

Book Reviews

Thomistes: Ou de l'actualité de saint Thomas d'Aquin edited by Serge-Thomas Bonino, OP, et al. (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2003), 279 pp.

THIS BOOK is a collection of essays that should serve well to introduce general readers and theology students to Thomistic theology. It also exemplifies the approach of the younger generation of Dominicans who are associated with the *Revue Thomiste*. Many of its authors presently teach at Toulouse or the University of Fribourg. Consequently, the book is a good introduction to the contemporary revival of this Dominican Francophone Thomism that had suffered greatly in the conciliar and postconciliar period. The last essay by Henry Donneaud provides a history of this school and underlines the continuity between these recent Thomists and the work of Marie-Michel Labourdette, who was the regent at Toulouse from 1946 to 1958 and a longtime editor of the *Revue Thomiste*.

The decline of this school in the 1960s and '70s, connected with the political gains of the "nouvelle théologie" and other movements, explains the cautious tone of many essays. These Francophone theologians were often lumped together with the Roman Thomists and dismissed as reactionary. For example, L.-B. Gillon, M.-R. Gagnebet, and Jean-Hervé Nicolas all made important historical and doctrinal criticisms of Henri de Lubac, and to the best of my knowledge these criticisms have never been addressed. But these Dominicans were overshadowed by other theologians. Moreover, Europe has not been greatly influenced by the increasing stature of medieval philosophy in the English-speaking world. The preface by Christoph Cardinal Schönborn indicates that he, perhaps like many influential leaders, is still worried about the return of preconciliar Thomism. The first essay by Serge-Thomas Bonino, the *Revue Thomiste's* present editor, takes pains to distance contemporary Thomism from Thomist fundamentalism. It is not clear who Bonino has in mind for this label. It is telling that an issue of the *Revue Thomiste* (2000) was devoted to de Lubac's *Surnaturel*, and that the earlier Dominicans' criticisms were not evident.

The essays cover a wide variety of subjects, such as faith, Christ and the Church, morality and the spiritual life, and Thomism itself. They are all at least competent and often excellent and should be accessible to someone with little background. In particular, contemporary theology students should be interested in Olivier-Thomas Venard's essay on the Bible, whereas even a general reader would find Gilles Emery's essay on God to be clear and helpful. The four essays on moral issues show the importance of Thomism for contemporary debates concerning the philosophy of law, the foundations of ethics, and bioethics. None of the essays follows a particularly scholastic method or uses difficult terminology. There is not much emphasis on argument. In general, the authors use doctrines that are taken from Thomas in order to address contemporary issues in an accessible manner. Some contemporary theologians make similar use of the Fathers, who perhaps lend themselves more easily to such an approach, since they so often wrote in an unsystematic and occasional fashion. Thomas himself integrated the thought of the Fathers into his own more rigorous and systematic approach. The authors have a difficult task in that they are taking doctrines that were so developed and applying them to the less sophisticated context of contemporary Catholic thought.

Although the writers often distance themselves from previous Thomists, in general they do not develop strange or surprising themes. They are often careful to connect their views with passages from recent encyclicals and the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*. For example, L.-T. Somme emphasizes the importance of happiness and virtue for Thomas's ethical theory and shows that these themes are reflected not only in the *Catechism* but also in *Veritatis Splendor*. I might also add that these themes were consistently and clearly expressed by such an old-fashioned preconciliar Thomist as Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Jean-Miguel Garrigue connects Pope John Paul II's emphasis on the human person to Thomas's own texts. Garrigue draws in large part on Thomas's understanding of charity in order to emphasize the role of the will in beatitude. Thierry-Dominique Humbrecht's essay on providence carries a different tone and perhaps content than the Dominican tradition as may have been best expressed by Banez (231). One is left with the impression that this tradition can be bypassed, although in his essays Bonino argues convincingly that it cannot. Some readers may question opinions that are expressed in Benoît-Dominique de la Soujeole's essays on ecumenism and non-Christian religions, especially since he seems to suggest that in the postconciliar era it is not as important to consider how individuals may have implicit faith (155). But de la Soujeole may be expressing tentative theological opinions and his views do not reflect the volume's general tone.

It seems to me that the newer group of French Dominicans does not have the philosophical and theological rigor of the earlier group. Although the volume is meant for a general audience, it should at least give more of an impression that theology is organized knowledge and not the vague musings on religious issues that it has become in many circles. Moreover, most authors do not emphasize the philosophical importance of Thomas's Aristotelianism for his theology. The reader might be led to believe that Thomas's theology can be separated from an outdated Aristotelianism. The writers' theological and linguistic context might explain the low profile of philosophy and Aristotelianism in particular. Although in Anglophone philosophical circles Aristotle is more respectable than Catholic theology, in theological and Continental circles it is perhaps different. Humbrecht's essay on God and metaphysics indicates a philosophical context in which Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger are the more important figures.

The book is valuable because it informs the reader about the current state of Toulouse–Fribourg Thomism and represents a welcome alternative to the somewhat shallow theology of the conciliar and postconciliar period. Nevertheless, readers may be led to believe that theology does not require a rigorous preparation in scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy, and that contemporary Thomism is superior to the Thomism of the preconconciliar years. The Toulouse–Fribourg Dominicans are wonderfully reviving their own brand of Thomism, but its members do not yet clearly show the rigor and learning of such figures as Gagnebet, Gillon, Labourdette, and Nicolas. But perhaps no one can now measure up to their high standard. N V

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Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology by Matthew Levering (*Oxford: Blackwell, 2004*), x + 254 pp.

ONE THING I ASK of the LORD; this I seek:
To dwell in the LORD'S house all the days of my life,
To gaze on the LORD'S beauty, to visit his temple.

—Psalm 27:4

ST. THOMAS Aquinas comments on this Psalm verse: "The saints who are in the fatherland direct their contemplation to God himself and also to those things which are ordered to God himself, and therefore the

Psalmist says, 'to visit his temple,' that is, the humanity of Christ" (*Super Ps. 26*). As he makes clear in *Summa theologiae* I, question 1, article 2, Aquinas understands *sacra doctrina* upon this earth to proceed from the light of this higher knowledge of heaven. *Sacra doctrina*, as *theologia* properly speaking, is a profoundly contemplative act that orients us toward the beauty of the Triune God, a vision that comes in visiting the temple of God, which is the humanity of Christ. In a world that has lost sight of the "one thing" in its myopia of pragmatism, Matthew Levering offers this beautiful vision of Aquinas for Trinitarian theology today. Brilliantly engaging and profoundly ambitious, Levering's *Scripture and Metaphysics* stands as a model for renewing theology according to its proper end: contemplating the triune God.

Levering writes his book in response to the opposition alleged in contemporary theology between scriptural and metaphysical modes of discourse. For many in the academy, the supposed impasse gives rise to one of two solutions: either reject metaphysics or conflate metaphysics with Scripture so as to produce Trinitarian metaphysics. Levering first gives the diagnosis of the problem. He writes,

When practical relevance replaces contemplation as the primary goal of Trinitarian theology, the technical precisions of metaphysics come to be seen as meaningless, rather than as ways of deepening our contemplative union with the living God revealed in Scripture. (2)

As an alternative to Moltmann's oft-cited "the Trinity is our social program," Levering then offers a recovery of theology as contemplative wisdom that does not reduce God to modern pragmatism. Levering states:

The ultimate relevance of the doctrine of the Trinity, however, consists in human beings' acquiring the practices of contemplation, which form the spiritual exercise by which we are drawn from idols and united, in Christ, to the true God in friendship. It is here that scriptural and metaphysical modes of instruction meet. Teaching the doctrine of the Trinity requires (even in Scripture) a metaphysical ascesis in order to accomplish the spiritual exercise of contemplation, in which the self-centered person becomes God-centered. (21–22)

Levering structures a coherent systematic dialogue of seven chapters that, in certain portions, reproduces arguments from his previous articles: "Beyond the Jamesian Impasse in Trinitarian Theology" (*Thomist* 66 [2002]: 395–420), "Wisdom and the Viability of Thomistic Trinitarian Theology" (*Thomist* 64 [2000]: 593–618), "Contemplating God: YHWH

and Being in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas" (*Irish Theological Quarterly* 67 [2002]: 17–31), and "Balthasar on Christ's Consciousness on the Cross" (*Thomist* 65 [2001]: 567–81). Levering's genius particularly shines in three notable characteristics of his method. He argues broadly within the structure of St. Thomas's thought, closely to many insights of Aquinas, and widely with an astounding range of contemporary theologians, exegetes, and philosophers. The following will consider these three aspects of *Scripture and Metaphysics's* contribution to the state of theology today.

First, as for his broad Thomistic structure, Levering comments upon themes taken from *Summa theologiae* without a slavish *articulatio*. Like his delightful *Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation According to Thomas Aquinas*, Levering's *Scripture and Metaphysics* finds room within Aquinas's structure to breathe new life into what has been summarily dismissed by Aquinas's modern opponents, such as Karl Rahner in his allegation that the very structure of the *Summa* made the Trinity irrelevant to Christian life. A unified vision, the book is modeled on the themes taken from *Summa theologiae* I, questions 1–43. Levering guides the reader through an introduction, seven chapters, and a conclusion. Each is powerfully illuminative. What may come as a surprise is how Levering dedicates chapter four to "The Paschal Mystery and Sapiential Theology of the Trinity." He admits that, "Aquinas, in his formal discussion of the triune God in Himself, hardly makes reference to Christ's passion and resurrection" (111), and so Levering has recourse to the *tertia pars* of the *Summa* and the *Commentary on the Gospel of John*. This maneuver alters Aquinas's order, and yet exposes the truth of Aquinas's teaching in the face of what others see as a glaring omission in Thomistic Trinitarian theology. Such a maneuver can be offered to satisfy those who cannot see the whole of Aquinas's sapiential theology, but isolate a question or a treatise from its universal vision.

Moreover, Levering recognizes that he does not directly treat question 43 on the temporal missions of the Son and Spirit, but that he does engage "this topic by emphasizing the scriptural and soteriological foundation of Aquinas's theology of God" (11). True, but Aquinas certainly placed the question on the missions of the divine persons last in this treatise for a reason. For one, it opens up the possibility of new creation immediately before Aquinas launches into the procession of creatures from our triune God in question 44. The discussion on the missions thus anticipates how creation will be graced and glorified by the saving work of the Father sending the Son and Spirit into our lives. In today's theological dialogues, I can easily imagine Levering making great use of *Summa theologiae* I, question 43, against those who misunderstand

Aquinas's respect for the power of God expressed in *Summa theologiae* III, question 3, article 5. In *Summa theologiae* I, question 43, article 4, Aquinas writes, "Mission in its meaning conveys a procession from another, and in divine things it means procession according to origin, as was said above. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way [*nullo modo*] is it fitting for Him to be sent."

Second, as for his close adherence to Aquinas's insights, Levering does not retreat from points in Aquinas's Trinitarian theology that have come under direct attack in recent years. These points include: a consideration of the one divine essence before considering the three persons; an awareness of the Son's beatific vision during the passion; an appreciation for the psychological analogy of the Trinity in its scriptural warrants; and an exposition of the names of the three divine persons. Rather than being embarrassed for Aquinas's unfashionable teachings, Levering unabashedly embraces them as exactly what is needed in today's theological dialogues.

For example, Levering defends Aquinas's metaphysical account of God's knowledge and will in chapter three against a certain contemporary biblical exegesis that makes God's knowledge and will to appear limited, fragmented, and changing. Far from yielding a portrait of a static Aristotelian deity, Aquinas's philosophical tools allow him to read the Sacred Scriptures in distinguishing what is analogical from what is metaphorical so as to show forth the beauty of the all-knowing and all-loving eternal God of Israel. Levering writes:

Aquinas's teaching on God's knowledge defends metaphysically the *scriptural* account of a supremely active, engaged God. Since God knows each thing in knowing his causal power, God's knowledge of things is, when joined to his will to give being to what He knows, the wondrously intimate *cause* at the heart of each and every thing. (92, original emphasis)

Third, as for Levering's dialogic gifts in the book, he has a wonderful penchant to choose interlocutors for an engagement of Thomistic wisdom. Of special mention are: R. Kendall Soulen, Jon D. Levenson, N. T. Wright, Richard Bauckham, Hans Urs von Balthasar, W. Norris Clarke, John D. Zizioulas, and Reinhard Hütter. Levering lets his colleagues in dialogue speak for themselves before offering Thomistic answers. This shows Aquinas to be not just an acceptable conversation partner for today—but a most able one for the best theology. Wide-ranging in scholarship, Levering also relies upon insights of other contemporary writers such as A. N. Williams, William Cavanaugh, David Burrell, Bruce Marshall, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel René Barnes, Rowan Williams,

and Thomas Weinandy. Most notably, Levering gladly points throughout the book to the magisterial work in Trinitarian theology of Gilles Emery. It should also be mentioned that the book is dedicated to Romanus Cessario and Matthew Lamb, two of Levering's former teachers whose influences appear in these pages. Perhaps it would be only quibbling to miss some other voices in this richly documented work, such as Walter Kasper's from his influential book *The God of Jesus Christ*. Also, a more complete index would have served the book better to identify authors and topics more readily for research purposes.

To glance at one example of a fascinating dialogue that Levering has constructed, the reader can enjoy Karen Kilby's critique of the pragmatic uses of Trinitarian doctrine that have followed Schleiermacher and William James. While agreeing with Kilby's criticisms, Levering lets the reader know that Kilby herself follows George Lindbeck's grammatical theory of doctrine to this conclusion written by her: "[O]ne should renounce the very idea that the point of the doctrine is to give insight into God" (236). That is unacceptable to Levering. Rather, he writes, the primary goal of Trinitarian theology as a contemplative exercise is:

to gain knowledge of God in Himself. Within the exercise, scriptural and metaphysical instruction complement one another. The knowledge of God in Himself is sought not for the sake of any created good, but simply because of the glory and beauty of God. However, such knowledge is sought within, and made possible by, the context of the triune God's self-revealing gifts of creation and redemption. . . . As Jesus said, "But seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well" (Mt 6:33). (238)

In conclusion, Matthew Levering has offered a lucid text that attempts to reorient Trinitarian theology back to nothing less than God himself through a contemplative ascesis. By reestablishing the contemplation of the Trinity as the goal of theology, Levering reunites Sacred Scripture and metaphysics, respecting their unique contributions. This exemplifies the teaching of John Paul II: "Metaphysics thus plays an essential role of mediation in theological research" (*Fides et Ratio*, no. 83). Levering's book may not prove wildly popular, but it leads those of us who follow Aquinas and Levering into a vision to be adored. At the beginning of this highly recommended book Levering quotes Jean-Pierre Torrell: "The Eastern Christians like to say of theology that it is doxology; Thomas would add some further clarifications to that, but he would not reject the intention: the joy of the Friend who is contemplated is completed in song" (2). Levering has done a great service in showing the abiding relevance of St. Thomas Aquinas for

the “one thing” to seek so that we too, in our age and for our needs, can enter Aquinas’s song of contemplating the triune God:

*Genitori genitoque laus et jubilatio,
Salus, honor, virtus quoque, sit et benedictio.
Procedenti ab utroque compar sit laudatio. Amen.*

N V

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Christus Sacerdos in the Preaching of St. Augustine: Christ and Christian Identity by Daniel J. Jones (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004), 493 pp.

CHRISTUS SACERDOS is much more than just a monograph on the (potentially narrow) topic of “Christ as priest” in Augustine. It is in fact a major study of Augustine’s Christology as a whole, and an argument for the essential link between Christology and the formation of Christian identity. The work has its origin as a doctoral dissertation at the Augustinianum in Rome, directed by Robert Dodaro and drawing on the scholarship of Hubertus Drobner. In this expanded version of his dissertation, Daniel Jones examines the title *Christus Sacerdos* in the preaching of Augustine, with the aim of showing how Augustine “shapes Christian identity in tandem with the doctrine of Christ” (20).

The outline of this volume reflects (in modified order) the three elements that Jones sees Augustine employing in order to ground a distinctive Christian identity in the mystery of Christ: (1) the identity and work of Christ himself, from which Christian identity derives; (2) the manner in which the doctrine of Christ serves to ground both what Christians are and what they are to become; and (3) the reinforcement of these by means of polemic against opposing ideals. In part I, Jones takes up the last element first, juxtaposing Christian and pagan identities and displaying Augustine’s critique of popular and cultured paganism. In part II, he offers an extended study of Christology in Augustine, focusing especially on the titles *Christus Mediator* and *Christus Sacerdos*, and showing their distinctiveness, interrelation, and connection to other Christological titles. And in part III, he demonstrates how Augustine uses the title *Christus Sacerdos* pastorally to ground Christian identity, especially by building on the theme of humility and by teaching on the distinctive role of faith, hope, and love.

There is no denying that this is a densely researched and argued work. Jones presents his case with a thoroughness that will please the Augustine

scholar but possibly daunt the non-specialist. And while the argument and outline of the work are clearly stated at several points, it is not always easy to follow the complex set of trails that we are led down. The reader will do well to read the introduction carefully, and perhaps glance through the summary conclusions (403–15), before plunging in. In the service of displaying the achievement of *Christus Sacerdos*, it may be helpful to identify here three contributions among the many that could be named.

The first notable contribution is a thorough exposition of a recently unearthed sermon of Augustine's (Dolbeau 26), discovered by François Dolbeau in Mainz, Germany, in 1990. Preached on the occasion of the pagan festival of the Calends of January (January 1, 404), this sermon lasted more than two and a half hours and in print runs to nearly fifty pages. Jones sees in this text not only one of Augustine's most complete descriptions of the title *Christus Sacerdos*, but the very outline of how Augustine employs teaching about Christ to form Christian identity and to refute opposing identities (in this case the claims of philosophical paganism). The sermon is a kind of microcosm of the entire argument and provides the structure for its development. Notably, Jones utilizes Augustine's critique of paganism in Dolbeau 26 to provide us with a nuanced, critical study of pagan practice in the time of Augustine (35–114). If for nothing else, we are indebted to Jones for this important contextual backdrop to the preaching of Augustine.

The second contribution worthy of note is the intensive theological examination of the title *Christus Sacerdos* in the preaching of Augustine. This is the center of the study and its focal point. Jones presents his own argument *contra* the thesis of Gérard Rémy who concludes that the Christ as *mediator* in Augustine has priority over Christ as *sacerdos* (priest). For Rémy, *mediator* determines *sacerdos* “ontologically,” in a way analogous to how being determines action. Jones rejects this way of relating the titles, as it puts Augustine's Christology in competition with itself, and he proposes instead that “*Christus Sacerdos* helps complete the meaning of *Christus Mediator* and complements its function to accomplish aims that *mediator* cannot accomplish” (26). Following a thorough investigation of the titles *Christus Mediator* and *Christus Sacerdos*, Jones presses on to explore how *Christus Sacerdos* relates to Augustine's understanding of Christ as Head (*Christus Caput*), to Christ as *Sacramentum* and *Exemplum*, and to Christ as the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy concerning Christ and the Church. By positioning the specifically biblical grounding of *Christus Sacerdos* in last place (functioning something like an appendix to his account of Augustine's Christology), Jones lends support to his earlier claim that Augustine develops his notion of Christ as priest, not so

much in contrast to Jewish high priesthood, but primarily as a polemic against alternative pagan accounts of priesthood (158).

Jones concludes his investigation of the title, *Christus Sacerdos*, with an answer to Rémy and a helpful summary of his findings.

This helps us see with particular clarity the complementarity of *mediator* and *sacerdos*. Christ remains both for all eternity, *mediator* in joining man to God, *sacerdos* in offering man to God. This eternal offering of his entire body perfectly united to himself leads us to the third sense of the meaning of *Christus Sacerdos*: the Whole Christ as priest in the one priest. (210–11)

“Thus, neither concept in itself presents the Whole Christ—only both taken together. For this reason, neither title in itself presents the whole mystery of Christ, since Christ chose not to be complete without his body” (298). This is both a persuasive and satisfying integration of the Christological titles in the effort to account for the very full and complex Christology that Augustine teaches, inseparable from his account of the Church as the body of Christ.

The volume could very reasonably have concluded at this point, and we would again be indebted to Jones for the insights concerning “Christ as Priest” in Augustine’s Christology. But Jones is convinced that with Augustine doctrine cannot be separated from pastoral care and the active formation of Christian identity. The third notable contribution of this study, then, is the way that Jones shows how Augustine integrates “doctrine” and “pastoral care” in his preaching. This ought to give a caution to those of us who would happily separate strictly doctrinal studies in the Fathers from the social and pastoral consequences of their preaching. Jones ably demonstrates that for Augustine doctrine and pastoral care are inseparably linked. In developing the function of *Christus Sacerdos* in Augustine’s preaching, Jones claims that Christ’s priesthood gives us both “an identity and an ideal. . . . It reveals to us who we are and who we are not; wither we are tending and what we must love in order to go there” (301). According to Jones, Augustine presents us with two great syntheses of this identity and ideal: His doctrine of humility (in contrast to pagan pride) and his teaching on the distinctive objects of Christian faith, hope, and love.

Jones sums up his study by stating that we cannot understand Augustine’s doctrine of Christ in isolation from the whole of Christian faith, because Augustine never conceived of Christology in isolation. Following Drobner, Jones concludes that “Augustine did no systematic Christology because he considered Christ not only the center of his thought, but also

the condition, author, and method of all his thinking" (423). All this has consequences for how we combine (or fail to combine) the doctrine of Christ with Christian identity. "Augustine believed that Christ could only be known through intimate identification with him. That is, Christ could not be reduced to a *scientia* capable of being known and studied as an object from a distance" (423). We are further indebted to this study of *Christus Sacerdos* in the preaching of Augustine for reminding us that we too can only properly come to a knowledge of Christ through an ever deeper identification with him. N.V.

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The Organic Development of the Liturgy: The Principles of Liturgical Reform and their Relation to the Twentieth-Century Liturgical Movement Prior to the Second Vatican Council by Alcuin Reid, OSB (*San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005*), 374 pp.

IN THIS IMPRESSIVE study, London-based liturgical scholar Alcuin Reid presents a historical and theological narrative of the Liturgical Movement and liturgical reforms from 1903 to the eve of the Second Vatican Council.

Ignatius Press renders a major service in reprinting this book, first published in 2004 by Saint Michael's Abbey Press. Previously difficult to obtain in America, Reid's breakthrough study has not hitherto attracted the attention it deserves. Ignatius's editors have emended the original edition's idiosyncratic and inconsistent footnote formatting, vastly improved the text's layout, and used a more reader-friendly style in the thirty-seven page bibliography. Careful proofreading has eliminated most of the typos and many stylistic flaws that hinted at hasty production of the first edition. The index is now more complete and precise. The most notable addition is a preface by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (dated 26 July 2004 and published in *Adoremus Bulletin*, November 2004) endorsing the book and offering the Cardinal's reflections based upon it.

Chapter one overviews "Liturgical Reform in History." Following widely accepted accounts, particularly by Theodor Klauser and Pierre Batiffol, Reid draws object lessons from past liturgical reforms. On the positive side, he characterizes the Tridentine reform of the missal as a "thoroughly traditional . . . growth of the living organism that is the Roman rite, involving little substantial change" (44). The primary negative example is the Roman breviary revised by the Franciscan Cardinal

Francis Quiñones. “The prudential judgment of Paul III promulgating this reform in 1536 was an error, finally corrected some five popes and thirty-two years later, in the light of the evident dissatisfaction of the faithful and at the prompting of scholars” (38). Reid similarly follows prevailing scholarly opinion when he evaluates Pope Urban VIII’s (1623–1644) “root and branch reform of the hymns of the Roman Liturgy . . . as a radical and unjustified departure from what is seen as the ‘authentic’ Tradition” (48). The main point here is that “approbation by authority” must not be considered “a principle of liturgical reform that can stand alone, without regard for, and indeed being subject to, objective liturgical Tradition” (57).

Yet Reid chronicles the rise of just such a principle in the twentieth century, when “popes begin to perceive their authority with regard to liturgical reform as absolute and so extensive that it could stand above, and not in humble respect before, objective liturgical Tradition” (249). In Pius XII’s promulgation of a new Psalter translated according to the Ciceronian preferences of the Jesuits of the Pontifical Biblical Institute, one sees “the emergence of a problem when reforms based on scholarly desires win the approbation of papal authority” (135). Suggesting that Pius XII went a bit too far, Reid detects “an exaggeration in *Mediator Dei* of the extent of papal authority in matters of liturgical reform” (152), which could manifest itself in papal imposition of liturgical innovation. It is not remiss to note, in this regard, that one line from Cardinal Ratzinger’s preface to the current volume reappeared almost verbatim in an altogether different context—the homily he delivered as Pope Benedict XVI upon taking possession of the Chair of Peter: “The pope is not an absolute monarch whose will is [thoughts and desires are] law” (10).

Chapter two, “The Liturgical Movement and Liturgical Reform up to 1948,” begins in 1903 with Pope St. Pius X’s *Tra le sollecitudini* and ends with Pius XII’s *Mediator Dei*. Following the majority opinion, Reid pinpoints the birth of the Liturgical Movement in a talk delivered by Lambert Beauduin in 1909. Reid navigates through the writings of numerous subsequent representatives of the Liturgical Movement: Joseph Göttler, Adrian Fortescue, Romano Guardini, Theodore Wesseling, Virgil Michel, Pius Parsch, Martin Hellriegel, Odo Casel, Anton Baumstark, Gerald Ellard, and various contributors to *Orate fratres*. Reid demonstrates admirable balance in assessing their contributions. Hellriegel, for example, showed “successful practical application” of “sound aims of the Liturgical Movement,” although in one instance he was “mistaken,” namely, in promoting the celebrating of Mass *versus populum* (118). On the whole, Reid evaluates this phase of the Liturgical Movement positively: “[I]ts essence was the

return of liturgical piety, of *participatio actuosa* in the traditional Liturgy, to its rightful centrality in order that it might bear fruit in Christian life" (303). Many of its proponents, such as Beauduin and Parsh, were open to prudent reform that respected the principle of organic development.

The third chapter, titled "The Liturgical Movement and the Liturgical Reform from 1948 to the Second Vatican Council," is the longest of the work—occupying over one-half of its pages. This period is the Liturgical Movement's "phase of 'pressure for reform'" (243). Reid analyzes the published results of international scholarly conferences that punctuated the period. He deftly narrates a story wherein the balance of the early Liturgical Movement gradually diminished before the consensus of a small but increasingly influential group of scholars. Reid notes, for example, that "one voice was never heard" at the Assisi Congress of 1956: "that of a speaker whose sentiment reflects some of the equilibrium of the Liturgical Movement in its origins" (253). Such conferences enshrined the proposal of reforms that "would do unprecedented violence to the objective traditional Liturgy in the name of pastoral expediency," including a radical alteration of the cycle of scriptural readings for Mass (191).

Two erroneous principles of liturgical reform, both rightly censured in *Mediator Dei*, exerted strong influence at these conferences: one based on liturgical archaeologism or antiquarianism, and another on "so-called 'pastoral' Liturgy" (150, 161). Regarding the desire for "pastoral" liturgy, Reid writes: "As early as 1949, reconstruction and innovation according to the perceived needs of modern man, conceived as clearly distinct from the development of the objective liturgical Tradition, was part of, if not the very basis of, the agenda of some (key) liturgists" (149). Among their number were Annibale Bugnini, J. D. Crichton, Clifford Howell, and John Murphy, who would cast aside objective liturgical Tradition in favor of "what appears to be the quickest and easiest route to liturgical participation" (276). Such scholars as Diekmann, Reinhold, and especially Joseph A. Jungmann, combined "pastoral reform" with liturgical antiquarianism "almost perversely" exalted "in the very name of Tradition" (287). According to Reid, Jungmann's highly influential principle of reform "combines antiquarianism with pastoral expediency. It is a historical and pastoral principle that . . . fails to accord sufficient respect to the organic development of the Liturgy beyond antiquity and, indeed, rejects organic development as the fundamental principle of liturgical reform, in favour of a 'jerking' of the Liturgy into suitable shape for modern man" (171, 187). "Should Jungmann's stance prevail," Reid comments, "liturgical reform would no longer be, as in history, the organic development of the

objective liturgical Tradition; rather, it would be the refashioning of the Liturgy according to prevailing scholarly opinion and the perceived needs of the day" (188).

Reid makes a particular contribution to liturgical history by analyzing the work of the Pian commission for liturgical reform: the 1951 reform of the Paschal Vigil, the 1955 reform of Holy Week, and the simplified rubrics for breviary and missal that appeared in 1960. Reid's evaluation of these reforms is mixed. More importantly, however, he discovers tendencies in the Pian commission toward Jungmann's "corruption theory" and "a confidence, verging on faith, in the opinions of liturgical historians" (225). The Benedictine liturgist Bernard Botte, for example, contended that "if the scholars could agree on a proposal, Rome would in all likelihood have accepted it" (204). The "scholars," however, were limited to a "relatively small northern European circle" (266). Drawing from conferences, publications, and correspondence from Ireland, Australia, England, and the U.S., Reid argues that the "pressure for ritual reform" (266) was not found in "the widely felt needs of the Church" (200).

As opposed to flawed theories and misguided pressure for reform, how does Reid define organic development? "Organic development," he writes, "holds openness to growth (prompted by pastoral needs) and continuity with Tradition in due proportion. It listens to scholarly desiderata and considers anew the value of practices lost in the passage of time, drawing upon them to improve liturgical Tradition gradually, only if and when this is truly necessary" (308). Reid highlights four principles, articulated by Dom Bernard Capelle in 1950, as hallmarks of a mature attitude toward liturgical reform that respects organic development of "the objective liturgical Tradition" and is "steeped in the ideals and work of the Liturgical Movement":

1. That which serves [well] at the present time is sufficient unless it is gravely deficient.
2. Only new things that *are necessary* are to be introduced, and in a way that is consonant with Tradition.
3. Nothing is to be changed unless there is comparatively great gain to be had.
4. Practices that have fallen into disuse are to be restored if their reintroduction would truly render the rites more pure and more intelligible to the minds of the faithful. (162–63)

Reid lauds other figures who likewise held such prudent principles and sought the authentic goals of the Liturgical Movement, including Cardinal Fernando Antonelli, Romano Guardini, and Louis Bouyer. On the other hand, Reid illustrates how some reformers compromised organic development: Bugnini, who asserts “the priority of a supposed ‘primitive’ Liturgy” (216), Crichton, Godfrey Diekmann, who articulates a “defective theology of Tradition” (208), Illtud Evans, Jungmann, Cardinal Giacomo Lercaro (246–47), and H. A. Reinhold. After providing copious citations from these authors, Reid observes: “[I]n the words of Bugnini, Jungmann, Crichton, and so on, we have seen that ‘pastoral’ reform means primarily that ritual reform is to effect the change of the Liturgy to accommodate the perceived needs of people of the day” (227–28).

In practical terms, Reid regards “minor reforms” as consonant with sound principles of liturgical reform and organic development. These include: pruning the sanctoral; using the vernacular for certain parts of the liturgy, such as scriptural proclamations; introducing a time of silent prayer at key points in the restored Paschal Vigil of 1951; celebrating the same vigil at night rather than in the morning. On the other hand, Reid identifies changes that do not respect objective liturgical Tradition: “the ‘facing the people’ fad” (125); complete vernacularization of the liturgy; the renewal of baptismal vows by the people in the restored Paschal Vigil of 1951, which “may be regarded as *the* major innovation of the reform,” (176); abolition of the last Gospel and the prayers at the foot of the altar; radical restructuring of the lectionary cycle.

Reid has mastered thoroughly the literature relating to his topic. He quotes extensively from scholarly writings and documents of the Holy See, and provides apposite analyses of everything he quotes. Footnotes often provide the original Latin, French, or Italian of key passages that are translated in the text. In addition to an impressive range of published sources, Reid also draws from private letters by and interviews of such figures as Carlo Braga, Adrian Fortescue, James Hitchcock, Frederick McManus, and Cardinal Paul Augustine Mayer. Reid’s arguments are compelling and his judgment is sound. Despite all its strengths, however, *The Organic Development of the Liturgy* is likely to receive a cold reception from a liturgical establishment that favors ongoing “root and branch reform” in the name of “pastoral expediency.”

Reid does not discuss the course that liturgical reform took after the Second Vatican Council. Nonetheless, he introduces and evaluates the working principles articulated by the cast of characters who influenced, if not determined, that reform. Reid occasionally hints at the path his investigation of postconciliar reforms might take, as when he demonstrates that

“on the eve of the Council neither John XXIII, the dicasteries of the Holy See, the Pian commission, the worldwide episcopate, nor the publishers of liturgical books envisaged that a root and branch liturgical reform was imminent” (298). One can only hope that Reid will apply his incomparable method of studying the Liturgical Movement and preconciliar liturgical reforms to the liturgical reforms that followed the Second Vatican Council. Such a critical analysis is long overdue. N V

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The Ways of Judgment by Oliver O'Donovan (*Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005*), xv + 330 pp.

AT THE END of *The Desire of the Nations*, Oliver O'Donovan promised a sequel that would stand to *Desire* as “political ethics” to “political theology.” His 2003 Bampton Lectures, *The Ways of Judgment*, handsomely fulfills this promise. If *Desire* showed the encompassing theoretical scope of the gospel for things political, *Ways* makes the gospel acutely contemporaneous for a host of ethical-political issues. O'Donovan writes in the conviction that while the gospel is “luminous,” political concepts are “obscure and elusive.” He aims to shed light on the political by the evangelical, and in this way provide pastoral guidance to Christians. He thinks also that “the capacity of faith to display the intelligibility of political institutions and traditions” will have apologetic weight. The guidance is welcome and the apology weighty.

The book is so rich, both in the scope of the political theology it deploys and in the number of issues covered, and as well in sheer theological and historical exuberance, that no adequate idea of what reading O'Donovan is like can be conveyed in a short review. I try to give some sense of the argument as a whole and of the range of issues illumined.

Under the sign of the Trinity, the book develops in three parts. Part one examines the act of political judgment, which witnesses to the sovereignty of the Father. Part two takes up the secular representation of people whose eternal representative is Christ. Part three treats the life of those who live by the Spirit in the church in the midst of society.

As in *Desire*, then, the preeminent component of political authority is judgment. In the Old Testament, political authority is constituted by the conjunction of the capacities to provide physical security, to give judgment, and to maintain community identity. In the New Testament, however, the identity of all people is to be located in the risen Christ, and

just enough force is permitted as is necessary to execute judgment, and we arrive at Romans 13.

Chapter one defines judgment as “an act of moral discrimination that pronounces upon a preceding act or existing state of affairs to establish a new public context.” It is therefore first of all an act of mind that distinguishes right from wrong. What might be called O’Donovan’s “intellectualism” is foundational. Second, judgment is responsive; it does not initiate or found, but addresses what has happened. And this is the basis of a sort of realism or conservatism of approach. Third, judgment establishes a new context for subsequent action. As looking backward to what was done, judgment must be true; as looking forward to the new context it establishes, it must be efficacious. Last, judgment is public, done on behalf of the public and done by the public through its representative.

In saying that judgment is of the essence, O’Donovan “does not intend to say that the whole operation of government is thinned down, as in some libertarian fantasy, to the operations of civil courts of justice; it means that political authority in all its forms—lawmaking, war-making, welfare provisions, education—is to be re-conceived within this matrix and subject to the discipline of enacting right against wrong.” The test of the book’s argument, therefore, is simply whether the re-conception of all things political in the light of this notion of judgment is enlightening and persuasive.

Chapter two shows us that political judgment, while necessary, is also necessarily imperfect. Its criteria, truth and efficacy, cannot be perfectly met, the first because of the limitations of human knowledge, and the second because of the inability of the reason judgment displays just by itself to change social contexts. Judgment must be good enough to end the cycle of vengeance, but the cry of Abel’s blood for “cosmic vengeance” is not met on its own terms but only on Calvary. This theme is revisited in chapter six, on mercy, understood as the necessary self-transcendence of imperfect judgment conscious of its imperfection. Here, O’Donovan engages Milbank and Derrida on forgiveness, as he does later on gift-giving.

Chapter three develops the important notion of “attributive justice,” the kind of justice political judgment should aim at. This is Grotius’s Christian revision of Aristotle’s distributive justice; it responds not to a right but to a suitability, and demands the exercise of a larger ethical imagination than that of calculating reciprocities or proportionalities. It engages the kind of insight involved, say, in making appointments, and it depends on attention to the antecedent intelligibility of human nature and the natural law. It is to be appreciated in O’Donovan’s own careful

discussion of where justice does and does not demand equal treatment of persons in questions of access to health care, aid to the poor, and standing before the law.

Chapter four treats the scope of judgment. First, temporally, political reality is coeval with man, something we always already find, not something constituted by joining Hobbesian human atoms together. This does not mean that there is any political *institution* coeval with human society, for the event of political judgment is prior to all institutions in which it is regulated. The *actual* political character of humanity, moreover, is a function of sin since it is the discernment of good from evil, and were there no evil, such discrimination would be unnecessary. Second, as to its topical scope, there is no realm to which political authority may not reach—including education and the economy—so long as there is some wrong to be redressed, “the necessary condition, but also the sufficient condition, for governmental intervention.” Totalitarianism, the abstract attempt to found and regulate by political action a society perfect in all its parts, is thus excluded.

Chapter seven is outstanding. It sets itself as a test of the book’s thesis the topic of punishment, wishing to escape the sterile oscillation between utilitarian and Kantian accounts. O’Donovan takes punishment to be “a judgment enacted on the person, property, or liberty of the condemned party.” Punishment remains retributive, but only in the sense that it visits the malefactor with the truth of his action. This manifestation of truth is good for both malefactor and society, and establishes a new context for subsequent, better, action. Punishment is not mathematically determined, but is a preeminent case of the working of attributive justice. This chapter gives pastoral guidance to Christians who are victims, and notes the post-Christian character of the contemporary interest in giving victims a voice in the determination of punishment.

Part two turns to institutions. Chapter eight vigorously defends the proposition that political authority, the right to make political judgment, is from God. It is an event prior to any human institution, as in Scripture “God raises up” those who exercise it. It cannot derive from “the will of the people,” for that “is precisely what needs explanation.” Why do the people obey *this* person and recognize *him* as authoritative? Constitutions may regulate the recognition of authority, but the thing itself is prior to human institution. Constitutionalism “presupposes the providential gift of authority.” O’Donovan’s intellectualism is developed at this point. Political authority obliges by giving light. “An authority is someone I depend upon to show me the reasons for acting.” This is exactly right. It follows that authority itself can never be a reason for action in the

absence of showing the goods the action will realize. The good that political authority shows is the common good, and rule obliges because the common good it manifests obliges. In detailing the common good, O'Donovan returns to the elements of political authority. The common good consists in right judgment, the display of the truth of moral discernment, the preservation of the identity of the community and its traditions, and power (for we are obligated only to an effective authority). The elements that make for political authority are the ones that make the common good although power, while necessary for the actuality of the idea of authority, is not strictly part of it. Authority is not the strength of Leviathan but the light of judgment, the right displayed in the context of preserving community identity.

Political authority is borne by representatives of the people, the topic of chapter nine. Its recognition is the people's recognition of themselves, of their good as made apparent and served in the judgment of its bearer, who is himself thereby the representative of the people. The people's relation to the representative is one of mind and discovery, not will, as if the people constituted the authority of the one whom God has raised up. "That the representative may act for us, and we in him, it is necessary that we see ourselves in him."

The rest of part two details three answers to the question, "how are the responsibilities of government justly to be attributed to the representative?" The first subjects representation to law, and especially to the mechanism of popular elections. Such elections can regulate, if they cannot produce representation. O'Donovan's discussion of the non-necessary relation of democratic institutions to liberal values should be read by the architects of American foreign policy. The second answer attempts to provide for just attribution of governmental offices by way of the separation of powers. O'Donovan points out that all branches of government judge, however, and shows importantly how separation can lead to breakdown. The third answer is some system of international regulation. The graceful comparison of the papacy of Gregory VII to the United Nations is elegant.

Part three opens with an evocation of Van Eyck's *Adoration of the Lamb*. The crowd of tourists come to Ghent Cathedral to see it "reenact unconsciously the very scene depicted there: pilgrims who stand and gaze at the sight of the sacrificed lamb, the goal and satisfaction of their journeys." Part three thus speaks to the position of those who announce to worldly rulers their subjection to Christ. Here, in chapter fourteen there is a foundational treatment of what sharing is and how it constitutes society. By sharing or "communication," which invests the goods of society and

the economy “with layers of social significance,” human beings become human agents in concert with other human agents. Spheres of communication are as various as the goods shared, and society is to be thought of as the sphere of the spheres of communication of one people. To describe the relations of differing spheres is the task of sociology. But because Christians communicate in goods not of this earth, goods that belong to the Kingdom, it becomes the task also of political theology. The relations of those who are bidden “Judge not” to those whose whole reason for existing is to judge others are delimited. O’Donovan shows how Christians who first “judge for themselves,” that is, live under and by the judgment of God manifest in Christ, acquire the freedom to not judge and the ability to speak to those who do. Catholics will be interested in his treatment of church order in chapter fifteen, whose consideration of church as both household and city is provocative. The last chapter speaks of conscience and on what it takes so to live as to “judge for ourselves.”

This book casts light on a host of issues, not all of which have been mentioned, such as taxes, abortion, and obedience to the state, the European Union, the use of force in arrest, torture, the peculiar evil of unemployment, private property, and more. At its beginning, we are led to wonder whether the political institutions of the west, born of Christian culture, can survive post-Christian forgetfulness. If the knowledge of God and the soul make for freedom, what happens if such wisdom is banished? But such questions, as also that of the possibility of the apostasy of the churches, are addressed in serenity and hope. *Desire*, in articulating what revelation has to say about political reality, made us see not just some derivative political import of Christian thought, but the political claims central to it, such that we will not think to have an adequate Christology or ecclesiology apart from articulating them. In the same fashion, *Ways* makes us not just better political theologians and ethicists, but better theologians. N V

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I Am the Lord Your God: Christian Reflections on the Ten Commandments, edited by Carl E. Braaten and Christopher R. Seitz (*Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004*), xi + 287 pp.

THIS IS a collection of essays by leading theologians and Christian ethicists that any pastor or theologian would enjoy reading. The essays are not

especially technical and are both informative and provocative. Different essays take up the commandments in turn although oddly, and significantly I will argue, not the seventh. The volume hopes to help refocus Christian thought on the Ten Commandments. The authors from many Christian confessions are justly concerned that the commandments have lost their guiding role in Christian life. Sermons abound on prayer, spiritual life, Scripture, and all for the good, but rare is a contemporary sermon that takes for its theme one of the commandments. Pastors looking for a resource to do so could not do better than starting here. *Starting here* because the overall sensibility of the volume is problematic. It is this I wish to address in the review rather than explicit discussion of some two or three individual contributions. All the essays are well worth reading—no question—though I especially liked those by Hart, Hütter, Seitz, and Wannenwetsch. Whilst the review addresses the overall tenor of the volume, toward its end I will briefly say why these authors' submissions struck me as especially rich.

What is best about the book is that the authors broadly agree with one another and yet very significant differences amongst them are evident. I thoroughly enjoyed this aspect of the book: You can flip back and forth amongst opposing essays and your own thought deepens in doing so. Any volume that forces you to think again and again is a very good volume indeed. For me, this was the highlight of the book, and it is really a consequence of the selection made by the editors. Here, the editors did a superb job. The editors did less well in omitting indices, however, and robbed their own volume of some of its usefulness as a source work. They ought also perhaps to have spotted a rather embarrassing typo in one essay where "Do not kill" is cast as the sixth commandment.

I also think an essay on medieval treatments of the commandments should have been included. Some essays very usefully address Calvin and Luther but there are no essays on Aquinas as such, nor Bonaventure or Scotus. Scotus in particular would have added a fascinating wrinkle to the book. The authors are pretty unanimous that the first table of the Decalogue, those commandments directly concerning man's worship of God, is divine positive law. Certainly, insist the authors, the first table is not natural law. Famously, Scotus argued that *only* the first table is natural law. Most of our authors agree with Scotus that the second table, that dealing with man's love of neighbor, is best thought of as divine positive law. It would have been interesting to see the editors assign someone the task of wrestling with Scotus given the general drift of the other essays. Dealing with the likes of Aquinas, Bonaventure and Scotus always sharpens a theologian's wits and I think the volume diminished by lack of such

engagement. That said, what is lost historically is almost made up for with the engaged quality of many of the essays as they identify within the Church and society at large the pernicious consequences of ignoring or misunderstanding the commandments. Again, this contemporary flavor is one of the best things about the book.

Problems begin though when lack of historical interest starts to have conceptual implications. It would not be fair to say that a natural law ethics such as a Thomist might offer is a direct target of the volume—though no Thomist contribution is included—but the book's overall sensibility is against treating the commandments, especially those concerned with love of neighbor, as a formulation of certain intrinsic goods and evils. Even those essays that come closest to acknowledging a role for natural law still shy away from such language. Rather is the emphasis on a moral order stemming from divine positive law, with most essays dwelling on the will of God made known through revealed writing. Indeed, most essays tend to run together ideas of command, obedience, will, and law in a way that would make John Finnis's eyes boggle. Liberal theologians will, of course, immediately identify the conservative tenor of the essays and the writers make no apologies for this. The authors themselves may be surprised to learn, however, just how much of a rightist tone their essays convey. Legal positivism has a conservative religious pedigree in de Maistre, de Bonald, Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt. These authors are normally thought to be well beyond the pale of polite Christian thinking, and I imagine the positivist authors of the volume think so as well. Admittedly these authors do not want to be the polite Christians expected by the *New York Times* but nor, I sense, do they really see throwing their lot in with a Donoso Cortés. Perhaps they should, and perhaps they do mean to. They certainly share with these earlier Christian positivists a glee for the *vanquishing* power of grace.

As legal positivists the majority of the authors tend to cast grace as at odds with ordinary moral consciousness. For example, we are told that Luther viewed self-defense as nothing less than revenge and hatred and that murder and honoring of mother and father are not separable as distinct contents of moral consciousness. I found the idea of Luther as a consummate phenomenologist of moral consciousness, as one essay suggested, quite interesting. Only I do not find his analyses (if accurately presented) terribly convincing. To any ordinary awareness it just is not true that the universal moral consensus about self-defense is also a moral consensus about the moral positivity of revenge and hatred. Indeed, revenge and hatred themselves are clearly analytically distinguishable contents of moral consciousness, the one quite different from the other.

Hatred, like fear and disgust, is an aversion whilst revenge is an “attack” mode of consciousness unless resting in impotency and then it turns to *ressentiment*. It might be said that “Of course grace is hostile to ordinary moral consciousness! That’s on account of its sinfulness.” It is this kind of response that disturbs, and something very like gives rise to the sensibility of the book. Who can doubt that sin is pervasive in every human life? This is still far from saying that sin is *everywhere* in human life. Of all the essays, I think only Gilbert Meilaender’s was sure-footed on this point. To celebrate the vanquishing power of grace as so many of the essays do is to invite a monism which flattens out, worse, cancels out, diverse sources of good. Of course, never sources alternative to God’s goodness but gravid aspects of his glorious plentitude. Meilaender’s essay is the last in the volume, and to me, his citation of Psalm 19—“the heavens are telling the glory of God”—stood as something of a rebuke to the sensibility of a majority of the essays. Monism has been the common motif animating all of the twentieth century’s most disastrous political movements and in theology it invites sectarianism.

A basic assumption throughout the book is that the commandments all depend radically on God’s will or command. Strange to say, perhaps, but this is simply not true. God’s command might be necessary for the promulgation of the commandments but it is not sufficient. One essay relies on an argument from Karl Barth. In this telling, Barth argues that it is harder to participate in a war than it is in an abortion because in war all of the commandments are broken: “those who wage war steal, rob, commit arson, lie, deceive, slander, and unfortunately to a large extent fornicate” (Barth as cited in the book). No one can doubt that any war, just or not, provokes great sinfulness. But are all takings in war stealing and robbing? This depends on the laws of war. Many English sea captains fighting the dictatorship of Napoleon became rich through capturing prizes. A captured enemy vessel, whether man-of-war or merchantman, became the property of the victorious captain and crew. Outside of war, property law was different and such a taking would be piracy punishable by summary execution.

The seventh commandment’s prohibition against theft relies on human positive law for much of its meaning or content. God tells me not to steal but it is Roman property law and, for those of us in English-speaking countries, Anglo-Saxon common law developed over centuries, which inescapably forms my consciousness of what that prohibition might consist in. There is a certain sectarian sensibility to our authors for an implication of their work is the need for some form of Christian sharia law. The revealed word of God should certainly inflect our inherited

understanding of property, but replace it? Perhaps the great majority of our authors do think some sharia-like property law is required to save us all from mortal sin. I look forward to reading that book when one of them gets around to writing it, but for now all of us will have to rely on the everyday moral consensus governing property.

My point here is that the commandments are not equal in their reliance on divine positive law: God, by entrusting us to one another's care and so requiring us to actively participate in his providence, has greater confidence in the created, natural powers, his "first grace," than do many of our authors. Lack of sensitivity to the inequalities within God's law with all of its implications is what I found most problematic about this book. Cajetan's claim that Jesus left it to moral reason to sort out the intricacies of the commandments is a worthy corrective to the tone of the moral theology offered in this volume.

Whatever my reservations about the general sensibility of the book, it deserves a wide readership. Let me take up the privilege of a reviewer and suggest to potential readers that they start their reading with four especially good essays. Hart, whose recent contributions to theology are justly praised, offers a missionary article. The volume is mostly concerned with discussion in and for the Church. No one can doubt the enormous importance of such discussion. Hart's essay though is really geared to earning theology a seat at the table of contemporary academic discussion. He uses theology superbly to illustrate the extremism and darkness latent in today's "mainstream" humanities and thereby offers theology as a cleansing agent. The essay by Seitz is perhaps the one I disagree with the most, but it is unquestionably a first-rate article. I greatly admire the clarity with which he presses the case for acknowledging the privilege of Israel, the unique witness to God's revelation. The essay masterfully shows that this privilege is also a fundamental act of generosity, for the law given to Israel reaches out its protective and perfecting shield to the sojourner in Israel's midst. Seitz's treatment of the commandments is perhaps the richest of the collection and all its implications are worthy of a lot of thought. Perhaps the single most trenchant contemporary application of the commandments to cultural criticism is found in Wannenwetsch's article. Addressing the prohibition against killing, he harrowingly observes that there now exists in the west, at least, a most intimate relationship between killing and the family. These disturbing pages have an echo in a few short, but very fine, pages in Hütter's article. Concerned with the eighth commandment and what he calls the "fallen tongue," Hütter documents shifts in the names given to certain western social practices that help to misrepresent to conscience precisely what is afoot in those

practices. These last two essays together would make fine preparatory reading for anyone likely to be reading the soon-to-be-released Vatican document on illicit descriptions of family relations found in international documents and the social sciences more generally.

Hopefully, these few closing comments on specific contributions help show the value of this book. Ranging from social criticism to careful theological elucidation of basic biblical themes, this volume is more than worthy of its task: helping the Church to hear afresh the demanding but gracious commands of God. 

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