

Grace as the Gift of Another: M. J. Scheeben, K. Eschweiler, and Today

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“As God does not change by his condescension,
so man is not swallowed up by being exalted.”

—St. Leo the Great¹

I. Pre-negotiating the Interpretive Situation

WHY Scheeben? Even prior to this symposium, the basic answer to this question must have seemed obvious. A conference today on Matthias Joseph Scheeben will be interested in renewing the sense of grace and the supernatural, widely recognized as the core and focus of Scheeben's thought. But this immediate sense of purpose leads directly to a second question that is more difficult to answer: Why is it that the renewal of our sense of grace and the supernatural is so urgent and difficult today as to require help from Scheeben? Why do we need to look back to the nineteenth century, or with it, to look back behind the various phases of scholasticism to patristic thought, both Latin and Greek? What is the charitological problem today, for which we are looking for help by investigating Scheeben's work? The quest to identify what was promising or deficient about Scheeben must therefore begin by identifying what challenges us today.

Some twenty-five years ago, in preparation of a commemorative volume that was to appear in 1988 on the centenary of Scheeben's death, the then-prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,

¹ Leo the Great, Epistula 28, *Ad Flavianum*, 3–4 (PL 54, 763–67): “Sicut enim Deus non mutatur miseratione, ita homo non consumitur dignitate” (cf. *Officium lectionis*, *Ad sollemnitatem Annuntiationis Domini*).

Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, wrote a necessarily brief letter to accompany the volume.² He recalled there the late-twentieth-century context, one that has changed but little since then, for understanding this “*Grundwort* of Scheeben’s theology,” the supernatural or, simply, “supernature.” Cardinal Ratzinger recalled first the reasons why the term had been discredited by Henri de Lubac and avoided by the Council.³ In opposition to the appearance of the “Zwei-Stockwerk-Theorie” (that nice but unnecessary upstairs addition to an already adequate bungalow),

... Lubac had wanted to make visible once again the dynamic ordering of both realms to one another, which implied that human beings cannot come to rest in mere nature. It had not been about eliminating the supernatural; quite to the contrary, it had been an attempt to shift the supernatural as the authentic directional signal and arrow of our entire existence back into the center of Christian anthropology. But now the polemical attack on the doctrine of the double “Stockwerk” was reinterpreted as a general rejection of every sort of “dualism”; even the very distinction of nature and supernature was declared illegitimate. Initially, the elimination of this supposed “dualism” had seemed slanted rather toward supernaturalism: all of reality was to be interpreted Christologically; but quickly, now, the whole tendency flipped over into a flat naturalism, which reduced even the Christological to the commonplace of human existentials. And once Christianity’s new, “supernatural” dimension has been denied, then its promise must also be reduced to the realm of the natural, to “this-sidedness”: political messianism and the banalities of immanentistic theologies were and remain the necessary consequence of this loss. Bound up along with this, there occurs simultaneously a terrible reduction of what it means to be human, which is now reduced to what can be done and shown off. The whole world of what is interior or higher is left to languish.⁴

The road to the recovery in our own day of an ability to be attentive to the mysteries of grace in both theology and ecclesial life is therefore not simply a matter of asserting the universal presence of grace or denying the distinguishability of grace from our nature, making the *de facto*

² J. Ratzinger, “Geleitwort,” in Vari Autori, *M.J. Scheeben teologo cattolico d’ispirazione tomista* (Studi Tomistici 33) (Citta del Vaticano: Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso e di Religione Cattolica 1988), 9–13 (translation mine).

³ Cf. also de Lubac’s letter of 12 November, 1961, to J. Maritain, admitting that Scheeben’s introduction of the term supernature into scholastic theology was “maybe not very fortunate”; quoted by René Mougél, “The Position of Jacques Maritain Regarding *Supernature*: The Sin of the Angel, or ‘Spirit and Liberty’,” in *Supernature: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought*, ed. Serge-Thomas Bonino (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2009), 59–83, here 72f.

⁴ J. Ratzinger, “Geleitwort,” 11ff.

nature that we always already experience into the primary *locus* and universal embodiment of the supernatural. That would simply repeat the “flip” that Cardinal Ratzinger described as leading from verbal affirmation of the supernatural to its existential redundancy; a flip that would lead at most to an inflationary supernatural, to “cheap grace.” To recognize the gift of grace is to recognize both the presence of a high good in our lives and its free source in Another. The cause of the supernatural seems to be something like that of *King Lear*: it is not necessarily the daughters who praise Lear most lavishly who are then most attentive to his legitimate claims. The question that we have to ask of Scheeben is whether his work and reception offer resources that allow us today to treasure more intentionally grace and faith as the rich and free gifts of Another.⁵ The goal of reading Scheeben and following his development and reception must be the retrieval of the capacity for that *discrimen gratiae et naturae* that is demanded for the flourishing of each; a goal toward which the legacy of a Joseph Kleutgen or even a Georg Hermes might, if not quite Cordelia-like, still be able to make a contribution, as if we could say of them what France says to Lear of his most reticent daughter:

Is it but this—a tardiness in nature,
Which often leaves the history unspoke
That it intends to do? (*Lear* I 1)

But, then, again, why, or in what sense, Scheeben? And when? Those who have studied Scheeben’s own development and that of his reception⁶ tell us of changes in both. In the first of two remarkable essays published in the “Scheeben year,” 1988, Leo Scheffczyk traced how Scheeben increasingly came to portray supernature as the goal and meaning of human creation itself.⁷ Although Scheffczyk applauded the reduction of the

⁵ Cf. the positive expectations of John Courtney Murray, “The Root of Faith: The Doctrine of Matthias Joseph Scheeben,” *Theological Studies* 9 (1948): 20–46; and *Matthias Scheeben on Faith: The Doctoral Dissertation of John Courtney Murray*, ed. D. Thomas Hughson, Toronto Studies in Theology, vol. 29 (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1987).

⁶ Until 1880, Scheeben’s development was driven in part by his ongoing controversy with Joseph Kleutgen (†1883) and other representatives of the Roman school of Jesuit neo-Scholasticism. The resultant diversity within Scheeben’s own development allowed for a diversity within the reception of Scheeben as well. This shift would modify what might still have been considered the extrinsicism of nature to grace in the famous early work of 1861. Cf. i.a. David Berger, *Natur und Gnade* (Regensburg: S. Roderer, 1998), 156–62.

⁷ Leo Scheffczyk, “Schöpfung als Vor-Ordnung der Gnade. Zur Schöpfungslehre M. J. Scheebens,” in *Vari Autori, M. J. Scheeben teologo cattolico d’ispirazione tomista*

extrinsicism implied in the work of 1861, he also mentioned at least four times in passing the bothersome appearance of too close an affinity of the later position to the supernatural existential of Karl Rahner. Scheffczyk felt compelled to take up this theme more directly in a second essay, in which he sought to distinguish the organic from the transcendental model of union between nature and supernature.⁸ Taking up a characterization suggested by Karl Eschweiler, Scheffczyk sees in Scheeben's "organic" model a less thorough-going union of nature and supernature. The heterogenous organs of any one organism, the distinct phases of its growth, its real distinction from other organisms are all aspects of the organic that Scheffczyk sees Scheeben employing to qualify the union of nature and grace and to underline their abiding difference and even opposition.

In that same brief letter that Joseph Ratzinger wrote for the Scheeben volume of 1988, the Cardinal singled out three areas of Scheeben's thought for our attention: Scheeben's thought was first of all centered in the supernatural. The twenty-six-year-old Scheeben came close to spelling out the issue here, when, at the very beginning of *Nature and Grace*, he points to the need to identify the "difference," even the "opposition," but also the "union" of nature and grace:⁹ *Unterschied, Gegensatz, Verbindung*. Does Scheeben's legacy help us to do this, or does the dazzling glory of their union blind us to the "charitological difference" necessary for us to recognize grace as a gift?

The second feature of Scheeben's thought singled out in the letter of 1988 just cited is a consequence of supernature, the sense of mystery that belongs to genuine theology and ecclesial life (what Aidan Nichols in his recent study of Scheeben translates as the "mysteric").¹⁰ As Ratzinger's letter put it:

(Studi Tomistici 33) (Citta del Vaticano: Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso e di Religione Cattolica 1988), 205–25; on Rahner cf. 206, 211, 217f., 220, 222.

⁸ Leo Scheffczyk, "Die 'organische' und die 'transzendente' Verbindung zwischen Natur und Gnade. Ein Vergleich zwischen Matthias Joseph Scheeben und Karl Rahner aus Anlaß des Scheeben-Gedenkens," *Forum Katholische Theologie* 4 (1988): 161–79.

⁹ In his English translation, Cyril Vollert renders "Unterschied, Gegensatz, Verbindung" in this context as "difference, opposition, and union": cf. M. J. Scheeben, *Nature and Grace* (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1954; reprint Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009), xvii.

¹⁰ Cf. Aidan Nichols, *Romance and System: The Theological Synthesis of Matthias Joseph Scheeben* (Denver, CO: Augustine Institute Press, 2010), 101–14. To illustrate the "continuity of principles," John Henry Newman had written of the nature of theology and the interpretation of Scripture less than twenty years before Scheeben's *Nature and Grace* in *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845: Part II, 7: Application of the Second Note: Continuity of its Principles): "In

What is essential to the world of faith is precisely what is entirely other: it provides a new beginning in history: that which cannot be deduced or derived, but precisely as new can only be disclosed from itself, when one risks that leap into what is new, what is not derived. That is what is meant by the word “mystery.” Where this dimension is not accepted, when what is considered Christian is reduced to what can be derived generally, then what is essential to a biblical faith doesn’t even come into our pervue. Theology of this kind misses its true object. Theology only begins with this courage for the mysteric, reflecting on faith and recognizing faith as the preception of the new and underived. Scheeben placed the greatest importance upon this inderivability, this complete disguishability of levels. This is the basic thought of his *Mysteries of Christianity*, which seems to me in turn to unfold the basic intuition of his entire theology. . . . A theology that speaks of what is new and cannot be reduced simply to the principles of our reason.¹¹

But, if “what is essential to the world of faith is precisely what is entirely other,” how does what J. Ratzinger noted as a third central concern of Scheeben avoid making both supernatural and the mysteric “Lebenswelt” seem like the fruit of one’s own being? Present already for example in the reflections on sonship in *Naturand Grace*, it is a dimension difficult to comprehend that Scheeben would stress increasingly as his worked progressed. In Ratzinger’s words, it is “the core of the whole controversy,” but one that calls into doubt the looser sense of union proposed to distinguish Scheeben’s model from the transcendental-idealistic ones:

. . . the doctrine of the non-appropriated indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the human soul. . . . Although logical considerations actually appear to enclose the three persons of God in the interior of His essence and to make them incommunicable to the outside; and although, from the other side, human beings cannot transcend the limit of their finitude, so that an immediate contact with the infinite seems impossible, although therefore from both sides there are necessary reasons that seem to speak against it, Scheeben wants to hold fast to the realism of this mystery in all its

like manner the contempt of mystery, of reverence, of devoutness, of sanctity, are other notes of the heretical spirit.” “It may be almost laid down as an historical fact, that the mystical interpretation and orthodoxy will stand or fall together.”

¹¹ Ratzinger, “Geleitwort,” 10, citing M. J. Scheeben, *Die Mysterien des Christenthums. Wesen, Bedeutung und Zusammenhang derselben nach der in ihrem übernatürlichen Charakter gegebenen Perspective dargestellt* (1865); cf. Manfred Hauke, “Das Faszinierende der göttlichen Gnade. Zur charitologischen Ästhetik bei M. J. Scheeben,” *Forum Katholische Theologie* 9 (1993): 275–89; and already Michael Schmaus, “Die Stellung Matthias Joseph Scheebens in der Theologie des 19. Jahrhundert,” in *Matthias Joseph Scheeben, Der Erneuerer der katholischen Glaubenswissenschaft*, ed. Carl Feckes, et al. (Mainz: M. Grünewald, 1935), 29–54.

consequences: that God has ways as person to touch the person and as God to be with his creature really and not just by way of mediations.¹²

II. Karl Eschweiler's Reading of Scheeben in the Context of His Times

The relation of “Unterschied” and “Gegensatz” to “Verbindung,” the relation of the difference and the opposition of nature and grace to the union of nature and supernature in human persons, as well as the relation of Scheeben's thought to the wide variety of transcendental-idealistic systems cannot be resolved without closer attention to Scheeben's nineteenth-century context. Aidan Nichols's recent study of Scheeben's theological synthesis between “Romance and System” has shown again the value of looking closely at Scheeben's own contemporary context. One of Nichols's sources, the 1926 study by Karl Eschweiler, *Two Paths of Recent Theology: Georg Hermes and Matthias Joseph Scheeben*, has always been acknowledged as a classic in this regard.¹³ The tragedy of its author, Karl Eschweiler, was arguably that he had a better grasp of controversies that had entered the twentieth century from the eighteenth and nineteenth than he had of those which first manifested themselves in the twentieth.¹⁴ Thanks to the recently completed Eschweiler study project carried out by Thomas Marschler at the University of Augsburg, we now have better access to Eschweiler's works than ever before. Not only have Eschweiler's philosophical dissertation on Augustine and his Scheeben study been made easily accessible again (the latter in digital form), but his 1921 theological dissertation from Bonn, *Der theologische Rationalismus von der Aufklärung bis zum Vatikanum. Ideengeschichtliche Studien zur theologischen Erkenntnislehre* and his habilitation in theology from there the following year, *Die Erlebnistheologie Johann Michael Sailer's als Grundlegung des theologischen Fideismus in der vorvaticanischen Theologie. Ein ideengeschichtlicher Beitrag zur theologischen Erkenntnislehre*, have now been published for the first time.¹⁵ These studies

¹² Ratzinger, “Geleitwort,” 12f.

¹³ Karl Eschweiler, *Die zwei Wege der neueren Theologie: Georg Hermes—Matthias Joseph Scheeben. Eine kritische Untersuchung des Problems der theologischen Erkenntnis* (Augsburg: B. Filser, 1926).

¹⁴ Cf. now Thomas Marschler, *Karl Eschweiler (1886–1936): Theologische Erkenntnislehre und nationalsozialistische Ideologie* (Regensburg: Pustet, 2011). The author thanks Prof. Marschler for generously sharing several pages of this important study just prior to its publication.

¹⁵ Karl Eschweiler, *Die katholische Theologie im Zeitalter des Deutschen Idealismus. Die Bonner theologischen Qualifikationsschriften von 1921/22*. Aus dem Nachlaß herausgegeben und mit einer Einleitung versehen von Thomas Marschler (Münster: Monsenstein und Vannerdat, 2010).

by Eschweiler on figures including Benedikt Stattler and Leibniz/Wolff, Georg Hermes and Kant, Anton Günther and Hegel, as well as J. M. Sailer and Jacobi were completed just prior to Grabmann's first edition of Scheeben's *Nature and Grace* in 1922, and they sharpened Eschweiler's understanding of the ongoing remarks by Scheeben on the thought of his contemporaries, the service that he still provides for us today.

The key to Eschweiler's reading of Scheeben's modern context is perhaps best found in chapter four,¹⁶ after he has already presented individual chapters on Georg Hermes (II) and on Scheeben (III). Where Scheeben had frequently situated his argumentative goal between excesses of self-confidence and self-doubt, Eschweiler now sees Scheeben's sense of genuine theology as the interplay between two kinds of light, the *lumen infusum* of grace and the *lumen naturale*. Eschweiler identifies in Scheeben's *analysis fidei* two general patterns of failure in understanding this interplay of lights, and he assigns two subgroups to each pattern of failure. There are on the one hand "monistic" patterns that fail by identifying only one source of light. As examples he suggests various forms of neo-Augustinianism that would attribute all theological light to grace, but also the various forms of rationalism that attribute all important and reliable religious light to nature, refusing to place any credence in divine authority. Among the many varieties of rationalism are the systems of Stattler, Hermes, and Günther, relying on the philosophies of Leibniz/Wolff, Kant, and Hegel respectively.

On the other side of the ledger, that other general pattern of failure in understanding the interplay of light in theology is called "dualism," paying distant respect to some under-utilized dimension, while concentrating on its alternative. The two subtypes here are exemplified by a fideism of experience over doctrine (Sailer) and what Eschweiler, happily or not, called "Molinism," meant to identify a wide spectrum of scholasticism which insists on a realm of knowledge and will that is initially free of any inclination toward God. Because the so-called "dualistic" models focus on just one element, there are ways in which they overlap with their monistic counterparts; there are fideistic parallels to Augustinianism, just as there are Molinist approximations to Hermes. Eschweiler's special interest is in restoring to theology a vitalized if differentiated unity, whereby the theological sub-disciplines that are not immediately informed by faith in *auctoritas divina* would be brought back into a whole that is moved first and foremost by such a faith.

This primary attention by faith to the *auctoritas divina* is what finally differentiates a third general pattern of theology as genuine in contrast to

¹⁶ Eschweiler, *Die zwei Wege der neueren Theologie Georg Hermes—Matthias Joseph Scheeben*, IV i, 3: 204–18.

the two failed patterns. Eschweiler calls it the “teleological type,” marked by the “mens sancti Thomae,”¹⁷ because of the *desiderium naturale visionis Dei* that inclines it from the start to seek faith in the “authoritative” word of Another, to seek new life that is the gift of Another, to seek a sonship that is not one’s own by previous right or generation. The chief feature highlighted by Eschweiler is its trust in the *auctoritas* of Another, which gives it what could be called a dialogical, interpersonal, or responsorial dimension. It is this responsorial dimension more than its organic or developing character that arguably distinguishes Scheeben’s thought most clearly from the active self-transcendence of a Karl Rahner, whose *analysis fidei* seems in this regard more reminiscent of Günther than of Hermes.

Although Hermes’s appropriation of Kant is named explicitly by Eschweiler as one exemplification of the rationalist subset of monistic theories on grace and nature, the second chapter also had identified laudable aspects in Hermes’s thought. Hermes’s apologetic goal had restricted the best use of reason to the sheer affirmation of God, while claiming only a far weaker sense of how his mysteries might be understood. One might here see the foreshadowing of the Bultmannian association of a non-objective understanding of the word of God with a keen sense of God’s addressing me by it (that “Anrede Gottes,” which the more radical Bultmannians around F. Buri and H. Braun would dismiss as an inconsequent retention of mythology). Scheeben’s sense of supernature and of the mysteric character of theology demands at least a parallel recognition that more is at stake in theology than what my native powers can easily grasp. The “new path” that Eschweiler suggests as a synthesis nearer to Scheeben than to Hermes is a theology designed to be vibrant both in its dialogical recognition and in its understanding of the mysteries of God. Eschweiler summarizes his chapter on Hermes as follows:

In the second chapter—‘*Georg Hermes*, the theology of critical reason’—the first of ‘The Two Paths of the Newer Theology’ is presented: and indeed in its most rigorous and, if you will, its most classical execution. Once its complicated way of thinking is unravelled, the critical theology of Georg Hermes no longer looks like that frightful ghost of theological rationalism, as which international theology had once portrayed it. Hermes is least of all a rationalist, much less a naturalist. It is merely a methodological step that leads him to isolate the essence of reason from faith. Admittedly, he applies this methodological isolation seriously and so radically reduces theological knowledge down to reason’s *iudicium creditatis*. If the method is applied seriously, without merely

¹⁷ Ibid., 216.

feigning isolation, the pure essence of reason, methodologically isolated from faith, becomes automatically a tool of whatever contemporary philosophy is considered at the moment absolutely necessary.¹⁸

If Hermes's vision of theology is not without its merits, so the other of "The Two Paths of Newer Theology," namely Scheeben, despite typifying the teleological method, is not without its limitations. Eschweiler describes what he sees as Scheeben's merits and limits shortly after publication of *The Two Ways* in answer to objections from the Jesuit faculty at Innsbruck.¹⁹

Conversely, the second of "The Two Paths of the Newer Theology" is characterized by this, that it allows theological thinking to enter as purely as possible into a believing understanding of the ideas of revelation and the ecclesial tradition. It is exemplified here by the great example of "Matthias Joseph Scheeben—Theology drawn from Faith" (third chapter). Both Scheeben's theory of faith and his general doctrine of grace show that this theologian, perhaps the greatest theologian that was bestowed upon the Church in the 19th century, has overcome the spirit of early modernity in Catholic theology by overcoming Molinism and by pressing on to the principles of genuine Thomism.²⁰

While describing Scheeben as "the most precious blossom ever bestowed upon the springtime of new scholasticism,"²¹ Eschweiler criticizes not his practice but his notion of theological method. And that critique suprisingly does not associate his theory with Sailer's fideism.

However, in theological epistemology Scheeben is still stuck in the parallelism of a method of pure reason here and of pure faith there. He doesn't himself practice this kind of theological reason isolated from faith. In contradiction to his own doctrine of faith and grace, but, rather, quite in accord with Molinist principles, he allows this parallelism of "a double form of theology" to continue.²²

¹⁸ Karl Eschweiler, "Eine neue Kontroverse über das Verhältnis von Glauben und Wissen," *Bonner Zeitschrift für Theologie und Seelsorge* 3 (1926): 260–76, here 261; cf. Eschweiler, "Eine neue Kontroverse (II)," *Bonner Zeitschrift für Theologie und Seelsorge* 4 (1927): 155–60.

¹⁹ Cf. the review of Eschweiler's book by Johann Stufler in *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* 50 (1926): 326–36; as well as Johann Stufler, "Molinismus und neutrale Vernunfttheologie," *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* 51 (1927): 35–59.

²⁰ Eschweiler, "Eine neue Kontroverse über das Verhältnis von Glauben und Wissen," 261.

²¹ Eschweiler, *Die zwei Wege*, 24.

²² Eschweiler, "Eine neue Kontroverse" (I), 261.

III. Responsoriality and Being a “Child of God”

Eschweiler interpreted Scheeben's sense of faith and theology as trust in Another and as a unique option in the midst of the many post-Cartesian turns toward self.²³ It is also this feature in Scheeben's thought that led him to that third characteristic identified by Cardinal Ratzinger in 1988: the doctrine of the immediate presence of God in the supernature of the human person. Eschweiler traces its origins to Scheeben's sense of faith:

The image of the relationship “child-father” characterizes the original sense of Scheeben's theory of faith. . . . The analogy is perfect. The interpretation of religious faith as a relationship of creaturely dedication and divine authorship could not have been expressed in a more tangible image.²⁴

Eventually the development of this image will move Scheeben into a unique place, not only in the modern history of Western theology, but in the context of the older Western theological tradition as well.

The tension involved in Scheeben's interpretation of God's unmediated indwelling and the problems it poses for that acknowledgment of alterity needed for recognition of the gift of adoption become evident only gradually.

The *homo iustus* is given in a natural-supernatural reality. Is he to be a child, who belongs entirely to the father in a natural community? But only one is the natural son of God, one in being with the Father. Human beings in the state of grace are “accepted” as children of God. The nobility and consecration of their divine being is “created grace.” They are conscious of their created nobility, children not by natural bonds. Therefore it is possible for them to conduct themselves as friends of God, self-guiding, come-of-age.²⁵

The tension-in-unity between friend and child will remain in Scheeben's thought, even as he begins, under the inspiration of Cyril of Alexandria, to place increasing stress on the dialectic between a *gratia increata* and the new and fragile beginning implied by a *gratia inhaerens*. The four essays collected in volume VIII of Scheeben's works on the controversy concerning the Council of Trent and the formal cause in those who are justified by their becoming children of God document the external and internal difficulties with which Scheeben struggled as he

²³ For Eschweiler's positioning of Scheeben between the “fideismus” of Sailer and the “rationalism” of Hermes, cf. Marschler, *Karl Eschweiler*, 128–33.

²⁴ Eschweiler, *Die zwei Wege*, 150f.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 157.

developed his uncommon doctrine. The editor of the volume, Heribert Schauf, who had followed this theme in Scheeben's works as no one else had,²⁶ sees here another point of comparison with the theology of Karl Rahner, who for his part underscored the exceptional character of Scheeben's doctrine of the Trinity.²⁷ Tracing that affinity and its aporetic would lead beyond the necessary limits of these reflections. Scheeben manages to see the abiding sense of self that makes possible the charitable difference, not just in a notion of friendship that would balance the notion of child of God, but also within that notion itself. In the volume of the *Handbuch katholischer Dogmatik* dedicated to the theology of grace, Scheeben singles out among the gifts of the Holy Spirit *timor filialis* as a formal principle of all the gifts. *Timor filialis* had long been understood as a principle of alterity, a reverence for the other that contains an awareness of one's own finitude. Thomas Aquinas had argued that, precisely in the creaturely finitude that is essential to it, *timor* of this kind would remain even *in patria*, so that the blessed might be fully blessed by their awareness of the gift of Another. It is this qualification of humanity's supernature that will be needed to re-center Scheeben's legacy if it is to find a lasting place in the future of Catholic theology. Scheeben's sense of *timor filialis* must be taken as the key to interpreting his theology of adopted sonship and the gift of the supernatural. **NV**

²⁶ Cf. Heribert Schauf, "Scheebens Lehre von der Einwohnung des Heiligen Geistes," *Pastor Bonus* 48 (1937): 11–26.

²⁷ Cf. Karl Rahner's 1960 contribution to the Festschrift for A. Stöcker: Karl Rahner, "Bemerkungen zum dogmatischen Traktat 'De Trinitate,'" also in Rahner, *Schriften zur Theologie*, Vol. 4 (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1960), 103–33, e.g. p. 108, where Rahner praises Scheeben and Schauf for their willingness to cast off the conceptual restrictions of created grace.