

Francisco Marín-Sola, OP, and the Origin of Jacques Maritain's Doctrine on God's Permission of Evil

MICHAEL TORRE
University of San Francisco
San Francisco, California

IN 1996, Editiones Universitaires Fribourg Suisse published the first volume of the lifelong correspondence between Jacques Maritain and Charles Journet.¹ From it, one can discover the origin of the former's view on God's permission of evil (and other directly related ideas pertaining to God's governance of created liberty). The correspondence reveals that Maritain's thought depends, directly and substantially, on that of Francisco Marín-Sola, OP.² This had already been surmised by some familiar with the latter's published work on these matters;³ the correspondence

¹ *Journet Maritain: Correspondance*, vol. 1, 1920–1929, ed. Mgr. Pierre Mamie (Paris: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse and Éditions Saint-Paul, 1996); vol. 2, 1930–1939, and vol. 3, 1940–1949, were published in 1997 and 1998. Their correspondence began in 1920; within two years, they were addressing each other as “friend”; by late 1924, they were corresponding very regularly.

² Marín-Sola published three articles on this matter: “El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina,” *La Ciencia Tomista* 32 (1925): 5–54; “Respuesta a algunas objeciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina,” *La Ciencia Tomista* 33 (1926): 5–74; and “Nuevas observaciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina,” *La Ciencia Tomista* 33 (1926): 321–97.

³ This was noted by L. Vereecke, CSSR, in his entry “Alphonse Ligouri” in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1967), 339; and by John Rock, SJ, in “St. Thomas on Divine Causality,” *Philosophical Studies* 5 (1955): 22. Jean-Hervé Nicolas, OP, also associates the two positions in his “La permission du mal” (*Revue Thomiste* 60 [1960], 5–37, 185–206, and 509–46), but he tries to show that they are really distinct positions (whereas, as will be seen herein, they are essentially the same). See also my “God's Permission of Sin: Negative or Conditioned Decree?” (Ph.D. diss., Graduate Theological Union, 1983), 825–49.

reveals both the degree of this dependence and the very interesting way in which it developed.

Charles Journet had a high opinion of Marín-Sola's book on the evolution of Catholic dogma.⁴ In his second letter to Maritain after arriving in Fribourg, Journet asks him to send any objections he has to the book, after he has read it; he can then pass them on to Marín-Sola, who appreciates them, since they give him the opportunity to develop certain finer points.⁵ In a reply that has been lost,⁶ Maritain apparently forwarded to Journet some objections of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP,⁷ for Journet says he knew of these, but does not find them telling: He had hoped for Maritain's own objections.⁸ In his next letter, Maritain admits that he has not yet had time to read the book, passes on one difficulty he foresees, and says that he is also asking for the opinion of Roland Dalbiez.⁹ Journet then gives

⁴ Starting in 1911, Marín-Sola published a series of articles on this matter in *La Ciencia Tomista* (and occasionally in the *Revue Thomiste*). He then published a book on the subject, *La Evolución homogénea del dogma católico* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1923), translated into French as *L'Évolution homogène du dogme catholique* (Fribourg: St. Paul, 1924). Emilio Sauras wrote a general introduction to the second, 1952, BAC edition (3–125), that supplies valuable information concerning Marín-Sola's life and work (especially 12–34), including his as yet unpublished three-volume masterwork, the *Concordia Tomista*.

⁵ Journet, letter no. 87 (November 14, 1924), 247. The editors indicate that Maritain had previously received a dedicated copy of the book (Mamie, *Journet Maritain*, 252, note 1).

⁶ The editors note this in p. 250, note 1. In his own letter of November 14 (no. 86), 245, Maritain had thanked Journet for sending him some volumes of Norbert del Prado, OP, although we now possess no letter or note from Journet that may have accompanied this package. It is possible that Journet sent him Marín-Sola's book in the same packet, since his next letter asks for Maritain's views on it. It also seems likely that Journet did not keep the objections sent him, since they were not Maritain's own, but ones of Garrigou-Lagrange that he already possessed.

⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange had himself dealt with this issue in his *De Revelatione* (Rome: Ferrari, 1918). He favored the view of Reginald Schultes, OP who had argued against Marín-Sola's view. See the latter's *Introductio in historiam dogmatum* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1922); and *De Revelatione*, vol. 1, 509, for Garrigou-Lagrange's view. Marín-Sola acknowledged their differences (see *Evolución*, 465, note 42, in relation to Garrigou-Lagrange, and 809 ff. in relation to Schultes), but sought to minimize their differences and to laud their respective virtues.

⁸ Journet, letter no. 88, (November 20, 1924), 249–50. This letter immediately follows his previous one of the fourteenth. As Journet notes, their letters of the fourteenth had crossed in the mail. In this second letter, Journet also expresses his irritation with Garrigou-Lagrange for objecting to Marín-Sola's views from his articles alone, and without reading his book.

⁹ Maritain, letter no. 89 (December 2, 1924), 251.

Maritain's difficulty to Marín-Sola and sends back the latter's answer to Maritain.¹⁰ Maritain replies to this letter by forwarding to Journet Dalbiez's favorable "review" and expressing annoyance with himself for not yet having gotten to Marín-Sola's book.¹¹ Maritain seems content with Dalbiez's opinion and willing to entertain Marín-Sola's position. A month later, Journet forwards the latter's answer to one matter Dalbiez had raised, reporting that he had liked Dalbiez's remarks.¹² This marks the end of the exchange.

There are several features of this initial exchange worth noting. First, Marín-Sola is at the center of their correspondence at this time. Indeed, starting with Journet's second letter from Fribourg (no. 88, November 20), Marín-Sola is mentioned in all of their next eleven letters save three (each a brief note). Second, while Journet greatly admires the latter's person and work, Maritain is more hesitant. Third, the reason for this is clear: Maritain is aware of the opposition of Garrigou-Lagrange, with whom he was at that time very close. (Garrigou-Lagrange had only recently helped Maritain found the *Cercles Thomistes* and was giving its yearly retreat at Meudon.) Fourth, his own admiration of Garrigou-Lagrange and consequent hesitation in relation to Marín-Sola does not prevent Maritain from appreciating the latter's work. Fifth, their relation follows a pattern: Maritain becomes familiar with Marín-Sola's thought through Journet; he sends Journet his difficulties, which the latter gives to Marín-Sola in Fribourg; and Marín-Sola then replies to Maritain via the same conduit. All of these features also mark their second exchange, which concerns God's permission of evil and the ideas directly related to it.

That new exchange begins with Journet's fifth letter from Fribourg (no. 92, December 10, 1924). In it, he indicates that Marín-Sola is "meditating on a way to restore the Thomistic notions of predestination, operating and efficacious grace, etc." and that he is ready to publish a series of articles on them.¹³ Maritain shows an immediate interest in this question. In the same letter in which he forwards Dalbiez's favorable opinion on evolution, he says he hopes that Marín-Sola will particularly address the issue of sin and its permission: He believes the Dominican position on

¹⁰ Journet, letter no. 90 (December 4, 1924), 254–55.

¹¹ Maritain, letter no. 93 (December 26, 1924), 262. Dalbiez's letter to Maritain was published seventy years later: "Une lettre de Roland Dalbiez à Jacques Maritain," *Nova et Vetera* 69 (1994/2), 155–59.

¹² Journet, letter no. 95 (January 28, 1925), 271–72, and letter no. 97 (February 11, 1925), 276. Maritain much later makes one further reference to this matter, indicating he had by then read Marín-Sola's book (letter no. 237a [May 11, 1928]).

¹³ Journet, letter no. 92 (December 10, 1924), 260, my translation (and hereafter, of both Journet and Maritain).

the morally good act is clearly “triumphant,” but that there remain “difficulties to resolve” concerning the morally evil act.¹⁴ From this letter throughout 1925, Marín-Sola’s views on this matter become a central topic of their exchange, so much so that the editors include an explanatory appendix on it by Georges Cottier, OP.¹⁵ Save for two brief notes, Marín-Sola is discussed in their next six letters (nos. 94–99) and, after a month’s hiatus, four of their next six (nos. 104–109); after the summer, there are another eight letters devoted to his views (nos. 109, 111, 112, 123, 125, 127, 128, and 131), culminating in a long letter in early 1926 that Maritain sends to Marín-Sola via Journet (no. 138a); three further letters (nos. 139, 148, and 149) end their exchange, a total of some two dozen letters, mostly in a one-year period (February 1925–February 1926). From it, the way Maritain comes to his own views through the teaching of Marín-Sola emerges clearly.

In his first letter expressing interest in this whole subject, Maritain says that he believes the “proposition” or “first initiative” of sin must come from the sinner (and not God).¹⁶ The sinner is

actually present to God’s eyes by reason of the eternity of his creative knowledge, and, because he is created from nothing, because nothingness is in the very entrails of the creature, he is constantly tending towards that nothingness under the hands of God and is in this way *constantly demanding permission* to engage in such and such sins.¹⁷

God sees the possibility of such sins in his simple intelligence and, for a greater good, gives his permission for one such, “from which follows (not according to time, but according to priorities and posteriorities of nature) the pure privation, inordination, or inconsideration of which Garrigou-Lagrange speaks (*Dieu*, 689–99), which sterilizes sufficient grace and in reason of which occurs the refusal of efficacious grace; in this way, we ourselves are sufficient in order to sin (*Dieu*, 684).”¹⁸ Maritain also thinks that we should give a double sense to the words “without Me you can do nothing” (*sine me nihil potestis facere*): Without Me you cannot do anything

¹⁴ Maritain, letter no. 93 (December 26, 1924), 262.

¹⁵ See Cottier, *Journet Maritain: Correspondance*, appendice 2, “La Liberté Créée Devant Dieu (À propos de la prémotion physique),” 742–46.

¹⁶ Maritain, letter no. 93 (December 26, 1924), 262.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 262. Throughout this paper, all emphases in this paper are original, unless otherwise noted.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 262–63. Garrigou-Lagrange’s work is *Dieu, son existence et sa nature* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1914); English, *God: His Existence and Nature* (St. Louis: Herder, 1946).

and without Me you can “do nothing” (*faire le rien*).¹⁹ He allows that Garrigou-Lagrange says all of this, but “more in the conclusions than in the principles and without sufficiently dotting his ‘i’s.”²⁰

This long paragraph is the first time Maritain gives his own personal view of this matter, one he had developed before possessing any knowledge of Marín-Sola’s view. There are several things especially worth noting about his ideas. First, they depend upon those of Garrigou-Lagrange in important ways. The latter had also argued that God’s refusal of efficacious grace supposed a defect on the part of the sinner (one that “sterilized sufficient grace”); but, he had also argued, that defect itself supposed God’s permissive will; and, furthermore, he had argued, that defect followed infallibly from the divine permission.²¹ Maritain follows him on these key ideas, so much so that one could speak of his view at this point as a variant on that of Garrigou-Lagrange (a characterization he himself more or less makes). Yet it is clear that already Maritain wants to find a way to give the first initiative in sin to the creature, and not to God’s permission: The creature “constantly tends towards nothingness” (“*faisant constamment pression vers le néant*”) and thus is “*constantly demanding permission*” (“*demandant constamment la permission*”) to engage in sin.²² In this crucial respect, his view tends to differ from Garrigou-Lagrange’s. Finally, in Maritain’s exegesis of *sine me nihil potestis facere*, the passage implies or suggests the “nihil” [“le néant”] that the creature tends toward on his own initiative. This creative exegesis and use of “nihil” is characteristic of Maritain’s writings on this matter throughout his career.²³

This paragraph is also interesting for what it does not contain. There is here no distinction made between a “*negatio pura*” that precedes sin

¹⁹ Maritain, letter no. 93 (December 26, 1924), 263.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ See Garrigou-Lagrange, *God: His Existence and Nature*, vol. 2, 365–96.

²² Maritain, letter no. 93 (December 26, 1924), 262.

²³ He first uses it in *Freedom in the Modern World* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1936) and systematically thereafter. (See notes 143, 149, and 150, below, for his first two usages of this in French works and his first important usage of it in English.) He uses it first in an English work (albeit not “technically”) in “The Thomist Idea of Freedom,” in Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), 119. Other typical examples can be found in Maritain, *Existence and the Existent*, 92; idem, *God and the Permission of Evil*, 33; and idem, *On the Philosophy of History*, 119. He uses it last in “Réflexions sur le savoir théologique,” in Maritain, *Approches sans entraves* (Paris: Fayard, 1973), 292–326, esp. 308–9; English: “For an Existential Epistemology II: Reflections on Theological Knowledge,” in *Untrammeled Approaches*, trans. Bernard Döering (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 243–71, especially pages 248–64.

and the “privatio” of sin itself or between a “non-consideration” of the rule and an “inconsideration” of it. Neither is there any distinction between a divine permission that antecedes this “negatio pura” and one that supposes it. Nor, and even more importantly, is there any suggestion of a divine permission that simply permits sin to be possible and one that supposes a defect in the creature and from which sin infallibly follows. Similarly, there is no idea of God’s antecedent will being conditionally efficacious and grounding a divine motion that can effect a true good or that can be impeded (that is, a “motion brisable”). All of these ideas are characteristic of Maritain’s mature thought on sin and its cause, but there is not the least indication that he has yet thought of or embraced such ideas when he first begins to think about this matter.

In his letter, Maritain apologizes to Journet for all of his “chatter” (“bavardage”) and asks Journet to correct it, should he think otherwise.²⁴ He also is obviously much interested in what Marín-Sola may think about what he had written. For, upon learning from Journet that he had forwarded his ideas to Marín-Sola,²⁵ but hearing nothing further from him in his next two letters about what the latter thinks, Maritain writes that he would be happy to learn of his views, should Marín-Sola mention something to Journet concerning the permission of sin.²⁶ In his following letter, Journet sends back to Maritain Marín-Sola’s reaction.²⁷

Journet says that Marín-Sola was very brief in his response, because this is precisely the question he is just beginning to address in his series of projected articles for *La Ciencia Tomista*.²⁸ Journet passes on three comments. First, that Maritain is right to see that the issue that needs more debate is God’s permission of sin. However, in the second place, that for sin infallibly to follow God’s permission, one must suppose the creature to be totally corrupt (the unacceptable premise of Calvinism). Thirdly, what Thomists have not sufficiently exploited is that, for Thomas, the cause of evil stops with the secondary cause: God does not know evil in himself, but in knowing the evil will of the secondary cause.

Three things should be noted here. First, Marín-Sola sees that Maritain is trying to move toward the position he himself had worked out, namely, that the first initiative for sin must lie with the creature’s will, not with God’s will (permissive or otherwise). Second, Marín-Sola puts his finger on the weakness in Maritain’s first view: In thinking that a defect

²⁴ Maritain, letter no. 93 (December 26, 1924), 263.

²⁵ Journet, letter no. 95 (January 28, 1925), 271.

²⁶ Maritain, letter no. 98 (February 14, 1925), 278.

²⁷ Journet, letter no. 99 (March 5, 1925), 282.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 282.

must follow infallibly from God's permission, he inevitably makes the creature unable to do any good when left to himself. Third, he indicates why Maritain and Thomists make this error: They want to explain all of God's knowledge, including sin, through himself alone—that is, through his own permissive will—rather than through the secondary cause.

Journet writes Maritain again twenty-six days later (March 31) without mentioning Marín-Sola, while Maritain's next surviving letter²⁹ to Journet is only written on April 28, thus coming almost two months after receiving Marín-Sola's response. It is perhaps not too surprising, then, that he makes no allusion to it in that letter. He remains, however, quite interested in what Marín-Sola has said, and thus six weeks later (June 2), he asks Journet whether he has spoken further with him about the permission of sin.³⁰ He also asks for the address of *La Ciencia Tomista* (having searched Paris in vain for months to find it!) and asks if Marín-Sola has begun to publish his articles there.³¹ That he has followed his thought can be seen in his response to it. He tells Journet that he can see how Marín-Sola's view will "marvelously explain" that God's will does not initiate sin, but will it not make God's knowledge be determined by the creature?

[I]f evil—I do not mean the evil act effectuated, but the deficiency or inordination that is the root of evil in the will of the creature; I mean *this determinate deficiency, here and now*, and which could not have been—precedes the permission that God accords it. . . . Is not the divine knowledge going to find itself *determined by the creature*?³²

He cannot see how to get past this obstacle posed by Marín-Sola's view.

Several observations are worth making here. First, Maritain also goes directly to the heart of the difficulty. Marín-Sola will himself affirm that how God knows sin is obscure for us, and that it may remain so in his account is practically its only real difficulty.³³ Second, although Maritain

²⁹ In a later letter (no. 106, June 12, 1925), Journet mentions some corrections Maritain had made in a book he had sent Marín-Sola. They had only recently referred to this book (in no. 95, January 28, 1925; and in no. 98, February 14, 1925), so Maritain must have only recently sent it to Marín-Sola; there is, however, no surviving letter that indicates when he did. There may have been, then, some exchange between Maritain and Marín-Sola during this two month period that is missing from his correspondence with Journet.

³⁰ Maritain, letter no. 104 (June 2, 1925), 293.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 295.

³² *Ibid.*, 293–94.

³³ For the obscurity of God's knowledge of sin, see Marín-Sola, "Respuesta a algunas objeciones," 41; for explaining it satisfactorily being practically the only difficulty his doctrine presents, see Marín-Sola, "Nuevas observaciones," 360. As we

distinguishes the defect that is the “root” of sin from the sinful act, he is still conceiving of this defect as “inordinate” (that is, not a “negatio pura”). Similarly, he supposes that no divine permission “precedes” it, because he is conceiving of permission as infallibly entailing what is permitted; (that is, he has not yet conceived of a divine permission that makes a defect possible, but not infallibly entailed). Thus, we can see that Maritain’s initial response is much like the response of other Thomists (such as Garrigou-Lagrange or Jean-Hervé Nicolas), who will later object to Marín-Sola’s position.

Journet writes Maritain within a week. He indicates that he has sent Marín-Sola Maritain’s difficulty, but does not yet have his response. He also reports a very revealing conversation. He had been saying that there was no middle ground between the *scientia media* and the divine decree. This prompted a sudden outburst of breath in Marín-Sola, who replied “yes, there was a middle ground for evil.”³⁴ He said that many Thomists ought to have seen the difficulty, but they have not dared take it up: It has been twenty years since he thought so.³⁵ Both Journet and Marín-Sola understood the risk he was taking in criticizing a position that many Thomists had taught all their life, and Journet describes him as “carrying a great weight.”³⁶ He thinks his articles will be a “great event,” but worries especially about the reaction of Garrigou-Lagrange. Marín-Sola knew that the latter had wanted to denounce him to the Dominican Master General for his work on the evolution of dogma; the previous general had supported Marín-Sola, but Journet is worried that the new general will not be as sympathetic on this issue.³⁷ Journet fears that “the good F. Garrigou or the Angelicum will immediately oppose him and will judge

will have the occasion to see, Marín-Sola makes this last observation with Maritain very much in mind.

³⁴ Journet, letter no. 105 (June 9, 1925).

³⁵ Ibid., 299. It would be interesting to know what prompted Marín-Sola’s initial interest. Perhaps it was the series of articles of Henri Guillemin, OP, (to whom he refers in his second article) on sufficient grace. See his “De la grâce suffisante,” *Revue Thomiste* 9 (1901): 505–19, *Revue Thomiste* 10 (1902): 47–76, 374–404, and 654–75; and *Revue Thomiste* 11 (1903): 20–31. In this last article (p. 23), Guillemin even says that sufficient grace might seem to be an impedible motion that will not always be impeded; he argues, however, that it will be. Were one not convinced by his arguments there, one would end with a view of sufficient grace very similar to Marín-Sola’s.

³⁶ Ibid., 298.

³⁷ Ibid. In this, Journet was prescient. He, not surprisingly, assumed that a Spanish Master General would look favorably upon his work. In fact, the new Master General—Buenaventura García de Paredes—while Spanish, was not well disposed toward Marín-Sola.

him, with pen still in hand, from the *Salmanticenses* or some other later Thomist, without waiting to read all.”³⁸ (This was what Garrigou-Lagrange had in fact done in relation to Marín-Sola’s *Evolution*, and it is what he was to do in relation to this question as well. What Journet feared is exactly what came to pass.)

Three days later, Journet writes Maritain again, forwarding him Marín-Sola’s reply to his difficulty. He says that his first article on this question, which was to appear shortly, will be sufficient for *him* to resolve all the other questions.³⁹ In response to his difficulty, Journet reports his reply as follows:

*[I]t is necessary to concede that God is determined, not subjectively and efficiently (by good!) but objectively and deficiently (by evil) and, at my astonishment, he placed under my eyes in two seconds a text of Billuart that places an objective determination in God. God knows evil post decretum non per decretum, in his eternity, not in his causality.*⁴⁰

Marín-Sola knows that Garrigou-Lagrange will shiver (“fremira”) when he reads his work. He believes that he is not changing the Thomistic view, but he also believes that Garrigou-Lagrange will not see this.⁴¹ Journet knows that Marín-Sola has deeply studied this matter, for he has seen his “enormous notebook of notes” that follow each historical development of this matter with great patience and method.⁴² Journet hopes

³⁸ Ibid., 299.

³⁹ Journet, letter no. 106 (June 12, 1925), 303.

⁴⁰ Ibid. The phrase “objective determination” affirms that there is a determination (one that is purely negative) in the created term or object of the divine decree. God knows the defect not in knowing himself alone, but in knowing the created object. This is just what Thomas himself says in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 10, ad 3: “evil . . . is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and, knowing *them*, He knows the opposite evils.” When confronted with the objection that it is an imperfection to know a defect *through* another (“per aliud”), he replies (ad 4) that it is no imperfection, because this is the only way a defect can exist (in a created good) and that it can be known: “To know a thing by something else *only* belongs to imperfect knowledge if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable” (my emphases). Note that this answer holds equally for physical evils caused by God and for moral evils caused by free creatures. Marín-Sola’s merit lay as much in calling attention to what Thomas had, in fact, said in this text as it did to any further commentary he made on it. It is this text that Thomists had insufficiently “exploited.”

⁴¹ Journet, letter no. 106 (June 12, 1925), 303–4.

⁴² Ibid., 305. There are presently some twenty notebooks of Marín-Sola’s notes on this matter (of some two hundred pages each, roughly) in the archives of the Spanish Dominicans in Avila. These are probably the notebooks to which Journet refers.

to avoid an antagonism between the two Dominicans: He will try to work on Marín-Sola, and he urges Maritain to do the same with Garrigou-Lagrange.⁴³

The risk he was running can be seen from another of his comments that Journet passes on to Maritain. He told Journet that “the question in *de Auxiliis* had not been settled with the desirable sangfroid and objectivity.”⁴⁴ To the Jesuit formula that with a general aid or “versatile grace,” man is able to have *more* than that to which God moved him, the Dominicans had opposed the formula that man is able to have *only* that to which God moved him; but the correct formula should have been that man is able to have *less* than that to which God moved him. And, against the Jesuit formula that God knows sin in the *scientia media*, the Dominicans had opposed the formula that God knows sin in His permissive decree; but the correct formula should have been that He knows sin in the sinner physically present to His *eternity* (“*post decretum* in his *eternity*,” as Journet reported).⁴⁵

We have no evidence of Maritain’s first reaction to Marín-Sola’s reply. A month later, however, Journet writes him a second letter, in which he tells Maritain how very much Marín-Sola appreciates his work: “[H]e told me that he had for you more than admiration, a real veneration, and that you had spoken of things in a way that ‘we’ were not able.”⁴⁶ He is in the process of reading Maritain’s *Three Reformers*,⁴⁷ which had just appeared, and he finds it admirable, especially Maritain’s characterization of Descartes’s “angelism.” It is obvious, from this and from his previous comment, that Marín-Sola regards their exchange on God’s permission as one that is amicable, one proper to friends equally dedicated to Thomas.

At this time, Marín-Sola published his first article in *La Ciencia Tomista*. Our interest in it here lies only in the way it bears upon Maritain’s later doctrine. Since Marín-Sola carefully distinguishes what he terms “the line of good” from the “line of evil,” and since his central interest is with the

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Journet, letter no. 106 (June 12, 1925), 304.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 303–4. Those unfamiliar with the 1920s may be puzzled by this idea of “risk.” The recent Thomistic revival had also revived the dispute between Jesuits and Dominicans concerning the ideas of *de auxiliis*. In criticizing an idea held by many Dominicans, he ran the risk of being accused of betraying his order’s position. This is just what happened.

⁴⁶ Journet, letter no. 109 (July 13, 1925), 308–9. The “we” presumably refers to “Catholic clerics.”

⁴⁷ Maritain, *Trois Réformateurs: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau* (Paris: Plon, 1925), English: *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1928).

second (which also is Maritain's central interest in his later doctrine on the permission of evil), we will be concerned here mainly with this "line."⁴⁸

Marín-Sola makes the following points: God's antecedent will that one attain a certain end (for example, salvation) is real and conditionally efficacious; in accord with it, God moves a creature toward the moral good (*bonum honestum*) in a way that is fallibly efficacious or impeditable; God thus infallibly places a free creature in act or moves toward a determinate end, but it can impede this motion from reaching the end towards which it is moved; *there is no other cause or explanation of this impediment than the creature's own will*; the first defect or impediment of the creature is its voluntary non-consideration of the rule that should govern action; this is not yet sin itself (a faulty consent or election), but the cause of sin (a defective final practical judgment); the sinful election infallibly follows the defective judgment, unless God intervenes in a special way; God infallibly knows the creature's defective judgment, because the creature is physically present to his eternity; God's permission that a creature sin infallibly entails that a creature sin only on the supposition that the creature is defective; however, supposing a creature is not defective, God's permission only makes sin possible; thus, it is the free creature's (fallible) will, and not God's (permissive) will, that determines the creature's actual defect and consequent sin.⁴⁹ Anyone familiar with Maritain's views will find them in this first article. In substance and in almost all details, most of Maritain's later views are simply those of Marín-Sola.

Marín-Sola indicates that much in his doctrine is not new to Thomists. It is principally new in not trying to explain a creature's initial defect by reference to a divine permission that would infallibly entail or determine that it exist; consequently, God's infallible knowledge of this defect must derive not from a divine decree, but from something else, namely, the fact that God's knowledge is eternal and all creation is present to it; finally, since a creature need not impede a divine motion to the moral good, the proper idea of a motion that is sufficient is one that effects the end toward which it moves, unless impeded. Let us attend to Marín-Sola's own words regarding these crucial points of his position.

In an interesting note, one can see Marín-Sola developing the same point on God's permission that he had made in relation to Maritain's own first ideas on this subject:

⁴⁸ Marín-Sola's first article was published in the July–August 1925 edition of *La Ciencia Tomista*. He begins his exposition by distinguishing the lines of good and evil (10). He later says that his main interest is with the second (11), and that he had arrived at his position some five years previously (1920), precisely in teaching a course devoted entirely to Thomas's teaching on the origin of evil (11).

⁴⁹ Marín-Sola, "El sistema tomista," esp. 17–22 and 46–52 (my emphasis).

[T]he divine permission that a creature sin is infallibly connected with sin, once one *supposes* the *actual* defect of the creature, but it is not so on *every supposition*, unless one is supposing a creature who is essentially evil. In effect, my permission that Peter fall, when he has not yet *begun* to fall nor even tripped, and therefore can not fall, in spite of my permission, is one thing; and a very distinct thing is the permission that he fall when he has already tripped and *begun to fall*, and infallibly will fall, if I do not support him.⁵⁰

To “trip” here is the inconsiderate final judgment that precedes choice; to “fall” is the sinful choice.⁵¹ Yet it is true, more generally, that there are two different senses to God’s permission: that we become defective (when we are not) and that we remain defective, when we already are. Given the first, to sin is only possible; given the second, to continue in sin follows infallibly. Many Thomists had mistakenly collapsed both suppositions. This yields a divine permission from which defect and sin infallibly follow, even though the creature is in a good (or graced) state. The key to Marín-Sola’s position lies in correcting this mistake.⁵²

Since God’s decree (permissive or otherwise) is not the cause of the creature’s actual defect, God cannot know this in knowing his own will alone. Again in a note, Marín-Sola deals with a problem this raises:

Perhaps someone will object that if the impediment or defect of the creature cannot be seen by God in his decrees insofar as decrees, but can be insofar as *eternal*, then God, before giving sufficient grace, does not know what this effect will have in the creature and He will be acting *blindly*. To this one responds that, in the first place, before *giving* sufficient grace is one thing and before *decreeing* to give it is another. Before giving it, He infallibly knows its effect, because He gives it in

⁵⁰ Ibid., 49–50, my translation of Marín-Sola: both here and hereafter.

⁵¹ In an interesting note in his second article, Marín-Sola writes that “what in necessary agents is the *specific form* is for intelligent or free creatures the *final practical judgment* that terminates ‘consilium’ or deliberation,” (“Respuesta a algunas objeciones,” p. 57). The exercise of this act thus will follow infallibly, save by a miracle.

⁵² To see better Thomas’s teaching on God’s permissive will, one should consult his extensive treatment in the *Sentences* (1, 47, 1, 2). He there teaches that we may not choose the object that is permitted (sin): “potest fieri oppositum eius quod permissum est”; that is, we are able not to sin, even though God permits sin. We find the same teaching elsewhere: God “permits some to be attacked, but He gives the fortitude to resist against this attack” (*On Divine Names*, 8, 5); and “God does not permit one to be tempted without the aid of divine grace” (*In 2 Corinthians*, 11, 5). There is no hint that Thomas means that we are “able” not to sin or to resist temptation only in the divided sense, and that we de facto will infallibly sin, given a divine permission; rather, God even aids us not to sin.

time and God knows everything from *eternity*. In the second place, if it concerns the before of *decreeing* to give it, and by “before” one intends an anteriority that affects the very *decrees* of God, then the phrase has no sense, because *all* the decrees are one sole and *eternal* act, without before or after. Thus God, from the first moment, knows everything and in no moment is ignorant of anything. Finally, if by this “before” one refers, as one ought to refer, to the *objects* of the decrees or to *our* human manner of conceiving them, then there is no inconvenience in conceding, and I believe that it ought to be conceded, that God does not infallibly know the outcome of sufficient grace *before decreeing* to give it, nor even in the very decree of giving it, *insofar as decree*. . . . To pretend that God knows all *before* every decree is Molinism and the *scientia media*. Whereas to pretend that God knows all *in* the decrees insofar as *decrees* will lead to placing the first cause of the actual defect of the creature in the divine decree. To one who objects that, in this case, the knowledge of God will be *determined* by the creature, we remind them to go to the proposition of Billuart: “*indebita voluntatis dispositio obiective determinat Deum ad movendum ad actum malum*.”⁵³

This text is obviously the one he had earlier shown Journet when replying to Maritain’s question, and the “one” referred to here is presumably Maritain himself. That this passage, as the previous one, appears in a note suggests that at least in part Marín-Sola added some notes only at the end, to reply to the difficulties that Maritain (and some others) had raised.

Finally, Marín-Sola is at pains to make clear that an impedible motion or sufficient grace does not imply that the creature is the first cause of any good. Some might argue that his theory entails that the creature’s “non-impediment” implies this and that it positively determines God’s grace or will. He anticipates this objection and replies to it as follows:

From the fact that God always gives an ulterior grace to one who has not placed an impediment to an anterior grace, it does not follow that the one not placing an impediment is the *cause* or *reason* of conceding a new grace. A seed or plant continues in its course or growth, not because one does not place an impediment (because a stone is not placed as an impediment and still it does not grow), but by virtue of its own vital power. Thus, the grace or supernatural premotion, once given by God, follows its course or growth, not because the *will* does not place an impediment, but by its own *proper* virtue. Yes, it is true that this power or course of grace will not continue, if the will places an impediment; but from this, that the will can paralyze or deviate the course of the motion or the

⁵³ Marín-Sola, “El sistema tomista,” 52–53. Billuart’s text is from his *De Deo Uno*, dissertation 8, article 5. The reference, here and to other commentators later referred to in this article, is taken from Marín-Sola.

divine grace, it does not follow that this motion is not intrinsically efficacious: it only follows that it is not *infallibly* or *perfectly efficacious*, as is no *sufficient* grace nor any motion of *general* providence. Neither does it follow that the not placing of an impediment is at least the *condition sine qua non*, since, even supposing the placing of an impediment, God can remove it and make it not interrupt the course of grace.⁵⁴

In other words, that the creature does what is in him (“*faciendi quod in se est*”) follows from the very power of the sufficient motion or grace itself (“*ex viribus gratiae*”), since it is moving him towards a determinate moral good.⁵⁵

As with Marín-Sola’s *Evolution*, so with this article, it comes to Maritain already under the negative judgment of Garrigou-Lagrange. For, when Maritain first mentions it to Journet, he says that the latter is up in arms against (“*trés monte contre*”) it. Maritain has been unable to get it and asks Journet to bring it with him (since later that month he is coming to Meudon for the fourth retreat of the *Cercles Thomistes*).⁵⁶ Journet does better, immediately sending him an extra copy he possessed.⁵⁷ A month later, Maritain travels to Fribourg to give a public lecture. Journet, reporting on its success in a letter to Raïssa, says that “F. Marín-Sola—he who never comes to conferences!—had attended in a beautiful, new, white robe.”⁵⁸ In his next letter to Maritain, Journet pronounces the conference a complete success and adds that Marín-Sola had spoken of “the enchantment he had had in seeing you; he loves you for the affability of your manner and is content to see that you are following the thread of his thought (while I am all at sea).”⁵⁹ This indicates that Maritain both had read his article and had spoken with him about it in Fribourg, but what he had thought of it is unclear, for Maritain does not mention Marín-Sola, in the letter immediately following his return to Meudon.⁶⁰

In this same letter in which he speaks of Marín-Sola, Journet indicates that he will interrupt his series of articles just this once to reply to difficulties that are being raised. Journet worries about this affair:

How will this end? I would have much preferred that F. Garrigou-Lagrange had reserved his objections to the end: in objecting after his

⁵⁴ Ibid., 29.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 31.

⁵⁶ Maritain, letter no. 111 (September 9, 1925), 312.

⁵⁷ Journet, letter no. 112 (September 12, 1925), 313.

⁵⁸ Journet, letter no. 121 (October 23, 1925), 326.

⁵⁹ Journet, letter no. 123 (October 30, 1925), 330–31.

⁶⁰ Maritain, letter no. 122 (October 24–25, 1925), 328.

first article, he gives the air of a man who is too pushy ["trop pressé"] and fevered ["fièvreux"]. That annoys me the more inasmuch as I love him with all my heart.⁶¹

Maritain must have responded to this letter, sending him some questions; for, two weeks later, Journet writes to respond to them. He indicates that Marín-Sola has finished his second article, part of which deals with the divine knowledge. Marín-Sola told Journet that, in writing this part, he had thought constantly of Maritain.⁶² Journet (worried that he may be prevented from completing his work) had urged him to publish his book all at once, and Marín-Sola had said he could do so by the following Easter: Only the citations would take some time.⁶³

In his reply to this letter, Maritain indicates that "this Marín-Garrigou controversy has caused me much worry."⁶⁴ He would very much like for the former to have reason, but

my instinct continues to make me terribly suspicious of a humanization and facilitation that would be at the expense of the great essential principles that the [Dominican] order was created to maintain. To admit in God the least formal determination coming from the creature is to destroy God.⁶⁵

The only way he thinks Marín-Sola can save his position is by showing how he can "safeguard the absolute independence of the divine knowledge, while avoiding Molina."⁶⁶ This needs to be addressed with metaphysical profundity, but he worries that Marín-Sola "prefers to concern himself with considerations that are more moral and less high."⁶⁷ Despite these misgivings, however, Maritain asks Journet to pass on to Marín-Sola "all my respectful sympathy."⁶⁸

Journet, in his reply, says that he is of the same mind: One cannot "put into the '*homo est prima causa mali*' anything that would make God passive."⁶⁹ It makes him a little uneasy to "hear him say that it is too bad if one cannot explain the divine knowledge."⁷⁰ Yet, Journet thinks that Marín-Sola has

⁶¹ Ibid., 331.

⁶² Journet, letter no. 125 (November 12, 1925), 334.

⁶³ Ibid., 334.

⁶⁴ Maritain, letter no. 127 (November 19, 1925), 337.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 337–38.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 338.

⁶⁹ Journet, letter no. 128 (November 29, 1925), 341.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 340.

many resources to deal with his difficulties: He would have preferred Garrigou-Lagrange to remain calm, while waiting for further articles.⁷¹ The latter chose not to, however, opposing him in the November–December 1925 issue of the *Revue Thomiste*.⁷² After reading his article, Journet writes Maritain that he himself could resolve many of his difficulties without too much trouble.⁷³ Maritain swiftly replies to this letter, but he makes no allusion to the controversy that has now “gone public.”⁷⁴

Marín-Sola himself replied to each of Garrigou-Lagrange’s difficulties in the following issue of *La Ciencia Tomista*.⁷⁵ Since our concern with it again is only as it bears upon Maritain, we will only review clarifications to the three central points earlier noted.

To take the last first, Marín-Sola is again at pains to indicate that his doctrine does not entail any first causality of the creature in the good. First, he notes that theologians speak of motions that are “frustrable,” “fallible,” or “impedible,” but he prefers the third (which is evidently closer to Thomas’s own language); for God’s glory and the good of the universe are not frustrated (even if a creature sins), and it is not God’s motion that “fails,” but the sinner.⁷⁶ Second, “the *making use* of grace comes from the grace itself; but the *not making use* or *abuse* comes from our own fault, in which we, and not God, are the *first cause*.”⁷⁷ And thus,

if Peter is moved by God most determinately to *act well*, he is thereby moved *not to place* an impediment to the divine motion, since in this precisely consists to *act well*. . . . If Peter does not place an impediment, then, he has in truth *more than John*, who places it, but he has *neither more nor less than that to which God moves him*.⁷⁸

Furthermore,

to the one who does not place an impediment to the sufficient preventient or operating grace received, God will give a further aiding or cooperating grace, because God never interrupts the *course* of grace if

⁷¹ Ibid., 341.

⁷² Garrigou-Lagrange, “La grâce efficace est-elle nécessaire pour les actes salutaires faciles?” *Revue Thomiste* 30 (1925): 558–66.

⁷³ Journet, letter no. 131 (December 24, 1925), 348.

⁷⁴ Maritain, letter no. 132 (December 31, 1925), 350.

⁷⁵ Marín-Sola, “Respuesta a algunas objeciones”: See note 2 above for the full reference.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 33.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 56–57.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 60.

man does not interrupt it, and with this *greater grace*, he has a *greater continuation of the act* than the other.⁷⁹

He again explains, now in greater depth, God's knowledge of the defect he does not cause. He again refers to a teaching of some Thomists (now Gonet, not Billuart) that man "objectively and materially determines the divine motion."⁸⁰ He then adds:

By only recalling that, in Thomism, all *divine knowledge* of the contingent is always *posterior* to [that is, supposes] the *decree*, one will immediately see that, if it is right to say that the divine motion and divine decree are modified by something of the creature, it will be right—and with greater reason—to say that the *divine knowledge*, always *posterior* to the decree, is modified. But all this is an *objective and material* modification made by the *defect* of the creature. It is, in a word, a defective modification. This in no way prejudices the rights and the dignity of the *first cause*, because God is the first cause only *in the line of the good*.⁸¹

His doctrine is that this defect is known in God's eternal action and he offers the following analogy:

[I]f I am raising in the air an object that can offer resistance to my action, a child for example, then in that very arm—that is, in my action or my causality—I am perceiving the effect of raising it; in that very arm, I perceive that the child struggles or resists my action; in that very arm, I perceive that the child has broken loose or escaped my action.⁸²

Or again: "If I see a statue well and it has no head, I see the statue to be *without head*; that is, I see not only what it has, but also, seeing *all* that it has, I see *ipso facto* all that it *does not have*, all that it *lacks*, all its *defects*."⁸³ Or, finally:

This *action* of God, this *actual not potential causation*, in being infinitely *intimate* to *being* insofar as being, which is its proper and formal effect, is *present* to everything; and, in being infinitely intelligent, *sees all* of it; and, in being eternal, *foresees* all of it: whether positive or negative, whether good or defective, whether infallibly or fallibly caused: *absolutely all*.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Ibid., 54.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 38–39. Gonet's text is from his *De Scientia Dei*, disputation 4, no. 200 (Vives, Tome I, 426).

⁸¹ Ibid., 39.

⁸² Ibid., 49.

⁸³ Ibid., 50.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

As can be seen, Marín-Sola appeals to God's eternity (or his decree as eternal) to explain how he can know infallibly something that is not caused infallibly. He points out that something can be present to another in two ways: by causality and by real containment. Thus, for example, water is contained in a vase or bodies in space (and are present to the latter without being caused by it); and thus, were these containers "by nature completely intellectual and infallibly comprehensive, they would contain all these things intellectually and would infallibly know them, without any relation to their causality."⁸⁵ Since, "in order for a thing to be present to eternity what is required according to Thomistic principles, *neither more nor less*, is that it exist in time";⁸⁶ and since this only requires that it be caused not that it be caused infallibly, it follows that something can be fallibly caused and yet be present to, or contained by, God's eternity, and thus be known infallibly.

Finally, as regards God's permission itself, it might be wondered why God allows a creature to resist him, since he could move him irresistibly to the moral good. With other Dominicans, Marín-Sola allows that there is nothing contradictory to freedom in willing the moral good irresistibly; indeed, he holds that this is a perfection of freedom, one proper to God himself (who freely yet infallibly wills the moral good).⁸⁷ And he holds that God does move the will this way: for example, in the process of justification, when he infuses sanctifying grace.⁸⁸ Yet, Marín-Sola argues, God also (and generally) moves creatures in a way that is "exactly *accommodated* to the exigencies and conditions of the creature."⁸⁹ Since all free creatures are by nature *defectible*, God moves them in a way accommodated to their defectible nature, such that they can resist or not his solicitations to act rightly.⁹⁰ In other words, God wills *absolutely* that a

⁸⁵ Ibid., 36.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 44.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 24.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 58. In Marín-Sola's doctrine, if God calls, then one is infallibly called; likewise, if God justifies, one is infallibly justified; and, finally, if God wills that one persevere in grace, then one infallibly perseveres. But there is a course between vocation and justification and between it and final perseverance, and one may impede that course. Thus, God moves free creatures in two different ways: sufficiently and efficaciously. The first is the general way proportioned to the free creature's own nature, which is defectible; the second is the special way proportioned to God's own indefectibility, when he introduces his divine life into his creature's own: when the Holy Spirit first inspires it, in its vocation; when the Holy Spirit first dwells in the creature through sanctifying grace, in its justification; and when, by its final perseverance, the Holy Spirit ensures its entrance into God's everlasting glory.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 23.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 24.

free creature be able to resist him or not. In his first article, Marín-Sola notes (following Ferrariensis) that God's antecedent will of an end includes the consequent will of means to that end:⁹¹ that is, God wills absolutely that a free creature be moved toward an end defectibly, permitting the end to be, or not to be, impeded.

Marín-Sola supports his position by an abundance of texts from his Dominican tradition. Indeed, no one—before, during, or since his time—has displayed a similar mastery of that tradition, at least in relation to these matters.⁹² He also quotes a number of important texts in Thomas. Here are just a few key examples: “quod aliquis dicitur extinguere Spiritus Sanctum in se, vel in alio, cum alius aliquid boni ex fervore Spiritus Sanctum vult facere, vel etiam cum aliquis bonus motus in ipso *surgit*, et ipse *impedit*: actorum 7—vos semper spiritui sancto *restitistis*” (*In I Thessalonians*, cap. 5, lect. 2); “in potestate liberi arbitrii est impedire divinae gratiae receptionem *vel non impedire*” (*Summa contra Gentiles*, III, 159); “in rebus voluntarius defectus actionis a voluntate actu deficiente procedit, inquantum non subijcit se actu suae regulae. Qui tamen *defectus non est culpa*, sed eum sequitur culpa, ex eo quod cum tali defectu operatur” (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 49, a. 1, ad 3); “ratio interdum *cessat* a consideratione regulae debitae, et sic voluntas producit actum peccati” (*ST I-II*, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1); “non uti regulae rationis *praeintelligitur* in voluntatem ante inordinatam electionem: huius autem quod est non uti regula rationis *non oportet quaerere aliam causam nisi voluntatis libertatem* quia videlicet in eius potestate est ut sinat moveri a ratione, *vel non sinat*” (*De malo* 1, 3).⁹³

I note the above texts of Thomas, as I have various of Marín-Sola's texts, only so that one can better see the degree to which Maritain's later doctrine depends upon his. (It can still be difficult, as it was for Maritain, to obtain Marín-Sola's articles.) As those familiar with Maritain know, he refers to many of these very same texts in support of his own position. This is not surprising, for they are central to the question at issue. Still, it

⁹¹ Marín-Sola, “El sistema tomista,” 16–17. Ferrariensis's text is from his *In Summa contra Gentiles*, III, 94.

⁹² He quotes, often at length and from different works, the following Thomists: Juan de Aliaga, Alvarez, Bancel, Billuart, Cajetan, Capreolus, Contenson, Ferrariensis, Pedro de Godoy, Gonet, González de Albeda, Goudin, John of St. Thomas, Peter de Ledesma, Lemos, Massoulié, Medina, Navarette, Nicolai, Reginald, the Salmanticenses, Serry, and Domingo Soto. He also quotes from works of his immediate predecessors (for example, Guillermin and del Prado) and from his contemporaries (for example, Hugon).

⁹³ See Marín-Sola, “Respuesta a algunas objeciones,” 12; and idem, “El sistema tomista,” 25 and 46 (my emphases).

was Marín-Sola who first called attention to the way they supported views Maritain will hold.

Maritain apparently never had any difficulty with Marín-Sola's views on permission. As noted earlier, he himself tended toward a somewhat similar view. Neither was he concerned with the idea of an impendible motion, although this considerably exercised Garrigou-Lagrange and thus seemingly gave him some pause. Maritain's difficulties ever concerned the divine knowledge. This can be seen from a remarkable letter forwarded to Marín-Sola via Journet.⁹⁴ Maritain thanks him for sending a copy of his second article and responds to it.

Maritain begins by saying he remains much interested in his views and he desires that his thesis be demonstrated. He believes he has put his finger on difficulties that cannot be hidden, but a great "obscurity" remains for him: not so much in the *infallibility* of God's knowledge (which Marín-Sola's second article treated at length), but in its *independence*.⁹⁵

Again with his customary intelligence, Maritain puts his finger on the key issue: what explains the way in which "the obstacle the creature opposes to the course of sufficient grace"⁹⁶ passes from God's simple knowledge (of its possibility) to his knowledge of vision (of its actuality). "Is it the will (at least permissive) of God that effects this passage? Or is it the *defectus* of the creature? And, in this last case, how avoid having the knowledge of God *depend* upon the creature?"⁹⁷ The first option is the one defended by Garrigou-Lagrange (and many previous Dominicans); the second is the one proposed by Marín-Sola.

Another way of putting the difficulty is to ask by what *medium* God knows the created deficiency: for the existence of an object to God's eternity "is only a necessary *condition* for the certitude of God's knowledge, but in no way a *reason* for that certitude."⁹⁸ He thus concludes as follows: "[H]ere is the gross objection, the antinomy that I do not see how to resolve: (1) The creature is the *first cause* of *evil* as such; (2) Nothing created can be the *cause* of the *knowledge* that God has of it."⁹⁹ One could only wish that every objector in a debate would pose as trenchant a difficulty as this one is with as much clarity and grace!

⁹⁴ Maritain, letter no. 138 (February 19, 1926), 369–371.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 369. Maritain had mentioned this problem to Journet (note 66, above) before reading the second article.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 370.

Having raised the objection, Maritain then admirably suggests that Marín-Sola may have offered its possible solution, namely, by affirming that the creature is the cause of God's knowledge of this deficiency, but that

this does not render God's knowledge dependent on things, for the created object is for it only a term materially attained. . . . One would thus say that God knows the good in his decree and the evil in this good itself (and in the decree *ut aeternus*), *modified in fact by the first causality in the line of evil*.¹⁰⁰

In other words, he wonders whether the idea of a term "materially attained" does not answer his new objection concerning the independence of God's knowledge, as well as his first objection concerning its determination. The former does not suffer any more than the latter, because what is at issue is no being or form, but an absence of being and form, a defect in being. Maritain regards this solution as "risky," but he sees no other way of defending the thesis.¹⁰¹

This is the last we hear of Maritain's response to Marín-Sola's views in these letters. The exchange thus ends on a positive note. For, despite his strong initial misgivings, which have not entirely been removed, he is inclining toward the latter's position (even if it is "risky"). He asks his forgiveness for writing him so freely, and hopes he will see in this "only a mark of the powerful interest I have in your work and of the excellent souvenir I retain of our conversation in Fribourg."¹⁰² Maritain here acknowledges his intellectual debt.

In his next letter, Journet indicates that he has passed his letter on to Marín-Sola, although he has not seen him since then (and we never do gather from him whether he sent a personal reply).¹⁰³ Journet thinks Maritain has raised a good objection; he admits that he is unable to decide between Marín-Sola's position and that of Garrigou-Lagrange, both of which seem to contain a contradiction (in the case of Marín-Sola, the idea of a creature modifying the divine motion); and he worries again about the outcome.¹⁰⁴ That very month gave him further cause, for

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. Maritain refers to Gonet's passage quoted in note 80 above. It is more accurate to say that God's knowledge of vision *supposes* the term materially attained: It makes no sense to say that God "sees" a creature, if no creature exists (at some time) to be seen. That the creature does exist, with whatever being it may possess, is caused by God's formative idea of it and his creative will.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Journet, letter no. 139 (March 8, 1926), 371.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 372.

Garrigou-Lagrange was not mollified by Marín-Sola's second article, and he published a second article against it, in the March–April issue of the *Revue Thomiste*.¹⁰⁵ Curiously, neither Journet nor Maritain ever refer to this second article. Perhaps that is simply because their surviving correspondence from this time is very thin.¹⁰⁶ Marín-Sola, however, responded to it in the next issue of *La Ciencia Tomista*. Since he had already written his next article, he merely adds an appendix, replying to the further difficulties raised.¹⁰⁷ In this article and appendix, he also responds to Maritain's concerns.

He begins the article by addressing a concern that Maritain had raised with Journet. (We cannot tell from the correspondence whether the latter passed this one on to Marín-Sola. If not, then he is responding to others who had the identical concern.) Marín-Sola had argued that sufficient grace gives man the power not to sin in easy (not difficult) matters, and for a limited time. This led to an objection, which he reports as follows:

[T]hey believe that this distinction is proper to casuists, that it considers these questions from a *moral* or practical point of view, which is improper to Thomistic metaphysicians or theologians, who always have founded their theory on an *ontological* point of view.¹⁰⁸

In reply to this difficulty, he points out that, for Thomas, fallen man is neither healthy nor whole, but sick; that is, he has the capacity to do *some* moral good—but not the difficult moral good—and for *some* time—but not for long. Since the actual graces *remotely* preparatory to justification¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange, “La grâce infalliblement efficace et les actes salutaires faciles,” *Revue Thomiste* 31 (1926): 160–73.

¹⁰⁶ There is a “lull” in the published exchange at this point: Maritain writes no letters in March, one in April (no. 140), one (no. 147) and a postcard (no. 146) in May, and none in June; Journet writes only three letters in April and one in May (no. 141 and nos. 143–145): thus, there is an exchange of only seven letters over four months (March 8–July 11).

¹⁰⁷ Marín-Sola, “Nuevas observaciones”; the appendix is 384–97.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 321. For Maritain's concern on this point, see note 67, above.

¹⁰⁹ Marín-Sola's theory should not be confused with that of González d'Albeda (later adopted by Henri Guillermin), who held that sufficient grace not only was an impetible motion, but that it could cause the *proximate* preparation for justification (my emphases). Marín-Sola holds that the latter is caused only by efficacious grace, the infusion of a new (and sanctifying) form. (On this point, see Marín-Sola, “Respuesta a algunas objeciones,” 7 note 1.) For a later, more historically based, account of Thomas's own teaching on actual, preparatory grace, see Guérard des Lauriers, OP, “La théologie du saint Thomas et la grâce actuelle,” *L'Année Théologique* 6 (1945): 277–300. For a similar type of analysis of what

are received in man's fallen nature, they move him to do some (easy) goods and to avoid sin (for example, not impede God's grace) for some time (not long). In speaking thus about "sufficient grace," he is speaking of the capacity of man's nature (that is, from an ontological point of view), but in its fallen state.

Later, in a footnote to the substantive portion of his article, he replies directly to Maritain's difficulty (and perhaps that of others, as well). He reports it as follows:

[I]n reading our first article, some Thomists became alarmed, believing that our solution destroyed the *infallibility* of the divine knowledge. After our second article, they now concede that it saves the aforesaid infallibility; but they object that they see even less clearly how it saves the *independence* of the divine knowledge, which requires that it not have any *created* thing as a *ratio cognoscendi*.¹¹⁰

Marín-Sola first answers this difficulty by reference to the following text from Godoy:

*Obijcies primo: "nihil creatum potest esse Deo ratio cognoscendi; alias eius scientia dependeret a rebus: sed si malum aut privatio cognosceretur a Deo per bonum creatum esset illi ratio cognoscendi privationem; ergo Deus non cognoscit mala per bonum creata." Respondeo: ratio cognoscendi posse quadrupliciter sumi. Primo, ex parte cognoscentis, per modum speciei aut verbi. Secundo, per modum objecti motivi. Tertio, per modum objecti formalis terminativi. Quarto, ut objectum in quo materiale. Tribus illis modis nihil creatum potest esse Deo ratio cognoscendi, ne illius cognitio a creatura dependeat. Quarto modo potest aliquid creatum esse illi ratio cognoscendi, nec ex illo sequitur dependentia cognitionis divinae a creatura, sed tantum dependentia objectorum: et solum hoc modo malum per bonum creatum ab intellectu divino cognoscitur.*¹¹¹

It is ever typical of Marín-Sola not to take credit for someone else's idea: His own idea is obviously that of Godoy. His central idea is thus not new; he does, however, provide the following commentary:

[T]he *reason of knowing* follows the *reason of being*. Thus just as it would be impossible—according to the teaching of Saint Thomas (*Summa*

Thomas himself meant by "sufficient," see M. D. Chenu, OP, "Sufficiens," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 22 (1933): 251–59.

¹¹⁰ Marín-Sola, "Nuevas observaciones," 360.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 360–61. Godoy's text is from his *De Scientia Dei*, disp. 26, no. 307, book I, 282. Godoy (and Gonet and Billuart) are defending Thomas's teaching of *ST I*, q. 14, a. 10, ad 4 noted earlier: See the text in note 40, above.

Contra Gentes I, 71)—that God know the *essence* of sin, were He to know only his own essence, without knowing the essence of the creature, so it would also be impossible for God to know the *existence* of sin were He to know only his own will or action, without knowing the will or action of the creature. In both cases, the creature must enter as a *medium* or as a *reason of being* and thus as a reason of being known. In the first case, the *essence* of the creature; in the second, the *action* of the creature. . . . Thus, to *us* it appears evident that, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas, to put in God *alone* the *futurition* of sin or the *truth* of sin or the *divine knowledge* of sin, is to put in God *alone* the *reason of being of sin*. If the creature enters, as it must enter, in the *reason of being* of formal sin, because it—and not God—is its *first* cause, there is no other remedy than to make it also enter in some manner in the *reason of being known* of sin, at least “per modum objecti in quo materialis,” without this interfering either with the infallibility or with the independence of the divine knowledge.¹¹²

Marín-Sola here argues not that this doctrine is perfectly “clear,” or that it removes the mystery for us of “how” God knows sin, but that it is the truth we are left with when other alternatives are eliminated as impossible. From his first article on, he argues that this is to place the mystery in these matters in the right place. In his third article, he appeals to John of St. Thomas: “Hoc est ergo maximum et obscurissimum *mysterium* hujus attributi et in quo humanus intellectus omnino *caligat*.”¹¹³ His is a salutary reminder that mystery is no weakness in theology, especially when it results from avoiding an absurd contradiction.

Garrigou-Lagrange had equally worried that, if God’s knowledge supposed anything created, this would render it dependent or passive. In his appendix, Marín-Sola supplies this *decisive* remark:

The *essential* or metaphysical relations of things, and, therefore, the *infallibility* of these relations, are not born of the will or efficient causality of God or of pure Act, but are *supposed* by it. Well then: in *all existing* being, even in the case of its existing by a *fallible* causality, there is an *essential* metaphysical property, *supposed* and not caused by the free will of pure Act. This essential property is the “infallibility of fact,” expressed many times by Saint Thomas in the formula that “all that exists, while it exists, exists *infallibly*. . . .” In virtue of this *essential principle* that “all the existent or caused (whether caused infallibly or *fallibly*) exists *infallibly* while it exists,” it results that the *effect* of a *fallible causality* can be the *object* of an *infallible knowledge*. In this case, the infallible knowledge

¹¹² Marín-Sola, “Nuevas observaciones,” 361.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 360, note 1. John of St. Thomas’s text is from his *De Deo*, q. 10, disp. 9, art. 3, num. 1 (Vives, book 2, 80).

of vision *supposes* something in the created object, without *receiving* anything of the created object. That which the knowledge of God *supposes* is something *essential* (the essential law of “infallibility of fact”) and, as all the *essential*—although it is supposed by the free *will* of God, and therefore, by the knowledge of vision—is a *formal* effect of the divine *intelligence* or simple intelligence, *exemplary* cause of all the *essential*, we hold that the science of vision of pure Act can *suppose* something in known objects; but this is something that, in its turn, comes from the very essence or simple intelligence of pure Act. One can affirm a *supposition* of something, without any divine *dependence* or divine *passivity*.¹¹⁴

He again takes no credit for this reply, pointing out that Cajetan had given a similar reply to an objection of Scotus (in a passage he had earlier cited).¹¹⁵

Finally, his third article also provides a metaphor for his doctrine on sufficient grace. The electric company supplies electric current to his house and gives him two keys with which he can turn it off: One that turns off one floor only, the other that turns off both. Although he cannot light his house (that is the work of the electricity supplied by another), he can darken it (either partly—the sin of commission—or wholly—the sin of omission). All that is in his hand, as first cause, is something negative: to turn off the light (that is, not to use the power that is in his hand, not to use his intellect to consider the rule that he could consider).¹¹⁶ This is a modern equivalent of Thomas's metaphor that we close our eyes to the light or close the shutters of our house to the sun:¹¹⁷ Again, our responsibility as first cause is purely negative.

Just as neither Journet nor Maritain refer to Garrigou-Lagrange's second article, neither do they refer to Marín-Sola's reply to it. Instead, Journet's next reference to the controversy is to a further piece Garrigou-Lagrange

¹¹⁴ Marín-Sola, “Nuevas observaciones,” 386–87. Marín-Sola indicates that he is preparing a book on these questions. This is the first volume of his *Concordia Tomista*, dealing with God's knowledge. (It runs to over one thousand portfolio pages.) He finished it in 1928, in Ocaña, the year after leaving Fribourg, together with a reply to Garrigou-Lagrange's final piece written against his position: See note 118, below. The third volume of the *Concordia Tomista*, on God's will, was then worked on during his return to Manila in 1929, but was left incomplete at his death in 1932. It runs to over six hundred portfolio pages.

¹¹⁵ Marín-Sola, “Nuevas observaciones,” 387. Cajetan's text is *In I*, q. 14, a. 13, no. 14 (Leonine, t. 4, 188–189) and was cited in Marín-Sola, “Respuesta a algunas objeciones,” 47.

¹¹⁶ Marín-Sola, “Nuevas observaciones,” 375, note 1.

¹¹⁷ For an example of Thomas's first use of the metaphor of shutting our eyes to the light, see 1 SN, 40, 4, 2, and ad 4; for that of the shutters, see 3 SN, 33, 2, 1, 1 and obj. 4. Thomas uses these metaphors throughout his career.

wrote against Marín-Sola.¹¹⁸ While he thinks many of its difficulties could be avoided, he still thinks it “hits home” (“cela porte”).¹¹⁹ He does not find Marín-Sola’s solution to the divine knowledge “solid”; and, while he is not satisfied with Garrigou-Lagrange’s solution either, he thinks it is “better to put obscurity on sin than on the divine knowledge.”¹²⁰ He also mentions that Marín-Sola has asked him if Maritain had received his (third) article. In reply, Maritain indicates that he has, but asks Journet to excuse him from answering further: He “no longer is able to,”¹²¹ apparently wishing to honor the silence the Master General is imposing on this controversy.¹²² He comments that Garrigou-Lagrange is content with this action. While perhaps “politic,” he himself can imagine “more noble solutions,” and says there still is need of a profound study of the permission of evil.¹²³ (Some thirty-five years later, he himself would attempt to supply this.)

Journet’s last comment on this controversy is not very even-handed, for the difficulty in each position concerns something of God. While Marín-Sola must explain God’s knowledge of sin, the other position must explain God’s will in relation to sin: not just sin itself, but the divine

¹¹⁸ Journet, letter no. 148 (July 11, 1926), 388. Garrigou-Lagrange’s piece was titled “Principia Thomismi cum novissimo congruismo comparata: Thomismi renovatio an eversio?” This was to have been published in the *Angelicum*; since the Master General imposed a silence on this controversy in the summer of 1926, it came out instead as a fascicule of that publication ([1926]: 121–75). Marín-Sola wrote a line-by-line reply to it (that runs to over twelve hundred portfolio pages, forming the actual second volume of his *Concordia Tomista*).

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 388.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 389.

¹²¹ Maritain, letter no. 149 (July 15, 1926), 390. Given the warmth and depth of their previous exchange, it is difficult to interpret his words (“Je n’en peux plus”) as deriving from any other source than a desire to be sensitive to the silence that the Master General was “about to impose on all the world” (“le P. General va imposer silence à tout le monde”). This silence would not have applied to Maritain, a layman with no formal affiliation to the Dominicans, much less to his private correspondence. Yet, as the Journet correspondence itself makes very clear, Maritain was much involved with many Dominicans at this time of his life. (Indeed, this was to be true throughout his life.) Given that Garrigou-Lagrange was a close personal friend, Maritain seems to have felt it was politic to avoid a further exchange at this time with Marín-Sola.

¹²² Ibid. This imposed silence explains both why Marín-Sola ceased publishing his series of articles and also why the first volume of his *Concordia Tomista*, although a complete book, was not then published. When Marín-Sola also wrote his reply to Garrigou-Lagrange, he must have known that it, too, was not likely to be published at that time. Seventy-five years later, it still awaits publication.

¹²³ Ibid.

permission of it. This is often pointed out by Marín-Sola, and never more eloquently than in these words:

Really, if one notices the phrases, more than the mind, of certain theologians, one would gain the impression that—under the pretext of saving the infallibility of divine knowledge—they are intent on establishing an infallible connection between divine causality and sin, making sin or the impediment be known by the sole means of a *decree*, even though disguised with the name of *permissive* decree, and that the premotion or beginning of the act leaves the most holy and most loving hands of God already infallibly connected with sin. No, no, and a thousand times no!¹²⁴

Rarely has a Dominican been willing to express so forcefully the objection of many other Catholics when faced with what has to them seemed a necessary implication of the “Thomist” view!

When confronted with Jansenism, many Dominicans attempted to elucidate how grace could truly be “sufficient” and sin could thus truly be our responsibility.¹²⁵ Yet, because God’s permission itself limited that grace to be only a capacity, which God (by his permission) chose not to activate, the word “sufficient” again seemed little more than a disguise. Here are Marín-Sola’s eloquent words on this development:

All those who admit in God no more *providence* than the infallible nor more *decrees* than the infallible nor more *premotions* or *graces* than the infallible appear to us to rest on that theory that there is no more *will* in God than the infallible or *consequent*, and thus that the *antecedent* will (with the decrees, motions, and graces that correspond to it, and that are called *sufficient*) is a will of pure name, a will of *sign*, not a real, true, and

¹²⁴ Marín-Sola, “Respuesta a algunas objeciones,” 38, note 1.

¹²⁵ As Marín-Sola argues throughout his articles, the Dominican position on these questions is framed by two controversies: on one side by that of *de auxiliis* and on the other by that of Jansenism. Both prior to the first and after the second, Dominicans make a strong use of God’s antecedent will and man’s resistance to it in order to explain man’s responsibility for sin. But Bañez regarded that will as one of “sign” only, and his systematic use of that idea in the controversies on grace led to a “hardening” of the Dominican position, for a brief time. Yet, due to the nature of the *de auxiliis* controversy, aspects of that position became “enshrined,” as “the” Thomist view on these issues, and it was difficult for Thomists responding to Jansenism (for example, Gonet and after) to free themselves entirely from those aspects, even though these no longer accorded with their own teaching on God’s antecedent will. Marín-Sola saw himself as attempting this “liberation,” and as, thereby, returning the Dominican view to positions and principles also held prior to the *de auxiliis* controversy.

sincere will of *beneplacito*.¹²⁶ It is true that this is not said clearly, and that the *names* of *antecedent* will and will of *beneplacito* are conserved. Yet, in reality this antecedent will is then destroyed in one of two ways: either by converting it into a will of pure sign, which is the equivalent of saying that it does not suffice *in fact* for anything, nor certainly for not placing an impediment in easy things and for a little time, and this way affirms that sufficient grace is a *pure potency*; or by transforming it into the *consequent* will and saying that it serves for something, but all that one has one has *infallibly*, and this is the theory that admits that sufficient grace is a premotion, but an *infallible* premotion, which is the equivalent of saying that there are no more true divine decrees than the *infallible*. Both theories are going to end up the same, that is, in denying the antecedent will of God: either by reducing it to so little that it serves *in fact* for *nothing* or by augmenting it to so much that there are no more ways than the infallible or irresistible in fact, with which one converts it into the consequent [will]. No, no, and a thousand times no!¹²⁷

¹²⁶ The author of this invention within Thomism (that the antecedent will is one of “sign” only) would appear to have been Cajetan. For a summary of diverse scholastic views of the antecedent will, see Albert Michel OP, “Volonté de Dieu, salvifique universelle,” in the *Dictionnaire du Théologie Catholique*, vol. 15, 2nd part (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1950), 3368. Scotus had argued the antecedent will was one of sign only (see his *In 1 SN*, 46, 1), following both Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure. In adopting this view, Cajetan incorporated a typically Franciscan position into that of Dominicans. A Thomist might suppose that he had some ground for this view, since in the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas himself describes the antecedent will as more *like* a “velleity” or mere wish (*ST I*, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1) than an absolute will; that is, it is like an inefficacious will, such as the desire “I wish I could fly,” which gives rise to no further action. However, this is to forget the supposition of Thomas’s text, which is that God (the just judge) is confronted with a sinner (a hardened criminal deserving of death). On that supposition, namely of a sinner with an impediment to his grace or who has resisted his conditioned will to save him, such a will may indeed be inefficacious. But that is because the sinner, not God, has first placed an impediment to it, and because God—in his absolute will—chooses not to overcome this impediment. The entire mistake of some Thomists on this point is to forget Thomas’s supposition that grounds his use of “velleity,” and thus to make it universally applicable: to those in sin and those not in sin. This error is the complement to the error of holding that God’s permission infallibly entails sin on any supposition, rather than for someone in sin: See note 52, above.

¹²⁷ Marín-Sola, “Respuesta a algunas objeciones,” 43. Another reason for this error, as he remarks later, is that “some theologians, even Thomists, want to give a universal extension to many Augustinian formulas on infallibly efficacious grace (67).” The “logical-mindedness” of Dominicans thus led to the curious situation of their placing a greater emphasis on God’s efficacious grace and decree (and his knowing sin by virtue of his decree) than Augustinians (who held differently regarding the grace of Adam). I say “curious,” because Thomas himself was initially criticized by some Franciscans (who regarded themselves as “truer” to

Again, those who have in the past been critical of the way Dominicans have interpreted sufficient grace could hardly articulate a stronger objection.

Indeed, one of the characteristics of Marín-Sola's treatment of this matter is to indicate how the Thomist interpretation he is offering makes the Dominican position much more acceptable to other Catholic positions, especially that of St. Alphonsus Ligouri.¹²⁸ He not only notes this in relation to Augustinians¹²⁹ and to "Sorbonic congruism," but also in relation to some Jesuit theologians (for example, Billot), who tend toward the more traditional Dominican view.¹³⁰ (He never mentions St. Robert Bellarmine's theory of "negative determination," but it bears an obvious relation to his view: What Bellarmine had applied to man's freedom, he limits to the fallible mode of that freedom, or to man's fallibility.)¹³¹ Furthermore, since Marín-Sola is intent on showing that his theory accords in its essentials with the solid "Thomistic edifice" of Bañez, and thus on distancing himself from the errors of Molina,¹³² he does not

Augustine) for not taking this view, and the very *first* Dominicans to defend Thomas did so precisely in relation to the importance of his doctrine concerning the physical presence of created things to God's eternity! (See John Quidort's *Correctorium corruptorii circa*, ed. Jean Pierre Muller, OSB [Rome: Herder, 1941], a. 3, 26.) Thomas ameliorates Augustine's position through Damascene's antecedent will. In making this inefficacious (either a will of "sign" only or an idle "velleity"), later Dominicans become even more "rigorous" than Augustine.

¹²⁸ See Marín-Sola, "El sistema tomista," 14 and 31, note 1; and especially idem, "Respuesta a algunas objeciones," 17–20. For a study of Ligouri's position that brings out their agreement fully, see Jose Fidel Hidalgo, *Doctrina Alfonsiana acerca de la gracia eficaz y suficiente* (Rome: Angelicum, 1951).

¹²⁹ For the Augustinians' view, see Winifried Bocxe, "Introduction to the Teaching of the Italian Augustinians," *Augustiniana* 8 (1958): 356–96. In a remarkable series of articles in the *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* (1960–1966), the modern Augustinian Athanasius Sage, A.A., applies Augustine's ideas on Adam's grace to those who are returned to a state of grace but still remain in *via*. He develops therein the Augustinian position in a way that accords perfectly with the Thomist position defended by Marín-Sola. See, especially, Sage's "Augustinisme et théologie moderne," *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 12 (1966), 134–56.

¹³⁰ See Marín-Sola, "El sistema tomista," 14 and 31, note 1.

¹³¹ For an exposition of Bellarmine's theory, see J. M. Hellin, SJ, "Determinación negativa en S. Belarmine," *Estudios Eclesiásticos* 10 (1938): 161–99. In English, a good article is R. Z. Lauer, "Bellarmine on *Liberium Arbitrium*," *Modern Schoolman* 33 (1955–1956): 61–89, esp. 79–89.

¹³² See Marín-Sola, "Respuesta a algunas objeciones," 71–73. Marín-Sola argues that Bañez and his companions held (against Molina) that grace was efficacious *ab intrinseco* and that predestination was completely free or "*ante praevisa merita*." In defense of those theological positions, they advanced two philosophical ideas: the divine decrees and physical premotion (both as necessary to cause free acts). He defends Bañez on each of these points.

underline that it also saves his “intent behind the error”; for God’s “general concursus” can be modified by the creature (but only negatively, and as a subordinate cause—not a coordinate one), and God does not know sin in his decree alone (but because creatures are present to his eternity—not because of a *scientia media*).¹³³ Marín-Sola even acknowledges that some “Molinists” have raised a telling difficulty: How could God know a defect “in his permissive decree,” if the latter supposed a knowledge of that same defect, which impedes sufficient grace?¹³⁴ His own distinction between man’s actual defect of non-consideration (which precedes sin and God’s permission of that) and sin itself (which supposes a final permission) is crafted in part to overcome this objection.

Finally, since “negative reprobation” is one of the most controversial ideas of the Thomist position, this text seems worth quoting at length:

Some Thomistic novices, in reading phrases where St. Thomas clearly says that the *unique* motive of negative reprobation is the *greater good of the universe*, thereby imagine that negative reprobation cannot suppose the foreknowledge of actual sins, as though “being uniquely for the greater good of the universe” and “supposing the foreknowledge of sins” were incompatible things, whereas, on the contrary, they are things that can be united. Let us take a common example to make this clear. Let us suppose that Peter has committed a crime, punished by the laws of the nation with the penalty of death. Let us also suppose that the prince of the nation so loves Peter that he has a true and most sincere will to pardon him and free him from death, but it is a will conditioned

¹³³ Marín-Sola argues that Molina also defends two theological positions: predestination “*post praevisa merita*” and “versatile grace” (Marín-Sola, “Respuesta a algunas objeciones,” 70). Marín-Sola’s view likewise “saves” truths contained in these theological positions. For God’s gift of final perseverance, while free and in no way “due” to previous merits, can still suppose them; and God’s sufficient grace can be impeded or not (and is “versatile” in *that* sense). Thomas himself expressly taught that predestination could suppose the foreknowledge of futures, both in the *Summa theologiae* (III, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4) and in a late quodlibet question (5, 5, 1): that is, in late and most authoritative texts.

¹³⁴ Marín-Sola mentions this difficulty in “El sistema tomista,” 50 and note 1. He says it was brought against Gonet first by Johannes Baptist Cardinal Franzelin (*De Deo uno* [Rome: Typographia Polyglotta, 1876], 458–59) and then is repeated later by a defender of the *scientia media*, Francis Zigon, in *Divus Thomas, arbiter controversiae de concurso divinae* (Gorizia, 1923), 148. Zigon was later to offer a critique of Marín-Sola’s own view from his “Molinist” viewpoint in “Marín-Sola, OP, de motione divina,” *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis* 8 (1931): 17–46 and 51–72. Herman Lange, SJ, was also to give a Molinist “critique” of his views in “Marín-Sola, Bañez und Molina,” in *Scholastik* 1 (1926), 533–65. For an effort to reply to these objections, and to other objections later advanced by diverse theologians to Marín-Sola’s view, see my “God’s Permission of Sin,” 413–533.

by one sole condition: by the condition that the pardon does not oppose the good of the republic. Let us suppose, finally, that the prince, after studying the case well, sees that to pardon Peter would be against the greater good of the republic, and in consequence, he decrees two things: (a) *not to pardon him*, but (b) to surrender him to the law and that he be hanged. In this case, a current and common one every day, two things are clearly evident: (a) the true and unique cause of *not forgiving* Peter (*negative* reprobation) is not the crime, but the greater good of the republic, since even after and despite the crime, the prince has the true and sincere desire to pardon him; (b) on the other hand, the true cause of hanging him (*positive* reprobation), is the *crime* committed. Thus are verified two affirmations of the doctrine of St. Thomas: first, that the motive of *positive* reprobation is sin; second, that the motive of *negative* reprobation is the *greater good of the universe*, but a good of the universe that supposes sin, because without *sin* the salvation of a person would never be opposed to the *good of the universe*.¹³⁵

Marín-Sola's work in these articles is nothing less than an attempt to exorcise from Thomism the idea of "negative reprobation *ante praevisa demerita*." So much does his position open itself to the other schools of Catholic theology on these issues that it has well been said to have brought an end to the quarrel generated by *de auxiliis*.¹³⁶

Despite his last comment noted, Journet clearly continues to be uncertain about these issues. Thus, over two years later, he makes a final mention of Marín-Sola.¹³⁷ He indicates that he is now in Manila; he notes Franzelin's objection that Marín-Sola had acknowledged and admits that he continues to find Garrigou-Lagrange's "solution" to it unsuccessful;¹³⁸ and he asks Maritain to work "to shed a little light on

¹³⁵ Marín-Sola, "Nuevas observaciones," 370–71, note 1.

¹³⁶ See Illytd Trethowan, OSB, "St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil," *Dublin Review* 212 (1943): 176. This is a review article of Maritain's book by the above name, and thus as he articulated Marín-Sola's position. One can take this idea further. The recent declaration on justification between Catholics and Lutherans holds that "personal consent [to grace] . . . is itself an effect of grace" and yet that "a person can reject the working of grace" (*Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification by the Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Church*, 4.1, nos. 20 and 21): This exactly follows the "directive line" of his thought. And, in emphasizing Damascene's antecedent will, his position is equally consonant with that of Orthodoxy.

¹³⁷ Journet, letter no. 276 (January 11, 1929), 658–75.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 661. Garrigou-Lagrange's solution applies the adage "*causae ad invicem sunt causae*" to this problem, but Journet here, as previously (for example, letter no. 139, July 15, 1926, 372) finds this to be a misapplication; for the same aspect is considered as both previous and posterior to the permission: There is thus a vicious circle. In other words, he acknowledges that Garrigou-Lagrange fails to answer Cardinal Franzelin's objection.

the question of premotion, above all on the points of resistance to grace” and how God can know this in his permissive decree.¹³⁹ Much later, he himself would attempt to shed some light on these difficulties.¹⁴⁰

Given Maritain’s avid interest in Marín-Sola’s views, the degree to which he vanishes from his correspondence following his last letter is remarkable. He makes only one other reference to him, almost two years later, and this in relation to a matter raised in Marín-Sola’s *Evolution* (which he had by then read), and not in relation to God’s permission.¹⁴¹ Nevertheless, his interest in the questions raised remained strong. As Cottier notes in his appendix to the correspondence, Maritain dedicated his course on metaphysics at the Institut Catholique, in 1936–1939, to “questions of freedom in God and in man”¹⁴² (thereby fulfilling Journet’s request). It seems, then, that he followed Marín-Sola in fixing his position only after a thorough examination of Thomas’s text. The evident consequence of this study was to put to rest his lingering doubt about Marín-Sola’s position. His own writings on this subject come increasingly to defend ideas and distinctions that derive directly from that position.

We can see the parentage of his position from his very earliest writing on this subject. In his “A Philosophy of Freedom,” he insists that man is the first cause of sin, specifically of “the mutilation that deforms my act,”¹⁴³ and this is something that he can do “without God, by withdrawing myself, as if by an initiative emanating from my nothing, from the

¹³⁹ Journet, letter no. 276 (January 11, 1929), 661.

¹⁴⁰ See his *Le mal, essai théologique* (Paris: Desclee, 1961), in English, *The Meaning of Evil* (New York: Kenedy and Sons, 1962), 176–82. He there indicates his clear sympathy for Maritain’s views, as he had gone on to elaborate them in *Existence and the Existent* and in *On the Philosophy of History*. Journet had already endorsed Maritain’s positions in *Entretiens sur la grâce* (Paris: Desclee, 1959), in English, *The Meaning of Grace* (New York: Kenedy and Sons, 1960), 25–31, a series of talks first given in 1956. Indeed, he had communicated to Maritain that, after attentively reading *Existence*, he found it “marvellous,” (vol. 3 of their correspondence, letter no. 937, November 26, 1947).

¹⁴¹ Maritain, letter no. 237 (May 6, 1928), 566. (The editors also annex some texts, on the matter of Catholic faith and doctrine [749–56] that Journet had supplied him in September 1927, and which make much use of *Evolution*.) Maritain ends by accepting Marín-Sola’s views on the development of doctrine, as can be seen from a letter in vol. 2 of their correspondence, no. 306 (January 4 or 11, 1930), 21 and 24. In the same volume, he also expresses to Journet how very pained he was to learn of Marín-Sola’s death (no. 419, July 31, 1932, 256).

¹⁴² Cottier, “La liberté,” 746.

¹⁴³ Maritain, “Une philosophie de la liberté,” in *Du regime temporel et de la liberté* (Paris: Desclee, 1933): The English is from “A Philosophy of Freedom,” in *Freedom in the Modern World* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1936), 27.

current of divine causality.”¹⁴⁴ Maritain here adopts Marín-Sola’s very own metaphor. Not surprisingly, he also adopts other elements of his position: God’s (final) permission supposes our “refusal,” but “does not will to prevent”¹⁴⁵ its effect; history is the result of “concordant or discordant initiatives”¹⁴⁶ of Creator and creature (of being and non-being, respectively); and God’s knowledge of the creature’s first causality in sin is secured by virtue of His eternity “where all the moments of time are indivisibly present.”¹⁴⁷ We also find here his first characteristic exegesis of John’s “without me you can do nothing.”¹⁴⁸ Maritain’s position regarding sin is altogether brief, but its directive lines are clearly set.

Two years later, he expands on these ideas. He now uses the word “nihilate” to refer to man’s first initiative in evil, which he here identifies as the creature’s “free non-attention to the rule of action.”¹⁴⁹ This word (“nihilation”) is unique to Maritain, but he here indicates that it is identical in concept to the “non-consideration of the rule” to which Marín-Sola had earlier called attention: to the creature’s initial free defect that causes sin.¹⁵⁰ Maritain also again argues that God knows this defect because it is present to his eternity; but he now further insists that “evil cannot be known save in the same instant when it thus wounds existence”¹⁵¹ (thus in the creature’s will, and not in God’s will or decree). Maritain here clearly accepts Marín-Sola’s solution to the difficulty of God’s infallible knowledge of sin.

He goes even further, answering his own initial worry that this would “determine” God’s knowledge, by giving us Marín-Sola’s very own response! Thus, to one so worried (as he had once been), he responds by asking: “Do you believe that created beings are for divine knowledge anything else but a secondary term attained as a mere ‘material’ or factual

¹⁴⁴ Maritain, “A Philosophy of Freedom,” 27 (my emphasis).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 27.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 28.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 27.

¹⁴⁹ Maritain, “La clef du chant,” published first in the *Nouvelle Revue Française* 5 (1935): 778–809; and then as chapter five of *Frontières de la poésie et autres essais* (Paris: Rouart, 1935); the English is from “The Freedom of Song,” in Maritain, *Art and Poetry* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943), 85. Journet writes Maritain his strong approval of this article. He does not miss its parentage, saying he believes that “Father Marín-Sola would have been ravished” by Maritain’s work (vol. 2, letter no. 518 [May 29, 1935], 466).

¹⁵⁰ In his next treatment of this subject, he explains that “nihilate” merely describes this initial defect “in picturesque present-day language”: Maritain, *St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1942), 24.

¹⁵¹ Maritain, *Art and Poetry*, 83–84.

datum, in no way formative or specifying?"¹⁵² It may be remembered that Maritain had initially regarded this answer as "risky"; he is now ready publicly to embrace that risk.

World War II brought Maritain to America, and it was there that he was to present a "rough draft" of his entire position in his Marquette lecture of 1942. Here, he even more clearly insists on the real distinction between sin and the initial defect that is its defective cause, now relying on the same text of *De malo* (1, 3) that Marín-Sola had earlier noted: One must "consider as prior" ("praeintelligitur") to sin a defect in the will, and one need seek no further than the will itself for its reason.¹⁵³ Maritain also notes that Thomas specifies that this defect is not yet sin or a privation, but the cause of sin or a "negatio pura."¹⁵⁴ In this he is original, for Marín-Sola had not quoted this text. However, since Thomas divides defects between privations and negations and since Marín-Sola had expressly affirmed that the will's prior failure to use the intellect to consider the rule was not a sin (and hence not a privation), he had said virtually as much. Pointing out this text does have the merit, however, of demonstrating the consistency of Thomas's position.

There is again nothing more than a verbal novelty in the way Maritain now chooses to speak of the divine motion or grace that is resisted by the creature: it is one that is "merely 'sufficient' or breakable ('brisable')." ¹⁵⁵ There is no real or conceptual difference between a motion that is "impedible" and one that is "breakable." Maritain himself later acknowledged this, saying that he had "proposed this expression 'breakable motion or actuation' as a kind of philosophical equivalent of the theological expression 'sufficient grace.'" ¹⁵⁶ He also now uses Marín-Sola's words of "the lines of good and evil," pointing out that there is a "dissymmetry" between them (since the creature is first cause only of an impediment to God's motion). The word "dissymmetry" is new, but not the concept.

All of the distinctions Maritain has been developing hang together and are aspects of Marín-Sola's theory. To this point, the remarks Maritain has made on the subject are embedded in longer works and do not tackle at length the relation between the divine motion and free will. He does this

¹⁵² Ibid., 84.

¹⁵³ Maritain, *St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil*, 24. Marín-Sola quotes the text in "El sistema tomista," 46, note 1.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 29. Thomas's text is *De malo*, 1, 3, ad 13 (although it is mistakenly printed as "ad 3" in his lecture).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 37.

¹⁵⁶ Maritain, *On the Philosophy of History* (New York: Scribners, 1957), 120, note 3.

first following World War II in the fourth chapter of *Existence and the Existent*. In this work, he now makes the following points, all made previously by Marín-Sola: that the creature's "non-impediment" adds nothing to the divine motion;¹⁵⁷ that a breakable motion moves the free creature according to the fallible mode proper to its nature;¹⁵⁸ that there are two divine permissions: one that makes sin possible (by moving the creature in an impeditable way), and the other that infallibly entails sin (supposing that the creature impedes the motion by his defect);¹⁵⁹ that the order of motions that is sufficient or breakable derives from God's antecedent will, which is an active will of *beneplacitum* and not an idle *velleity*;¹⁶⁰ and that God's providence "takes into account" the "nihilations" of the creature, as first cause.¹⁶¹ The latter is clearly just another way of saying that God's predestination can suppose a knowledge of our defect (a position Marín-Sola again expressly defends).¹⁶²

With *Existence and the Existent*, Maritain commits himself to Marín-Sola's position, both in its directive lines and in its details. On one point, however, he seems to differ from him slightly. In a lengthy footnote, he argues that—supposing a creature does not impede the divine motion—it then receives a new, infallibly efficacious motion that is specifically different and that effects the good election.¹⁶³ It seems evident that Maritain is here trying to accommodate the earlier concern of Garrigou-Lagrange; for, with him, he here holds that an infallibly efficacious motion is necessary to cause any good choice. (Or, to put the point differently, he here appears to be ontologizing Marín-Sola's sufficient and efficacious graces, making both types of motions be proper to every choice.) Yet his thought is murky here. For he also says that, should we not impede the divine motions, then they "fructify by themselves into the unshatterable divine activation."¹⁶⁴ This is Marín-Sola's view. In any case, Maritain was later to repudiate certain aspects of this footnote and to

¹⁵⁷ Maritain, *Court Traité de L'Existence et de L'Existant* (Paris: Paul Hartmann, 1947); the English is from *Existence and the Existent* (New York: Pantheon, 1948), 92. See also page 100 and its note 10.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 93–94.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 102.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 118.

¹⁶² Marín-Sola, "El sistema tomista," 32–40. He is mainly concerned to defend that predestination supposes the knowledge of sin; as he says (44), the idea that predestination can also suppose the existence of non-persevering merit is secondary and not necessary to defend the first proposition.

¹⁶³ Maritain, *Existence and the Existent*, note 9, 94–99; see especially 95 and 97.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 94.

maintain that its attempted distinctions were “to a large extent incidental” to his main thesis.¹⁶⁵

Marín-Sola had himself anticipated the type of reservation that Maritain apparently had felt. In a footnote, he observed that some Thomists might “become frightened” by the idea of man’s defect modifying the divine motion and thus want to hold that it is God himself who modifies His own motion.¹⁶⁶ He says that “this accidental change of formula is to us of little importance”.¹⁶⁷ What is essential is that God never causes the activity in sin unless man’s defect is supposed as ontologically prior. Now, what is accidental in regard to an impediment is likewise so in regard to a non-impediment. The essential point is that God permits a free creature to be moved to the honest good in a way that can or cannot be impeded, and that his defect or failure derives from his will alone, not God’s permission.

Given the extraordinary degree to which Maritain follows Marín-Sola, it is remarkable that he does not mention him further. His involved footnote may supply the reason: He was still mindful of Garrigou-Lagrange and his former strong opposition to this view. Perhaps Maritain felt that he was trying to stake out a “middle ground” between the two positions. More likely, he simply did not want to find himself in contention with his old “mentor.”¹⁶⁸ He was evidently not the only one to proceed in this manner. For, in his notes to volume 1 of the Spanish bilingual edition of the *Summa theologiae* published that same year, Francisco Muñiz, OP, advocates Marín-Sola’s position on these matters . . . without ever once mentioning his name!¹⁶⁹ He acted the same way

¹⁶⁵ Maritain, *God and the Permission of Evil*, viii. In that same work, he says that his thought in that footnote involved a “complementary distinction badly arrived at” (55).

¹⁶⁶ Marín-Sola, “Respuesta a algunas objeciones,” 64, note 1.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ He would not have been wrong to be mindful of Garrigou-Lagrange! The latter saw not only the likeness between Maritain’s views and those of González d’Albeda and Guillermin, but that Maritain had gone “much further” (“beaucoup plus loin”) than they, *precisely in allowing that the initial defect in sin does not infallibly follow a divine permission* (my emphasis). He tells Maritain that such an admission will lead “much further than he thinks,” and he expresses his “deep regret” that he had published these pages: See vol. 3, letter no. 957 (April 18, 1948), 639. Maritain replies, briefly defending his position, and again without mentioning Marín-Sola.

¹⁶⁹ Francisco Muñiz, OP, *Suma teológica de santo Tomás de Aquino*, vol. 1 (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1947), appendix 2, 979–1055. That Muñiz’s views were those of Marín-Sola did not go unnoticed; see José Sagües, SJ, “Reflexiones teológicas: Crisis en el Bañecianismo?” *Estudios Eclesiásticos* 22 (1948): 699–749.

when he later supplied the notes to the volume on God's grace.¹⁷⁰ Given that he was a younger colleague of Garrigou-Lagrange at the Angelicum, his behavior is not altogether surprising: The latter was still a powerful figure in Rome. Maritain may likewise have felt that it was wise for him to distance himself from this "Dominican quarrel."

If so, he was not entirely successful. To begin with, his position gave rise to a series of articles in the *Revue Thomiste*, with many Dominicans "weighing in" (mostly favorably) on the ideas he had presented in *Existence and the Existent*.¹⁷¹ And then Jean-Hervé Nicolas, OP, wrote a sustained article that was pointedly critical of his views.¹⁷² During this period, Maritain had continued to meditate on ideas related to this matter.¹⁷³ He was thus prepared to reply to Nicolas, clarifying his views

¹⁷⁰ Francisco Muñiz, OP, *Suma*, vol. 5 (1956), appendix 1, esp. 757–81. Jesus Valabuena, OP, likewise followed Marín-Sola, and acknowledged as much, in his appendix 2, in vol. 3b of the *Suma* (1959), "El influjo de la causa primera en el obrar de las causas segundas," 1117–1183.

¹⁷¹ See M.-J. Nicolas, OP, "La liberté humaine et le problème du mal," *Revue Thomiste* 48 (1948): 191–217; C.J. Geffré, "La possibilité du péché," *Revue Thomiste* 57 (1957): 214–45; G. Bavaud, "La doctrine du Père Marín-Sola sur la grâce: est-il une concession au Molinisme?" *Revue Thomiste* 58 (1958): 473–83; and M.-J. Nicolas, "Simples réflexions sur la doctrine thomiste de la grâce," *Revue Thomiste* 58 (1958): 645–53.

¹⁷² J.-H. Nicolas, "La permission du mal": For the full reference, see note 3, above. This gave rise to further articles in the *Revue Thomiste*, mostly supportive of Maritain. See G. Bavaud, "Comment Dieu permet-il et connaît-il le péché?" *Revue Thomiste* 61 (1961): 226–40; M. Corvez, "Où commence le péché?" *Revue Thomiste* 64 (1964): 53–62; L.M. Antonioti, "La volonté antécédente et conséquent selon S. Jean Damascène et S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste* 65 (1965): 52–77; J. P. Arfeuill, "Le dessein sauveur de Dieu, le doctrine de la prédestination selon S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste* 74 (1974): 591–641; and M. L. Guérard des Lauriers, "Le péché et la causalité," in the *Bulletin Thomiste* 11 (1960–1962): 553–637. It is ironic that J.-H. Nicolas defended the same line as Garrigou-Lagrange . . . but while at Fribourg; whereas Muñiz defended Marín-Sola's views . . . while he was at the Angelicum! (And Maritain also developed his "defense" of Marín-Sola while he was in Rome!)

¹⁷³ In "Le péché de l'ange, essai de ré-interpretation des positions thomistes," *Revue Thomiste* 56 (1956): 197–239, English: *The Sin of the Angel* (Westminster, MA: Newman, 1959), esp. 5–15, Maritain applied the structure of the free fallible act to the angel. And, in *Neuf leçons sur les notions premières de la philosophie morale* (Paris: Tequi, 1951), 174–76, English: *An Introduction to the Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy* (New York: Magi, 1990), 195–97, he begins to reflect on what in God is resisted by our sin, reflections that would later reach their culmination in one of his last essays, "Réflexions sur le savoir théologique," *Revue Thomiste* 69 (1969): 5–27, esp. 14–26; English, "For an Existential Epistemology II: Reflections on Theological Knowledge," in *Untrammelled Approaches*.

and giving his final and definitive position, in *Dieu et la permission du mal*.¹⁷⁴ In this work, he returns to Marín-Sola's position, affirming that a "shatterable" motion infallibly effects a tendency toward a good act, yet "can non-attain the final object to which it tends."¹⁷⁵ These are just different words for what Marín-Sola had earlier taught: that the divine motion infallibly effects the beginning of the good act, but that it may not reach its final term (due to an impediment). And Maritain further follows Marín-Sola in holding that the divine motion continues to the act of sin, but now as deformed by the defect: "[A]ll ordination to the moral good being suppressed by the fact of nihilation of the creature, the shatterable motion towards the moral good gives way to a simple pre-motion to all that there is of the ontological in the act of election."¹⁷⁶ Again, the difference between them is only verbal, not conceptual or real.

It is even more remarkable that Maritain does not mention Marín-Sola in his reply to Nicolas, since the latter had distinguished his view from that of Marín-Sola. Here was the perfect opportunity to "set the record straight"! Yet he does not do this. This unfortunately allowed Nicolas's characterization to stand. Thomists had to await the Journet–Maritain correspondence to see the degree to which it was inaccurate. (Nicolas, of course, had no access to that correspondence when he wrote. It was only published thirty-five years later.) Maritain does here refer to Garrigou-Lagrange precisely as one who had "advanced" the traditional Dominican position in the right direction!¹⁷⁷ This remark becomes a little less puzzling if one remembers that Maritain then goes on to criticize this position in no uncertain terms. Nevertheless, it does not clarify the parentage of his own views. Perhaps he felt that certain of his distinctions importantly distinguished his views from those of Marín-Sola. For he suggests that he may have made an "effective contribution" to philosophy more on this matter than anywhere else in his work.¹⁷⁸ He does engage in certain "baroque" reflections on some of the finer points involved in the theory,¹⁷⁹ and he was fond of such points, such as were often made by his favorite commentator, John of St. Thomas.

Specifically, as I noted earlier, Maritain had called attention to the fact that Thomas describes the voluntary non-consideration of the rule as a

¹⁷⁴ Maritain: in English, *God and the Permission of Evil* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966).

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 57–58.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, foreword, viii.

¹⁷⁹ Specifically, see his "schemas" no. 2 and no. 3 in chapter II/II, regarding the "ultimate time" of deliberation and the "moments of nature" involved in the sinful act: *God and the Permission of Evil*, 47–54.

"negatio pura." This term suggests that Thomas is thinking of a non-consideration during the time of deliberation. In fact, when we deliberate about what we should do, we may consider many things. While we are considering, for example, the pleasure that might come from acting a certain way, we are then not considering the moral rule that should govern all our action (and that may prohibit our acting for this pleasure). Yet this non-consideration is clearly no fault, nor is it even connected to sin, as its defective cause, since we can go on to consider that rule before we act, and can choose in accordance with it (rejecting the pleasure considered). Thus, prior to the final judgment that terminates deliberation, any non-consideration is clearly nothing more than a negation, an absence that is not due; for we need only consider the rule when we proceed to make our choice. However, from the viewpoint of a faulty final practical judgment, we can and should rightly say, "this judgment was my fault, because I did not consider the rule (that should govern my action), as I could have." Thus, we can and should also say, "that voluntary non-consideration was prior to and the cause of this judgment being defective"; as Thomas says, we can "pre-consider" the non-consideration in the intellect (and we can likewise pre-consider the voluntary non-use of the intellect by the will).

Maritain, in noting that the voluntary non-consideration is a "negatio pura," emphasizes the time of deliberation that precedes the final practical judgment. In this, as earlier noted, he is original. Marín-Sola, on the other hand, emphasizes the final practical judgment itself that establishes the connection between the non-consideration of deliberation and the subsequent inconsiderate and sinful election.¹⁸⁰ Yet these emphases are in truth perfectly complementary: They are mutually related aspects of an identical theory. Perhaps Maritain felt that his own speculations helped explicate and defend a theory he had come to regard as deeply important, and that his "effective contribution" lay chiefly in its defense. Whether he did or not, it was through Maritain that Marín-Sola's position was to affect French and English Thomists¹⁸¹ (as it was to affect Spanish Thomists through the work of Muñiz and Valabuena). Marín-Sola, as he himself said,

¹⁸⁰ Maritain speaks of this, without identifying it as the final practical judgment. In his analysis, this is the first "moment of nature" involved in sin, a moment subsequent to the time of deliberation and prior to the sinful choice itself: a moment in which the prior "negatio pura" (non-consideration) now is sin's negative cause.

¹⁸¹ To take only one instance, I myself came to take an interest in Marín-Sola's view after having first become acquainted with it through the work of Maritain (and the critique of J.-H. Nicolas to which he makes reference).

had a real “veneration” for Maritain; he had “thought constantly” of him as he presented his doctrine; and he was obviously very much concerned to know how he had received his last articles. There is something fitting, then, that it was through Maritain (a far more famous figure than he) that his doctrine was to have a worldwide impact and to receive the attention it so clearly deserved. I think it must please him that God in his providence arranged matters this way. N V