

The Roots of Transhumanism

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Am I not alone, miserably alone?
—Frankenstein's monster to Frankenstein

NICANOR AUSTRIACO, breaking the mold of the utilitarian-dominated field of medical ethics with its myopic focus upon results and upshots, gives our attention a refreshing turn toward virtue. He allows us to delve into the inner workings of the human heart, and to find there our true human good. In our modern world we can forget that our human good consists not merely in health, pleasure, freedom from suffering, and autonomy. We can forget that our human good is a shared good, which is realized in acts of love.

The Transhumanist Movement

This renewed focus on virtue and the inner springs of human action, when applied to what is called transhumanism, reveals a movement that has lost sight of the simple goods in human life. This movement, which proclaims a new age of technologically enhanced human beings, promises results and marvels that will free us forever from the woes and evils that have plagued human history: death and disease, ignorance and selfishness, will all be overcome. I wish to suggest, however, that the accomplishment of these promises is more to be feared than welcomed. It will

arise from a sickness of soul that will lead inexorably to emptiness and despair and ultimately to fresh horrors of human cruelty.

In the long run, good intentions—when pursued without constraints—can be more harmful than bad intentions. Some of the greatest atrocities of our age have arisen from a misguided desire to accomplish good. The communists' angry desire to bring justice to the downtrodden working class has ushered in the massacre of those unwilling to conform. The desire to create a superior race has introduced the systematic elimination of "inferior" races.

I wish to suggest that the transhumanist movement embodies one such misguided desire. This movement seeks to enhance human beings, giving them greater strength, intelligence, perception, and so on, perhaps even creating entirely new powers, such as the ability to fly, or even powers unimagined as of yet. These new creatures will transcend human nature, hence the name "transhumanism."

One might well wonder whether this movement has more to do with science fiction than with science.¹ Perhaps its grand visions are mostly fanciful; nevertheless, current technologies have some very real applications, and others are not far in the future. We can use growth hormone, for instance, to increase a child's height; we can use stimulants to increase concentration. In the near future, various proteins, multiplied through gene splicing, may well increase our memories.

It is not so much the technologies—whether real or imagined—that are problematic; it is the attitudes that necessarily underlie the use of these technologies. Like its forebear, the eugenics movement, transhumanism will result in terrible deeds. Transhumanism sometimes claims to be a "liberal eugenics," purified of all that was evil in the old eugenics. Nicholas Agar, for instance, claims that the new eugenics will not be coercive; it will allow people freely to use enhancements or not.² The

¹ Tom Koch (in "Enhancing Who? Enhancing What? Ethics, Bioethics, and Transhumanism," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 35 [2010]: 685–99, at 687–89) argues that the promises of transhumanism are mostly hot air.

² See Nicholas Agar, *Liberal Eugenics: in Defence of Human Enhancement* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) and Nicholas Agar, "Liberal Eugenics," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 12 (1998): 137–55. Agar wishes to distance himself from transhumanism by promoting only what he considers moderate enhancements. Nevertheless, his essential outlook of "liberal eugenics" is generally adopted by the transhumanist movement. See also Nick Bostrom, "In Defense of Posthuman Dignity," *Bioethics*

human race will improve by free choice, and not by government intervention. On this view, eugenics is not bad in itself; it just happened to get linked with an unfortunate philosophy.

But what if the link is not accidental? What if, as Jeffrey Bishop claims, the very philosophy of eugenics, or of enhancements, is embroiled with excess and coercion.³ Already clouds appear on the horizon, foreshadowing the storm that will break upon us. Some have suggested that parents have an obligation to choose a child without defects or even positively to choose enhancements.⁴ A neglected obligation sometimes demands coercion, as in the case of deadbeat dads.⁵ If the benighted masses do not follow the pipings of the transhumanists, then they may need to be forced to comply, for their own good of course. If liberalism cannot win in the court of free ideas, then it will embed its ideas in the next generation through technology.⁶ It is worth recalling that the old eugenics began with a positive call for improvement but quickly slid into a negative call to eliminate the unfit.⁷

19 (2005): 202–14, at 206; John Harris, *Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 72–85.

³ Jeffrey P. Bishop, “Transhumanism, Metaphysics, and the Posthuman God,” *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 35 (2010): 700–720, at 713. Koch (“Enhancing Who”) argues that the new liberal eugenics are not very different from the old eugenics. In contrast, Nicholas Agar (*Liberal Eugenics*, 3) claims that Galton, the founder of eugenics, could not have foreseen the evil that would be done in the name of eugenics. One might well wonder, however, whether he *could* not have foreseen or he *chose* not to foresee? Was the evil done merely in the *name* of eugenics or was it part and parcel of eugenics?

⁴ See Julian Savulescu, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children,” *Bioethics* 15 (2001): 413–26; see also Harris, *Enhancing Evolution*, 19–35.

⁵ Dov Fox (in “The Illiberality of ‘Liberal Eugenics,’” *Ratio* 20 [2007]: 1–25) argues that just as government requires certain educational and social training, so it will be obliged, upon liberalism’s own principles, to require certain genetic enhancements. Robert Sparrow (in “A Not-So-New Eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on Human Enhancement,” *Hastings Center Report* 41 [2011]: 32–42) provides a similar argument. Savulescu and Harris think they can avoid this conclusion.

⁶ For instance, among the things that Persson and Savulescu (in “Moral Transhumanism,” *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 35 [2010]: 656–69) wish to program into human nature is a sensitivity to environmental concerns; they also wish to protect human beings from religious fanaticism, however that might be defined.

⁷ For an accessible history of the eugenics movement see Edwin Black, *War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master Race* (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003).

My general claim is simply that the error of transhumanism is rooted in its underlying attitudes. The use of technological enhancements arises from a sickness of the soul. Most fundamentally it issues from pride. This pride itself, however, is linked to ingratitude, and these two vices together bring forth a false love, revealed most poignantly in a hatred for the weak and imperfect.

One Action, Two Attitudes

Two identical actions, or two nearly identical actions, with nearly identical results, might arise from quite distinct attitudes (by which I mean a pattern of motivation); one action might be good and the other evil, although their upshots are much the same. As Michael Sandel suggests, the act of enrolling one's child in the best private academy might in fact be two quite distinct actions.⁸ For some parents, it might be an act of love, providing the best environment for the enrichment of their child. For other parents, it might be an act of heavy-handed control, by which they hope to assure that their child will get ahead in the world. Although the two actions are similar outwardly, the child feels the difference. Although he has a host of material benefits, he yearns for the smallest act of love.

Sandel thinks that modifications of our children by way of technological enhancements are parallel to the case of heavy-handed control; they are not acts of true parental love.⁹ The results may be ostensibly positive for the child: he acquires astonishing intelligence or he receives a first-rate education. Nevertheless, there is more to life than results. Our human good is constituted through relations with others. More important than the results of our actions are the attitudes from which they arise. A small deed done with great love is of far more significance than a great deed done with meager love, and a great deed done out of anger or ambition is destructive rather than constructive.

Transhumanists use the analogy with overbearing parenting to their advantage. Overbearing parents might enroll their child in the best preparatory school, but truly loving parents might do the same. The action

⁸ Michael J. Sandel, *The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 49–62.

⁹ Sandel, *Case Against Perfection*, 61–62.

of enrolling the child is not, by itself, linked to any particular attitude; it can arise from either good or bad attitudes. Similarly, someone might seek enhancements out of a kind of overbearing love, but perhaps someone else might seek enhancements for the true good of the child. Once again, the action is not, by itself, linked to any particular attitude: enhancements can arise from overbearing love or they can arise from true love.¹⁰

I wish to claim that technological enhancements are different in this regard. Whereas the use of a good preparatory school can arise either from good or from bad attitudes, the use of technological enhancements, when done with full knowledge, cannot arise from true love. Enhancements cut at the core of love; they undermine the very good that love seeks. In fact, transhumanism is necessarily infected with three destructive attitudes: pride, ingratitude, and overbearing love. In order to reveal the link between transhumanism and these attitudes, I will begin with overbearing love, for which our experience provides a more accessible grasp of its destructive character.

Characterizations of Parental Love

Let us consider two extreme parental approaches, what might be called true love and what we will call overbearing love. Realistically, most parents have a mixture of the two kinds of love. They want what is good for their child for his sake, while at the same time they sometimes promote their child's good in an overbearing manner that actually serves to alienate the child and his good. Conceptually, we will attempt to separate these two loves, considering as far as possible each extreme in its purity.

In true love, parents seek to share their good with the child; they want the child to have the good so that he can enjoy it, even as they themselves do. In contrast, overbearing love, if it can be called love, seeks the good of the child for some further purpose—for example, for the reputation of the parents or for the sake of some ideal perfect child. Junior will be the best tennis player not so that he can enjoy playing tennis, but so that Dad can enjoy the success of his son.

¹⁰ Agar (*Liberal Eugenics*, 113–16) argues that if we are permitted to change a trait by nurture, then we should be equally permitted to change it by enhancement.

True love provides the child with opportunities in order to nourish his development, so that he can grow in the good. Overbearing love forces the child to develop. For true love, the ultimate success is seen as the success of the child; as such, the child is allowed freedom, within limits. For overbearing love, the child is more passive, and the success is perceived by the parents more as their own; as such, the child is controlled.

A related point might be expressed as “pre-determination.” Overbearing love predetermines the particular good of the child: Junior will grow up to be a doctor; he will be in the top 10 percent of his class; he will be a concert pianist; and so on. In contrast, true love does not decide ahead of time the particular good of the child, but seeks to help the child develop his own potentials. Obviously, this help presumes some idea of what is the good of the child, but it is not so firmly set and determined as with overbearing love. In part, the good of the child must be discovered, a discovery possible for true love because the good of the child is received; his good is not entirely the making of the parents.

A consequence of this predetermination is disappointment with failure. Since the goal is predetermined, if the child does not meet the goal, then he is a disappointment to the parents. When the child does not live up to the ideal, the parents take out their disappointment through harsh treatment. Of course, failure can be a disappointment for true love as well. The sorrow of the parents, however, is not apt to strike out in angry retaliation.

Self-hatred often arises from a kind of overbearing love for oneself. An individual sets an impossible ideal, and when he does not live up to it—when he faces failure—then his own deficiency becomes an evil against which he strikes out. Likewise, the old eugenics set up an ideal, and then sought to suppress failure by eliminating those who did not live up to it. Today, when parents discover that their unborn child has Down syndrome they often choose to abort him. He does not live up to the ideal; he is a disappointment that must be eliminated, to make way for the “satisfactory” child.

Similarly, transhumanism wishes to create an ideal. When human beings fail from this ideal, I suggest, transhumanism will turn to a kind of self-loathing, a hatred of the species as it is now realized. It will strike

out in retaliation against those Luddites who refuse to accept its brand of salvation.

A transhumanist might well object that I am overstating the case. Certainly, it may be reasonable to see a tendency in transhumanism toward overbearing love. Like an overbearing parent, transhumanism sets high ideals, a kind of predetermined goal. Like overbearing parents, the means chosen to achieve this ideal is more forceful, since it is achieved apart from the child's cooperation.¹¹

Nevertheless, these points do not establish a necessary link between transhumanism and overbearing love. They indicate only a tendency. The same sort of tendency might be found in parents who place their children in excellent preparatory schools. A significant percentage of these parents may have a predominance of overbearing love. Nevertheless, truly loving parents can send their children to excellent preparatory schools. Similarly—so the argument goes—using technological enhancements to bolster the capabilities of one's child might often arise from overbearing love. No necessary connection, however, makes it so.

I wish to suggest, however, that there is a necessary connection. The use of technological enhancements always arises from something besides true love, often from overbearing love, and inevitably, as we will see, from ingratitude and from pride. Drawing this connection requires a consideration of a topic to which transhumanism is averse, namely, human nature.

The Importance of Nature

The good cannot be realized apart from some nature. The good of a knife is to be sharp and the good of a hammer is to be heavy and dull. Being sharp just by itself is not good; it is good as realized in certain natures, such as a knife, but not for others, such as a hammer. Similarly, the human good is the good of a human nature.¹² Such goods as strength or

¹¹ This criticism is one of Habermas's major concerns with genetic manipulations: see Jürgen Habermas, *The Future of Human Nature* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2003), 13–14 and 53–60.

¹² Francis Fukuyama (in *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* [New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002]) recognizes the importance of human nature, but he defines it simply in terms of typical emotions or behavior (130); the importance of the human function, and the functions of various parts of

intelligence are good for our human nature, but not for a rock. Unfortunately, in our age we have no clear notion of human nature.¹³

Any nature involves a direction to some end or good. A knife is directed toward cutting, and by its nature an eye is directed toward seeing. Similarly, human nature involves some impulse or direction to an end. We do not create our end or good; it is received from our nature. The error of transhumanism will be precisely to try to create what can only be received.

The transhumanists suppose that they will transcend human nature, but inevitably they imagine another sort of nature, namely, a disembodied consciousness.¹⁴ Of course, they are typically materialists, so that this consciousness is disembodied only in the sense that it arises from pure structure and can be reincarnated simply by replicating the structure. This consciousness might be realized in a human body, but—they suppose—it might also be realized in a computer. In either event, we can attribute certain goods to it, for instance, greater intelligence or greater power to act.

Transhumanists tend to describe enhancements as instrumental goods. By promoting enhancements, they need not, so they claim, presuppose any one notion of the good life; goods such as strength or intelligence are universally useful, for every vision of the good life. Transhumanists, then, need not promote one vision of the good life over another, or so they claim.¹⁵

Every instrumental good, however, presupposes that there is some

human nature, is lost from sight.

¹³ See Bishop, "Posthuman God," 716, who claims that the word "nature" has lost its meaning; Elizabeth Fenton (in "Liberal Eugenics and Human Nature: Against Habermas," *Hastings Center Report* 36 [2006]: 35–42, at 39) claims that there is no fixed human nature, thereby confirming Bishop's concerns. Human nature, it seems, is viewed by Fenton and others simply as whatever evolution has now given to us.

¹⁴ Persson and Savulescu ("Moral Transhumanism"), for instance, reject the importance of membership in the human species (conceiving the human species, after the biological manner, simply as mutual fertility) and they argue that we can change human nature, by which they mean typical psychological dispositions. Unstated throughout the article is another sense of human nature, which remains unchanged, namely, a conscious being. R. P. Doede (in "Polanyi in the Face of Transhumanism," *Tradition & Discovery* 35 [2008]: 33–45) claims that transhumanism is committed to a "Laplacian" consciousness, which ignores the need for the human body.

¹⁵ See Agar, "Liberal Eugenics," 145–48; Fox, "Illiberality," 10.

inherent good, and every inherent good requires some nature of which it is the good. Furthermore, some goods instrumental to one nature are destructive of another; sharpening a knife is useful for the knife, but sharpening a hammer is detrimental to the good of the hammer. If in fact human beings are not disembodied ghosts that happen to reside in a biological machine, if in fact we are by nature embodied reason, then taking away our bodies will not serve our good. We can imagine that placing our minds into a machine can serve our good, but this wishful thinking is possible only because we have presupposed something about our nature; we have presupposed that we are disembodied consciousness. Transhumanism, then, cannot avoid promoting one vision of the good life over another; it cannot avoid presuppositions about human nature.

Transhumanists might well ask: why should we so narrowly seek only the good of human nature?¹⁶ Why cannot we pursue the good of superior beings that will eventually replace us? Transhumanism hopes to get beyond our particular prejudices, which self-interestedly seek the human good; it hopes for new horizons. It selflessly admits that our good is not the whole good; the good of other beings might surpass our own.

A Shared Good

This self-proclaimed nobility of transhumanism, however, is based upon another illusion, namely, the lie of selfless altruism, which supposes that we can pursue the good just in itself, apart from its being connected with our own good. In fact, no such altruism exists or can exist. If we seek the good for others, it is because we seek to share our good with them; we never seek a good that has nothing to do with our own.

I should note that I am not asserting egoism, as if we must seek the good of others only as instrumental for our own fulfillment. Rather, I am suggesting that when we seek the good of others, we are seeking not a solitary good but a shared good. An individual does not seek a good

¹⁶ Agar (*Liberal Eugenics*, 90) wonders why our humanity should matter, although later he argues that it does; see Nicholas Agar, *Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010). Persson and Savulescu ("Moral Transhumanism," 668) think it does not matter whether improvements create a being that is no longer biologically human.

that belongs only to himself, nor does he seek a good that belongs only to someone else; rather, he seeks a good that is shared between himself and others.

In order to understand this point, it will be helpful to examine some ways in which the human good is shared, ways that will have a direct bearing upon the question of technological enhancements. I will attempt to illumine the human good through an analogy with works of art. When an artist paints, he hopes to capture, in the painting, some share of the beauty that he has perceived and seized within his own mind. When he succeeds, we say that the painting reflects the genius of the artist. A single painting, however, cannot capture the genius of a great artist; only several works together reflect the full measure of his genius.

In a similar fashion, the human good is a share in a certain beauty, the beauty of rational nature, which cannot be fully captured in a single individual. A single human being cannot realize the rational good, most dramatically because he is mortal; he will live but a short time. Consequently, human beings can attain the rational good only through an immortality realized through procreation. One individual can realize the rational good only in a limited slice of time; to realize it more fully, he must share his good in the prolongation of the species.

Even apart from mortality (which, after all, transhumanism hopes to overcome), a single individual cannot fully realize the beauty contained within rational nature.¹⁷ Just as the beauty within the artist's mind has a diversity that cannot be captured in a single painting, so rational nature cannot be captured in a single individual. The rational good contains a variety of elements, including coming to grasp the truth, using the truth to change the world around us, and using the truth to guide our own behavior. No individual can completely comprehend the whole of truth; no individual can realize all the skills and technology involved in changing the world; no individual can fully realize the diverse ramifications of self-control, which plays itself out in many distinct personalities. Each

¹⁷ Leon Kass (in "L'Chaim and Its Limits: Why Not Immortality?" *First Things* 113 [2001]: 17–24) suggests that mortality has its benefits for the human good. In particular, it can help us recognize our other limitations.

individual realizes a part of the human good; only together do they begin to reflect the multifaceted aspects of the beauty of human nature.

When we seek our individual good, then, we seek to share in a greater good. Our good is not solitary; it is had in union with others. By seeking the good of others, we do not seek a good wholly separated from our own; rather, we seek “our” good, a good that is attained only together with others. Just as the members of a soccer team seek the good of playing together, so those who seek the human good seek to attain it together.

We fool ourselves if we imagine that we can will for someone a good in which we have no share. Even the individual who sacrifices his life for another still seeks a good that is shared, for he has come to see the good of the other as his good, which is precisely what it means to love someone. He and his friend share in a greater good, which they attain in union, even in the union of offering oneself for the other.

Transhumanism, then, does not get beyond human nature, as if it sought some good in which human nature has no share. Rather, transhumanism misconceives human nature. It supposes that human nature is simply disembodied intelligence, which can be transferred from a body to a computer, and which can be elevated in unforeseen ways.

Genetically modified human beings, of course, can still share in the human good.¹⁸ They still have a human nature, and they still reflect various aspects of the beauty found within this nature. The problem, here, is not that there is no good to be willed; the problem is how the good is treated. Is it treated as something to be shared? Or is it treated as something to be created?

How do paintings share in the beauty found within the artist? In part, through being similar to that beauty. There is something more, however. The beauty in the painting must come about in the proper manner, that is, it must come about from the artist. If it does not, then it does not share in the good of the artist. Suppose that some third party doctors up a painting, altering features here or there. Whatever else these additions might do, they will not help the painting to share in the good of the artist. Even if they are improvements of some sort or other, they will not be improvements as a work of this artist. Whatever good

¹⁸ Hence, Bostrom (“Posthuman Dignity,” 209–10) asserts that they have dignity.

they bring about, then, will be no sharing in the good of the artist; they will distort the original.

By analogy we can see that technological enhancements aim at no share in the human good.¹⁹ As we have seen, the full human good requires diverse individuals, each reflecting various aspects of the overall good. Human nature realizes the needed diversity, in part, through diverse natural endowments, which are given naturally through procreation. The multifarious individuals are like the “works of art” of human nature. In short, we share in the human good not only by having features that apply to our rational nature; we share in the human good insofar as we, and our features, *arise* from human nature itself.

All manner of technological reproduction, even those that involve no genetic manipulations, such as in vitro fertilization, attempt to get around our origins within human nature. They do not aim to share in the human good, which is a good that arises from nature. They aim to create a good of their own. Of course, they cannot entirely exclude human nature, so the offspring still share in this nature. Nevertheless, the act of “manufacturing” a human being is not an act that seeks to share in the human good.

Treatment versus Enhancement

Transhumanists are averse to the idea of receiving goods from nature. The gifts of nature, Nick Bostrom complains, are not always good.²⁰ Disease and deformity come from nature, as well as strength and intelligence. If we must receive all our goods from nature, then we will be left impotent in the face of its evils. If we cannot enhance human intelligence—because intelligence must be received from nature—then neither can we correct defective vision, which also comes from nature. Should we do nothing to correct a cleft palate, because it is a sharing in the good of nature?

In opposition to this transhumanist argument we find a typical response, based upon a distinction between enhancement and treat-

¹⁹ In a similar fashion, Agar suggests that radical enhancements might alienate the enhanced individual, because he cannot share in the human good; see Agar, *Humanity's End*, 180–91.

²⁰ Bostrom, “Posthuman Dignity,” 205.

ment. Enhancement adds perfections onto a child's disposition; healing or treatment corrects defects within a child's disposition. Since a cleft palate and poor vision are defects, we can intervene with technology, correcting these problems. On the other hand, increasing a normal child's height, intelligence, or strength, is not the correction of a defect but enhancement. It is one thing to correct a child's eyesight, so that he has 20/20 vision; it is another to give a child the farseeing vision of an eagle.²¹

Transhumanists are unsatisfied with this distinction. They claim that it has no basis beyond our particular prejudices and predilections.²² We happen to have set the standard of 20/20 vision, but in fact some people have better vision, and by way of LASIK we might improve someone's vision beyond 20/20. If we are allowed to correct someone's vision to the point of 20/20, then why can we not go further? In either event we are tinkering with the person's natural disposition. It would surely be acceptable, if it were possible, to correct the mental defects of a Down syndrome child. Why, then, should it not be acceptable to take someone with an IQ of 100 and increase it to 180? Why does the increase from 50 to 100 count as the correction of a defect, while the increase from 100 to 180 counts as an enhancement?

Indeed, the distinction between healing and enhancing can be difficult to discern.²³ Even when concrete instances can be readily separated, the theoretical underpinnings of the distinction are unclear. We readily distinguish, for instance, between therapeutic cosmetic surgery

²¹ This distinction is defended by James E. Sabin and Norman Daniels (in "Determining 'Medical Necessity' in Mental Health Practice," *Hastings Center Report* 24 [1994]: 5–13) in order to distinguish what should be covered by insurance (namely, the correction of defect) and what should not (namely, what is not related to defects).

²² See Agar, *Liberal Eugenics*, 78–81; see also Agar, "Liberal Eugenics," 141–42; see H. Tristram Engelhardt, "Persons and Humans: Refashioning Ourselves in a Better Image and Likeness," *Zygon* 19 (1984): 281–95, at 281–84; Michael Bess, "Enhanced Humans versus 'Normal People': Elusive Definitions," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 35 (2010): 641–55, at 645–47.

²³ For helpful discussions see Erik Parens, "Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project," in *Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications*, ed. Erik Parens (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998); Eric Juengst, "What Does Enhancement Mean?" also in *Enhancing Human Traits*; Eric Juengst, "Can Enhancement Be Distinguished from Prevention in Genetic Medicine?" *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 22 (1997): 125–42.

to correct the scars consequent upon an automobile accident and enhancement cosmetic surgery in order to have a more beautiful nose; nevertheless, we may be pressed to give a good theoretical account that will always distinguish between the two kinds of surgery.

In some manner, human nature must be the standard for identifying treatment, since treatment presupposes some prior defect, a defect that is defined in terms of human nature. Nature is not a kind of statistical norm, as if an IQ of 100 is natural because it is common in current populations.²⁴ Rather, “natural” refers to what belongs to a human being in light of the human purpose or function. Given the function of the human eye, we can define what is natural to it, that is, what is required to fulfill this function. We can reasonably conclude that 20/100 vision does not fulfill this function. Furthermore, we can see that the sharp vision of an eagle is not necessary for this function, and might in fact hinder the function.

We more clearly distinguish between treatment and enhancement for concrete functions. It is difficult for us to say what the precise function of the eye is within the overall purpose of human life; of course, it is to see, but what is the purpose of seeing? If we cannot answer this latter question, then we will not be able to determine how precise human sight must be; we will be unable to understand why the vision of an eagle might be a kind of defect for human beings.²⁵ When we look at the more concrete functions within the eye, however, we readily make the appropriate distinctions. The function of the lens, for instance, is to let light pass through and to focus the light upon the retina. Consequently, we can easily identify certain instances of defective lenses.²⁶

²⁴ Bess (“Enhanced vs. Normal,” 643–48) criticizes the distinction between therapy and enhancement because he observes too great a flexibility for what is “normal” and for what is “healthy.” Similarly, in “A Fatal Attraction to Normalizing: Treating Disabilities as Deviations from ‘Species-Typical’ Functioning,” in *Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications*, ed. Erik Parens (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998, 95–123), Anita Silvers seems to reduce proper functioning to a kind of population average.

²⁵ Juengst (“Enhancement Mean,” 36) points out that we do not have a sufficient account of an overall function of the organism to specify functions for intellectual ability and moral sensitivity.

²⁶ The recognition that some cases are not clear, most especially for mental dysfunction, does not obviate the distinction between therapy and enhancement. The fact that people have made mistakes in the past does not obviate the distinction. The fact

Does nature, then, give both good things and defects, as the transhumanists complain? Certainly, if by “nature” is meant something like “mother nature,” the sum total of all nonhuman causal interactions.²⁷ But no one is suggesting that we must accept whatever comes from nature in this sense. If by “nature” is meant human nature, then what nature provides is a diversity of good things. It does so by a reproductive power that can sometimes fail. It might fail because “mother nature” intervenes, causing some defect. It might fail because the mechanism itself is defective (presumably, through some prior intervention of “mother nature”). In neither event does the defect come from human nature.

As we have suggested, human nature involves a directedness to some end. Furthermore, we have seen that this end is a shared good. This end and this sharing must both be received from nature. We cannot create our own end. We cannot share the good except by receiving it, and we can receive it only from nature. Among the various “directions” or tendencies within human nature we find the impulse to share that nature through having a child. It is this sharing that we must learn to accept from nature as a true good. Disease and defect are a falling short from this nature; they represent an opposition to the direction or impulse of nature.

Natural and Unnatural Methods of Improvement

The distinction between treatment and enhancement is only a first step. It reveals that technological interventions are acceptable when done in order to treat a defect of nature; it does not reveal that technological interventions to bring about enhancements are wrong.²⁸ Clearly,

that sometimes moral norms or standards have been incorporated into the distinction (rather than using the distinction as the basis of a moral judgment) does not obviate the distinction. These shortcomings indicate that we must approach the distinction with caution. Some would suggest that our caution should lead us to more readily place something on the treatment side of the line, so that we can thereby relieve the sufferings of as many as possible. At the risk of sounding hardhearted, I recommend the opposite caution, in order to avoid the risk of a cruel kind of false love.

²⁷ Bostrom (“Posthuman Dignity,” 211) refers to “Mother Nature,” claiming that she should be jailed for child abuse.

²⁸ Much of the dispute over the treatment/enhancement distinction concerns its use to determine whether society should support some medical intervention, for example,

some attempts to enhance are perfectly acceptable. A man can enhance his muscles through a rigorous workout program; another man might accomplish the same enhancement in conjunction with the use of steroids. Is the first approach acceptable while the other is wrong? Or are the two approaches just two morally indifferent means toward the same goal? Someone might believe that having his child listen to Mozart increases her intelligence; someone else might choose to splice “intelligence genes” into his child. Both approaches aim at the enhancement of increased intelligence. Is one approach acceptable and the other not?

Some methods of improving ourselves are perfectly acceptable. Indeed, part of what we have received from nature is the ability to improve ourselves. By improving ourselves, then, we actually further the good we have received from nature. Changing ourselves for the better is not opposed to receiving goods from nature. The very act of improving ourselves is also an act of seeking a good that arises from nature.

If some ways of improving ourselves are acceptable, such as a rigorous workout program, then can we conclude that all ways are acceptable, including the use of steroids and gene splicing? Or should we distinguish between those that are natural and those that are unnatural? The distinction is not between improvements without the use of technology and improvements by way of technology. A rigorous workout program might well involve technology, such as a treadmill; it does not thereby become unnatural.²⁹ How, then, is the distinction to be drawn?

Ultimately, we must look again to the good at which nature aims. It seeks the diverse realization, within multiple individuals, of the many aspects of human nature. One aspect of human nature that needs to be realized is self-improvement, as well as the improvement of others. Na-

it is sometimes thought that we should provide for treatments but not for enhancements. I am making no such suggestion. My use of the distinction is to recognize that defects do not arise from nature, so that correcting defects is not opposed to receiving the goods of nature. I am not concerned, then, about the justice or injustice of supporting growth hormone treatment for two boys, both of whom will likely end up being 5'3" without the treatment, one of which will have this height from a defect in the mechanism of growth and the other from his natural genetic endowments. It is worth noting that having a height of 5'3" is no defect; the defect is in the mechanism of growth.

²⁹ Nor should “natural” be taken to mean simply the current products of evolution, as Engelhardt seems to suggest (see “Refashioning Ourselves,” 285–86).

ture provides for this self-improvement, giving us the power to realize our potential. We can improve our physical nature by eating healthily and by exercise; we can improve our mental nature by study and by providing an environment conducive to learning.

Are there any means of self-improvement (or the improvement of others) that aim at a good apart from nature? Do any aim to achieve the good independently, not as received from nature? Any such means, if they could be identified, would not be seeking to realize the good of nature; they would be seeking one's own independent good. I will suggest that some such inappropriate means can be clearly identified while others are suspect, although less clearly opposed to nature.

Nature has provided the means of dispersing diverse natural dispositions through our power to reproduce. These natural dispositions, then, are received – as a good of nature – through this natural power. Any attempt to get around the power of reproduction, whether through simple in vitro fertilization or through genetic manipulations, is an attempt to achieve the good of nature without nature. It severs us from the true good, which is a reflection of human nature and not of ourselves; it leaves us only with our isolated accomplishment.³⁰

The use of pharmaceuticals to achieve enhancement (as opposed to treatment) is suspect. It is natural to take in nutrients, and some of these nutrients might be better for us than others; some might lead to improvements or something like enhancements, whether physical or mental. It is completely natural, then, to control our diets in order to improve ourselves. This natural power appears to be hijacked for another purpose, however, when it is used not to take in healthy nutrients but to take in a chemical directed simply toward a change in our person.

Likewise, the use of technology seems suspect when it becomes, in some manner, a “part” of us. It is one thing to use binoculars in order to improve our vision; it would be another thing to implant an enhancing

³⁰ Agar (“Liberal Eugenics,” 139–41) denies any relevant distinction between improvements by way of changing our environment and improvements by way of changing our genes. He thinks that the distinction hangs upon some notion of genetic determinism. I am suggesting that the relevance derives from the manner in which nature distributes our genetic endowments. There is nothing magic about genes themselves; what matters is that they be received from nature. As we have suggested, defects are not received from nature; in other regards, however, our genetic makeup is received through the power of reproduction, not through our laboratory interventions.

lens within our eyes. The former does not change our very selves, while the latter certainly encroaches upon our makeup. That which we have received from nature is changed; it is not accepted but replaced.

For the latter two cases I do not claim to have a clear method of demarcation. The natural dispositions coming through the power of reproduction are fairly straightforward. The natural means of achieving improvements are less clearly delineated. I do wish to claim that any means of improving ourselves must also be received from nature. Which means are received from nature and which are not, however, is not always clear.

Nor do I wish to defend the status quo of current human dispositions, as if whatever is “natural” in this sense is sacrosanct.³¹ The question concerns the good of human nature, which is our good. That good, if it is truly to be good, must be received from the directedness found within human nature. The more concrete question, then, concerns how we receive something from nature. In one way, we receive the genetic dispositions through the human power of procreation, although when these are functionally defective, then the resulting dispositions are received not from human nature but from a failure of human nature. In other ways, we improve ourselves according to the manner given us by nature, which will depend upon the direction nature gives us toward certain ends. Concerning this latter point, the distinction between what is natural and what is not is unclear, at least to me.

In practice, the precise distinction may not be especially relevant. Perhaps every instance of the use of steroids for enhancement pursues some isolated good, an accomplishment apart from nature, but perhaps not; perhaps some instances fit within the order received from nature. In practice, however, it seems that the use of steroids arises almost uni-

³¹ Fenton (“Liberal Eugenics”) is primarily concerned to argue against the view that what is natural is sacrosanct, which may not in fact be the position of Habermas, against whom she argues (see Habermas, *Future of Human Nature*), although it may be the view of Fukuyama in *Posthuman Future*. Like Fenton, Ted Peters (in “Playing God’ and Germline Intervention,” *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 20 [1995]: 365–86, at 368) seems to oppose this view of the sanctity of nature, claiming that those who wish to restrict enhancements “tacitly bless the status quo.” I argue, however, that the current gene pool is indeed what we have received from nature; it should not be meddled with, not because it is ideal, but so that we can truly participate in the good by receiving it.

versally from the attitude of independence, of separation. The use of steroids is what Sandel calls hyper-agency, an attempt to make my improvement entirely my own.³² Even without a precise demarcation, then, we can say that the “unnatural” enhancements described above arise, with *near* inevitability, from the destructive attitudes that we will now proceed to analyze.

Ingratitude and Pride

Transhumanism is averse to accepting the good things that come from nature; it prefers good things made by human beings. Underlying this preference are the two attitudes mentioned previously, ingratitude and pride. When someone receives a gift but is dissatisfied with it, wanting something more, we recognize ingratitude. If someone receives a new computer and complains that it is not powerful enough, even going so far as to turn it in for another, he is not grateful for the good that he has received. R. P. Doede sees this kind of ingratitude in transhumanism: “Transhumanist enchantment will... [eliminate] the ‘unchosen’ dimensions of their world and their selves. In this categorical refusal of the givens of human existence, they will be launched into a thankless future.”³³

When we receive a gift, we recognize that it is not simply our good; it is a good shared with the giver. As we have suggested, when we receive the diverse attributes of nature, we accept them as a sharing in the human good; they are not simply our own goods. But if we should desire the goods of nature—or that which is like the goods of nature—simply as our own, as coming from ourselves, then we would exhibit pride, which desires a singular excellence. In this case, the excellence is to have an individual good that comes from ourselves.

The fallen angels suffered from precisely this kind of pride.³⁴ They did not desire what was evil; rather, their error was the manner in which they desired the good. They desired it simply from themselves and for

³² Sandel, *Case Against Perfection*, 26.

³³ R. P. Doede, “Transhumanism, Technology, and the Future: Posthumanity Emerging or Sub-humanity Descending?” *Appraisal* 7 (2009): 39–54, at 52. Sandel (*Case Against Perfection*, 85–95) also emphasizes the importance of gratitude.

³⁴ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 3.

themselves. They did not want their good to be received from God; they wanted it to be their own accomplishment. They did not want their good to be a sharing in God's good; they wanted it simply to be their own.³⁵

In a similar manner, transhumanism seeks attributes that are truly good, such as greater strength or intelligence, but it seeks them not as a sharing in the good of human nature. The unwillingness to submit to another is typical of pride. In this case, transhumanism does not wish to submit to the dispensations of nature.³⁶ Consequently, it clings to an isolated good, a good that is not a sharing in the human good.

Transhumanists might well concede the point. So what, they might ask. What is the value of sharing in an inadequate good? Why not exceed this natural good? We should seek what is better, and the good of nature is less than the good that we ourselves can now make. At one time in human history we had to accept the goods that nature dispensed. We are no longer so limited. We can now attain to higher things. If, in the process, we must give up a sharing in some lesser good, then so be it.

Pride can rarely see the folly of its ways, and the ingrate does not often recognize his debt, even when it is pointed out to him. What is difficult to deny, for almost anyone, however, is the importance of love. Consequently, we will return our focus toward love, in the hope of identifying the destructive character of ingratitude and pride.

Self-Hatred

In order to recognize the nature of false love, it will be helpful to investigate self-love and self-hatred. We do not suppose that low self-esteem arises from a healthy self-love; to the contrary, it exhibits aspects of self-hatred. Nevertheless, it is founded in a kind of self-love, as is all our

³⁵ Nigel M. de S. Cameron and Amy Michelle DeBaets (in "Germline Gene Modification and the Human Condition before God," in *Desire and Destiny: Jewish and Christian Perspectives on Human Germline Modification*, ed. Ronald Cole-Turner [Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008], 106–7) note that the simple act of building a tower was fiercely opposed by God in the Old Testament, not because there was any inherent evil in the tower, but because those who built it sought their own glory and independence.

³⁶ For this reason, Sandel (*Case Against Perfection*, 85–92) argues that the hyper responsibility generated from enhancements will eliminate humility, as well as solidarity with others.

activity. Paradoxically, it is founded in something of an overgrown self-love. Probably on account of the expectations of society or of parents, the person wants such a grand good for himself that when he sees by how much he has fallen short of reaching this ideal, he becomes downcast and self-critical. He is dissatisfied with his own small accomplishments, since he wants greater things for himself.

The person with low self-esteem must learn to accept himself, including his failings and limitations. Acceptance does not mean defeatism, as if a person who accepts his limitations cannot strive to overcome them; we can earnestly work to improve ourselves. A difficult balance, however, is required, since the person with low self-esteem is apt to seek to improve himself out of self-hatred, wishing to rid himself entirely of his hateful failings. When he fails, yet again, to eliminate his undesirable traits, he sometimes turns to self-mutilation, whether psychological or physical. In this manner, enhancements upon oneself might turn out to be a kind of self-mutilation, an attempt to eliminate the person one hates and replace it with something new and improved. It is no accident that the enhancements of cosmetic surgery are promoted in advertisements by convincing people that their appearance is defective.³⁷

How are we to find a balance between defeatism and improvements arising from self-hatred? By accepting the limited nature of our good. I do not mean accepting the present state of our good, that is, accepting the fact that we are now imperfect, although this acceptance will follow; rather, I mean accepting what it means for us to be good. Our good—not just now as it is imperfectly realized but even if it were to be fully accomplished—is limited and partial. Our good is precisely to be a part. As such, our good, by its nature, is received.

When we recognize the limited nature of our good, then we see that—despite our failings—we have some share in the good. Indeed, we see that we *are* good. Our goodness arises from the fact that we are a part, even if an imperfect part. As a part, we are ordered to the good of

³⁷ Susan Bordo (in “Braveheart, Babe, and the Contemporary Body,” in *Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications*, ed. Erik Parens [Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998, 189–221]), for instance, emphasizes the drive to convince women that their appearance is defective. This approach might lead to temporary satisfaction with one’s enhanced appearance but long-term dissatisfaction with oneself.

the whole, and this very ordering gives us a share in the good. We are not good through a collection of grand perfections; we are good through our lowliness, through being a part.³⁸

From his role within the whole, an individual can recognize his imperfections and realize what good he has yet to strive for. He acknowledges, however, that his imperfections must be overcome *as received*; they must be overcome not simply from himself. The resulting perfection will not simply be “his”; it will be “ours.” It will belong to all of those who have helped; it will belong to human nature itself.

From this point follows another insight: he might have to live with his imperfections for some time. Indeed, it might be better to live with his imperfections than to attain perfections in the wrong way, as if they were only “his.”³⁹ It is better to rejoice in his small share of the received good than to strive after solitary and exalted accomplishments. It may take him some time to learn how to depend upon others; it may take him some time to learn how to depend upon his fragile nature. He must learn to be happy with what he has, with what he has received; he must learn gratitude.

What of the person who seeks his own exaltation, who seeks his own good as isolated and independent? According to his own conception of the good, his goodness is not received; his goodness is not on account of his being a part within the whole. Rather, his goodness depends entirely upon his own perfections. Consequently, he learns to hate his imperfections, which are destructive of his only good. When he realizes how embedded his imperfections are within him, he learns to hate himself.

Self-Aggrandizement

What happens to the individual who does achieve his own exaltation, the one who succeeds rather than fails, perhaps becoming among the best in his field? Has he not attained a good thing in which he can rejoice? And should we not take this individual as our model (rather

³⁸ Likewise, Gerald McKenny (in “Enhancements and the Ethical Significance of Vulnerability,” in *Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications*, ed. Erik Parens [Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998], 222–37) emphasizes the importance of bodily vulnerability for our human good. He never goes so far as to find value in our lowliness insofar as, through it, we participate in a greater good.

than bemoan the failed individual with low self-esteem)? After all, we often suppose that the best way to overcome low self-esteem is by emphasizing our own accomplishments.

Unfortunately, if this individual does in fact seek his own independent greatness, then he is cut in the same pattern as those with low self-esteem. I do not mean that everyone who accomplishes great things suffers from psychological inadequacies; rather, I speak of those who accomplish these great things perceiving them simply as their own and not as shared and received; these individuals do indeed suffer from psychological inadequacies. They have not learned to love themselves, or rather, their self-love is distorted.

The individual who rejects his role as part also rejects the shared good. In rejecting this good, he is preferring some other, namely, his own individual good, which he prefers because he has perceived it as better than the shared good. Why? Because it arises from himself, without being received. After all, we readily suppose that a self-made man is a great thing.

Once he pursues this first independent excellence, then he may go on to desire another excellence, namely, a greater *degree* of the good than he would have insofar as he is a part. He might desire, for instance, greater intelligence. In any event, he desires his good comparatively, as better than the good that belongs to him as a part. What he comes to love in his own good is that it excels; it is better than others.³⁹ In this state, when he sees someone who appears to excel beyond himself, then he perceives his own good as diminished. If to be good is to excel, then to be outdone is to be defective.

Those who pursue this self exaltation are doomed to two kinds of dissatisfaction. On the one hand, they will be dissatisfied when their own excellence seems to be outstripped by others. On the other hand, they will be dissatisfied when they recognize, in their moments of honesty, that their own good is rather limited. They will learn to hate their true limited selves; they love only the false image they present of themselves. Since they have no goodness from what they are, but only from

³⁹ Bishop ("Posthuman God," 705–6) argues that when we have no goal beyond ourselves, then we are left only with self-augmentation and constant overcoming.

their perfections, they are forced to imagine themselves as more perfect than is really the case.

False Love

From this portrayal of false self-love, it is not difficult to see how a rejection of the received good distorts our love of others. Parents who want super excellence for their children do not really love their children. Like the person with low self-esteem, they do not desire the good of their child as a part, as received from the whole. They begin to despise their true limited child, and they drive him on to ever further accomplishments, so that they can take satisfaction in their imagined ideal child.

Just as the individual who seeks his own singular excellence perceives no goodness in himself apart from his perfections, so the parents who seek the singular excellence of their child find no good in the child apart from his accomplishments. The child is not good insofar as he is a part; he is good, they suppose, insofar as he excels beyond the part, independently of any role within the whole. This independent goodness, however, can only be the goodness of individual perfections. When the child falls short of this ideal, then he has no goodness in himself by which he might be loved.

We can see, then, why the love of others always involves a shared good. A friend is first of all good by sharing in the whole, not by having a list of perfections. When we desire some good for her, we desire it for her as she is, as an imperfect part that can become better. If, on the other hand, she has only the good of her perfections, then we cannot will the good for her as an imperfect individual; rather, the imperfections must be removed, and we will anything for her only insofar as she is perfect.

Ultimately, an individual—even when he has a distorted love—must conceive the person loved as in some manner united with himself. When the good is conceived as a singular excellence, however, it is not the union of two parts within a whole; rather, the person loved is probably conceived as an extension of the lover. The perfections of the child, for instance, are perceived as perfections of the parent.

Typically, the child perceives this backhanded love. He perceives that the goods he receives—the excellent education, the special training

in sports, and so on—are not goods meant for himself. He learns to hate these goods. He longs for a shared good, a good, however small, that he has with others, and which the others desire for his sake.

Enhancements and Love

This portrayal of overbearing love may well be uncontested. What will be contested is the link between technological enhancements and overbearing love.⁴⁰ The act of sending a child to a top-ranked preparatory school can arise from true love or false love; in contrast, I claim, an act of technological enhancement excludes true love. I do not mean that parents who seek technological enhancements have no love for their child; rather, I mean that the act of enhancing itself cannot be an act of true love but only of overbearing love.

Technological enhancements are destructive of love. The pursuit of them necessarily severs the good from the whole of which it should be a part. The desire for a good not received from human nature exhibits pride, a pride that seeks to excel beyond the good of the part.⁴¹ The consequent deformed good is isolated, unable to be shared. All that remains of this good is its excellence. And what of the one for whom this good is desired? His good also is found only in excellence. The technological enhancements, then, cannot be desired for the individual insofar as she is good; it must be desired for her in order to make her good. She is loved not as a limited part, that is good through her order to the whole; rather, she is loved only as super excelling. Her limited nature comes to be hated. Enhancements, then, are a kind of mutilation, a destruction of the perceived evil in the individual and a replacement with something more desirable.

The root of this disorder is pride, pride wedded to ingratitude. The partial good is despised because it is limited. Its first limitation is precisely that it is received, for it is a kind of excellence to create things

⁴⁰ For convenience, I use the term “technological enhancements” (and even, for short, just “enhancements”) to refer to the kinds of enhancements that fail to respect the directedness of our human nature, such that the enhancements are not received from nature, as described above. I am not suggesting that every use of technology in order to improve ourselves—even a treadmill—is problematic.

⁴¹ Leon Kass (in *Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics* [San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002], 129) describes this pride as “playing God.”

from oneself.⁴² What we forget is that it is also an excellence to receive. When we reject what is received we are ungrateful. By his nature, the ingrate cuts himself off, holding his good as only his own. Other goods are disdained.

A single act of enhancing is but one instance of such pride and false love. This single act, however, might well arise from a more general disposition of pride. At the very least, it will give rise to this disposition. Once the attitude of enhancement becomes a settled mindset within a society, then the partial good will be despised; the love of exaltation will turn to hatred of what is lowly. The Down syndrome child is not wanted.⁴³ “Inferior races” must be purged. Defective individuals are “mistakes” relegated to the fringe of society.⁴⁴ What begins in the tones of a high-minded pursuit of a great ideal becomes all that is ugly.

When we see suffering in the world we can take two quite divergent approaches. On the one hand, we can seek to alleviate the sufferings of those around us. On the other hand, we can dream of a world without suffering, which becomes a substitute for the world in which we live. In the latter case, we learn to hate the world in which we live. In the end, we do not seek to mend our broken world; we seek to eliminate it, to replace it. As Tom Koch suggests:

Were enhancement enthusiasts serious about wishing to reduce harm and improve human potential enhancement, they might endorse as human rights those programs that improve the life of persons with cognitive, sensory, and physical differences.... Were enhancement enthusiasts truly serious about advancing the lives of society and its members, they might seek not the reflexive elimination, but the general nurturing of those whose differences they do not understand. . . . Instead they note with

⁴² McKenny (“Vulnerability,” 230–35) also argues for the importance of our limitations for the love of others. In particular, he emphasizes the importance of the vulnerability of our bodies.

⁴³ In his promotion of “liberal” eugenics, Agar suggest (“Liberal Eugenics,” 138) that the first step of such eugenics might involve aborting a defective child, thereby “canceling out the wrong of the life that would have been lived.” All that can be seen in such a child, evidently, is a wrong life.

⁴⁴ See Kass, *Defense of Dignity*, 130.

approval the high rates of second-trimester abortions of fetuses that would, if allowed to develop, become persons with Down syndrome. That is, for me, a pity.⁴⁵

C. S. Lewis emphasizes that we must marvel at a child as a gift received, as someone with whom we can share our good, a good that we ourselves have received.⁴⁶ If a child is not a gift, then he becomes a thing for satisfaction, a source for the parents own exaltation. The child yearns for love; instead, he gets only “goods.” He has all the things that money can buy, including exceptional intelligence and superhuman strength, but he is alone, miserably alone. And he knows it. 

⁴⁵ Koch, “Enhancing Who,” 696–97.

⁴⁶ C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of the Man* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1947), 32–33.

