

Book Reviews

Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to the Biblical Commentaries edited by Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum (London: T&T Clark, 2005), xii + 257 pp.

FOLLOWING UP on a previous symposium titled *Aquinas on Doctrine*, the editors of that volume commissioned the present set of articles on the biblical commentaries of Thomas Aquinas. As Nicholas M. Healy points out in his introduction, this symposium grows organically out of its predecessor because the contributors to the volume on doctrine frequently relied on Thomas's biblical commentaries as foundations for their doctrinal expositions.

During his entire career, Healy observes, St. Thomas never publicly taught either the *Summa contra Gentiles* or the *Summa theologiae*, but throughout his life he continued to lecture on Holy Scripture, thus fulfilling his primary task as *magister in sacra pagina*. Some of the commentaries are rather long. *The Lectures on the Gospel of St. John*, for example, run to more than one thousand pages in English translation.

In spite of Thomas's proficiency as a biblical theologian, his commentaries are not widely read today. The majority of them have still not been edited in critical editions, and only about half have become available in English translations. A large number of these commentaries are not from the hand of Thomas himself, but are "reports" (*reportationes*) given by disciples or students.

The nine chapters of this book present commentaries by Aquinas on sixteen books of the Bible: two from the Old Testament (Job, Isaiah) and fourteen from the New Testament. The New Testament chapters treat the lectures on the Gospels of Matthew and John and expositions on various Pauline writings, including the Pastoral Letters and Hebrews, all of which Thomas ascribed to Paul. The essays are consistently concise, carefully researched, and judicious. They inform the reader about the date and provenance of the commentaries, the methods employed by Aquinas, and the main points of doctrine found in each commentary.

As a biblical commentator, St. Thomas offers something very different from the typical historical-critical commentary that is considered standard in our day. Aquinas's exegesis is predominantly doctrinal. In the commentaries here examined, he focuses primarily on the literal sense, but he does not mean by it what Pius XII and Raymond Brown understood by "literal." Rather than the sense intended and expressed by the sacred writer, he means what God as the true author intended to convey by the words, thus including under the literal meaning what some modern exegetes designate as the *sensus plenior*. Thomas does at times attend to mystical or allegorical meanings, but when he does so he is often able to refer to other texts in which these meanings are literally affirmed. In Isaiah 7:14, for example, the virgin's child is not literally Jesus, but Matthew 1:23 makes the identification explicitly. The Paschal Lamb in the Old Testament is a type of Jesus, but the identity is affirmed in the New Testament (1 Cor 5:9). In other cases Thomas accepts the allegorical interpretation given by the Fathers without explicit scriptural warrant. Thus he treats the origin of Eve from the side of Adam as a prototype of the birth of the Church from the pierced side of Christ.

The commentaries on 1 and 2 Thessalonians, presented by Francesca Aran Murphy, show how far the Angelic Doctor is from fundamentalism. He gives figurative interpretations to the trumpet mentioned in 1 Thessalonians 4:16 and the thousand years of Revelation 20:1–6. He refuses to understand 1 Thessalonians 4:17 as if it meant that some who are alive at the second coming will be "raptured" without dying.

Unlike most modern commentators, Thomas does not greatly concern himself with the identity of the sacred writers, with their sources, or with the literary structure of their work. Convinced that the canonical Scriptures should be read as a single book, he freely engages in cross-references within Scripture as a whole. Thomas Weinandy, in his chapter on Hebrews, notes the multiplicity of citations from other books of Scripture. St. Thomas also exhibits a remarkable familiarity with the commentaries of the Fathers. He regularly cites Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Pseudo-Dionysius as authorities. Mark Edwards complains that he neglects John Chrysostom in his interpretation of Ephesians and Colossians, but other contributors to this volume attest to his enthusiasm for that saint. In his *Lectures on the Gospels of Matthew and John*, Thomas draws heavily on the *Catena aurea* he had composed at the behest of Pope Urban IV. Unlike most modern commentators, he engages in dialogue not only with other exegetes but with philosophers of different schools, including Aristotle and a variety of Jewish and Muslim thinkers. He does not accord medieval commentators such as Peter Lombard the same

reverence that he extends to the Fathers. Rather frequently, as Matthew Levering notes, St. Thomas uses heresies as guideposts for the wrong way of reading Scripture.

The exegesis of St. Thomas is highly doctrinal. At some points it comes so close to his systematic works that it hardly differs except in the arrangement of the material. As Daniel Keating explains, Thomas uses 1 Corinthians to develop his theology of the sacraments and 2 Corinthians to expound his theology of ministry. The discussion of Hebrews by Thomas Weinandy shows how St. Thomas uses that letter to present his views on the primacy of Jesus Christ, on the priesthood of Christ, and on the nature of faith.

On occasion Thomas uses Scripture apologetically. His commentary on Job, as John Yocum explains, interprets that work as a defense of divine providence against objections based on the sufferings of the innocent. Job, in Thomas's view, gives plausible reasons (*probabiles rationes*) to believe that human affairs are not ruled by chance but by divine providence. Thomas represents the speeches of the friends of Job as if they were a medieval university disputation, with God himself as judge issuing the final *determinatio*.

St. Thomas frequently inserts doctrinal disquisitions (*quaestiones*) as excursions into his running commentaries. For example, as Jeremy Holmes remarks, he discusses the properties of the risen body in connection with Matthew's account of the Transfiguration. John Saward's chapter on the Pastoral Letters provides similar material. In treating the statement that "God will have all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim 2:4), the Angelic Doctor makes careful distinctions between different types of divine will, such as the antecedent and the consequent wills, the *voluntas signi* and the *voluntas beneplaciti*. These distinctions are not foreign to exegesis because they assist in the proper understanding of the passage in question. Matthew Levering, in his chapter on the Gospel of John, shows how Aquinas uses philosophy to give a precise interpretation to the statement, "And from his fullness we have all received" (Jn 1:16). Thomas distinguishes between fullness of sufficiency, fullness of superabundance, and fullness of "efficiency and overflow." These distinctions enable Thomas to differentiate between Mary's superabundant fullness of grace and the unique causative fullness of Christ's grace of headship (*gratia capitis*).

Joseph Wawrykow, in his chapter on Isaiah, discusses reasons why even the doctrinal theologian should wish to turn to Thomas the exegete. In some cases familiarity with the biblical commentaries forestalls objections that might arise from a study confined to systematic works such as the

Summa theologiae. The commentary on Isaiah, for example, shows that Aquinas did not, in his personal thinking, separate the gifts of the Holy Spirit from Jesus Christ, who possessed them to an eminent degree. Daniel Keating points out that St. Thomas's commentaries on 1 and 2 Corinthians furnish a far richer account of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the souls of the just than does the *Summa theologiae*.

According to Jeremy Holmes, the *Lectures on Matthew* give valuable clues to the history of St. Thomas's thought, since the treatment of the beatitudes in these lectures serves as a first sketch of the treatment of them in the *Summa theologiae*. In many cases the *Lectures on Matthew* are the nearest precursor of the *tertia pars*.

As a commentator on Scripture, St. Thomas shows how biblical exegetes can get beyond merely historical and literary questions, though they should give due attention to these as well. If they really believe that Scripture is the word of God, as Catholic faith affirms, they will turn to it as a source of doctrine. They will want to know what Scripture entitles or obliges us to believe.

St. Thomas's reliance on the unanimity of Scripture, tradition, and speculative philosophy makes his exegesis inseparable from his systematic theology. His method of using all three in convergence is in full accord with Vatican II's *Dei Verbum*, which in number 12 instructs exegetes to use this broader context and not to restrict themselves to what the human writers meant by their words.

Although this symposium offers an excellent introduction to the exegesis of St. Thomas, it does not pretend to be a substitute for actual study of the commentaries. Nor does it claim to be anything like a complete survey. The editors have made a selection for reasons that they judged good. In so doing they omitted many of St. Thomas's commentaries such as those on the Psalms, Jeremiah, the Lamentations, Romans, and Galatians. It may be hoped that this or some other team of scholars, encouraged by the success of this pioneering exploration, will find an occasion to introduce some of these other commentaries. N.V.

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God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas by Fulvio Di Blasi (*South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2006*), xxi + 264 pp.

OVER THE PAST forty years a battle has been engaged in Thomistic circles over the relationship between "metaphysics" and ethics. One camp

has contended that our knowledge of ethical principles depends upon a prior understanding of human nature, in particular an understanding of our natural inclinations. Others have claimed that our practical knowledge of the human good is entirely independent of any speculative knowledge of human nature: We cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” The common man, these thinkers insist, can know ethical norms without becoming a metaphysician and without a philosophy course in human nature.

Another theater of this ongoing war has focused on the role of God within ethics. Some Thomists have followed Dostoyevsky, supposing that without God all things are permitted. God as a final end of human life is essential to any Thomistic ethics, especially an account of Thomas’s natural law, which demands God as the lawgiver. Others have sided with Grotius, claiming that even if we supposed there were no God, there would still be a human good and evil, a moral right and wrong. Apart from revelation, after all, our knowledge of God is limited, requiring difficult philosophical arguments, inaccessible to the common man.

The young Sicilian scholar Fulvio Di Blasi enters the foray firmly in the metaphysician’s camp. In his *God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas*, he delivers a commanding defense of the need for human nature and God within a Thomistic ethics. In his earlier years Di Blasi was strongly influenced by the “neoclassical” school of thought led by John Finnis and Germain Grisez, but with further study he recognized that their “new natural law” theory has problems both with “nature” and with “law,” with nature because it denies any dependence of ethics upon our knowledge of human nature, and with law because it leaves out the divine lawgiver, thereby transforming the precepts of natural law into mere counsels.

Di Blasi’s thoroughly enjoyable introduction—essentially an indispensable opening chapter—dissects the elements of the neoclassical view, a school of thought that originated with a penetrating critique of the “conventional natural-law theory.” This conventional theory claims that we should follow the directives imbedded in our natural inclinations. Why? Because God wills it. In short, the morality of following our nature becomes the morality of following an arbitrary command of God.

Di Blasi does a masterful job of portraying the dialectical problem in terms of the contrast between heteronomy and autonomy. The conventional theory is heteronomous, that is, it—like the nominalists of the Middle Ages—places the source of morality outside of human beings, namely, in the arbitrary will of God. This manualist view does direct us to follow our nature, but failing to connect that nature with our human good, it simply stipulates that we must follow our nature because God wills it. In the end, the conventional theory is a voluntaristic divine-command view.

The neoclassicists, like the anti-nominalists before them, attempt to make morality autonomous, that is, arising from some internal source, which for the neoclassicists is our intuitive grasp of basic human goods. Unfortunately, this entirely internal morality becomes a set of counsels given by ourselves rather than a set of commands that we must follow, for the neoclassical view fails to recognize that the binding force of morality must arise from someone outside of ourselves, someone who directs us to the end. Morality demands even that we sacrifice our own personal will and preferences to the law that arises from someone else's will. Di Blasi sums up his criticism as follows: "If natural law is nothing more than an explanation of the dynamism of human reason oriented toward action, to continue to call it 'law' may be just a source of ambiguity and misunderstanding. Natural law without God easily becomes a *lex naturalis* without *lex*" (68). Using Suarez as his model, Di Blasi himself hopes to combine the elements of heteronomy and autonomy, giving us a morality founded upon the good of our nature, yet directed by the creative God who impresses his will into our nature.

The linchpin for Di Blasi is our knowledge of God and his directive will, for if we know the human good in our nature but do not recognize in it the will of God, then we do not have law and moral obligation; we have only a desirable good, not a good that we are obligated to pursue. Consequently, Di Blasi expends much energy trying to explain what he calls a natural knowledge of God. Unfortunately, he has difficulty distinguishing between a natural knowledge of God and self-evident knowledge. He fully recognizes that the latter is rejected by Aquinas, but it never becomes clear what counts as "natural" short of self-evidence. Apparently, everyone has at least an idea of God. Unfortunately, the very text he adduces in his favor speaks of knowing God as a general good, without necessarily knowing that this good is God. Di Blasi's discussion of the various proofs for the existence of God is intriguing, but its complexity does turn one's sympathies toward the "anti-metaphysicians." Does the common man—or anyone—really have to use such reasoning to know that he has moral obligations? Perhaps Di Blasi could have fruitfully employed the idea—defended by Stephen Brock and Lawrence Dewan—that everyone, or nearly everyone, has an understanding of God that follows, without apodictic proof, from a general acquaintance with the world. Does Di Blasi's project really need proof of God or merely a strong presumption for the existence of God?

Di Blasi convincingly links God's will, the human good, and human nature. First, he shows that by a natural love we love God above all else, for our good is fulfilled in God and in God's will. Then he argues that

God's will is expressed in the human nature that God has willed to create. Consequently, we should follow the order of nature; for by so doing, we fulfill the will of God, in which we find our good. In this manner, Di Blasi unites the heteronomy of the conventional theory with the autonomy of the medieval anti-nominalists. Morality is heteronomous since it involves following the will of God as expressed in our nature. At the same time, morality is autonomous, for this divine will and human nature are not disconnected from our human good; since by nature we love God above all else, our good is ultimately found in following the will of God.

Nevertheless, Di Blasi's position looks surprisingly like the conventional theory. He adds only one uniting tether, namely, the natural love of God, that ties the otherwise arbitrary divine command to our inherent good. Di Blasi might have provided a stronger link between God's will and our nature. Take contraception, for instance. Divine-command ethics simply states that God has forbidden contraception, not because it has anything to do with our good, but simply because God so willed. Naturalism states that contraceptive acts, being unnatural, are contrary to our human fulfillment. Di Blasi is dissatisfied with both accounts. The first is entirely heteronomous, leaving no foundation for morality within the human person. The second is entirely autonomous, providing no basis for an *obligation* not to contracept, which must be imposed from outside ourselves. Di Blasi unites the two by saying that it is naturally good for us to follow God's command concerning contraception. In the end, it is not contraception that is inherently wrong, but disobedience. Di Blasi's resolution is somewhat disappointing. Could not his autonomy have been more full-blooded, allowing that contraception is both disobedient and inherently wrong? One suspects that Di Blasi has the resources for such an account, building upon the naturalism of his mentor Henry Veatch, but he does not provide it here. Instead he offers intriguing analyses of the five proofs for God's existence.

The most interesting part of *God and the Natural Law* is the final chapter, in which he explains the natural law in light of the treatment in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, rather than by use of the more often cited *Summa theologiae*. He begins with the eternal law, which is God's providential guidance of the universe. This divine direction is realized in creatures through natural inclinations. God moves and directs human beings in a special way, namely, by law. The need for law arises in human beings, somewhat paradoxically, as a result of freedom. Because of our free will, we must not simply be moved to the end, as a puppet is moved by a marionette, but we must move ourselves through the light of rational principles. Law is precisely the manner in which we can have freedom, because law provides the knowledge by which we can choose God as our end.

Our natural inclinations, and especially our natural inclination to love God above all, lay the foundation of the natural law by providing its impetus and driving force. Without the natural inclinations, with only the direction that reason provides to the end, nothing requires that we follow reason. The natural inclination to love God, however, moves us to live out the love of God, through which we become good. Since God has willed the natural order, and fulfilling this order is our good, it follows that obeying the will of God coincides with our human good. We must heteronomously pursue our own good, that is, we are obliged to pursue it, on account of the autonomous love of God, that is, the love that arises from within our own nature.

Are our actions good because they follow natural inclinations or because they unite our will with God's will? Evidently, for both reasons, at least for the natural inclination regarding the love of God. Di Blasi, however, consistently emphasizes the good of actions from their relation to the will of God, for an action is good when we love God as our ultimate end. The mere material execution of natural inclinations does not make actions good. Rather, our intentional attitude to nature determines our attitude to God (since God has willed our nature), and only as such is nature the standard of morality. Once again, Di Blasi narrowly escapes the voluntarism of divine-command ethics.

God and the Natural Law, with its tight organization and clear style, does not wander through peripheral issues but quickly delves to the heart of the matter. Di Blasi's portrayal of the dialectical tension between heteronomy—finding obligation outside of ourselves—and autonomy—finding morality in our own good—is superb. His identification of the pitfalls of the neoclassical theory of natural law is insightful, and his emphasis of the much overlooked natural inclination to love God above all else is a welcome reminder of the importance of God even in Aquinas's natural ethics. Di Blasi has done much to restore nature and God to the natural law. N V

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By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas by Michael S. Sherwin, O.P. (*Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005*), 270 pp.

MICHAEL SHERWIN'S book is an excellent discussion of how Thomas Aquinas developed his understanding of the relationship between the

intellect and the will in the moral life, and how this development influenced his view on the relationship between faith and charity. Sherwin is responding to “theologians of moral motivation,” who think that a morally good will is prior to moral knowledge. Some of these theologians think that Thomas in his later writings holds a view of freedom that is a precursor to their own.

In Chapter One, Sherwin situates the debate in the context of post-Vatican II attempts to update moral theology. Karl Rahner distinguished between categorical freedom, which is exercised in a particular act, and transcendental freedom, which involves the agent’s total orientation. The exercise of this transcendental freedom became known as the “fundamental option.” Theologians such as Joseph Fuchs held that the agent could commit objectively moral sins and yet as a subject be in a morally good state through the fundamental option. For instance, someone could exercise categorical freedom through theft or blasphemy and yet be ordered to God through transcendental freedom. Sherwin does not clearly explain why theologians would hold this view, although he indicates that they might be influenced by the prevalence of apparently mortal sins of weakness and ignorance among the faithful. I do not see how the prevalence of such sin is an argument for the distinction between transcendental and categorical freedom, unless perhaps we also wish to hold that mortal sin is very uncommon. But Sherwin does not discuss the arguments for this position at any great length. His concern is not so much with the argument for their position as with James Keenan’s interpretation of Thomas as developing the view that the exercise of liberty can be preconceptual, and consequently that there is something like a preconceptual fundamental option.

In Chapter Two, Sherwin argues against Keenan’s interpretation of Thomas’s development. The issue at stake is the distinction between the liberties of exercise and specification. As Sherwin interprets him, Keenan holds that this distinction implies that for Thomas an agent can elicit an act that is not specified by the intellect. There could consequently be a liberty of exercise without a liberty of specification. These two liberties have been much discussed in the scholarly literature. If Sherwin’s understanding of Keenan is correct, Keenan’s interpretation is an outlier that does not have much *prima facie* plausibility. Nevertheless, this chapter is important both for its presentation of Keenan’s view and for its general summary of Thomas’s development.

In Chapter Three, Sherwin discusses how Thomas’s development on freedom is connected to his development on the relationship between knowledge and love. It contains a helpful discussion of the relationship

between happiness and love, and shows that both knowledge and love play a role in the stages of any human action. Chapters Four and Five extend this discussion of knowledge and love to the theological virtues of faith and charity, respectively. He traces Thomas's development with respect to the beginning of faith and the role of charity as the form of the virtues. In Chapter Six, Sherwin uses the results of his research to return to the issues raised in Chapter One, and argues that since Thomas shows how charity is involved in acts of choice that require conceptual knowledge, it is mistaken to interpret him as a precursor of a preconceptual fundamental option.

Sherwin's main point is that for Thomas charity presupposes conceptual knowledge. His claim is undoubtedly correct. Moreover, he shows that Thomas's view is more plausible than that which is held by the theologians of moral motivation. Although this aspect of the book is important for theologians, it may be less interesting for philosophers, since the distinction between transcendental freedom and categorical freedom is not widely held in philosophical circles. Indeed, much of Sherwin's main argument draws its strength from the sheer implausibility of his opponents' views. Nevertheless, both theologians and philosophers should find the book valuable both for its clear presentation of Thomas's development in moral psychology and as a stimulus for further scholarship. Sherwin makes countless provocative suggestions both in the text and in the notes. For example, he gives an at least initially reasonable argument for an early dating of Thomas's *De caritate* (199–200, note 192).

The text is rich in detail and citations from Thomas, but there are many terminological infelicities that often sent me to the texts themselves. Many of these mistakes do not directly affect the book's main argument, but they are distracting. Two such examples should suffice. In one passage Sherwin unknowingly uses in two different ways the phrase "true" but "imperfect" virtues (182). The first refers to those acquired virtues that are true but imperfect because they are not connected with each other through acquired prudence. The second refers to those acquired virtues that are so connected but yet imperfect with respect to the infused virtues. A second infelicity is that in a note he states that there is no difference between the exterior act, the external act, and the commanded act (185, note 152). But there are many commanded acts that are not external.

Such infelicities are distracting but do not substantially take away from the book. However, he makes some that do obscure his main argument. For instance, he uses different meanings of the word "natural" without making clear which one is being used. Sometimes he uses the word in opposition to "elective," whereas at other times he uses it in opposition

to “supernatural” (98–100). In one passage he seems to identify all natural knowledge of God with that natural knowledge of him that is acquired through philosophical reasoning (123–24).

The lack of clarity is most serious when it affects his discussion of love. It is often difficult to determine whether Sherwin is discussing love as a principle of action or as an action (77, 156). His explanation of the relationships between *amor naturalis*, *dilectio*, and charity is also difficult to interpret (154–57). Does he hold that charity plays the same role on the supernatural level that a pre-elective love plays on the natural level? What does he think of the relationship between charity and the elicited act of natural love for God? The problem may result from the slipperiness of the words “natural” and “love.” It would have been helpful if he had distinguished between the natural love (*dilectio*) of God and charity in terms of their objects. In general, he focuses too little on the objects of virtue, and especially the objects of faith and charity.

One aspect of the book that calls for further study is the role of charity in the stages or components of an action (191–92). He does recognize that virtues such as charity and faith have their own acts (230). But he also seems to state that the virtue of charity plays the central role in those steps of every graced action that belong to any virtue. He does not delineate the role that the other virtues play in conjunction with charity. He does mention that charity’s relationship to the other virtues should be understood in light of the fact that acts that belong to one virtue can be commanded by another. For example, he explains how martyrdom, which belongs to fortitude, can be commanded by charity (181). But he does not successfully connect or contrast how charity commands with the way in which the other virtues do. For example, justice can command acts of bravery, and penance can command acts of almsgiving. Sherwin wants to say that charity plays a more important role as the form of the other virtues, but he does not sufficiently describe what this role is. Both charity’s ability to command other virtues and its status as the form of the other virtues are directly relevant to his argument, but he does not indicate whether these are separate points or how they might be involved in the components of any graced virtuous action.

Sherwin’s book is a fine contribution to contemporary moral theology and refutes interpretations of Thomas as a herald of the theology of moral motivation. It is also an excellent source for reflection on Thomas’s understanding of the relationship between knowledge and love. **NV**

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La papauté et le nouvel ordre mondial (1878–1903). Diplomatie vaticane, opinion catholique et politique internationale au temps de Leo XIII edited by Vincent Viane (*Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005*), 516 pp.

AT THE START of the pontificate of Leo XIII, the diplomatic isolation of the Holy See was almost complete. The end of the nineteenth century saw at the same time an international mobilization of the Catholic masses following what historically is known as the “Roman Question”: the situation of the pope within the city of Rome, which was resolved only in 1929 with the signing of the Lateran Treaties, which set up what we call Vatican City-State. The public manifestations of support for the papacy by Catholic masses demonstrated, according to Wladimir Czacki, the then-secretary of the Congregation for Ecclesiastical Affairs, that the future of the papacy was that of “an immense moral power.” It has been argued that the establishment of this new vision of the papacy replaced the Papal States as the “body” of the pope with Catholic public opinion that became the basis for the presence of the papacy within politics and society. The present volume is the outcome of an international conference, organized by the Catholic Documentation Center at the University of Louvain, on the interaction between Vatican diplomacy and Catholic opinion during the pontificate of Leo XIII (1878–1903), an era that saw considerable economic, social, and political change that involved the Church directly (mission movement, anti-slavery movement, international peace movement, etc.). “Catholic opinion” is defined by the editor as “the process by which the Church and the Catholic social movement are reproduced as a participant in the public sphere” encompassing all phenomena by which Catholicism is turned into a statement on the public stage (13).

The volume contains twenty essays and an extensive bibliography (478–508) and index (509–14). The essays are divided into four parts. Part One offers a broad picture of Leo’s worldview. Readers of this journal might be interested in Jean-Dominique Durand’s essay “Léon XIII, Rome et le monde” (55–77). Leo XIII’s injunction to “leave the sacristies” and Christianize society was intended to be firmly founded upon Thomistic metaphysics and anthropology, favored by the 1879 encyclical *Aeterni Patris*. One could also refer to *Fides et ratio*, numbers 103–104, in which a similar political aspect, coined by the phrase “evangelization of the culture,” is also present. This is just one of the many similarities contemporary readers may notice between the pontificates of Leo XIII and John Paul II.

Part Two is devoted to the position of the Holy See in European politics. Apart from the essays dealing explicitly with the Roman Question,

the contribution by Karina Urbach (181–94) is most telling. It recounts the private mission of George Errington to Rome by order of the liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone with the goal of finding papal support in downplaying the Home Rule Movement in Ireland. The Vatican's hope for a resumption of diplomatic relations proved to be futile when papal injunctions remained without effect on Irish Catholic opinion and English opinion toward Roman Catholicism could not be surmounted. The reaction by Prime Minister Gladstone on the conversion of his friend is telling in this respect: "I felt as if Manning had murdered my mother by mistake" (184).

Part Three studies concrete elements that shaped transnational Catholic opinion, such as congresses, the Jubilees of 1888 and 1893, Peter's Pence, the visual representation of the pope, and the Vatican press. These six essays prove to be very accessible to a general audience as well. Emiel Lamberts's short survey, "Catholic Congresses as Amplifiers of International Catholic Opinion (213–23), investigates the collaboration between the Holy See and important laymen in establishing a wide range of Catholic congresses that supported the moral-religious impact of the Church and the papacy. Jean-Marc Ticchi tells a fascinating, detailed story (225–48) about the "entrepreneurial organization" of Leo's golden jubilee in 1888, which became a worldwide "happening" and strengthened the wave of devotion to his person. Annibale Zambarbieri's contribution, "Forms, Impulses and Iconography in Devotion to Pope Leo XIII," discusses the Jubilees of his pontificate in general and then illustrates his points by investigating Leo's episcopal jubilee of 1893. A contemporary testimony summarizes the impact as follows: "The laity, once almost indifferent to the fate of the Church, today actively rallies round the Throne of Peter" (262). In another interesting essay, Jan De Maeyer investigates the way Leo XIII was imaged in art and iconography (303–22). He shows how the dominant image of the pope-king gradually evolved toward a representation of Pope Leo as a "good father" and a "people's pope." The reader will undoubtedly notice the many similarities between the two popes who led the Church into a next century.

Part Four deals with the role of the Church and the papacy of Leo XIII during the Western expansion in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the humanitarian, political, and cultural problems it created. The reading of these essays can prove to be fruitful in the face of the current globalization. A first essay deals with the coordination of diplomatic actions and Catholic missions (351–79). The two essays dealing with the vigorous anti-slavery campaign following Leo's encyclical *In plurimis* of 1888 highlight the success as well as the difficulties following

this initiative. On the one hand, Gianni La Bella concludes that it represented “one of the finest examples of the new diplomacy that we now call humanitarian, conducted by denunciation, awareness-raising, active solidarity, and diplomatic networking” (394). The essay by Philippe Delisle on the other hand illustrates, by way of the reaction of the French missionaries, the reservations this campaign caused in the field. Giovanni Miccoli describes the reaction by the Holy See to the growing anti-Semitism at the end of the nineteenth century as a “calculated Roman passivity.” Another “strategic disaster,” according to Hans de Val, was the Holy See’s effort to gain admission to the Hague peace conference of 1899. The two final essays deal with another global problem at that time, that of mass migration, and in particular to the United States. These essays will be of particular interest to the American readers of this journal. In his essay “Leo XIII and Immigrants to the Church in the United States” (453–63), Gerald Fogarty, S.J., of the University of Virginia, developing insights from his *The Vatican and the American Hierarchy from 1870 to 1965* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1982), traces the various initiatives undertaken by the American hierarchy in support of Leo XIII to overcome the ethnic differences and meld “that distant church into a body that remained ethnically pluralistic, but was united in loyalty to the Holy See.” This however, according to Fogarty, may have led to “a loss of a legitimate sense of autonomy and collegiality. . . . The American church today prides itself on its ethnic and racial diversity; yet, it remains weak in asserting its national identity in regard both to Roman congregations and to pastoral concerns” (463). John F. Pollard, fellow of Trinity Hall (Cambridge), investigates the consequences for Vatican diplomacy of the emergence of the United States as a colonial and world power following the Spanish–American War in 1898 and the occupation of former Spanish colonies. His essay is titled “Leo XIII and the United States of America, 1898–1903” (465–77). Although the mission of the future president Howard Taft to Rome in order to settle issues in Philippine church–state relations proved unsuccessful at first, from the perspective of the Holy See it was seen as a success. The U.S. government de facto had recognized that “the pacification of most of its new colonial possessions could not be achieved without the cooperation of the Church authorities at the highest level” (475).

Reading the various topics addressed in this volume on the triangle between Vatican diplomacy, Catholic opinion, and international politics, one has a clear sense of Pope Leo’s program to give Catholicism in general and papacy in particular, after being shorn of its temporal power, its own face in the modern world and the means of communication used to do

so. "The image of the Holy See as a moral great power firmly in charge of millions could take hold in the minds of Catholics and non-Catholics alike, even if reality lagged behind projection." Apart from the specialist in the field, this volume could also provide interesting material for a more general audience, especially considering the many similarities between Leo XIII and John Paul II to which also Raymond de Souza pointed out recently ("Two Popes," *First Things* [October 2003]: 36–41). **N·V**

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