

Recasting Augustine to Look like Aristotle: Philip the Chancellor, Natural Desire, and the Advent of *potentia obedienciae*

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IN HENRI DE LUBAC'S *Summae*,¹ he argues that the Neo-Scholastic theologians of his day mistakenly distinguished natural desires from supernatural ones, while Thomas Aquinas, together with the whole medieval tradition, distinguished natural desires from free ones.² In defense of this claim, he cites Odon Lottin's *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*,³ the first volume of which had just appeared four years prior. Lottin, de Lubac observes, claims that the distinction between natural and free desire in medieval theology could be traced back to the distinction between two Greek terms, *θέλησις* and *βούλησις*, which Philip the Chancellor inherited from his reading of John Damascene.⁴ For de Lubac, the shift from distinguishing the natural will from the free will towards distinguishing the natural will from a "supernaturalized" will, augmented by grace, parallels the shift in post-Thomistic anthro-

¹ Henri de Lubac, *Summae: Études historiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946).

² De Lubac, *Summae*, 251–52. De Lubac was preceded in this argument by Jorge Laporta, "Les notions d'appétit naturel et de puissance obédientielle chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 5 (1928): 257–277. Laporta was in turn building on the work of Heinrich Kierfel, "Das natürliche Verlangen nach der Anschauung Gottes," *Divus Thomas* (Vienna) 1 (1914): 33–57.

³ Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, 6 vols. (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1942–60).

⁴ Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, 400–06, ctd. in de Lubac, *Summae*, 251n3.

pology from man considered as oriented by nature towards the vision of God, and man considered as oriented by nature towards a naturally attainable end, the call to the vision of God being “superadded” to man’s natural finality.⁵

Since de Lubac’s main concern is to establish a context for the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, and since the mere observation that there is a distinction between *θέλησις* and *βούλησις* in Philip the Chancellor was sufficient evidence of the use of that distinction in the early thirteenth century, de Lubac does not devote much space to a study of those terms and the distinction they denote in Philip the Chancellor. However, at a sufficient distance from the impact of de Lubac’s observation *that* such a distinction was theologically important in the period leading up to Aquinas, the question may rightly be asked concerning *how* and *to what purpose* the distinction was used in the theology of the early thirteenth century. The question deserves an independent consideration for two reasons. First, if we consider it instrumentally insofar as it aids us in establishing the proper context for the interpretation of Aquinas, this leads to the danger that we may anachronistically read the theology of the second half of the thirteenth century back into the first half of that century. Second, even if one were to base an interpretation of Aquinas upon a reading of early thirteenth century texts, then a detailed study of early thirteenth century texts would only contribute towards a more careful and precise reading of later authors.

The purpose of this article is to study the theological implications of Philip the Chancellor’s reception of Damascene’s distinction between *θέλησις* and *βούλησις*. I will argue that Philip makes use of the distinction as part of a larger project of rethinking a late twelfth-century Augustinian perspective on nature in the light of Aristotle, and of crafting a theological language that can incorporate an Augustinian anthropology in the language of Aristotelian natural philosophy. In order to do so, Philip employs the concept of a “potency for obedience” (*potentia obedientiae*), which was deliberately used to describe Augustine’s understanding of what is natural (man’s receptivity to what God willed for humanity at Creation) in the language of Aristotelian natural philosophy. The article will proceed in two parts. First, I will explore the theology of nature and of natural desire in Peter Lombard. Second, I will approach the same topic in the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor, and show how his reception of Damascene’s distinction between *θέλησις* and *βούλησις*

⁵ De Lubac traces this shift in *Surnaturel*, 375–94.

enables him to rethink Peter's anthropology.⁶

A. Peter Lombard's Theology of Natural Desire

According to Peter Lombard, any theological account of our natural desire has to come to terms with three questions. First, what does it mean for a motion to be called "natural"? Second, what is the end of the will's natural motion? Third, what is the relationship of the natural end of the will with that end which is posited for human nature by Christian Revelation? Peter answers the first question in Book 2 of the *Book of Sentences*, but leaves the second and the third until Book 4.

In order to explain what it means for a motion to be natural, Peter educes the words of the *Glossa ordinaria* on Romans 7:15, where Paul notes the dichotomy between what he wills and what he does. The *Glossator* had observed that "man, having been subjected to sin, does what he does not want to do, because he naturally wants what is good, but this will always fails to achieve its effect unless [it is aided] by the

⁶ In what follows, I will not discuss the anonymous *Summa Duacensis* of MS. Douai 434, because the relationship of that *Summa* to Philip the Chancellor's has yet to be established with certainty. In brief, there are three hypotheses as to the relation between the two works: 1) The *Summa Duacensis* was prior to the *Summa de bono*, because it was a draft, authored by Philip, of portions of the *Summa de bono*; 2) the *Summa Duacensis* was prior to the *Summa de bono* and was not authored by Philip, but Philip used it; 3) The *Summa Duacensis* was posterior to the *Summa de bono*, and was authored by G. de Soissons, the compiler of Douai 434. The first view is that of Victorin Doucet, "A travers le manuscrit 434 de Douai," *Antonianum* 27 (1952): 531-80. The second is that of Palémon Glorieux, Introduction to *La "Summa Duacensis" (Douai 434)*, ed. Palémon Glorieux (Paris: J. Vrin, 1955), 9-11. The third is that of Nicolai Wicki, Introduction, in Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono* (Bern: Francke, 1985), 1:49-62. Richard Dales, speaking only of Glorieux's and Doucet's positions, summarizes the difficulty well: "The hard evidence is slight and the arguments on both sides tenuous, and in any case it was through Philip's work that these views influenced generations of Latin thinkers." Cf. Richard Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 25. Dales's comment should not be taken to mean that the *Summa Duacensis* is not deserving of scholarly attention; it is a valuable witness in itself to a number of points in early thirteenth century philosophy and theology. It is simply not possible at the present to establish to what extent it is related to the *Summa de bono*. For the purposes of this article, it is worth noting that the *Summa Duacensis* does use the term, *potentia obedientie*, in a manner similar to that of the *Summa de bono*, but discusses it at much greater length. Cf. *Summa Duacensis*, *De opere miraculoso*, cap. 1, q. 6, a. 4, sol. (Glorieux 120-21). The manner of its discussion of this term seems to favor Wicki's view that the *Summa Duacensis* is posterior to the *Summa de bono*, but again, the evidence is too scant to make a reliable determination.

grace of God.”⁷ Peter perceives in this comment a distinction between what is willed naturally (*naturaliter*) and what is willed freely (*libenter*).⁸ What is willed naturally is what Adam would have willed at Creation, because God made him morally upright. Subsequently, whatever sins we may happen to commit freely, a trace (*scintilla*) of that natural will remains in us after the fall.⁹ Grace, according to this view, frees us from freely choosing sin, and allows us to make free choices in accord with our natural will.¹⁰

If the role of grace is to heal fallen nature from the free choice of evil so that it may freely pursue the goal of its natural will, this raises a second question: whether the natural goal of the will is that end which is posited for human nature by Christian revelation. The importance of this question arises from the fact that, if Adam could choose freely in

⁷ Peter Lombard, *II Sent.*, d. 39, cap. 3, no. 1. “*Dicit enim quod ‘homo subiectus peccato facit quod non vult, quia naturaliter vult bonum, sed voluntas haec semper caret effectu, nisi gratia Dei’ adiuvet et liberet.*” The critical edition of this text can be found in Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2 vols. (Quaracchi: College of St. Bonaventure, 1971–81), 1:555. References in this work will be given by chapter and number, since this is often more precise than page number. The editors of the Quaracchi edition note that the most likely author of the Gloss is Anselm of Laon (1:555n2).

⁸ *Ibid.*, d. 39, cap. 3, no. 3. Although Peter acknowledges later in this chapter that there are others who deny this distinction (no. 4), it is clear from context that he himself prefers to draw it.

⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, d. 35, cap. 2. Here Peter distinguishes, with respect to sinful acts, between acts considered insofar as they are acts (*inquantum actus sunt*), in which case he says that they are always good, and acts insofar as they are evil (*inquantum mala sunt*), in which case he says that they are sins.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, d. 24, cap. 3, no. 1. The editors of the Quaracchi edition note the dependence of Peter on the school of Anselm of Laon (Quaracchi, 1:452, note to cap. 3). The text of the gloss reads, “*Naturaliter quidem ratio vult bonum, sed voluntas haec semper caret effectu, nisi gratia Dei velle suum ad amandum bonum addiderit quod ad effectum potest perducere. Est enim velle naturae, velle gratiae, velle vitii. Velle naturae per se impotens est, nec palmam meretur, sed vincitur et trahitur a velle vitii, nisi velle gratiae subveniat, quod velle vitii fugat, et velle naturae liberat.*” Cf. *Biblia Sacra cum Glossa Ordinaria* (Venice: Giunti, 1603), 96A. This is probably the original source of Peter’s text in the *Book of Sentences*, although its proximate source is almost certainly the Lombard’s own gloss on the Pauline Epistles, where this text is included *verbatim* (PL 191:1423A). Peter’s distinction of wills parallels that of the *Glossa ordinaria* precisely. On Peter’s use of the *Glossa ordinaria*, as well as his contributions to glossa on the Psalms and the Pauline Epistles, see Philip Rosemann, *Peter Lombard* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 43–48; Lesley Smith, *Glossa ordinaria: The Making of a Medieval Bible Commentary* (Boston: Brill, 2009), 200–204.

accord with his natural will without the need for grace to heal him from sin, and if Adam's natural will was ordered towards the beatific vision, then it would seem that Adam could choose the beatific vision without the help of grace. Peter, aware of the Pelagian danger in such a consequence, is keen to point out that in no sense does the human will suffice to achieve the final end posited for it by Christian Revelation without the help of grace.¹¹ If it did, then grace (*gratia*) could nowise be called gratuitous (*gratuita*), because it would be due the merits of our previous actions.¹² Nevertheless, there are some basic goods towards which our will might tend even without the aid of grace, such as cultivating a field and building a dwelling.¹³


Lest we read later distinctions into Peter's text anachronistically, we should advert to two peculiarities of Peter's description of the human will thus far. First, Peter does not predicate the word, "natural," of those basic goods which are willed freely without the help of grace. Rather, he distinguishes first between what is willed naturally and what is willed freely; second, he distinguishes between what is willed freely with the help of grace and what is willed freely without the help of grace. Cultivating a field and building a house are not willed naturally for Peter;

¹¹ Ibid., d. 26, cap. 4, no. 5.

¹² Ibid., d. 26, cap. 7, no. 1. Quoting Augustine's Epistle 194.3.7, Peter's text reads, "Illius enim gratiae percipiendae, quae voluntatem hominis sanat, ut sanata legem impleat, nulla merita praecedunt. Ipsa est enim qua iustificatur impius, id est fit iustus qui prius erat impius; meritis autem impii non gratia, sed poena debetur; nec ista esset gratia, si non daretur gratuita." Datur autem gratuita, quia nihil ante feceramus unde hoc mereremur." The last sentence, which is not from Augustine but which appears in Peter's commentary on Romans 3:22–26 (PL 191:1361C), reveals Peter's dependence on his own previous work. Peter's commentary, in turn, is also based on the *Glossa ordinaria* of the passage in question, which uses the text from Augustine in a slightly different form. "Sed voluntas nostra ostenditur infirma per legem ut sanet gratia voluntatem, et sanata voluntas impleat legem, non constituta sub lege, nec indigens lege huius gratiae percipiendae nulla praecedunt merita, quia meritis impii non gratia sed poena debetur, nec ista esset gratia, si non daretur gratuita." Cf. *Biblia Sacra cum Glossa ordinaria*, 6:50. The discrepancy between the text of the *Glossa ordinaria* and Lombard's first use of it, together with the manner in which he expands the quotation from Augustine from his commentary on Romans to his *Book of Sentences*, suggests that Peter probably knew and read the text from Augustine alongside the *Glossa ordinaria*, and that, while the *Glossa ordinaria* influenced his application of this text from Augustine to this question, Peter did not merely repeat what he had learned from the school of Laon here, as he sometimes does elsewhere.

¹³ Ibid., d. 26, cap. 7, no. 2.

they are willed freely *without* the help of grace. Neither is charity willed naturally; it is willed freely *with* the help of grace.¹⁴



On account of the fact that Peter primarily distinguishes between what is willed naturally and what is willed freely, when Peter discusses the will's end in the context of drawing the aforementioned distinctions, he only discusses the end of what is willed freely, not the end of what is willed naturally. The goal of the will's free action, Peter argues, is not the ultimate end of man. Free action concerns the means to our end, not the end itself.¹⁵

Speaking, then, of means towards our end, Peter describes a twofold proximate end of the will: good delight (*delectatio bona*) for those who choose good means to their end; evil delight (*delectatio mala*) for those who choose evil means to their end.¹⁶ Explaining what constitutes an object of good delight, Peter acknowledges that "good" can be said in several senses: "as useful, as it can be rewarded, as a sign of the good, as an appearance of good, as licit, and perhaps in other ways."¹⁷ But for the purposes of selecting the means to our end, all that matters is the sense in which our actions can be said to be rewardable.¹⁸ Only those who freely will here and now to take good delight in actions which are rewardable with good, a choice that cannot be made without grace,¹⁹ will be rewarded with the ultimate end of man, the never-ending enjoyment (*fruitio*) of God.²⁰

Having explained the proximate and remote ends of the free will,

¹⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, d. 29, cap. 1, no. 2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, d. 26, cap. 11, no. 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, d. 38, cap. 4, no. 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, d. 41, cap. 2. "Bonum enim multipliciter accipitur, scilicet pro utili, pro remunerabili, pro signa boni, pro specie boni, pro licito, et aliis forte modis."

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, d. 41, cap. 1, no. 8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, d. 41, cap. 1, no. 4.

²⁰ Peter Lombard, *I Sent.*, d. 1, cap. 2-3.

Peter inquires into the relationship between an action freely chosen without the help of grace and an action freely chosen with the help of grace. Here some confusion might arise because Peter uses the adverb “naturally” equivocally. According to Peter, actions performed without the help of grace are done naturally (*naturaliter*), while actions above nature (*praeter naturam*),²¹ and performed by grace (*per gratiam*) are done marvelously (*mirabiliter*).²² The difference between the two concerns how each is caused in a creature. Relying on terminology taken from Augustine’s *De genesi ad litteram*, Peter observes that, although, “the causes of all things are in God . . . [,] the causes of some things are both in God and in creatures, while the causes of some things are only in God.”²³ According to Augustine, as Peter interprets him, when God wants a creature to be the co-cause of something, God places a germinatory property (*ratio seminalis*) in the creature, which develops organically as a seed, and which allows the creature to perform an action of its own accord.²⁴ When God wants to be the sole cause of something, he places a primordial cause (*causa primordialis*) in the creature, which is not a cause properly speaking; rather, it is something in the creature, by which the creature responds to what God chooses to do in it.²⁵


²¹ For this and all Latin words that admit of a classical or a medieval spelling, I will follow the convention of the edition referenced for each author.

²² Peter Lombard, *II Sent.*, d. 18, cap. 6, no. 2. The distinction seems to be taken from the *Glossa ordinaria* on Genesis 2:20. Cf. *Biblia Sacra cum Glossa ordinaria*, 1:79B. “Omnia ergo quae ad gratiam significandam non naturali motu rerum, sed mirabiliter facta sunt, eorum absconditae causae in Deo fuerunt.” The *Glossa* is in turn quoting Augustine, *De gen. ad lit.* 9.18.34 (CSEL 28.1:293). “. . . omnia, etiam quae ad hanc gratiam [per quam salvi fiunt peccatores] significandam non naturali motu rerum, sed mirabiliter facta sunt, eorum etiam causae in Deo absconditae fuerunt.”

²³ *Ibid.*, d. 18, cap. 6, no. 1. “Omnium igitur rerum causae in Deo sunt . . . sed quarundam causae et in Deo sunt et in creaturis, quarundam vero causae in Deo tantum sunt.” As an antecedent to this passage, the Quaracchi editors point us towards Peter’s commentary on Ephesians 3:9 (*PL* 192:189D). “Sacramenti dico, absconditi a saeculis, non in saeculis, sed in Deo, qui omnia creavit. Habet enim Deus in seipso absconditas quorundam factorum causas, quas rebus conditis non inservit, easque implet; non illo opere providentiae quo natura substituit ut sint, sed eo quo illas administrat ubi voluerit, quas ut voluit condidit, ibi est et gratia per quam salvi facti sunt peccatores. Non enim per naturam vitio depravatam, sed per Dei gratiam restauratur.”

²⁴ *Ibid.*, d. 18, cap. 5, no. 3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, d. 18, cap. 5, no. 4; cap. 6, no. 2. The distinction between *rationes seminales* and *rationes primordiales* is taken from Augustine, *De genesi ad litteram*, lib. 5–6. While the latter term (*rationes primordiales*) appears to be unique to Augustine,



Although, therefore, Peter distinguishes between natural and free will in Book 2, he does not discuss the end of natural will in that book; rather, he saves a more detailed discussion of the end of natural will for Book 4, Distinction 49, in his treatment of happiness (*beatitudo*) and man's desire for it. In that distinction, Peter does not offer any of his own commentary on the subject; instead he quotes lengthy passages of Augustine, which describe the difficulties of understanding natural desire, without actually offering a solution to the question of the desire's end. The problem, as Peter has Augustine describe it, is that while it is empirically true that all people desire happiness, it is also empirically true that not all people know that the path to happiness, as Christian revelation proposes, is virtue; nor do all people know that the goal of happiness, as Christian revelation proposes, is the vision of God; nor would all people, if they knew these things, desire to use virtue to enjoy the vision of God.²⁶ Peter's conclusion, again through the mouth of Augustine, is that all people know the basic contour of a happy life, "having all you want and not wanting anything wrongly," but not all people realize that the only possible possession of this happiness is in God.²⁷ In short,

the former term (*rationes seminales*) may have entered Latin theology through Jerome's discussions of Origen. Cf. Jerome, *Contra Iohannem* 26, ed. Jean-Louis Feiertag, CCSL 79A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), 43–44. Peter's use of *De genesi* is not entirely direct, relying in part on the *Glossa ordinaria* on Gen. 2:5, which reads, "In prima mundi conditione cum Deus omnia simul creavit, non factus est, qui esset ratio creandi hominis non actio creati. Sed aliter haec in verbo Dei, ubi ista non facta sunt, sed aeterna. Aliter in elementis mundi, ubi omnia simul facta sunt futura. Aliter in rebus quae iam non simul, sed tempore suo quaeque creantur. Aliter in seminibus in quibus rursus primordiales causae repetuntur de rebus deductae, quae secundum causas quas primum condidit extiterant, velut herba ex terra, semen ex herba." The text is taken from *Biblia Sacra cum Glossa ordinaria*, 1:62C. The passage here is an abbreviated and somewhat corrupted version of *De genesi ad litteram* 6.9.16–6.10.17.

²⁶ Peter Lombard, *IV Sent.*, d. 49, cap. 1, nn. 4–5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, d. 49, cap. 1, no. 7. An antecedent to this passage can be found in Peter's commentary on Romans 4:1–8 (*PL* 191:1369D–1370A).

as Peter goes on to describe in his own words, we have a natural desire for a happiness which is only found in God, though a given individual, who is unaware of God's existence, might not experience this as a natural desire for *God*, and might freely seek happiness elsewhere.²⁸

According to Peter, then, there are two principles in each of our actions. The first is a natural desire for a happiness that can only arise from having all that we want and not wanting anything wrongly. This desire is consistently present in us both before and after the fall, moving us to seek a means of attaining said happiness. If we choose means that are ordered towards the act in which that happiness is to be found (the vision of God), then we experience good delight, and may be rewarded with the goal of our natural desire. However, choosing good delight requires grace, whether in order to prepare us for happiness alone (such as Adam required), or whether to heal us from sin and prepare us for happiness (such fallen human nature requires). If we choose means that are not ordered towards the immediate vision of God, then we experience evil delight, and may not attain the goal of our natural desire. Finally, we may perform a limited set of good actions without grace, which do not concern our final end as such. These actions are not "natural" actions; they are actions willed freely without grace. Nevertheless, they can be said to have been done "naturally" in an equivocal sense, according to a germinatory property.

B. Appropriating Aristotle: Philip the Chancellor

Philip the Chancellor's understanding of natural desire develops Peter's understanding subtly but significantly. It is framed around the same three questions. First, what does it mean for a motion to be called "natural"? Second, what is the end of the will's natural motion? Third, what is the relationship of the natural end of the will with that end which is posited for human nature by Christian revelation?

In discussing the meaning of "natural," Philip relies both on Peter's *Book of Sentences* as well as a *Glossa* on the Pauline Epistles, which Peter had completed prior to the *Book of Sentences*.²⁹ Philip's text makes it clear that he intends the reader to see his understanding of nature in continuity with that of Peter. However, the continuity is sometimes more apparent

²⁸ Ibid., d. 50, cap. 2, no. 3. ". . . in hac vita nullus adeo malus est ut penitus secludatur a cogitatione Dei, qui nec perdit appetitum beatitudinis et quendam boni amorem, quem naturaliter habet rationalis creatura."

²⁹ For the dating of Peter's *Glossa* on the Pauline Epistles with respect to his *Book of Sentences*, see above, note 10.

than real, for Philip's primary point of reference is not, as it was for Peter, humanity as it was historically created by God—Philip's idea of nature is less historical and more conceptual, even though his understanding of nature is still inexorably linked to historical and theological observations.

Philip begins by grounding his reflections on nature in the text of Peter through a comparison of Peter's *Glossa* on Romans 11:24 with the text of Book 2 of the *Liber sententiarum*. Peter's text of Paul had read, "against your nature, you were grafted onto the good olive tree."³⁰ On this, Peter had commented in his *Glossa*:

Since God is the one who creates and establishes all natures, he does nothing contrary to nature, since what he, from whom comes every mode, number and order of nature, does, is what belongs to nature or is natural for any sort of thing. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to say that [God] does something contrary to nature when he acts contrary to that which we know in nature.... Yet he never acts contrary to that highest law of nature, which is far from the knowledge of we who are wicked and weak, because he does not act contrary to himself.³¹

We may note how Peter's text weds two ideas: the first is the historical act of Creation, revealed in Genesis, whereby God creates and establishes natures; the second is the structure of a given nature on account of God's choice to create it as such. There is a dependency of the second upon the first—God's creative act fixes, in a historical moment, the bounds of a given nature. There is also a certain plasticity and contingency with respect to the word, "nature." The ordinary course of events, according to which we understand and experience our human nature, occurs in our nature's fallen state, not the state of its first creation. When God justifies a sinner, therefore, although God acts contrary to the ordinary course of events for a nature wounded and weakened by sin, God does act contrary to human nature according to its primary institution.

³⁰ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono, De bono gratie in angelis*, q. 8 (468:173). "Contra naturam insertus es in bonam olivam."

³¹ Peter Lombard, *Glossa in Rom.* (PL 191:1488B). "Deus . . . creator et conditor omnium naturarum, nil contra naturam facit, quia id est naturae, vel naturale cuique rei quod facit, a quo est omnis modus, numerus, ordo naturae, sed tamen non incongrue dicitur aliquid facere contra naturam, quando facit contra id quod novimus in natura.... Contra vero illam summam naturae legem a notitia remotam, sive impiorum, sive infirmorum, tam Deus nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit."

When Philip quotes this passage of Peter, he abstracts it from the historical context of creation and the fall, leaving out the part of Peter's text which discusses God as the one who creates and establishes all natures, and thereby obscures the distinction between original and fallen nature. It is not that Philip does not think that God is the one who creates and establishes all natures—*absit!*—rather, the historical context of creation and fall is not as determinative of Philip's approach to the structure of nature as such. A closer look at Philip's discussion of nature reveals the shifting basis from which he considers it. Responding to the question of whether it is of the essence of a miracle that it be done contrary to nature, Philip observes:

Nature is taken in many senses. For sometimes the natural course of events [for a given creature], as known to man, is called "nature," as is said in the aforesaid authority [i.e. Peter's Gloss] . . . Sometimes a certain possibility belonging to that creature, which God has given to it so that what he wills may be done from it, is called "nature," and nature is defined in this way by the Gloss on the passage from Romans 11[:24] . . . which says, "what belongs to each thing's nature is what God, from whom comes every mode, number, and order of nature, makes of it." And in Book 2 of the *Sentences*, d. 18 [it likewise says]: "Moreover, [God] gave to natures that [what God wills] could be educed from them, not that they would have it by a natural motion . . ." Sometimes the highest law of nature is called "nature," namely, God himself. [Thus] the Gloss on the [aforesaid] passage from Romans 11 [says] . . . "But he never acts contrary to that highest law of nature, which is far from the knowledge of we who are wicked and weak, because he does not act contrary to himself."³²

³² Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, ed. Nicolas Wicki (Berne: A. Francke, 1985), *De bono gratie in angelis*, q. 8, a. 1 (468:183). ". . . Natura accipitur multipliciter. Dicitur enim quandoque naturalis cursus hominibus notus, ut in predicta auctoritate dicitur. . . . Quandoque dicitur natura possibilitas quedam ipsius creature, quam dedit ei Deus, ut ex ea fiat quod ipse vult, et sic accipitur super illud ad Rom. XI . . . Glosa: 'Id nature est cuique rei quod de ea facit Deus, a quo omnis modus, numerus et ordo nature.' Et II Sententiarum XVIII: 'Dedit autem naturis ut ex eis hoc fieri posset, non ut naturali motu haberent. . . .' Quandoque dicitur natura summa lex nature, ipse scilicet Deus, super illud ad Rom. XI . . . Glosa: 'Contra illam summam nature legem a notitia remotam sive impiorum sive infirmorum tam Deus nullo modo facit quam contra se ipsum non facit.'"

Philip goes on to argue that miracles are contrary to nature only in the first sense, not the other two.³³ But since not everything that is done contrary to the ordinary course of nature is a miracle, Philip distinguishes further. Some things, which are done contrary to the ordinary course of nature, have an end result entirely in accord with it, such as the healing of the blind. These are miracles, but they are beyond nature (*preter naturam*) rather than contrary to nature (*contra naturam*), because there is nothing contrary to nature about a man who sees.³⁴ Some things, which are done contrary to the ordinary course of nature, have an end result which is entirely above nature, such as the justification of sinners,³⁵ or the assumption of a human nature by the Word.³⁶ These things are not contrary to nature so much as they are above nature (*supra naturam*).³⁷

Whereas the primary factor in determining the natural, for Peter, is how a motion relates to God's institution of a nature at Creation, the primary factor in determining the natural, for Philip, is how a motion relates to the ordinary course of events. This has a significant influence on how Philip appropriates Peter's understanding of the relationship between what is done freely with the help of grace and what is done freely without it. By decoupling reasoning about nature from an account of Creation, Philip is able to attempt a synthesis of Augustinian causes, as described by Peter, with Aristotelian causes, the knowledge of which had recently become available in the time between the completion of Peter's *Book of Sentences* and the composition of the *Summa de bono*.³⁸

There are two Aristotelian texts that seem to have influenced Philip in particular. The first is *Physics* 2.1.³⁹ In that text, Aristotle gives two accounts of nature. The first is less a definition than an indication of how to begin thinking of nature: everything with a nature has an intrin-

³³ Ibid. (468:195).

³⁴ Ibid. (471:273, 280).

³⁵ Ibid. (469:214).

³⁶ Ibid. (471:268).

³⁷ Ibid. (469:218, 471:268).

³⁸ In the recovery of Aristotle's works in the Latin West, each book, and sometimes parts of each book, has its own respective history. That being the case, I will discuss the relevant history for each work when it is pertinent for understanding a given author.

³⁹ Cf. Nicola Wicki, Introduction to Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 46. Wicki comments that Philip knew Aristotle's *Physics* in the translation of James of Venice, which was completed ca. 1170, and which included only books 1 and 2.

sic principle of motion and rest.⁴⁰ The second relates nature to each of the four causes. Aristotle begins from material causality: “nature . . . is the immediate material substratum of things which have in themselves a principle of motion or change.”⁴¹ In terms of formal causality, “nature is . . . the shape or form (not separable except in statement) of things which have in themselves a source of motion.”⁴² In terms of efficient and final causality, nature is that from which and towards which generation and corruption tend.⁴³ Of all the four causes, a thing’s formal cause is most properly called its “nature,” because form brings the potency of matter into act, and is that which governs the transmission of nature in generation.⁴⁴

The second text of which Philip makes use is *Metaphysics* 9.8, in which Aristotle develops the account of nature given in *Physics* 2.1, by expounding upon the teleology of nature as a formal cause.⁴⁵ Aristotle first associates nature with potency: every principle of movement or rest is a “potency,” and thus nature is a potency in a thing for movement with respect to itself.⁴⁶ As with any potency, the actuality of nature is prior to its potentiality in three senses: meaning (*λόγος*), because potency is ordered to act;⁴⁷ time (*χρόνος*) with respect to form but not with

⁴⁰ Aristotle, *Physics* 2.1 (192b13–14). “Each of them [animals, plants, simple bodies] has *within itself* a principle of motion and stationariness.” This and all English translations of Aristotle will be taken from *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001). Philip alludes to this passage and actually uses it as a definition of nature in *Summa de bono*, *De bono gratie in angelis*, q. 8, a. 5 (486:134).

⁴¹ Ibid. (193a28–30).

⁴² Ibid. (193b3–5). “... ἡ φύσις ἂν εἴη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἢ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χωριστὸν ὄν ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.” The Greek text of Aristotle’s *Physics* is taken from W.D. Ross, *Aristotle’s Physics*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936).

⁴³ Ibid (193b12–18).

⁴⁴ Ibid (193b6–7).

⁴⁵ Philip references a hodgepodge of translations of the *Metaphysics*, but it is likely that he at least consulted Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* in the *translatio media*, which included most of the *Metaphysics*, save for Book XI. Cf. Nicola Wicki, Introduction to Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 46, especially, n2.

⁴⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 9.8 (1049b5–8). “λέγω δὲ δυνάμεως... ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ στατικῆς.” The Greek text of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is taken from W.D. Ross, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953).

⁴⁷ Ibid. (1049b12–14). “τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δηλον (τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτως δυνατόν...)” (“Clearly it is prior in meaning; for that which is in the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible for it to become active . . .”). I have altered McKeon’s translation, since

respect to number, because any existing potency or act always comes to be from something in act, even if the source of that act is another individual;⁴⁸ and finally being (*οὐσία*), for the same reason that it is prior in time, and also because an existing potency, like all existing things, is ordered towards a principle, and act is its principle.⁴⁹ By thus classing nature as a species of potency and defining every potency by the act towards which it is ordered, Aristotle suggests that every nature, as a potency, is ordered towards act as its teleological perfection.

The encounter with Aristotle left Philip with a dilemma. From Peter's reading of Augustine, Philip received an account of nature that was dependent on God's will as the cause of nature; from Aristotle, he received an account of nature that was dependent on some act as nature's end. In order to harmonize these two accounts of nature, Philip looked to the first of the three arguments from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle had argued that act is prior in meaning (*λόγος*) to potency because potency is ordered to act. A subtle linguistic coincidence allowed him to bring Aristotle together with Peter. *Λόγος* was rendered by the Latin translator as *ratio*, the very same word that Peter had used to

his use of "formula" for *λόγος* is a bit awkward.

⁴⁸ Ibid. (1049b17-29) "τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ᾧδε: τὸ τῷ εἶδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δ' οὐ... ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ὃν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, ἀεὶ κινουντός τινος πρώτου: τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργεῖα ἤδη ἔστιν. εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγοις ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεται ἐκ τινος τι καὶ ὑπὸ τινος, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ εἶδει τὸ αὐτό." ("In time it is prior in this sense: the actual which is identical in species though not in number with a potentially existing thing is prior to it... For from the potentially existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually existing thing, e.g. man from man, musician by musician; there is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually. We have said in our account of substance that everything that is produced is something produced from something and by something, and that [it is] the same in species as it.")

⁴⁹ Ibid. (1050a3-10). "Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσία γε,... μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα... καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἔνεκα ἢ γένεσις), τέλος δ' ἢ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἢ δύναμις λαμβάνεται." ("But it is also prior in being . . . because the things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form and in being . . . and because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end (for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired.") I have changed McKeon's rendering of *οὐσία* to "being" from "substantiality" for greater ease of comparison with the Latin use of Aristotle's text.

describe the properties that God had placed within creatures at Creation. Philip availed himself of this coincidence to unite the two ideas by means of a single definition: "A potency ordered to an end is called a *ratio*; for an end orders every cause."⁵⁰ This definition gave Philip the necessary conceptual tools to describe Augustine's *rationes* in terms of Aristotle's potencies.

As Philip attempts to harmonize Augustine and Aristotle, he makes more distinctions from Augustine's text than did Peter. For Philip, there is a germinatory property (*ratio seminalis*) in every creature, which corresponds to a material cause, a natural property (*ratio naturalis*) which corresponds to a formal cause, a causal property (*ratio causalis*) which corresponds to an efficient cause, and all of these are ordered towards a final property (*ratio finalis*) as to a final cause. The germinatory and natural properties are intrinsic to a thing, the causal property is extrinsic.⁵¹ As for primordial properties, they are either in God as the causes of things, or are identical to the germinatory and natural properties of a creature.⁵²

Philip's association of Augustine's primordial causes with Aristotle's material and formal causes created a problem that had existed neither for Peter nor for Aristotle: how does one give a teleological account in terms of material and formal causes of that property of human nature in virtue of which God causes effects in it that human nature cannot cause of its own accord? The problem had not arisen for Aristotle, because Aristotle had only considered human nature in relation to the ends of acts which it *could* achieve of its own accord. The problem had not arisen for Augustine and Peter, because they had only considered human nature in relation to acts which it could either achieve of its own accord, or which could be caused in it by God's grace.

⁵⁰ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, a. 5 (481:9). "*ratio dicitur potentia ordinata per finem; finis enim ordinat causas omnes.*" The sentence is nowhere to be found in Aristotle. As an antecedent to this attempted harmonization, we may highlight Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi: College of St. Bonaventure, 1952), 2:162. "Quatuor sunt genera causarum, et ideo ratio dicitur quadrupliciter. Aliquando enim dicitur in comparatione ad causam finale, *et sic accipitur ratio simpliciter*; aliquando autem respicit causam formalem, et sic dicitur ratio naturalis; aliquando autem respicit causam materialem dispositam, et sic dicitur ratio seminalis; aliquando respicit causam efficientem, et sic dicitur ratio primordialis." (emphasis added) Philip's association of *ratio* and *potency* is anticipated here, but not in the complete sense in which Philip discusses it.

⁵¹ Ibid. (481:13).

⁵² Ibid. (482:18).

Philip's solution was to develop a new kind of potency. Taking as his point of departure the association in *Metaphysics* 9.8 between nature and potency, he states:

A potency for obedience (*potentia obedientie*) towards every divine work was created from the beginning, whether nature mediates it as a principle, or whether the will of the Creator does it immediately. But while there is the same potency for obedience towards every work, there is not a potency in the same degree to one or another work. Rather, for some [works] it is called a potency in the second or third degree, while for miraculous works (*opera miraculosa*) it is only called a possibility. However, since that possibility arises from the creature's obedience, [since] God can make of it what he wills, and since it is a passive possibility, it does not therefore follow that [the possibility] is a potency for an act.⁵³

By his recourse to the term, "potency for obedience," Philip intentionally recasts Peter's Augustinian distinctions in Aristotelian language without changing their underlying meaning. A potency for obedience sounds Aristotelian, but insofar as an Aristotelian potency is immediately ordered to an act, a potency for obedience in the utmost degree is not a potency properly speaking, because it is not ordered immediately to any particular act. That is why Philip calls it only a "possibility."⁵⁴

As with Philip's account of nature, his account of natural desire is also eclectic, drawing on Peter, but in this case relying mostly on Aristotle and John Damascene. With Peter, Philip distinguishes in general

⁵³ Ibid. (483:69). "... potentia obedientie a principio creata est ad omnia opera divina, sive mediante natura principio, sive voluntate creatoris immediate. Et est eadem potentia obedientie ad omnia opera, sed non est potentia in eodem gradu ad hec opera et ad alia; sed ad alia dicitur potentia in secundo gradu vel tertio, ad opera vero miraculosa possibilitas tantum. Sed non ideo sequitur quod potentia sit ad actum, quia illa possibilitas est secundum obedientiam creature, de qua potest Deus facere quod vult, et est possibilitas passiva."

⁵⁴ In fact, keenly aware of this difference between Aristotelian potency and what he is proposing, Philip goes on to call the Aristotelian potency, "active potency" (*potentia activa*), and the Augustinian possibility, "receptive potency" (*potentia susceptiva*). Cf. Ibid. (484:90). "Est enim potentia activa, et est potentia susceptiva . . . et potentia activa est tam nature superioris quam inferioris, susceptiva autem tantum nature inferioris. Et verum est quod quicquid est Deo possibile secundum potentiam activam, est nature possibile, non simpliciter, sed secundum potentiam susceptivam, et hec est dicta possibilitas, sed non secundum activam . . ."

between a natural desire by which we desire what is good in general, and a free desire for any particular good.⁵⁵ Philip also identifies that natural desire with a spark (*scintilla*),⁵⁶ which was part of Adam's upright nature at Creation,⁵⁷ and cannot be extinguished completely, even by sin.⁵⁸ However, Philip's thought adds to these distinctions taken from Peter several subsequent distinctions drawn from Aristotle and Damascene.

In chapter 36 of *De fide orthodoxa*,⁵⁹ Damascene distinguishes two aspects of the will: natural willing (*θέλησις*, transliterated by the medieval translators as *thelisis*), which concerns in general everything that pertains to a creature's natural existence,⁶⁰ and deliberative willing (*βούλησις*,

⁵⁵ Ibid., *De bono nature intellectualis creature coniuncte corporali*, q. 2, a. 3, n. b (199:105).

⁵⁶ Ibid., q. 2, a. 3, n. a (192:3).

⁵⁷ Ibid., q. 2, a. 3, n. b (197:65).

⁵⁸ Ibid., q. 2, a. 4, n. d (204:50).

⁵⁹ Damascene explains his philosophical psychology in cap. 36, and applies it to the two wills of Christ in cap. 56. The translation of *De fide orthodoxa* which Peter used for the *Book of Sentences*, from the twelfth century Venetian theologian, Cerbanus, starts at cap. 45 and only continues until cap. 52. A later edition, by Burgundio of Pisa, would include the complete text. Circumstances appear to have been such that Peter may have only had a brief time to copy out texts he considered to be most important from a complete edition, and he evidently judged Damascene's philosophical psychology not to be among the most important passages. Philip, however, shows a thorough acquaintance with the complete translation, and is able to incorporate Damascene's moral psychology more thoroughly into his reflections on the natural desire for God. For this hypothesis, see Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 38; Colish, *Peter Lombard* (New York: Brill, 1994), 1:22. Both translations are available in a modern critical edition in John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1955). On the versions of *De fide orthodoxa*, see Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Translations and Translators," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert Benson and Giles Constable (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 430n36. On Cerbanus's life and work, see Walter Berschin, *Greek Letters and the Latin Middle Ages: From Jerome to Nicholas of Cusa* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 218.

⁶⁰ John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, trans. Burgundio, cap. 36, n. 8 (Buytaert 135-36). "Oportet scire quoniam animae inserta est naturaliter virtus, 'appetitiva eius quod secundum naturam est, et omnium quae substantialiter naturae adsunt contentiva,' quae vocatur voluntas. Nam 'substantia quidem esse et vivere et moveri secundum intellectum et sensum appetit, propriam concupiscens naturalem et plenam essentiam'. 'Ideoque' et sic determinant hanc naturalem voluntatem: 'thelima (id est voluntas) est appetitus rationalis et vitalis, ex solis dependens naturalibus'. 'Quare thelisis (id est voluntas) quidem est ipse' naturalis et 'vitalis et rationali appetitus' omnium naturae constitutivorum, 'simplex

transliterated by the translators as *bulisis*), which concerns some “particular thing.”⁶¹ *θέλησις* is in us prior to any actual determined intention, whereas *βούλησις* is the beginning of any action and concerns the end in view.⁶² As compared with Peter’s Augustinian psychology, we may note one significant similarity and one significant difference in Damascene’s distinction of wills. The similarity concerns *θέλησις*, which, like Augustine’s natural willing, is not the subject of free will; it is rather the “simple power of willing,”⁶³ which seeks the satisfaction of human nature in general.⁶⁴ The difference concerns the nature of *βούλησις*, which, unlike Augustine’s freely willed actions, concerns not just the means to a determined end, but the very end itself.

When Philip approaches Damascene’s moral psychology, he attempts to harmonize it with Augustine and Peter. In order to do this, he adopts Damascene’s distinction between *θέλησις* and *βούλησις*, but maps onto it Augustine’s distinction between natural and free will. This posed no

virtus’. Qui aliorum enim appetitus, non existens rationalis, non dicitur thelisis (id est voluntas).” The passages in single quotes are taken by Damascene from Maximus the Confessor, *Opusculum I ad Marinum* (PG 91:12C–13A). For an account of Maximus’s understanding of the will, see Andrew Louth, *Maximus the Confessor* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 58–61.

⁶¹ Ibid., cap. 36, n. 9 (Buytaert 136). “‘*Bulisis (id est voluntas) autem est qualitativa naturalis thelisis*’ (id est voluntas, scilicet naturalis et rationalis appetitus ‘alicuius rei’. Nam iniacet quidem hominis animae virtus rationaliter appetendi. Cum igitur naturaliter motus fuerit ipse rationalis appetitus ad aliquam rem, dicitur bulisis (id est voluntas). *Bulisis (id est voluntas) enim est appetitus et desiderium cuiusdam rei rationalis.*” The quoted passages are taken by Damascene from Maximus the Confessor, *Opusculum I ad Marinum* (PG 91:13B).

⁶² Ibid., cap. 36, n. 11 (Buytaert 137). “‘Est autem bulisis (id est voluntas) finis,’ non ‘eorum quae sunt ad finem.’ ‘Igitur finis quidem est voluntabile,’ ut regem esse, ‘ut sanum esse; ad finem autem est quod consiliabile est, scilicet modus per quem debemus sani esse,’ vel regnare; deinde, post bulisim (id est voluntatem), inquisitio et scrutatio; et post haec, si ex hiis quae in nobis sunt est, fit consilium, scilicet consiliatio. ‘Consilium autem est appetitus inquisitivus, de hiis quae in nobis sunt rebus fiens.’ Consiliatur autem, si debet pertractare rem vel non. Deinde, iudicat quod melius, et dicitur iudicium; deinde, disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est, et vocatur sententia. Si enim iudicet et non dispositus fuerit ad quod iudicatum est, scilicet non diligit id, non dicitur sententia. Deinde, post dispositionem, fit electio; electio autem est duobus praeiacentibus eligere, et optare hoc prae altero. Deinde, impetum facit ad operationem, et dicitur impetus. Deinde, utitur et dicitur usus. Deinde, cessat ab appetitu post usum.” The quoted passages are taken by Damascene from Maximus the Confessor, *Opusculum I ad Marinum* (PG 91:13–16).

⁶³ Ibid., cap. 36, n. 15 (Buytaert 140–41).

⁶⁴ Ibid., cap. 36, n. 8 (Buytaert 135–36).

particular difficulty as concerns *θέλησις*.⁶⁵ However, it posed a set of difficult questions concerning *βούλησις*.

First, since Damascene explicitly states that *βούλησις* concerns the end primarily, not the means to the end, while Augustine states precisely the opposite about what is willed freely, Philip was left to resolve the discrepancy between the two authorities.⁶⁶ Second, since Peter had followed Augustine, it was sufficient for Peter to define *beatitudo* as “having all you want, and not wanting anything wrongly,” because the first part of his description of happiness pertained to man’s fixed end, and the second to the freely chosen means towards that end. Since, however, Philip follows Damascene, he had to make room in Augustine’s description of happiness for an explanation of why any person would *want* to choose human nature’s ultimate end for himself. In short, Philip had to distinguish between the *object* of human happiness, the subjective *dispositions* which cause a person to desire that object freely, and the person’s choice of *means* towards that object, whereas Peter only distinguished between the object and the means of obtaining it.

The necessity of distinguishing the object of happiness from the subjective dispositions which lead a person to choose it freely was made all the more important in light of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. In Philip’s day, only the first three books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* were available to Latin readers,⁶⁷ and in Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defines happiness as “an activity of the soul according to perfect

⁶⁵ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, *De bono nature intellectualis creature coniuncte corporali*, q. 2, a. 1 (160:29). “*Dividit autem [bulisim] contra voluntatem naturalem, que thelisis dicta est.*”

⁶⁶ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, *De bono nature intellectualis creature*, q. 8, a. 3 (73:32). “*Est enim voluntas secundum duos modos. Primo modo dicitur voluntas finis quod est summum bonum, et sic ponitur voluntas cum tria anime assignantur secundum conversionem eius ad essentiam divinam per illa tria intelligentia, memoria et voluntas que sunt trinitas creata. Secundo modo dicitur eorum que sunt ad finem que ex iudicio et deliberatione procedunt, ut II Damasceni XXII, et huiusmodi dicitur liberum arbitrium facultas sive ipsa voluntas facilis. Primam vocat Iohannes Damascenus thelisisim, secundam que est liberum arbitrium bulisim. Prima est in bonum tantum, secunda est declinans in bonum vel in malum.*”

⁶⁷ István Bejczy, “Introduction,” in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200-1500* (Boston: Brill, 2008), 3. The translation of books 2-3 was known as the “*ethica vetus*,” while the translation of book 1 was known as the “*ethica nova*.” Both are presumed to have been made by Burgundio of Pisa, the same translator who completed John Damascene’s *De fide orthodoxa*.

virtue.”⁶⁸ Philip, aware of this text, sought a way of distinguishing the good, as the end of human nature, from virtue, which leads us to choose the good as our particular end. He does this by leaving aside Augustine’s definition of happiness and preferring one taken Boethius: “happiness . . . is ‘a state made perfect by the amalgamation of everything that is good.’”⁶⁹ Philip, like Boethius, identifies the amalgamation of everything that is good with God as an object, and so is able to distinguish virtue from it as the subjective disposition which disposes a subject for the enjoyment of God.⁷⁰

C. Conclusion

Philip the Chancellor made two contributions to mid thirteenth-century reflection on natural desire. The first concerned what it means to be natural. By redefining the “natural” as that which happens according to the ordinary course of events, Philip developed an account of nature which was more directly receptive to philosophical analysis through detachment from any explicit reference to the biblical narrative of creation, fall, redemption, and glorification. This had the benefit of bringing Christian reflection on nature into more explicit dialogue with non-Christian reflection on it, and of allowing for a rich flowering of philosophical analysis of human nature in the decades to follow.

The second concerned Peter Lombard’s category of free desire without the aid of grace. Through an appropriation of John Damascene’s moral psychology, Philip extended free desire to include the end of

⁶⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1.13 (1102a5). “ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμῶν καὶ τελείων.” The Greek text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is taken from I. Bywater, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894). Burgundio’s translation reads, “est felicitas anime actus quis secundum virtutem perfectam.” The critical edition of Burgundio’s translation is available in *Ethica Nicomachea. Translatio Antiquissima libr. II-III sive 'Ethica Vetus', Translationis Antiquioris quae supersunt sive 'Ethica Nova', 'Hoferiana', 'Borghesiana', Translatio Roberti Grosseteste Lincolnensis sive 'Liber Ethicorum' (Recensio Pura et Recensio Recognita)*, ed. R.A. Gauthier, 5 vols., *Aristoteles Latinus* 26 (Leiden: Brill, 1972-1974). This text is available as *Aristoteles Latinus* 26.2:91.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, *De bono gratie in homine, De gratia gratum faciente, De virtute in communi*, q.1 (527:37). The definition is taken from Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, lib. 3, pros. 2. “Liquet igitur esse beatitudinem statum bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum.” The critical edition of this text is available in Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae; Opuscula theologica*, ed. Claudio Moreschini (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2000), 60.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* (528:83). Philip expresses a similar idea to that of Boethius in *De consolazione philosophiae*, lib. 3, pros. 10.

human nature, not just the means of achieving that end. The legacy of this contribution was more ambiguous, however, in light of two questions that Philip left unanswered. First, what is the ultimate end of man's free desire without the aid of grace? Peter had not asked this question, because he did not think that man's ultimate end was the subject of free desire without the aid of grace—he spoke only of proximate and immediate ends for such a desire, like those associated with the sustenance of human life. Even though his thought allowed for it, Philip did not resolve this question, as his speculation on man's freely chosen end focused on the end of man's free desire *with* the aid of grace.⁷¹ Nevertheless, standing in the background to subsequent reflection on the ultimate end of what is willed freely without the help of grace was Peter Lombard's comment that whatever is so desired can be said to be desired "naturally," even if in an equivocal sense.

This leads to a second question: what is the relationship between the ultimate end of man's natural desire (as contrasted with free desire), and the ultimate end of man's free desire without the aid of grace (as contrasted with the ultimate end of man's free desire with the aid of grace)? Is the end of both "natural" desires the same, or is there a different end for each? If they are the same, then an infelicitous consequence could arise for theological anthropology: how can man be said to desire the vision of God freely without the aid of grace?⁷² If they are differ-

⁷¹ In order to highlight Philip's contribution in bringing Christian theology into a more explicit dialogue with Aristotelian categories of will and desire, we may profitably compare him to William of Auxerre, for whom our free desire for the knowledge of the first truth can only be identified with faith. Cf. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, lib. III, tract. 10, cap. 4, q. 3 (Quaracchi, 3.1:152). ". . . Amor est in qualibet virtute, ut post dicitur, et amor cognitionis prime veritatis fidei est; amor autem summi boni, in quantum bonum, caritas. Nec dicimus quod delectatio que est secundum tactum spirituale sit caritas, sed est finis motus caritatis. Eodem modo delectatio que est in gustu vel odoratu spirituali non est caritas, sed finis motus caritatis; eodem modo intelligendum est de visu spirituali. Dicimus ergo quod desiderium cognoscendi Deum est intellectus fidei; sed desiderium delectandi in Deo vel per modum visus vel odoratus vel gustus vel tactus caritatis est." William does possess a doctrine of natural love of God, but he suspects it as being potentially too closely related to the natural love of creatures. Cf. *Summa aurea*, lib. 2, tract. 2, cap. 5.

⁷² It was not until the sixteenth century that this view became widespread. Its most well known form is found in Francisco Suárez, *De fine hominis*, dis16, §2, n. 7, in *Opera Omnia* (Paris: Vivès, 1856), 4:155. Suárez argues that man has an innate desire for the vision of God (meaning by "innate" something analogous to what Peter Lombard meant by "natural"), but that man can form an elicited but conditional desire for the same end (meaning by "elicited" something

ent, then de Lubac may have done himself a disservice by unknowingly drawing a false dichotomy. For although de Lubac appealed to Philip the Chancellor's appropriation of Damascene's distinction between *θέλησις* and *βούλησις* as evidence that, in the early thirteenth century, natural desires were always distinguished from free desires rather than from supernatural desires, that very appropriation planted the seed for a contrast between the ultimate end of our free desire *with* the aid of grace and our free desire *without* the aid of grace. If Philip did not call this a distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" desire, Peter had at least already called the former, "natural." In short, while Philip certainly *emphasizes* the distinction between natural desire and free desire, his appropriation of Damascene's distinction between *θέλησις* and *βούλησις*, seen in the light of Peter's equivocal use of the word, "natural," prepared the very distinction that de Lubac sought to criticize by referencing Philip in the first place.

Finally, de Lubac did not reference Philip the Chancellor for Philip's own sake; he sought in Philip grounds for a better reading of Thomas Aquinas, which would contrast all instances of "natural desire" with free desire rather than supernatural desire. But if both distinctions can be found in the early thirteenth century, at least in a germinatory form, then it stands to reason that theologians examining the doctrine of natural desire in the thirteenth century will be unable to content themselves with a simple choice between one distinction or the other. Indeed, subsequent scholarship has before it the task of exploring and attempting to map out the complex ways in which both distinctions were received by theologians in the subsequent decades of the thirteenth century.⁷³ N V

analogous to what Peter Lombard and Philip the Chancellor mean by "free"). Cf. Lawrence Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas Aquinas and his Interpreters* (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2010), 221–35. While Feingold rightly notes that Suárez's synthesis became common among Dominican and Jesuit Thomists, he omits that members of the Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine (OESA) at this time also routinely held the view that the vision of God is the end of natural and free desire, without resorting to a doctrine of conditional elicited desire. I hope in the future to contribute a detailed account of the various positions of members of that order. In the mean time, I refer the reader to my *The Natural Desire for God: Henri de Lubac and European Thomists of the Early Twentieth Century* (PhD Diss., Catholic University of America, 2014), 119–36, 172–81.

⁷³ As a preliminary contribution to that further study, I refer the reader to my "Kataphasis and Apophasis in Thirteenth Century Theology: The Anthropological Context of the *Triplex Via* in the *Summa fratris Alexandri* and Albert the Great," *Heythrop Journal* (forthcoming).