true and good, and all other things are true and good by participation in God" (2). Rziha explains the importance of rooting ethics, therefore, in a theory of participation: "In this view, God is the source of all moral truth but not an arbitrary source. Through his wisdom, God has created a universe where each creature is fulfilled by performing its own proper action. When God legislates morality, this legislation is in accord with His divine wisdom, and when humans know moral truth, their knowledge participates in divine knowledge. The divine wisdom that orders all creatures to perform their proper actions is called eternal law" (2). Throughout the whole of *Perfecting Human Actions*, Rziha establishes the foundation for what *Veritatis Splendor* calls theonomy: "By developing the notion of participation in eternal law, this work is meant to show the proper relation of human actions to God" (2).

Chapters 1 and 2 supply the historical and metaphysical groundwork that introduces the reader into the basic mechanics, as it were, of participation. The second part of Chapter 2 is especially valuable in this regard. Rziha walks the reader through the major treatises of the *prima secundae*

of the *Summa theologiae*, and he demonstrates how St. Thomas regards the human moral act as a participation in the eternal law, that is, as an effect participating in its cause. In addition, Rziha helpfully makes clear how this participation obtains in the orders of both nature and grace.

Chapters 3 and 4 form the heart of Rziha's work. In the former, Rziha examines the variety of ways in which the eternal law moves and governs human activity: through the inclinations of human nature, through the acquired and infused virtues, and through the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Chapter 4 focuses on man's cognitive participation in the eternal law. Among the many benefits of this chapter, the reader discovers a treatment of the workings of practical reason, an account of practical reason's dependence on speculative reason, a review of the twelve steps that mark a completed moral act, and an explanation of practical reason's perfection through virtue and grace. In Chapter 5, Rziha demonstrates the strength of his method of moral inquiry by applying it to various contemporary moral debates, such as grace and freedom, divine law and human politics, and practical advice on how to treat specific situations.

Because it orients virtue ethics toward the prior and complementary doctrine of participation—a proper orientation noted specifically in *Veritatis Splendor* 40—*Perfecting Human Actions* merits a wide readership. The book should find a place on the shelves of moral theology professors and in the hands of all students of divinity. Though admittedly not as hip an *aide-mémoire* as that of Professor X, Rziha's book will leave a more lasting impression on its readers than any tattoo can create. N V

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Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering edited by James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White, O.P. (*Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009*), x + 357 pp.

DIVINE Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering is a significant volume, for more reasons than one. The topic treated is itself one of central importance, as some of the essays contained therein argue explicitly. Claims of divine impassibility—the teaching that God cannot suffer, or more specifically, that God altogether escapes creaturely vulnerability to being changed—is certainly one of the oldest Christian tenets, central to early

Christian understandings of the divine nature and of salvation. For the most part, the teaching remained quite undisturbed for 1,800 years or so. Serious challenges, though, to this understanding of God arose in the nineteenth century, and these became widespread in the twentieth. Either in outright rejection of the doctrine, or in radical rethinking of it, thinkers including Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Barth, and Jurgen Moltmann have, in different ways, moved a long-settled matter into the realm of disputation.

It is an issue worth thinking through for anyone interested in Christian theology, and for that task, this volume is a highly valuable resource. Indeed, this is something like a round-table discussion of the topic, with essays authored by Catholic scholars as well as by Orthodox and Protestant scholars, and with views spanning a wide variety of opinion.

Gilles Emery, Paul Gondreau, Thomas Weinandy, Bruce Marshall, and Trent Pomplun, each arguing from a Catholic position, offer various reassertions of a traditional understanding of impassibility. Emery offers a remarkably thorough, if brief, recounting of the history of the doctrine of impassibility. He draws upon St. Thomas Aquinas to argue that the passion of Christ finds its full power and intelligibility in the context of an explicitly Trinitarian account.

Paul Gondreau also works in a Thomistic context, but his emphasis is a narrower one, exploring Christ's affective suffering in view of St. Thomas's account of the communication of the idioms. Drawing on the significant work done in his monograph *Does God Suffer?* Thomas Weinandy engages directly another one of the contributors to this volume, Robert Jenson. Weinandy, too, leans heavily upon Aquinas as he steps back to argue that the basic Creator/creature distinction, as articulated by Aquinas, is the hinge that requires us to understand God as impassible. Focusing very specifically upon Christ's cry of dereliction from the Cross, Bruce Marshall, writing with his usual clarity, also draws upon Aquinas to argue for the traditional affirmation of impassibility. Marshall offers a nuanced account of the different senses in which Christ suffered, first, for the sinful humanity incorporated into his body, and, second, in his own person. Trent Pomplun's essay inquires into the work of the fourth-century Father, St. Hilary of Poitiers, and the history of the interpretation of his work. Pomplun notes the contemporary critiques of impassibility, but seeks to convince readers that these critiques simply do not hold with regard to thinkers such as St. Hilary, in whose work is described a profoundly human suffering in Christ. Finally, in this, one of his last works, Avery Cardinal Dulles satisfies himself with reminding readers of a related, and very practical, perspective: the question of human suffering in general.

Paul Gavrilyuk and David Bentley Hart address the topic from their position as Orthodox thinkers. They, too, defend the claim of impassibility, but each seeks to display the patristic account of impassibility in its fullness and nuance. Each, we should note, also reflects in his essay a more in-depth treatment of the question accomplished elsewhere. Gavrilyuk, who had already authored *The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought*, argues that if we would uphold the Christology of the Church Fathers, we should speak not of God's simple isolation from suffering; we should speak, rather, of a fundamental way in which God is related to suffering, namely, that God is eternally victorious over it. David Bentley Hart is, in a sense, the center of this volume, as the book evolved out of the proceedings of a conference centered on Hart's interest in the nature of divine transcendence. Having authored both the remarkable volume *The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth* and also a slim volume on theodicy entitled *The Doors of the Sea*, Hart here argues that the full meaning of transcendence allows us to see that impassibility is not simply an inability to suffer, but refers rather to a divine existence that completely surpasses "the responsive and the unresponsive . . . receptivity and resistance."

Other contributors to this volume argue for a revision, more or less radical, of the notion of impassibility. Gary Culpepper turns to the Chalcedonian affirmation of "two natures" in Christ in order to argue that there is, in fact, a kind of suffering proper to Christ's divine nature, as there is a suffering proper to the human nature. Bruce McCormack elucidates, and expands upon, the position of Karl Barth, locating a certain form of impassibility—and indeed, the divine nature itself—within the divine will. McCormack's essay represents a place on the theological map that must be taken with great seriousness. This is careful thinking that re-imagines basic ecclesial claims in a modern philosophical universe. Robert Jenson offers some response to Weinandy's essay, but primarily—and not uncharacteristically—he articulates a completely innovative account, in this case drawing upon music theory.

It is, then, a remarkable gathering of scholarly opinion, and could indeed be described as a "round table"—with one meaningful exception. As noted, this volume responds to a controversy set in motion in the nineteenth century, and yet, if there is a position missing here, it is one clearly and strongly growing out of the nineteenth-century philosophical movements that are most influential in this regard. Jensen is accused of Hegelian tendencies, in what seems to this reviewer a partly accurate accusation. He himself rejects the classification, though, and his essay here certainly does not represent a persuasive version of Hegelian thought. Hegel, in fact, is like a ghost haunting this volume but never speaking directly. In a sense, all the

writers represented in this volume can be understood as responding to him, but without a committed defender thereof among them.

Now, this is perhaps understandable. The editors do not claim that this volume represents every viewpoint present in the current world of Christian theology, and they themselves may well have no interest in taking up that goal. Perhaps this phenomenon of seeming to spar with an invisible partner could be best understood not as pointing to a weakness of the volume, but as pointing to a reality in contemporary Christian theology, broadly considered. Aquinas, so often referred to here, and Hegel, silent but always present, stand behind some of the most important work going on in Christian theology today. Although the two represent radically differing commitments regarding God's nature and our knowledge of Him, their intellectual heirs seldom engage with one another directly on these most fundamental questions. A specific question such as divine impassibility might have offered an ideal location to do that.

It is of course possible to see the writers here precisely as taking up that task, from the perspective they represent. This is, in fact, another strength of the volume. The authors not only offer lucid treatments of the immediate question at hand, a fundamental one having to do with God's nature, but they also display implicit answers to other basic questions: what is theology? what are its sources? in what context is it taken up? As it makes a contribution in both the smaller and the larger sense, the volume demonstrates itself to be an unusually valuable resource for those doing theology now. **N V**

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A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe edited by Ulrich Lehner and Michael Printy (*Leiden: Brill, 2010*), v + 463 pp.

TAKING the measure of an age is no easy feat. The scholar who wishes to do so may emphasize formal characteristics or historical boundaries, and his choices in this regard largely determine how we conceive the age in question, be it the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, or the Enlightenment. Take, for example, one of my favorite books of the Catholic Enlightenment, Antonio Giorgi's *Alphabetum Tibetanum* (1762). Giorgi was an Augustinian hermit with an abiding interest in Etruscan antiquities. His *Alphebetum* used the reports of Capuchins in Tibet to write a training manual for missionaries who wished to evangelize the land of snows. Such works, which introduced missionaries to the languages, histories, and cultures of the peoples they hoped to evangelize, were a

peculiar genre of the Catholic Enlightenment. Stylistically, Giorgi's work is a baroque tome on steroids: it is written in a dense and ponderous Latin and wields its erudition like a sledgehammer, using nine different fonts and quoting texts in at least fifteen languages. And yet none other than Johann Winckelmann, the doyen of "modern" art history, wrote the official approbatio for Giorgi's *opus arduum*, and Immanuel Kant quoted it with approval. Considered formally, Giorgi's *Alphabetum Tibetanum* hardly appears a product of the Enlightenment; considered historically, it cannot be otherwise. It belongs to that class of historical artifacts that seem to defy their time period, but which could not have been produced in any other age, like a séance attended by William James.

Thankfully, a generation of scholars is slowly uncovering the richness of Catholic intellectual culture beyond the Middle Ages, and *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe*, edited by Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy, is a worthy contribution to this endeavor. The companion consists of nine essays. After Lehner's summary of scholarly debates about "Catholic Enlightenment" and similar terms, the reader is treated to eight surveys that divide the Enlightenment geographically: Jeffrey Burson covers the Catholic Enlightenment in France; Harm Klueting in Austria or the Hapsburg lands; Michael Printy in the Holy Roman Empire; Mario Rosa in Italy; Frans Ciappara in Malta; Richard Butterwick in Poland-Lithuania; Evergton Sales Souza in Portugal; and Andrea J. Smidt concludes the volume with a survey of the Catholic Enlightenment in Spain. Each essay provides a solid survey and wonderful bibliography. The essays show a remarkable unity—a testament to the prowess of the editors—each focusing on the period from the promulgation of the anti-Jansenist *Unigenitus* (1715) to the Suppression of the Society of Jesus (1773), with some extending back to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and forward to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790) and the Secularization in Germany (1803). In the course of the essays, we are introduced to a range of fascinating but lesser-known characters, from critical historians such as Jean Mabillon (1632–1707) and Ludovico Muratori (1672–1750) to radically eclectic philosophers such as Celestino Galiani (1681–1753) and Antonio Genovesi (1712–69). Of particular interest is the striking number of educational reformers: Eusebius Amort (1692–1775), Luiz Antonio Verney (1713–92), Diego Zapata (1644–1745), and Benito Jerónimo Feijoo (1676–1764).

Priceless among the many interesting insights provided by Lehner and Printy's *Companion* is the long view it affords to contemporary controversies in the Catholic Church. Lehner subtly undercuts much of the existing literature by setting the Catholic Enlightenment as the fulfillment of reforms initiated at the Council of Trent (18). Indeed, it is astounding just

how “Jansenist” much of the twentieth-century criticism of the “baroque” looks after reading Lenher and Printy’s work. We see just how much the Enlightenment informed the later Romantic fascination with the Middle Ages, even as the principal figures of the anti-baroque Enlightenment simply adopted the older humanist criticism of the Middle Ages. Lehner shows himself quite well aware of these ironies when he notes, almost in passing, the “embarrassing realization” of noting how much of the Catholic Enlightenment came to fruition in the Second Vatican Council (47).

Pace scholars such as Jonathan Israel, Lehner and Printy use their massive erudition to demonstrate that Catholics, too, contributed to the advancement of reason, historical criticism, jurisprudence, interdenominational toleration and dialogue, and the manifold forms of social progress common to the age. If the collection has an animating spirit, it is perhaps the work of William Doyle. Almost every essay defines the positive aspects of the Catholic Enlightenment in terms of “Jansenism,” generally approving of its resistance to papal authority, its desire to reform individual prayer and the liturgy, and its Eucharistic austerity. Conversely, they consistently define it negatively in its opposition to the Jesuits and the “baroque” (23–24, 131, 192, 217, 367, 407). The use of the conflict between Jesuits and Jansenists as an organizing trope for the Catholic Enlightenment is nothing new. In fact, it is practically unchallenged in the field. I am not convinced of its necessity, since it tends to simplify the Jesuit contribution to the Catholic Enlightenment. It not only ignores changes in the Jesuits’ educational model—the Collegio Romano, for example, added chairs in ecclesiastical and liturgical history to keep up with the times—it also ignores their contribution to the sciences and arts such as ballet, theater, and emblematics. It also tends to minimize the less-than-enlightened aspects of Jansenism, such as the convulsionaries at St. Médard, or even romanticizes Jansenism as a modern progressive movement. Burson, for example, takes the political rhetoric at face value when he characterizes the Jansenist control of the Sorbonne as “a conscious attempt to revive a tradition of consensual deliberation over doctrinal matters” (!) (71).

A subtle romanticization of Jansenism sometimes leads authors into subtle anachronisms in their references to the controversy over frequent communion (63, 152). For the record, Jesuits allowed laypersons to approach the altar every Sunday only if their spiritual directors confirmed that they were consistently blessed with mystical graces. In other words, there is little in the Jesuit doctrine that looks like the “modern” approach to frequent communion encouraged by Pope Pius X. It should go without saying that almost no one fulfilled the Jesuits’ criteria, and much of the Jansenist polemic on this matter sacrificed the finer nuances for greater

rhetorical punch. "Molinism" is shorn of its theological subtleties, too, and becomes little more than an emblem of the Jesuit emphasis on free will (64, 73, 106). At the end of the day, "Jesuit" and "Jansenist" become figures of the formal types "baroque" and "Enlightenment" rather than historical realities, and the contributions of philosophers and theologians from other orders, especially the Dominicans and Franciscans, are sometimes lost in the dialectical scuffle. In all fairness, though, the essays also do much to retrieve the contributions of the Benedictines, Oratorians, and Piarists.

The authors emphasize the discontinuities between baroque Catholicism and Enlightenment Catholicism a tad too much for my taste. I would be inclined, for example, to see the beginnings of positive theology in Melchior Cano, O.P. (1506–60) or Dionysius Petavius, S.J. (1583–1652) rather than Bernard Lamy (1640–1715) or Richard Simon (1638–1712) (34). Such dates point to a standard problem in periodization: many of the formal characteristics of one age can be found in earlier ages. Indeed, much of the interest in historical studies during the Catholic Enlightenment had its roots in the new archaeology of the Renaissance. In this respect, someone like Muratori fit seamlessly into an archaeological tradition that dated to discoveries in Rome during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, even as his philosophical and historical interests looked forward to concerns more typical of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

I would have liked the authors to have interpreted "Europe" formally rather than geographically, and so would have preferred to see chapters on the important European colonies in Mexico and New France as well as a chapter on the missions in Asia. But this is nothing more than my own scholarly prejudice. The editors chose to produce a different book. So be it. Some figures are conspicuous by their absence, such as the Jesuit Joseph-François Lafitau (1681–1746), who is often thought to be the father of modern ethnography, or the Malebranchian reformer Hyacinthe Sigismond Gerdil (1718–1802). Lehner adds a note on the influence of Giovanni Battista Scaramelli (1687–1752)—the great villain in Garrigou-Lagrange's genealogy of modern mysticism—but the inclusion of more textbooks of spirituality might have made the age of the Jansenist convulsionaries seem less paradoxical. Still, these are minor quibbles. Had I written any of these essays, I would have failed to equal the erudition of their authors. Each has done an admirable job balancing the conflicting demands of addressing any age, especially one so rich as the Catholic Enlightenment, and I cannot praise this collection and its bibliographies highly enough. N.V.

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What Is Dogma? by Charles Cardinal Journet, translated by Mark Pontifex, O.S.B. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011), 124 pp.

CHARLES JOURNET'S classic work *What Is Dogma?* remains as relevant for the Church today as it was when first published in French in 1963. As Roger Nutt observes in his new Foreword to this reprint of the text's 1964 English translation, Catholic dogma has been "under fire" from theologians and faithful the world over throughout the period following the Second Vatican Council. In the twelve chapters of this accessible volume, Journet provides readers with a concise but robust Thomistic framework that counters these attacks by demonstrating the substantial unity of the Christian faith over the millennia.

Already in Chapter 1, the author makes it clear that his principal contention is with writers who misconstrue Aquinas's thought so as to justify their claim that the Church's dogmas admit of mutation: "They wish—and the illusion is not a new one—to think it possible, thanks to the progress of knowledge, to give the dogmas of the Church a meaning different from that which the Church has given them and gives them" (20). Not content with a facile solution to this challenge, Journet steps back and surveys the landscape of dogma such as it has developed not only in the Church but over the entire course of divine revelation. Beginning in Chapter 3, he considers epochs before the Gospel was preached. Balancing St. Paul's teaching that God wills all men to be saved (1 Tim 2:4) with the observation that theological faith requires the presence of theological truths, he affirms that "undoubtedly all men . . . are yet granted some prophetic light offering to them a message by which they will be saved for all eternity if they accept it in the depth of their hearts" (34). Journet elucidates this dynamic with the help of Aquinas's exegesis of Hebrews 11. As Hebrews 11:6 indicates, God made knowledge of the two fundamental dogmas (*prima credibilia*) of the faith—that God exists and that he rewards believers—available to those who lived before the coming of Christ. These statements "contain in themselves, implicitly, all that will finally be revealed," including the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation (36). Accordingly, he who assents explicitly to the *credibilia* assents implicitly to the entire Creed.

Journet describes two avenues by which a non-Christian may be said to possess the substance of the Christian faith. First, he reminds us of St. Thomas's teaching that a man who follows his natural reason in seeking good and avoiding evil will "certainly" receive from God the knowledge he needs for salvation, whether directly by inner inspiration or indirectly through a preacher (37). Second, in the spirit of the journal he co-

founded, Journet acknowledges the value of Aquinas's traditional explanation while raising the possibility that a "more profound" answer might take advantage of insights from contemporary human psychology. After reiterating St. Thomas's teaching that it is necessary for a person to consciously assent to the two primary *credibilia*, he asks:

But previous to this normal state of faith, is there not the possibility of an imperfect and provisional state in which the two primary "credibilia" would be believed, truly, actually, formally, so far as their content and substance is concerned, but in a way that is as yet preconceptual, prenotional, through the will, and to this extent unconsciously, that is, not with reflective consciousness? (38)

Early in life, every child—whether baptized or not—is compelled to choose for or against a rational human good. According to Journet and Jacques Maritain, whom he cites, this movement of the will is made possible because the child has been granted a "purely practical knowledge of God." If the child chooses the good, he is unknowingly tending toward God through the sanctifying light bestowed from above: "He reaches God actually and formally, but blindly, in virtue of the hidden force of his will" (39). Should the child later be blessed with the opportunity to conceptualize the content of this movement, he would state the two *credibilia* such as they are formulated in Hebrews 11. In the meantime, these children "are at once undoubtedly joined, initially, imperfectly, yet in a way that brings salvation, to the great universal Church, entrusted here below to the jurisdiction of Peter and of the sovereign pontiff" (43–44).

Before proceeding to the next stage of his argument, Journet raises the issue of whether his conclusions regarding faith in individual children can be applied to the waking of moral consciousness in the human race as a whole. He affirms that humanity has undergone considerable psychic and cultural evolution over the millennia, and that much of human history entailed "a condition of childhood as regards membership in the Church" (40). In this way, the author's conviction that God does not abandon individual children extends to entire peoples who lived in the childhood of the human race. He even suggests that this may illumine the status of those who still today lack explicit knowledge of the mysteries of Christianity: "I am convinced that the Church is wider than is supposed, that she possesses everywhere children who do not know her, and whom she does not know" (46).

In Chapter 4, Journet employs the principles elucidated in previous chapters in order to vindicate the unity of dogma throughout the Old and New Testaments. He reiterates that the two primary *credibilia* of God's exis-

tence and providence affirmed in the Old Testament “already contain the whole substance of the Christian faith,” including the revelation of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Like a rose in its bud (or an embryo, an image that he uses in *The Meaning of Grace* and Benedict XVI uses in *Spe Salvi* to make a similar point), the true faith developed over the course of divine revelation, all the while maintaining its essential identity (47). Despite accidental changes to the faith as it was further explained over time, what the two *credibilia* signify was not transubstantiated; it “developed in a homogeneous, and not an evolutionary, way” (49), a point Blessed John Henry Newman also makes in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. How, then, do we account for the fact that the apostles affirmed more articles of faith than their Old Testament predecessors? With Aquinas, Journet explains that this increase entailed a gradual passage from implicit faith in the full number of revealed truths to an explicit profession of faith in the Creed, a development made possible “only through the action of fresh prophetic lights of revelation” (50). Accordingly, ancient Israelites did not enjoy explicit knowledge of the Trinity and Incarnation, but they did possess these realities implicitly through their assent to the *credibilia*.

At the close of Chapter 4, Journet pauses to clarify that a passage from implicit to explicit faith can take place in two different ways insofar as it either requires fresh revelations or occurs by “simple development,” the type of development upon which Newman’s work focused. In contrast with the type of development we find in Scripture, development of doctrine within the Church (“simple development”) does not require, and indeed excludes, new revelation. The Church’s faith becomes more explicit only insofar as Christians gradually articulate better the revelation that ended once and for all with the death of the last apostle. The author provides a lengthy citation from Francisco Marin-Sola, O.P., to further illumine this distinction, noting that there are “two very different degrees in what is implied by implicit” (51). While the dogma of the Trinity is implicitly contained in the dogma of God’s existence, and the dogma of the Incarnation is implicitly contained in the dogma of God’s providence, these truths are not implicit *in relation to man*. In other words, whereas an apostle may have consciously professed fewer revealed dogmas than Christians do today, all these truths would have resided in his consciousness in an implicit way. An apostle who had never heard the word “Trinity” would have assented to it had the term been explained to him. In contrast, those who lived before Christ confessed fewer truths for a very different reason: they could not explicitly assent to the dogma of the Trinity because it had not yet been revealed.

The ensuing chapters of Journet’s work address the question of how Christians today can be certain that the dogmas they profess are the same

ones revealed to the prophets and apostles. In a salient passage, which again finds parallels in Newman, the author teaches: "If God wished to preserve publicly throughout the ages without change the original meaning of the revealed deposit, oral as well as written, there was only one way to do this: it was to accompany publicly throughout the ages the revealed deposit with an interpretation which had God's help. This he has done" (59). Journet thereby demonstrates the necessity of the Magisterium as a reference point for any Christian who wishes to maintain that the faith to which he assents is the same faith professed by Christians over the past two millennia. The primary task of the Church, then, is not to create new dogmas but rather to preserve throughout the ages the deposit that she has received from the apostles (63–64). Accordingly, when the Church does give birth to new dogmas, it is "not by their substance or content, but by the way in which they express and manifest the substance or content" (69). Journet proceeds to back up these claims with examples of dogmatic development concerning the Trinity, Christology, and Mariology.

In Chapter 9, the author returns to the issue he raised at the beginning of the book, elaborating that the individuals he has in his sights claim that "dogmas of faith should be accepted only in the practical sense, as standards of conduct, not as standards of belief" (92–93). He refutes this assertion with incisive real-life scenarios. In the same way that is not enough for a woman to act "as if" her husband were faithful to her or for a man to act "as if" the child given him is really his own, "we do not tell a Christian to act 'as if' God truly became incarnate for love of us." Applying this to the question of whether Christians need certainty concerning dogma, Journet concludes that "it is the meaning of the revealed statements that is important. . . . The words in which this meaning is expressed may vary" (94). As time marches on, the Church may advance in the way she expresses her dogmas, but their meaning remains unchanged. Likewise, as in the intriguing case of the term *consubstantial*, "it may happen that the same expression, rejected in the sense it first possessed, should afterwards be adopted by the faith with a substantially different meaning" (94). Journet buttresses his conclusions with the authority of the First Vatican Council, which taught that "the meaning of the holy dogmas that must always be retained is that which our holy mother the Church has once recognized in them, and this it is never right to turn aside from, on the pretext of, or in the name of, a higher understanding" (Denz. 1800). After citing the anathema that follows this statement, the author concludes, "Could the thought of the Church about the absolute truth of the statements of faith be more clearly expressed?" (98).

With this, Journet puts the final touch on an incisive rebuttal against currents that would seek to justify changes in the Church's dogma based on the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. The book persuasively executes its argument that the Christian faith has maintained a substantial unity over the millennia, a unity that is rooted in the *credibilia* accessible to human reason and extends through the Old and New Testaments to the present day. It is worthwhile to consider the relationship and compatibility of Newman's theory of doctrinal development with that of St. Thomas as presented here by Journet, as they seek to achieve similar ends. Readers of Newman and Aquinas alike may be surprised to find here a centuries-old framework capable of accounting for development both within Scripture and within the Church today. N V

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A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper edited by Bernard N. Schumacher (*Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009*), viii + 312 pp.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL revival of virtue theory has often been attributed to G. E. M. Anscombe (1958) or Vladimir Jankélévitch (1968–72) or Alasdair MacIntyre (1981). Its theological revival has been ascribed to Servais Pinckaers (1978, 1985), Stanley Hauerwas (1981), or Paul Ricœur (1990). All of these thinkers have offered significant input. But the earlier (1934), sustained and vast work of Josef Pieper (1904–97) earns him the right to be considered one of the major figures in the current revival of virtue ethics and one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. His influence is not waning. Pieper's prodigious corpus (70 works), numerous translations (16 languages), and growing popularity are indicative of the importance of his contribution.

Pieper is a philosopher who has fearlessly addressed the issues that divide the world and that threw the twentieth century into conflict and war. Of special popularity are his books on the virtues, leisure, culture, and history. His approach to philosophy has demonstrated a capacity to put the sapiential tradition into dialogue with the contemporary situation in order to resolve human issues that remain problematic when addressed by modern and post-modern conventions.

This volume is composed of ten original essays on the thought of Josef Pieper. In the opening article, Bernard Schumacher invites the reader into Pieper's work, providing not only an introduction to the collection but also

a contribution. Pieper approaches the human person and ethics through culture and creation. Mankind's dignity is protected in the practices of true culture that Pieper defends using the Greek and Christian traditions in dialogue with contemporary thought. The criterion in this dialogue is not allegiance to a particular tradition *per se*, but rather allegiance to truth, the truth of things and the reality of creation (3). His sapiential approach critiques the relativism and historicism that have become so popular, but that can be understood only when put in the context of modern philosophy, which is the task of Berthold Wald's article (24–62). Pieper addresses philosophical issues (such as truth and meaning, creation and nothingness, language and reality) in a way that resolves the deadlock between analytical and hermeneutical schools of thought. He sets the task of philosophy in everyday human speech and thought that aims at knowing, loving, and action. Pieper addresses the challenges of the post–World War II spiritual situation, which naturalizes theology or completely denies God and creation (nihilism), on the one hand, or imagines a utopian outcome to human hardships and efforts, on the other.

Pieper, moreover, confronts totalitarianism on several fronts. By both defending a virtue-based vision of the human person and rejecting the reduction of the person to productivity, he aims to protect the community from making itself an absolute. Frank Töpfer addresses such threats in his article “Josef Pieper on the Intellectual Foundations of Totalitarianism” (63–87). Pieper's philosophy of culture and leisure serves as an antidote against materialist notions. His promotion of a fuller conception of human happiness and the common good defends personal freedom from being flattened by the criteria of productivity and utility.

Pieper is a thinker who is intimately bound to reality. In order to remain so, he had to resist the limitations exercised by diverse currents of thought, not only Hegelianism and Marxism, but also National Socialism. As a young researcher, he was engaged in debate with the social and political ideas of his time, as is presented in Hermann Braun's article “Josef Pieper's Early Sociological Writings” (88–115). His commitment to reality and a just social order was focused by the encouragement that Romano Guardini gave him (“All that ought to be is grounded in what is”) and by the social teaching of the Church (especially Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo anno* in 1931). Pieper's opposition to the National Socialist regime led to the banning of his *Theses on Social Policy* (1934) and to his return to philosophy. The thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas became perhaps the most telling influences on his work. Aquinas's influence was especially a methodological one, inasmuch as it aided Pieper to resist facile propositions and rendered him free to contemplate reality in

a bold philosophical stance of confidence in truth. He rooted his resistance to moral subjectivism in a synthetic historical and systematic approach, convinced that a self-enclosed system of truth contradicts the creatureliness and transcendence of the finite human person.

Pieper's ethics of virtue and his treatment of the cardinal and theological virtues is discussed in Thomas S. Hibbs's article (116–40). Instead of following Max Scheler's notion of value or a casuistic rule-based ethics, Pieper articulates a virtue approach to ethics within an Aristotelian notion of the "whole" or flourishing life (*eudaimonia*). He reclaims the notion of virtue from static notions by placing it in an understanding of the person as tending toward fullness of being through the practice of virtue. Thus he also offers an alternative to Kantian formalist ethics and to utilitarianism. In 1934, he addressed the pressing issues of his time by publishing a book on courage. It was the first of an extensive series on the four cardinal and three theological virtues, which was rounded out in his book on love (1972).

Pieper's treatment of virtue is remarkable, especially in his *Hope and History*, as explained in Joseph J. Godfrey's article (141–70). The timeliness of Pieper's account is illustrated by his treatment of three historical countercurrents of thought, which focus on: the annihilation of the human race (Hiroshima); utopian visions of progress (Ernst Bloch); and evolutionary accounts of man and God (Teilhard de Chardin). His antidote to misuses of hope involves, on the one hand, discerning the distinct levels of hope that range from everyday to ultimate hopes and, on the other, continually seeking to do "what is wise, good, and just."

The noted Canadian philosopher Kenneth Schmitz provides a lucid treatment of tradition in Pieper's works (171–98). The act of philosophizing must make reference to the world, to tradition, and to revelation. There is no way to demonstrate the verity of the "first things" that are needed for humans to realize their well-being. Nor is there absolute control over them. Tradition is the first thing that grounds objective reality itself. Philosophy appeals to tradition, seen as the reception of the gift—the transcendent Source, the "truth" of truth—whose intelligibility is opened by loving surprise and sealed with hope-filled belief.

Pieper bases his philosophy on the ontology of creation. As Matthew Cuddeback explicates, this metaphysics of creation is in turn the foundation of his theory of "the truth of things and the world's true face" (228–50). Pieper's approach humbly identifies the limits of human knowledge. Man cannot know the inner structure of anything fully, totally, and perfectly. As Pieper says in his *Truth of All Things* (quoted on p. 14): "Knowledge of the essence and the totality of things is man's prerogative within the 'promise of hope.'" Understanding the world as

created gives the whole sense of being to things and to human knowledge of them. This metaphysics of creation, on the one hand, recognizes the human capacity to know the essence of a thing through intellection and rational acts of knowing. On the other, it affirms that man cannot fully comprehend a thing, since its lucidity surpasses the human intellect.

The philosopher is called to a double discipleship, as Bernard Schumacher demonstrates in his article on faith and reason (199–227). The philosopher must be truly open to the whole of being and to the loving possession of wisdom. The philosophical question “why” leads to a journey of attentiveness to the gift that is the knowledge of the whole and ultimately of the God who speaks (*theios logos*). Theology has its proper task of critically interpreting, comparing, and explicating the meaning of the data that tradition carries. Philosophy must also be open to revealed data when it establishes the basis for critical thinking and contemplation, which are goals for each human being. Activism, by contrast—as pursued in the midst of rebuilding society, in a post–World War II Europe or a twenty-first-century world buried in public and private debt—promotes work as the highest value and thus runs the risk of instrumentalizing the person and subjecting everyone to the sole criterion of output and profit. Pieper emphasizes the need to affirm a true culture intimately linked to authentic leisure. Each person and each civilization as a whole will flourish only if there is a distinction between the entertainment that seeks to escape reality, on the one hand, and a genuine leisure that expresses the human potential for free contemplation and responsible expressions of culture, on the other. Pieper identifies a similar fight that Plato’s philosophy also had to wage against the Sophists and the pragmatic approach to man. Juan F. Franck’s article “The Platonic Inspiration of Pieper’s Philosophy” (251–78) addresses the Greek sources that Pieper calls upon in order to make a credible response to contemporary quandaries.

In sum, this volume is unique in being the only systematic treatment of Pieper’s philosophy available. It demonstrates the importance of virtue theory and approaches that draw on classic thought in dialogue with contemporary forms of knowledge and science. The volume’s editor is one of the rare experts in the writings of Josef Pieper. Schumacher has also published a monograph on the German thinker: *A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope* (translated by D. C. Schindler [New York: Fordham University Press, 2003]). The present book further consolidates Schumacher’s effort to make Pieper’s works accessible to English speakers.

The authors of the volume do us a great service in putting the German thinker’s corpus into the context of philosophical, historical, and cultural

developments, from ancient history into the twenty-first century. In their own right, they deepen an understanding of pressing philosophical issues. True to Pieper's own efforts, they address culture and leisure, totalitarianism and work, virtue and human growth, hope and violence, faith and reason, as well as contemporary thought and tradition. One seldom finds a collection of essays that is not only so wide-reaching in breadth and homogeneous in focus but also so beneficial in effect.

Finally, the volume is philosophically critical and practically constructive. It exemplifies Pieper's idea that a firm assent to reality, as basically good, underlies the true leisure of contemplation. Such an assent is practically expressed in the principle of celebration. This attitude to reality is seen in the manifold ways that love is expressed toward the world, other human beings, and oneself. The love of each thing's existence leads to the most festive of celebrations, which is the worship that gives thanks for life. **N-V**

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
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
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
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