

Book Reviews

Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction edited by Thomas F. Weinandy, Daniel Keating, and John Yocum (*London/New York: T&T Clark International, 2004*), xvii + 276 pp.

THINKING ABOUT the causes that led to the decline of Thomistic theology in the post-Vatican II era, one can discern, I believe, at least two main reasons. First, the texts of the council on the role of Aquinas in catholic theology (*Optatam totius*, no. 16; *Gravissimum educationis*, no. 10) were perceived as referring only to formal characteristics of Aquinas's mind such as his intellectual capacity for discernment and penetration regarding theological questions, the way in which he was able to receive the tradition before him, his openness for a dialogue with the contemporary theology of his time, his search for a harmony between reason and faith, and so on. Second, there arose an apparent contradiction between the appeal of the council for a *ressourcement* of theology in Scripture and Aquinas's "scholastic" theology, which seemed to leave little room for Aquinas as a biblical theologian. Based on a renewed reading of the statements of the Church on Aquinas and the results of contemporary Thomistic scholarship, the volume presented here offers a unique overview of the significance of Aquinas's dogmatic theology by discussing the principal themes of Christian doctrine.

By way of response to the second objection mentioned above, it is fitting that the volume opens with an essay by Christopher T. Baglow on the relationship between Sacred Scripture and sacred doctrine in Aquinas (1–25). After describing the methods and presuppositions of Scripture and doctrine, Baglow concludes the first theoretical part of his essay with the observation that, for Aquinas, the two are actually one. The second part gives three examples of this "fundamental identification" (9) between Scripture and doctrine. First, he argues in favor of the suggestion made by André Hayen that the structure itself of the *Summa theologiae* is a biblical one. Second, he exemplifies Thomas as a biblical thinker in the *Summa* by presenting the sections on the resurrection of Christ and

on the Old Law. Third, Baglow discusses Thomas's "greatest achievement," his exegetical corpus and, more in particular, his commentary on John 6:26–72. In it he discerns a "particular theological model" (18), namely, "a fusion between the exegetical and the theological which" draws "the Catholic teaching on the Eucharist into a natural cohesion with the text by first drawing that doctrine from the text itself" (20).

David B. Burrell (27–44) elucidates the Christian doctrine of a free and unique Creator, the "hidden element in the philosophy of St. Thomas" (Josef Pieper). Philosophically, he focuses on the way Aquinas articulates the non-reciprocal relation of Creator and creature by developing the platonic notion of participation in order to distinguish the two without separating them. Theologically, he recalls the work of Gilles Emery, arguing that "a complete and proper understanding of creation requires knowledge of the processions of the divine persons" (42).

The essays by Gilles Emery and Thomas Weinandy on, respectively, the Trinity (45–65) and the Incarnation (67–89) are some of the most lucidly written presentations in this field that I know of. They provide an excellent entry into the most speculative part of Aquinas's dogmatic theology. Especially these elements of Aquinas's doctrine have received considerable criticism in the twentieth century because of the perceived dichotomy between an Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and an existential-Christian relational metaphysics. Emery and Weinandy on the contrary succeed in showing how, for Aquinas the theologian—precisely through the use of metaphysical distinctions—relation not only lies at the heart of God but also at the heart of the world through the salvific action of the divine persons and finally at the heart of every human, created being insofar as its destination lies in the beatific vision of God through the union with the risen incarnate Christ. Aquinas finds a strong confirmation of this in what has been done and suffered by Christ during his life for "every action of Christ is for our instruction." Questions 27–59 of the *tertia pars* of the *Summa* on the life of Christ are therefore studied next in the essay by Michael J. Dodds (91–115).

By means of a careful examination of the texts, Romanus Cessario (117–37) shows that Aquinas, particularly in his mature writings, conceives satisfaction within a framework that seeks to harmonize the themes of image perfection in the human creature and satisfactory suffering in Christ. Rightly understood, "satisfaction" belongs to the dynamism of love working in history and through the sacraments of the Church to restore the fallen *imago Dei*. Following the increased attention given to Aquinas's biblical commentaries, Daniel A. Keating (141–58) concludes from his exacting study of the biblical works that salvation "begins and

ends with divine action,” but “respects the integrity of human nature and illuminates its transformation at every step” into the image of Christ (157). In the light of this conclusion, a discussion on the *Joint Declaration on Justification* by the Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Church in 1999, would have contributed considerably to his argument.

Two articles are devoted to Aquinas’s treatise on the sacraments. John P. Yocum (159–81) succeeds in giving a well-structured account of the nature of the sacraments, the need for sacraments, their effects, and their order. Again the Christocentric nature of Aquinas’s theology comes to the fore: the initiation of the new life in the risen Christ comes about through the signs of the sacraments as effecting reminders of Christ’s act of perfect self-offering to the Father. The sacraments are therefore “an extension of the effects of the Incarnation” (172). The consummation of all the sacraments in the liturgy of the Eucharist is the topic of the essay by Matthew Levering (183–97). He argues that Aquinas is able to offer us the necessary guidelines in order to avoid the “pitfalls” of spiritualizing or instrumentalizing the liturgy of the Eucharist. On the one hand, a visible self-offering accords with God’s providence for human history. The purpose, on the other hand, of the liturgical action lies first and primarily in sharing in the action of his sacrifice, that is, in himself through whom we receive the gift of deification.

In his essay “Thomas on the Church” (199–223), Herwi Rikhof starts from the assertion that Aquinas, by his “definition” of the Church as *congregatio fidelium*, focuses on the “concrete historical community” (208) and, from there on, gives an in-depth analysis of two of Aquinas’s various images to describe the nature of the Church, that is, “body” and “domus.” His conclusion however that “the Church on all accounts [is] an historical phenomenon” (220) stands in need of discrimination, for, as such, it would not have been agreed upon by Aquinas. Moreover, as Leo Cardinal Scheffczyk recently has shown in regard to the discussion on the relationship between the universal Church and the local churches, the Church according to Aquinas is an ontological reality and can, as such, not be reduced to a historical reality.¹

Aquinas’s eschatology, as Matthew Lamb convincingly shows (225–40), does not form a mere appendix but is intrinsically connected to the whole of his theology as the subaltern science of God and of the blessed in heaven. The greatest contribution of Lamb’s essay consists foremostly in

¹ See Leo Scheffczyk, “Das Problem der ‘eucharistischen Ekklesiologie’ im Lichte der Kirchen- und EucharistieLehre des heiligen Thomas van Aquin,” in *Indubitante ad veritatem. Studies offered to Leo J. Elders*, ed. Jörgen Vijgen (Budel: Damon, 2003), 388–405.

showing that an eschatology comes forth from a continuing search for the intelligibility and reason operative in the divine wisdom as revealed by faith.

Apart from the discussions on the Immaculate Conception, Aquinas's Marian thinking has received little attention by scholars. A fact which is remarkable considering the importance of the Virgin Mary in the teaching of John Paul II in general and Louis de Montfort, from which stems his heraldic device "Totus tuus," in particular. Aidan Nichols (241–60), therefore, offers a much welcomed chronological overview of practically all of Thomas's sayings on Mary from his commentary on the *Sentences* to the *Summa theologiae*, in order to conclude that Thomas was a *doctor mari-anus*. Combining a deep sense of the texts with a profound knowledge of Thomas's sources and recent literature, this essay can provide the basics for a book-length study of Aquinas's Mariology in relationship to the teachings of Vatican II and John Paul II.

The essays in this volume combine a extensive historical knowledge of the results of previous Thomistic scholars in and outside of the English-speaking world with a thorough knowledge of the works of Aquinas, emphasizing his biblical commentaries. They are lucidly written, manifesting as well the philosophical qualities of the contributors. It has the potential to lead many theologians back to Aquinas and, thus, to enrich mainstream theology. Is this comprehensive book on Aquinas's doctrine not a sign that times are ready for a series of students' manuals of catholic theology, written from a Thomistic perspective? N V

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A Biblical History of Israel by Iain Provan, V. Philips Long, and Tremper Longman III (*Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003*), 416 pp.

A BIBLICAL HISTORY of Israel is chiefly a defense, in theory and in practice, of writing a history of Israel using biblical evidence and, in fact, of the possibility of any history of Israel in the first place. The authors describe the roots of this crisis in recent historiography on Israel and propose to consider all the evidence: biblical, extra-biblical, and archaeological. Their main principle is that one should accept traditional historical testimony in general, setting it aside only when it can be proven false. Another point of method is the use of literary analysis to make sense out of the textual evidence. Based on this approach, they narrate the history of Israel from Abraham to the postexilic period, considering the major

historical turning points and issues, such as the plausibility of the conquest and the reality of David and of Solomon's empire. By restricting themselves to major issues, they can write with sufficient detail for the scholar and sufficient brevity for the layman. The book also includes extensive endnotes and indices (one hundred pages all told). In summary, the book builds up the evidence instead of tearing it down. It uses historical evidence to shed light on the Scriptures and uses the Scriptures to furnish a comprehensive account of Israel's story.

Part one addresses the method for writing a history of Israel. The first chapter analyzes the modern problems in this discipline through specific case studies and through a general treatment on the principles and origin of modern and postmodern historiography. Chapters 2 to 5 defend a solution, which culminates in a description and summary of the authors' project in chapter 5.

In chapter 1, the authors begin with K.W. Whitelam's assertion that it is no longer possible to write a *biblical* history of Israel at all. The Bible presents only a partial perspective with an ideological slant. It is written as literature that shows itself fictitious, not objective. Finally, there are no trustworthy witnesses that corroborate it sufficiently. They point to arguments by scholars like J. A. Soggin, J. M. Miller, and J. Hayes who hold similar, though less pessimistic, views. In a summary, the authors remark, "All that Whitelam does is push Miller and Hayes to be more consistent in following through to their conclusion their governing assumption and method" (18). The problem is that none of these scholars has been able completely to overcome the three problems of ideology, literary artistry, and absence of corroboration. They merely look for texts in the Bible that show less evidence of these difficulties.

Much of part one, then, attempts to solve the problems. The authors identify the roots of them in "the general suspicion of tradition that has been such a feature of post-Enlightenment thought generally, and which has in differing degrees marked out the history of the history of Israel in the same period" (19). Historians became particularly suspicious because they desired to subject history to a rigorous "inductive scientific analysis" (20), a desire occasioned by the success and prestige of the natural sciences. They wanted to tell objectively "how it really was" (21), in opposition to the Bible. Because of this suspicion, "arbitrary choices about starting points in the tradition, ungrounded in convincing argument, have marked out the history of the history of Israel" (27). In short, some scholars are simply more suspicious than others.

Chapters 2 through 5 offer the solution. In chapter 2, the main argument is that a priori skepticism of tradition or testimony makes human

knowledge impossible. In fact, "we are . . . intellectually reliant upon what others tell us when it comes to what we call knowledge" (45). We may be suspicious of testimony if there is good reason, but we may not reject it out of hand. Intellectual life, they argue, simply does not function that way.

In chapter 3, continuing the same line of thought, they argue that testimony requires less corroboration than historians usually suppose. Nor does a source's proximity to the event objectively corroborate it, since all witnesses, whether proximate or remote, inevitably interpret the event (57). They argue that there is no reason why source texts should not "be given the benefit of the doubt in regard to their statements about the past unless good reasons exist to consider them unreliable in these statements and with due regard (of course) to their literary and ideological features" (55). Their best point is that "contradictory" archaeological evidence does not itself falsify textual witness. As they note, archaeology is just as interpretive and ideological as narrative historiography (63). Ultimately, their objection is not so much to attempts at verification or falsification as it is to privileging some often scanty forms of evidence over others and to extreme distrust in texts simply because of literary or ideological qualities.

Thus, in the same chapter, they also address the issue of ideology and conclude that it does not drain the historical value from a text. All written testimonies, they argue, contain ideology (implicitly including those of modern historians), and there is no good reason to suppose such testimony to be historically worthless (68–69). While this is true, one would like a clearer, more substantive argument on this point. A cynic might be tempted to swear off history altogether since all historiography is also ideological.

Further, they argue that one cannot permit modern ideology to determine readings of a text's plausibility through the so-called "principle of analogy," the notion that all time exhibits "normal, customary, or at least frequently attested, events and conditions" (70), which should be used as standards to judge the plausibility of an account. Against this principle, they remark that "real human experience (as opposed to the artificial construct of 'common human experience') is, of course, vast, differentiated, and complex" (71). Later, they will argue that there is "a measure of truth and wisdom" (226) in the use of analogy, but on a practical level, they adopt the position that it cannot be used as a bed of Procrustes to amputate and mutilate the textual witness itself.

In chapter 4, they argue that literary art need not obliterate a text's historical witness, because history is in many respects an artistic portrait (87). It presents a coherent picture as opposed to a jumble of isolated

events (84). Moreover, the presence of literary art makes possible the fruitful application of literary analysis, as they argue in part two regarding the book of Joshua: "One of the best ways to gain a sense of what a particular narrative is about is to pay close attention to how the narrative begins and ends and to how it is structured as a whole" (149). Ultimately, their common-sense observation that men experience life itself as a narrative is a valuable contribution.

Part two undertakes the history. Chapter 6 considers the patriarchal narratives, particularly the story of Joseph and the rise of Moses, as well as the Exodus. Chapter 7 considers the Israelites' conquest and settlement of the land, with an emphasis on fitting Joshua and Judges together as history. Chapters 8 through 10 consider the monarchy, primarily David and Solomon (as one would expect, given their importance). Chapter 11 treats the exile. The book fizzles out somewhat after chapter 9 and the discussion of Solomon. A couple of highlights from part two will make clear what the book has to offer.

Chapter 7 on the settlement puts the authors' methods into practice very nicely. They survey the historical reconstructions currently circulating in the discipline (139–47). Then, they turn to the biblical sources. There is a clear presentation of the chiasmic structure of Judges that depicts a *peripeteia* in Israel's attempt to possess the land, as well as a distinction between *subjugation* of the land and *possession* of it. This distinction shows how Joshua, which depicts, not a total annihilation, but a crushing subjugation of the Canaanites, agrees with Judges, which depicts not the contradiction of Joshua, but the gradual results of the Israelites' attempt to *take possession* of the land. The authors remark that other Near Eastern "conquest accounts" are given to hyperbole and that Joshua, like them, should not be read as indicating a total annihilation. They corroborate this conclusion with internal evidence from Joshua itself. They conclude with a survey of archaeological excavations of sites mentioned in the conquest, such as Jericho and Hazor, thus completing their survey of all three types of evidence.

Another highlight is the reconstruction of Saul's kingship and David's rise to power. Here, they argue how the structure of Saul's accession to the throne, in fact, indicates that he did not have a rightful claim to the throne because he delayed fulfillment of the customary test "by engaging in some feat of arms or military action" (210) expected before a king could be confirmed in office. Further, Saul adds to his shoddy performance by failing to meet the second part of the test, viz., waiting for Samuel, thus showing "a fundamental inability or unwillingness to submit to the divine rule, as mediated through the prophet, and thus a fundamental

unsuitability to be king in Israel" (214). The authors proceed to explain how in this context the biblical text presents Jonathan as accepting Saul's rejection and thus having plausible reason to assist David's accession in his place (225–27).

On the whole, one is impressed with the authors' attempt to recover a meaningful approach to Israel's history. Undoubtedly their most valuable contribution on that score is the insistence that literary analysis has an important role in historiography. They point to the past's intrinsic narrativity and, thus, show that they can take the Bible seriously as narrative history. More important (although the authors do not emphasize this fact), literary analysis permits a truly *ad fontes* method because it reveals what the sources are and are not saying. They take advantage of this fact throughout to reconcile apparent contradictions between biblical accounts, such as that between Joshua and Judges.

On the other hand, aside from a few passages where greater clarity concerning the principles would be desirable, one might be disappointed by the authors' failure to address the cultural ethos, hopes, and expectations of Israel in any depth (cf. N. T. Wright's *The New Testament and the People of God*). For instance, they devote only a single paragraph to discussing the significance of the Exodus for the Israelites, and although they note its importance, for them it does not figure in providing any overall view of Israel's history. The result is that although the study shows several moments of luminous coherence, it lacks a strong sense of the coherence of the biblical sources as a whole. It seems the authors were unable or unwilling to push their insistence on the coherence of biblical testimony all the way to a fully unified presentation of Israel's history and an emphasis on the narrative of the whole canon. In all fairness, the book is more concerned with offering a solution to a problem (and to particular conflicts in the evidence) than to the overall view of Israelite history.

In the end, readers are most likely to find this history valuable because of its plausible reconstructions and reconciliations of apparent conflicts in the historical evidence. Its overview of the historical discipline, coupled with its extensive endnotes, also makes it a valuable reference tool. On the level of method and theory, the authors have proposed a solution, which although perhaps not entirely satisfactory, is nevertheless worthwhile because it debunks some of the fallacies of extreme historical criticism and offers a common-sense approach to serious consideration of historical sources without wholly abandoning intelligent questioning of them. In the final analysis, the book's best aspect relates both to its method and to its actual historical reconstructions. The authors' use of narrative literary criticism enables them to respect the literal sense of the

sources and to present riches in them that otherwise would remain hidden. For that reason, if for no other, the book is valuable. N·V

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A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope by Bernard Schumacher, translated by D. C. Schindler (*New York: Fordham University Press, 2003*), xii + 317 pp.

THE FIRST of the virtues that Josef Pieper (1904–1997) addressed in 1934 in a now–classic series of essays on the cardinal and theological virtues was courage; in the very next year, as things in Germany continued to darken, he took up the virtue of hope. The end of the war did not mean the end of darkness, however, neither political nor intellectual, and Pieper returned to the topic of hope and related themes throughout his career. Just think of *Death and Immortality*, *The End of Time*, and *Hope and History*. In wanting to understand Pieper on hope, Schumacher is aiming at a major part of Pieper's work. The scope of this book is therefore ambitious, and doubly so in that Schumacher wants to put Pieper in dialogue with other contemporary thinkers on hope. The main dialogue partner is Ernst Bloch, although Jean–Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel, and a host of lesser figures make many appearances.

Schumacher executes his program in six chapters. Chapter one lays out the anthropological and ontological foundations of Pieper's treatment of hope. Schumacher recalls Pieper's consideration of the distinction of artificial things, whose essence is fixed by the human mind, and natural things, whose essence is fixed by the divine mind of the Creator. Because he is created, man's essence precedes his existence, and already determines the nature of what human happiness and the fulfillment of human freedom must look like. Because man's being is not–yet–being and is realized only in time, this fulfillment is not achieved without the exercise across time of human freedom. For the same reason, and granted the difficulty of fulfillment, this fulfillment must be an object of hope. It further follows that our freedom is necessary to the fulfillment of hope. Since we are created, however, the shape of happiness and the fulfillment of our desire will answer to the contours of the original gift of being and the structure of our natural desire. The ontological frame of Pieper's thought on human hope is a metaphysics of created gift, just as its anthropological frame is that of freedom deployed in time.

Chapter two reviews the characteristics of hope, first, as Pieper recounts them in dependence on St. Thomas, who teaches him to understand the object of hope as the possible but difficult good, and second, according as Pieper may be brought into dialogue with contemporary thinkers. It is in this chapter that Schumacher retails Pieper's insight that an act of hope is intrinsic to the very deployment of reason and the exercise of philosophy itself.

Chapter three distinguishes ordinary hopes (*espoirs*) for this, that, and other good things, and fundamental hope (*espérance*), whose object is "salvation," the complete fulfillment of man according to his nature, and notes the limit situations such as martyrdom where fundamental hope emerges. Pieper follows St. Thomas in holding that the only *virtue* of hope (as distinct from the passion of hope, the human attitude of looking forward to the possession of a good difficult to attain) is theological hope, and Schumacher identifies this with fundamental hope. Not only the object of this hope, eternal life with God, but the virtue itself, is therefore a gift of God. There is no natural virtue of hope, according to Pieper following St. Thomas, for the very good reason that in its natural form, like faith or opinion, hope is something that bespeaks imperfection. Hope perfects only when it reaches above itself, to God; it is a virtue in an unqualified sense only according as it conduces to our one, true, final, and supernatural end. Schumacher, to the contrary, thinks it possible to speak of a natural virtue of hope.

Chapter four takes note of the opposites of hope, presumption and despair, and recalls Pieper's retrieval of the ancient notion of the sin of *acedia* (sloth), which can just as easily manifest itself in frenetic activity as in torpor—both are despairing refusals so to act and live as to set oneself on the way to salvation.

Chapter five takes up the warrant of hope. Writing in 1935, Pieper asserts that Christ is the reason of our hope. But, Schumacher says, whenever he subsequently invokes Christ, he indicates that this is an extra-philosophical appeal. On the other hand, Pieper never abandons the view that hope is theological, an infused virtue. So, is what Pieper doing philosophy? And does Pieper have a less Christological, more philosophical justification of hope? The first question is addressed in the next chapter. As to Schumacher's construction of Pieper's justification of hope in the face of death, it can fairly be said that it is, as it were, a justification on the ground of the first article of the Creed alone. It goes like this. The experience of love, as based on the good of the beloved object, is an experience of a gift, a gift of being. But second, beings are connected, and being is a whole. So we arrive at a metaphysics of being as gift. Further,

love bespeaks a desire for eternity, and love wants to be a promise of eternity. Now, this promise is trustworthy, and the experience of being as gift is veridical, if the gift really is *donum* and not just *datum* (K. Schmitz), that is, if it really is the bequest of a Creator God, the sole motive of whose largesse is love. Therefore, we have warrant to think that the permanence and fulfillment of our loves, which is part of salvation, is reasonably hoped for. Moreover, there is a more particular argument from the nature of that part of creation that man is: incorruptibility of substantial form (soul) follows from immateriality of intellectual operation, and immateriality of intellectual operation follows from the immateriality of the truth relation. Philosophically, the career of the soul after death is quite opaque to us, but granted the goodness of the God who makes us, we may hope for some solution to the *aporia* death evokes for an animal that is both spiritual and mortal.

Chapter six takes up the question of hope for humanity as a whole in an atomic age, for the question of hope can never remain a question of my personal fate alone, but, since my personal history is constituted by that of others, must involve also the fate of humanity as a whole. It is in this context that Schumacher addresses the question of whether Pieper's project is philosophical at all. This is an important question for the book. Pieper, and Schumacher with him, very definitely want a *philosophy* of hope. Pieper indeed thinks the question of the object and ground of hope is a question that must be asked by philosophers contemplating the end of history in the second half of the twentieth century. Schumacher seems to find persuasive Pieper's own apologia for the philosophical character of his project. It is philosophical if (1) the requirement that philosophy consider the whole means also that the philosopher who is a believer must take account of things known only by faith; and (2) philosophy is itself constituted by beliefs, even religious beliefs (as was, for instance, Platonism), not all of which can be mediated perspicuously and satisfactorily to philosophical reason itself.

Schumacher can be thanked for the great service he has done in bringing together and making so accessible the enormous amount of material on hope in Pieper's *oeuvre*—which makes me all the more regret the following critical comments.

First, I think Schumacher wrong to identify fundamental hope and theological hope, which he does in chapter three. I do not see that he really shows this identity in Pieper. Moreover, the very thrust of *Hope and History*, where for the first time Schumacher says Pieper makes the distinction between fundamental and ordinary hope “explicit,” counts against identifying them. The question of the book is not whether Christian hope

but whether man's hope can be satisfied within history. Thence the possible candidates for a satisfactory answer are reviewed—Enlightenment Progress, E. Bloch's Marxism, Christianity. So, do we want our human hope to become Christian hope? Fundamental hope is related to theological hope, therefore, in the way the desire for the good is related to the desire for the Infinite Good, or the desire for happiness to the desire for heaven, or the natural desire to know God to the supernatural desire for the beatific vision, or in the way the natural capacity to love God above all things is related to the friendship of charity. The gap between each of these first things and each of these second things is the gap between nature and grace.

Second, though generally in agreement with Pieper, Schumacher disagrees at a key point, and he ought not to. He notes that Pieper held throughout his career that the virtue of hope is theological, but himself asserts to the contrary that there is a natural virtue of hope, indeed, a natural virtue of fundamental hope. I do not see that he really supports this view or answers the objection of St. Thomas to it that Pieper makes his own.

Third, the argument that hope is warranted in the face of death, the argument that rests with the first article of the creed, does not give a correct picture of Pieper. It is not that Schumacher does not truly report certain considerations and arguments of Pieper, but, as the notes show, he is not reporting considerations and arguments expressly warranting the (theological) virtue of hope. They are rather considerations from the phenomenology of love or the metaphysics of goodness and being that show it is reasonable to trust the Creator, but which, by no means, bear closely, precisely, on the quite determinate object of Christian hope. When it is a question of hope, theological hope, I do not see that Pieper himself ever offers anything less than the whole Creed. True, he does not always repeat the expressions of 1935, according to which Christ is the both the "foundation" and "fulfillment" of hope. But after all and as Schumacher knows himself so well, we are dealing with a writer who expressly draws our attention to what is not said in a text. So, if there is not much talk of Christ in *The End of Time*, the third chapter is nonetheless dominated by the figure of the Antichrist. Moreover, *Hope and History* invokes the Incarnation and the Resurrection of the body in explaining the attitude of the Christian to the future, and this quite expressly.

"It is very difficult to keep in mind the fundamentally incomprehensible fact that hope, as a virtue, is something wholly supernatural." I do not think Schumacher has entirely grasped the full scope of this, Pieper's remark of 1935. Unless I am mistaken, Schumacher wants a natural virtue of hope in the face of death, justified by the considerations of natural reason naturally knowing the Creator and the goodness of nature. He

wants something more purely philosophical than Pieper has given us. While always marking the frontiers when he passed over them, Pieper never hesitated to make large raids on the theological. If it is a fact that such forays into theology must be made in speaking much of hope, death, the end of man and of history, it is an important one, and one Pieper shows us throughout his many writings on hope. **N V**

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Voegelin, Schelling, and the Philosophy of Historical Existence
by Jerry Day (*Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003*), pp. 320.

JERRY DAY'S ambitious new work offers an important contribution to scholars of intellectual history, philosophy, and religious thought. Day aids recent ventures to recover Schelling's importance while bringing the philosophy of Eric Voegelin to the center stage. These efforts coalesce in what seems to be the narrow focus of the book: the influence of Schelling on Voegelin. Day shows that by recovering the subterranean Schellingian influence in Voegelin's work one gets to the heart of Voegelin's philosophy of history.

Voegelin's massive, five-volume *Order and History* is considered his most impressive contribution to philosophy. This work begins in third-century B.C. Egypt, moves through Israel and Mesopotamia, then treats ancient Greece as well as Christianity. Like most of Voegelin's thought, *Order and History* culminates in a devastating critique of the quagmire that is modern culture and thought. Day informs readers that Voegelin first conceived the work as a textbook on the history of political ideas. He began this project shortly after his exodus from Nazi Vienna to the United States and had accumulated a 4,000-page typescript by the early 1950s. Voegelin's research on Schelling led to a change of course. Voegelin remarks in his *Autobiographical Reflections*:

When I studied [Schelling's] philosophy of myth, I understood that ideas are nonsense: there are no ideas as such and there is no history of ideas; but there is a history of experiences which can express themselves in various forms, as myths of various types, as philosophical development, theological development, and so on. (quoted on 5)

Day seeks to square this candid debt to Schelling with Voegelin's criticism of Schelling scattered in works over many decades. The book does

not offer a compelling reason for this omission, but does argue carefully that the positive assessment of Schelling makes sense in the context of Voegelin's central philosophical tenets about order, consciousness, symbol, and history. Scholars who place Schelling between Fichte and Hegel on the scale of bad and worse spectra of idealism (and this idealism ultimately leads to Gnosticism according to Voegelin) usually ignore Schelling's posthumous publications. Voegelin knew of the later Schelling (published by his son, K. F. A. Schelling, in the collected works after Schelling's death) but often accepted the historiography of those who did not: first F. C. Baur and later Hans Urs von Balthasar. In various writings—inexplicably it seems—Voegelin seemed to forget his own knowledge of the later Schelling when he called him a Gnostic on numerous occasions.

Schelling provides the matrix for *Order and History* with his articulation of negative and positive philosophy. As Day recounts,

Negative philosophy [like Kant's *The Critique of Pure Reason* and Hegel's *Logic*], is so named because it negates particular ("subjective") differences of experience in order to understand the a priori nature of the mind common to all human beings as such. Positive philosophy is so named because it interprets the particular aspects of existence as positive manifestations of the essential order glimpsed by negative philosophy. (128)

Such a construction allows not only for history itself to be taken seriously, but also for God to *intervene* in history, manifested in the mythic and revelatory experiences of the great religious traditions and Greek philosophy. Voegelin picks up this schema and replaces a history of ideas with one of symbols. For an idea is a human construct, but, at least for Voegelin,

the truth of . . . symbols is not informative, it is evocative. . . . [Symbols] do not refer to structures in the external world but to the existential movement [that is, the experiences] . . . from which they mysteriously emerge as the exegesis of the movement in intelligibly expressive language. (75)

The essence of Gnosticism (that is, modernity) for Voegelin is the attempt to make the human mind the source for any construction of reality. Consequently, there results a range of philosophies that either become solipsistic (take your pick) or reductionistic (Marxist dialectical materialism, and the psychoanalytic articulation of the collective unconsciousness or the libidinous desire are all *closed* systems of reality). Philosophizing against the backdrop of the Auschwitz ovens, Voegelin thinks the consequences are dire. Philosophers must articulate an openness to divine

intervention in history, but not forsake the intellectual endeavor to envision an *order* out of this *history*.

Day does yeoman's work in explaining Voegelin's philosophy of consciousness and symbol, as well as Schelling's philosophy of history and the divine potencies. He is not uncritical of Schelling and Voegelin in his exposition. Schelling for instance, cannot fit Chinese religion into his historiography of God-consciousness, but does not rethink his historiography (154–57). Voegelin tries to show the compatibility between Pauline and Platonic theology and butchers the biblical text in doing so (261–64). Overall, the book's careful exegesis and hermeneutic generosity lead to an intelligent and persuasive argument for the importance of Schelling and Voegelin; they are critical realists whose response to the collapse of the modern project provides a more sober alternative than postmodern relativism.

To write this kind of book, a scholar needs to be a lot of things: an intellectual historian, a philosopher, a theologian, a Voegelinian, and a Schellingian. This is a tall order, especially for a young scholar. Day's knowledge of the earlier Schelling has a few gaps. The two types of empiricism (sensual and mystical) that Day views as central to Schelling's later philosophy echo the 1803 *University Studies* where the *early* Schelling distinguishes between empirical and pragmatic history. Further, Day never acknowledges the importance of Spinoza for Schelling. Negative and positive philosophy belong to the same reality due to Schelling's transformation of Spinoza's monism. Schelling's early (and open) embrace of Spinoza not only let him move beyond the dichotomies of the subjective idealists (Kant and Fichte) but also informed his understanding of how the potencies operate in God. Day recalls Schelling's debt to Spinoza in a footnote (97 note) but does not recognize its impact.

Day's knowledge of the textual history and reception of Schelling's later philosophy is equally uninformed. True, Schelling published next to nothing after 1810, but the oral reception of his philosophy had a definite impact. Day does not mention the Munich lectures in the 1830s, several of which are now in print. Schelling himself complained to his son Fritz that theologians had stolen from his *Philosophy of Revelation* in an 1837 letter—before Schelling went to Berlin, and before his lectures were published. Further, Day follows the standard account that Schelling's lectures were wildly unsuccessful. Manfred Frank has argued persuasively in his introduction to the lectures (Suhrkamp edition) that Schelling's positive philosophy made an impact on several left-wing Hegelians.

Day's limited facility with some theological concepts occasionally emerges. He states, "As such, [Schelling's process theology] resembles the

theological language that Thomas Aquinas called the *analogia entis*” (37). First, Day uses process theology univocally, not realizing that Schelling’s process differs in important ways from Whitehead and his followers. Second, Aquinas never used the phrase *analogia entis*, a point belabored endlessly by theologians familiar with the drawn-out dispute over analogy that took place between Karl Barth and Erich Przywara (the proper author of the term) in the 1920s and ’30s. Perhaps this confusion stems from Voegelin’s own confusion on the matter (224 note).

Still, if Day overstretches in this ambitious work, the merits of his ambition outdistance minor problems. Many philosophers have been skeptical about the viability of Schelling’s positive philosophy and have questioned whether Voegelin’s marriage of order and history holds up, but few familiar with either thinker doubt that these two at least asked the right questions. If Day’s book sparks people to return to these questions with an energy and seriousness approximate to that expended by Schelling and Voegelin, then Day will have done a great service to the intellectual community. **N.V.**

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Littérature et théologie: Une saison en enfer, volume 1 of Thomas d’Aquin poète théologien by Olivier-Thomas Venard, OP (*Geneva, Switzerland: Ad Solem, 2002*), 510 pp.

THIS BOOK is the first of three volumes dedicated to exploring the act of speaking/writing (*la parole*) and beauty in theology. According to the author’s own summary, this volume wants to reopen a dialogue between theologians and poets by seeking out the theological in literature and the literary in theology, particularly in the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas. Venard takes up the study of literary genres in Aquinas first pioneered by Chenu, asking “what literary status ought we give to a *summa*?” Rhetoric and the arts of speech, writes Venard, necessarily involve themselves in theological discourse. This is especially true when, as in the *Summa*, such discourse has a pedagogical end in view. A literary text is one wherein a distinct poetics—that is, a theory governing the making of texts—is at work; Venard suggests that the body of scholarly work on Aquinas’s poetics is limited. It is to remedy this lack that he is writing this extended study.

It is true, writes the author, that Thomas does not seek beauty first. If the fruit of Thomas’s act of writing is beautiful, this is a bonus, a grace: Writing about beautiful mysteries, such as that of the Incarnation, entails

that the writing will itself be beautiful. Nevertheless, the communication of such beauty is a literary craft worthy of study. Venard draws attention to Thomas's life of study and writing as one long interpenetration of written or oral composition and contemplation. To the objection that a concentration on the literary dimensions of the text risks obscuring the theological truths that Aquinas proposes with such clarity, Venard replies that a critical realist study of texts cannot ignore the contingencies of literary creation, the concrete conditions of the elaboration of theological ideas. Attention to the poetics of Aquinas, far from getting in the way of understanding, promotes a deeper grasp of the truths he mediates.

Such a stance is not anti-metaphysical, as some linguistic studies of Aquinas sometimes are. Venard is committed to Thomas's realism, and will indeed address it explicitly in the second volume of the study. But precisely because Thomas's metaphysical commitments are to a cosmos that is revelatory (or, in Venard's terms "epiphanic"), we must take the time to know how the work of the theologian participates in the mediation of beauty, in the intellectual unfolding and clarification of symbol which is part of the role of human beings in the cosmos. For Thomas, proposes Venard, being and writing illuminate each other, not only in the Scriptures, but in every act of writing.

The book proceeds in three parts. The first, titled "From Theology to Literature," brings to light the literary dimensions, the poetics, of the *Summa theologiae*. Here the author reviews recent scholarship on *sacra doctrina*, and on the structure and plan of the *Summa*, and brings to light the three poetic principles of the *Summa*: *determinatio*, *clarificatio*, and causality. The second part of the work proceeds "From Literature to Theology." Beginning with the doomed quest of Rimbaud for God, Venard argues that the "presence in absence" which modern French poetry reveals has many points of contact with the poetics of Aquinas. Returning to Aquinas's Eucharistic hymns, he shows how their symbolism responds to the "presence in absence" of contemporary French poets with a "presence in absence" of its own, the *latens veritas* of the *Adoro te*. The third part, titled "Rhetorical Synthesis and Theological *Summa*," pulls the arguments together by examining the wisdom and humility of Aquinas's rhetorical approach, and further develops recent work on Aquinas's use of *convenientia* in theological discourse. Far from being made impossible by contemporary struggles with the opacity of language to Being and the consequent impossibility of speaking or writing Truth or God, Thomas's theological writing can promote a return of contemporary poetics to its medieval sources in order to be refreshed. It is this return which Venard will develop in the next two volumes.

This is a fascinating work. It takes contemporary poetry seriously and gives it a fresh and invigorating reading. It is also a meticulously researched work, and Venard's writing is compact. These two elements can, for the North American reader unfamiliar with the literary and academic scene in Europe, make for difficult reading. Perseverance is amply rewarded: Venard is a promising scholar with an exciting and convincing vision of Thomistic studies. NV

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Walking in the Light: Perspectives for Moral Theology Ten Years after *Veritatis Splendor* (Camminare nella luce. Prospettive della teologia morale a partire da *Veritatis Splendor*) edited by L. Melina and J. Noriega (Rome: Lateran University Press, 2004), 818 pp.

IT IS ALREADY more than a decade since Pope John Paul II wrote the encyclical *Veritatis splendor*. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of a document that dealt so thoroughly, as never before in the history of the Church's Magisterium, with the moral foundations of the Christian life.

What was the main aim of the encyclical? After the Second Vatican Council, some points of view arose, approaches such as those of consequentialism or proportionalism, that attempted to reduce the richness of the Christian moral experience. The papal encyclical was received and read mainly as an answer to these dangers. But in such a reading of the encyclical, the most important aim of this document was obscured. For the pope intended to focus, above all, on the tremendous richness of the Christian moral experience, on the new horizon with which Christianity shows the splendor of human action. The focus on the several "no's" (the doctrinal clarifications) of the encyclical risked forgetting the main "yes" (the prospects for the way to be covered which the gospel opened up) that was intended by the pope. In other words, the document was more a beginning than an end. In denouncing the separation between truth and freedom and the more important one between faith and life, the encyclical tried to overcome this tragedy of modern man with the special light shed by the gospel.

The book we are reviewing collects the proceedings of a conference held at Rome in November 2003 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the encyclical, a conference that tried to concentrate precisely on that big "yes," on the big challenge that the pope wanted moral theologians to face. It was organized by the International Research Group on Moral

Theology, a group of professors and students under the direction of Msgr. Livio Melina, who, for the last several years, have been trying to deepen the foundations of moral theology (the fruits of these efforts are the volumes published since 1999, the proceedings of the six conferences already held at the Lateran University on the foundations of moral theology, as well as the publication of several monographs in different languages).

A quick look at the structure of the book suffices to make evident the relevance of the proposal. Two main contributions, one by Cardinal Ratzinger, and the other by Msgr. Cañizares, archbishop primate of Spain, open the volume and give important guidelines for the following discussion. It follows the studies held at the congress by the main lecturers, among which we find papers by Angelo Cardinal Scola and Francis Cardinal George, and the contributions of theologians and philosophers such as D. L. Schindler, L. Melina, L. F. Ladaria, M. Rhonheimer, and E. Schockenhoff. In two other sections, other interventions and contributions are collected that are different reactions to the issues exposed by the main lecturers.

In books composed with contributions of different authors, it is sometimes difficult to see the leading thread that gives unity to the whole work. The preparation that lies behind the conference, as well as the dialogue that was offered among the participants, avoided this danger. There is a unitary proposal contained in this book. In what follows, I will try to highlight some of the guidelines, new ways that moral theology is encouraged to walk in the future.

What is the approach the organizers wanted to give to this congress? The title of the volume guides us to a correct understanding: "Walking in the Light," inspired by 1 John 1:7. The mention of the light focuses on the illumination that is given to the human person in order that he may be able to guide his actions. The light reminds us of a gift that precedes our action and is able to guide it. This light is the light of human reason, but also the light of Christ's grace that lets us understand the greatness of our actions, that goes beyond any human capacity.

The conference's motto refers also to "the way," to the action of "walking in the light." The mention of "walking" points out the originality of the moral light, of moral reasoning: It is a special light because it becomes a way, because it is "a truth to be lived out" (*Veritatis splendor*, no. 88). Besides that, the mention of "walking" reflects the fact that this light brings with it a dynamism, that it is a light that has to move along a way. Let us develop some of these important leading threads.

1. "Walking in the *Light*." The light of Christ must be present from the outset in the analysis of ethics. In other words, there is a need to

recover a theological approach to Christian ethics which allows us to overcome the divorce between faith and life. Cardinal Ratzinger points out that this was one of the aims of the council's proposal (42–44). This prospective becomes crucial in order to situate moral action in a wide horizon: The issue which moral theology deals with is no less than the collaboration or synergy of human and divine action. In this way it tries to answer the question of how it is possible that God and man construct an action together. This is the way in which the Christian point of view overcomes the Kantian contraposition between autonomy and heteronomy. The theological approach from which the ethical problems have to be tackled is described with the metaphor of the horizon (47, 61). The horizon is the place where heaven and earth, God and man, join and where all human ways find an orientation and a goal that overcomes the merely human.

2. This light acquires the form of a way. This very fact points out the originality of moral reasoning, and the corresponding specific moral truth. The moral point of view takes its starting point from the Christian experience and involves an original form of intellect (practical reasoning), and not merely a logical deduction from rational principles. Only from this point of view can we approach an adequate understanding of human action.
3. Let us see how this way starts. The beginning of the action takes place with the offering to man of a communion with God. God himself, by the gift of his love, awakens in man the desire to lead a life in communion with him. This gift is the gift of a presence which man discovers through an encounter with Christ. It has to be lived in the form of a friendship, and becomes interior to man thanks to the action of the Holy Spirit. It is this first gift of God, present in man by his grace, which sets in motion the entire moral dynamism.
4. But this is not enough to understand the whole moral life; actually, this light discloses a way to be covered. There indeed exists the risk of remaining in an anti-moralism that does not take into account the very disposition of human nature, the human good that is at stake. This anti-moralism leads to a spiritualism that forgets the importance of human collaboration with God's gift, paralyzing the dynamism of the action and remaining inconclusive. Human nature and culture have to be taken into account. The importance of the consideration of the human body and the human passions and virtues in ethics

appears then with great clarity, in such a way that freedom acquires a new meaning.

The moral life has to be built up, the temporal dimension of it cannot be forgotten. The very taking into account of the human side means to accept the necessity of walking, of building up in time, the communion that the encounter with Christ offers us from the outset. Pneumatology is the way of structuring that dimension of the moral life, because the Holy Spirit guides us to the whole truth in a continuous deepening of our friendship with Christ.

5. The book tries to focus as well on the place where all that occurs, the house of human action, the Church. A contribution by L. Melina (cf. pp. 281–99) tackles the problem of the relationship between the conception of the Church as a community that transmits a way of life to the individuals (as proposed, for example, by S. Hauerwas, A. MacIntyre, and P. Wadell) and the universality of the Church's proposal, that cannot be reduced to one more among the others. Both approaches have to not be contradictory, and their coordination passes through highlighting the link between ecclesiology and Christology (the Church as Spouse of Christ who is the Logos and Eternal Wisdom of the Father).
6. The title of this volume, "Walking in the Light," points to the principal goal of the book: it discloses new ways that need to be walked, it highlights the fact that the moral proposal of the Church has a richness still to be discovered in its fullness. In doing so, it shows how great is the conception of human life, of human vocation and dignity, supported by Christianity. By pointing this out, this book becomes a sign that the new evangelization is possible and at hand. The analysis of the pastoral perspectives, the last section of the volume, displays splendidly the fecundity of the approach proposed. **N V**

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