

***Una ratio* versus *Diversae rationes*: Three Interpretations of *Summa theologiae* I, Q. 13, AA. 1–6**

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Introduction

This essay takes up a dispute pertaining to Thomas Aquinas's doctrine that names of pure perfections are said analogously of God and creatures. Specifically, it addresses the question of whether such names as "being," "good," and "wise" are predicated analogously through one *ratio* (or concept) or are, instead, predicated analogously through diverse *rationes* (or concepts). George Klubertanz defended the thesis that Aquinas professed *una ratio* in some early writings but changed his mind to *diversae rationes* by the time he composed the *prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae* [ST].¹ Unlike Klubertanz, various prominent Scholastic Thomists observe

¹ See George Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), 23–24. Klubertanz cites three texts from Thomas's *Commentary on the Sentences* for *una ratio* and two texts each from the *prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae* [ST] and the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* for *diversae rationes*, concluding: "These texts show St. Thomas changing his answer to the question of the plurality of the analogous intelligibility. In three early texts he speaks of a *single* intelligibility; in all later texts he denies a single intelligibility and speaks instead of different intelligibilities attributed to the same thing or of intelligibilities which are partly the same and partly different" (24). John Wippel briefly discusses this passage from Klubertanz in a footnote, arguing that the *Commentary on the Sentences* passages need not be taken as endorsing *una ratio* at all, and consequently that they do not "necessarily have to be

no such development from *una ratio* to *diversae rationes* in Thomas's writings. Instead, they dispute among themselves over whether the *una ratio* unequally participated by the analogates is (1) identical to the *ratio* proper to one of the analogates or (2) a separate (or distinct) *ratio* from the diverse *rationes* proper to the analogates.

I find at least the following three positions on what Klubertanz called the problem of "*una ratio* versus *diversae rationes*." I will refer to them as options A, B, and C. Option A is Klubertanz's own developmental thesis, whereby Thomas changes his mind from *una ratio* to *diversae rationes*. Option B proposes that the *una ratio* is one of the *diversae rationes* proper to the analogates. Finally, option C claims that the *una ratio* is separate from the *diversae rationes* proper to the analogates.²

A full consideration of the relative merits of these three positions as interpretations of the thought of Thomas Aquinas is beyond the scope of this paper. For now, I will judge the positions' merits only against *ST* I, q. 13, aa. 1–6. I choose this text because it is considered representative of Aquinas's mature position, because Klubertanz cites it as providing strong support for his developmental thesis, and because it has always confused me. I will conclude that option B provides the overall most consistent and least problematic interpretation of the passage.

regarded as contradicting Thomas's later references to analogous *rationes* as being partly the same and partly not the same" (*The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being*, Monographs of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy 1 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 570n238).

- ² The position I am calling "option B" is put forward with variations by John Capreolus (d. 1444), Dominic of Flanders (1425–1474), Thomas di vico Cajetan (1469–1534), and Francis Silvestri of Ferrara (1474–1528). I find option C with variations in the writings of Paul Soncinas (d. 1494) and Chrysostom Javelli (ca. 1470/72–1538). For a direct treatment of these Renaissance Thomist authors on the number of *rationes* involved in analogous predication, see Domenic D'Ettore: "The Fifteenth-Century Thomist Dispute Over Participation in an Analogous Concept: John Capreolus, Dominic of Flanders, and Paul Soncinas," *Mediaeval Studies* 76 (2014): 241–73; "Not a Little Confusing: Francis Silvestri of Ferrara's Hybrid Thomist Doctrine of Analogy," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 90, no. 1 (2016): 113–17; and "A Thomist Re-consideration of the Subject Matter of Metaphysics: Chrysostom Javelli on What is Included in Being as Being," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 89 (2015): 215–17. The disagreement between these Thomists (and others, including Hervaeus Natalis and Thomas Sutton) over "One or many *rationes*" is treated as "The *Rationes* Problem" in Domenic D'Ettore, *Analogy After Aquinas: Three Logical Problems and Some Thomists' Solutions* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2018).

***Summa theologiae* I, Q. 13, AA. 1–6: Summary of Principle Points**

Thomas Aquinas's discussion of analogy in articles 5 and 6 of *ST* I, q. 13, picks up on his treatment in articles 1–4 of how the human intellect can signify names about God. Article 1 establishes that a name signifies things through a “mediating concept,” which Thomas also calls a *ratio*.³ Since our intellects do not know God through his essence, but through creatures, it follows that we can name God only through creatures and that the names we use do not express the divine essence as it is in itself.⁴ Articles 2 and 3 lay out the different ways in which names of creatures are said of God.

³ See *ST* I, q. 13, a. 1, resp.: “I answer that it must be said that, according to the Philosopher, vocalizations are signs of understandings, and understandings are likenesses of things. And so it is clear that vocalizations are referred to things to be signified by a mediating conception of the intellect [Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione intellectus]” (all translations from the works of Thomas are my own, done from the Latin as found at corpusthomisticum.org unless otherwise noted). In this passage, Thomas draws on Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 1.16a. See also Aquinas, *In I peri hermeneias*, lec. 2, in *In Aristotelis Libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio*, ed. R. M. Spiazzi, 2nd ed. (Turin, IT: Marietti, 1964), 9–12, and *In V metaph.*, lec. 5, in *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, ed. R. M. Spiazzi (Turin, IT: Marietti, 1950), 223b. For a discussion of signification in Thomas's work and in the period following him, see Giorgio Pini, “Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8 (1999): 21–52. See also E. J. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signification in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991): 43–53.


⁴ See *ST* I, q. 13, a. 1, resp.: “Therefore, something can be named by us insofar as it can be known by us in the intellect. But it was shown above that God is not able to be seen through His essence by us in this life. Rather, He is known by us from creatures, according to the relation of principle, and through the mode of excellence and removal. So therefore, He can be named by us from creatures, although that name signifying Him does not express the divine essence according to what it is in the way that the name ‘human’ expresses with its signification the essence of human according to what it is. For [‘human’] signifies its definition, declaring its essence; for the *ratio* which the name signifies is the definition [Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a nobis potest nominari. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam; sed cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum, exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est, significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam; ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio].”

Names are said either negatively or affirmatively, and if affirmatively, then either absolutely or relatively, and if absolutely, then either metaphorically or properly. A name signifies the divine substance or essence itself (albeit very imperfectly) only if it is being said of God properly. Names of pure perfections, such as “being,” “wise,” and “good,” can be said of God properly (see Figure 1).⁵ Article 4 addresses the divine simplicity by affirming that the human intellect employs different *rationes* when predicating different names of God properly, even though there are not different perfections in God answering to the different *rationes*.⁶

⁵ See *ST I*, q. 13, a. 2, resp.: “I answer that it must be said that concerning names which are said about God negatively or which signify His relation to a creature, it is clear that they do not signify His substance in any way. Rather [they signify] a removal of something from Him, or [they signify] His relation to another, or rather [a relation] of something to Him. But concerning names which are said about God absolutely and affirmatively, such as ‘good,’ ‘wise,’ and the like, . . . it must be said that indeed names of this kind signify the divine substance, and they are predicated about God substantially, but they fall short from a representation of Him [Respondeo dicendum quod de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur negative, vel quae relationem ipsius ad creaturam significant, manifestum est quod substantiam eius nullo modo significant; sed remotionem alicuius ab ipso, vel relationem eius ad alium, vel potius alicuius ad ipsum. Sed de nominibus quae absolute et affirmative de Deo dicuntur, sicut bonus, sapiens, et huiusmodi . . . dicendum est, quod huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et praedicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius].” See also *ST I*, q. 13, a. 3, ad 1: “To the first therefore it must be said that certain names signify perfections of this kind proceeding from God into created things. In this way, that very imperfect way by which the divine perfection is participated by a creature is included in the very thing signified by the name, just as ‘stone’ signifies something existing materially. And names of this kind can only be attributed to God metaphorically. Certain names, however, signify the very perfections absolutely, without any mode of participating being included in their signification, such as ‘being,’ ‘good,’ ‘living,’ and the like, and such names are said about God properly [Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quaedam nomina significant huiusmodi perfectiones a Deo procedentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus imperfectus quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso nominis significato includitur, sicut lapis significat aliquid materialiter ens, et huiusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi metaphorice. Quaedam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum, vivens, et huiusmodi, et talia proprie dicuntur de Deo].”

⁶ See *ST I*, q. 13, a. 4, resp.: “Therefore, just as one simple principle answers to diverse perfections of creatures [and is] represented by diverse perfections of creatures variously and multiply; so too, one altogether simple thing answers to various and multiple conceptions of our intellect insofar as conceptions of this kind are understood imperfectly. And, therefore, names attributed to God are not synonymous, even though they signify one thing, because they signify it under multiple

Figure 1: Ways names are said of God in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, a. 1–6



Article 5 continues the previous article's interest in the role of the mediating conception or *ratio* in names said of God. Thomas rejects the possibility of a name being said of God and creatures univocally on the grounds that the same name cannot be said of God and creatures through the same *ratio*. As Thomas argues in the first *sed contra* of article 5, when a name is predicated of many things, it is predicated of them either through the same *ratio* or through diverse *rationes*. A *ratio* that does include a particular genus cannot be identical to a *ratio* that does not include that same genus. Names of pure perfections are said about creatures through *rationes* that include a particular genus. For example, "wisdom" said of a human signifies a perfection in the category of quality. But wisdom is not a quality in God (since God is simple, and therefore outside of every genus). Hence, the *ratio* of a name must be altered for the name to be predicated of God and a name is said of God properly through a *ratio* different from the *ratio* through which the same name is said of a creature properly.⁷ Thomas

and diverse *rationes* [Sicut igitur diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum varie et multipliciter; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo attributa, licet significant unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma]."

⁷ See *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5, sc 1: "On the contrary, whatever is predicated about some things according to the same name and not according to the same *ratio* is predicated about them equivocally. But no name belongs to God according to the *ratio* according to which it is said about a creature. For wisdom in creatures is a

repeats the point in the *respondeo*, and he emphasizes that, although the names of pure perfections signify complexity in creatures, they do not signify complexity when said about the divine essence.⁸

Analogy first comes up in article 5 as the alternative between pure equivocation and univocity. An alternative is necessary because, if names were said only purely equivocally about God and creatures, then the fallacy of equivocation would occur in all attempts to learn about God from creatures,⁹ while as noted above, naming God and creatures univocally is incompatible with divine simplicity. Thomas writes that analogy in names occurs in two ways. In the first way, called analogy of “many to one,” the same name is said of two things that stand in different relations to a third


quality, but not in God; a variation in genus, however, changes the *ratio*, since it is part of the definition. And the same reasoning applies to other cases. Therefore, whatever is said about God and creatures is said equivocally [Sed contra, quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur].”

⁸ See *ST I*, q. 13, a. 5, resp.: “In the same way, as was said above, all the perfections of things, which in created things exist dividedly and multiply, preexist in God unitedly. So therefore, when any name pertaining to a perfection is said about a creature, it signifies that perfection as distinct from others according to the *ratio* of the definition. For example, when the name ‘wise’ is said about a human, we signify a perfection distinct from: the essence of a human; from the power; from its existence; and from all things of this kind. But when we say this name about God, we do not intend to signify something distinct from His essence, power, or existence [Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius].”

⁹ See *ST I*, q. 13, a. 5, resp.: “Consequently, no name is predicated univocally about God and creatures. But neither also [are they all predicated] purely equivocally, as some have said. Because, by this [position], nothing could be known or demonstrated about God from creatures. Rather, one would always fail by the fallacy of equivocation [Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur. Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia equivocationis].”

thing, such as when “healthy” is said of both urine and medicine, which relate differently to the health of an animal. In the second way, called analogy of “one to another,” the name is said of two things where one receives the name due to the relation it has to the other, such as when “healthy” is said of medicine and the animal made healthy by the medicine.¹⁰ Having divided the ways names are said by analogy in two, Thomas insists that some things (*aliqua*) are said of God and creatures in the second way (i.e., analogy of one to another).¹¹

Figure 2: Ways a single name is said of many things in *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5



¹⁰ See *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5, resp.: “Therefore, it must be said that names of this kind are said about God and creatures by analogy, that is proportion. Indeed there are two ways [analogy] occurs in names: either because many have proportion to one, as ‘healthy’ is said about medicine and urine inasmuch as both have order and proportion to the health of an animal, of which the former is the sign, but the latter is the cause; or because one has proportion to the other, as ‘healthy’ is said about medicine and an animal inasmuch as medicine is the cause of the health which is in the animal. And some things are said about God and creatures analogously in this way, and not purely equivocally, nor univocally [Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce].”

¹¹ See *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5.

Thomas gives no reason in *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5, for analogy of *many to one* being unsuited for predicating pure perfections about God and creatures. This marks a departure in practice, if not in doctrine, from the parallel passage written a few years earlier in chapter 34 of *Summa contra gentiles* [*SCG*] I.¹² Thomas there observes that, if names were said of God and creatures by analogy of *many to one*, then “it would be necessary to assert something prior to God.”¹³ This reason refers the reader back to Thomas’s rejection of univocity for naming God and creatures in chapter 32: “What is predicated of many univocally is simpler than each of those things, at least according to understanding. But something cannot be simpler than God either according to thing or according to understanding. Therefore, nothing is predicated univocally about God and other things.”¹⁴ A variation of the line that nothing is “simpler than God [either] according to thing, or according to understanding” appears in *ST* I, q. 3, a. 5, sc (where the question concerns the divine simplicity). Substituting the word “prior” for the word “simpler,” Thomas writes: “A genus is prior according to understanding to that which is contained in it. But nothing is prior to God, neither according to thing, nor according to understanding. Therefore, God is not in any genus.”¹⁵ In the *respondeo* of *ST* I, q. 3, a. 5, Thomas argues that God has not genus, difference, or definition.¹⁶ From these passages, one can conclude that the problem that Thomas has both with univocity and with analogy of *many to one* for the divine names is that they presume complexity (at least definitional complexity) in the things signified by the name. Since God has no such complexity and no definition

¹² On the similarity of St. Thomas’s doctrine in *Summa contra gentiles* [*SCG*] I, ch. 34, to what he writes in other mature works such as *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 7, and *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 82–83.

¹³ *SCG* I, ch. 34: “Therefore, names of this kind are not said about God and other things analogously by the first mode—for it would be necessary to assert something prior to God—but in the second mode [Huiusmodi igitur nomina de Deo et rebus aliis non dicuntur analogice secundum primum modum, oporteret enim aliquid Deo ponere prius: sed modo secundo]” (Leonine ed., 13:103a–b; translation mine).

¹⁴ See *SCG* I, ch. 32: “Quod univoce de pluribus praedicatur, utroque illorum ad minus secundum intellectum simplicius est. Deo autem neque secundum rem neque secundum intellectum potest esse aliquid simplicius. Nihil igitur univoce de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur” (Leonine ed., 13:97b; translation mine).

¹⁵ *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5, sc: “Sed contra, genus est prius, secundum intellectum, eo quod in genere continetur. Sed nihil est prius Deo, nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum. Ergo Deus non est in aliquo genere.”

¹⁶ *ST* I, q. 3, a. 5, resp.

knowable to us,¹⁷ names cannot be said univocally or by analogy of *many to one* about God and creatures.

Proceeding to article 6, Thomas adds that names must be said *per prius* of God when they are said of God properly. The article's *respondeo* begins with a general rule: "In all names which are said about many analogously, it is necessary that all are said by relation to one; and therefore, it is necessary that *that one is asserted in the definition of all*."¹⁸ Thomas connects being named *per prius* to being the "one" in the definition of the other or others:

And because the *ratio* which the name signifies is the definition, . . . it is necessary that that name is said *per prius* about that which is asserted in the definition of the others, and *per posterius* about the others according to the order by which they approach to that first, either more or less: as "healthy" which is said about an animal falls in the definition of "healthy" which is said about medicine, which is called "healthy" inasmuch as it causes health in an animal; and in the definition of "healthy" which is said about urine, which is called "healthy" inasmuch as it is the sign of the health of an animal.¹⁹

The final portion of the *respondeo* in article 6 adds a distinction between the order of the imposition of a name and the order of thing signified by a name. Speaking about names said properly about God, Thomas writes:

For when it is said "God is good, or wise," it not only is signified that He is the cause of wisdom, or goodness, but that these preexist in him eminently. Hence, according to this, it must be said that, as far as the thing signified through the name, they are said *per prius* about God as compared to creatures, because perfections of this

¹⁷ Besides his remarks in *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5, see the same point made in other words when Thomas argues that God's existence is not self-evident to us on the grounds "quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est" (*ST* I, q. 2, a. 1).

¹⁸ *ST* I, q. 13, a. 6, resp.: "Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum unum: et ideo illud *unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium*" (emphasis added).

¹⁹ *ST* I, q. 13, a. 6, resp.: "Et quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis vel minus, sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sana inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis."

kind remain in creatures from God. But as regards the imposition of the name, *per prius* they are imposed by us to creatures, which we know first.²⁰

At this point, the reader finds that St. Thomas has given a *sic et non* answer to the article's question. Yes, the names are said of God *per prius*, but only insofar as God is first in the order of thing signified by the name. God is prior to creatures in this order because the perfection signified by the name must preexist eminently in God. The name is quite specifically not said first of God in the order of imposition. That is, when signification is first attached to a name (or, more precisely at this stage, to a *vox*) such as "being," "wise," or "good," the signification relates the name to the perfection in a creature.²¹

From the above summary, I conclude that *ST* I, q. 13, aa. 1–6, requires of any adequate position on "*Una ratio versus diversae rationes*" that it be consistent with at least the following criteria. (1) One is in the definition of all analogates (article 6). (2) Pure perfections can be properly predicated about both God and creatures, and not merely negatively, relatively, or metaphorically (as per articles 2–4). (3) Names are said analogously of God and creatures by the analogy of *one to another*, rather than by that of *many to one* (article 5); Finally, (4) the fallacy of equivocation is avoided in reasoning from creatures to God (article 5).

Una ratio versus Diversae rationes

With these four criteria in mind, I return now to the three positions laid out at the beginning of the article on the number of *rationes* or mediating conceptions through which the name of a pure perfection is said about

²⁰ *ST* I, q. 13, a. 6, resp.: "Cum enim dicitur Deus est bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius praexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum est quod, quantum ad rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus."

²¹ On the relation between imposition and signification, see Ria van der Lecq, "Logic and Theories of Meaning in the Late 13th and Early 14th Century," *Handbook of the History of Logic* 2 (2008): esp. 347–48: "The basic function of language is to signify things, and imposition is the way words acquire their meanings. This is supposed to work as follows: a first *impositor* investigates things and their properties and then decides which sound (*vox*) should be used to signify the object. When this sound has been imposed to signify some thing, it becomes a sign and it has acquired signification."

God and creatures by analogy. Option A: Thomas abandons *una ratio* for *diversae rationes*. Option B: the *una ratio* is one of the *diversae rationes*. Option C: the *una ratio* is separate from the *diversae rationes*.

It seems to me that option A is incompatible with criterion 1: "In all names which are said about many analogously . . . it is necessary that that one is asserted in the definition of all." Insofar as this "one" is "asserted in the definition of all" the analogates, it functions as either the whole or an identifiable (and thereby intellectually separable) part of the definition of the name.²² As the whole or as a separable part of a definition, the "one . . . in the definition of all" is a mediating concept, a *ratio*. With this rule in mind, it is clear that there being diverse *rationes* for a name said of many by analogy does not prevent there also being one *ratio* for a name said of many by analogy. On the contrary, it is necessary that there be *una ratio* in some way contained in all the *diversae rationes*. At least insofar as option A proposes that Aquinas simply replaces *una ratio* with *diversae rationes* by the time he composes *ST*, option A fails to satisfy criterion 1, and is thereby inconsistent with and unsupported by the text.

Options B and C face the challenge of consistently meeting both criteria 1 and 2. They must be able to explain how it is that a name such as "wise" can be said properly about God and creatures (as required by criterion 2) and analogously about God and creatures, which (according to criterion 1) entails that "one is . . . in the definition of all." This is a challenge because, as presented by Thomas, when a name is properly predicated of one thing, then it is not said of that thing by reference to another. And yet, it is reference to another that occasions the presence of one *ratio* in the definition of all. The difficulty of reconciling criteria 1 and 2 is attested by the historical practice of the Thomists who propose *either* option B *or* option C. A standard move among these Thomists is to deny that criterion 1 applies to names said of God and creatures. They do this by appealing to remarks Thomas makes either in *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 11, ad 6, or in *In I sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.²³

²² According to Klubertanz, "to be in the definition of something" either means "to be one of the constitutive intelligibilities of an essence" or means "to be part of the complete intelligibility of the creature as creature, or again, of God as Creator" (*St. Thomas on Analogy*, 34). Recalling that "intelligibility" is Klubertanz's translation of *ratio*, I think that the account I have given of what it means for one to be "asserted in the definition of all" is consistent with Klubertanz's. Klubertanz himself does not acknowledge any obstacle between what I am calling criterion 1 and his developmental solution to the problem of "*una ratio* versus *diversae rationes*."

²³ See the table below for a presentation of the different ways in which Renaissance

Thomas demonstrates that it is reference to another that distinguishes naming negatively, relatively, and metaphorically from naming properly by the examples he gives in *ST I*, q. 13 of the signification of negative, relative, and metaphorical names. For example, he says that: if God were called

Thomists explain away criterion 1. Specifically, these authors deny that names are said of God and creatures in the way in which “healthy” is said analogously about an animal and medicine.

Option Letter	Thomist	Preferred text(s) for explaining away criterion 1
B	Capreolus	Both <i>In I sent.</i> , d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, and <i>De veritate</i> q. 2, a. 11, ad 6
B	Dominic of Flanders	<i>De veritate</i> q. 2, a. 11, ad 6
B	Cajetan	<i>De veritate</i> q. 2, a. 11, ad 6
C	Soncinas	<i>In I sent.</i> , d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1
C	Javelli	<i>In I sent.</i> , d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1

For the texts of these authors, see: John Capreolus, *Defensiones* 1, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, and d. 35, q. 2, a. 2; Dominic of Flanders, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis, secundum expositionem eiusdem Angelici Doctoris, lucidissimae atque utilissimae quaestiones* XII, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3; Cajetan, Thomas di Vi Cajetan, *Commentaria in summam theologiae St. Thomae* I, q. 13, a. 6, nos. 2–4 (Leonine ed., 4:151a); Paul Soncinas, *Pauli Soncinatis ordinis praedicatorum, Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissime: nunc demum summo studio, et accuratius quàm antehac vnuquam castigatae, repurgatae, & multis in locis illustratae. Cum triplici earum indice, quorum primus, questionum titulos promiscuè: secundus, ad hos, iuxta librorum & alphabeti seriem simul materiam: tertius verò digna notatu circa haec omnia, demonstrat* IV, q. 4, ad 1; Chysostom Javelli, *Quaestiones, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis: Ab innumeris mendis repurgatae & in gratiam Philosophiae studiosorum denuo editae Accessit in hac editione, Tractatus de natura Metaphysices ex Epitome Metaphysica eiusdem autoris huc translatus, & duplex Index . . .* IV, q. 1.

For Klubertanz’s interpretation of this “rule,” see esp. *St. Thomas on Analogy*, 32–34. According to Klubertanz, the passages in which Thomas affirms, denies, or affirms and denies that “one is in the definition of the other” are not contradictory. Rather they are instances of a “confusing terminological shift.” Klubertanz sums up his own conclusion on the matter by stating: “It is true that its relationship to God is part of the complete intelligibility of a creature as creature; and also true that we human knowers know God naturally inasmuch as He is the cause of creatures, and so the relationship to the creature is part of the intelligibility of God *for us*” (34). Inasmuch as Klubertanz’s resolution of the (at least) apparent conflict between Thomas Aquinas’s texts relies on considering creatures and/or God relationally, rather than properly, Klubertanz’s resolution resembles the solution proposed by Francis Sylvester of Ferrara (to be discussed further below).

“living” negatively, then the name “living” would signify “that God in this way is not like non-living things”;²⁴ if God is called “good” by the relation of causality, then the name “good” would signify “cause of goodness in things”;²⁵ and if God were called “lion” metaphorically, then the name “lion” would signify, “God relates similarly as He works strongly upon His works, as a lion upon its.”²⁶ In each of these cases, one thing receives a name properly and at least one other receives the name by reference to another, and the *ratio* of the name as said properly of one appears in the *ratio* of the name as said of the other. So, when the name “wise” is said properly about a creature, there is not some other *ratio* of the name contained within the definition of the name that is distinct from the proper *ratio* of the name as said of the creature, and the same is true when the names are said of God properly. But if one *ratio* does not appear in the definition of all the recipients of the common name, then the name is not being said about them by analogy.

I draw inspiration from an unusual proponent of option B to consider whether this option is able to hold together criteria 1 and 2.²⁷ It is consistent with *ST* I, q. 13, to suggest that, in those cases of analogy of *one to another* where the name can be said *properly* of both analogates, the name can also be said *relatively* of both analogates. For example, a creature can be called “wise” properly, thereby signifying an accident in the creature, and a creature can be called “wise” relatively, thereby signifying its accident *qua* effect of divine wisdom. The same name “wisdom” can be said of God properly, thereby signifying the divine essence, and said of God relatively, thereby signifying a causal relation to creatures. When the intellect compares how it signifies one of these names about God to how it signifies one of these names about creatures, it considers either the perfection in God as the cause of the creature or the creature’s perfection as an effect of God. Either way, when a name is said of one relatively to how the name

²⁴ *ST* I, q. 13, a. 2: “Cum dicimus Deum esse viventem, significamus quod Deus non hoc modo est, sicut res inanimatae.”

²⁵ *ST* I, q. 13, a. 2: “Cum dicimus Deus est bonus, sit sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis in rebus.”

²⁶ *ST* I, q. 13, a. 6: “Sic nomen leonis, dictum de Deo, nihil aliud significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis.”

²⁷ The unusual proponent is Francis Silvestri of Ferrara. For a discussion of his position, see Ralph McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy: An interpretation of St. Thomas* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 23–31, 164–65. See also the comparison of Francis Silvestri with earlier Thomists in Domenic D’Ettore, “One Is in the Definition of All: The Renaissance Thomist Controversy over a ‘Rule’ for Names Said by Analogy,” *The Thomist*, 82 (2018): 89–111.

is said properly of another, the *ratio* of the name proper to one analogate appears in the *ratio* of the name as it is being said of the other. By considering how the same name can be said both relatively and properly about the same thing, it is apparent that option B can satisfy both criteria 1 and 2.

I have not yet come across a historical proponent of option C who parts from the practice of explaining away criterion 1. So, this tentative solution on behalf of option C is original. One prominent proponent of option C identifies the *una ratio* with the *ratio* of the name as first conceived. The intellect generates more determinate and diverse proper *rationes* after comparing how its first and absolute concept for a name applies in different cases.²⁸ By this account, the rule that “one is . . . in the definition of all” entails that the proper *rationes* of names as said properly of God and their *rationes* as said properly of creatures are both determinations of the *ratio* of the name as first conceived absolutely. This approach does not seem to me to be incoherent, and perhaps it even could be reconciled with *ST* I, q. 13, as a whole. But the examples Thomas uses in the question strongly suggest option B, not option C. For example, the “one health” in the *ratio* of the name “healthy” said of medicine and of an animal appears to be the health of the animal, rather than a “healthy” absolutely considered that is indeterminate to either the health proper to an animal or to medicine. So, even if option C is not incapable of satisfying both criteria 1 and 2, option B can satisfy them in a way much closer to the text of *ST* I, q. 13.

Another consideration in favor of option B over option C is that the former fits easily with criterion 3: names are said of God and creatures by the analogy of *one to another*. If the *ratio* of a name as said of God falls in the *ratio* of the name as said of a creature, or *vice versa*, then clearly the name is said of God and creature by analogy of *one to another*. By contrast, if, as required by option C, the *una ratio* is a separate *ratio* that appears in the *rationes* proper to the analogates, then it becomes difficult to explain why the name is said by analogy of *one to another* rather than by analogy of *many to one*. For reasons mentioned above, this particular line of consideration is even stronger when Thomas’s decision against analogy of *many to one* in *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5 is read in the light of the parallel passages in the *SCG*. Since I am deliberately isolating *ST* I, q. 13, I will say no more on this point.

The one consideration that I find weighing against option B in favor of option C is criterion 4, by which an adequate interpretation of the passage should be consistent with Thomas’s intention to use analogy in naming as a means of avoiding the fallacy of equivocation when reasoning from

²⁸ See Javelli, *In IV metaph.*, q. 1.

perfections first known in creatures to the existence and attributes of God. The problem for option B is that the fallacy of equivocation occurs in at least some cases in which the *ratio* proper to one analogate appears in the definition of another. Indeed, option B appears to be entirely consistent with the standard Scholastic example of the fallacy's second species: "Every healthy thing is an animal, and urine is healthy; therefore, urine is an animal."²⁹ To follow option B without qualification in this passage would be to find Aquinas saying that names of pure perfections are said by the analogy of *one to another* about God and creatures in precisely the way that "healthy" is said in the fallacious argument above. This could be a philosophical problem with Thomas's position, rather than an interpretative problem with option B. In fact, some historical proponents of option B notice this very problem and explain it away by appealing to other texts by Aquinas.³⁰ Option C does not share option B's problem of lining up exactly with a well-known fallacy, and in part, C has been developed historically to answer objections that demonstrations using terms analogously are fallacious.³¹

Conclusion

I do not propose that I have settled the overall question of which of the three positions on "*Una ratio versus diversae rationes*" agrees with the mind of St. Thomas, and I have deliberately avoided interpreting *ST I*, q. 13, in light of Thomas's other works, choosing to focus on one particular part of the wider dispute involving the range of Thomas's works. Within that range of Thomas's works, Klubertanz identified real variations in the way that Thomas Aquinas wrote about names said of many by analogy. One of those variations is whether a name is said by analogy through one *ratio* or through *diversae rationes*. Klubertanz cites *ST I*, q. 13, a. 5, as evidence that Thomas had abandoned *una ratio* for *diversae rationes* in his mature works. I have argued that this text does not provide the evidence Klubertanz claims from it. Rather, the passage requires both *diversae rationes* and one *ratio* that is in all the *diversae rationes*. I have argued further that the most internally consistent reading of the text regards the one *ratio* said of many

²⁹ See Peter of Spain, *Peter of Spain: Summaries of Logic*, ed. Brian P. Copenhaver, Calvin Normore, and Terence Parsons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 277 (for the editors' discussion of the fallacy of equivocation, see 50–52; on this text as a standard textbook of logic, see 9–12).

³⁰ For example, see the first reference to Capreolus in footnote 23 above.

³¹ See the references to Soncinas and Javelli in footnote 23 above. Both of these authors are following the example of Capreolus.

by analogy as one of the *diversae rationes* proper to the analogates, although even this interpretation is not without difficulties.

Table 1: Evaluating the Three Positions

	Option A: Aquinas changes his mind from <i>una</i> <i>ratio</i> to <i>diversae</i> <i>rationes</i> .	Option B: The <i>una ratio</i> is one of the <i>diversae rationes</i> proper to the analogates.	Option C: The <i>una ratio</i> is separate from the <i>diversae</i> <i>rationes</i> proper to the analo- gates.
Criterion 1: In all names that are said about many analo- gously, . . . <i>one</i> <i>asserted in the</i> <i>definition of all.</i> " (a. 6)	Inconsistent	Consistent	Not as obvi- ously consistent as option B.
Criterion 2: <i>Proper predi- cation</i> of pure perfections about God and creatures (aa. 2–4)	Consistent	Consistent	Not as obvi- ously consistent as option B.

Criterion 3: Pure perfections said of God and creatures by analogy of <i>one to another</i> , not by analogy of <i>many to one</i> (a. 5)	Consistent	Consistent	Problematic textually
Criterion 4: Reasoning from creatures to God through an analogous name does not commit the <i>fallacy of equivoca-</i> <i>cation</i> . (a. 5)	Problematic philosophically	Problematic philosophically	Not as obvi- ously problem- atic as options A and B.