

St. Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Temperance and Aristotle

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FOR SOME DECADES NOW, one can witness a renewed interest in the non-Aristotelian sources of the thought of St. Thomas, and in particular in his debt to the Fathers of the Church and neo-Platonist sources.¹ Fully acknowledging the importance of these studies and St. Thomas's real indebtedness to these sources, the editors of a recent volume underscore—and rightfully so—that, “for this reason, Aquinas's theological use of Aristotle requires renewed attention, lest the study of Aquinas's theology become one-sided.”² It is in this same spirit that I will survey and analyze, after a brief introduction into temperance in the Greco-Roman world, the use of Aristotle in St. Thomas's treatise on temperance in the *secunda secundae* of his *Summa theologiae* [ST]. What a close reading of these questions and the use of Aristotle's arguments therein, and in particular from his *Nicomachean Ethics* [EN], will show, I hope, is the extent to which Aristotle is Aquinas's principal philosophical interlocutor.

¹ I have traced these and other sources extensively in my *Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs* (Paris: Les Presses universitaires de l'IPC, 2015). An English edition will be published shortly by the Catholic University of America Press. The current article is a considerably revised version of “The Presence of Aristotle in St. Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Temperance,” *Espíritu* 65 (2016): 327–48.

² *Aristotle in Aquinas's Theology*, ed. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), vi–vii.

Temperance in Ancient Greece and Rome

In ancient Greece, the words *sōphrōn* (σώφρων) and *sōphrosynē* (σωφροσύνη) signified reservation and restraint in one's conduct and knowing one's place. To behave oneself in a temperate way is the opposite of being passionate.³ In particular, the young should be trained to adopt this attitude of self-restraint. In the *Charmides* of Plato, *sōphrosynē* is the beginning of spiritual health, and in the *Republic*, Plato formulates his doctrine of the four cardinal virtues as corresponding respectively to the mind and the three appetitive parts of the soul⁴.

Aristotle treats temperance extensively in *EN* 3.10 as a virtue that has its seat in the irrational part of the soul and makes us attain the mean with regard to bodily pleasures. However, he excludes from this need of restraining our desires the delight we find in objects of vision and of hearing, and part also of the delight in odor. Natural appetites may go wrong in the direction of excess, which is a sort of self-indulgence. Here, the virtue of temperance should intervene. A temperate person moderates his desires. Temperance is a disposition of the appetitive part of the soul that makes it obey reason. If one possesses this virtue, his desires will be moderate and there will be no need to repress them. Reaching "the mean" is to desire in the right degree, the right time, the right manner, and so on.⁵ Aristotle endorses the view that some pleasures are good while others are bad.⁶ He confirms, therefore, the commonsense view of moderation and a generally accepted distinction between the different kinds of pleasure.

The position of Epicurus on pleasure must be understood as a recommendation to seek moderate pleasures of taste, sex, vision, and hearing. He wrote about himself the following words: "I know not how to conceive the good, apart from these pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form."⁷ But, as J. M. Rist observes, Epicurus writes elsewhere that he

³ Plato, *Gorgias* 478d; Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 12.160e. See the classical study by Helen F. North, *Sōphrosynē: Self-knowledge and Self-restraint in Greek Literature* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966).

⁴ *Republic* 4272–34c. This theory of the four main virtues may not be Plato's invention; see Helen F. North, "Pindar, Isthmian, 8, 24–28," *The American Journal of Philology* 69 (1948): 304–8.

⁵ See James J. Walsh, *Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 91.

⁶ See William F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), 294–300.

⁷ Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 10.6, trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925), 2:535.

is not talking so much about the sensual pleasures as about freedom from bodily pain and mental affliction: sober reasoning brings us the happy life.⁸ Epicureanism became a missionary doctrine that spread through the Roman Empire in spite of the strong opposition it met from the Academy, the Peripatetics, and Stoicism, in particular from Chrysippus.⁹ The beginning of its decline was brought about by its denial of afterlife.¹⁰

As to the ethical doctrine of the Stoa, the four main moral virtues were strongly confirmed by Chrysippus: he considered them expressions of one and the same reason¹¹ that unfolds itself into four directions, the four cardinal virtues. With regard to choosing desirable things, this central reason and activity of the *hêgemonikon*¹² becomes *sôphrosynê*, self-control, which brings all our movements and impulses into conformity with reason. It is the expression of the harmony of the soul. For the Stoics, the connection between the virtues is so strong that one wonders whether it is still possible to speak of *different* virtues. According to the Stoics, the four main virtues are accompanied and assisted by subordinate virtues.¹³ Cicero speaks of “parts” of the main virtues and translates the Greek term *sôphrosynê* by the Latin *modestia et temperantia*.¹⁴

The Stoics' ethical theory of the four main virtues was taken over by St. Ambrose, who coined the expression the “cardinal virtues.”¹⁵ The virtues are the highest moral good,¹⁶ and as did the Stoics, Ambrose accepted nature as a norm of moral behavior. Reason should reign over the passions. While Ambrose drew on the Stoics by way of his heavily drawing on Cicero, half a century later, St. Augus-

⁸ John M. Rist, *Epicurus: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 100.

⁹ Norman W. DeWitt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 1954), 328–33.

¹⁰ See Franz Cumont, *Lux perpetua* (Paris : P. Geuthner 1949), 138.

¹¹ One should notice that, while Cleanthes stressed the *tonos* (force) of the soul, other Stoics extolled reason.

¹² The *hêgemonikon* is the seat of sensation, assent, thought, and reason.

¹³ See Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.60.9. The text uses the word *υποτεταγμένα* (subordinated) to describe their general character. Four are mentioned: orderly behavior, orderliness, modesty, self-control.

¹⁴ Cicero, *De officiis* 1.15. In the *Tusculanae disputationes*, he uses also *moderatio*.

¹⁵ See St. Ambrose, *De excessu fratris* 1.57. See also István Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: a Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 12–18.

¹⁶ St. Ambrose, *De officiis ministrorum* 2.18.

tine records that the Stoics and their teachings are hardly mentioned any more in the schools of rhetoric.¹⁷ For Augustine, the four cardinal virtues are instances of the same love for God,¹⁸ and he defines temperance as the *habitus* that makes us refrain from our desires for those things for which *turpiter adpetuntur* (it is shameful).¹⁹

Another important authority repeatedly quoted in Aquinas's questions on temperance is Pope Gregory the Great. Gregory advises his readers about the pastoral aspects of such questions as fasting, and in answer as to whether sins of intemperance are the most serious sins, Thomas quotes him as saying: "Although their guilt is less, their infamy is greater."²⁰ Thomas considers him a valuable source for the study of gluttony and its effect, and for wrath, humility, and pride.

Temperance in the *Summa theologiae*

Temperance and its Parts

The treatise on temperance in *ST* II-II is divided as follows: temperance as such (q. 141); vices opposed to temperance (q. 142); does temperance have parts? (q. 143); the study of these parts and the contrary vices (qq. 144–69).

With regard to the question of the virtues associated with temperance and occasionally enumerated in Stoic literature, Aquinas introduces greater clarity by dividing them into three groups : (1) the *integral* parts of temperance are the feelings of shame, which makes us avoid impudent behavior, and appropriateness (qq. 144 and 145); (2) next are the so-called *subjective* parts, the species of temperance, such as being moderate in the use of food and beverages and restraint in sexual behavior (qq. 146–56) ; finally, (3) Thomas also speaks of *potential* parts of temperance, meaning those virtues that introduce moderation, such as humility, meekness, mildness, modesty , simplicity, and contentment, in adjacent domains (qq. 157–62).

¹⁷ St. Augustine, Epistle 118, no. 21.

¹⁸ St. Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae* 1.25.

¹⁹ Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 1.27; Augustine, *De diuersis quaestionibus* 31.1: "Temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio." Its parts are *continentia*, *clementia*, *modestia*, and *pudor*.

²⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* [*ST*] II-II, q. 142, a. 4, ad 1, citing Gregory's *Moralia* 1.33.12 (PL, 76: 688). All translations from *ST* are my own and based upon the Latin text as it can be found in the Busa/Alarcon edition at www.corpusthomicum.org.

The Virtue of Temperance

The first issue to be examined in question 141 is that of whether temperance is a virtue. To remind his readers that the *Summa theologiae* is a theological treatise and that profane authors, as such, have no authority in theology, the *sed contra* of article 1 quotes St. Augustine, not Aristotle, to confirm that temperance *is* a virtue.²¹ Significantly, Aristotle is present right at the beginning, when a *philosophical* difficulty is mentioned in objection 1: a virtue cannot be opposed to our natural inclinations, on the contrary, as Aristotle writes (*EN* 2.1), these inclinations are a natural aptitude to the virtues. This position will accompany us all through the treatise. Thomas also lets Aristotle say that our nature moves us to seek pleasure while temperance withholds us from doing so.²² This difficulty obliges us to study our different inclinations and to make a distinction between man as a rational being and man's animal functions. Temperance, Thomas writes, does not withhold us from those pleasures that are conformed to the demands of the rational part of our being, to our human nature.

In the following articles of *ST* II-II, q. 141, Aristotle intervenes time and again to lay down the philosophical foundation of what we are arguing about. His presence is impressive. He confirms in the *sed contra* of article 2 that temperance is a *special* virtue, and so he lays the foundation for the entire treatise, inviting the reader to consider more precisely its object.

Our languages, however, allow us to use the term "temperance" also for discreet and modest behavior, as is confirmed by a quotation from *EN*²³ in the *sed contra* of article 4. Aristotle tells us that, in the proper sense of the word, "temperance" concerns the desires and

²¹ One should keep in mind the role of the *sed contra* in the *ST*, which is to provide the basis for the response and doctrinal determination, and as such, it contains an authority (Holy Scripture, Tradition, the Fathers, the custom of the Church, and so on) in theology. See Leo Elders, "Structure et fonction de l'argument *Sed contra* dans la Somme théologique," *Divus Thomas* 80 (1977): 245–60. When, therefore, Aristotle is used in a *sed contra*, one should assign a particular philosophical and argumentative weight to that argument of the *sed contra*.

²² *Nicomachean Ethics* [*EN*] 1.1.1103a25 and 1.3.1104b5.

²³ *EN* 4.1123b5: "He who is worthy of little and thinks himself worthy of little is temperate." Unless stated as being quoted in another work such as *ST*, English translations of Aristotle come from *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

pleasures of the sense of touch. He reminds us that the word may also be used to express moderation in our desire of external things such as wealth or honors and that this virtue makes us want the latter only in so far as is fitting for us. Thomas himself explains why this virtue has as its object the pleasures of the sense of touch. He uses a comparison with the virtue of courage or force, which gives us the right attitude with regard to the greatest evils and dangers threatening us. In a similar way, temperance does so with regard to the most intense pleasures consecutive on our most natural operations, such as eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse. The pleasures consecutive on natural operations are the stronger the more important these activities are for the human individual or for the human race as such. The enjoyment in hearing good music or seeing beautiful things need not be restrained.

This takes us to the contents of article 5 of question 141, concerning the pleasures we experience through the sense of taste. It would seem that these pleasures, such as those of gluttony, also come in under the object of temperance and should be restrained by it, as Aristotle suggests in two texts quoted in the second and third objections, for the sense of taste is the sense concerned with food. But, in the answer to the first difficulty, Aristotle confirms that touch is the sense that is concerned in the first place with nutrition, since it registers warm and cold, humid and dry, essential for us when eating and drinking. St. Thomas answers that the virtue of temperance has as its primary object the pleasure consequent on our main natural activities ordained to the conservation of the individual and the species, but also that it secondarily has as its object contrivances that make these natural activities more pleasant, and so it also exercises control of the sense of taste.

Article 6 treats the rule or the right measure of temperance. This is an important theme of Christian moral thought, and so Augustine is invited to indicate the essentials of this virtue in the *sed contra*. Yet, in his response to the second objection, Thomas refers to Aristotle's distinction between "necessary as a condition without which one cannot live" and "necessary as that without which we cannot reach a good state of things."²⁴ So he reminds us that there are degrees in what is necessary for human life. As a matter of fact, temperance is concerned not only with the necessities of life but also with things helpful for our health or that give us a good condition. It helps us

²⁴ *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a20.

to seek to acquire these things in the way we should.²⁵ Aristotle says the same in another quotation from *EN* 3.11: the temperate man also desires other pleasant things if they are no hindrance to the middle position he has chosen with regard to the above mentioned basic pleasures; he also takes into consideration that what he strives for are noble things and not beyond his means.²⁶ In short, Aristotle is quoted in support four times even in an article that considers what one would qualify as a theme of Christian ethics.

In article 7, St. Gregory the Great is quoted as the authority who confirms that temperance is a *cardinal* virtue,²⁷ and this takes us to the next point. Considering the importance this virtue has in Christian spiritual literature, one might wonder whether it is perhaps the most important of the moral virtues. St. Ambrose appears to confirm this in the first objection raised in article 8. Aristotle, however, asserts that those virtues that are also advantageous to other persons are to be revered most: "If a virtue is a faculty which confers benefits to others, the greatest virtues are necessarily those which are most useful to others."²⁸ In his response, Thomas confirms this by another quotation from the *Ethics*: "The good of the many is greater and more noble than that of a single citizen."²⁹

The Vices Contrary to Temperance

In *EN*, after having defined the object of temperance, Aristotle proceeds by indicating its characteristics and its opposite extremes, intemperance and insensibility. Aquinas treats these contrary vices in question 142 in four articles. Aristotle is the undisputed authority, providing the *sed contra* arguments, which are each time the basis and starting point for the subsequent doctrinal development in the response. The first article deals with insensibility. One might doubt as to whether this disposition is really sinful: abstaining from all pleasures of the sense of touch seems to facilitate the activity of reason. Even Aristotle himself writes that, if we put aside the pleasures, we are less likely to commit sinful acts.³⁰ Nevertheless, he considers insensibility a vice.³¹ Thomas explains that totally abstaining from all pleasures of the

²⁵ *EN* 3.12.1119b17.

²⁶ *EN* 3.11.1119a17–20.

²⁷ This qualification goes back to St. Ambrose.

²⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.9.1366b4.

²⁹ *EN* 1.2.1094b7.

³⁰ *EN* 2.9.1109b11.

³¹ *EN* 2.7.1107b8 and 3.11.1195a5.

senses is wrong and that we should allow them in the measure they are necessary for preserving our health and for the survival of human kind. At this point, Aquinas introduces an important qualifying remark introduced, as it is so often, by *sciendum tamen*. Sometimes it is not only praiseworthy but also necessary to abstain from these pleasures that are otherwise necessary for a man's well-being or the preservation of the species. Some refrain from sensible pleasures in order to attain "certain engagements" (*propter alicuius officii executionem*), as do athletes. Others, like penitents, abstain from pleasures as a kind of "spiritual diet," and yet others sacrifice their carnal desires for the sake of "contemplation and divine things." Precisely because the things are done for the sake of a higher end, these actions are in accord with right reason and should therefore not be viewed as pertaining to the vice of insensibility. This more personal remark by Thomas is most likely inspired by opinions of certain members of the *Artes* Faculty, opinions that would become the topic of the condemnations of 1277.³²

In article 2, the question is raised of whether intemperance is just a childish behavior, as Aristotle seems to say in the *EN* 3.12, quoted in the *sed contra*. But, in a human and Christian perspective, it is much more than that, as St. Jerome and St. Paul indicate in the first and third objection. In fact, Aristotle does not say exactly that it is a childish fault: his remark just means that the Greek term for intemperate, ἀκόλαστος, is also used to characterize the behavior of spoiled children. Thomas avails himself of this remark to analyze further what intemperance precisely is. Firstly, just as children sometimes do something blotted or unpolished, the concupiscent person also does. Well-polished and decent behavior agrees with reason and man's dignity.³³ Passion does not follow reason, as Aristotle says,³⁴ so it is disgraceful. Secondly, intemperate behavior not only is unchastened but also shows some similarity with the result of the behavior of spoiled children: they become self-willed and conceited. In a similar way, if the intemperate person does not restrain his desires, these will become an irresistible incitation to bad conduct. A third similarity may be seen in the remedy to be applied: as spoiled children must learn by discipline, the intemperate must reduce his desires to decent proportions by resisting them, as Aristotle says in a text quoted by

³² See Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain, BE : Publications Universitaires, 1977), 297–300.

³³ By way of confirmation, Thomas quotes Cicero, *De officiis* 1.27.

³⁴ *EN* 7.6.1149b1: "ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία [οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ]."

Aquinas: "As the child should follow the directives of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible to accord with reason."³⁵ If it is objected that concupiscence is quite natural as far as eating and drinking and sexual intercourse are concerned, Thomas comments that, in respect of natural desires, our nature demands only what is necessary for the preservation of the individual and the species, such that excess lies in quantitative excess. But people sometimes use special contrivances to increase artificially these pleasures. In such cases, Aristotle speaks of an excess that is not conformed to right reason in this regard.³⁶

At the other extreme from intemperance, there is the vice of cowardice, examined in article 3. The Latin text has *timiditas*, but "cowardice" seems a better translation than "timidity." Cowardice is the opposite of the virtue of courage, which as a virtue, ranks higher than temperance. Is cowardice worse than intemperance? Aristotle seems to say so in the second difficulty put forward by Thomas: "If a person is overcome by violent and excessive pleasures, . . . we do not admire him, but his conduct is somewhat understandable."³⁷ It is, indeed, more difficult to combat pleasure than anger, says Thomas, again quoting Aristotle.³⁸ But against this condoning evaluation of intemperance pleads the fact, stressed by Aristotle in the *sed contra*, that intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice. The question is important because, in moral philosophy and theology, one must determine more precisely what intemperance actually is. So, in his response, Thomas explains that, considered from what these two vices are about, a coward flees from mortal danger to secure something urgent and important—to stay alive—whereas an intemperate person is seeking excessive pleasure, which has no real urgency.

If one considers cowardice from the side of the acting person, similar conclusions can be drawn. (1) The more a person has control over himself, the more serious his sin will be. Demented persons are not accountable for what they do or fail to do. Fear, such as the fear of death, and very serious grief can stupefy the human mind, something pleasure does not do. (2) The more voluntary a sin is, the more serious it becomes. Intemperance has more of voluntariness than does cowardice. The reason is that what one does out of fear has its ground in something threatening outside, such that it is mixed-voluntary.

³⁵ EN 3.12.1119b14.

³⁶ EN 3.11.1118b15.

³⁷ EN 7.7.1150b5.

³⁸ EN 2.3.1105a7.

Here again, Thomas refers to Aristotle.³⁹ What one does out of pleasure is simply voluntary. In general, no one wants to be intemperate, but in a concrete situation, people let themselves be overcome by the pleasures attached to certain acts. Therefore, in order to avoid intemperance, one should not linger when considering pleasurable objects. Finally, (3) it is easier to use remedies against intemperance than against cowardice, as has become clear. Aristotle provides the basic facts of what is examined in this third article, but Aquinas adds important developments from the point of view of moral theology and practice.

Article 4 examines whether the sin of intemperance is most detestable. Even in this question Aristotle provides helpful insights. Sins of intemperance are committed so frequently that they do not seem to be among the most odious transgressions. Moreover, this vice is concerned with pleasures resulting from human actions. But there are such deviations as bestiality, ripping open pregnant women and devouring their babies, cannibalism and other brutish acts.⁴⁰ Yet, as Aristotle says in the *sed contra*, among the vices, intemperance appears rightly to be execrable.⁴¹ This is explained by Thomas in the response: intemperance is most detestable because it is very much against man's dignity. Furthermore, intemperance does away with the beauty and decorum that are characteristic of a life in the light of reason.

The Parts of Temperance in General

Question 143 of *ST* II-II is an introduction to the study of those virtues that are parts of temperance, species of temperance, or dispositions used by it. Some are referred to in Holy Scripture, while Cicero mentions continence, clemency, and modesty. Macrobius, in his commentary on Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*, and Pseudo-Andronicus even list seven of them.⁴² Using these divisions, Thomas presents a survey of these associated or auxiliary virtues by distinguishing integral, subjective, and potential parts of temperance. In the first objection, Aristotle reminds us that continence, considered by some a part of temperance, is not a

³⁹ *EN* 3.1. The example of the mixed voluntary act is that of throwing overboard valuable cargo in a storm.

⁴⁰ Quoted from *EN* 7.5.1148b20–35.

⁴¹ *EN* 3.10.1118b2: "Self-indulgence is rightly detestable because it is in us not in so far as we are men, but as animals."

⁴² Pseudo-Andronicus, *De passionibus*, in *Pseudo-Andronicus de Rhodes Περὶ Παθῶν, édition critique du texte grec et de la traduction latine médiévale*, ed. A. Glibert-Thirry (Leiden: Brill, 1977).

virtue: if one has to restrain oneself to behave temperately, one does not yet have this virtue. Thomas overcomes the difficulty by considering continence an imperfect state of temperance. Its object, however, is the same as that of the virtue itself.

The Integral Parts of Temperance

Passing now to the study of the parts of temperance separately, *verecundia* and *honestas* are examined in the next two questions (144 and 145) as integral parts of temperance. These terms are difficult to translate. *Verecundia* is the equivalent of feeling ashamed of one's intemperate behavior. Aristotle considers it a passion, rather than a virtue, but as virtues do, it helps us keep the mean between being shamed excessively and the absence of any feeling of shame.⁴³ In the second objection, Thomas argues that shame is not a part of any other virtue, since it is a sort of fear, as a text of Aristotle confirms. Yet it is a good and praiseworthy disposition, and therefore it must be a virtue in its own right. This applies the more so as virtues are generated from successive good acts.⁴⁴ Somewhat surprisingly, the *sed contra* of question 144 quotes Aristotle to the effect that shame is not a virtue, as one would nevertheless conclude from what was already explained. Thomas brings these different statements into harmony to show to what extent *verecundia* falls short of the definition of a virtue. Shame is a certain fear of something that is reproachable and detestable, but one who is in possession of temperance in its perfect state is not afraid of doing something condemnable.

Given the importance attached to shame in philosophical literature, Thomas further determines its character. Aristotle calls it the "fear of dishonor."⁴⁵ Some quotes from Aristotle help Thomas to determine shame as the fear of committing shameful acts (q. 144, a. 2). One is afraid of being blamed and exposed because of these acts. A next question is whether one fears most to be blamed by relatives and friends (q. 144, a. 3). Aristotle writes that people feel shame before those who are admired by them or who admire them.⁴⁶ A man

⁴³ EN 2.14.1108a32.

⁴⁴ In arguing these points, Thomas constantly refers to EN 2.1.1103b21 and 1.12.1101b15.

⁴⁵ EN 4.9.1128b11.

⁴⁶ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.6.1384b30. In this article, chapter 6 of the second book of the *Rhetoric* provides Thomas with the arguments needed to elaborate the theme of the feeling of shame.

does not reproach others with the shameful things he does himself. Aristotle also speaks of slanderers and people who spend their time in looking for their neighbors' faults, those of whom people are afraid more than they are of their relatives. But Aristotle also writes that people are likely to feel more ashamed of intemperate behavior before those who are likely to be always with them.

A final question is discussed in article 4: does a good person feel ashamed? *Rhetoric* 2.6.1384b17 tells us that people may also be afraid of indications of shameful things. But elsewhere, we read that the good man (σπουδαῖος) will never voluntarily do bad actions, and so he will feel no shame. Yet, if there was in them something blameworthy, they would feel ashamed. The virtuous person avoids not only what is really wrong but also what is considered wrong by common opinion.⁴⁷

A further integral part of temperance is respectability, treated in question 145. But is it really a virtue? Being respected comes from the outside, whereas a virtue consists in an inner attitude and choice. Moreover, Aristotle also reminds us that we do not seek a virtue for itself, but in order to reach happiness.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, and perhaps in view of the massive importance given to honors by Cicero and other authors, Thomas argues that honor is bestowed on one because of excellence, but excellence is above all measured by virtue, which, as Aristotle says, is the disposition of one who is perfect.⁴⁹ In this way, virtue and honor come down to the same thing. Although it is true that virtue is practiced because of the happiness it brings, as Aristotle says,⁵⁰ Thomas observes that respectability also has some goodness of itself and, so, can be sought.⁵¹ Some persons are honored because of their wealth, power, or nobility, but a quote from Aristotle confirms that, properly speaking, only the good man should be honored.⁵² The respectable is sought because of itself and is pleasurable.⁵³ But not all pleasurable things are respectable. The last article of question 145 inquires whether respectability must be considered a part of temperance. Is the respectable the person who is worthy of honor? Now

⁴⁷ EN 4.9.1128b21.

⁴⁸ EN 8.13.1163a22; 1.9.1099b16.

⁴⁹ Aristotle, *Physics* 7.3.246a13.

⁵⁰ EN 1.9.1099b16.

⁵¹ EN 1.7.1096a30.

⁵² EN 4.3.1124a24.

⁵³ As Aristotle says in EN 1.8.1099a7.

Aristotle writes that righteous and strong persons are respected most.⁵⁴ Thomas answers that, considering the good attained by justice and courage, these virtues deserve to be honored more, but temperance deserves to be honored because it makes us repress execrable vices.

The Subjective Parts of Temperance

The next questions, 146–62, deal with the virtues considered parts of temperance and the vices contrary to them: abstinence and fasting and the opposite vice of gluttony, followed by sobriety and drunkenness. The presence of Aristotle is minimal in these questions. He is quoted to remind us that the mean is characteristic of all the virtues.⁵⁵ And this mean is determined not according to quantity, but by reason.⁵⁶ A second quotation recalls Aristotle's saying that what is much for one person is little for a second.⁵⁷ To underpin that gluttony has some attraction, Thomas writes that it satisfies an aspect of happiness in that it gives some pleasure, as Aristotle says.⁵⁸ Inordinate passions are accompanied by pleasure or pain: misplaced gaiety is related to gluttony.⁵⁹

Turning now to the vice of drunkenness in question 150, the question arises whether it is sinful. One might object that it is not because there is no sin contrary to it, as virtues are in the middle between two extremes. Thomas explains this absence by quoting Aristotle: "People who fall short with regard to pleasures, by seeking them less than they should, are hardly found, for such insensitivity is not human."⁶⁰ A further interesting question on which Aristotle is consulted is whether drunkenness excuses from sin. Aristotle mentions that, in Athens, penalties were doubled for misbehavior of drunkards, since authorities were convinced that a man has the power of not getting drunk. The activity of reason is obstructed by drunkenness.⁶¹ Nevertheless Thomas quotes the sequel of a text of the *Politics* 2.9 that pleads for some leniency.

In the examination of chastity in question 151, Aristotle is quoted to remind us that a virtue is a willed and chosen disposition, while chastity (in the original meaning of the Latin term) seems to be the

⁵⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.3.1105a1.

⁵⁵ *EN* 2.6.1106b36.

⁵⁶ *ST* II-II, q. 147, a. 1, ad 2, referring to *EN* 2.6.1107a1.

⁵⁷ *ST* II-II, q. 147, a. 7, obj. 3, referring to *EN* 2.6.1106a36.

⁵⁸ *ST* II-II, q. 148, a. 5, corp., referring to *EN* 1.8.1099a7 and 1.10.1177a22.

⁵⁹ *ST* II-II, q. 148, a. 6, corp., referring to *EN* 2.5.1105b23.

⁶⁰ *EN* 3.11.1119a3.

⁶¹ *EN* 3.5.1113b31; 3.7.1147a11; Aristotle, *Politics* 2.9.1274b20.

intactness of the body.⁶² But, finding support in another text of Aristotle, Thomas underlines the spiritual aspect of chastity: it restrains concupiscence.⁶³ When he examines whether chastity is a special virtue, he refers us again to a statement of Aristotle: the types of pleasure correspond to the different actions that one performs.⁶⁴ The objects of touch are different in the case of food and in sexual intercourse.⁶⁵ The last article of this question is about pudicity. Aristotle confirms that any form of intemperance is detestable.⁶⁶

The presence of quotations from Aristotle is impressive in article 2 of question 152, as to whether virginity is a licit form of temperance. The discussion of virginity, generated by what was thought to be Aristotle's position on temperance and insensibility, was heavily discussed in the early commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics*.⁶⁷ The famous 1277 condemnation of 219 theses by the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, precisely contains the thesis (no. 169) that "perfect abstinence from the act of flesh corrupts virtue and the species."⁶⁸ Aristotle himself seems to pose a difficulty insofar as he says, in *EN* 2.1.1104a22, that someone who refrains from all pleasures is insensible. Aquinas responds by first recalling that Aristotle also holds that the goods of the mind are more important than those of the active life and of the body.⁶⁹ Moreover, Aristotle holds that the criterion for determining the mean of a virtue is not quantity, but conformity to right reason.⁷⁰ In other words, a virtue can be quantitatively in excess and, yet, a mean with respect to right reason. Aquinas refers to magnanimity, of which Aristotle writes that, quantitatively, this virtue goes to the extreme but, according to right reason, it is a mean.⁷¹ Similarly, virginity goes to the extreme regarding sexual pleasure but it is nonetheless a mean according to right reason, enabling the contemplation of the truth. Finally, virginity does not abstain from all pleasures, but

⁶² *EN* 3.6.1106b36.

⁶³ *EN* 3.12.1119a33.

⁶⁴ *EN* 10.4.1174b23–25.

⁶⁵ *EN* 10.10.1118a29.

⁶⁶ *EN* 3.12.1119a15.

⁶⁷ See René-Antoine Gauthier, "Trois commentaires 'averroïstes' sur l'Éthique à Nicomaque," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale Et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 16 (1947–1948): 298.

⁶⁸ See Hissette, *Enquête*, 299–300.

⁶⁹ *EN* 2.2.1104a22; 1.8.1098b12; 10.7.1177a12.

⁷⁰ *EN* 2.6.1107a1.

⁷¹ *EN* 4.3.1123b31.

from those regarding sexual intercourse, and she does so, as has been said, according to right reason. Aquinas's response to this debated question is an excellent example of his mastery of Aristotle's texts, which enables him to confront philosophically objections to the specifically Christian virtue of virginity.

Turning now to the vice of libidinousness in question 153, a first observation to be made is that, although one cannot think of anything while absorbed in sexual intercourse, as Aristotle says, this does not render it illicit.⁷² Aristotle is absent in the following articles on lewdness except for a final remark: intemperance corrupts prudence.⁷³ He also is quoted to remind us that noble thoughts while one is awake may make dreams cleaner while one is sleeping.⁷⁴ In the twelve-article-long question 154, on the different species of lasciviousness, there is one more quotation from the *Nicomachean Ethics*: should bestiality as a vice against human nature nevertheless be regarded a species of *luxuria*? Thomas esteems that it must be reduced to the same genus.

Continence and Incontinence

Question 155 deals with continence, a disposition that Aristotle does not consider a virtue.⁷⁵ The earliest Latin commentators on the *Nicomachean Ethics* at the *Artes* Faculty in Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century strictly followed Aristotle on this point.⁷⁶ Unsurprisingly then, the 1277 condemnation contains precisely the sentence that "continence is not essentially a virtue" (*non est essentialiter virtus*).⁷⁷ It is more likely that Thomas had Albert the Great's commentary in mind, the *Super ethica*, the first complete Latin commentary of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, written 1250–1252, at a time when Thomas was Albert's assistant in Cologne. For, it is in this commentary on *EN* 7.1 that Albert inquires into the "essence of virtue" (*circa essentiam virtutis*) and claims that continence is not a virtue in the proper sense of the word.⁷⁸ Thomas proceeds very carefully. He recalls the opinion of some Church Fathers (e.g., Augustine) for whom perfect continence is iden-

⁷² *EN* 7.11.1152b18.

⁷³ *EN* 6.5.1140b13.

⁷⁴ *EN* 1.13.1102b9.

⁷⁵ *EN* 7.1.1145a17.

⁷⁶ See Gauthier, "Trois commentaires," 300.

⁷⁷ See Hissette, *Enquête*, 297–98.

⁷⁸ Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethica* 7.1, ed. W. Kübel (Münster: Aschendorff, 1987), 517 (lns. 89–90: "Non sunt proprie et substantialiter virtutes"; Albert is referring to both continence and heroic virtues).

tical to virginity, the virtuousness of which, as we recall, he defended also on Aristotelian grounds. He also here recalls Aristotle's position, which he identifies with that of other Church Fathers such as Jerome, for whom continence "does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue" because the habituation is not strong enough to prevent vehement passions from arising. With regard to this meaning of the term, Thomas can agree with Aristotle that continence is a "mixture" of virtue and passions, and therefore falls short of virtue properly speaking. However, in a broader sense (*largius accipiendo*), one may call it a virtue, since it is the principle of praiseworthy actions. Continence has the same object as temperance in that it allows one to control the pleasures of touch, in particular in the field of sexuality, but it does not relate to the pursuit of wealth unless one uses the term in a broader sense.⁷⁹ Thomas explains that continence is not in the concupiscent appetite one is struggling with, but in the will that decides not to follow certain desires of the sensitive appetite.

The opposite disposition is incontinence (question 156). Does it have its seat in the soul rather than in the body? Two texts from Aristotle seem to favor the latter position. In particular, there is the fact that incontinence is consequent on bodily dispositions, such as being choleric and so on. Yet, since we do not assign it to animals, it must have its seat in the soul.⁸⁰ Incontinence is blamed more than simple sins, since it has a certain malice.⁸¹ The excuse that one can overcome incontinence only by divine help and not by oneself does not hold, for as Aristotle says, what we can do with the help of friends, we can also do in some way by ourselves.⁸² An interesting question is whether an incontinent person is more guilty than an intemperate one who sins. Aristotle says that an incontinent acts more against his conscience, since he knows that what he is going to do is bad. However, the incontinent regrets what he has done, while the intemperate enjoys it. The incontinent is a better person than the intemperate, since he still knows what the end is he should attain.⁸³ Is it worse to be incontinent in one's anger than in one's lascivious desires? It would seem easier to fight against concupiscence than against anger. However, one who is in anger somehow still listens to reason, while a person who gives

⁷⁹ EN 7.5.1148b34; 7.4.1148b10; 7.4.1147b29; 7.5.1149a1.

⁸⁰ EN 7.7.1550b25; 7.3.1147b5.

⁸¹ EN 7.3.1112b27.

⁸² EN 3.4.1148a2.

⁸³ EN 7.1146b22; 7.7.1150b29; 7.81151a24.

in to his sensuality does not, and so his attitude is more disgraceful, although anger may make us cause greater evils.⁸⁴

Clemency, Meekness, Anger, and Cruelty

In question 157, Thomas studies clemency and meekness. Are they the same virtue? Virtues are concerned with passions and actions, as Aristotle says.⁸⁵ Virtues that moderate passions may attain the same effect as those that moderate actions. Meekness, for example, reduces anger, and so may contribute to diminish punishment, something that clemency also does.⁸⁶ Both are virtues, since both subordinate the appetite to reason and make one act reasonably in their respective fields. A quote from the *Nicomachean Ethics* says that every man is dear to every other, such that it is sheer madness to be delighted in punishing others.⁸⁷ In this question, Seneca is quoted nine times.⁸⁸

Regarding the question whether anger is a vice (question 158), Aquinas starts with Aristotle's remark that anger does not listen well to reason, as is the case also with envy.⁸⁹ Thomas explains that anger and the other passions are movements of the sensitive appetite and may be regulated by reason; they are not necessarily bad. In the questions about the sinfulness of the vices, Thomas resorts to the authority of Christian authors. Aristotle seems to say that a person who acts in anger acts with pain, so that one might think that he acts unwillingly.⁹⁰ But, Thomas comments, if such a person acts with pain, he does so because of the injustice done to him. As we have seen before, according to Aristotle, being incontinent in respect of sensual desires is worse than being incontinent in one's anger.⁹¹ But, in view of the massive condemnation of raging anger by the Church Fathers, Thomas adds some distinctions: considering what a person

⁸⁴ EN 7.7.1150b6; 2.3.1105a7; 7.6.1149b1.

⁸⁵ EN 2.3.1104b13.

⁸⁶ In EN 5.1138a3, reducing punishment is said to be the task of *epieikeia*, reasonableness. Thomas says that reasonableness applies to judging about what the legislator has in mind when he made the law, but here, we speak of a mild mood in punishing someone.

⁸⁷ EN 2.6.1106a15; 1.13.1103a1; 8.1.1155a22.

⁸⁸ Seneca's classical text is *De clementia*. See Michel Spanneut, "Influences stoïciennes sur la pensée morale de saint Thomas d'Aquin," in *The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Leo Elders and Klaus Hedwig (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1984), 50–79.

⁸⁹ EN 7.6.1149a26; 2.6.1107a9.

⁹⁰ EN 7.6.1149b20.

⁹¹ EN 7.6.1149b2.

in anger wants to reach (punishment of the other), the object is less bad than what an envious person seeks to attain. What a person in anger wants is some justice, which is more valuable than what one who is lascivious desires to reach, as Aristotle confirms.⁹² But, concedes Thomas, with regard to the inordinate way in which the angry person acts, anger exceeds by its vehemence and its quickness the way a lewd person goes about his pursuits. In *EN* 4.5, Aristotle distinguishes between choleric and sulky people who, when in anger, react differently. He also mentions a type of anger of bad-tempered people that cannot be appeased until punishment has been inflicted.⁹³

Cruelty (question 159) is also a species of intemperance, as it is opposed to clemency, wanting as it does to inflict fierce punishment on others who are guilty. It exceeds, however, the right measure in punishing. Savageness is an excess of cruelty and is opposed to a more excellent virtue (*superexcellentiore virtus*), a virtue that Aristotle called “heroic” or “godlike,” which “according to us” (*secundum nos*), Thomas says, is a Gift of the Holy Spirit, the particular Gift of Piety.⁹⁴

Modesty, Humility, and Pride

We now pass to another species of temperance, modesty (question 160). Modesty, as Aquinas describes it, is a virtue that makes us keep the right measure in doing things, eventually even finding some pleasure in those that do not normally exercise a very strong attraction and are easier to control. Thomas distinguishes four domains where this virtue is active through its subordinated species: esteem of one’s own excellence (humility); desire of knowing (studiousness); correct bodily posture; decency and modesty in the way one dresses. Thomas notes that Aristotle added pleasantness and being ready-witted to these

⁹² *EN* 7.6.1149b2 and 7.6.1149b2b23: anger can be conquered by argument

⁹³ *EN* 4.5.1126a28.

⁹⁴ *EN* 7.1.1145a20. Contrary to what he does elsewhere, Thomas does not refer here to a special book of the *Ethics*, which means that he is quoting by memory. The passage of Aristotle provided a sort of opening toward supernatural grace, as do some other sentences in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the *Liber de bona fortuna*, a collection of texts from the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*. See Thomas Deman, “Le Liber de Bona Fortuna dans la théologie de S. Thomas d’Aquin,” *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 17 (1928): 38–58, and more recently, Valérie Cordonier, “Sauver le Dieu du Philosophe: Albert le Grand, Thomas d’Aquin, Guillaume de Moerbeke et l’invention du ‘Liber de bona fortuna,’” in *Christian Readings of Aristotle from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, ed. Luca Bianchi (Turnhout, BE: Brepols, 2011), 65–114.

subspecies of modesty,⁹⁵ which are the correct attitude with regard to the pleasure we derive from games and playing, says Aquinas, which seems to add to what Aristotle writes.

In discussing humility (question 161), one is faced with the following difficulty: a virtue is the disposition of one who is perfect while humbleness seems characteristic of imperfect people. Moreover all virtues are concerned with actions and the passions, as Aristotle says,⁹⁶ but humility is not mentioned as one of the virtues controlling the passions, nor does it come in under justice, which directs actions. Drawing on Christian spiritual theology, Thomas affirms that humility is a virtue, defining it, perhaps for the first time in moral theology, as the virtue that refrains us from immoderately tending to noble and lofty things. He explains its absence in the *EN* as due to the fact that Aristotle's intention was to treat of the virtues in civil life, where the subordination of a citizen to others is regulated by law. Humility, however, as a special virtue, concerns man's submission to God, and so even to others.⁹⁷ Thus, Thomas indicates that the use of Aristotle's ethics in Christian moral theology is limited. Therefore, it is not surprising that the only references to Aristotle in this question concern technical points, such as whether humility is part of temperance or of modesty. Thomas quotes a text from Aristotle in which, where we would speak of humility (*quem nos humiles dicere possumus*), Aristotle writes of one who tends to small objectives in conformity with his capacity, one who is temperate.⁹⁸

The vice of pride is studied in question 162. As is to be expected, there are hardly any references to Aristotle's ethics in the eight articles of this question. Thomas is drawing his material from Christian authors, but he tries to pinpoint the vice at the other extreme of pride, as Aristotle says there must be one, for a vice is not just opposed not only to the contrary virtue but also to a vice at the other extreme of this disposition.⁹⁹ This vice, Thomas writes, is a kind of pusillanimity in so far as it means that one is busying oneself with things below one's dignity. Further references to Aristotle are few. In ad 3 of the fifth article, Aristotle defends the possibility that a virtue may

⁹⁵ *EN* 2.7.1108a24–27.

⁹⁶ Aristotle, *Physics* 7.3.246a13 (virtue is a certain perfection); *EN* 7.3.1104b13; 2.7.1107a28.

⁹⁷ ST II-II, q. 161, a. 1, ad 5.

⁹⁸ ST II-II, q. 161, a. 4; *EN* 4.3.1123b5. In article 5, we hear Aristotle say that justice is the most excellent of the virtues.

⁹⁹ *EN* 2.8.1108b13.

become the cause of a vice by accident, as when a person is proud of his humility.¹⁰⁰ Is pride the most serious sin? A text of Aristotle that suggests a negative answer provides the occasion for a further elaboration: from the point of view of its object, pride is not the worse sin there is, but considered as an aversion from the Good, God, it is.¹⁰¹ In article 7, Aristotle writes that pride may make one behave as if he were strong and courageous.¹⁰²

Original Sin and Its Consequences

Arrived at this point of his study of pride, Thomas adds three questions about the sin of the first man and its punishment (questions 163–65). Obviously the idea is that this sin was a sin of pride, and so, on account of its enormous consequences, it deserves to be studied after the articles on pride as the first of all sins. With regard to what precisely was the object of this pride of Adam, Thomas adds further details. Desiring to acquire the knowledge God has is as such not sinful, but rather natural to man, who seeks knowledge, as Aristotle says,¹⁰³ but desiring to become similar to God in an inordinate way is a sin. One hardly expects to find references to Aristotle's works in this study of the history of salvation. Yet, in the article on whether the transgression of the first parents has been the greatest of sins of mankind, Thomas invites Aristotle to remind us that the first principles of eternal things are most true: what gives other things their content has itself this content in the highest possible way.¹⁰⁴ The statement fits in a Platonic scheme of ontological dependence of first perfections (such as the ideas). But Thomas answers that the principle does not apply in a series of such things as sins, which have no intrinsic order to one another.

Studiosness and Curiosity

In question 166, the virtue of studiosness is examined. The Greek term for *studiosus*, which is σπουδαῖος, is used to characterize virtuous people in general, and so studiosness does not seem to be a special virtue.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, we can use the term in a more specific sense.

¹⁰⁰ Aristotle, *Physics* 8.1.251a29.

¹⁰¹ *EN* 8.10.1160b3. It is difficult to avoid it, but even more so because it comes so easily (*EN* 2.3.1105a7).

¹⁰² *EN* 3.7.1115b29.

¹⁰³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1.980a21.

¹⁰⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b24.

¹⁰⁵ Thomas says that Aristotle often uses the term in this general sense. The editors of the Leonine edition refer to: *EN* 1.13.1102b10; 9.4.1166a13; 8.1169a35.

All men desire to acquire knowledge.¹⁰⁶ A special virtue, studiousness, regulates this desire and the efforts one makes in this respect. The wider use of the term σπουδαῖος can be explained insofar as this regulating of the desire of knowledge is close to prudence, a virtue of the intellect, which intervenes in all virtuous acts.¹⁰⁷ In his answer to the third difficulty of article 2, Thomas refers again to Aristotle, who writes that we are drawn to do the things that most appeal to us.¹⁰⁸ Question 167 explains the opposite vice, curiosity. A first objection uses a saying of Aristotle to argue that, as regards intellectual knowledge, one cannot go wrong, since it is something good by itself.¹⁰⁹ The answer is that the virtue of studiousness concerns the appetite of learning. In pursuing the knowledge of certain things, there may occur a disorder insofar as it makes more difficult acquiring knowledge of the highest truth¹¹⁰ and determining more precisely which pursuits of knowledge are to be avoided. Aristotle appears to attach some value to our attending theater performances and games.¹¹¹ Thomas gives detailed answers with regard to the moral aspects of such activities.

Modesty and Play

Modesty, insofar as it is concerned with our behavior in our posture and way of dressing, is the objection of question 168. Can there be any virtue in our outward bodily movements if much in these spontaneous movements are natural to us, as Aristotle says?¹¹² To the extent to which these movements can be directed by reason, they are the object of a virtue. Inasmuch as we order them in view of helping or pleasing our fellow men, they come in under the virtue of friendship or affability. However, insofar as these outward movements signal an inner disposition, they fall under the virtue of truthfulness or sincerity, which makes us show in our outward appearance what we are in our inner self, a distinction proposed by Aristotle in the *EN* 4.6–7.

Thomas next devotes three articles to the issue of plays or games.

¹⁰⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1.980a21.

¹⁰⁷ *EN* 6.13.1144b30.

¹⁰⁸ At this place, the Latin text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* used by Thomas (to become virtuous one must do the things to which his nature inclines him most) does not quite express the Greek in 1109b1, where Aristotle writes that we must drag ourselves away and go to the contrary of what we desire most.

¹⁰⁹ *EN* 2.6.1107a8.

¹¹⁰ *EN* 10.7.1177a19.

¹¹¹ Aristotle, *Poetics* 4.1448b9.

¹¹² *EN* 2.3.1103a23.

Church Fathers such as St. Ambrose and St. John Chrysostom are quite severe in their judgments about going to the games that were a form of amusement in their days. Aristotle says that people do go to the games and theater for the sake of the pleasure they find in them, but he is rather severe in his judgment: we are injured rather than benefitted by them, since they make us neglect our bodies and our property.¹¹³ Yet elsewhere, Aristotle points to the virtue of εὐτραπεία, which makes us adopt the right attitude with regard to amusement.¹¹⁴ In article 3, excessive amusement is said to be against the rule of reason, but there is also the possibility that one has no interest in entertainment whatsoever, an attitude that Aristotle calls blameworthy.¹¹⁵ Such persons are uncivilized.¹¹⁶ But, since amusement is not sought for itself, not caring about it is a lesser vice than seeking too much of it.¹¹⁷ A certain reserve may be an attitude related to kindness or friendliness, yet insofar as it restrains superfluous pleasure seeking, it comes in under temperance.

Modesty in the way one dresses is the subject of question 169. Thomas first points out that variety in the way one dresses according to the changes in fashion during one's lifetime is not an object of virtue or vice. He lets Aristotle remind us that we have a natural aptitude for virtue, such that what people ordinarily do—he apparently means here the way people dress—seems to be morally neutral.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, certain ways of dressing can be unbecoming, as Aristotle says, and are a matter of extravagance. There can also be negligence in the way one dresses.¹¹⁹ The outward appearance should be an expression of one's inner being, and so controlling it comes in under the virtue of truthfulness, which includes not only words but also deeds.¹²⁰

¹¹³ EN 10.6.1176b9; 2.4.1105a31.

¹¹⁴ EN 2.7.1108a24. Cf. EN 4.8.1128a10.

¹¹⁵ EN 2.7.1108a25; 4.8.1128b2.

¹¹⁶ EN 4.8.1128a4.

¹¹⁷ EN 10.6.1176b34; 9.10.1170b28.

¹¹⁸ EN 2.7.1107a28; 2.1.1103a25.

¹¹⁹ EN 7.7.1150b3; 4.7.1127b28. The attention that St. Thomas devotes to the *decorum* is also due to Roman influences, in particular to Cicero. See G. Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 16.

¹²⁰ EN 4.7.1127a23 and a33.

Conclusion

It is noteworthy that, in St. Thomas's systematic exposition of the virtue of temperance, as we have seen, Aristotle occupies a central place in providing definitions, divisions, and arguments. In short, St. Thomas accepts his doctrine of this virtue as a truthful account of the nature of temperance, as full of human experience and wisdom and resulting from extremely keen observation and careful analysis. If one wonders why, in a theological study of the virtues, Aristotle's ethical doctrine does have a central place, the answer is that the infused virtues are, in their operation, similar to the acquired virtues.¹²¹ And in order to determine the nature of the former, we must resort to the latter.

Secondly, St. Thomas was convinced that Aristotle had given a correct analysis of the basic categories of thought by which we can define the nature of the virtues and the vices. One might quote here the words of John Henry Newman at one of his conferences intended to lay the groundwork for studies at the planned Catholic university in Dublin: "While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for the great Master does but analyze the thoughts and feelings, views and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle, and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it."¹²²

The somewhat scattered references to Aristotle in the questions following the basic treatment of the virtue of temperance itself show that St. Thomas had present in his mind the works of Aristotle. One feels tempted to say that, having read them once, he could with great ease quote them to clarify difficult or obscure aspects to the benefit of getting a clearer view of theological questions laying in the background. In this way, he reminded his students of an important natural truth: the order of grace does not do away with the order of nature, but builds on it and perfects it.¹²³

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¹²¹ *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 5, ad 3: "The acts of the infused supernatural virtues greatly resemble the acts of the acquired natural virtues [Actus autem virtutum gratuitarum habent maximam similitudinem cum actibus virtutum acquisitarum]" (trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. [Chicago: Henry Regnary, 1952]).

¹²² John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University*, discourse 5, no. 5 (New York: Longmans and Green, 1947), 97.

¹²³ See Leo Elders, "Faith and Reason: The Synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Nova et Vetera* (English) 8, no. 3 (2010): 527–52.