

Thomas Sutton's Doctrine of Analogy: Revisiting a Continuator of Thomas Aquinas

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Introduction

Thomas Sutton (1250–1315) has been called the “Prince of the primitive Thomists.”¹ A contemporary of John Duns Scotus at Oxford in the first decade of the fourteenth century, Sutton was among the first participants in Thomist-Scotist dialogue, as he and Scotus responded to each other's oral and written teachings.² Twentieth-century scholarship on Sutton's doctrine of analogous naming was initiated in 1959 by Joseph Przedziecki,³ whose article served as a point of reference for Bernard Montagnes's 1963 study of Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of analogy and for the 1990s and 2000s articles by E. J. Ashworth and Mark Henninger. Each of these works draws principally or exclusively

¹ A. Krempel, *La Doctrine de la Relation chez Saint Thomas: Exposé historique et systématique* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1952), 29. For information about Sutton's place in early Thomism, see Frederick Roensch, *Early Thomistic School* (Dubuque, IA: The Priory Press, 1964), 44–51 and 73–78. Roensch says that Sutton “represents a high point in the progress of Thomism and occupies a position of superiority in matters of doctrinal analysis among his fellow Dominicans” (ibid., 51). On his life and works, see also Gyula Klima, “Thomas of Sutton,” in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2003), 664–65.

² Joseph J. Przedziecki briefly treats the evidence that Sutton and Scotus knew of and responded to each other's work in “Thomas of Sutton's Critique of the Doctrine of Univocity,” in *An Etienne Gilson Tribute*, ed. Charles O'Neil (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1959), 190–92. He draws the conclusion that Sutton's “masterly intervention” did much to check the spread of Scotism at Oxford (ibid., 208).

³ Przedziecki, “Thomas of Sutton's Critique,” 189–208.

from Thomas Sutton's *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32 and 33.⁴ Przezdziecki, Ashworth, and most of all Henninger provide excellent summaries of significant portions of *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32 and 33. In the first part of this paper, I relate salient portions of Sutton's doctrine and an interpretation controversy between Ashworth and Henninger. In the second part, I draw attention to an untreated but important aspect of Sutton's doctrine of analogy: how demonstration proceeds through analogous terms. I use Sutton's arguments in this context to support Henninger's interpretation against Ashworth's and then to go beyond Henninger by proposing a resolution to the apparent contradiction in Sutton's position that Ashworth's interpretation attempts to address. I draw the further but related conclusion that Montagnes was closer to the mark than Ashworth credits him when Montagnes describes Sutton as a precursor to Cajetan in his use of analogy of proportionality.⁵

Thomas Sutton on Analogy, Its Modes, and Its Application Across the Categories and to God and Creatures

*Joseph J. Przezdziecki—Introducing Thomas Sutton and His
doctrine of Analogy*

Przezdziecki summarizes the main arguments that Sutton presented in the objections section of *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32 for the univocal pred-

⁴ An alternate title for this work is *Questiones disputatae* 35. Roensch puts its composition at 1295 (Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, 50). Mark G. Henninger follows Schneider, editor of the 1977 edition of Sutton's *Ordinary Questions*, and dates them between 1305 and 1310; see Henninger, "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy," *The Thomist* 70 (2006): 540. Given the extent to which Sutton is responding to Henry of Harclay's own *Quaestiones ordinariae*, which were written between 1300 and 1312, I find the later dating more probable, see Henninger, "Henry of Harclay," in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 305. All translations are my own.

All of my citations of Sutton's *Quaestiones ordinariae* are taken from the edition published in *Zur Diskussion über das Problem der Univokazität in Umkreis des Johannes Duns Scotus*, ed. Michael Schmaus (Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1957) (hereafter, Schmaus). There is a difference in question numbering between Schmaus's edition and Przezdziecki's. What is Question 32a in Schmaus is Question 33 in Przezdziecki. Consequently, question 33 for Schmaus is question 34 for Przezdziecki, and so forth.

⁵ See Bernard Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain, BE: Publications Universitaires, 1963), republished as *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas*, trans. E. M. Maciejowski (Milwaukee, MI: Marquette University Press, 2004), 119 and 142–43.

ication of a *conceptus communis* of “being” and other names across the categories and of God and creatures.⁶ Rather than addressing Sutton’s responses to particular objections, Przezdziecki turns his attention to Sutton’s *respondeo*, which begins with Sutton’s account of why some were led to believe, mistakenly, that there is a common signification of “being” across the categories and of God and things. According to Sutton, this view arises from the similarity “being” bears toward a genus, and it is dispelled by showing how “being” lacks the commonality that characterizes a genus term. Sutton employs the standard argument that “being” is not a genus found in chapter 25 of part I of Aquinas’s *Summa contra gentiles*, among other places. The concept of a genus cannot be included in the concept of its difference. But the concept of “being” is included in every concept. Hence the concept of “being” cannot be divided by a difference as any generic concept can.⁷ Furthermore, “being” cannot be a species, difference, property, or accident because it is more general than any species and it is predicated *in quid*.⁸ Since “being” is not predicated in the manner of a genus, species, difference, property, or accident across the categories or of God and things, “being” is not signified univocally of these and it has no *conceptus communis*.⁹

The name “being” is not said purely equivocally in these cases, however, but analogously. Sutton writes that “being” is predicated primarily of substance, and of accidents only by their relation to

⁶ Przezdziecki, “Thomas of Sutton’s Critique,” 192–98. Sutton provides numerous objections. In the numbering provided by Schmaus there are thirty-three objections in *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32 (see Schmaus, 24–32). There is some difficulty in numbering them, since Sutton interjects replies to objections and then rebuttals to those replies within the objections.

⁷ Przezdziecki, “Thomas of Sutton’s Critique,” 199–201; Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32 (Schmaus, 33–34). The concept of a genus cannot be included in the concept of a difference because, then, the whole species would be expressed in the difference. “Being,” however, is included in every concept, since what lacks being is nothing. For a brief statement of this argument see Thomas Aquinas, *In V metaphysicorum*, lec. 9 (Marietti no. 889; Marietti edition, 238b).

⁸ Przezdziecki, “Thomas of Sutton’s Critique,” 201; Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32 (Schmaus, 34).

⁹ See also the summary of this argument presented in Henninger, “Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy,” 544–46. Here, I follow the example of Henninger and merely mention that Sutton’s arguments against univocity in *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32 assume a point Scotus denies—namely, that a term is univocal if and only if it is predicated according to one of Porphyry’s five predicables.

substance.¹⁰ Regarding “being” said of God and creatures, he adds that, since God is being essentially and others are being by participation, there is an even greater distance between creaturely being and divine being than there is between accidental being and substantial being. Since there is not univocity in the case of “being” said of substance and accident, even less could there be univocity in the case of God and creatures.¹¹

The salient point so far is that, according to Sutton, there can be no univocal signification where there is no common concept. There is no common concept where a name is said by diverse significations, as occurs in the cases of “being” and other names said across the categories and of God and creatures.¹² Where there is a single *ratio* or concept, there is univocity. “Being” is analogous to the ten categories, and so there are ten concepts of “being,” one for each category.¹³

¹⁰ Przedziecki, “Thomas of Sutton’s Critique,” 202; Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32 (Schmaus, 34–36).

¹¹ Ibid., 203–04; Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32: “Ulterius sciendum est, quod ens dicitur analogice de deo et de quocumque alio. Deus enim dicitur ens essentialiter, quia est suum esse subsistens habens omnem perfectionem essendi. Sed omne aliud dicitur ens per participationem, quia nullum aliud est suum esse nec habet omnem perfectionem essendi, sed participat ipsum esse et partialiter habet aliquam essendi perfectionem secundum gradum determinatum ad genus et ad species et multo longius distat esse cuiuslibet creaturae ab esse divino, quam esse accidentis cuiuscumque ab esse substantiae, propter quod multo minus potest ens dici de deo et creatura univoce quam de substantia et accidenti. Respectu enim dei alia sunt magis non entia quam entia [Further, it must be said that ‘being’ is said analogously about God and about every other thing. For God is called ‘being’ essentially, because He is His *esse* subsistently having all the perfection of being. But every other thing is called ‘being’ by participation, because no other is its *esse* nor has all the perfection of being, but participates its *esse* and has some perfection of being partially, according to a determinate grade to a genus and to a species. And because the *esse* of any creature is a much longer distance from the divine *esse* than the *esse* of any accident from the *esse* of a substance, being is much less able to be said univocally about God and creature than about substance and accident]” (Schmaus, 38).

¹² For more from Sutton on this point, see *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32, ad 12 (Schmaus, 40), and 32a, ad 3 (Schmaus, 58). See also, Thomas Sutton, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 3 ad 4, in *Quodlibet*, ed. Michael Schmaus (Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1969), 183–84.

¹³ See especially the *respondeo* to question 32: “Dicendum est igitur, quod ens, prout dicitur de rebus decem praedicamentorum, habet decem significationes, secundum quas dicitur de eis analogice [It must be said therefore that being, insofar as it is said about the ten categories, has ten significations according to which it is said about them analogously]” (Schmaus, 36).

Any concept of categorical being refers either to a determinate category or indeterminately to this or that category. God and creatures are even more diverse than substance and accident. So, just as there is no common concept of “being” said of the diverse categories of being, there is no common concept of “being” or any other name said of God and creatures.¹⁴

Przezdziecki's summary resumes at the *respondeo* of *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33 (question number 34 in Przezdziecki's numbering), where Sutton offers his explanation of the four kinds of equivocation by design as derived from Boethius. These are: (1) *similitudo*, (2) *proportio*, (3) *ab uno* (from one), and (4) *ad unum* (to one). For *similitudo* or imitation, Sutton gives Aristotle's example from *Categories* 1.1a, that of “animal” said of a man and a picture of a man. Sutton explains *proportio* with the standard examples from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 5 of analogous principles including “unity as the principle of number,” “a point as the principle of a line,” “the spring of a river,” and “the heart of a body.”¹⁵ He adds that *proportio* is the proper sense of analogy and that *analogia* is the same as *proportio*. (Following Przezdziecki's example, I will use the expression “analogy of proportionality” to refer to this second mode of analogy henceforth.) For the third mode, *ab uno*, Sutton offers the example of the name “medical” said of a book and a tool. Here the name “medical” descends from medicine to things related to the art of medicine. The fourth mode, *ad unum*, occurs when diverse things receive a name by their reference to one. Here he gives the standard examples of the ways the name “healthy” is used in reference to the health of an animal, and he adds that the name “being” is said of substance and accidents in this mode.¹⁶

¹⁴ See note 11.

¹⁵ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.1.1012b34–1013a17.

¹⁶ Przezdziecki, “Thomas of Sutton's Critique,” 204–05; Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32a: “Quae autem sunt aequivoca a proposito, dividuntur quadrupliciter. Quaedam enim sunt aequivoca a proposito secundum similitudinem, quaedam secundum proportionem, quaedam ab uno, quaedam ad unum. Aequivoca a consilio secundum similitudinem dicuntur ut homo et quod pingitur ad similitudinem hominis, quorumque utrum dicitur animal. . . . Secundo modo aequivoca a consilio vel a proposito, scilicet secundum proportionem, dicuntur, ut cum principium dicitur de unitate, quae est principium numeri, et de puncto, qui est principium lineae, et de fonte, qui est principium fluvii, et de corde, quod est principium in animali, et istud exemplum aequivocorum posuit Aristoteles in V Metaphysicae et bene dicuntur aequivoca secundum proportionem et propriissime, quia proportionaliter dicuntur de diversis. . . . Tertio modo aequivoca a proposito dicuntur aequivoca ab uno, quia scili-

Przezdziecki observes that, at this point in the text, Sutton has yet to claim that one or some one of these kinds of equivocals by design or analogy is suitable for names said commonly of God and creatures. Indeed, Sutton allows that names can be predicated of God and creatures by each kind of analogy, but it is the second kind of analogy, proportionality, which is both furthest from pure equivocity and characteristic of divine names.¹⁷ As treatment of this point is much more extensive in Henninger's piece, I close my summary of Przezdziecki's article here.

Absent from Przezdziecki's account is any discussion of the difference between Sutton's treatment of the kind of analogy suited to names said across the categories and names said of God and creatures. Likewise absent from Przezdziecki's article are any questions of Sutton's relative fidelity to Aquinas or any of the other questions posed by subsequent scholars concerning whether the analogy of proportionality (i.e., Sutton's *proportio*) applies to "being" said of God and creatures as it does for other pure perfections such as "wise," "just," and so on.

Mark G. Henninger, S.J.—Thomas Sutton's Modes of Analogy Revisited

Henninger's article stands out for its detailed attention to the different modes of analogy presented by Sutton and its comparison of them to the positions expressed by Aquinas at different periods of his writing.¹⁸

cet descendunt ab uno aliquo ad multa, de quibus dicitur aliquod nomen aequivoce, ut a medicina dicitur medicinalis liber, in quo scribitur de scientia medicinae. . . . Quarto modo dicuntur aequivoca a consilio ad unum, quando scilicet diversa referuntur ad unum et ex hoc dicitur de illis nomen idem, sicut sanum. Nam cibus dicitur sanus et farinatum sanum et exercitium sanum et urina sana, quia referuntur ad unum finem, scilicet ad sanitatem animalis, et hoc modo ens est aequivocum ad substantiam et ad alia praedicamenta, quia ens dicitur de quantitate et qualitate et ceteris praedicamentis accidentium, prout habent habitudinem ad unum, scilicet ad substantiam, quae est primum ens, non tamen tamquam ad unum finem, sed tamquam ad unum subiectum" (Schmaus, 71–72). For a similar account in Thomas Aquinas's writings, see *Sent. eth.* 1, lec. 7, in the Leonine edition vol. 47/1 (1969), 26–27, lines 168–213.

¹⁷ Przezdziecki, "Thomas of Sutton's Critique," 205–07.

¹⁸ Pages 542–60 of Henninger, "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy," summarize some objections and replies from *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32, as well as the argument in the *respondeo*. For the limited purposes of this article, I prefer the summary of Przezdziecki, but I find no disagreement between the Henninger and Przezdziecki in their interpretations of Sutton's arguments.

Henninger himself professes the developmental thesis defended by B. Montagnes and J. Wippel, which Henninger summarizes as follows: "We know that the complexities of analogy and its use in a number of contexts stimulated Aquinas to rethink and deepen his theory during his career. While discussing the problem of the divine names, Aquinas in his early works used a form of the analogy of attribution, while in *De Veritate* (1256–59) he argues for another type of analogy, that of proportionality. Finally in his later works, such as *De potentia* and the *Summa Theologiae*, he quietly abandons the views of *De Veritate* and returns in the main to his earlier opinion."¹⁹

Translated into the terms used by Sutton and so far in this article, the developmental thesis holds that the earliest writings of Aquinas use analogy *ad unum* (the fourth mode of analogy) to explain the divine names. His *De veritate* experiments with what Sutton called *proportio* and is commonly called analogy of proportionality (the second mode of analogy). Aquinas's later works abandon that experiment, returning to analogy *ad unum* to explain the divine names.²⁰ Henninger investigates Sutton's reasons for continuing Thomas Aquinas's *De veritate* experiment.²¹

Sutton discusses the diverse modes of analogy in *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33, where the question is: "whether names, which are said about God and creatures, are said univocally about God and crea-

¹⁹ Henninger, "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy," 538.

²⁰ On the developmental thesis, see G. P. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), 94: "The absence of any subsequent text which teaches proper proportionality between God and creatures constitutes strong evidence that St. Thomas quietly abandoned this doctrine after 1256"; and John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being*, Monographs for the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy 1 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 555. This thesis is challenged in Joshua Hochschild, "Proportionality and Divine Naming: Did St. Thomas Change His Mind about Analogy?" *The Thomist* 77 (2013): 531–58.

²¹ Henninger draws the conclusion that Sutton is "an able 'continuator' of Aquinas" on analogy, while arguing that Sutton's reasons for championing the analogy of proportionality for names said of God and creatures are not those given by Aquinas in *De veritate* and that he does not have the same interest in the true form of analogy and intrinsic denomination as is expressed by Thomas di Vio Cajetan ("Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy," 574).

tures.”²² Sutton opens by presenting the alternative that such names are said either univocally or in some way equivocally²³ and proceeds to argue that there is at least one kind of equivocation that is close enough to univocity to account both for how names are said of God and creatures and for why many mistake such names for univocal names. Following Henninger’s example, I will now consider Sutton’s reasons for rejecting all but the second of the four modes of analogy for the divine names.

Sutton tells his reader that the “common position” about the divine names is that they are said by order or respect to one (*ad unum*) in the way that “healthy” is said of diverse things by relation to one.²⁴ Names are said of both God and other things because all created things have order to God as to their cause. Hence, God is the one something in relation to which others receive a common name. As Henninger observes, the common opinion seems to be endorsed at times by Aquinas (especially in the *De potentia*, *Summa contra gentiles*, and *Summa theologiae* passages on names said of God and creatures).²⁵

Against the common position about how names are said of “God and other things,” Sutton points his reader’s attention to the consideration of the “signification of names, according to which analogy is principally attended.”²⁶ Although God’s justice or wisdom is causative of a man’s justice or wisdom, a man is not called “just” or “wise” because he has order to the justice of God or the wisdom of God.²⁷

²² Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33: “utrum nomina, quae dicuntur de deo et creaturis, dicantur univoce de deo et creaturis” (Schmaus, 63).

²³ Ibid. (Schmaus, 71).

²⁴ Ibid. (Schmaus, 76–77).

²⁵ Aquinas says that names are not said of God and creatures in the way that “*ens*” is said of quantity and quality (called the analogy of “many to one” in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologiae*, and “two to a third” in the *De potentia*), but rather, in the way that “*ens*” is said of substance and accident (i.e., by the analogy of “one to another”); see *Summa contra gentiles* (hereafter, SCG) I, ch. 34, in Leonine edition vol. 13 (1918), 103b ; *De potentia* VII, a.7, corp., in *Quaestiones disputatae*, 2 vols. (Turin/ Rome: Marietti, 1965), 2:204b, and *Summa theologiae* (hereafter, ST) I, q.13, a. 5, corp., in Leonine edition vol. 4 (1888).

²⁶ Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33: “ad significationem nominum, secundum quam principaliter attenditur analogia” (Schmaus, 77).

²⁷ Ibid.: “Non enim ideo dicitur homo iustus vel sapiens, quia habet ordinem ad iustitiam dei vel sapientiam dei sicut ens dicitur de quantitate propter hoc, quia est entis, quod est substantia [For therefore a human is not called just or wise because he has order to the justice of God or the wisdom of God as being is said about quantity due to the fact that it belongs to a being which is a substance]” (Schmaus, 77).

Furthermore, although the names in question are all first imposed on creatures and later attributed to God, they are not said about God *to signify* His relation to other things.²⁸ According to Sutton, these considerations exclude both analogy *ab uno* and analogy *ad unum* as candidates for use in the analogous signification of names to God and creatures.²⁹ Henninger notes the central importance Sutton gives to signification in determining the mode of analogy suitable to a given instance and sees this as a difference between Sutton and Aquinas.³⁰ The relations of causality and dependence make no difference by themselves for what kind of analogy is in use. What matters, according to Sutton, is the primary versus the secondary significations of the term. Since God is not called wise *to signify* a relation to creatures, nor vice versa, the name “wise” is not said of God and creatures by analogy *ad unum* (or *ab uno*).

After rejecting the *ad unum* and *ab uno* modes of analogy for expressing the signification of names said of God and creatures, Sutton proceeds to do the same for *similitudo*, the analogy of imitation (which Henninger calls “resemblance”). All things have some analogous resemblance to God, but the resemblance is not what is signified

²⁸ Sutton does not deny that, even in analogy of proportionality, one analogate receives the name by priority and others by posteriority. Indeed, he writes specifically in *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33: “Secundum enim quod res sunt nobis magis notae, secundum hoc prius nominantur. Magnitudo autem est nobis magis nota quam alia et ideo prima pars magnitudinis dicitur principium per prius et in aliis dicitur per posterius [For insofar as things are more known to us, they are first named. Now magnitude is more known than others and therefore the first part of magnitude is called ‘principle’ first and it is said *per posterius* in others]” (Schmaus, 75). Proportionality differs from the other modes insofar as the posterior analogate receives the name absolutely and not only through a relation to the prior analogate. I see no conflict between Sutton’s position on proportionality and the interpretation of Aquinas’s position found in Hochschild, “Proportionality and Divine Naming,” 547–50.

²⁹ Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33: “. . . prius imposita fuerunt rebus aliis, deinde fuerunt attributa deo, non tamen sic, quod dicerentur de deo ad significandum habitudinem eius ad res alias et ideo videtur, quod proprie loquendo non dicuntur ista nomina analogice illo modo scilicet ad unum nec etiam illo modo, quo aliqua dicuntur analogica ab uno [they were first imposed on other things, then they were attributed to God, nevertheless not such that they were said about God for signifying His relation to other things and therefore it seems that, properly speaking, those names are not said analogously in that way, namely *ad unum* nor even in that way in which some are called analogs *ab uno*]” (Schmaus, 77).

³⁰ Henninger, “Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy,” 564–65.

by the common name. There is a resemblance of human wisdom to divine wisdom and human goodness to the goodness of God, but it is not because of this resemblance that a man is called good or wise.³¹ There appear to be two problems with this kind of analogy. First, it would require knowing God prior to knowing creatures. Since we do not know God prior to knowing creatures, it would be false to say that perfections first known and named of God are afterwards said of creatures when they are found to imitate God. The man must be known and known to be an animal before what imitates him (for example, a picture or reflection) can be recognized as imitating him and called an “animal” by imitation of the man. Secondly, the picture of a man no more has the perfection of being an animal than medicine has the perfection of being healthy. So naming due to *similitudo* as such does not involve naming essentially, in contrast to the divine names.³²

What’s left and the option Sutton embraces is the second mode of analogy, which he calls alternately *proportio* and analogy properly speaking.³³ Sutton is quite liberal with his examples of names said

³¹ Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33: “Nec etiam dicuntur ista nomina illo modo, quo aliquo dicuntur analogia secundum similitudinem, sicut animal est analogum ad hominem et ad illud, quod pingitur ad similitudinem hominis. Quamvis enim omnes res habeant aliquam similitudinem ad deum, ut sapientia hominis ad sapientiam dei et bonitas hominis ad bonitatem dei, non tamen propter hoc dicitur homo bonus vel sapiens, quia habet similitudinem bonitatis dei et sapientiae dei [Nor even are those name said in that way in which some are called analogates according to likeness, as animal is analogous to a human and to that which is painted to the likeness of a human. For although all things have some likeness to God, such as the wisdom of a human to the wisdom of God and the goodness of a human to the goodness of God, nevertheless, a man is not called good or wise because of the fact that he has the likeness of God’s goodness or God’s wisdom.]” (Schmaus, 77). See Henninger, “Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy,” 566.

³² This seems to be Aquinas’s reasoning against using the model of how “animal” is said of a man and a picture of a man for names said of God and creatures in *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 11, ad 8, in Leonine edition vol. 22, 1/2 (1970), 80b, lines 271–80.

³³ E.J. Ashworth mentions this passage to show that thirteenth-century authors were familiar with the fact that the medieval Latin usage of the word “analogy” did not correspond with the Greek use of the same term, and she cites similar observations from James of Viterbo (a contemporary of Sutton’s) and Gerard of Harderwyck in the fifteenth century; see Ashworth, “Suarez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background,” *Vivarium* 33.1 (1995): 55–56.

analogously of God and creatures in this way.³⁴ I mention here a few. A man who knows the highest causes is called “wise.” God knows the highest causes perfectly and therefore ought to be called “wise.” A man who has knowledge of things through their proper cause is called “knowing.” God knows the order of all causes and effects in the most perfect way and so ought to be called “knowing.” A man is called “just” if he gives to each one what is his own. God most of all gives to each his own, since God wills all the things required for the things that He wills. Sutton concludes that all other names that abstractly signify a perfection are said of God and creatures analogously in this way, and these analogous names are furthest from pure equivocation and closest to univocation.³⁵

Henninger clarifies the distinction between Sutton's understanding of analogy in the context of the categories and his understanding of analogy in the context of the divine names. In the categorical context, Sutton follows the “common opinion.” The name “being” is said by analogy *ad unum* of substance and accidents in the same way that the name “healthy” is said of an animal and medicine or urine. The divine names are said by analogy of proportionality. In both

³⁴ Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33: “Relinquitur igitur, quod nomina dicta de deo et de rebus aliis dicantur quarto modo, scilicet secundum proportionem, prout hoc nomen principium dicitur de unitate et de puncto et de fonte, ut dictum est, et hoc facile est manifestare de singulis nominibus. Sicut enim homo cognoscit altissimas causas et ideo dicitur sapiens, ita deus cognoscit altissimas causas perfecte et ideo merito debet dici sapiens. . . . Similiter sicut homo habet cognitionem rerum per propriam causam et ideo sciens dicitur, ita deus omnium causarum et effectuum ordinem cognoscit modo perfectissimo et ita propter talem proportionem debet dici sciens. . . . Similiter etiam sicut homo habet cognitionem principiorum absque discursu, ita et deus omnia cognoscit absque discursu et ideo sicut homo dicitur intelligens, ita etiam deus. . . . Adhuc sicut homo dicitur iustus, qui tribuit unicuique, quod suum est, hoc autem maxime deo convenit, quia ex hoc, quod vult aliquid, vult ei omnia, quae ad ipsum requiruntur. Illa enim sunt quasi debita ei, ut habeat. Sic secundum proportionem talem deus dicitur iustus” (Schmaus, 77–78). Sutton's examples of proportional naming in *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33 closely follow SCG IV, ch.12, in Leonine edition vol. 15 (1930), 47a–b.

Each of the proportions that Sutton gives refers to a kind of activity. This point is addressed independently of Sutton in Norris Clarke, “Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God,” in *Explorations in Metaphysics: Being—God—Person* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1994), 131, and J. F. Ross, *Portraying Analogy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 164.

³⁵ Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33 (Schmaus, 78–79).

contexts, however, Sutton follows the same rule for determining the kind of analogy used, which is the order of the signification of the names. If the name is imposed on one to signify its relation to one, then it is said by analogy *ad unum*. Since such a relation is not signified in the context of the divine names, a different kind of analogy must be at work there. Analogy of proportionality alone properly captures the proportionally similar significations of names such as “wise” and “just” said of creatures and of God.

The final portion of Henninger’s paper briefly addresses concerns raised by Ashworth in her 1994 article on Sutton. Since Ashworth published further on the topic in 2008, I conclude my first part of this paper with a consideration of her two pieces together.

E. J. Ashworth—Sutton Revisited, Revised, and Questioned

E. J. Ashworth first discussed Sutton’s *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32–33 in detail in her 1994 article “Analogy and Equivocation in Thomas Sutton, O.P.,”³⁶ and she returned to the same topic with some revision in her *Les Theories Analogie* over a decade later in 2008.³⁷ Her work stands out from Przezdziecki’s and Henninger’s primarily through her argument that “being” said of God and creatures is an exception to Sutton’s rule that names are said by analogy of proportionality between God and creatures. She also argues that Sutton’s understanding of analogy of proportionality differs from Cajetan’s in a way that undermines Montagnes’s claim that Sutton was a precursor to Cajetan.³⁸

Towards the conclusion of her 1994 article, Ashworth seems to have caught Sutton in a contradiction. As we have seen, Sutton employs analogy *ad unum* for “being” said across the categories and analogy of proportionality for the divine names. When explaining why some mistakenly thought that the divine names are said univocally of God and creatures, Sutton asserts that analogy of proportionality is, as Ashworth puts it, “furthest from pure equivocal and the

³⁶ E. J. Ashworth, “Analogy and equivocation in Thomas Sutton, O. P.,” in *Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XII–XIV Century)*, *Acts of the XIth Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, San Marino, 24–28 May, 1994*, ed. Marmo Costantino, *Semiotic and Cognitive Studies* 4 (Turnhout, BE: Brepols, 1997): 289–303.

³⁷ E. J. Ashworth, *Les théories de l’analogie du XIIe au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 2008).

³⁸ Henninger echoes the distinctions Ashworth makes between Sutton and Cajetan without further elaboration (“Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy,” 574).

nearest to univocals.”³⁹ So it seems as though Sutton is committed to holding that the analogy between God and creatures, an analogy of proportionality, is closer to univocity than the analogy across the categories, an analogy *ad unum*. In *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32, however, he had apparently claimed the opposite. I quote the text Ashworth refers to directly: “For just as every name said about God and about creatures is said of them analogously, so too the *ratio* of each such name belongs to God and to others analogously and the *ratio* of such a name cannot be partly diverse and partly the same, but the whole *ratio* is analogous, although in creatures the *ratio* of the name sometimes is partly the same and partly diverse, for example, the *ratio* of ‘man’ belonging to a true (man) and to a picture (of a man).”⁴⁰

In addition to this text, one can recall the passage mentioned above in which Sutton says that there is a greater distance between the being of God and the being of creatures than there is between the being of substance and the being of accidents. According to Ashworth, Sutton is asserting that the name “being” is more equivocal when said of God and creatures than when it is said of substance and accidents. If Sutton is not contradicting himself, “it seems to follow,” Ashworth remarks, “that the divine names are very different from *ens* which is more equivocal when said of God and creatures than it is when said of substance and accident.”⁴¹

Ashworth develops this point in her later treatment of Sutton in *Les Theories Analogie*, where she proposes that Sutton distinguishes three different cases of analogy. First, there is analogy of attribution to one for “being” said of substance and accident. Second, there is another analogy of attribution for “being” said of God and creatures, but this time an analogy of attribution that is further from univocity than in the first case for the reasons stated above. Third, the other Divine Names are said by analogy of proportionality.⁴²

³⁹ Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation,” 297. Ashworth is referring to Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33 (Schmaus, 78–79).

⁴⁰ Thomas Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32: “Sicut enim omne nomen dictum de deo et de creaturis dicitur de eis analogice, ita ratio cuiuslibet talis nominis convenit deo et aliis analogice et non potest ratio talis nominis esse partim diversa et partim eadem, sed tota ratio est analoga, quamvis in creaturis ratio nominis quandoque sit partim eadem et partim diversa ut ratio hominis veri et picti” (Schmaus, 40); see Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation,” 296.

⁴¹ Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation,” 297. See also her brief treatment of Sutton on this point in “Suarez on the Analogy of Being,” 57.

⁴² See Ashworth, *Les théories de l'analogie du XIIe au XVIe siècle*, 52–53: “He makes a distinction between three cases. The first case is that of the word ‘being’ said

Henninger disputes Ashworth's reading of Sutton, noting the intention expressed by the titles of the articles and Sutton's express statement that analogy of proportionality applies to "all those names which absolutely signify perfection," which presumably includes "being."⁴³ Furthermore, Henninger observes that, although Sutton does not give an example of how "being" is said analogously of God and creatures, "we can easily construct a sentence that illustrates the analogy of proportion for being on the model of Sutton's sentences for the other divine names: 'As a caused substance, not being in another, is being *per se* formally, so God, neither being in another nor being caused by another, is being *per se* formally and causally.'"⁴⁴ It is certainly striking that Sutton neither gives his own statement of how

about substance and accident. In this context, the word is an equivocal by design and an example of the analogy of attribution. The second case is that of the word 'being' said about God and creatures. In this context, the word is much further from univocity than the same word said about substance and accidents. God exists by His essence, whereas creatures exist by participation. Consequently, there is nothing that can be common to the two. There is no *ratio* that is partly the same and partly different, but there is one *ratio* that is entirely analogous. These remarks suggest the presence of a return to the analogy of imitation. However, the word 'being' said about God and creature is always an example of the analogy of attribution. The third case is that of the divine names such as wise, just, and good. Sutton holds that these names are analogous, but, differently from words such as 'being' and 'healthy,' their significations do not contain a relation. One does not say that a human is just because his justice is connected to the justice of God, whether by causality or by resemblance. The only type of analogy that is appropriate in this case is the analogy of proportionality. When we are saying that a human is wise, this is because he knows the highest causes, and when we say that God is wise, this is because He knows the highest causes perfectly. In other words, we make a comparison between the relation existing between the knowledge of a human and the objects of his knowledge and the relation of God and the objects of His proper knowledge, and we employ the same word 'wise' about the two relations. The word found by analogy is a fifth term, as in the *Posterior Analytics*. Sutton adds that we have a tendency to believe that the words 'wise,' 'just,' and 'good' are univocal because, unlike the word 'being,' they are very far from equivocals and very near to univocals. They resemble the word 'principle' (*principium*), which also is very far from equivocal and very near to univocal" (My translation from the French.)"

⁴³ See Henninger, "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy," 570. See also Alessandro D. Conti, "La composizione metafisica dell'ente finito corporeo nell'ontologia di Tommaso Sutton," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 2 (1991): 326.

⁴⁴ Henninger, "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy," 571.

“being” is said by proportionality of God and creatures in the way he does for the names “wise,” “just,” and “liberal” nor expressly states that the name “being” is an exception to the rule of proportionality among divine names.

Now although Henninger rejects Ashworth's solution, he admits the “tension” in the text she observed, and offers no resolution to save the consistency of Sutton's position.⁴⁵ In the final portion of this paper I will explore an additional problem with Ashworth's solution to the apparent conflict in Sutton's text, emerging from his treatment of the fallacy of equivocation, and then propose a solution to the difficulty she observed.

Analogy of Proportionality and the Fallacy of Equivocation

There are two passages in his *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33 in which Thomas Sutton presents Scotist objections to the use of analogous terms in demonstrative reasoning. The first passage argues that analogous terms cannot avoid the fallacy of equivocation any more than purely equivocal terms. The objector gives a standard example of the fallacy of equivocation: “Every dog is a land animal; a star is a dog; therefore, a star is a land animal.” The objector asserts that the same fallacy occurs in a syllogism employing a name analogously, offering the example of “everything healthy is an animal; medicine is healthy; therefore, medicine is an animal.” The conclusion follows that nothing could be proven or known about God through creatures if we posit that those names are predicated analogously, any more than if they are said equivocally.⁴⁶

In answer to this objection, Sutton grants that use of analogous terms can result in sophistical reasoning, but he adds that one can use terms analogously in a demonstrative argument when the analogous

⁴⁵ Ibid., 573.

⁴⁶ Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33, arg. 5: “Praeterea sicut aequivocatio pura impedit illationem, ita et analogia. Sicut enim haec est fallacia aequivocationis: Omnes latrabile est canis, sidus caeleste est canis, ergo sidus caeleste est latrabile, ita et haec est fallacia per vim analogiae: omne sanum est animal, medicina est sana, ergo medicina est animal. Ergo si ponamus illa nomina praedicari de deo et creaturis analogice, nihil potest probari nec cognosci de deo per creaturas, sicut nec potest, si dicantur pure aequivoce. Relinquitur ergo, quod pure univoce dicantur de deo et creaturis” (Schmaus, 65). This is the same example that appears in Peter of Spain, *Tractatus Sextus*, in *Summulae Logicales cum Veroriis Parisiensis Clarissima Expositione* (Hildesheim / New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1981; repr. of 1572 Venice edition), 181. See also the treatment of the fallacy of equivocation by Aquinas in *De fallaciis*, ch. 6, no. 650, in *Opuscula Philosophica* (Marietti edition, 1954), 228b.

terms are “analogous by *proportio*.” He repeats the familiar example from *Metaphysics* 5: as the heart relates to the whole animal, so the spring relates to the whole river. The heart is the principle of the animal, and likewise, the spring is the principle of the river; the heart and the spring are principles analogously. Sutton then adds the following example of a Natural Theology demonstration:

Thus, God is whatever is absolutely better that He be than He not be. But it is altogether better in creatures to be wise than not wise, free than not free, living than not living, just than not just, and so on about other things which carry perfection absolutely without defect. Therefore, God is living, wise, free, just and so forth. For those names signify perfection absolutely, as far as that which is principal in their *ratio*, although they carry some imperfection as regards what is less principal, and, therefore, they are said of God by removing that which is of imperfection.⁴⁷

In other passages, Sutton explains that what is imperfect about these perfections is that they are qualities or *habitus* in creatures. And as qualities or *habitus*, they express a certain imperfection that must be removed when the names are said of God.⁴⁸ Sutton leaves it to his reader to infer that the *ratio* of a name carrying imperfection is analogous by proportionality to the *ratio* of the same name with the imperfection removed, and that such analogously similar *rationes* are used without equivocation in a demonstration.

⁴⁷ Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33, ad 5: “Ad quantum dicendum, quod in analogis, sicut convenit arguere sophisticæ, ita convenit in eis arguere bene et demonstrative, praecipue in analogis secundum proportionem sic: Sicut se habet cor ad totum animal, ita se habet fons ad totum flumen. Sed cor est principium animalis, ergo fons est principium fluminis. Et similiter convenit ex perfectionibus creaturarum necessario probare perfectiones dei, quamvis analogice convenient deo et creaturis. Sic deus est quidquid absolute melius est ipsum quam non ipsum. Sed melius est omnino in creaturis sapiens quam non sapiens, patens quam non patens, vivens quam non vivens, iustum quam non iustum et sic de aliis, quae important perfectionem absolute absque defectu. Ergo deus est vivens, sapiens, patens, iustus et sic de aliis. Ista enim nomina significant perfectionem absolute, quantum ad illud, quod est principale in eorum ratione, quamvis aliquam imperfectionem important, quantum ad id, quod est minus principale et ideo removendo illud, quod est imperfectionis, dicuntur de deo” (Schmaus, 81–82).

⁴⁸ Ibid., 32a, ad 3 (Schmaus, 58).

The other demonstration-based objection takes up the argument from motion. It would be sophistical to argue that God is the “first mover” unless “mover” is said according to the same *ratio* of both God and other movers.⁴⁹ Sutton responds that the name “mover” is said about God analogously by analogy of proportionality and that, where names are said in this way, demonstration proceeds just as it does when the names are said univocally because analogy of this kind is so close to univocity.⁵⁰

Notice that Sutton does not deny that there are four terms in a Natural Theology demonstration. Indeed, his doctrine that no name signifies God and creatures through the same concept requires that any Natural Theology demonstration employ four terms. Consider his own example mentioned above.

Major Premise: It is absolutely better to be wise.

Minor Premise: God is whatever it is absolutely better that God be.

Conclusion: God is wise.

The name “wise” in the major premise cannot signify the wisdom proper to God because the perfection of wisdom in creatures carries

⁴⁹ Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33, arg. 25 (Schmaus, 70). While the objectors are unnamed, one can see a resemblance to an objection found in John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pt. 1, q. 1–2, nos. 38–40 (in *Opera Omnia*, Vatican edition, 3:25–27). Unless the terms carry the same meaning when said of God and creatures, calling God a mover or wise is like calling God a stone (or calling a star a land animal). For a brief summary of all five arguments Scotus gives for univocity, see Luis Alberto De Boni, “Duns Scotus and the Univocity of the Concept of Being,” in *New Essays on Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens*, ed. Roberto Hofmeister Pich, Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 43 (Louvain-La-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2007), 102–12. For a fuller description of all five arguments presented within the context of Scotus’s overall cognitional theory, see Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer, *Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus: An Introduction* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 38–47.

⁵⁰ Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33, ad 25: “hoc nomen motor . . . dicitur de deo et aliis analogice secundum proportionem . . . et in talibus valet probatio ex creaturis ad deum in omnibus, quae nullam imperfectionem important principaliter . . . quia talis analogia propinqua est univocationi, propter quod tenet probatio, sicut in univocis [the name ‘mover’. . . is said about God and other things analogously according to proportion. . . and in such cases the proof from creatures to God is effective in all things that principally carry no imperfection . . . because such analogy is near to univocation, on account which the proof holds just as in univocals]” (Schmaus, 87).

the imperfection of being a quality (and non-qualitative wisdom cannot belong to a creature, or that creature would be subsistent wisdom—presumably, Sutton assumes with the Aristotelians that Natural Theology does not discover the wisdom of God through prior knowledge of subsistent wisdom). The name “wise” in the conclusion cannot signify through the same concept as it does when it signifies creaturely wisdom, since then it would falsely attribute imperfection to God. The name “wise” cannot signify through the same concept in both the major premise and the conclusion, since then it would signify univocally. So the name “wisdom” in the major premise signifies through the *ratio* proper to creatures and in the conclusion through the *ratio* proper to God. The syllogism has four terms: absolutely better to be, God, the quality of wisdom, and subsistent wisdom.⁵¹

Now Sutton says that such a syllogism is not an instance of the fallacy of equivocation because the two *rationes* of the name “wise” are analogously similar by a proportionality that is close enough to univocity to mediate demonstration. The *ratio* “the quality of knowing the highest causes” is analogously similar to the *ratio* “subsistently knowing the highest causes perfectly,” and this similarity is enough for demonstration.

It is here that I see in Sutton’s doctrine the precursor to Cajetan’s that Montagnes took it to be. In the *De nominum analogia* chapter addressing the same Scotist objections, Cajetan explains that the fallacy of equivocation is avoided when terms are said by analogy of proportionality because “whatever belongs to one, also belongs to the other proportionally; and whatever is denied about one also is denied of the other proportionally: because whatever belongs to a similar, in that similar thing, also belongs to that other thing to which it is similar.”⁵² His point is that proportional likeness of signification

⁵¹ That the syllogism has four terms, not three, is clear if we replace the term “wise” in the minor and in the conclusion with the concepts signified by the word “wise” in those propositions. Said of creatures, the concept of the term “wise” signifies the quality of knowing the highest causes. Said of God, the concept of “wise” signifies subsistent knowledge of the highest causes. The syllogism would then appear as follows: “It is absolutely better in creatures to possess *the quality of knowing the highest causes*. God is whatever it is absolutely better to be. Therefore, God is *subsistent knowledge of the highest causes*.”

⁵² Thomas di Vio Cajetan, *De nominum analogia* 10.106: “eo quod quidquid: convenit ulli, convenit et alteri proportionaliter; et quidquid negatur de una, et de altera negatur proportionaliter: quia quidquid convenit simili, in eo quod simile, convenit etiam illi, cui est simile, proportionalitate semper servata”; see *Scripta Philosophica*, ed. P. N. Zammit (Rome: Angelicum, 1934), 80–81.

in the *rationes* of the names is sufficient for an inference to be made from what properly receives one *ratio* to what properly receives the other proportionally similar *ratio*. In the case of the demonstration that God is wise, it is legitimate to infer from the qualitative wisdom of creatures to the proportionally similar subsistent wisdom of God. Or to put the point negatively, it would be false to deny that there is in God something that answers proportionally to the wisdom found in creatures.⁵³ Cajetan makes explicit what Sutton's treatment had left implicit. Two things cannot be both similar and dissimilar at the same time and in the same respect. This holds not only for univocal commonalities but also for the proportional similarity that both Cajetan and Sutton propose to recognize in the diverse *ratio*-

⁵³ This point would be easier to make and understand if the authors provided a set of non-theological examples of demonstrations with analogous terms to explain how their principles work in the more-known-to-us cases. Sutton provides one example in *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33, ad 5: "Sicut se habet cor ad totum animal, ita se habet fons ad totum flumen. Sed cor est principium animalis, ergo fons est principium fluminis [As the heart relates to the whole animal, so the spring relates to the whole river. But the heart is the principle of the animal; therefore, the spring is the principle of the river]" (Schmaus, 81). For the purposes of this article, consider the position of someone familiar with how the terms "motion" and "activity" apply to physical objects and who has just learned that stock prices are not physical objects but social constructs with no concrete physical manifestation. Now, this person hears someone say that "the stock price is moving." From her prior experience, she knows that "what is moving is active." She could bring these two propositions together into the syllogism "what is moving is active; the stock price is moving; therefore, the stock price is active." The sense of terms "moving" and "active" in her major premise, drawn from experience of physical objects, is clearly not identical to the sense of these terms in the minor premise and in the conclusion. However, it does not follow that her syllogism commits the fallacy of equivocation unless she supposes that the terms must be used in exactly the same sense. She can recognize that the terms in the major apply in some similar yet different sense to the stock price and reasonably conclude that something similar but different is happening to the stock prices as happens to rocks and animals in motion. Since we do in fact learn to use the terms "moving" and "active" about stock prices in ways proportionally analogous to the way we first learned to use the terms about physical objects, we can recognize that forming such a syllogism could in fact be someone's entry into discovering the analogous sense of a term or set of terms. I see Aquinas as employing the term "motion" in reasoning similar to my example here in his *In I libros posteriorum analyticorum*, lec. 41 (Marietti edition, 300a), where he reasons from the conditions for the unity of a physical motion to the conditions for the unity of a demonstrative science. Suggestions of better and easier examples would be much appreciated.

nes through which names are said of God and creatures. Since it is true that similar things agree in that in which they are similar, and since these analogates are proportionally similar, I would say that Sutton's account of *proportio* analogy, in which the analogous term is predicated according to different but proportionally similar *rationes*, gives at least a strong preliminary answer to the Scotist objection to demonstration through analogous terms.⁵⁴

I also propose that Sutton's treatment of demonstration through analogous terms provides additional reasons for rejecting Ashworth's interpretation of his doctrine of "being" said of God and creatures. If "being" is not said of God and creatures by analogy of proportionality, then being could not be demonstrated to belong to God any more than wisdom could be. And Sutton clearly holds that God's being is demonstrable. Ashworth's solution to the apparent contradiction adds to the problems within the text rather than solving them.

That said, if Ashworth's solution fails to save him, Sutton may still be trapped in his apparent contradiction. Recall that the trouble lies in Sutton's claim that the *ratio* of the name "being" when said of God and creatures is not partly the same and partly different, but entirely analogous. This seems to suggest that "being" is more equivocally said of God and creatures than it is when it is said across the categories, which would conflict with Sutton's later statements about divine names belonging to the kind of analogy that most closely approaches univocity. I think the problem dissolves on further consideration of what Sutton means when he says that the *ratio* of the name is entirely analogous when said of God and creatures.

We have a clue as to what Sutton means by "entirely analogous" in the contrast case provided in the text. The *ratio* of "man" said of a true man and a picture is partly the same and partly different. The example here is an analogy of imitation. Now, where is the sameness and where is the difference here? Recall that, for Sutton, analogy is a matter of the order of signification of a name. What is partly the same in the signification of the two things receiving the name "man" is the proper *ratio* of the true man, which is signified essentially in the one case and is signified relationally in the other. The same partially similar, partially diverse significations can be found in the case of "being" said of substance and the other categories. The

⁵⁴ I do not suppose that it would satisfy the Scotist on the Scotist's own terms. I think, instead, that it provides a rational defense within Thomism to the external criticism from the Scotist.

ratio of “being” proper to substance is signified diversely in each case: essentially of substance, and by relation to substantial being of the other categories.⁵⁵

Turning then to God and creatures, we can notice how the manner of signifying the analogates changes. Neither the *ratio* of “wise” proper to God nor the *ratio* of “wise” proper to creatures is signified relationally when the name “wise” is predicated of the other. The same holds for the name “being.” The essential signification of “being” to created substances and the essential signification of “being” to God are analogous. Their significations are not partly the same and partly different, as in the other modes of analogy, where the signification of one appears as part of the signification of the other. The similarity between the significations is the proportionality between the *rationes* taken as distinct wholes.⁵⁶ The significations are entirely analogous. Just as the entire *ratio* of the name “wise” predicated of creatures is analogous to the entire *ratio* of the same name predicated of God, the entire *ratio* of the name “being” predicated of created substances is analogous to the *ratio* of the name “being” predicated of God.

Conclusion

Thomas Sutton neither contradicts himself, makes an exception for the name “being” said of God and creatures, nor renders himself unable to engage in demonstration from creatures to God. When he denies in *Quaestiones ordinariae* 32 that the *ratio* of the name “being” is partly the same and partly different when it is predicated of God and creatures, he is not asserting that its signification there is further from univocity than its signification across the categories. Rather, he is anticipating the distinction he will make in *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33 between the different modes of analogy and their suitability for the divine names. In

⁵⁵ This is not inconsistent with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 5, in which he includes all the categories within the division of being *per se*. Granted that “being” according to its absolute consideration belongs *per se* to all the categories, even so, since substance is found in the definition of each of the accidents, it is contained in the signification of the name “being” when “being” is predicated of accidents. See Aquinas, *In V metaphysicorum*, lec. 9 (especially Marietti no. 885; Marietti edition, 237a–238a), and *In 7 Metaphysicorum*, lec. 1 (Marietti nos. 1258–1259, Marietti edition, 317b).

⁵⁶ To borrow a phrase I have heard used many times by J. F. X. Knasas, “the sameness is in the difference.” The reason why one entire *ratio* is analogous by proportionality to another entire *ratio* is that what makes them the same is inseparable from what makes them different.

interpreting Sutton in this way, I am making connections that he does not explicitly make himself. This does not distinguish my approach from Ashworth's, but it does better save the overall coherence of Sutton's position.

Thomas Sutton's doctrine of analogy is partly the same and partly different from the doctrine professed by Thomas Cajetan nearly 200 years later in the *De nomina analogia*. Ashworth is right to note that Sutton applies the analogy of proportionality only to names said of God and creatures and sees analogy *ad unum* as suitable for "being" across the categories. In this respect, Sutton clearly gives the analogy of proportionality less work in metaphysics than Cajetan does.⁵⁷ However, Sutton's use of the analogy of proportionality to answer Scotist objections to demonstration through analogous terms shows that he anticipates Cajetan more than Ashworth grants. It is not merely that analogy of proportionality captures the signification of the names in ways that other forms of analogy cannot that suits it to the divine names. Proportionality's distinct manner of signification also makes demonstration possible where other modes of analogy would lapse into the fallacy of equivocation. Cajetan's explanation in *De nominum analogia* 10 is more thorough than Sutton's replies to objections in *Quaestiones ordinariae* 33, but the "prince of primitive Thomists" and the great scholastic commentator employ the same mode of analogy, pointing to the same properties that belong to that mode to answer the same objections. The thought of one anticipates the thought of the other, and both provide strong reasons for a Thomist Natural Theology to employ analogy of proportionality for names said of God and creatures. N·V

⁵⁷ On analogy of proportionality's role in metaphysics and its direct application across the categories, see especially Cajetan's *De Nominum Analogiae*, chs. 3–5. On Cajetan's overall position, see Joshua Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 2010).