Journet on the Impossibility of Christian Holy War

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Whether the medieval Crusades can be deemed justified still elicits debate. Thus, when President Obama cited the Crusades as evidence of wrongful Christian violence in the past (as a strategy for explaining how Islam as a religion should not be singled out for blame on grounds that it is especially prone to violence),[1] friends of the Crusades stepped forward to defend the noble spirit of self-sacrifice that animated the Knights Templar and other Christians who had sought to protect their co-religionists from harm and to regain the inheritance of Christ from Muslims.[2] Indeed, if we survey the vast literature on the Crusades, it can be normatively divided between those who paint this religiously motivated warfare in dark strokes (as premised on a misguided belief in divinely sanctioned violence) and others who express their admiration for the high values that motivated the crusaders and even hold it up as an example of Christian behavior that could be applicable in all times and places. Thus, the theological apologists around General Franco encouraged his prosecution of the Spanish civil war (1936–1939) on grounds that this war against

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1 Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President at the National Prayer Breakfast," The White House, February 5, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/05/remarks-president-national-prayer-breakfast.

2 See Elizabeth Bruenig, "Conservatives Have Stooped to Defending the Horrific Crusades," *The New Republic* (digital edition), February 9, 2015, https://newrepublic.com/article/121008/obamas-crusades-remark-generates-conservative-backlash.

Republican "unbelievers" who were endangering the Catholic identity of Spain was a spiritual continuation of the medieval crusade against the infidel Moors.[3] And in our own day, some have criticized Pope Francis's conciliatory stance vis-à-vis Islam and have instead suggested that a fifth "crusade" should be initiated in the Middle East in order to protect fellow Christians from attack by the Islamic State and other militant groups.[4] Echoes of this thinking may be discerned in a 2014 Vatican address[5] by Steven Bannon (former chief strategist for the Trump administration) when he stated: "If you look back at the long history of the Judeo-Christian West's struggle against Islam, I believe that our forefathers kept their stance, and I think they did the right thing. I think they kept it out of the world, whether it was at Vienna, or Tours, or other places. . . . In like manner, it is incumbent on all of us . . . to really think about what our role is in this battle that's before us."[6] From the context, it is made abundantly clear that this is a war to defend the "Judeo-Christian West" and its values. This is what, in earlier times, was known as a defensive holy war, "a crusade."

A Normative Viewpoint on the Crusades

Determining the normative status of the Crusades—vis-à-vis the past but also as mode of Christian action that could be undertaken today—was a central topic of theological inquiry for Charles Journet in the years 1937–1939. As can be gleaned from his correspondence with Jacques Maritain, it was the outbreak of civil war in Spain that had prompted the Swiss abbé to reflect on this issue. In May of 1937,

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3 See Gregory M. Reichberg, "Jacques Maritain: l'Espagne et la guerre sainte," *Revue thomiste* 115, no. 2 (2015): 215–33.

4 William Kilpatrick, "Needed: A New Church Policy toward Islam [Pt. 2]," Crisis Magazine, February 4, 2015, http://www.crisismagazine.com/2015/needed-new-church-policy-toward-islam-pt-2; "The Fifth Crusade? – Pope Francis Calls For Armed Christian Crusades Against Islam," The Last Refuge, August 11, 2014, http://theconservativetreehouse.com/2014/08/11/the-fifth-crusade-pope-francis-calls-for-armed-christian-crusades-against-islam.

5 J. Lester Feder, "This Is How Steve Bannon Sees The Entire World," Buzz Feed News, November 16, 2016, https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-the-entire-world?utm_term=.rtL0DpaeV#.hogNOy9GA.

6 Earlier in the address, Bannon emphasized: "There is a major war brewing, a war that's already global. . . . We're at the very beginning stages of a global conflict, and if we do not bind together as partners with others in other countries this conflict is only going to metastasize."

Journet read the first draft of Maritain's polemical essay "De la guerre sainte"[7] ("On Holy War"), which aimed to discredit theological claims that the Nationalists were rightly engaged in a "holy war" to defend Christendom.[8] Several months later, Journet published his own essay on this topic, "Le pouvoir indirecte de l'Église: les Croisades" ("The Indirect Power of the Church: the Crusades").[9] In it, we find mention neither of the bloodletting in Spain nor of the ongoing attempts to justify it by reference to the "holy" medieval Crusades. As its title indicates, Journet's piece was written as a dispassionate theological examination of a question relative to Church jurisdiction: did Popes such as Urban II, Eugene III, or Gregory VII issue a crusading call to arms by virtue of their canonical role as supreme shepherds over Christ's Church? Or did they do so by virtue of another role, say insofar as they were temporal rulers themselves? In raising this question, Journet sought to discern whether the Crusades were a direct expression of the popes' spiritual ("canonical") power or, inversely, whether this power was only "indirectly engaged." If the former was found to obtain, the Church, Christ's mystical body on earth (the very embodiment of Christianity) would bear direct responsibility for the Crusades and these should be deemed an authentic instance of a divinely sanctioned "holy war." By contrast, if the latter alone was to hold, the Crusades would represent an initiative for which temporal rulers should be credited with the primary and constitutive authority. Such wars might very well be termed "just," but it would be improper to call them "holy."[10]

As we shall see, Journet opted unequivocally for the second of these alternatives. Beginning in 1937 within the pages of *Nova et Vetera*, he wrote on this topic at some length over the next two years.

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7 Soon after, it appeared in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* 49, no. 286 (July 1937): 21–37. The essay later formed part of Maritain's preface—"Considerations françaises sur les choses d'Espagne"—to the French edition of Alfred Mendizabel, *Aux origines d'une tragédie: La politique espagnole de 1923 à 1936* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, September 1937).

8 In a letter written May 28, 1937, Journet comments on a draft of Maritain's essay: "Your effort to destroy the myth of holy war seems to me eminently healthy and purifying. It is completely in the logic of your theology of history which passes from [a regime] of a sacral sort to one of a profane kind" (Charles Journet and Jacques Maritain, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, *1930–1939* [Fribourg, CH: Editions Universitaires, 1997], 656–60 [letter no. 603]; translations from *Correspondance* are my own).

9 Charles Journet, "Le pouvoir indirect de l'Église: les Croisades," *Nova et Vetera* 12, no. 4 (1937): 437–58.

10 Journet lays out these two alternatives in "Le pouvoir indirect," 452–53.

His correspondence with Maritain provides a valuable window on the *status quaestionis* as it appeared to him during this period. The outcome of this reflection was a section in the first volume of *L'Église du Verbe Incarné*,[11] which Journet completed in 1939 (although, due to the outbreak of war, it was not published until 1941/2). As indicated by the work's subtitle ("Essai de théologie spéculative"), Journet did not view himself as engaged in apologetics.[12] His point was not to explain Christian participation in violence simply by attributing it to error or human failing on the part of the Church hierarchy. Rather, his aim was *doctrinal*: to delineate, based on a reading of Scripture and other authoritative sources, the exact standing of the Church in relation to violence. Could the apostolic faith provide the Church with any valid justification for resorting to violence? Or should such resort be rejected in principle as incompatible with the Church's identity and mission?

In this undertaking of a doctrinal assessment of the Church's standing in relation to violence, historical facts would need to be examined. Indeed, Journet attended closely to historical research on the Crusades.[13] But, in so doing, he made clear that these facts would

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[11] Charles Journet, *L'Église du Verbe Incarné: Essai de théologie spéculative*, vol. 1, *La hiérarchie apostolique* [henceforth, EVI-I], in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 1 (Fribourg, CH: Editions Saint-Augustin, 1998), 618–74. The English translation is by A. H. C. Downes in *The Church of the Word Incarnate*, vol. 1, *The Apostolic Hierarchy* (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 304–30. In what follows, citations from EVI-I will give the pagination of the French edition first, followed by the corresponding pages of the English translation (often modified in my longer quotations) in brackets. The first half of this section on the Crusades appeared earlier in "La guerre sainte et la croisade," *Nova et Vetera* 14, no. 3 (1939): 290–306, and was reproduced verbatim in EVI-I, 618–648 [304–19].

[12] See Journet's comment to this effect in EVI-I, 13–15 [xxix–xxx]. On the genesis of *l'Église de Verbe Incarné* and its relation to Journet's earlier writings, see Jacques Rime, *Charles Journet: Vocation et jeunesse d'un théologien* (Fribourg, CH: Academic Press, 2006).

[13] In "Le pouvoir indirect," Journet cites chiefly from René Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem* (Paris: Plon, 1934). In EVI-I, Carl Erdmann's *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1935) is also frequently cited. Journet's other sources include H. Pissard, *La guerre sainte en pays chrétien: Essai sur l'origine et le développement des theories canoniques* (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1912), and a set of lectures that Michel Villey had delivered in Beirut (a copy of which was conveyed to Journet) under the title *La Croisade dans l'histoire et le droit du moyen âge*. These lectures were later taken up in Villey's doctoral thesis, *La Croisade: Essai sur la formation d'une théorie juridique* (Paris: Vrin, 1942).

have to be interpreted *theologically*; in and of themselves, they cannot decisively confirm or disconfirm a theological proposition. History could show, for instance, that a pope had commanded resort to violence, but theology alone could establish on what grounds he had done so and by virtue of which specific role or mandate. But beyond researching holy war as a phenomenon within Church history, Journet was also intent on determining the viability—the "legitimacy," as we would say today—of holy war for Christians of the present age. While he does not mention the possibility of a militant Islamic advance on the Christian communities of the West or Middle East, he does expressly ask whether the future defense of Christianity against the onslaught of militant atheism (then represented by an expansionist Soviet Union) could justify a new sort of "holy war," analogous to the medieval Crusades. Some Catholic voices were soon to speak in this way,[14] but Journet steadfastly maintained that this phraseology should be rejected, for reasons that will be explained below.

In considering the possibility of Christian holy war, Journet acknowledged that the data of history would have to be carefully weighed. In fact, some six months after first reading "Le pouvoir indirect," Maritain questioned whether Journet had adequately accounted for the manifest fact that the medieval Popes had deliberately induced temporal rulers to engage in religiously motivated warfare.[15] "Culturally, during the middle ages," Maritain wrote: "*The Church did use the [temporal] city* as an instrument in the *broad* sense—*sending people to war against Islam— how, is it possible to deny this?*"[16] For

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[14] For instance, the French Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart (rector of the Institute Catholique in Paris) created a stir in 1941 when he was reported to have issued a declaration that the German invasion of the Soviet Union was a "holy war." Allusion to this appears in a letter written by Yves Simon to Jacques Maritain on November 6, 1941 (Jacques Maritain and Yves Simon, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, *Les années américaines [1941–1961]*, ed. Florian Michel [Paris: Editions CLD, 2012], 80 [letter no. 439]). I have not been able to find a published version of the declaration in question, but in his posthumously published diary, Baudrillart comes close to affirming as much. Writing on July 8, 1941, he exclaims that "now it is a question of a crusade against the Soviets; a crusade, please God that it be that and that one can count on France to be engaged and present on the Russian front" (Alfred Baudrillart, *Les Carnets du Cardinal: 1941–1942* [Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1999], 115).

[15] This issue was first raised by Maritain in a letter written on May 20 or 27, 1938 (Journet and Maritain, *Correspondance*, 2:725–27 [letter no. 630]).

[16] Jacques Maritain, Letter of [probably] June 2, 1938, in Journet and Maritain, *Correspondance*, 2:732 (letter no. 632; emphasis original).

Maritain, to say that the Church had employed the "heavy means" of the temporal sphere as instruments of its spiritual action was equivalent to placing primary responsibility for such action—including the inevitable bloodletting—on the Church. Although the Popes and other prelates might not have taken part in the fighting themselves, this was nevertheless done at their instigation, and hence, in a fundamental sense, it was directly imputable to them and ultimately to the Church under whose authority they issued their crusading appeals. Despite agreeing with Journet that formal distinctions are necessary in order to preserve a correct understanding of doctrine, Maritain cautioned nonetheless that, "if these distinctions are used to deny historical facts, they will take on the appearance of an evasion [*un échapatoire*]."[17]

The correspondence with Maritain reveals how, behind the calm exterior of a theologian discoursing on the proper jurisdictions of Church and state, Journet found himself anguishing over the exact relationship of Christ's Church to violence.[18] Indeed, Journet set the bar for his analysis very high. Two truths about nonviolence he deemed inherent to the Christian faith, and these correspondingly served as premises for his theological argument on this topic: (1) Jesus Christ made it abundantly clear that he would have no active part in violence and that his disciples should not defend him by violence, and by extension, the Church, Christ's mystical body on earth, should likewise refrain from all active participation in violence; (2) by exercising supreme leadership over Christ's Church on earth, the popes, by their canonical power (namely, the power conferred on them as successors of St. Peter), can have no direct role in war or violence of any sort.

The problem confronting Journet was accordingly to reconcile the second of the premises with the wide historical record of papal involvement in wars, the medieval Crusades in particular. Is it not obvious, for instance, that Pope Urban II and his successors issued a call to arms for the retaking of Jerusalem? Did not the inquisition to free the South of France from "Catharism"—an inquisition resulting

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17 Maritain, Letter of June 2, 1938.

18 Thus, after laying out his position in a letter written on May 30, 1938, Journet states that, "unless some clear statement of authority obliges us to trace the effusion of blood to the Church as such, why not seek an explanation in the direction that I have marked out?" Later, in the same letter, he expresses some self-doubt, asking whether "I should modify my starting point?" (Journet and Maritain, *Correspondance*, 2:730 [letter no. 631]).

from a papal bull issued by Innocent III—authorize a war against the Albigensians?

It what follows, I examine the strategy adopted by Journet for reconciling evangelical nonviolence with the historical record concerning papal involvement in war, the Crusades most especially. Journet's analysis was admittedly broader, as it was intended to cover the inquisition against heretics and related phenomena as well.[19] But, to keep the present article within manageable proportions, I will focus on the Crusades, with only peripheral comment on these other issues.

It goes without saying that there has been a broad philosophical/theological output on the relation of Christianity to violence. Within this field, much of the discussion has focused on the compatibility of Christianity with the idea and practice of just war. This is not, however, the angle pursued by Journet. He does not question the soundness of the just war doctrine; he takes it to be perennial teaching within the Church.[20] His interest is rather to discern in what measure there can be such a thing as a war undertaken in the name of Christianity—a "holy" war. From a descriptive point of view, he does not doubt that numerous Catholic Christians, including leading theologians and prelates, have affirmed the justifiability of a war undertaken in defense of the faith. He recognizes that some have even believed that infidels could rightly be compelled to the faith

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[19] Several months before "Le pouvoir indirect" appeared, Journet published a related article on the inquisition: "Le pouvoir coercitif de l'Eglise," in *Nova et Vetera* 12, no. 3 (1937): 303–46. A section of EVI-I was subsequently devoted to this issue (530–618 [262–304]).

[20] Among some Catholic theologians, there was a trend in the early 1930s to seek a revision of the traditional teaching on just war. A declaration to this effect was issued in Fribourg, Switzerland, (hence it was termed the "Fribourg Conventus") in October of 1931 and published six months later as "Le problème de la moralité de la guerre" in the Dominican journal *Les documents de la vie intellectuelle* 3 (1932): 199–213. Then a professor at the Grand Seminary in the same city, Journet expressed his reservations about this initiative in a letter to Jacques Maritain on March 21, 1932 (Journet and Maritain, *Correspondance*, 2:215 [letter no. 391]). For indications on the doctrinal status of just war among Catholic theorists in the first three decades of the twentieth century, see Jean-Marie Mayeur, "Les catholiques français et la paix du début du XXe siècle à la veille de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale," in *Les Internationales et le problème de la guerre au XXe siècle: Actes du colloque de Rome 22–24 novembre 1984* (Rome: Publications de l'École française de Rome, 1987), 151–64.

by force of arms.[21] He was well aware that some cardinals and even popes have led troops into battle.[22] In this descriptive sense, it cannot be affirmed that Christianity excludes holy war. Journet's project was nonetheless not situated at this level. His intention was normative: to assess, within the framework of theology understood as *sacra doctrina*, whether holy war is consistent with the teaching of the faith. In so doing, his focus was principally on defensive holy war, as this still remained an open topic of theological debate[23] (in contrast to forced conversion, or offensive holy war, an idea that had been definitively ruled out by the thirteenth century[24]).

In mounting his argument against holy war, Journet proceeds from a reasoned conception of what Christianity is (including the Church as a divinely caused society of believers) and how violence can or cannot pertain to it. He recognizes that alternative theological viewpoints have been advanced (as we shall see, Suárez is mentioned in this connection), but he argues for the soundness of his own account.

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[21] In the letter on May 20 or 27, 1938, Maritain pointed out that, after the conquest of Saxony in 785, Charlemagne issued a capitulary informing the inhabitants that those unwilling to accept baptism would be put to death (Journet and Maritain, letter no. 630). Alluding to this issue in EVI-I, Journet conceded that "the old ideas of conversion by constraint, armed mission, forced baptism [have] haunted the imagination of many men of action," but at the same time he emphasized how these ideas have "expressly been rejected by the Church, and [are] not to be imputed to it without injustice" (631 [310–311]).

[22] See the documentary evidence amassed in D. S. Chambers, *Popes, Cardinals, and War: The Military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).

[23] As already noted, in 1936–1939, the theologians who supported the nationalist side in the Spanish civil war argued for the ongoing validity of defensive holy war within Catholic teaching; see for instance, A. de Castro Albarrán, *Guerra Santo: El sentido católico del movimiento nacional Español*, preface by Cardinal Goma (Burgos, ES: Editorial Española, 1938).

[24] The theological consensus rejecting offensive holy war was authoritatively affirmed in a decretal (*Quod super his*) issued by Innocent IV (Pope from 1243 to 1254): "Infidels should not be forced to accept the faith, since everyone's free will ought to be respected, and this conversion should [come about] only by the grace of God" (passage reproduced in Gregory M. Reichberg and Henrik Syse, *Religion, War, and Ethics: A Sourcebook of Textual Traditions* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014], 92). Thomas Aquinas made a similarly emphatic statement against forced conversion in *Summa theologiae* [*ST*] II-II, q. 10, a. 8. At that time, only more limited pockets of debate remained, such as the question of whether the children of Jews could be baptized against the wishes of their parents.

Given Journet's normative optic, his analysis is patently not situated within the history or sociology of religion. Yet, by advancing this explicitly theological treatment of holy war, he provides a valuable complement to these discussions. It is to make this contribution better known that the present article has been written.[25]

Key Premises concerning the Church and Nonviolence

Before elucidating Journet's solution to the problem at hand—whether acts of violence can be attributed to the Church—let us first consider the two premises concerning nonviolence that inform his discussion. The first premise bears, on the commitment to nonviolence as was taught and exemplified by Jesus. Citing Matthew 26:52, John 18:11, and related verses by which Jesus prohibited any resort to arms for his own defense, Journet affirms that these words must be taken at face value. From this scriptural basis, he concludes that the idea of a "Christian holy war" is inherently contradictory. Armed force that is made instrumental to spiritual ends, and thereby harnessed to such service by spiritual authorities, is inconsistent with the core message of the Gospels. "Never has there been, nor will there ever be, a 'holy' war in the proper sense of the term."[26]

The crucial question, of course, is to delineate the exact scope of the Gospel prohibition of resort to armed force. Journet takes this to bear directly on Jesus's actions and, by consequence, those of his disciples, since these actions are expressive of the Kingdom of God. Indeed, Jesus renounced violence in self-defense precisely to show how his Kingdom is "not of this world" (John 18:36). Contrasting the Gospel law to the law of Mohammad in this respect, Journet concludes that the former was taught to show us how the rules that govern "God's Kingdom" are all intended to manifest the primacy of charity.[27] In this respect, they necessarily exclude all deliberate spill-

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[25] There has been relatively little written on Journet's treatment of holy war. One exception are the suggestive comments advanced by James Turner Johnson in his survey article "Holy War," *Nova et Vetera* (English) 10, no. 4 (2012): 1099–113 (see especially 1105–8).

[26] Journet, "Le pouvoir indirect," 457.

[27] Journet, "Le pouvoir indirect," 457–58. In this respect, Journet follows the analysis of St. Thomas; see for instance the latter's commentary on Romans 12:21 ("Do not be overcome by evil"), where he explains how the good man can vanquish over evil by drawing his enemy into the "circle of love" (Marietti ed., no. 1015). For an analysis of Aquinas's statements concerning nonviolence, see Gregory M. Reichberg, *Thomas Aquinas on War and Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 54–66.

ing of blood. This Kingdom, as Journet puts the point emphatically, "never takes up arms."[28]

What, and where, is God's Kingdom? For Journet, it is the society of those who live according to the true knowledge and love of God. This society exists most fully in heaven among those who see God "face to face" (enjoy the beatific vision), but it also extends into our world among those who walk in faith, hope, and charity. While retaining its fundamental unity, the kingdom of God nonetheless exists under two states or conditions: wayfarers, on the one hand, and the blessed, on the other. "Church" (*Église*) is another name for the kingdom of God, provided, Journet clarifies, that the first term be taken in its *formal*, *ontological*, or *theological* sense.[29] It is of course possible, he acknowledges, to speak of the Church in a sociological or *material* manner, in which sense it designates that collection of human beings who are named under this single heading insofar as they are baptized members of the ecclesial community. Such individuals can remain faithful to their baptismal commitment or deviate from it. For this reason, historians and others who write from an "empirical" standpoint naturally speak of the Church as though it were inherently composed of men good and bad: "The actions of each," as Journet puts it, belong "indiscriminately to the Church." On this sociological understanding, "the Church is responsible for all the good and evil that its members produce in time; it is at once the source, and the scene, of all the high achievements and all the unworthy lapses of Christians."[30] On this conception, there would be no impediment to saying that warfare is conducted by or for the Church—that there has been Christian holy war.

But it is not according to this sociological/empirical meaning that Journet denies, on the part of the Church, any possible engagement in holy war. Speaking instead from the ontological standpoint of specu-

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[28] Journet, "Le pouvoir indirect," 457; reproduced in EVI-I, 673 [330]. A slightly different formulation may be found in EVI, vol. 2, *Sa structure interne et son unité catholique* (Fribourg, CH: Editions Saint-Augustin, 2000; originally published 1951), 1571, where Journet notes that, in contrast to Christendom, "the Church as such does not raise armies." In making this comparison to Islam, Journet drew on the standard medieval trope that Christianity has advanced "by the blood of martyrs" and Islam "by the tip of a sword." On this background and the distortions it implied, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, "Saint Thomas et les non-chrétiens," *Revue thomiste* 106 (2006): 17–49 (especially 34–42, on the Saracens).

[29] EVI-I, 9 [xxvii].

[30] EVI-I, 11 [xxviii].

lative theology, he argues that warfare is inimical to the very nature of the Church qua Kingdom of God. Looked at in this way, the Church contains only what is consonant with the law of the Gospel:

> The frontier of the Church passes through each one of those who call themselves its members, enclosing within its bounds all that is pure and holy, leaving outside all that is stain and sin. . . . So that even below, in the days of her pilgrimage, in the midst of the evil and sin at war in each one of her children, the Church itself remains immaculate. . . .
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> We must resist every tendency to materialize, to confuse its real frontiers with those of the persons who belong to it, of the groups and parties in which they are enrolled. We must always be redrawing by faith its true and living frontiers *within* these persons, groups, and parties, indeed within our own proper selves.
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> Of this Church (which comes from God by way of Christ and the hierarchy, which is visible, which includes sinners and not their sins) we shall have to say that it is at once purer and vaster than is commonly believed; purer, because it rejects all stain of sin, and vaster because it draws to itself everything that begins to spring up in this world from the seed of grace.[31]

From the parenthetical comment in the last paragraph of the quote above, it is manifest that Journet does not subscribe to the idea that an "invisible" and "perfect" Church" stands apart from the visible and imperfect Church that is led by an all-too-fallible clergy in this world. Rather, on his teaching, one and the same Church is at once visible and invisible, in heaven and on earth, and it is altogether pure and without sin. That part of the Church that is on earth issues from Christ through the mediation of St. Peter, his successors, and the resulting hierarchy.[32] This mediation is indispensable; it cannot be bypassed. Hence, with respect to the *essential* (constitutive) functions that Christ has deputed to the Church hierarchy, there can be no deviation from the truth or corruption by sin. These functions are twofold: on the one hand, there is the "sacerdotal power"[33] (an

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[31] EVI-I, 13 [xxix].

[32] In Journet's technical vocabulary, the Church hierarchy exercises a "ministerial efficient causality" vis-à-vis that part of the Church that is on earth (see EVI-I, 115–20 [46–50]).

[33] Also termed a "power of order" (as in "holy orders").

extension of Christ's priesthood) by which the holy sacraments confer on us the life of grace; on the other hand, there is the "jurisdictional power"[34] (an extension of Christ's kingship) by which we are governed—led on the path of faith—within the kingdom of God.

Within the Church, the exercise of governance (jurisdictional power) is likewise twofold. First, there is the "declaratory power" by which we are transmitted an infallible instruction on the truths of faith (and are thereby told "what pronouncements are to be received on the immediate authority of God"[35]). Second, there is the "canonical power" (also termed "legislative") by which we are directed to actions that are binding upon us as citizens ("members") of this distinctive society that is the Church:[36]

> [This power] prescribes acts that fall under human observation, namely external acts [by contrast with the declaratory power that prescribes internal acts of assent]. . . . And indeed what exterior acts should it command save those directed to the Kingdom of God. . . . The ecclesiastical law . . . is not in the least like the law of temporal kingdoms. Rather it is a . . . determination of the revealed principles of a spiritual kingdom, a kingdom of grace and truth. . . .[37]
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> The declaratory power addresses itself to all men. The canonical power never bears on any but the baptized. On them it can lay new duties; and to what is already prescribed for them by the divine law—and directly affecting the internal forum—it can add a new canonical obligation directly bearing on external acts.[38]

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[34] Also termed a "pastoral" or "apostolic" power.

[35] EVI-I, 331–32 [160–161].

[36] The idea that the Church is a society analogous to but fully distinct from the temporal societies of the world is discussed at length in EVI-I. For a good treatment of this theme and a defense of Journet's conceptualization against some standard criticisms, see Benoît-Dominique de la Soujeole, "L'Église est-elle une 'societé'?" *Revue thomiste* 114 (2014): 197–212.

[37] EVI-I, 372–73 [182].

[38] EVI-I, 374 [183]. For a list of acts ordained by the apostles by virtue of the canonical power conferred on them by Christ (Matt 16:19 or John 21:17), see EVI-I, 366–67 [179–80], which cites, among others: Acts 15:29; 1 Cor 5:5; and 2 Cor 8–9. For an example of canonical power as exercised by popes, Journet mentions that Pope Pius IX, after defining the Immaculate Conception as an object of divine faith, "invoked the *canonical* penalties provided by the law against those who would *outwardly* deny it" (EVI-I, 374 [183]).

This resumé of Journet's teaching on jurisdictional power in the Church leads us to the second of his two premises regarding the possibility of holy war.

(2) In exercising their canonical power, is it at all conceivable that the popes and others in the Church hierarchy should direct the faithful to participate in acts of war? Was it by his canonical power that Urban called a crusade to wrest the Holy Land from the infidel Muslims, or was it by canonical power that Innocent III instigated a military campaign to suppress heresy among the Albigensians? Echoing his earlier correspondence with Maritain, Journet formulates this question in terms of a theological dilemma:

> We shall . . . have to discuss . . . the legitimacy of many measures taken by the medieval popes in the name of their powers: . . . transference of the imperial dignity, deposition of apostate princes, suppression of heresy, organization of crusades. If we maintain that these measures were justified, there seems to be a danger that those who thus work to save the full authority of the canonical power entertain the secret hope that one day all its medieval applications will be revived. And if, on the contrary, we disavow these measures, and consider them to have been usurpations on the part of the spiritual power, it seems as though we shall have to agree that in thus falling in with the methods of the kingdoms of this world the Church lost sight of its transcendence, yielded to the third temptation rejected by our Lord, allowed its sanctity to be eclipsed during long centuries and, by ambition, weakness, or ignorance, betrayed the mission that Christ had entrusted to it. Neither the theologian who simply asserts the divine character of the canonical power, nor the historian content to plead extenuating circumstances for an attitude he admits to be regrettable, will ever resolve these grave questions.[39]

In working toward a resolution of this dilemma, Journet had no choice but to deny that the harsh measures listed above could have been directed by the popes by virtue of their canonical power. The actions that flow from the Church as Body of Christ and Kingdom of God are always spiritual in nature, and thus ecclesiastical penalties,

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[39] EVI-I, 393–94 [193].

insofar as they are necessary for the Church as it exists in this world, "will always be spiritual by reason of their end."[40] Consequently, even when these penalties "touch delinquents in their visible, temporal and material goods": "[The penalties in question] will be distinct from those inflicted by civil society. They will have another measure . . . [and will not] go so far as the shedding of blood and the death penalty."[41] Similarly, fidelity to theological principles drawn from Holy Scripture required Journet to affirm that "preaching (and living) the Gospel" are "the sole means of conquest proper to the Church" and that, for this reason, it is never permitted to expand its boundaries by dint of war.[42] Nor is the Church allowed to protect itself from outward attack by force of arms:

> The sole means of defense proper to the Church as such, and arising from its nature as the visible Kingdom of God among men, remain spiritual in measure and aim, even when temporal in themselves. They do not consist in opposing blade to blade, bloody constraint to bloody constraint: "Behold, I send you forth as sheep among wolves" (Matt 10:16). . . . The only bloodletting for which the Church, as such, takes the full and immediate responsibility is that of the martyr.[43]

Significantly, Journet resists the easy way out (the *échapatoire* alluded to above) of saying that, although the Church itself cannot shed blood, it can ordain civil authorities to do its bidding for its own ends. On his judgment, this reasoning will not work. Whoever orders an action is directly responsible for it. Although others may materially cooperate with the instigator in producing a particular result, it is he, rather than the auxiliaries, who bears the ultimate responsibility for the outcome. It was to foreclose this sort of strategy, which pretends that the Church remains faithful to its mission even when it uses the state as an instrument to carry out its "dirty work" (say by handing over heretics to the secular arm for execution) that Journet began his 1937 article on the Crusades with a

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40 EVI-I, 396 [194].

41 EVI-I, 396 [194–95]. This is a reference to the "soft" forms of coercion that the Church is entitled to exercise insofar as it is a perfect society. See also EVI-I, 530–65 [262–280].

42 EVI-I, 396 [195].

43 EVI-I, 396 [195].

discussion of the Church's "indirect power" over temporal affairs.

Traditional in Catholic theology, the contrast between the Church's "direct" and "indirect" power derives in large measure from St. Bernard's doctrine of the "two swords," itself based on a reading of Luke 22:38 ("Lord, behold, there are two swords"):

> Both swords, namely the spiritual and the material, belong to the Church, . . . and although only the former is to be wielded by her own hand, the two are to be employed in her service. It is for the priest to use the sword of the word, but to strike with the sword of steel belongs to the soldier, yet this must be by the authority [*ad nutum*] and will of the priest and by the direct command of the emperor.[44]

Journet, who earlier had written a book on this topic,[45] emphasized how the distinction in question could be read in both good and bad ways. The bad way would be to take it materially: the Church engages in "direct" action whenever it acts solely by its own personnel; "indirect action," by contrast, is whatever it does by the mediation of temporal (secular) authorities, even if placing them at its service. Journet observes, however, that this is misleading, for when the Church has "recourse" to the secular authorities, it can do so in two different manners, either (1) by taking the primary initiative, and hence the responsibility, upon itself or (2) by leaving this initiative to the secular power, as when, for instance, ecclesial leaders remind princes of their duty to provide adequate security within their realms. But under the standard formulation, not only the second but also the first of these alternatives would count as indirect action. This is a confusing way of speaking and is even disingenuous. For, under this description, even an initiative that the Church undertakes of its own accord and for which it assumes the responsibility would still be classified as *indirect* if the action in question is carried out by the state in service of the Church's own purpose. Thomas Aquinas himself excluded this sort of phraseology when, apropos the parallel case of an executioner carrying out (in good faith) the unjust sentence of a judge, he noted that it is not the former

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[44] St. Bernard, *Treatise on Consideration* 4.3, trans. a priest of Mount Melleray (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1921), 119–20.

[45] Charles Journet, *La juridiction de l'Eglise sur la cité* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1931).

who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.[46]

In Journet's eyes, the good way of understanding the doctrine of the two swords is to frame it in terms of whether or not the Church takes primary responsibility for the action in question. A *direct* action is any initiative that the canonical authority undertakes of its own accord. An *indirect* action, by contrast, is one that the canonical authority encourages or otherwise participates in, all the while leaving the initiative to the secular power that carries out the action in the manner it sees fit. Thus conceived, an action will be *direct* even when the Church, acting in view of the spiritual end for which it has primary responsibility, employs secular means (provided by the state) to achieve this purpose. On the other hand, an action will be *indirect* when the Church proposes an initiative that lies foremost within the ambit of the state. This the Church does when our spiritual welfare is impacted by measures that are temporal in kind, for instance the enactment of civil laws or the protection of the common good (including the practice of religion) against external threats. In this instance, the secular authority does what it is equipped to do, that for which it has been established, and even should it receive guidance from the Church, the state nonetheless operates as a "principle," hence noninstrumental, "cause."[47] Here the state retains the primary and immediate (i.e., *direct*) responsibility for what it does.

The Church thus has two swords, the spiritual sword that represents its primary raison d'être and modus operandi, and a temporal sword. In turn, the Church can avail itself of the temporal ("material") sword in two very different ways, in line with what we have outlined above. It can place functions provided by the state at the service of its canonical, spiritual activities, and in this manner the Church could administer coercive sanctions when needed. Journet does not deny that the Church, as a "perfect society," has within its mandate to impose such sanctions, for instance removal from a position, confinement to a determinate location, restrictions on teaching, and so on.[48] Here, clearly, the Church bears the primary responsibility, and for

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[46] *ST* II-II, q. 64, a. 6, ad 3. The same reasoning would hold in the case of a culpable man who is put to death: formally speaking it is the judge who is the primary, and hence direct, cause of his death, the executioner being an instrument.

[47] To mark how the Church provides guidance, but without assuming the initiative or the responsibility for what follows, Journet says that the state exercises in this instance a "secondary principle causality" (EVI-I, 667 [327]).

[48] See EVI-I, 530–549 [262–72].

this reason, Journet is insistent that the temporal means it accordingly employs as instruments must be consistent with the canonical authority's spiritual purpose and mode of action. As Augustine had much earlier made clear, no "hard" means, certainly no capital punishment or spilling of blood, will here be apposite.[49] This, on Journet's view, is where Suárez erred: the Jesuit put forward as a "primary Catholic assertion" (*prima assertio catholica*) that the exercise of capital punishment against heretics is eminently just "from the power of the Church" (*ex potestate Ecclesiae*).[50] Journet does not dispute that capital punishment can in principle be allowed (at the time this was still a standard Church teaching), and so too, on occasion, resort to armed force, but he reacts strongly against Suárez's further statement that the power of inflicting the death penalty on heretics "resides principally and eminently in the ecclesiastical magistracy and above all in the Sovereign Pontiff; and . . . resides in kings, emperors, and their ministers as it were in a proximate manner and on dependence on the ecclesiastical power."[51] To Journet's mind, this position is gravely mistaken. It confuses the essential characteristics of spiritual and temporal authority. The correct approach would have been to acknowledge that the Church wields the violent means of the material sword (capital punishment or engagement in just war) strictly in an indirect manner. This the Church does when it urges "the state

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[49] See EVI-I, 581–83 [288–89], were Journet cites from Augustine, Epistle 133, to Marcellinus, and *Contra Cresconium* 3.55.

[50] Francisco Suárez, *De fide*, disp. 23, sect. 1, no. 2, cited by Journet in EVI-I, 512n170 [253n2].

[51] Suárez, *De Fide*, disp. 23, sect. 1, no. 7, cited in EVI-I, 512n170 [253n2]. See also EVI-I, 586n269 [291n2: "Suárez does not hesitate to throw the responsibility for the death of heretics on the Church" (with reference again to *De fide*, disp. 23, sect. 1, no. 7)]. Much more could be said about Journet's critique and positioning vis-à-vis Suárez. The Swiss theologian is at pains to differentiate Suárez's viewpoint from his own as well as from that of St. Thomas. Speaking of the Dominican saint, Journet notes that "there is nothing in his writings to oblige us to rank him among those who threw the judicial responsibility for the death penalty on the Church" (EVI-I, 586 [291]). That the position of Suárez was diametrically opposed to his own is made clear in a letter to Maritain on May 30, 1938, in which he comments that, if he is forced to admit (as had been suggested by Maritain) that "responsibility for the spilling of blood was ultimately traceable to the [medieval] Church," then his whole approach to the question of the Church and violence would be in doubt and he would be "thrown into the position I have attributed to Suárez" (Journet and Maritain, *Correspondance*, 2:730 [letter no. 631]).

to obey its own righteous temporal laws (and here we assume that recourse to war and the death-penalty can sometimes be legitimate)":

> In so doing the Church is in no way the cause of, and consequently in no way responsible for, the harsh and temporal character of the means employed or the effects sought. It can adopt and approve this character, if you like, for the sake of the state, never for its own sake. . . . The Church cannot err to the point of considering the means, even just means, freely used by temporal kingdoms, as suitable means for the Kingdom of Heaven; or of confusing the righteousness of Caesar's business with that of God's business. . . . So the Church does well to require things from states which are just for states, but would not be just for it.[52]

If, in sum, the medieval Popes did not (and in fact could not) have called the Crusades by virtue of their canonical power, by what power, specifically, did they do so? As has already been noted, Journet did not deny that these Popes had in fact undertaken such initiatives. Nor did he chalk this up to their personal failings. On the other hand, however, were a pope to do so today, this would indeed constitute a grave fault against his office. To repeat the question: by what power did the medieval Popes call the Crusades, and why is that power no longer exercisable today?

The Temporal Power of Medieval Popes

In formulating a solution to the problem at hand, Journet indicates that he is not here concerned with papal modes of indirect action (in the proper sense), situations in which a pope (or another highly placed ecclesial authority) *reminds* civil authorities of their responsibility to provide an adequate defense against attacks upon their citizenry or other vulnerable persons. Providing such a defense would constitute

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[52] EVI-I, 510 [253]. For elaboration, see the related section "Style of the Church, Style of the State" (EVI-I, 612–14 [301–12]). Journet recognizes that cases, perhaps numerous, may be found in which Church authorities have called on the state apparatus to do things that are wrongful. The ecclesiastical condemnation of Joan of Arc and her subsequent consignment to state authorities for execution is but one famous example of such abuse. But when this has happened, it is the churchmen themselves—not the Church acting by its canonical authority—that is responsible "for the *malice* of the ends and effects sought."

the core of what the Scholastic tradition termed "just war." Journet adopts this terminology. Recent appeals to a "responsibility to protect" by John Paul II and his successors would fall into this category of indirect papal involvement in armed confrontation or even war.[53] Journet sees no obstacle to acknowledging that this should happen by virtue of the popes' canonical power, as it falls within their spiritual mandate to safeguard, albeit indirectly, through teaching alone, the soundness of the natural order, including the attendant political and social realities. And as grace elevates nature but does not destroy it, these papal urgings in favor of the natural political order have often included blessings for the exercise of bravery in just wars and similar "meritorious" deeds in support of the common good. The conferral of such benefits does not change the essentially temporal character of the deeds in question:

> Like all temporal activities that are morally legitimate, [these] just wars may, as such, receive the approbation of the Church. . . . The Pope may give his benediction, may order prayers or thanksgiving for the success of wars he considers just or which are represented to him as such; he blessed Charlemagne's war against the Saxons, and sent a standard to William the Conqueror, which was raised at the battle of Hastings.
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> Supposing that these wars were just and conformed in all essentials with the requirements of Christian doctrine, are we to call them holy wars? No, they were in reality wars waged for the defense of secular interests, and had no immediate relation with spiritual things.[54]

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[53] For recent papal statements on the responsibility to protect, see, for instance, Pope John Paul II's World Day of Peace address in 2000 or Pope Benedict's address to the United Nations General Assembly in 2008 (reproduced in Reichberg and Syse, *Religion, War, and Ethics*, 131 and 138–39, respectively). The idea of humanitarian intervention was intimated in Pope Pius XII's 1948 Christmas address, in which he wrote: "It is perfectly lawful to defend [goods of humanity] against an unjust aggression. Their defense is even an obligation for the nations as a whole who have a duty not to abandon a nation that is attacked" (Reichberg and Syse, *Religion, War, and Ethics*, 123). This, at any event, was how Journet read Pope Pius's address; see his "La guerre et la paix selon l'enseignement de S. S. Pie XII," *Nova et Vetera* 27 (1952): 15–31.

[54] EVI-I, 625–27 [308–9]. Later, Journet points out that, by the same canonical power, the popes could also condemn wars they viewed as iniquitous. He recognizes that, in approving some wars as just and disapproving others as unjust, the popes might nevertheless err and even sin. Such interventions "could be prompted by incomplete and one-sided information, not

In calling the Crusades to recover the Holy Land, the Popes assumed much more than the indirect role described above, for here they took the lead in instigating wars that were carried out by their bidding, for ends that they themselves set, and with the conferral of spiritual benefits (e.g., indulgences) that they alone could give.[55] By reason of their "special relationship . . . to spiritual things," these wars undertaken by papal initiative represent a subcategory within the wider category of just wars. To mark out their distinctiveness, and with a nod to received usage,[56] Journet concedes that they may be called "holy wars," albeit in a loose or improper sense of the term[57] (namely, insofar as they are directly undertaken by the Popes for a religious purpose). But if these wars are not imputed to the Popes by reason of their canonical power (hence, cannot be called "holy" with full appropriateness), on what other possible basis might they be explained?

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to mention prejudice and passion, and raise terrible cases of conscience for Christians who found themselves fighting in good faith in the wrong camp" (642–43 [316]).

55 EVI-I, 630–631 [310].

56 Pissard, for instance, made ample use of this term: on his definition, "a pure holy war is one instigated and organized by the head of the Church, *in his capacity as spiritual sovereign*, who addresses himself to the faithful, in abstraction from their [different] nationalities" (*La guerre sainte en pays chrétien*, 27; my translation). Citing this definition, Journet reacted strongly against the italicized words, leading him to conclude that: "Such a war never occurred, not even against the Albigensians. And it *cannot* have taken place" (EVI-I, 631n318; my translation, as this footnote does not appear on the corresponding page, 310, of the English translation).

57 Journet, "Pouvoir indirect," 455 ("guerre sainte *au sens improper*"). See also EVI-I, 630 [310]. It is noteworthy that Journet situates "holy war" (in this attenuated sense) within the wider category of "just wars." He proceeds from the supposition that, even when military initiatives are undertaken by papal initiative, the ordinary rules pertaining to the conduct of war are not thereby suspended (see EVI-I, 628n315 [309n3], where Journet cites Cajetan to the effect that the mere fact that a pope declares or encourages a war does not ipso facto render it just). In other words, Journet does not subscribe to the idea, common in the scholarly literature, that holy war represents a frenzy of divinely mandated violence where excess is allowed precisely because the war is waged at God's command. As an example of such a formulation, see Roland Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1960), 148: "The crusading idea requires that the cause be holy, . . . that the war be fought under God and with his help, that the crusaders shall be godly and their enemies ungodly, and that *the war shall be prosecuted unsparingly*" (emphasis mine). On Journet's understanding, there can be no sound theological basis for the idea of a holy war waged without *in bello* limits.

In seeking to identify an adequate response, Journet notes how this direct papal involvement in war or violence was not limited to military initiatives for the regaining of the Holy Land ("Crusades" in the narrow sense of the term). Already in this connection, we have mentioned the military initiatives that were directed against apostates and heretics ("the inner crusade"). In addition, there was armed action to repel Muslim invasion of areas under Christian rule, as well as wars waged for the preservation of the Papal States.[58]

Of these pope-directed wars, the last-named category presents the least theoretical difficulty, since it can readily be argued that, in raising armies to protect the Papal States, the Popes did not exercise a canonical role, but rather a straightforward temporal, political role.[59] During the long period in which the Papal States were in existence,[60] the popes could assume two roles, one of them essential, by which they governed the Church, the other nonessential but nonetheless necessary under specific historical conditions, by which they ruled over a specific territory, on a par with other temporal princes. But this case aside, by what power, if not the canonical, did the Popes assume responsibility for military action—with the concomitant shedding of blood?

In response, Journet explains how these Popes exercised a distinctive role vis-à-vis the temporal, political sphere during the Middle Ages. In addition to their supreme leadership over the society of believers on earth, then, these Popes also enjoyed authority *within* civil society, where they were acknowledged to have a role as protectors (*tuteurs*) over the whole of Christendom. Thus, alongside their spiritual authority over Christians within the distinctive society that is the Church, these Popes also possessed a temporal authority over these same Christians insofar as they were assembled together within the Christian kingdoms and principalities of Europe. Composed of individuals who were also members of the Church, temporal society at that time was organized according to principles that were drawn from a shared Christian faith. So, while these Christians lived in

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[58] Journet outlines this typology in EVI-I, 625–31 [308–10].

[59] "By reason of the *political power* conjoined with the apostolic the medieval popes could take, or cause to be taken, all the military measures needed for the defense of the states of the Church" (EVI-I, 644 [317]). Thus, Journet denies that these should be called "holy wars" even in the improper sense of the term.

[60] This state of affairs lasted from roughly the sixth century until 1870, when the popes lost the last remaining parcels of their territory to the newly unified Italian state.

independent political commonwealths, by virtue of their shared faith, they also viewed themselves as members of a wider Christendom. This Christendom derived its ultimate unity from the Church, but because it designated a mode of temporal, rather than spiritual, society, it should not be conflated with the Church. Christians were thus members of two overlapping but distinct societies, each with its own structure, powers, and mode of operation: the spiritual society of the Church and the temporal society of Christendom.[61] Over the first, the pope was sovereign pontiff, acting as successor of St. Peter through his essential powers of order and jurisdiction. Over the second, Christendom, he was the chief "protector" (*tuteur*[62]) of its unity, a function that was less formally constituted than the former, having more of a symbolic than an administrative character.[63] In times of crisis especially, in particular when vigorous authority was lacking on the part of kings or princes, or on those occasions when not just this or that part, but the whole of Christendom, was thought to be endangered, the popes could step into the breach and initiate military engagements that would ordinarily fall within the purview of the emperor or other purely temporal rulers. In this vein, Pope Sergius IV issued an appeal to avenge the Muslim destruction of the church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem in 1010, Pope Leo IX waged a war against the Normans in 1053 (to which end the first papal army was created, recruiting not only in Rome, but from wide afield in Europe), and Pope Urban II issued a call for the first Crusade in 1095. The examples could be multiplied.

In describing this medieval Christendom (and the special papal prerogatives that followed from it), Journet was intent on differenti-

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[61] As Journet later put the point in EVI-II, "le christianisme et la chrétienté n'ont pas le même corps [Christianity and Christendom do not have the same bodies]" (EVI, 2:1571; my translation). "L'Église divine, société visible surnaturelle, ne pourra jamais s'identifier aux nations, sociétés visibles temporelles [The Divine Church, a supernatural visible society, can never be equated with nations, i.e., temporal visible societies]" (EVI, 2:1573; my translation).

[62] While "tutor" does not have this political connotation in English, in French, this term can signify someone who exercises a *tutelle*, namely a protectorate over a particular territory (on this usage, see "Tutelle" in *Dictionnaire de droit international public* [Brussels, BE: Bruylant, 2001], 1110–1111).

[63] Maritain had encouraged Journet to speak of the medieval Popes as "protectors" (*tuteurs*) rather than "heads" (*chefs*) of Christendom because, in that period, the kings of France never recognized any temporal rule above their own, and this prerogative went uncontested by the Popes (Journet and Maritain, *Correspondance*, 2:763 [letter no. 646]).

ating it from the Christian religion as such. Christendom (*chrétienté*) is clearly linked to Christianity (*christianisme*), but the two must be clearly distinguished from one another. The former represents the imprint of the latter within the temporal structures of society. "Christian civilization" would be an alternative name for "Christendom." Christianity, by contrast, finds its full embodiment only within the Church. The Church, as we have already noted, is the society of those who live according to the grace of the New Law. The Gospel can provide inspiration for the social life of our temporal societies, but even should this happen, these societies will nonetheless be organized in view of a purpose that cannot purely and simply be equated to the transcendent end pursued by the Church.[64]

Journet believes that Christianity—and by extension the Church—despite its many vicissitudes, nonetheless has retained its fundamental identity from its founding to the present day.[65] The forms of Christendom have, by contrast, varied dramatically in the course of history. There are multiple ways in which Gospel truths can inform the construction of civil society. During the Middle Ages, a form of

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[64] Journet recognizes that, during the long period of sacral Christendom, theologians often inadequately distinguished Christianity from its embodiment within a particular form of Christendom, and for this reason they sometimes employed the term "Church" as an equivalent for "Christendom" (see EVI-I, 490–492 [242–43]). We should accordingly not expect to find in the writings of medieval theologians (Thomas Aquinas included) an explicit contrast between Christianity and Christendom. The contrast became apparent only in modernity, once it was recognized that one and the same faith (and Church) was compatible, over time, with different ways of applying this faith within the temporal sphere—different *Christendoms*. The medieval theologians knew of only one form of Christendom, the sacral, and this was, as it were, the air that they breathed. Hence, it is clear that conceptual articulation could come only later, once other possible modes had come to be recognized.

[65] For this reason, he reacted to Maritain's claim that he (Journet) had idealized the Church of the Middle Ages. In response to Maritain's further statement that, during this period, "there was *a holy war recognized* by the Church, and even *instituted* by it to secure religious and sacred ends, through the temporal as minister of the spiritual" (Journet and Maritain, *Correspondance*, 2:726 [letter no. 630]), Journet responded that "the Church of the Middle Ages, was it not also the Kingdom [of God]?" (2:730 [letter no. 631]), with the supposition that the fundamental identity of the Church remains constant over time; what is true in one period concerning its essential functions must obtain in other periods as well. The question of the Church's unity over time is the express theme of the third volume of EVI (published 1969), subtitled *Essai de théologie de l'histoire du salut*.

Christendom emerged in which the bond of shared faith was assumed to be a condition essential for membership in the civil sphere. Journet follows Maritain in terming this a "sacral" Christendom.[66] Non-Christians could not be accepted as full-fledged members of the civil polity. They were accordingly assigned a marginal status.[67]

During the Middle Ages, no one doubted that being a member of the Church was one thing and belonging to the kingdom of France was another: the first was essentially spiritual (and the door to admittance was conferral of a sacrament, baptism), while the second was temporal (with admittance being obtained by family lineage). By the same token, however, the former set a condition for the latter. There was more to being a member of a determinate polity than the simple fact of being baptized, but without that condition *sine qua non*, none of the prerogatives of membership would follow. Similarly, during the Middle Ages, it was understood that to be a schismatic was one thing, while being a seditionist was another. The first disrupted the unity of the Church, while the second tore at the unity of the body politic. But, when Christian faith was taken to be a precondition of membership in the civil polity, should someone call the faith into question by the commission of heresy (and be found guilty for such by the Church), he would also, and by extension, be suspected of sedition, and could be held liable for this crime by the state. Moreover, under the historical regime of sacral Christendom, the temporal common good was thought to have instrumental value only; its purpose was to facilitate

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[66] Maritain introduced this term in his *Humanisme intégral* (Paris: Aubier, 1936). The idea that there can be multiple forms of Christendom, while Christianity maintains its fundamental unity throughout time, was first articulated by Journet in *La juridiction de l'Eglise sur la cite* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer), 13: "Le christianisme demeure, mais les chrétientés qu'il développe autour de lui se succèdent et disparaissent. Une seule Église est possible, mais plusieurs chrétientés sont possible [Christianity endures, while the Christendoms it develops around itself proceed one after another and disappear. A single Church is possible, but several Christendoms are possible]" (my translation). For the special characteristics of the medieval sacral political regime, see EVI-I, 489–530 [241–62].

[67] As evidence of the commonly held medieval supposition that shared faith was a key element constitutive of the body politic, see the topics addressed by Thomas Aquinas in *ST* II-II, q. 10, on unbelief. He asks, for instance, whether it is permitted to have contact with unbelievers (a. 9), whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over believers (a. 10), and whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated (a. 1). Questions such as these could have application only within the context of a sacral Christendom.

passage to eternal life. Hence, anyone who contested the Christian identity of the temporal polity was, by this very fact, thought to be an obstacle to the salvation of its members, and obviously, this was deemed to constitute a very serious offense against God and religion.

By these and similar arguments, Journet seeks to explain how religious values could navigate from their "natural" locus within the life of the Church and become elements integral to civil society.[68] They would be assumed into the structures of temporal society, and in so doing, would take on distinctive meaning there, a meaning analogous to, but nonetheless distinct from, the parallel existence these very same values would have within the Church. Thus, whereas Jesus would not allow his disciples to defend him by force of arms and during the Middle Ages no ecclesial person could be allowed to resort to arms either, it was nonetheless thought to be justifiable (and even praiseworthy) that temporal princes should undertake an armed defense of ecclesiastical lives and property (including Christ's inheritance in the Holy Land), since goods essential to temporal well-being would otherwise be endangered. So, whereas it would be nonsensical and perhaps even blasphemous to say that "Christianity wages war," or that "war is waged in the name of Christianity," no such obstacle stands in the way of saying this of "Christendom." It would not be oxymoronic to say that medieval Christendom waged war against the Saracens, or that such a war was waged *in the name of* medieval Christendom. Journet is thus able to assert that:

> Owing to the failure of the imperial power the Pope was compelled to accept the responsibility for the Crusade, not as Vicar of Christ and head of Christianity, but as protector of a sacral Christendom, being bound to act on account of the spiritual values then involved in the political order, values which therefore could and should be defended by political resources. Thus it was in virtue of a temporal extra-canonical power that

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[68] This point is summed up nicely in the following passage from EVI-I, 505 [250]: "A special phenomenon appeared during the Middle Ages. In virtue of the principle that bases political unity on the unity of visible communion with the Church, a spiritual element descended into the civil order and became one of its components. . . . It could be defended not only as a value of Christianity, but also as a value of Christendom. To the degree in which the constitution of the medieval society recognized the faith as a value intrinsic to its common good, it is clear that the Church could require the faith to be defended with all the machinery used by cities in defense of their common good."

> the Pope then intervened, exercising authority over the princes considered as pure instruments for the common good of Christendom. To be responsible for a just war, for just bloodshed, was no sin for a temporal power; it was ethically good and so could be made meritorious by charity; but it would have been a sin for the Church. . . . The Crusade might very suitably be a war waged by *Christendom* against Islam. It could not be a war of *Christianity* against Islam, since Christianity does not go to war. If then a "holy war" is a war for which the Church takes the responsibility there has never yet been a holy war.[69]

Impossibility of Crusades Today

In the foregoing, I have sought to explain why Journet held that *holy war* in the proper sense of the term—warfare waged by the Church on behalf of the Christian faith—must be deemed a contradiction in terms. Popes cannot engage in violence by virtue of their canonical power as successors of St. Peter. By the same token, however, Journet concedes that, if *holy war* is taken in an attenuated sense, as a war waged for the defense of Christendom, then it is true that the Popes, acting as protectors (*tuteurs*) of Christian Europe, did in fact engage in warfare of this kind. Theologically, there is no reason to deny that, in the past, Popes have indeed assumed such a role. But what Journet cannot accept is that popes might assume this protector role today. Why not? His argument is as follows.

It has already been noted that, even though it is itself a society, the Church nonetheless possesses an identity distinct from the temporal societies that compose the nations of the world (or the larger community that results from their agglomeration, as when we speak of the "society of nations"). Historically, the Church, and by extension Christianity, has stood in two quite different relations to the polities of this world. On the one hand, from Constantine to early modernity, visible membership in the Church was considered a prerequisite for membership in civil society. In other words, profession of faith was essential to the unity of the civil polity. Standing outside the Christian faith (pagans, Muslims, or Jews) or straying from the faith and its community, the Church (heretics, apostates, or schismatics), entailed separation from the civil polity.

Within this "sacral Christendom," elements from Christianity exercised a formal role within the constitution of the body politic.

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[69] EVI-I, 668–69 [328].

But this is not the only way that Christianity can influence temporal society. Other modes of influence are possible whereby Christian faith can inspire some members of a polity to implement Christian ideals indirectly within society. This is what Maritain termed "profane Christendom," and it consists in a "the refraction" of Gospel values in the temporal sphere.[70] For instance, Maritain maintained (and is supported in this contention by recent historians such as Samuel Moyn[71]) that the post–World War II conception of human rights, while it is a secular idea, nonetheless has a Christian origin. This mode of influence is compatible with religious pluralism. Journet maintains that both modes of Christendom, "profane" and "sacral," are valid, but he judges that the former represents an advance over the latter because, in it (the profane form of Christendom), the temporal and the spiritual, the "things of Cesar" and the "things of God," are more perfectly distinguished. At the same time, with the severing of a formal connection between faith and the political sphere, a space is opened up for a more vital and spiritual link between the two orders. Journet also holds that history has a direction, and so to revert to the sacral model after the profane model has been introduced (if only imperfectly) would constitute a dangerous reversion. There can be no return to the past model of Church–state relations, and attempts at effecting such will necessarily result in corruptions of the political and oftentimes deep conflict (the Spanish civil war would be a case in point). Indeed, Pope Benedict XVI, in his 2005 address to the Roman Curia, affirmed the impossibility, and indeed the undesirability, of a return to sacral Christendom (the "confessional state").[72]

It would thus constitute an anachronism to expect that the modern popes should again assume a protector role over a temporally unified Christendom. In light of the "secular Christendom" that charac-

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[70] In addition to his *Humanisme intégral*, see also *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 154–62, where Maritain placed the contrast between sacral and profane Christian "civilizations" in the broader context of his analysis of human rights.

[71] Samuel Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

[72] Referring here to the Second Vatican Council, Pope Benedict notes that "it was necessary to give a new definition to the relationship between the Church and the modern State that would make room impartially for citizens of various religions and ideologies" (Benedict XVI, Christmas Address to the Roman Curia, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2005/december/documents/hf_ben_xvi_spe_20051222_roman-curia_en.html).

terizes the aspirations of our modern age, there can be no sense in calling crusades to reestablish a Christian hegemony within the temporal, political space of Europe or the Middle East. Moreover, in relation to just war, with the disappearance of a sacral Christendom and the substitution, in its place, of secular forms of Christendom (or the aspiration thereof), no longer would there be any legitimacy in waging war for the defense of specific Christian interests, including the protection of Christians (say in the Middle East) from attack by non-Christians.[73] Under this new historical regime that is ours, there can be ample justification for mounting an armed defense of vulnerable Christians, but not specifically because they are Christians. They, and all others who are subjected to violence because of their religious affiliations—whether Shia, Sunni, or Yazidi—should receive protection by reason of their humanity. In other words, the foundation for the "responsibility to protect" must lie in fundamental human rights. This is how the popes understand this responsibility today.[74] Purely confessional reasons for according protection are no longer admitted.

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[73] This is in line with Journet's comment that, "in a sacral regime, temporal princes ought, on their own responsibility—whether they act spontaneously, or are called to their duty by the canonical power—to draw the sword in defense of their Christian subjects against those who attack them in their Christian faith or life" (EVI-I, 627 [309]). In the corresponding footnote (note 312 [2]), he suggests that, in a secular regime, this should not happen except insofar as the state protects religious liberty qua temporal good.

[74] The turning point from the sacral to the secular conception of armed force can be traced to the pontificate of Pius XII. When speaking "to the Spanish nation" at the end of the Spanish civil war (1939), he adopted the language of sacral Christendom: "With an immense joy we address you, our very dear sons of Catholic Spain, to express our paternal congratulations for the gift of peace and victory by which God has deigned to crown the Christian heroism of your faith and charity. . . . We acknowledge also our duty of gratitude toward all those who sacrificed themselves heroically on the field of battle *for the defense of God's inalienable rights and of religion* ("Con inmenso gozo, Radio address to the Spanish Nation," April 16, 1939; my translation from the French of the Solesmes edition listed just below; emphasis added). In the same address, he likewise affirmed the importance of "defending the ideals of the faith and of Christian civilization." But nearly a decade later (addressing members of the U.S. Congress on October 7, 1947, appropriately the anniversary of the battle of Lepanto), we find him reframing nearly the same assertion in terms of the "the rights of God and of man." Both passages are reproduced in an anthology of papal statements on war and peace: *Les Enseignements Pontificaux: La Paix Internationale*, vol. 1, *La guerre moderne*, ed. the Monks of Solesmes (Tournai, FR: Desclée & Cie, 1956), 203–6, and 457, respectively.

Conclusion

Journet did not reject appeals to holy war on pacifist grounds. We have seen that he admitted the ongoing validity of just war. He nonetheless took care to emphasize that war is inherently a temporal reality. Christians can take part in it solely by virtue of their membership in temporal society. Ultimately, then, if the Crusades can be justified, at least within a determinate historical context, it is only insofar as they represent a special variant of just war—namely, just war for the protection of Christendom. It would be wrong to justify the Crusades precisely as a divinely mandated expression of the Christian faith.

By thus attributing the Crusades to *Christendom* (the "things of Cesar") rather than to Christianity (the "things of God"), Journet relativizes the Crusades both historically and religiously. As to the first, he offers reasons why the Crusades had warrant only within a particular historical context, the sacral political regime of medieval Christendom.[75] Such a context is no longer operative today, and hence, under the conditions of Christian modernity, a reversion to crusading ideals, as happened during the Spanish civil war, merits disapprobation. But, because the Crusades did have a proper warrant in times past, under the very different set of cultural expectations that were operative in the Middle Ages, there is no need to make amends for them today (except in the measure that they involved misdirection or excess, as in the 1204 sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade), in contrast to the regrets that have rightly been expressed vis-à-vis the mistreatment of the Jews or the condemnation of Galileo. Indeed, Journet thinks that the crusading élan represented a nobility of spirit that is to be admired. But, despite affirming this moral goodness, he is keen to relativize the religious content of the Crusades: insofar as they involved warfare, they were not—and in fact could not be—a direct expression of the Christian theological virtues. Nor, rightly understood, were they an initiative of the Church, which must be committed to nonviolence within its own sphere of action, a commitment that was as binding in the past as it is today.

Journet's theological argument on the impossibility of Christian holy war builds on complex set of elements: the fundamental rejection of violence by the Gospels; the Church as a society coextensive

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[75] "Holy wars are bound up with the existence or survival of a sacral type of Christendom" (EVI-I, 619–20 [395]).

with the Kingdom of God that retains its identity throughout time, a society in which there can be no sin; a differentiation between the popes' canonical and extracanonical (political) powers; the justifiability of just war for temporal society and its unjustifiability for the Church in its own sphere of action; the difference between Christianity and Christendom; and finally, the two historical regimes of Christendom, sacral and profane. On each of these points, Journet's reasoning could be challenged, and in fact often was. But it was in bringing these elements together—explicitly detailing the key assumptions—that he provides a compelling theological examination of the Crusades qua Christian holy war. He digs into the entrails of this question to a degree unprecedented in Catholic theology.

What I find most appealing in Journet's approach is his commitment to the Gospel teaching on nonviolence. He believes that this teaching is compatible with a doctrine of just war, but unlike Vitoria, Suárez, and later just war theorists in the Church, Journet does not confine evangelical nonviolence to the far margins of theological inquiry. On the contrary, he thinks it has a central role to play in our thinking about the Church's activity in the world.[76] It is not an uncomfortable teaching that should be explained away or passed over in silence. Jesus's words must serve as a norm for Christians. Journet nonetheless maintains that, when understood well, this norm does not exclude the possibility of just war.

Journet's argument against the possibility of Christian holy war, which, as we have seen, takes Jesus's commitment to nonviolence as its starting point, can serve as a useful corrective to contemporary Catholic discussions on the uses of armed force. The tendency nowadays is to assume that adherence to the Gospel "precepts of patience"

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[76] The point is put nicely when Journet writes: "In the Christian outlook peace, in itself, is a higher, nobler, stronger work than [just] war" (EVI-I, 624 [307]). The idea that "nonviolence" is not merely about inaction, but also and especially designates a mode of action (a characteristic set of peaceful deeds) that exceeds in perfection anything that can be accomplished by just war, was explored at some length by Maritain in a section of *Du régime temporal et de la liberté* (1933) that praised the example and teaching of Gandhi. This work was dedicated to Journet and provided a context for his discussion of nonviolence in EVI-I. For the details of Maritain's teaching on this theme, see Gregory M. Reichberg, "Jacques Maritain: Christian Theorist of Nonviolence and Just War," *Journal of Military Ethics*, January 19, 2018, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/FzQUCxw72wEEmF4346tx/full (forthcoming in no. 3 of print vol. 16 [2018]).

(as Gratian called them) is incompatible with the traditional doctrine of just war: to the degree the one is talked up, to that same degree the other must be talked down. There results a visible discomfort and strained reasoning wherever occasions arise when resort to armed force seems necessary (for instance to protect civilians against the attacks of the Islamic State). But, because the language of just war has been rejected, articulating theologically how there may be an obligation to provide this military assistance has become well-nigh impossible. Journet provides an alternative and more coherent template for thinking about these matters, and for this reason, we would do well to read him today.[77] NV

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