

Reason, Passion, and Metaphysics in Bonaventure: Against Hylomorphic Enthusiasm

MATTHEW J. DUGANDZIC
St. Mary's Seminary and University
Baltimore, MD

Introduction

Contemporary commentators on Aquinas's understanding of the passions all agree that reason is supposed to be the ruler of the passions, but they disagree on the character of this rule. Some would ascribe a high degree of freedom to the passions, such that, even though reason is overall the ruler of the passions, sometimes the passions are right to resist this rule.¹ Others argue that the passions ought to obey reason slavishly, such that, if any passion is to be virtuous, it must result from "reason's immediate control, . . . [that is,] reason *now* commanding this or that passion."² Many other thinkers would fall somewhere in between these two positions at various points, such that giving a full account of the range of these positions would be quite complicated, but these scholars could also be placed neatly into two categories according to how they would answer the following question: Are virtuous passions only those that arise in response to reason's immediate command, or can other passions be included, such as those that, for example, without

¹ G. J. McAleer, for example, says that the passions must "consent" to reason's rule and that it is sometimes a good thing for the passions to rebel against reason's rule, since "sometimes this unruliness is a rejection of the false rule of reason" (*Ecstatic Morality and Sexual Politics: A Catholic and Antitotalitarian Theory of the Body* [New York: Fordham University Press, 2005], 38).

² Giuseppe Butera, "On Reason's Control of the Passions in Aquinas's Theory of Temperance," *Medieval Studies* 68 (2006): 133n2.

being explicitly commanded to do so by reason, prompt reason to do this or that, or even inform reason about some aspect of an object?³ Until recently, most scholars of Thomas Aquinas would have held the latter position, that the passions sometimes have some positive roles to play in the virtuous life even when they arise in the absence of an immediate command from reason.⁴ In recent years, however, the number of scholars who maintain the former position, holding that any passion that does not arise in response to reason's immediate command is not virtuous, has been growing.⁵

³ The language of "prompting," for example, can be found throughout Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011). For "informing" reason, see 106, where Lombardo says that "virtuous passions impart 'affective knowledge' that assists moral decision making," and also McAleer, *Ecstatic Morality*, 37–38, where he discusses the "moral knowledge" that the passions can share with reason. For a more cautious approach to the ability of the passions to prompt reason to act and to furnish it with "affective knowledge," see Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae Ia* 75–89 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 262–63.

⁴ Examples of scholarship in addition to McAleer's that can be placed in this second camp include: Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Les passions vertueuses: L'anthropologie de saint Thomas," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 13 (1974): 11–18; Chenu, "Body and Body Politic in the Creation Spirituality of Thomas Aquinas," in *Western Spirituality: Historical Roots, Ecumenical Roots*, ed. Matthew Fox (Notre Dame, IN: Fides/Claretian, 1979), 193–214; G. Simon Harak, S.J., *Virtuous Passions: The Formation of Christian Character* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1993), 90–98; Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 263; Jean Porter, *Moral Action and Christian Ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 172–73; Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens, "Rationalized Passion and Passionate Reality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions," *The Review of Metaphysics* 56, no. 3 (2003): 544–57; Jeffrey Hause, "Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 81 (2007): 9–10; Romanus Cessario, *Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 63–66; Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae Ia-IIae* 22–48 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 106–8; Craig Steven Titus, "Passions in Christ: Spontaneity, Development, and Virtue," *The Thomist* 73 (2009): 72–73; Fiona R. Barker, "Connaturality and the Cogitative Power: A Thomistic Account of the Influence of Culture on Moral Formation" (PhD diss., St. Louis University, 2011), 79; Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 13, 41, 69, 132; Martin Rhonheimer, *The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011); Paul Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Providence, RI: Cluny Media, 2018).

⁵ Examples of scholarship in addition to Butera's that can be placed in the first camp include: Steven Jensen, "Virtuous Deliberation and the Passions," *The Thomist* 77 (2013): 193–227; Daniel D. De Haan, "Moral Perception and the Function of the Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas's Doctrine of Antecedent and Consequent Passions,"

My aim in this article is further to bolster the case of those who hold that, for Aquinas, the only passions that are virtuous are those that arise from reason's immediate command. I will do this by criticizing an argument that is commonly used by those who oppose this position, and which I refer to as "hylomorphic enthusiasm." Generally speaking, the logic of hylomorphic enthusiasm goes like this: Aquinas's understanding of the relationship between passion and reason is rooted in his hylomorphic view of the unity between body and soul, which unity implies that, for him, reason and passion have something of a collegial relationship, whereby reason rules the passions not despotically, but as a ruler who, though in charge, is nevertheless interested in hearing what his subjects have to say. Paul Gondreau, for example, says that, in Aquinas's view, reason rules over the passions as in a "constitutional monarchy," in which "citizens submit to the supreme authority of the monarch, yet without relinquishing all their political rights and privileges."⁶ For Gondreau, Aquinas's characterization of the relationship between reason and passion was unique for his time, and was due to his similarly unique "hylemorphic [*sic*] metaphysics of human nature."⁷ Bonaventure, on the other hand, did not share this hylomorphic view of the relationship between body and soul, but was rather a substance dualist, and so, consequently, he thought that reason cannot rule the passions politically, but can only "'tame' the passions by a kind of exterior imposition, or forced 'submission to reason' [*obtemperat ratioini*]]."⁸

In sum, the position of the hylomorphic enthusiasts is this: Aquinas's hylomorphic view of the unity of body and soul implies a collegial view of reason's rulership over passion, while Bonaventure's more dualistic view of the relationship between body and soul implies that reason could rule the passions only despotically, rather than politically. There are a number of premises, both implicit and explicit, in this argument. For the sake of focusing this paper, I will choose to focus on two. First, I will focus on the explicit claim that Bonaventure held a dualistic view of the relationship

Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 25 (2014): 290–330; and Nicholas Kahm, *Aquinas on Emotion's Participation in Reason* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2019).

⁶ Gondreau, *Passions of Christ's Soul*, 240. I am focusing on Gondreau here as an example of someone who subscribes to what I call hylomorphic enthusiasm. Similar arguments can be found in Chenu, "Les passions vertueuses," 12; Chenu, "Body and Body Politic," 216–19; Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 212–16; Titus, "Passions in Christ," 72–73; and Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 100.

⁷ Gondreau, *Passions of Christ's Soul*, 236.

⁸ Gondreau, *Passions of Christ's Soul*, 243.

between body and soul; I maintain that Bonaventure's understanding of the relationship between body and soul is no more dualistic than Aquinas's. Second, an implicit premise of hylomorphic enthusiasm is that having a hylomorphic or dualistic view of the relationship between body and soul neatly corresponds, respectively, to a political or a despotic view of the character of reason's rule of the passions. My conclusions regarding Bonaventure's view of the relationship between body and soul challenges this premise, since, if it is granted that Bonaventure and Aquinas think differently about how reason rules the passions, and if my conclusion is correct that they do *not* think much differently about how the body and the soul are related to one another, then it follows that the relationship between Aquinas's or Bonaventure's metaphysics and their view of the relationship between reason and passion is not as clear as would be implied by hylomorphic enthusiasm. That is, whatever differences there might be between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the relationship between reason and passion, these differences are not due to any differences in their respective metaphysical views.

Body and Soul in Bonaventure

What exactly is the charge against Bonaventure? That is, in what way is his view of the relationship between body and soul dualistic? Bonnie Kent explains this characterization of Bonaventure's views quite clearly. For Aquinas, as she puts it, "the rational soul is both the form of the body and the form of the composite, so that it is the same form that makes the body to be a body and makes the soul and body together to be a human being."⁹ Bonaventure and most Franciscans in his day thought that the body had existence from its own form, separate from the rational soul. Thus, "the relationship between body and soul is not as close in Franciscan thought as it is in Thomism."¹⁰ In other words, Aquinas thought that the rational soul was the only substantial form of the body, but Bonaventure thought that the body had its own form, which made it to be a body, in addition to the rational soul. Putting it this way does indeed seem to imply that Bonaventure thinks of the body and soul as two separate things, rather than a closely united composite, which might indeed imply that, for Bonaventure, the spiritual faculties of the soul cannot work with the organs of the body as immediately as they can for Aquinas. But, of course, this conclusion might

⁹ Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 215. Chenu argues similarly in "Passions vertueuses," 12, and his argument is cited in Titus, "Passions in Christ," 67n12. Chenu also makes a similar argument in "Body and Body Politic," 219.

¹⁰ Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 215.

follow only if the initial description of Bonaventure's understanding of the relationship between the body and soul is correct.

This section will argue that a proper understanding of Bonaventure's metaphysics shows that there is no more "distance" (as Kent might put it) between the body and the soul in Bonaventure's thought than in Aquinas's and, consequently, that Bonaventure's understanding of the relationship between body and soul does not imply that reason's rule of the passions must be despotic. I will begin by focusing on the claim that Kent makes that, for Bonaventure, the body has (at least) two forms, one form that makes the body to be a body and another that makes it to be part of the composite whole that is the human person. For this, I will turn to an examination of Bonaventure's account of the composition of corporeal substances.¹¹

Bonaventure elaborates his understanding of how corporeal substances are composed of matter and form within the context of discussing the six days of creation. According to Bonaventure, the first thing that God created was prime matter, such that prime matter existed before light or any distinct beings.¹² This matter was formless, insofar as it had the potential to be informed by all kinds of corporeal forms. But for Bonaventure, this potential to be informed is itself a capacity, which, in Bonaventure's metaphysical system, "is to it as a form."¹³ Clearly, this understanding of prime matter is already different from Aquinas's, for whom prime matter is not something informed, but is merely a principle.¹⁴ In addition, for Bonaventure, prime matter was extended in space, and was therefore also located in space, which

¹¹ I would like to thank the participants in the 2018 Pinckaers Symposium for their helpful feedback on an earlier version of the arguments presented here. I would also like to acknowledge the impressively thorough work of John Francis Quinn, whose treatment of Bonaventure's philosophy was immensely helpful in guiding me through Bonaventure's texts. See John Francis Quinn, *The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1973). The work of D. Thomas Graf, OSB, though quite dated, was also helpful in locating the key texts in Bonaventure's corpus (*De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV*, vol. 2, *De subiecto virtutum cardinalium* [Rome: Herder, 1934]).

¹² See Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 12, where Bonaventure discusses "the production of the corporeal creature with respect to the material principle" ("de corporalis creaturae productione quantum ad principium materiale"). Bonaventure's Latin is taken from the Quaracchi edition of his *Opera omnia*; translations are my own.

¹³ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, concl.: "est sibi pro forma."

¹⁴ Compare, for example, Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 66, a. 1, which contains Aquinas's own treatment of the six days of creation, wherein he asserts that "prime matter . . . in itself does not have any form."

implies that it is a bodily substance occupying space.¹⁵ Nevertheless, prime matter is not a complete substance for Bonaventure. It is still quite indeterminate, having incomplete form. As Bonaventure puts it, prime matter is not really something, but it also it is not really nothing. Rather, it is “something that is midway between something and nothing.”¹⁶

Thus, Bonaventure states: “Though [matter] does not in and of itself have the act of form, it nevertheless has the capacity for form and exists for form.”¹⁷ Moreover, matter has an “appetite that is directed to form as its substantial perfection,”¹⁸ and that “disposes [it] . . . for the introduction of form.”¹⁹ When matter and form are combined, they are “made one.”²⁰ This combination of matter and form is accomplished by means of “mediating dispositions,” which remain in the composite of matter and form after matter and form have been combined, since they themselves are perfected thereby.²¹

These mediating dispositions between matter and form are also called *rationes seminales*, which is the term that Bonaventure uses when he discusses how matter and form come to be united.²² For him, form is educed out of matter by means of the *rationes seminales*. These *rationes seminales* are effectively inchoate essences that are co-created with matter and that may later

¹⁵ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 12, a. 2, q. 3, concl.

¹⁶ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1: “aliquid quod est medium inter aliquid et nihil.”

¹⁷ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. ad 1: “etsi non habeat de se et in se actum formae, ipsa tamen capacitas formae est ei pro forma.”

¹⁸ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 1: “appetitus materiae ordinatur ad formam, tamquam ad perfectionem substantialem.”

¹⁹ Bonaventure, *Coll. in Hex.*, sermo 2: “disponit . . . ad introductionem formae.”

²⁰ Bonaventure, *In I sent.*, 1.3.2, ad 1: “fit unum.”

²¹ Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, sermon 2: “mediantibus dispositionibus non quod illae dispositiones perimantur, sed magis perficiantur.” Compare with Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 76, a. 6, where, speaking of soul and body, Aquinas rejects the position that the soul is united to the body by any mediating dispositions in that the soul is understood as the substantial form of the body. But if the soul were looked at only as the motor of the body, then the idea of there being mediating dispositions between the soul and the body seems more plausible.

²² Aquinas understands the *rationes seminales* differently, though his account is harder to piece together because he does not always use the term *rationes seminales* even when this concept appears to be operative in his thought, as in the case of his commentary on creation in *ST I*, qq. 65–74. For an analysis of Aquinas’s understanding of the *rationes seminales*, see Mariusz Tabaczek, O.P., “The Metaphysics of Evolution: From Aquinas’s Interpretation of Augustine’s Concept of *Rationes Seminales* to the Contemporary Thomistic Account of Species Transformatism,” *Nova et Vetera* (English) 18, no. 3 (2020): 945–72.

be educed from matter.²³ This means that the seminal reasons are simultaneously active and passive. They are passive in that they do not, of themselves, educe substantial forms, but they are active in that “they cooperate with an agent” in educing a substantial form.²⁴ Consequently, created agents can educe new forms in matter without themselves being creators. That is, created agents can actualize the potencies, the seminal reasons, that inhere in matter, but without thereby causing a new substantial form to exist.²⁵

Thus, for Bonaventure, the creation of corporeal bodies is a process of successive eduction of forms from matter by means of *rationes seminales*. Starting with prime matter, one of the most basic forms to be educed from matter is the *forma elementaris*, that is, the form of the basic four elements of earth, air, fire, and water. Once formed, these elements can be mixed together, by means of the *forma mixtionis*, which gives rise to the basic inanimate corporeal bodies that one encounters in everyday life. Now, such a corporeal body is not suitable for information by a soul, or a *forma vitae*. For this, it needs a further degree of organization, which is provided by the *forma complexionis*. It is this form, the *forma complexionis*, that makes a body suitable for information by a soul, that is, capable of supporting the activities of life.²⁶

Now, with this background information on Bonaventure’s understanding of the eduction of substantial forms from matter, I can discuss the problem at hand: whether a human being has multiple substantial forms. At first glance, it can indeed sound this way. Regarding the preparation of Adam’s body for ensoulment, for example, Bonaventure says that “the *forma elementaris* is united to the soul by means of the *forma mixtionis*, and the *forma mixtionis* disposes to the *forma complexionis*.”²⁷ Reading this makes it sound like the human person, the composite of body and soul, retains a number of lower forms. Consequently, Bonaventure seems like a pluriformist.

There is a sense in which this is true. Clearly, on the basis of this text, Bonaventure does think that a number of forms are present in a human being in some sense. But this sense needs to be clarified. While Bonaventure does, as here exemplified, speak of lower forms remaining in matter when

²³ This doctrine is found throughout *In II sent.*, d. 18, but a. 1, q. 3, ad 6, is particularly helpful for making this specific point.

²⁴ Conrad J. O’Leary, O.F.M., *The Substantial Composition of Man According to Saint Bonaventure* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1931), 53.

²⁵ Bonaventure explains this doctrine thoroughly in *In II sent.*, d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, concl.

²⁶ For Bonaventure’s explanation of these forms, see *In III sent.*, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3.

²⁷ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 17, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6, “Forma elementaris unitur animae mediante forma mixtionis, et forma mixtionis disponit ad formam complexionis.”

that matter is united to higher forms, he does not mean to say that all of these forms coexist in the matter in the same way. This would imply that every corporeal body is an accidental aggregate of elements, which is not the case for Bonaventure. Rather, as Bonaventure explains, “the more posterior and the higher a form is, the more noble [it is], since the anterior [forms] are material with respect to the posterior.”²⁸ From Bonaventure’s account of substantial change, it is clear that, for him, matter has both active and passive qualities. As such, it is not inconsistent with his terminology to refer to one form as “material” with respect to a higher form. What, then, would it mean to say that the *forma complexionis* is “material” with respect to the rational soul?

In Bonaventure’s theory of generation, the body is prepared for ensoulment by a power contained within the semen, but it is the rational soul that serves as the principle of all the person’s activities, including life, sensation, and reason.²⁹ However, the rational soul needs to inform a body that is suitable for it. This suitability comes from the *forma complexionis*, which, for example, ensures that the body has organs that the sensitive faculties of the rational soul are able to use.³⁰ Nevertheless, note that these faculties are faculties *of the rational soul*. Bonaventure argues that the rational soul, being created by God and *not* educed from matter, has both sensitive and rational faculties, which means that the two sets of faculties are powers of the same soul.³¹ So, although the *forma complexionis* does prepare the body for ensoulment, once the body is ensouled it is the rational soul that serves as the principle of life, sensation, and rational activity. Thus, when Bonaventure says that the *forma complexionis* is “material” with respect to the rational soul, he means to say that the *forma complexionis* is needed in order to render the body suitable for ensoulment, but no more. That is, once the body is ensouled, the *forma complexionis* has no other function to perform.

This conclusion is further borne out by a consideration of what happens to the body after a person dies. When the soul leaves the body at death, the body corrupts. It disintegrates back into its component parts, which can later

²⁸ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 15, a. 1, q. 2, ad opp. 4: “Quanto forma posterior et ulterior, tanto nobilior, pro eo quod anteriora sunt materialia respectu posteriorum.”

²⁹ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1. Bonaventure explains this position thoroughly here. He also, notably, refutes the opinion that man has two souls, one rational and one sensitive, that operate in concert. He here argues rather that, if man is to be considered essentially one, then he has one perfection, one principle of operation, and therefore one soul.

³⁰ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1.

³¹ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1.

give rise to new substances, such as maggots.³² What this shows is that the *forma complexionis*, though it does prepare the body for ensoulment, does not suffice to sustain the body in existence after the departure of the rational soul. Furthermore, this shows that the antecedent forms that prepare the body for ensoulment are merely preparations. Once the body receives the rational soul, the rational soul is its unique substantial form, serving as the body's unique principle of unity and operation.³³

In sum, these conclusions show that it is a mischaracterization of Bonaventure's anthropology to say that the body has its own form in addition to the rational soul.³⁴ Indeed, the body needs a form to prepare it for ensoulment, but once ensouled, the body has only one substantial form, which is the rational soul. Without the rational soul, the human body is no longer a body, but rather a mass that disintegrates back into its component parts. It therefore seems more proper to say that the *forma complexionis* renders the body suitable to receive its substantial form, and not to make the body to be a body, properly speaking.

There is, however, an additional problem. Although none of the hylomorphic enthusiasts draw attention to this matter, the soul, for Bonaventure, is a substance composed of matter and form. This might seem to add some "distance" (as Kent might put it) between the body and the soul. Bonaventure considers the soul a *hoc aliquid*; does this not mean that the soul has some substantial independence from the body, which would constitute it as a separate thing with a merely accidental relationship to the body? As I will now argue, the answer to this question is no, and showing why this is the case will help to show just how "close" the soul is to the body in Bonaventure's thought.

To begin, it is important to ask why Bonaventure thinks that the soul,

³² Bonaventure, *In IV sent.*, d. 43, a. 1, q. 3.

³³ It should be noted that Bonaventure's account of generation is, on the whole, compatible with Aquinas's, once their differences in terminology are accounted for. Aquinas also speaks of the preparation of the body for ensoulment in terms of a succession of forms, wherein each one replaces the one that came before, and the one that came before remains virtually present in the substance. Rather, therefore, than speaking in terms of forms that are "material" with respect to a substantial form, as Bonaventure does, Aquinas uses the language of virtual presence, but they overall seem to mean the same thing. See *ST I*, qq. 76 and 118, for Aquinas's account of the preparation of the body for ensoulment.

³⁴ Moreover, Bonaventure is quite clear, as noted above, that a human being has one and only one substantial form. He is in no sense a pluriformist. For defense of Bonaventure from the charge that he is a pluriformist of one kind or another, see chapter 3, "The Problem of Plural Forms" (219–319), in Quinn, *Historical Constitution*.

which is spiritual, has matter. His answer mostly has to do with the distinctions between act and potency and between essence and existence. The soul has both active and passive principles of operation. Passive principles are on the side of matter, not form, so the soul, for Bonaventure, has matter. In accord with what was revealed above about Bonaventure's way of speaking of antecedent forms being "material" with respect to higher forms, this manner of speaking coheres with his metaphysical language. "Matter" for Bonaventure refers to something that is passive with respect to something else. Consequently, the soul, since it has active principles in addition to its passive ones, also has form. What Bonaventure says in particular is that the soul subsists, that it exists as a kind of thing. This means that it has both essence and existence. The formal principle is what gives it its essence, and the material principle determine existence. Therefore, the soul has both matter and form.³⁵

Bonaventure, of course, clarifies that the soul's matter is spiritual matter, not corporeal matter, in that it does not have extension and it is incorruptible.³⁶ The soul is therefore clearly different from the body, which is made up of corporeal matter. But how does the soul differ from an angel, which would also be composed of form and spiritual matter? Bonaventure argues that the difference is that the soul has an essential property called *unibilitas* or "the aptitude [of the soul] to unite with the body," which "is not accidental to the soul, but rather essential to the soul. And so it cannot be separated from it."³⁷ This is because it is the nature of the rational soul to be the substantial form of the body.³⁸ As such, the soul cannot vivify just any body, but only a human one. Similarly, while an angel can inhabit a body, it does not thereby make that body human.³⁹ Since the rational soul is the substantial form of the body, it gives being to the whole body and all of its parts, which means that the whole soul is present in each part of the body.⁴⁰

It is because of this *unibilitas* that Bonaventure says that the soul is not united to the body immediately, but through a mediating disposition, which is this *unibilitas*. But this should not be taken to imply that the soul is united to the body accidentally. Bonaventure clearly says that man "is made

³⁵ All of these arguments are found in Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2.

³⁶ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2.

³⁷ Bonaventure, *In III sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3: "unibilitas sive aptitudo uniendi cum corpore non est animae accidentalis, sed est ipsi animae essentialis, et ita non potest ab ea separari."

³⁸ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 1, p. 2, a. 3, q. 2.

³⁹ Bonaventure, *In III sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3.

⁴⁰ Bonaventure, *In I sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, a. 1, q. 4.

essentially one by the vivified body and the vivifying soul.⁴¹ Furthermore, though he speaks of body and soul as substances in their own right, he also says that, when united, they form one person with one nature.⁴² Clearly, then, despite being composed of matter and form, the soul has an essential disposition to be united to the body, such that its existence is incomplete unless it is so united. This conclusion is made particularly clear from Bonaventure's consideration of personhood, and in particular the question of whether the separated soul is a person.⁴³ Bonaventure thinks that the separated soul falls short of meeting all of the requirements for being a person, which include incommunicability. The soul is not incommunicable, "because it has the appetite and the aptitude to be united to the body for the sake of constituting a third [thing]."⁴⁴ Consequently, the soul is not a single, unified thing in the sense that a person would be; that is, the separated soul is a less complete kind of thing than is the composite of soul and body together.⁴⁵

Given these considerations, along with Bonaventure's frequent assertions that the rational soul is the single substantial form of the body that endows the composite of body and soul with life, sensation, and intellection, it does not seem that there is any more "distance" between the body and the soul in Bonaventure's thought than in Aquinas's. Therefore, whatever differences there may be between Bonaventure and Aquinas on how each understands reason's rule of the passions, these differences are not corollaries of their respective metaphysical views of the relationship between body and soul.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to make a modest contribution to the ongoing discussions regarding Aquinas's understanding of the relationship between reason and passion. Some scholars, whom I have called the "hylomorphic enthusiasts," have argued that Aquinas's political, rather than despotic, view of reason's rule of the passions is due to his underlying hylomorphic understanding of the relationship between body and soul. Those who make this

⁴¹ Bonaventure, *In II sent.*, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4, "fit unum per essentiam ex corpore vivificato, et anima vivificante."

⁴² See, for example, Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* II, ch. 10, and *Breviloquium* VII, ch. 7. The position that he lays out here appears *in nuce* in *In II sent.*, d. 1, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2, sc 1.

⁴³ See Bonaventure, *In III sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3.

⁴⁴ Bonaventure, *In III sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3: "... quia appetitum et aptitudinem habet ut uniatur corpori ad constitutionem tertii."

⁴⁵ This point is made clearly in *In III sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3, where Bonaventure considers whether, in the hypostatic union, Christ assumed a human *nature* or a human *person*.

argument frequently use Bonaventure as a foil, arguing that Bonaventure's substance dualism entails a despotic view of reason's rule of the passions. I have argued that Bonaventure is not a substance dualist. That is, Bonaventure does not think of the body as having its own form, separate from the rational soul, which would make the body to be separate substance from the soul, and might imply that the spiritual faculties of the soul are not able to work closely with the organs of the body. Rather, I have argued that, for Bonaventure, the rational soul is the unique substantial form of the body, and is, consequently, the sole principle of a human being's rational and sensitive operations. Consequently, if Aquinas and Bonaventure have disparate views on the way in which reason rules the passions, whatever differences there may be are not due to their respective metaphysical views. N.V