

Book Reviews

Changing Unjust Laws Justly: Pro-Life Solidarity with “The Last and the Least” by Colin Harte (*Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005*), vii + 363 pp.

HARTE IS the pro-lifer’s pro-lifer. In his *Changing Unjust Laws Justly: Pro-Life Solidarity with “The Last and the Least,”* Harte argues persuasively for solidarity with all human life, even with the last and the least among us, namely, infants in the womb. His central thesis is that solidarity with the last and the least among us would preclude voting for legislation that would restrict abortions. To vote in favor of such legislation, he argues, would be to vote for a law that is fundamentally unjust.

In Part One, Harte deals with the practical realities of restricting abortion. What is missing in this debate, he offers, is a denial of solidarity especially when certain categories of unborn (for example, in the case of rape, incest, genetic anomalies, etc.) children are excluded from protection against abortion. In Part Two, Harte discusses the legal questions surrounding the abortion debate, especially the notions of legal “permission” to carry out abortions versus legal “toleration” of the same. It is within this section that the author discusses the issue of intrinsically unjust laws among which are included not only the most liberal abortion laws, but also the most restrictive. Even the most restrictive abortion legislation leaves some infants unprotected against death by abortion. Harte takes up ethical considerations in Part Three. Here he deals with the fundamental distinction between bad acts and good acts, material cooperation, the principle of totality, the notion of the lesser evil, and the law of gradualness: the latter three in the context of avoiding ethical inconsistencies. Legislative matters make up Part Four. Here Harte makes the distinction between just and unjust proposals and looks at the history of voting opportunities. In the Part Five, Harte discusses magisterial teachings, especially Pope John Paul II’s *Evangelium Vitae* and *Veritatis Splendor*. This is followed by an overview of his arguments and conclusions. The book ends with five appendices containing the texts of various abortion laws.

The most controversial part of Harte's position is, without doubt, his analysis of *Evangelium Vitae*, especially the meaning of §73.3. Here we read that,

when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at *limiting the harm* done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general morality and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.

Harte's interpretation of this passage, we will see, does not permit legislators to vote for restrictive abortion laws. He bases his conclusions on the paragraph that immediately precedes the one just quoted, which states: "In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to 'take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or vote for it'" (§73.2).

For those who have been heartened by John Paul II's approach to the dilemma in which many pro-life legislators find themselves, namely, whether or not to vote in favor of legislation that would restrict abortions, Harte's more apodictic position may come as a surprise. What kind of moral analysis lies behind John Paul II's approach? What are we to make of the preceding paragraph that would seem to preclude voting for more restrictive legislation? Is Harte correct in his interpretation of *Evangelium Vitae*, or isn't he?

Regarding the kind of moral analysis that lies behind John Paul II's approach, it is fairly safe to presume that the pope draws from *Veritatis Splendor*, §78:

The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the "object" rationally chosen by the deliberate will. . . . In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behavior. [original emphasis]

The consensus among moral theologians commenting on *Evangelium Vitae*, §73, is that, in the case of the elected official voting for legislation to restrict abortion, the freely chosen object would be the vote for said legislation with the further intention, that is, the motive, of limiting its scope. What lies outside of the legislator's intention (*praeter intentionem*) would be the continued practice of abortion that the law permits. Harte

does not accept this consensus opinion. He argues that these moral theologians have misread both *Evangelium Vitae*, §73, and *Veritatis Splendor*, §78.

Harte argues that *Evangelium Vitae*, §73.3, must be understood in light of §73.2. §73.2 prohibits voting for abortion laws of any kind, even the most restrictive. Why is this? Because such laws are intrinsically unjust. According to Harte, §73.3 does not contradict this statement. How so? Because §73.3 states that a legislator may vote for *proposals* aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law. Voting for proposals that limit the harm done by even restrictive abortion laws is not the same as voting for a law itself. To vote for such a law would, in Harte's estimation, be to vote for a law that is intrinsically unjust by virtue of the fact that even restrictive abortion laws preclude those to whom they do not apply, for example, infants conceived as a result of incest, rape, who are a danger to the mother's life, or who may be in some manner handicapped. In spite of the good motives of pro-life legislators, the choice to vote for restrictive abortion laws would be the choice of an object that is intrinsically evil, as Harte reads *Veritatis Splendor*, §78.

The purpose of this review is not to resolve the divergent interpretations of the two encyclicals. It is my hope, rather, that this review will goad those who are interested in the topic to pick up and read Harte's worthwhile contribution to the discussion. Wherever one stands on the issue, Harte's book will not disappoint. It will find a welcome home in college and university libraries and in the hands and on the shelves of educated readers.

N V

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Constructing Antichrist: Paul, Biblical Commentary, and the Development of Doctrine in the Early Middle Ages by Kevin L. Hughes (*Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005*), 278 pp.

KEVIN HUGHES has written a thorough study on how the Second Letter to the Thessalonians has functioned as a vehicle for the development (in different ways) of early medieval thinking on the Antichrist. This means that for instance the Johannine perspective (1 Jn 2:18–22, 4:1–3; 2 Jn 7; Rev 13) does not receive much attention. However, what the book loses in scope it gains in depth: By focusing on 2 Thessalonians (which is included, in the book, in the Latin of the Vulgate and in English translation) Hughes provides a detailed survey of one specific avenue of thinking about the Antichrist.

This is not to say that even within the tradition of commentaries on 2 Thessalonians Hughes fails to uncover different strands. On the contrary, building on suggestions made by Bernard McGinn, he helpfully distinguishes in chapter one between a number of polarities, characterizing the role of the Antichrist as external (evil comes from without) or internal (it comes from within); as in terms of dread or as a deceiver who lures the faithful away; Hughes further introduces a “temporal polarity” in which the Antichrist is described as either “present” or “to come.” These polarities then allow Hughes to distinguish between “apocalyptic realism” (which understands the Antichrist primarily as imminent and external), and a more “spiritual” interpretation of Antichrist (in which the Antichrist is seen as immanent, internal, and deceptive). The first position emphasizes the historical, the political, and the future. The second prefers to interpret apocalyptic events and figures primarily in terms that refer to the present life of the Church and the soul, and only secondarily to the future judgment.

In chapter two, dealing with “apocalyptic realism” in the early Church, A.D. 200–400, Hughes offers an in-depth overview of a number of authors (Ambrosiaster, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Jerome, Pelagius) who all share an emphasis upon the non-allegorical, eschatological meaning of the Antichrist, although none claim that the arrival of the Antichrist is imminent. Chapter three deals with a more spiritual exegesis of 2 Thessalonians: Especially influential in this regard is the typological interpretation by Tyconius, an excommunicated Donatist layman from the end of the fourth century. Without denying that the end will come, Tyconius very much puts the emphasis elsewhere, on a more spiritual reading: For him the revelation of the “man of sin” is actually that of “the body of sin” within the Church. Tyconius appears to have influenced the later Augustine who proves quite dismissive of predictive, realist apocalyptic speculation. Augustine remains agnostic about the details of the events of the end although he remains convinced of their essential truth; and he too interprets the Antichrist primarily in terms of the growing body of iniquity within the Church.

Chapter four covers mainly the Carolingian period and beyond: from A.D. 500–1000. During this period a synthesis of apocalyptic realism and the Augustinian critique was eventually forged. Key figures that pass the review include Rabanus Maurus, Sedulius Scotus, and Haimo of Auxerre. The following chapter examines the way Paul and the Antichrist were seen in the early scholastic exegesis (A.D. 1000–1160), with particular attention to Lanfranc of Bec (the teacher of Anselm of Canterbury) who affirms the apocalyptic realist perspective, editing and reinterpreting the

Augustinian position to support this perspective. Lanfranc also develops a new form of biblical exegesis, attempting to understand the text first through close grammatical analysis, followed by drawing up his own interpretation while using individual glosses summarizing the tradition. Major attention is also given to Bruno the Carthusian, the *Glossa ordinaria*, and Peter Lombard (who preserves the different exegetical traditions, both realist and spiritualist, although his own preferences clearly lie with a thoroughgoing spiritualist reading).

Kevin Hughes has produced a solid scholarly and detailed study of the way the Antichrist was perceived and “constructed” through the lens of early medieval commentaries on the Second Letter to the Thessalonians. He has shown that the apocalyptic imagination was a constant cultural fact in the Middle Ages, thereby challenging the view that the early medieval high culture was essentially “post-apocalyptic.” He has also reminded us that the medieval tradition of apocalypticism is faithful to the tension of the “already” and the “not yet” within the New Testament: “Antichrist was alive and well in the early Middle Ages, both as the immanent presence of evil and as the coming evil one.” (250). This book, with its detailed and nuanced reading of early medieval apocalypticism in the tradition of commentaries on 2 Thessalonians, will undoubtedly remain a standard work for many years to come. N-V

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Cusanus: The Legacy of Learned Ignorance edited by Peter Casarella
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), xxxi + 280 pp.

SANDWICHED between Meister Eckhart (1260?–1329?) and Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), Nicholas of Cusa (1401–64), cardinal-statesman-theologian, vies with them for regularly missing top billing in the history of philosophical theology. Astride the “early-modern” period, he resists classification, so had often been seen as a forerunner of the Renaissance, notably in the neo-classical revival of Plato and Platonism—a view that this collection partially inverts by tracing his continuity with earlier figures. His “Platonism” is especially evidenced by the recourse he has to complex mathematical figures to illustrate the ineffable relation of creatures to their creator, a topic neatly elucidated in this volume, itself the result of a symposium called in 2001 to celebrate the six-hundredth anniversary of his birth. Contributors include long-standing expositors of Cusanus (as he has come to be called), while the diversity of topics aptly

illustrates the range of his life and work, from debates at the Council of Basel regarding the degree of authority to be given either to pope or to councils, and on to be papal legate to Byzantium to negotiate a short-lived reconciliation between Eastern and Western Christianity. As the proceedings of a symposium celebrating the range of Cusanus's work, however, one misses a focus, so those wishing a clearer presentation of his singular contribution to philosophical theology ought to let the disparity of these essays direct them to the superbly focused work by Clyde Lee Miller, *Reading Cusanus: Metaphor and Dialectic in a Conjectural Universe* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), where thorny issues like "negative theology" are treated with both philosophical deftness and theological sensitivity. Taken together, these two works would then genially introduce us to a figure who epitomizes that quality of medieval theological reflection for which Aquinas offers a paradigm, notably in transforming Hellenic philosophical categories to negotiate what Robert Sokolowski has dubbed "the distinction" of creator from creatures. A participant in the symposium, Miller's mature reflections on the interaction of language and logic in Cusanus show how adroitly he epitomizes the subdominant Platonic themes elucidating Christian faith, from Scottus Eriugena through Meister Eckhart, to return us to an illuminating recapitulation of the "unknowing" regnant in Aquinas's philosophical extensions of "Christian doctrine." Seen in this way, Cusanus offers a capstone to classical medieval philosophical theology, as well as offering fresh initiatives.

As organizer of this symposium and editor of the volume, Peter Casarella offers an illuminating introduction, linking these efforts with those of 1964 in Brixen, Cusanus's Tyrolean see, for the fifth centenary of his death. The 1964 papers "were oriented toward the idea that Cusanus's thought was an original synthesis of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance sources whose principal function was to pave the way for modernity," while "the focus in 2001 was not so much on modernity's origins as on its manifold expressions" (xxiii). Moreover, he notes how our current ambivalence regarding "modernity" is also exhibited in this symposium in a way it was not in 1964, so that "the overcoming of modernity's excesses—whether such excess is posited in the anthropocentric eclipse of a sense of meaning and wonder in the world or a positivistic separation of the pope's juridical authority from the need for consent and reception in the Church as a whole—is also in view in many of the essays" (xxiv–xxv). A masterfully succinct summary of the present legacy of *On Learned Ignorance*, "the first truly philosophical and the most programmatic work of Nicholas" (xxv) completes this introduction.

The essays can be grouped in four clusters: (1) spirituality and philosophical theology, beginning with an illuminating translation of his sermon on the *Pater Noster* (Nancy Hudson and Frank Tobin) and Bernard McGinn's exposition of his *De visione Dei*, locating it in the neo-Platonic tradition of "Seeing and Not Seeing" God. Jasper Hopkins then details Cusanus's "Intellectual Relationship to Anselm of Canterbury," while Louis Dupré explores "The Question of Pantheism from Eckhart to Cusanus" and Wilhelm Dupre "The Image of the Living God" in human beings. (2) The power of visual representation is explored by Karsten Harries in the "Power and Poverty of Perspective," while Walter Andreas Euler essays an interpretation of "An Italian Painting from the Late Fifteenth Century" as a way of introducing Nicholas's efforts to come to terms with Islam. While his interpretation of the three figures as representative of the three Abrahamic faiths is disputed in a companion piece by Il Kim, his assessment of the balance of Cusanus's ground-breaking attitudes toward Islam is quite judicious. (3) Cusanus's attempts to lay out the civil and ecclesial polities as complementary are assessed by Thomas Prügl—"The Concept of Infallibility"; Cary Nederman in "Empire Meets Nation," as Cusanus tries to make way for new forms of political life; and in Paul Sigmund's critical assessment of Cusanus's contribution to modern political theory in "Medieval and Modern Constitutionalism." (4) Elizabeth Brient then explores "Three Mathematical Metaphors from *De docta ignorantia*" to ask how "the infinite can be the measure of the finite?," while Regine Kather extends the "Arguments for the Relativity of Motion" in his cosmology to "Their Transformation in Einstein's Theory of Relativity." Rich fare, indeed, and the fertility of Cusanus's inquiry is clearly demonstrated by the way each of these distinguished thinkers can find him contributing incisively to their respective disciplines. In nearly every case, his way of breaking new ground allows his seminal explorations to shed fresh light on current ways of considering these topics—another fascinating sign of his diversity.

Allow me to inscribe summary statements of each author, some more amply than others. Beginning with the initial set, McGinn notes that

the Cardinal's treatise was larger than its times. In *De visione Dei* Cusanus not only rethought and reformulated the fundamentals of the dialectical Neoplatonic mysticism developed by Dionysius, Eriugena, and Eckhart, but he also sought to bring to coherence issues about God's visible invisibility that were rooted in Scripture and had been present in Christian mysticism since its earliest encounters with Hellenic philosophy. . . . It was a new creation. (52–53)

Then Jasper Hopkins:

Nicholas, making use of Anselm's writings, seeks to extend and supplement those of Anselm's ideas that he incorporates into his own metaphysics, . . . lead[ing] Nicholas to speak in paradoxical ways: God, he says is unknowable because He is infinitely knowable; God is the Being of being and the Not-being of not-being; God can give himself to me only if He gives me to myself. In such paradoxicality, Anselm's thought becomes . . . subsumed, elevated, and transformed. (71–72)

Louis Dupré emphatically insists that

Cusanus never was a pantheist, no more than Eckhart. But their views on the relation between God and creation differ from common doctrine on causality. . . . Cusanus avoids that ambiguity [between formal or efficient causality] in his radical equation of God's immanent presence with a person's identity. (87)

(I would suggest, however, that Sara Grant has effectively challenged a “common doctrine on causality,” as it intends to reflect Aquinas's teaching, in her Teape lectures, *Towards an Alternative Theology: Reflections of a Nondualist Christian* [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002].) Wilhelm Dupre allows that “much of what Cusanus says sounds exaggerated in our ears; [yet] the metaphor of the living image . . . brings the meaning and experience of humanity into perspective and inspires us to give the aesthetic dimensions of our being the credit they deserve” (102).

In the second set, Karsten Harries reminds us that “we have no way of understanding God's creation as He understands it” (121); hence the need for conjectures—a favorite term of Cusanus. Yet what guides our formulating such conjectures is that

our soul experiences something of . . . the call of the divine *Logos*, in all that is beautiful. The beauty of creation opens windows in the house our reason has built. Only by thus opening ourselves to what lies outside that house can our life and thought gain the measures that are a presupposition of all responsibility. (126)

Walter Andreas Euler folds his original paper, with the working title of “The Christology of the *Cribratio alkorani*,” into speculation regarding a late fifteenth-century painting in Sassoferrato (Italy), whose three figures he takes to represent the three Abrahamic faiths. Il Kim's sequel punctures that line of speculation, but Euler's reflections on Cusanus and Islam stand. Bedeviled as he was by a poor translation of the Qur'an as well as

hamstrung by prevailing attitudes in the West, often fertilized by fear, Cusanus did not keep from searching “tirelessly throughout the Qur’an for links with his understanding of religions” (141), specifically that “the actual path to God has at its center the Christological dogma of the hypostatic union of God and man in one person” (140), which Islam could, of course, never countenance.

In the third set, Thomas Prügl offers a careful analysis of *infallibility* in Cusanus, the more significant for his early role in the “conciliarist” movement. He concludes that

infallibility in Cusanus stems from a soteriological context. . . . The Roman Church (*Ecclesia romana* in all its realization) and the universal councils share the privilege of inerrancy, [which] however, presupposes broad consent within the Church, especially consent among the members of a council and the consent between council and Pope. (175–76)

Cary Nederman links Cusanus with “Piccolomini [to] demonstrate how genuine intellectual commitment to the idea of a universal empire did not preclude acceptance and justification of the national state system that had clearly enveloped Europe by the fifteenth century” (194). Paul Sigmund reprises a debate between Nederman and Francis Oakley regarding the “differences between late medieval and early modern constitutionalism” (207), without attempting to conciliate their views, yet firmly distancing Cusanus from Locke’s “much more individualistic theory of consent” (208).

In the fourth set, Elizabeth Brient explores Cusanus’s twin assertions that “[i]t is evident that there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite” yet that “the divine infinite is ‘the one, most simple, and most adequate measure of the whole universe and of everything existing in the universe’” (210). Absent any “proportion,” what could “measure” possibly mean here? The answer can be found in a metaphysical strategy closely connected with the relation between One and many: “[E]very finite creature *participates* (albeit in an limited way) in the divine infinite” (220) (emphasis added). Moreover, the inscribed polygon tending, at its limit, to the circle in which it is inscribed offers an example within creation of “the way in which the infinite acts as the measure of the finite because it is [displayed in the limit as] the essence of each finite thing” (224). Finally, Regine Kather, while acknowledging that “the starting point of the theory of relativity differs from the cosmology Cusanus developed,” goes on to note how

insight into the methodological and conceptual limits of a physical cosmology and into the ontological conditions of human life leads Einstein—as well as other theoretical physicists of the twentieth century—to a view of the world that converges in a certain respect with that of Cusanus. (249–50)

And as if all this were not enough, Peter Casarella appends a rich panoply of “suggested reading,” where one can find the work by Lee Miller with which we began this review. N-V

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Implicit Moral Knowledge by Ralph McInerny (*Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino Publishers, 2006*), 49 pp.

THIS brief but very interesting book contains the first of the Aquinas Lectures of the *Thomas International* project. The lecture was given in Palermo, Sicily, in 2004, and it deals with one of the most important topics in modern and contemporary philosophy: the foundations of knowledge and the relation between implicit and explicit knowledge in ethics.

This is about the “great questions which, one way or another, everyone already has asked or will eventually ask” (25). As one might expect, in the course of history there have been many significantly different answers. With regard to the foundations of knowledge, modern philosophers (from Descartes on) have put forward perspectives completely different from the past. Therefore, to deal with this topic with the help of one of the most important thinkers of the ancient and medieval period, Thomas Aquinas, can be very stimulating in order “to promote engagement between classical thought and modern and contemporary thought, in all branches of human knowledge” (9). This is the aim of the *Thomas International* project, as its president, Fulvio Di Blasi, states in the preface. Since the project aims also at combining “the best energies of the old and the new continents” (9), it is promoted by both American and Italian research institutes. Accordingly every Aquinas lecture will be published in both English and Italian.

This book is easy to read, even though its theme is crucial to the history of philosophy. As the author states at the beginning, “philosophy, at least as I have engaged in it, call it the Aristotelian way, prides itself on beginning where everyone already is” (19). McInerny adds that “the small hope I have is that, when I am done, you will say, I already knew that”

(19–20). Well, this is not so puzzling as it might seem. Philosophy should provide accounts for the experience shared universally by humanity because, before doing philosophy, the philosopher is a man. This is why I said earlier that this book is easy to read, and why the author maintains that his aim is to explicate what everybody already knows.

Let me now talk about this point in detail, since it constitutes the speculative core of the book. First of all, I would like to point out that this book presupposes a very specific image of philosophy. McInerney suggests that we call it “the Aristotelian way,” and he seems to use Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition of Aristotle as “the first philosopher of common sense.” In fact, the great Greek thinker was the first to take common experience as the starting point of philosophy. As such, philosophy should only unfold what people already know. We could add that it should not *discover* or *produce*, as it is the case in the scientific and technological domain, but only *explicate*. To use a modern word, philosophy must show the *foundations* of knowledge. In other words, the foundations already exist because every knowledge presupposes them, and the goal of philosophy is to explicate them. To give an example, in the realm of moral knowledge the philosopher should not find new moral rules but only define principles already known by every man (known only implicitly, as a presupposition of every action) and then explain how to act in conformity with them.

I hope that everything I have said so far is clear. For clarity’s sake, I also want to explain what the “common experience” is, out of which every philosopher should start. If philosophy is the quest for truth—as its etymology implies—then its starting point must be something true. By the same token, it cannot consist of a not-specified “common knowledge,” but only of *what we cannot not know* (as in the suggestive title of a book by Jay Budziszewski, *What We Can’t Not Know: A Guide* [Dallas: Spence Publishing, 2003]). I am referring to judgments that have the following characteristics: Firstly, they are true; secondly, they are common in that everybody knows them immediately without any kind of cognitive process. They cannot be demonstrated except *per absurdum* (the only form of demonstration in matter of principles). That the world (understood as the whole of everything that is) exists and that I exist: These are only some examples of what I am referring to. From ancient times on, and particularly in modern and contemporary histories of philosophy, such judgments have been called “common sense” (from Latin *sentire* = to judge, to think, to have an opinion). Many philosophers have dealt with them in many different countries and languages (“*sensus communis*,” “*Gemeinsinn*,” “*senso comune*,” “*sentido comun*,” “*sens commun*,” “common sense”). To recall only a few: Juan Luis Vives, Claude Buffier,

Giambattista Vico, Thomas Reid, Friedrich Oetinger, Antonio Rosmini, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Gilson's pupil, the contemporary Italian Antonio Livi. Although employing very different philosophical perspectives, they all have pointed out that not all knowledge can be reached through demonstration and have opposed the tendency of some modern philosophers to reduce philosophy to the mathematical method. In this respect, they have rejected every kind of rationalism and have stressed that philosophy is "wisdom," that its beginning is in universal human experience, which should be simply acknowledged as it is. As McInerny says by means of a suggestive image, "when a mother asks, 'How would you like it if someone did that to you?' she expects and gets a recognition from her child. Is she teaching him the Golden Rule? Only in the sense that she teaches him English, presupposing the capacity to speak" (43).

All said and done, I must confess that I do not fully understand why McInerny states that "the first truth of thought, language, and reality is that something cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same respect" (35). True, the principle of non-contradiction is the first logical principle, but it cannot be considered the first judgment. What I mean is that *contra-dictio* refers only to *dictio*, only to thought and language; in the sense that it is useful to understand, it is the first logical principle, but it is not the first content of knowledge. It is possible to state that something cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same respect only by logically presupposing the following:

1. that something exists;
2. that something is different from something else;
3. that not only one, but many things exist; and
4. that things change in time.

This is what Gilson meant when he stated that the first truth is that "res sunt," and that the principle of non-contradiction is based on this sentence. Perhaps McInerny would agree with my explanation, since he himself observed that what he had just defined "the first truth" (the principle of contradiction) "is said to be grounded in knowledge of being, of that which is, and everybody has that" (35).

It goes without saying that in this context "common experience" or "common sense" does not refer to what people generally know (this is irrelevant within a philosophical discourse), but to the very foundations of knowledge, to what people intuitively know as the presupposition of

everything they know (knowledge), to what cannot be denied. True, some modern philosophers tried to deny this (from the “cogito” on), but for some others (at least those I have already quoted) this has only led to a further confirmation that this position lacks philosophical validity.

Let me now take into consideration the term “implicit philosophy.” John Paul II used it in the encyclical *Fides et Ratio* as a synonym of common experience. This is very important: Although the pope was interested principally in the relation between faith and reason, he also wanted to deal with the foundations of knowledge. McInerny himself used the term “implicit philosophy” as a synonym of prephilosophical knowledge or common sense and I personally agree with this choice. However, I also see a close relationship between the notion of implicit philosophy and the encyclical’s topic. It is true that at the end of the book McInerny refers to this in some evocative image. He says:

Theology? From Plato to Chomsky, philosophers have confronted this ineluctable fact about us. We have the capacity to learn, practically, morally, theoretically. No other human confers it on us. . . . There are metaphysical and theological discussions of this, but all those discussions bear on something already there. (47)

Clearly, McInerny sees the connection but he does not dwell on it. If one were to further explicate it, one would come to the connection between philosophy and Christian faith. As “wisdom,” philosophy deals with the foundations of every knowledge. Any discourse about foundations takes us back to the metaphysical relationship that binds all creatures to their Creator. Not by chance, Heidegger had interpreted the Cartesian cogito as abandonment of the Christian Revelation.

Maybe this remark is useful also with regard to the *Thomas International* project, because “to confront the perennial questions of the human heart and to seek solutions to the problems facing our society” (as Di Blasi says on page 9) is very difficult without referring constantly to the importance of Christian faith for society’s development and our culture at large.

I would like to add that what I have just said does not support any kind of confusion between faith and reason. Christian Revelation itself helps human reason to work *on its own* and poses many questions for philosophers thanks to its own *rational* foundations. (Antonio Livi has dwelled on this in *Reasons for Believing. On the Rationality of Christian Faith* [Aurora, CO: The Davies Group Publishers, 2005].) This is why philosophy would not be the same today without its relationship with Christian religion (it suffices to mention such notions as those of *creation, freedom, person, history*).

Implicit Moral Knowledge represents a very good beginning for the *Thomas International* project. McNerny's book shows both the perennial value of its central topic and the extraordinary speculative wealth one can find in the classical philosophical tradition and in particular in Thomas Aquinas. With regard to Thomas, I would like only to remind the reader that he came very close to a definition of common sense. In his discourse on "cognitio experimentalis" (see *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 112, a. 5), he said that only by willing we know our will, only by living we know that we live. In his lecture and book, McNerny expressed this thought so well that to quote him represents the best way to conclude this review: "Articulating common sense is something like explaining a joke. No explanation can substitute for the outburst of laughter that preceded the explanation. The explanation is not the joke, it presupposes an immediate response" (21). N V

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Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology by Lewis Ayres (*New York: Oxford University Press, 2004*), 475 pp.

THE DEBATE following a Church council is often as significant as what went on before and during the council. That was certainly true after the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451, and it has been borne out in modern times in the decades since Vatican Council II. But it was also the case after the Council of Nicaea, the first worldwide assembly of Christian bishops. What happened in the five decades between Nicaea in 325 and the Council of Constantinople in 381 has formed our understanding of its decisions and our interpretation of its creed.

Lewis Ayres believes that the conventional accounts of this epoch, dutifully repeated again and again in histories of Christian thought, have gotten the story wrong and are, in his words, "deeply mistaken" (11). *Nicaea and Its Legacy* is a revisionist interpretation of the controversy over the decree of Nicaea and of the theological views that eventually brought about a resolution to the conflict. It is an ambitious project and Ayres carries it off with learning and intelligence. The discussion is detailed and dense, but he offers fresh insights into many longstanding problems as well as a comprehensive view of the formation of classical Trinitarian thinking. But this is not simply a historical study; Ayres also has a contemporary agenda and the final part of the book offers a proposal about how to re-appropriate more faithfully the classical Christian theological tradition.

To lay the groundwork for his argument Ayres notes some puzzling facts about Nicaea and its aftermath: In the ancient sources there is no suggestion that the creed of Nicaea was a universal statement of faith binding on the whole Church; there is no mention of the creed of Nicaea in letters or other documents from 325 to the early 340s, that is during the first fifteen years after the Council adjourned; the terminology of Nicaea, for example, words such as *ousia* or *homoousion*, was not considered sacrosanct, the necessary starting point for thinking about the relation of the Son to the Father; Arius was only one item on the Council's agenda, the bishops also issued a number of liturgical, disciplinary, and administrative canons; there was no "Arian" school, that is a group of teachers who sought to preserve and defend Arius's theology.

To explain such anomalies Ayres shows that in the early fourth century there were four theological "trajectories" reflected in the writings of major Christian thinkers. Identified by the names of individual figures, they are the following: (1) Alexander of Alexandria and the early Athanasius who taught, following Origen, the eternal generation of the Son from the Father, yet resisted speaking of three *hypostases*. (2) The Eusebian approach found in bishops such Eusebius of Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea, who, like Arius, believed that the Word came into being not through "generation" but as an act of the divine will. St. Paul, they argued, did not call Christ *the* power of God or *the* wisdom of God, but "God's power and God's wisdom" without the article. (3) Marcellus of Ancyra who thought that the use of the terms hypostasis and *ousia* in the plural was a serious mistake and threatened the Church's teaching on the oneness of God. Understandably he was suspected of Sabellianism. (4) Latin writers, for example, Tertullian, Novatian, Lactantius, and the early Hilary, emphasized the unity of God, but were strongly antiadoptionist. At the same time they carefully distinguished the Father from the Son, the one "an overflowing fount," the other "a stream flowing . . . from that" (73).

Ayres contends that in the wake of Alexander's condemnation of Arius in Alexandria and the deliberations at the Council the differences in these several theological positions came to the surface. Though all these thinkers were supporters of Nicaea—to different degrees—and could agree on many central theological points, the Council's decree did not resolve the differences in their approaches. For that reason, in the decades that followed, its formulations became contentious and differences in interpretation led to the sorry spectacle of regional councils going their own way and in some cases anathematizing one another. It was only as Nicaea was given a fresh interpretation by another generation of theologians, most notably the Cappadocians, that its language became authoritative and its

creed acknowledged as binding on all. The reception of the Council took place not through a benign process of acquiescence but through a bitter and protracted theological (and political) controversy that stretched over two generations.

The theological differences were real, and it was only after much reflection and argument, and, one might add, several failed attempts, that the leading bishops of the Church were able to find terms and formulas that all could live with. The “orthodox” understanding of the Trinity was achieved only at the end of the controversy. Along the way there were definite casualties, thinkers who held on too long to ways of thinking that had to be discarded because they were thought incapable of expressing the fullness of the God that Christians worshipped. Though the mystery of the triune God was beyond the grasp of human thought, the Church had to find a way to express in human language what was believed in human language. To do less was to make Christian teaching a matter of feeling and sentiment or of will and power. Of course much that transpired during the decades after Nicaea was low and dirty, the machinations of ambitious, ruthless, and self-serving bishops, as Ramsay MacMullen has shown in his recent *Voting about God in Early Church Councils* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). Yet any serious student of the period must be impressed by the high seriousness of the endeavor.

The bishops realized that there were insurmountable obstacles in the way of defining orthodoxy by reference to “individual terminologies and creedal formulae” (84). For this reason Ayres proposes that the developments after the Council created a distinct “theological culture,” a way of thinking about the mystery of the Triune God that is common to both Eastern and Western thinkers. Christian thinkers were able to set forth in great detail the inner logic of Christian belief about the relation of the Son to the Father, and they insisted that the language of Christian doctrine be interpreted within the context of the Church’s understanding of the Holy Scriptures and her worship and prayer.

The Church Fathers were not interested in ideas as such. For them theology was always in service of the praise and adoration of the Triune God and the practice of the Christian life. The “Nicene” theologians thought that their opponents failed “to maintain appropriate attention to the mysteriousness of God” (343) and were inattentive to the consequences of their teaching on the “training of the soul.” In a sermon on John 1:1–3, Augustine says to his congregation that this passage was not read “to be understood” but to help us discover “what prevents our understanding and so move it out of the way and hunger to grasp the eternal Word, and for ourselves to be changed from worse to better” (338). Ayres remarks, “the

skopos of the Scripture intrinsically includes the journey of the soul in Christ towards union with and understanding of the Triune God" (338).

In his presentation of the "theological culture" of Nicaea, Ayres gives greater attention to the Scripture than to the liturgy. He does mention St. Basil's appeal to the baptismal formula in his defense of the divinity of the Spirit, but it is the scriptural context of theological language that dictates the argument of the book. "The language of Scripture is taken as the primary and most trustworthy language for Christians"; and the technical terms they forged were conceived "not as a necessary transposition of ideas, but as an elucidation of the text of the Scripture" (277).

Yet I felt in reading the book that Ayres is still too much formed by older ways of thinking about patristic thought and that the centrality of the Scriptures in early Christian writings does not actually shape his mode of discourse. In truth there are long sections in which the Scriptures enter only tangentially into the discussion. And Ayres has the frustrating habit of mentioning a biblical text but not actually citing the passage under discussion. As a consequence the reader can easily miss the force of the argument being presented. Inexplicably the book does not have a scriptural index. More significantly he could have made the differences between the four "trajectories" of thinking in the early fourth century much more vivid by illustrating how the several writers dealt differently with the same biblical texts or deployed other texts.

As an example of what is missing, consider Exodus 3:14, "I am who I am." Ayres mentions the text (without giving the scriptural reference) in passing in a discussion of Gregory Nazianzen's use of light imagery, but he does not let the reader know why this passage was so problematic and, in the end, so rich for Trinitarian thinking. The reason it was difficult is that it suggested that only God the Father was "being" in the proper sense of the term.

Because Eunomius thought it referred only to God the Father, not the Son, Gregory of Nyssa discusses it in some detail in his *Contra Eunomium*. In his interpretation of the passage, Gregory first cites Galatians 4:8, where Paul says that the Galatians once served "beings that by nature are no gods." He notes that Paul uses the same expression, "to be," in this case "*are* no gods," as is used in Exodus, but he also employs the expression "served" with relation to "those who are no gods." From there Paul moves to the term "servant" in Romans 1 where one reads "servant of Jesus Christ." From this he concludes that we "no longer serve those who are by nature no gods" but serve the one who is by nature God "to whom every knee shall bow in heaven and on earth." That is to say, Jesus Christ, like the Father, belongs in the category of the "one who is."

Next Paul cites 1 Timothy 6:16, another key text, which reads, “king of kings and Lord of lords who alone has immortality and dwells in unapproachable light.” Like Exodus 3:14 this passage also seems to assume that the Father is uniquely God and alone possesses immortality. But Gregory points out that in the Gospel of John Jesus says, “I am the life” and so is also the source of immortality, and as the “true light,” he too is “unapproachable.” From these texts then we learn that the “Father is not without the Son” and the words “I am who I am” apply equally to the Son as to the Father.

Ayres is of course aware of this kind of reasoning in the Church Fathers, but he passes too quickly over the actual interpretation of biblical passages in the texts he cites to move on to what seems more properly theological or philosophical. The reader seldom senses how pervasively the language of the Bible actually gives shape to the form of the arguments. The theological issues that dominated the discussion were at bottom exegetical. Fourth-century writers were faced with a panoply of biblical texts that needed interpretation, and different writers sought to reconcile the seeming contradictions between biblical passages in different ways. In turn this led them to conclusions that were often at odds with each other. It was only as the interpretation of key texts gained wide assent that a consistent theological perspective took hold in the Church’s life and thought.

In a penultimate section dealing with Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine, Ayres shows that though they differ in many respects, they shared a wide set of fundamental assumptions about how to think about the Holy Trinity. That is to say they offer “two compatible articulations of the legacy bequeathed to later generations by pro-Nicene Christians across the late antique Mediterranean and Near East” (383). This understanding of the classical differences between Greek and Latin writers has the potential of seeing Eastern and Western Trinitarian thought as complementary.

The final section of the book is a critique of the assumptions of modern, that is, post-Enlightenment, systematic theology. A distinctive feature of modern theological reasoning is that Christian teaching must be established on some other ground than the authority of the tradition. The truth of Christian faith must be subjected to criteria that have been developed since the Enlightenment, including modern historical exegesis of the Bible.

Against this view Ayres presents a view of theology as “contemplation of Scripture.” By this he means that the sense of the text is to be understood as it has been “organized and summarized” (418) by the Church’s basic creedal formulations. As Tertullian argued in his programmatic essay, *De praescriptione haereticorum*, the Bible is the Church’s book and must be read in light of the Church’s life, worship, and creeds. This means that the

task of the interpreter is to find a place for Christian discourse within the world opened by the scriptural text as it is interpreted in the Church's tradition. The reasoning behind this argument is deceptively simple and one that is supported by historical experience. Theologies that are unable to sustain a reading of the Scriptures within the Catholic tradition of scriptural interpretation eventually find it difficult to sustain an engagement with the doctrinal tradition they claim to uphold.

Too often it is assumed that continuity of doctrine means continuity in propositional content. But Henri de Lubac argued that all reflection is an abstraction from contemplation of the mystery itself, and that the development of Christian doctrine should be seen in light of the awareness of the mystery at its core. That is, though we receive as an inheritance the formulations and concepts of the past, nevertheless we stand in a similar relation to the mystery we seek to understand as those who have gone before.

Although this is a work of highly sophisticated theological and historical reasoning, and to follow its argument is a demanding intellectual enterprise, Ayres ends his fine book, in a welcome ecclesiological key. In the final pages he argues that the faithful handing on of the Church's faith may not rest on establishing intellectual or historical criteria to judge the appropriateness of doctrinal developments, but will depend on "wider faith commitments" (429). By this he means belief in the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church and her teaching office. This does not mean that one silences the historian or shuts down the workshop of the theologian, but acknowledges that we cannot, either by theology or historical research, demonstrate the continuity of the Church's teaching from apostolic times to our own.

In the view of his contemporaries Newman's approach to the development of doctrine seemed to lead too readily to a justification of an inspired teaching office as the only faithful guide for a historically minded Christian. "To modern ears," writes Ayres, "this seems a strange paradox to be sure; but perhaps his contemporaries had seen the heart of the matter" (429). **NV**

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Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi by Thomas Aquinas, edited by Leonard E. Boyle, O.P. and John F. Boyle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2006), x + 221 pp.

THE SINGLE most important decision in St. Thomas Aquinas's career as an author, the one with the most far-reaching consequences for the flowering

of his genius and for his influence on the history of theology and philosophy, would appear to have been his decision in Rome, probably in 1266, to abandon a commentary on Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences* that he had begun there in the academic year 1265–66, in order to start working on what would be his masterpiece, the *Summa theologiae*. The commentary is mentioned in the early fourteenth century by the Dominican historian Tolomeo of Lucca, who had known Thomas in Naples during 1272–73. Tolomeo specifies that it is a commentary on Book One and says that he himself had seen a copy of it in Lucca. From the time of Tolomeo until the late twentieth century, however, the commentary, presumed lost, was rarely mentioned, while on the other hand the *Summa*'s authoritative status tended to obscure the occasion of its origin.

Thomas had commented on the *Sentences* before, in the normal course of his studies in theology at the University of Paris during 1252–57, but it was an unusual step for him to do so again as a master. His reason for starting a second *Sentences* commentary was apparently to provide his Dominican students in Rome with an introduction to theology. His reason for setting it aside seems to be hinted at in his prologue to the *Summa*, where he explains his proposal to write on what he variously calls Catholic truth, Christian religion, and sacred doctrine, in a mode suited to beginners, who he says are suffering from several impediments, including the fact that what is necessary for them to know is not being taught according to “the order of learning,” but according to what is required by “exposition of books.” The prologue thus seems to allude obliquely to Thomas's turn away from exposition of Lombard's book to a project of setting forth the order intrinsic to the discipline of theology. This inauguration of a new mode and order of writing might be compared to other momentous literary decisions. With the *Book of Sentences* itself, for example, Lombard had made a similarly drastic and comprehensive innovation in the ordering of theological material against a background of earlier twelfth-century collections of *sententiae*. And in the other direction, at the end of the sixteenth century, Francisco Suárez introduced a new order of metaphysical learning with his *Disputationes metaphysicae*, which he wrote while pausing from his work on an exposition of Thomas's *Summa*. The sources of the *Sentences* among the Fathers and the influence of the *Disputationes* among the moderns suggest even wider historical horizons for Thomas's decision in Rome.

Much scholarly work remains to be done that would contribute to fuller understanding of the more immediate circumstances and ramifications of that decision. For one thing, the structural and doctrinal relations between Thomas's *Summa* and the *Summa theologica* begun by Alexander

of Hales and continued by other Franciscans after Alexander's death in 1245 are still largely unexplored. For another, a critical edition of Thomas's *Summa* is a desideratum, and will probably continue to be one for another generation or more. On the other hand, thanks to the edition here under review, at least some of the text of Thomas's second commentary on the *Sentences* is now available. In providing such valuable context for Thomas's Roman decision, the edition makes a major contribution to Thomistic scholarship.

The text is that of a commentary in the front and back leaves and the margins of a late thirteenth-century Italian manuscript at Oxford (Lincoln College, Lat. ms. 95), the main text of which is Thomas's Parisian commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*. The marginal commentary was probably copied into the manuscript before 1286 (10). In an article titled "Alia lectura fratris Thome?" published in 1980 in *Mediaeval Studies* 42, Hyacinthe Dondaine drew attention to this marginal commentary, asking whether it might be Thomas's Roman *Sentences* commentary but concluding that it is not. He discussed several marginal references in the manuscript to "the other lecture of Brother Thomas," a phrase that he took to mean Thomas's Roman commentary, from which, along with other works by Thomas, he thought the author of the marginal commentary is drawing. Dondaine argued that the commentary transmits Thomistic doctrine, but he also thought that it reveals an un-Thomistic extension of reason's power in the following remark: "It must be said that just as faith posits, so reason can consider, although not perfectly, the Trinity of persons in unity of essence in what is divine" (*Lectura romana* 2.2.3, 98). In 1982 Leonard E. Boyle mentioned the marginal commentary in his Gilson lecture, "The Setting of the *Summa theologiae* of Saint Thomas," which has been printed and twice reprinted, and which is the most authoritative scholarly account of Thomas's situation at the time of his Roman decision. Boyle said that "there is good internal as well as external evidence in this marginal commentary that it is really a copy of a *reportatio* of the Roman classroom lectures of Thomas on I *Sententiarum* in 1265–66." In 1983 Boyle published this evidence in a reply to Dondaine in *Mediaeval Studies* 45 titled "Alia lectura fratris Thome," insinuating by his subtraction of Dondaine's titular question mark that there is no question in his own mind that the marginal commentary *itself* is a copy of at least some of a *reportatio* of Thomas's Roman commentary, and that the references to "the other lecture of Brother Thomas" are indications of places where this commentary should be aligned with Brother Thomas's "other"—that is, his *Parisian*—commentary. Boyle soon invited his student John F. Boyle to serve as co-editor in preparing the present edition of the

Roman commentary, which he, Leonard Boyle, continued to work on until his death in 1999, even throughout his thirteen years as prefect of the Vatican Library. John Boyle has completed the edition and furnished it with a learned introduction that presents the commentary in detail. It would be an impertinence to praise the scholarship of the great medievalist Leonard Boyle, but it can be said that John Boyle, his student, collaborator, and successor on this project, has maintained the very high standards of scholarship established by him.

I note that while many, myself obviously included, have been persuaded by the arguments of the two Boyles that the marginal commentary is indeed Thomas's Roman commentary, there are skeptics, including the distinguished Jean-Pierre Torrell, who was at first persuaded by Leonard Boyle's original arguments but later became doubtful. But I also note that since publication of the edition John Boyle has published "Aquinas's Roman Commentary on Peter Lombard" (*Anuario Filosófico* 39 [2006]: 477–96), which skillfully addresses the doubts of both Dondaine and Torrell with respect to the remark quoted above about reason's ability to consider the Trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence. (This point of controversy seems a good occasion to ponder the sense Thomas attributed to his beloved verb *considerare*.) Meanwhile the editors have shown that whoever copied the marginal commentary believed that he was copying a text by Thomas (8), and that the owner of the manuscript may have been a student of Thomas's (67–69). Since even those who, like Dondaine and Torrell, doubt the Thomistic authorship of the commentary grant that much of its doctrine is closely related to that of Thomas, there is every reason for Thomists, whatever their views on the commentary's authenticity, to take a serious interest in this edition.

The contents consist of John Boyle's introduction (1–57), which includes an extensive "Description of the Distinctions and Articles" (19–55); a reprint of Leonard Boyle's "Alia lectura fratris Thome" (58–69); the text of the commentary (71–207); a bibliography (208–211); and indices of scriptural passages and other authorities quoted by the commentary or the editors (211–221). There is a textual apparatus and an apparatus of sources, the latter of which includes for most of the articles indications of *loca parallela* in the Thomistic corpus. The text regularizes the manuscript's spelling to conform to modern—that is, classical—conventions, and the numbering of lines for each article is indicated in the margins at five-line intervals.

It is not clear whether the manuscript, and therefore the present edition, include all or only part of what Thomas completed of his Roman commentary on book one of the *Sentences*, but as it stands there is a

prologue followed by commentary, consisting of ninety-seven articles and three notes, on some early parts of the first book of the *Sentences*, namely Lombard's prologue and distinctions 1–17 and 23–24. Unlike Thomas's other *Sentences* commentary, this one, at least in the manuscript copy, contains no divisions or expositions of the text, although it does provide at the opening of most distinctions a list of questions to be discussed.

Because of the parts of the *Sentences* treated, the principal themes of the commentary as we have it include the mode of proceeding in theology, the Augustinian distinctions between use and enjoyment and between things and signs, divine names, the possibility of reaching knowledge of God through creatures, the processions of the Trinity, charity, and—at greatest length—the person of the Holy Spirit. Evidently the text holds special appeal for theologians, Trinitarian theologians in particular, but those interested in Thomas's metaphysics will also be drawn to it for its articles on the divine simplicity in distinction 8 and on the definition of person in distinction 23.

It remains for Thomists to continue what the editors have begun by assimilating this “new” text and comparing its contents with those of the familiar works in the Thomistic corpus. The indications of *loca parallela* in the apparatus of sources will be useful pointers for such comparison, and complementing these are valuable remarks in the introduction that help situate the commentary in the Thomistic corpus by pointing out verbatim parallels between it and other works in the corpus (*Compendium theologiae*, *De veritate*, *De potentia*, and *De virtutibus in communi*), and by discussing the Thomistic character of its style and doctrine (14–16). The bibliography of secondary sources (210–211) includes references to preliminary researches on the commentary's relation to the corpus that have already been published, among them John Boyle's “The Ordering of Trinitarian Teaching in Thomas Aquinas's Second Commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*” (*Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, suppl. 1 [1995]: 125–36), which suggests that Thomas in this commentary chafed at Lombard's order of topics as he came to realize that it is not the order of learning.

As familiarity with the text becomes common among Thomists and the scholarship on it grows, it will become clearer both how the *Lectura romana* resembles other Thomistic texts and how it adds to our knowledge of Thomas's mind by presenting words, phrases, images, questions, and arguments unparalleled in the Thomistic corpus. On the micrological level, the introduction mentions three terms that occur nowhere else in the corpus, namely *effigatio*, *individuativum*, and *multiplicabilitas* (18). On a larger scale, while most of the ninety-seven questions asked are provided with indications of parallels in the corpus, there are eight exceptions, cases

in which the editors have been unable to find Thomas asking precisely the same question elsewhere (see 16, note 63). These are: whether man ought to use or enjoy himself (1.1.3.1, 86–88); whether virtues are to be enjoyed (1.1.3.4, 90–91); whether there is something supremely good (2.2.1, 95–96); whether there is only one supreme good (2.2.3, 98–99); whether it is possible for there to be a plurality of persons in the supreme good (2.2.4, 99–101); whether essence is a principle of generation (5.1.2, 126–27); whether God alone is simple (8.3.1, 145–46); and whether a supernatural light is required for loving God (17.1.1, 190–91).

The introduction identifies several “illustrations” that are “fuller in the *Lectura romana* than anywhere else in Thomas’s writings (if present at all)” (17), and by way of offering a foretaste of the text, I conclude with a translation of one of these. It occurs in an article on the Augustinian theme of the image of the triune God in the human mind’s threesome of memory, intelligence, and will. An objection says that thought about and love of God are not always present in the human mind, yet the image of God is always present, and so the meaning of image should not be understood with reference to intellect and will. In his answer Thomas uses one of the terms just mentioned that occur nowhere else in his works, namely *effigiatio*, meaning “outline.”

To the fourth objection it must be said that just as we see that in an external image sometimes there is only an outline, that is, when the image is merely drawn, but sometimes there is, in addition to this, coloration, so too it is in the soul. For when the soul is fixed on God and joined to Him through understanding, then it is an image that is “colored in,” as it were, and complete. But because it cannot always be fixed on God and joined to Him, there is not always in it an image with complete knowledge and love. Inasmuch as the mind is naturally capable of turning to God by means of intelligence and love, however, there always remains in it an image at least “in outline,” as it were. (3.3.3, ad 4, 119)

Here Thomas makes an analysis of visual images into outline and color serve as the basis of a vivid comment on the spiritual image, according to which sometimes there is in the human soul, by virtue of its natural powers, merely a “drawing” of God, but sometimes, by virtue of the soul’s activities of thought and love, there is in it a “painting” of him, so to speak. While its point is different, the passage is in keeping with Thomas’s remarks on image, shape, and color in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 35, a. 1. More generally, the passage’s elaboration of images of the image of God is keeping with the way in which Thomas, despite the abstractness of his thought and the formality of his speech, always kept in view, and was

ready to make something of, the precise and concrete implications of the words he was using. N-V

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Divine Likeness: Toward a Trinitarian Anthropology of the Family

by Marc Cardinal Ouellet (*Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006*), 246 pp.

DIVINE LIKENESS shows how fruitful it can be to bring John Paul II into dialogue with the theological anthropology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, about which Cardinal Ouellet wrote his 1983 dissertation at the Gregorian University in Rome (*L'existence comme mission: l'anthropologie théologique de Hans Urs von Balthasar*). The first part of *Divine Likeness* ("Toward a Trinitarian Anthropology") reproduces the 1996 McGivney lectures delivered by Ouellet at the John Paul II Institute in Washington, DC. It is the theologically richest and most systematic part of the book. The second part consists of six essays united by the theme "Perspectives of Trinitarian Spirituality for Marriage and the Family" written for study weeks of the Italian Conference of Bishops between 1998 and 2000.

Ouellet's book is simultaneously scientific and pastoral. While it presents a rigorous and profound theological argument, its declared aim is to help Christian families achieve "a new theological awareness that shapes from within the sacramental relationships of love, faithfulness, and fecundity in the service of the Gospel" (4). Its intended audience is thus not only theologians, but Christians from all walks of life.

Chapter one presents an introductory overview of "Theology of the Family: An Ongoing Project." Vatican II's Trinitarian ecclesiology of communion serves as the point of departure for a new theological examination of the family. The communion of divine persons is the exemplar of all communion (*Gaudium et Spes* §24.3). Even more, there is a dramatic interpenetration between family relations and Trinitarian relations. The "place" of every created person is the exchange of love between the divine persons. Image and dramatic interpenetration, these are the two principal themes of Ouellet's McGivney lectures.

Chapter two is devoted to the first of these two themes, "The Family, Image of the Trinity." John Paul II affirms that the family is an image of the Trinity, while Augustine, in Ouellet's reading, rejects it (more on this issue later). The recent work of some exegetes about Genesis (reviewed in detail by Ouellet) supports John Paul II's thesis. The family "we" is an image of

the Trinitarian “We” in a manner that goes beyond mere metaphor to genuine analogy. The precise point of analogical likeness does not lie in the bodily characteristics of the male and female sex, but in the communion of persons. “The specificity of the analogy is centered on communion” (34).

Chapter three is devoted to the second of the two themes. It takes the step beyond mere likeness to the dramatic interplay between the Trinity and the family (“The Covenant of the Trinity and the Family: The Domestic Church”). Ouellet unfolds this topic by turning to Balthasar’s account of the full constitution of personhood through mission. While every human being is a unique spiritual subject, that subject cannot answer the question, “Who am I?” in an ultimate way out of its own natural resources. Only when God grants it a share in the mission of his Son, a unique mission in the body of Christ, only then does this subject become “person” in the full theological sense of that term. The sacramental presence of the Spirit of love in the family draws its members into the mission of Christ and thus into the exchange of love between the Father and the Son.

Chapter four looks from this core of the mystery of the family toward living it out in “The Trinitarian Mission of the Family at the Dawning of the Third Christian Millennium.” If the family is to live its mission to the full, moral teaching alone is not enough. The family’s life springs ultimately from the event of Christ and the gift of the Spirit, not from mere moral norms. “Consequently, it is the duty of a spirituality of the family to cultivate the ‘theological’ consciousness of the family members, that is, the consciousness of a personal relationship with God which constitutes the foundation of their dignity and the source of their capacity for gift in Christ’s image” (60). Human love in the family is taken into the service of the mutual relation of love, gift, and glorification between the divine persons. Here one can see the deep Johannine roots of Balthasar’s and Ouellet’s Trinitarian anthropology. “Whatever you ask for in my name I will do, so that the Father may be glorified in the Son” (Jn 14:13). “In this is my Father glorified, that you bear much fruit and become my disciples” (Jn 15:8). “All who are mine are yours, [Father,] and yours are mine, and I am glorified in them” (Jn 17:10).

Divine Likeness is an outstanding book. Ouellet brings a powerful systematic mind to bear on the issues, a mind nourished by the Catholic tradition from Scripture and the Fathers to the present, especially John Paul II and Balthasar. At the same time, it is animated by prophetic warmth in proposing to families their mission at the dawning of the new Millennium. The following critical remarks do not detract in any way from this overall positive judgment.

In Ouellet's reading, John Paul II's thesis that the communion of persons in the family is an image of the Trinity contradicts Augustine and the tradition that follows him, particularly Thomas Aquinas. In John Paul II, he points out, "The specificity of the analogy is centered on communion" (34). It is unfortunate that he does not point in a similarly precise way to the specificity of the analogy in the position discussed and rejected by Augustine and Thomas.

When one examines that position, one sees an important difference. The specificity of the analogy is centered on the *relations of origin* in the family, not on the communion of persons. The position lines up these relations of origin one by one with the relations of origin in the Trinity: God the Father corresponds to Adam as father and to human fathers in general; God the Son corresponds to the children begotten by Adam, as children, and to human children in general; God the Holy Spirit corresponds to Eve, inasmuch as she proceeded from Adam, not by way of generation, but in some other way, just as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father without being the Father's Son. (Strictly speaking, this third correspondence holds only for Eve; all other human mothers are begotten.)

John Paul II does not focus on these relations of origin in the family, but on personal communion. This is why he does not posit a one-to-one correspondence between persons in the Trinity and in the family. He does suggest a certain correspondence between the Holy Spirit and one specific member of the family, but it is the child rather than the mother. Mutual love is fruitful. In the love between Father and Son, the Holy Spirit is this fruit. In the love between man and woman, children are. Yet John Paul II does not attempt to line up father and mother with the other two persons in the Trinity, the Father and the Son. In this way, the divine image he proposes is essentially different from the divine image rejected by Augustine and Thomas.

Ouellet himself points to two texts in Augustine's *Tractates on John* in which Augustine establishes an analogy between the communion of human persons who are "of one heart and soul" (Acts 4:32) and the communion of the divine persons who are one God. It is here in Augustine's work that one can find the real connection with John Paul II. Although Augustine does not *de facto* speak about "image" in these passages, he could do so *de iure*.

A similar point applies to many texts by Thomas Aquinas. For example, in his commentary on Jesus' prayer, "Holy Father, preserve them in your name, which you have given me, so that they may be one as we are one" (Jn 17:11), Thomas says:

They are preserved for this goal, namely, to be one. For, our entire perfection consists in the unity of the Spirit. "Take every care to preserve the unity of the Spirit by the peace that binds you together" (Eph 4:3). "How good and joyful it is when brothers dwell in unity!" (Ps 133:1). But he adds, "as we are one." There is a difficulty in this. They are one in essence; therefore we will also be one in essence. But this is not true. Response: The perfection of each being is nothing other than a participation in the divine likeness. For we are good to the degree in which we are made like God. Our unity, therefore, is perfective precisely in the degree to which it participates in the divine unity. Now, there is a twofold unity in God, namely, the unity of nature (cf. "The Father and I are one," Jn 10:30) and the *unity of love in the Father and the Son which is the unity of the Spirit*. Both of these are in us, not in equality of rank, but by a certain likeness. The Father and the Son are numerically of one nature, but we are one in nature according to our kind. Again, they are one by a love that is not derived from the gift of someone, but [by a love] that proceeds from them. For the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, but we by a love in which we participate as something derived from a higher source [that is, from the Holy Spirit]. (Thomas Aquinas, *Lectures on John*, ch. 17, lect. 3, Marietti §2214)

Thomas does not explicitly address the question whether the unity of the Spirit among human beings is an image of the corresponding unity in the Trinity, but he does call it a "likeness," the term coupled with "image" in Genesis 1:26. When one examines it, this "likeness" in the unity of love fulfills all the requirements listed by Thomas for an "image" in the full sense as a specific likeness of its exemplar (*ST I*, q. 93, a. 2).

There is a second point at which Ouellet seems to see too much contrariety in the theological tradition, namely, in the closely related development of the theology of marriage. He suggests that a naturalistic and legalistic conception of marriage was overcome by the "personalist revolution" (61) that began before Vatican II and took clear shape in the pontificate of John Paul II.

In defining the essence and mission of the family by love and not first by procreation, the pope . . . claims to be returning to "the very roots of reality" (*Familiaris Consortio* §17). This position marks an important step toward the personalistic recasting of the Christian doctrine of marriage and the family. It places the three traditional values of marriage—procreation, faithful love, and sacramental signification—in the line of fruitful conjugal love and no longer in that of procreation as a distinct end. (61)

It is not necessary to read this text as an attack on the doctrine of the hierarchy of ends in marriage, and in particular of procreation as the

primary end of marriage, although the phrase “no longer” could be read as suggesting such an attack. Wojtyła strongly affirms the doctrine of the primary end (see *Love and Responsibility*, 68); and in his *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II reads *Gaudium et Spes* as reaffirming the traditional hierarchy of ends (see *Theology of the Body*, 127:3).

Divine Likeness leaves the impression that the theological tradition was not fully aware of the centrality of love in marriage. This impression, which is widely shared among contemporary authors, may be due in large part to looking in the wrong place for the tradition’s understanding of love in marriage, namely, in the formal treatises about marriage. These treatises are for the most part meant to prepare future pastors for their work. It is more fruitful to look in another place, namely, mystical writings and commentaries on the Song of Songs, the most frequently commented on book of the Bible in the Middle Ages. A fruit of this tradition can be seen in the rich spousal theology of Matthias Josef Scheeben (1835–88). Scheeben shows the wealth of personalist understanding of marriage available to Catholic theology in the nineteenth century. John Paul II himself seems to have drawn the core of his vision of marriage from the spousal and Trinitarian theology of St. John of the Cross, in which the gift of self plays such a key role, in accord with the statement repeated three times by the bride in the Song of Songs, “My beloved is mine, and I am his” (Song 2:16). “I am my beloved’s, and my beloved is mine” (Song 6:3). “I am my beloved’s, and his desire is for me” (Song 7:10). Here too, the tradition is more cohesive than Ouellet suggests. N V

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