

Saint Thomas and Joseph Ratzinger / Pope Benedict XVI on the Body and Adoration

KEVIN E. O'REILLY, O.P.
*Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas
Rome, Italy*

THE ARGUMENT PUT FORWARD in this brief article is straightforward. In brief, both Saint Thomas and Joseph Ratzinger / Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI espouse the logic of hylomorphic anthropology, that is to say, the understanding that we are body–soul unities, as well as a participatory metaphysics. With regard to their respective views on the role of the body in adoration, therefore, there is a striking similarity. For both theologians, human worship of God is necessarily embodied worship. This view, moreover, extends to the role of the cosmos in worship, since the cosmos assumes a symbolic significance precisely on account of the fact that embodied existence is spatially and temporally determined by it. The hylomorphic liturgical anthropology of both theologians stands in stark contrast to the dualistic liturgical anthropology that has become dominant in the West in our own time. Ratzinger/Benedict of course offers a critique of these contemporary liturgical trends. If Thomas were alive today, his critique would arguably be substantially the same as that of the Pope Emeritus. Since what is at stake in the case of the celebration of the Mass is the penetration and shaping of the soul by the Word, there is good reason for attempts at renewal to range Thomas and Benedict side by side against those forces that undermine the majesty and mystery of Catholic liturgical worship.

In order to make this argument, however, a brief account of hylomorphic anthropology is in order. This account is drawn from the teaching of Saint Thomas, since Ratzinger/Benedict, to my knowledge, offers no systematic treatment of this subject. While hylomorphic anthropology is a philosophical construal of human nature, Aristotelian-Thomistic in its provenance, it has

nevertheless been adopted by the Church's magisterium. Most recently John Paul II, in his encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*, emphasized this point, referring to "the Church's teachings on the unity of the human person, whose rational soul is *per se et essentialiter* the form of his body."¹ "The spiritual and immortal soul," John Paul II continues, "is the principle of unity of the human being, whereby it exists as a whole—*corpore et anima unus*—as a person."²

Having clarified the concept of hylomorphic anthropology, the article will then turn to an exposition of the thought both of Saint Thomas and of Ratzinger/Benedict on adoration. Both theologians consider bodily gestures to be a physical manifestation of an internal attitude. By the same token, bodily gestures such as prostration and kneeling for their part cultivate a spirit of adoration. Both Thomas and Benedict deal with the issue of orientation in the liturgy. Their agreement in this regard, which is grounded in the Church's ancient Tradition, is the fruit of an understanding that we are psychosomatically constituted. Our worship can therefore never be purely spiritual and thus prescind from space and time. A brief account of the contemporary liturgical situation, however, shows it to be Cartesian in its dynamics. In other words, it cultivates a kind of liturgical practice that is disembodied (inasmuch as this is possible for human beings). The overwhelming creativity that one encounters at times in the liturgy and which constitutes a break with Tradition is the fruit of this philosophy. There is therefore good reason to engage with the reflections of Thomas and Benedict concerning the body and adoration.

Saint Thomas's Hylomorphic Anthropology³

¹ Pope John Paul II, *Veritatis Splendor* (1993), §48. See also §86, which refers the reader to the Council of Vienne's constitution *Fidei Catholicae*, and the Fifth Lateran Council's bull *Apostolici Regiminis*.

² John Paul II, *Veritatis Splendor*, §48. The views of Joseph Ratzinger / Pope Benedict XVI on matters eschatological with respect to the relationship between body and soul lie beyond the confines of this article. For a treatment of this issue, see Patrick J. Fletcher, *Resurrection Realism* (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014).

³ The material of this section is drawn from my article "On the Alleged Physicalism of St. Thomas Aquinas at *S.Theol.*, I-II, 94, 2," *Angelicum* 88 (2011): 233–36. For a very fine treatment of Thomas's hylomorphic anthropology, see Giles Emery, O.P., "The Unity of Man, Body and Soul, in St. Thomas Aquinas," in *Trinity, Church, and the Human Person: Thomistic Essays* (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2007), 209–35. For a contemporary Thomistic philosophy of the body that engages various streams of contemporary thought, see G. J. McAleer, *Ecstatic Morality and Sexual Politics: A Catholic and Antitotalitarian Theory of the Body* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). For a superlative neo-Aristotelian treatment of the logic of human embodiment, see Leon R. Kass, *The Hungry Soul: Eating and*

Thomas's understanding of the human body is inseparable from his teaching concerning the intellectual soul as man's sole substantial form.⁴ "The soul is the very nature of the body,"⁵ he proclaims provocatively in his commentary on the *Sentences*, thereby emphasizing the intrinsic and intimate connection that obtains between soul and body. We can well assert that the body's actuality derives from the intellectual soul, an assertion that is in accord with Thomas's metaphysical teaching to the effect that matter "has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely."⁶ Completely ruled out in this view is the possibility of experiencing one's body from within as though it were a "thing" separate from one's true self. Marie-Joseph Nicolas expresses well Thomas's understanding of the human body when he describes it as "the expressive field of the soul."⁷ It is the visible and material index of an invisible and immaterial principle. The body is so united to the intellectual soul that it constitutes the soul's somatic manifestation.⁸ The body is the exterior face of this being whose interior principle is the soul.⁹

A radical consequence follows from conceiving the intellectual soul as the root principle which issues forth into all the various expressions, both rational and somatic, of our human nature: human rationality and human embodiment can in no way be divorced from one another.¹⁰ This point has implications for how we understand bodily actions. The body is not something separate from one's true self and so cannot be regarded as some kind of corporeal instrument at the behest of the rational soul. A bodily action is thus not some kind of effect on the basis of which we can infer some

the Perfecting of Our Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). Kass concludes his study with a consideration of the Old Testament dietary laws.

⁴ Bernardo C. Bazán, "La corporalité selon saint Thomas," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 81 (1983): 369–409.

⁵ Aquinas, *In I sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1: "Anima enim est natura ipsius corporis."

⁶ Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, [ST] I, q. 76, a. 6.

⁷ Marie-Joseph Nicolas, "Le corps humain," *Revue thomiste* 79 (1979): 357–58: "The human body can of course be validly regarded as an object—as when a surgeon operates on it" (translations of Nicolas are my own).

⁸ See Nicolas, "Le corps humain," 358.

⁹ Nicolas, "Le corps humain," 377.

¹⁰ See David Berger, *Thomas Aquinas and the Liturgy* (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2004), 54: "The Doctor Angelicus therefore emphasizes in the most definite manner the body's, that is, matter's integral affiliation to the human person. It is this affiliation that naturally ennoble the body to prepare it for ascension into the kingdom of grace." Berger shows how man, on account of the psychosomatic structure of his being, is for St. Thomas "a liturgical being, which means that the liturgy as sensual expression of religion is connatural to man" (56).

rational intention that ultimately causes it and which logically precedes it. An intention does of course logically precede an act, but it is the intention nevertheless of an agent who is psychosomatically constituted. Rationality in effect suffuses the bodily act itself and is to be read in it rather than from it. A bodily act is therefore not simply an index of reason's operation, but rather is literally its embodiment.

The hylomorphic anthropology that I have briefly delineated is immediately called into service by Thomas in the second of three articles that he devotes to adoration in *Summa theologiae* [ST] II-II, q. 84. As one probes his treatment of the bodily gestures that constitute and speak, as it were, the somatic language of spiritual adoration, it becomes clear that these bodily gestures for their part enkindle an attitude of subjection to God in humility. There obtains, in other words, a dynamic reciprocal interaction between body and soul. Embodiment means, moreover, that adoration is spatially and temporally constituted. The ancient tradition of facing the east in adoration of God proves to be in harmony with the logical demands of human nature constituted as a psychosomatic unity.

Saint Thomas on the Body and Adoration

The Word of God in Scripture provides the fundamental direction to Thomas's reflection. Thus, in the *sed contra* of ST II-II, q. 84, a. 2, he quotes Exodus 20:5—"Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them." A gloss on this verse introduces the notion of the worship in both body and soul: "Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor adore them outwardly" (*nec affectu colas, nec specie adores*). As he embarks on his response Thomas in the first instance invokes the support John Damascene in unpacking the significance of Exodus 20:5 and the gloss thereon: "As Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* iv, 12), since we are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration [*duplicem adorationem*]; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which consists in an exterior humbling of the body." Even a brief acquaintance with Thomas's anthropology alerts us to the fact that this *duplex adoratio* does not refer to two different acts—one internal and spiritual, the other external and physical—but rather to a single composite act comprising two aspects. Devotion, that is to say, "the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of God,"¹¹ expresses itself in the humbling of the body. The logic of devotion in a being that is psychosomatically constituted is manifested in a visibly humbled body. Even in their dealings with other human beings, Thomas

¹¹ ST II-II, q. 82, a. 1.

tells us in a question devoted to the virtue of humility, “fearing and respectful persons are especially wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves with others.”¹² The concept of *logikē latreia* (the worship of the mind) therefore ought not to be understood in dualistic terms: it is not the worship of a disembodied mind.

It ought to be understood nevertheless that the internal spiritual act enjoys a certain primacy over its external corporeal expression. This qualification comes into focus in the light cast by John 4:23, where the Lord Jesus says that “*the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.*” It might seem, on the basis of these words, that adoration does not in fact denote an act of the body at all.¹³ Nevertheless, Thomas argues in accord with the demands of hylomorphic anthropology, “even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so far as it proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion.”¹⁴ The analogy of language helps to clarify further the relationship between the internal and external dimensions of human adoration: “Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and secondarily expressed in words, as stated above (q. 83, a. 12), so too adoration consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but secondarily in certain bodily signs of humility.”¹⁵ Bodily signs of humility in effect constitute the body language of humility. Examples of this body language are genuflection and prostration: to genuflect signifies our weakness in comparison to God, while to prostrate ourselves is in effect to profess that of ourselves we are nothing.¹⁶

Notwithstanding this primacy that the mind enjoys with respect to the body, the direction of influence between mind and body is not unidirectional. In other words, it is not *simply* the case that the mind as it were speaks through bodily gestures. It too in turn is stirred by sensible signs to reach out to God.¹⁷ Indeed, the primary importance of the mind with respect to the body necessarily entails that “in all acts of latria that which is without is referred to that which is within as being of greater import.”¹⁸ It turns out therefore that not only are bodily gestures such as genuflection and prostration physical signs of the mind’s subjection to God in humility, but they in turn “incite our affections to submit to God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the intelligible.”¹⁹ While humility

¹² ST II-II, q. 161, a. 2, ad 1.

¹³ See ST II-II, q. 84, a. 2, obj. 1.

¹⁴ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 2, ad 1.

¹⁵ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 2, ad 2.

¹⁶ See ST II-II, q. 84, a. 2, ad 2.

¹⁷ See ST II-II, q. 84, a. 2, ad 3.

¹⁸ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 2.

¹⁹ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 2.

is in the appetite as moderating it, one ought to bear in mind the dynamic interaction between reason and affectivity (the will and the passions). This dynamic interaction means that affectivity possesses a certain epistemic import.²⁰ The logic of human embodiment thus entails not only that gestures such as genuflection and prostration are somatic manifestations of the mind's subjection to God; they in turn, by means of the affections which they arouse, conduce to the mind's subjection to God, wherein its perfections consists.²¹

As embodied souls our existence necessarily unfolds within the bounds of the spatio-temporal horizons of this material universe. The spatial constitution of human adoration of God—that is to say, the fact that adoration requires a definite place—is a consequence of the logic of human embodiment. This logic along with another text of Scripture furnishes the interpretative key for a correct understanding of John 4:21, where Christ says to the Samaritan women: “The hour cometh, when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father.”²² This teaching might seem to indicate that no definite place is necessary for adoration. The significance of the Lord's words however concerns to the rites of the Jews and of the Samaritans who adored in Jerusalem and on Mount Garazim respectively. They point to the fact that with the coming of “the spiritual truth of the Gospel,” both these rites ceased. Malachi 1:11, moreover, dispels any lingering doubts as to the veracity of this interpretation that is directed against an absolute spiritualization of adoration. Accord-

²⁰ On this point, which is too involved to be adequately elaborated in the context of this article, see: Kevin E. O'Reilly, “The Vision of Virtue and Knowledge of the Natural Law in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas,” *Nova et Vetera* (English) 5 (2007): 41–65; O'Reilly, *The Hermeneutics of Knowing and Loving in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 80–107; Reinhard Hütter, “The Directedness of Reasoning and the Metaphysics of Creation,” in *Reason and the Reasons of Faith*, ed. Paul J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hütter (New York: T&T Clark International), 160–93. For a treatment of the dynamic interaction between reason and the passions, see Elizabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens, “Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions,” *Review of Metaphysics* 56 (2003): 525–58.

²¹ See *ST* II-II, q. 81, a. 7: “We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun.”

²² *ST* II-II, q. 84, a. 3.

ing to this text “*a sacrifice is offered to God in every place.*”²³

Bodily signs are fitting because they are proportioned to the exigencies of human nature as psychosomatically constituted, on account of which constitution “it is connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the intelligible.”²⁴ On this basis Thomas argues for the fittingness of adoring towards the east. The first reason that he offers is cosmic in its scope: “The Divine majesty is indicated in the movement of the heavens which is from the east.”²⁵ Neither Scripture nor any source from the Tradition is explicitly invoked here but underlying Thomas’s reason is the doctrine of creation and his participatory view of reality—that is to say, his understanding of the created universe as participating according to its finite mode in God’s uncreated being. Also operative is his theory of analogy. As an effect of God’s creative causality, the universe reflects in an analogous way something of the divine being just as any effect tells us something about its cause.²⁶

Continuing with his explanation, Thomas says that revelation serves to throw further light on the fittingness of facing towards the east in adoration.²⁷ According to the Septuagint version of Genesis 2:8, Paradise was located in the east. Orientation towards the east signifies our desire to return to Paradise. Protological considerations in effect give rise to an eschatological attitude on the part of the adorer. The final reason adduced by Thomas, once again based on revelation in Scripture, focuses on matters eschatological. Thomas discerns “a certain fittingness in adoring towards the east,”²⁸ on account of Christ, who is “the light of the world.”²⁹ The reference at Zechariah 6:12 to “the Orient”³⁰ is interpreted Christologically by Thomas in the light of this reference to Christ as “the light of the

²³ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 3, ad 1.

²⁴ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 2.

²⁵ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 3, ad 3.

²⁶ See ST I, q. 93, a. 6.

²⁷ See Br. Evagrius Hayden, O.S.B., “*Convertere, Israël, ad Dominum Deum Tuum!*: Whether the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass Ought To Be Celebrated towards the East”: “From the inspired testimony of Sacred Scripture we also have several passages that indicate the preeminence of worshiping towards the east. These are of two kinds, either they indicate that Christ departs into and returns from the east, or else that certain geographical locations are to be found in the east that are known for the eminent nobility of their symbolism” (2015, PDF online, p. 11; reviewed by Peter Kwasniewski at newliturgicalmovement.org, November 16, 2015). Hayden illustrates the use the Fathers in general made of these passages.

²⁸ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 3, ad 3.

²⁹ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 3, ad 3. This quotation is from John 8:12 and 9:5.

³⁰ ST II-II, q. 84, a. 3, ad 3.

world,” as also is Psalm 67:34, where Thomas understands Christ to be the one “who mounteth above the heaven of heavens to the east.”³¹ He is therefore expected to return from the east, as Matthew 24:27 confirms: “As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the coming of the Son of man be.”³²

The words of Ratzinger/Benedict coincide with and express well the idea that Thomas highlights here: “The fact that we find Christ in the symbol of the rising sun [or, as in the last example, lightning] is the indication of a Christology defined eschatologically. Praying toward the east means going to meet the coming Christ.”³³ These words, ultimately grounded in a hylomorphic anthropology and in agreement with Thomas’s conviction concerning orientation in (liturgical) adoration, provide a suitable pivot to a consideration of the treatment of the body and liturgy by the Pope Emeritus. His comments concerning the use of the word *proskynein*—“the classical word for adoration on one’s knees”—present us with an explicit appeal to hylomorphic anthropology. Similar to what we have seen in the case of Saint Thomas, Ratzinger/Benedict arguably appreciates the significance of human embodiment not only with respect to bodily gestures as an external index of the soul’s adoration of God but also with regard to the epistemic import of these gestures. He concurs with the Angelic Doctor, moreover, in clearly discerning the cosmic foundation of liturgy in his reflections concerning the eastward orientation of those participating in the liturgy. The cosmic nature of liturgy cannot be thought apart from human nature as a body–soul unity. Indeed, when the light of revelation is cast on creation, one can discern the Christological form of this orientation.

Joseph Ratzinger / Benedict XVI on Bodily Gesture as an Expression of a Spiritual Act

As he introduces the notion of *proskynein*, Ratzinger/Benedict lingers exegetically on two texts, namely Matthew 14:33 and John 9:35–38. Since the fundamental point that emerges from both discussions is identical, it suffices for our purposes to outline his comments on the first passage, which occur in the account of how, following the multiplication of the loaves, Jesus sends the disciples to the other side of the lake and dismisses the crowds while he himself goes up the mountain to pray. The boat in

³¹ *ST II-II*, q. 84, a. 3, ad 3. Thomas here espouses a common patristic interpretation.

³² *ST II-II*, q. 84, a. 3, ad 3.

³³ Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, trans. John Saward (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 69.

which the disciples are traversing the lake is tossed about by the waves on account of the wind and Jesus comes towards them, walking on the water. During the episode that follows, Peter gets out of the boat and begins to walk on the water towards Jesus, but becoming frightened, he begins to sink and is saved by the Lord. After they get into the boat, the wind dies down. The Greek text continues: *hoi de en tō ploiō prosekunēsan autō*.

Benedict points to two possible and complimentary translations of these words. Thus, for example, the Knox version reads: "And the ship's crew came and said, falling at his feet, 'Thou art indeed the Son of God'." The Revised Standard Version, for its part, translates the sentence thus: "[The disciples] in the boat worshipped [Jesus], saying . . ." Benedict's reaction to these two different translations is actually Aristotelian-Thomistic in its impulse: "The Knox version brings out the bodily expression, while the RSV shows what is happening interiorly. It is perfectly clear from the structure of the narrative that the gesture of acknowledging Jesus as the Son of God is an act of worship."³⁴ A little further on Benedict again emphasizes the inseparability of the bodily and spiritual meanings that are communicated by the verb *proskynein*: "The bodily gesture itself is the bearer of the spiritual meaning, which is precisely that of worship. Without the worship, the bodily gesture would be meaningless, while the spiritual act must of its very nature, because of the psychosomatic unity of man, express itself in the bodily gesture."³⁵

The word *proskynein* communicates two meanings that in fact constitute a synthetic unity. When either of these two meanings is absent, the significance of the act that it denotes is vitiated. On the one hand, an act of kneeling that is merely external—that is to say, divorced from any interior attitude—proves to be meaningless. On the other hand, attempts to offer purely spiritual worship that prescind from any kind of material expression evaporate, for "what is purely spiritual is inappropriate to the nature of man."³⁶ Worship, in fact, is "one of those fundamental acts that affect the whole man."³⁷ Elsewhere, in the *Feast of Faith*, drawing on Josef Pieper, the great interpreter of Saint Thomas, Benedict writes that bodily gestures of adoration "bring together the 'outside' and the 'inside' in a reciprocal relationship which is equally important for both."³⁸ Benedict,

³⁴ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 189.

³⁵ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 190.

³⁶ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 191.

³⁷ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 191.

³⁸ Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *Feast of Faith*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 74. Benedict refers to Josef Pieper, "Das Gedächtnis des

like Thomas, appreciates the epistemic significance of bodily gestures. Thus, in commenting on Philippians 2:6–11, he clearly regards bending the knee at the name of Jesus as a way of putting on the mind of Christ, for “in bending the knee we signify that we are imitating and adopting the attitude of him who, though he was ‘in the form of God,’ yet ‘humbled himself unto death.’”³⁹ Bodily gesture is in effect a form of language. Bending the knee at the name of Jesus, for example, “attains the status of a confession of faith in Christ.”⁴⁰ Indeed, “words could not replace such a confession.”⁴¹ This confession, moreover, is biblically well grounded, as the quotations adduced indicate. As Tracey Rowland comments, in Ratzinger’s/Benedict’s estimation, “Christians should kneel, and parish and diocesan liturgical ‘experts’ who say anything to the contrary seem to have overlooked the scriptural basis for this practice.”⁴²

For Benedict as much as for Thomas, moreover, the idea that there can be no such thing as purely spiritual worship necessarily entails a cosmic dimension that in the light of the Incarnation, death, and resurrection of the Savior is imbued with a Christological significance. On the subject of bending the knee at the name of Christ, he writes the Church “is entering into the cosmic gesture, paying homage to the Victor and thereby going over to the Victor’s side.”⁴³ Facing the east is another dimension of the cosmic nature of the liturgy.⁴⁴ In taking up the issue of Christians facing the east when they worship, Benedict once again expresses a conviction that is at one with what we have seen in Thomas: “This is not a case of Christians worshipping the sun but of the cosmos speaking of Christ.”⁴⁵

As in the case of Thomas, Benedict thus espouses the ancient tradi-

Leibes: Von der errinernden Kräfte des Geschichtlich-Konkreten,” in *Kirche aus lebendigen Steinen*, ed. Walter Seidel (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1975), 68–83.

³⁹ Ratzinger, *Feast of Faith*, 75.

⁴⁰ Ratzinger, *Feast of Faith*, 75.

⁴¹ Ratzinger, *Feast of Faith*, 75.

⁴² Tracey Rowland, *Ratzinger’s Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 138.

⁴³ Ratzinger, *Feast of Faith*, 74–5.

⁴⁴ Ratzinger/Benedict cites Josef Andreas Jungmann and Erik Peterson as sources for his thinking on facing eastward in prayer; see (quoted in Ratzinger, *Feast of Faith*, 140n1) Jungmann, Review of *Der Standort des Liturgen am christlichen Altar vor dem Jahre 1000*, 2 vols. (Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1965), by Otto Nußbaum, *Zeitschrift für Kirche und Theologie* 88 (1966): 445–50, and Peterson, “Die geschichtliche Bedeutung der jüdischen Gebetsrichtung” and “Das Kreuz und die Gebetsrichtung nach Osten,” in *Frühkirche, Judentum und Gnosis* (Freiburg: Herder, 1959), 1–14 and 15–35, respectively.

⁴⁵ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 68.

tion that ascribes a Christological significance to orientation. Prayer that engages us as psychosomatically constituted beings receives a Christological form by virtue of turning to the east in the direction of the rising sun. Time and, by implication, the virtue of hope are also brought into play, since this orientation bespeaks the future New Heaven and New Earth. In effect, argues Benedict, an eastern orientation symbolizes the direction in which the pilgrim journeys, a direction that has been “shown us by the life, Passion, and Resurrection of Christ.”⁴⁶ Indeed, Benedict shows how “[even] the symbolism of the Cross merges with that of the east.”⁴⁷ In this regard he quotes two scriptural texts that might have been linked in order to impart an added emphasis to the eastern direction for prayer. The first text is Revelation 1:7 in which Saint John says: “Behold, he is coming with the clouds, and every eye will see him, everyone who pierced him; and all tribes of the earth will wail on account of him. Even so. Amen.” John 1:17, which quotes Zechariah 12:10, acquires a whole new meaning in this context: “They shall look on him whom they have pierced.” The second text is Matthew 24:30, where the Lord says: “Then [on the last day] will appear the sign of the Son of Man in heaven, and then all the tribes of the earth will mourn [cf. Zech 12:10], and they will see the Son of man coming on the clouds of heaven [cf. Dan 7:13] with power and glory.” Ratzinger remarks succinctly on the implications that flow from the juxtaposition of these two texts: “The sign of the Son of Man, of the Pierced One, is the Cross, which has now become the sign of victory of the Risen One.”⁴⁸ Scott Hahn draws out well the implications of Benedict’s reflections on Christ and his Cross: “True worship is once again made possible—the worship for which humanity was made in the beginning; the worship that unites flesh and blood, body and soul, spirit and matter, heaven and earth.”⁴⁹

A final point that Benedict adds with regard to turning to the east in prayer concerns the relationship between creation and salvation. This

⁴⁶ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 69.

⁴⁷ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 69. For an elaboration of this point see Peterson, “Das Kreuz.” Ratzinger/Benedict himself writes: “With regard to the eastward-facing position of the celebration prior to the Council, one cannot talk of celebrating ‘toward’ the altar, let alone ‘toward the holy of holies,’ but it can be said that the Mass was celebrated facing the image of the cross, which embodied in itself the whole theology of the *oriens*” (*Feast of Faith*, 141).

⁴⁸ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 69. For a further elaboration of the idea that the Mass, celebrated facing the image of the cross, “embodied in itself the whole theology of the *oriens*,” see Ratzinger, *Feast of Faith*, 139–142.

⁴⁹ Scott Hahn, *Covenant and Communion: The Biblical Theology of Pope Benedict XVI* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2009), 164.

orientation “signifies that cosmos and saving history belong together.”⁵⁰ Clearly the symbolic significance of the cosmos can be only properly understood by man in his psychosomatic unity in the light of the Word through whom it has been created. Man’s instantiation in space and time as a result of the corporeal aspect of his being and the significance that space and time therefore assume in his worship of God mean that the liturgy is necessarily cosmic in nature. As Benedict puts it: “The theme of creation is embedded in Christian prayer.”⁵¹

In order to highlight the significance of the striking convergence of our two theologians with respect to adoration, not just in terms of general positions taken but with respect to various details, the next section briefly outlines the present liturgical situation which, among other things, is arguably the fruit of a dualistic anthropology. The thought of René Descartes is an obvious port of call, since it distills and communicates various ideas that continue to exert their influence even in our postmodern era. Ratzinger/Benedict has of course commented critically on the abuses and departure from Tradition that have attended the turn to the (liturgical) subject and the privatization of liturgy—and therefore the destruction thereof—that has become all too common in our times. The Pope Emeritus, it ought to be noted, expresses the same kind of concerns as are held by Thomists—not surprisingly, in the light of the similarity between the teachings of Saint Thomas and Pope Benedict XXI on the body and adoration.⁵²

The Fruits of Dualistic Anthropology: the Present Liturgical Situation

In contrast to the hylomorphic anthropology both of Thomas and of Benedict, Descartes argues that each one of us is essentially a mind that inhabits a body. In his view mind and body are ontologically distinct entities. In other words, my body is not part of who I am. I am my mind or a thinking thing (*res cogitans*), as Descartes intimates in his most famous assertion: *cogito, ergo sum* (“I think, therefore I am”). Thinking, according to his later thought, is moreover a form of willing. As Michael Allen Gillespie remarks

⁵⁰ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 69.

⁵¹ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 70.

⁵² See, e.g., Johnathan Robinson, “Changing the Subject: The Liturgy as an Object of Experience,” *The Thomist* 75 (2011): 365–91, at 365: “Examples from ordinary parish life show that something has gone seriously wrong with how many Catholics today understand the liturgical life of the Church.” While Robinson offers rich insights into the present liturgical situation and suggestions for ways to recover a sense of the objective givenness of the liturgy, he nevertheless fails to pinpoint an operational anthropological dualism as a crucial part of the problem to be solved.

concerning his mature works, "thinking in all of its forms is . . . understood to be crucially bound up with and dependent upon the will."⁵³ Descartes in fact accords freewill a quasi-divine status, "in itself the noblest thing we can have since it makes us in a way equal to God and seems to exempt us from being his subjects."⁵⁴

For Descartes, the material universe is mechanistic. As a result everything external to the mind, including the human body, is devoid of intrinsic value. As Susan R. Bordo explains, "The body is pure *res extensa*—unconscious, extended stuff, brute materiality."⁵⁵ Bodily gestures can thus no longer be instances of embodied rationality. The Cartesian subject, moreover, "the whole nature or essence of which is to think," and which is therefore disembodied, has "no need of any place."⁵⁶ While Descartes does not pronounce on the subject, presumably the kind of worship offered by the human subject as conceived by him would be purely spiritual—that is to say, not alone disembodied but also unconstrained by place (and, for that matter, time also). Another notable aspect of his anthropology is the understanding of the human subject as a radically autonomous being.

A final characteristic of Descartes is his rejection of the authority one might ascribe to sources outside of the self. Thus, at the very outset of the first meditation in his *Meditations*, he writes: "I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last."⁵⁷ Preceding tradition is

⁵³ Michael Allen Gillespie, *Nilism Before Nietzsche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 41.

⁵⁴ René Descartes, Letter to Queen Christina of Sweden on November 20, 1647, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 3, *The Correspondence*, trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 326. Descartes adds here: "And so its correct use is the greatest of all goods we possess; indeed there is nothing that is more our own or that matters more to us. From all this it follows that nothing but free will can produce our greatest happiness." See also Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 384. There Descartes writes that free will "renders us in a certain way like God by making us masters of ourselves, provided we do not lose the rights it gives us through timidity."

⁵⁵ Susan R. Bordo, *The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 93.

⁵⁶ Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, pt. 4 (no. 33), trans. John Cottingham in *Philosophical Writings*, 1:127.

⁵⁷ Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 2, trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 12.

accordingly denied any authority whatsoever. According to the spirit of his philosophy we do not accept truths on trust, but rather generate them for ourselves—each one individually—in a process of reasoning on the basis of clear and distinct ideas. While the rejection of authority is not directly predicated on a rejection of embodiment as partly constitutive of personal identity, this rejection nevertheless means that the mind transcends the temporal dimension of being. Hence the logic of rejecting tradition in any shape or form.

It is not difficult to see the dynamics of this kind of philosophy in Ratzinger's description of contemporary liturgical dynamics. The priest—not God—becomes the focus of the liturgy. Indeed, his creativity sustains the whole liturgical enterprise. Different people from among the faithful are assigned all kinds of liturgical roles, while the liturgy is planned by groups of people who offer their own “creative” contributions. I would add that a mechanistic view of reality has facilitated this egocentric liturgical creativity. In its extreme expression, this creativity treats the liturgy as if it were simply an arbitrary collection of elements that can be substituted and changed according to the whims of priests and the faithful. According to Ratzinger/Benedict the characteristics of contemporary liturgical creativity are: “arbitrariness as the necessary form of the rejection of each previously given form or norm; unrepeatability because in repetition there would already be dependence; and artificiality, since the result must be a pure creation of humans.”⁵⁸ In other words, the liturgy becomes an instrument of the will's creative impulses independent of Tradition. This will is not bound by reason, by law, or by any necessity.⁵⁹ Its nature, as Gillespie puts it, is “self-assertion and mastery.”⁶⁰

This view is far removed from that according to which the Eucharistic liturgy is understood to be the most exalted context in which Tradition has been transmitted to us and which nobody, not even a priest, has the authority to interfere with. Since the totality of the Church is realized in each celebration of the Eucharist, as Maximilian Heinrich Heim writes, “the liturgy becomes the existential expression of the Church, to which the personal, what is one's own, has to surrender.”⁶¹ The liturgical rites, which

⁵⁸ Benedict XVI, *A New Song for the Lord Faith in Christ and Liturgy Today* (New York: Crossroad, 1996).

⁵⁹ See Gillespie, *Nihilism*, 53.

⁶⁰ Gillespie, *Nihilism*, 52.

⁶¹ Maximilian Heinrich Heim, *Joseph Ratzinger: Life in the Church and Living Theology, Fundamentals of Ecclesiology with Reference to Lumen Gentium*, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 518.

constitute the privileged locus for the transmission of the Word, are something that the priest ought to receive and to observe in a spirit of humility. As Benedict observes in his *Sacramentum Caritatis*, “faithful adherence to the liturgical norms in all their richness”⁶² has sustained the belief of all believers.⁶³ Indeed, in the Church’s ancient Tradition, Christian forma-

⁶² Pope Benedict XVI, *Sacramentum Caritatis* (2007), §38.

⁶³ For a critique of Benedict’s vision on this and on other points, see Mariusz Biliniewicz, *The Liturgical Vision of Benedict XVI: A Theological Inquiry* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2013), 245–77. With respect to the present point concerning the liturgy as a gift, Biliniewicz writes: “It could be claimed that Ratzinger’s understanding of the liturgy as a gift is influenced by his Platonic, descending theology which leads him to an overly static vision of the liturgy. When one reads in his memoirs that liturgy was to him ‘a reality that no one had simply thought up, a reality that no official authority or great individual had created’ and that it comes to us ‘from the depths of the millenia and, ultimately, of eternity,’ one could wonder if this is just a literary metaphor or if it is not yet another sign of an underlying Platonism which sees the blueprint of the liturgy ‘somewhere there’ and wants to impose this blueprint ‘over here,’ i.e. within history” (246). It is not possible to respond at length to this comment within the confines of this article. One might note however that the author seems to presuppose that what is in effect a participatory metaphysics (“an underlying Platonism”) is in fact wrong. That presupposition is certainly robustly rejected not only by scholars sympathetic to Platonic modes of thinking but also, of course, by Thomists. Secondly, although Biliniewicz does not argue that a participatory view of reality in general and of liturgy in particular is incompatible with historical instantiation, this compatibility needs to be highlighted. The scriptural foundations of Benedict’s liturgical thought ought also to be emphasized. In this regard it is particularly pertinent that Ratzinger/Benedict devotes much of the first chapter of *Spirit of the Liturgy* to Israel’s exodus experience, the goal of which “is shown to be worship, which can only take place according to God’s measure” (16). In other words, his thinking in this regard is clearly inspired by the testimony of Scripture. The manner in which God ought to be worshipped, he writes, “contains its measure within itself, that is, can only be ordered by the measure of revelation, in dependency on God” (16). The second chapter moves from the Old Testament to the New Testament. In brief: “In virtue of Jesus’s Cross and Resurrection, the Eucharist is the meeting point of all the lines that lead from the Old Covenant, indeed from the whole of man’s religious history. Here at last is right worship, ever longed for and yet surpassing our powers: adoration ‘in spirit and truth’” (47). The Mass has its origin in the historical sacrifice of Christ, as Benedict XVI asserts: “This true sacrifice [“the exodus of the Cross”], which transforms us all into sacrifice, that is to say, unites us to God, is indeed fixed and founded on an historical event, but is not situated as a thing in the past behind us—on the contrary, it becomes contemporary and accessible to us in the community of the believing and praying Church, in its sacrament: *that is what is meant by the ‘sacrifice of the Mass’*” (*The Essential Pope Benedict XVI: His Central Writings and Speeches* [San Francisco: Harper-San Francisco, 2007], 152–53 [emphasis added]; quoted in Hahn, *Covenant and*

tion had an experiential character and the celebration of the Eucharist formed the core of that experience. The *intellectus fidei*, the understanding of the faith, has a primordial relationship to the celebration of the liturgy according to the mind of the Church. This understanding of the liturgy as something that we receive in the Tradition and that itself is the locus par excellence for the communication of Tradition is scarcely either intelligible or tolerable for the Cartesian liturgical subject. Catherine Pickstock writes of Descartes that his "system for the attainment of certitude (conceived as a *punctum*) challenges the prior significance of memory as a means which inseparably links knowledge, tradition, and the transcendent."⁶⁴ It is no surprise that Tradition was a victim of the emergence of totalizing reason, since, as already intimated, this reason, precisely as disembodied, is necessarily atemporal. It is no surprise, moreover, that Cartesian dualism has no truck with the spatial embeddedness of human nature in this world. Thus, as Pickstock remarks, the Cartesian subject is "ideally unconstrained by place or time."⁶⁵

Anthropological dualism, albeit combined with the loss of a participatory construal of reality, has also undermined the capacity of man to appreciate the significance of symbols, for it cultivates a disembodied spirituality, whereas symbols are physically instantiated realities. Anthropological dualism moreover lies at the base of the idea that this-worldly reality furnishes raw material that human beings can freely manipulate inasmuch as they possibly can. The implications of this dualism are, I contend, what Ratzinger characterizes as "a widespread dissolution of the rite, which must now be replaced by the 'creativity' of the community."⁶⁶ The seriousness of this development becomes apparent in an argument that Stratford Caldecott attributes to the anthropologist Mary Douglas: "Contempt for ritual forms leads to the privatisation of religious experience and thereby

Communion, 179).

⁶⁴ Catherine Pickstock, *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 71.

⁶⁵ Pickstock, *After Writing*, 72.

⁶⁶ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 163. Elsewhere, Ratzinger/Benedict writes that the creativity of the group is understood in terms of an Enlightenment construal of freedom as predicated on autonomy and emancipation (*A New Song for the Lord Faith in Christ and Liturgy Today* [New York: Crossroad, 1996], 151). The notion of creativity operative here, he continues, "is the direct opposite of the objectivity and positivity that belong to the essence of Church liturgy. The group is only free if it constantly reinvents itself. . . . A liturgy that deserves the name is radically opposed to this."

to secular humanism.”⁶⁷ In other words, a dualistic approach to liturgical worship not only undermines adoration of God but also conduces to the exclusion of God from the rest of human life.

The rupture with Tradition along with the death of a symbolic imagination that have been bequeathed by anthropological dualism have found expression in the contemporary art and architecture that surrounds, attends and—in the case of architecture—at times even constrains and shapes the celebration of the Church’s liturgy. In many instances traditional architectural language has been eschewed in order to elevate the role of the assembly and to avoid any hint of hierarchy. Along with other recent practices, modern architecture has helped to confuse the roles of priests and laity and has arguably induced a false humility on the part of priests. The following paragraph from Ratzinger/Benedict shows forth the irony intrinsic to this state of affairs:

There is the touching story told by Eusebius in his history of the Church as a tradition going back to Hegesippus in the second century. Apparently, St. James, the “brother of the Lord,” the first bishop of Jerusalem and “head” of the Jewish Christian Church, had a kind of callous on his knees, because he was always on his knees worshipping God and begging forgiveness for his people (2, 23, 6). Again, there is story that comes from the sayings of the Desert Fathers, according to which the devil was compelled by God to show himself to a certain Abba Apollo. He looked black and ugly, with frighteningly thin limbs, but, most strikingly, *he had no knees*.⁶⁸

Benedict’s comment on this episode is succinct, but it powerfully shows forth the implications of embodiment in all its aspects with respect to adoration: “The inability to kneel is seen as the very essence of the diabolical.”⁶⁹

Conclusion

Caldecott perceptively notes that many seemingly unrelated problems

⁶⁷ Stratford Caldecott, “Liturgy and Trinity: Towards an Anthropology of Liturgy,” in *Looking Again at the Question of the Liturgy with Cardinal Ratzinger: Proceedings of the 2001 Fontgombault Liturgical Conference*, ed. Alcuin Reid, O.S.B. (Hampshire, England: Saint Michael’s Abbey Press, 2003), 39.

⁶⁸ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 193.

⁶⁹ Ratzinger, *Spirit of the Liturgy*, 193.

that beset the Church share a common cause—namely, anthropological dualism.⁷⁰ One encounters, on the one hand, a clerical domination of the laity and, on the other hand, a relationship between clergy and laity that eliminates any sense of the transcendent. With regard to the former, one can find “a poisonous cocktail of clericalism, aestheticism and misogyny.”⁷¹ The latter can be observed in in “politically correct” liturgies “devoted to themes of justice and peace: everyone sitting in a circle, praying for the homeless and passing the consecrated chalice from hand to hand, with the priest improvising parts of the eucharistic prayer in order to make it more relevant and friendly.”⁷²

Both of these dualistic liturgical anthropologies have served to undermine the apostolic faith that we receive by means of both Scripture and Tradition as interpreted by the magisterium. In this regard it ought to be noted that the most privileged context for the transmission of the Word of God by means of Tradition is liturgy, especially Eucharistic liturgy.⁷³ It is to be noted also that Saint Paul subscribes to the view that human persons are embodied beings even though he did not express this view in hylomorphic terms.⁷⁴ The interpenetration of body and soul that I have intimated

⁷⁰ On this point, see Caldecott, “Liturgy and Trinity,” 46–48.

⁷¹ Caldecott, “Liturgy and Trinity,” 46.

⁷² Caldecott, “Liturgy and Trinity,” 47.

⁷³ See Yves Congar, O.P., quotes Dom Guéranger’s *Institutions liturgiques*: “It is in the liturgy that the Spirit who inspired the Scriptures speaks again; the liturgy is tradition itself at the highest degree of power and solemnity.” Congar adds here that “no finer expression of the truth could be found” (*The Meaning of Tradition*, trans. A. N. Woodrow [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004], 134) and proceeds to examine this truth from “the three most decisive aspects presented by tradition: as a means other than writing of transmitting everything in a ways that is profoundly educative; as a means, in some cases, of transmitting something not contained formally in Scripture; and as an interpretation of holy Scriptures that really brings home their meaning.” See also Matthew Levering, *Engaging the Doctrine of Revelation: The Mediation of the Gospel through Church and Scripture* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014), 59–85. Levering concludes in the very final sentence of this chapter: “It can be no surprise, then, that it is preeminently in the eucharistic liturgy, where the Church shares in Christ’s gift of himself, that we hear Scripture as it is truly meant by God to be heard” (85).

⁷⁴ See James D. G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 41–78, for an outline of Paul’s anthropology. For Paul, embodiment is “a dimension of our very existence” (78). I do not intend to claim that Paul’s anthropology in this respect is identical with Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism. Certainly, however, they are compatible. Indeed, hylomorphic anthropology can be regarded as the best philosophical expression of the scriptural understanding of man.

in this article is in a way articulated by Ignatius of Antioch, although, once again, he does not employ hylomorphic categories to express his thought. Nevertheless, as Gregory Vall comments, “man’s own composition as a creature of ‘flesh and spirit’ is at the forefront of Ignatius’s thinking as he works out the ‘fleshly and spiritual’ implications of redemption at various levels.”⁷⁵ Maximus the Confessor’s anthropology, while neither Platonic or Aristotelian, has, in the words of Marius Portaru, “clearly more in common in its overall aspect and structure with Aristotle.”⁷⁶ It arguably undergirds Maximus’s view that the liturgy is, as Thomas Cattoi puts it, “an itinerary of inner and outer transformation, where fragmentation is replaced by ordered harmony, and where the transfiguration of the inner life of the individual overflows into the gradual deification of the cosmos as a whole.”⁷⁷ Cattoi continues: “Maximus’ dazzling intellectual virtuosity, as he unveils the net of correspondences between inner and cosmic transformation, bestows extraordinary dignity on even the most seemingly insignificant liturgical action, each of which appears pregnant with extraordinary salvific potential.”⁷⁸

While neither Thomas nor Benedict draws explicitly on any of these Fathers of the Church, Thomas does quote Damascene, as we saw at the outset of our treatment of his thought concerning adoration. Damascene writes that “we are composed of a visible and an invisible nature, of an intellectual nature and a sensitive one.”⁷⁹ We therefore offer “a twofold worship to the Creator.”⁸⁰ This assertion is in fact made as an explanation as to why Christians worship faces towards the east. After adducing various scriptural texts in support of this custom while we await the Lord’s return, Damascene then concludes that “this is, moreover, the unwritten tradition of the Apostles, for they have handed many things down to us unwritten.”⁸¹ Since Thomas quotes from an earlier part of the text just

⁷⁵ Gregory Vall, *Learning Christ: Ignatius of Antioch and the Mystery of Redemption* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 120.

⁷⁶ Marius Portaru, “Classical Philosophical Influences: Aristotle and Platonism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor*, ed. Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 142.

⁷⁷ Thomas Cattoi, “Liturgy as Cosmic Transformation,” in Allen and Neil, *Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor*, 417.

⁷⁸ Cattoi, “Liturgy,” 417.

⁷⁹ John Damascene, *An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, in *The Fathers of the Church*, vol. 37, *Saint John of Damascus: Writings*, trans. Frederic H. Chase Jr. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1958), 352.

⁸⁰ John Damascene, *Exact Exposition*, 352.

⁸¹ John Damascene, *Exact Exposition*, 353–54.

cited, he was doubtless familiar with and appropriated this teaching. His own teaching indicates as much.

Thomas could not have foreseen the kind of departures from the liturgical Tradition, predicated upon a hylomorphic anthropology, that we all too often witness in our own times. He therefore does not comment thereupon, although he clearly recognizes the epistemic impact of bodily gestures. One could argue on the basis of his anthropology and psychology that the other factors that attend liturgical worship such as place, orientation, architecture, images, and music, necessarily shape the worldview of those who gather to worship—and even end up destroying its meaning of and their desire to worship.⁸² Ratzinger/Benedict, as we have seen, does offer a critique of what has come to pass in the last few decades in the Roman Rite. Although his thought is lacking with regard to an explicit formulation of hylomorphic anthropology and a psychology founded on this view of the human person as a psychosomatic unity, his phenomenological observations informed by his acute reading of Scripture show his sensibilities with respect to worship to be of the same order as those of Saint Thomas. While there are indeed differences between the theologies of Thomas and Ratzinger/Benedict, it is important not to allow oneself to be blinded to the fundamental convergence between them, particularly when cooperation is of paramount importance in moving praxis to a healthier place, one that is faithful to the Tradition that clearly unites these two theologians. When one properly understands the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass as the privileged site of Sacred Tradition for the transmission of the Word and when one appreciates the idea that the most exalted form of participation is active receptivity, then the need for a widespread hylomorphic liturgical consciousness cannot be overstated: rather than violently shaping what is received in Tradition in accordance with the logic of the Cartesian ego, this anthropology—officially espoused by the Church and reaching back to apostolic times, allows the liturgical subject—*corpore et anima unus*—to be fashioned ever anew by the Word. A return to a greater emphasis on kneeling and facing the east would, I believe, bear what to many would seem like unexpected fruit in terms of Catholic faith and morals in general, given the impact of such physically instantiated phenomena on human consciousness. N V

⁸² For a sustained argument to this effect, see Kevin E. O'Reilly, O.P., "Aesthetics, Hermeneutics, and the Liturgical Transmission of the Word," *Angelicum* 93 (2016): 631–54.