

Introduction: Benedict XVI and Conciliar Hermeneutics

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IT IS A PRIVILEGE FOR US, the Jesuit scholars who have authored the articles of this special edition of *Nova et Vetera* (English) on the thought of Joseph Ratzinger / Benedict XVI, to present them as a tribute to His Holiness the Pope Emeritus on the occasion of completing his ninetieth year. We do so with loyalty and esteem, extending our grateful congratulations *ad multos annos*.

I

In displaying the range of Benedict's thought, these studies offer commentary on what likely represents the chief achievement of his pontificate: adroitly guiding the reception of the Second Vatican Council, the golden jubilee of whose opening occurred during his incumbency.¹ This achievement eminently suited the pontiff precisely because his priestly life, from its early days, was focused on realizing it. From November 1962, Joseph Ratzinger exercised an active role in the Council as a peritus. Moreover, he wrote extensively on it as professor in Bonn (1959–1963), Münster (1963–1966), Tübingen (1966–1969), and Regensburg (1969–1977). Further trained while he shepherded the Archdiocese of Munich (1977–82), his experienced voice, when speaking as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine

¹ Vatican II opened on October 11, 1962, and closed on December 8, 1965. Benedict served as pope from April 19, 2005, to February 28, 2013.

of the Faith, influenced St. John Paul II's magisterial implementation of the Council's teaching.² In 2012, his substantial writings on Vatican II were gathered in his collected works.³ Our Jesuit authors cite a variety of these writings in both the original and English translation. In order to place their articles in context, we shall review important statements on conciliar hermeneutics with which Benedict framed his papacy, together with their origins, and also comment on the debate of which they are a part.

II

Benedict's famous Christmas address to the Roman Curia given in his first papal year probes into why the Council has proven so difficult to put into effect. As an answer, it distinguishes between two hermeneutics: "discontinuity and rupture" and "reform," or "renewal in continuity."⁴ The first splits asunder the pre- and post-conciliar periods, stressing that Vatican II's "innovations alone" represent its "true spirit." This spirit is essentially divorced from the letter of the conciliar texts, which are deemed compromises designed to settle disputes among various ecclesiastical factions. Adhering to what is distinctively new, the true spirit must therefore "go courageously beyond the texts" in order to fulfill Vatican II's legacy, however "vaguely" it might be envisaged. We see something of this hermeneutic in Massimo Faggioli's advocating "a non-originalist reception" of the Council that, understood primarily as an event, "unleashed" dynamic energy "for the transition to a new age of Catholicism."⁵

² John Paul II served as pope from October 16, 1978, to April 2, 2005.

³ Joseph Ratzinger, *Zur Lehre des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils: Formulierung-Vermittlung-Deutung*, vol. 7 (in two parts) of his *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Gerhard Ludwig Müller, 13 vols. [16 vols. planned] (Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder, 2011–2016).

⁴ Pope Benedict XVI, "Address to the Roman Curia Offering Them His Christmas Greetings," December 22, 2005, *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* (hereafter, AAS) 98 (2006): 40–55, and also at, accessed April 23, 2017, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2005/december/documents/hf_ben_xvi_spe_20051222_roman-curia.html. Unless noted otherwise, all citations of magisterial works come from the versions on the Vatican's website (<http://w2.vatican.va/content/vatican/en.html>),

⁵ Massimo Faggioli, *Vatican II: The Battle for Meaning* (New York: Paulist Press, 2012), 137–38. The problem with this view is the same raised about a non-originalist interpretation of the US Constitution. Everyone has license to interpret the text as he wishes, including those in authority to enforce their view. This makes it a recipe for fascism, whether political or ecclesiastical. The same criticism applies to the intriguing hermeneutic of Peter Hünermann

By contrast, the second hermeneutic views the Council's true spirit as tethered not only to the letter of the texts but also, first and foremost, to "the one subject" of the Council, the Church that, while developing, always remains the same. In no sense does authentic renewal discount the tension between continuity and discontinuity in the Council's texts, but it does posit a subtle approach to reconciling it. In fidelity to the mission given Vatican II at its convening by Pope John XXIII, the Council endeavored to express "truth in a new way," and this entailed adhering to "the teaching of the Church in its entirety" but expounding it through the methods "of modern thought."⁶ Accordingly, Benedict associates continuity with principles lodged deep within the Church's essential patrimony and discontinuity with the letter of the text.

Because discontinuity can be ambiguous, Benedict, in explaining the hermeneutic of reform, advises that we carefully discern discontinuity in Vatican II. It may represent an innovation connected or not to a principle of the patrimony. If not connected, it may be purely contingent and dispensable when proven ineffective. If connected, the principle must be grasped, affirmed, and preserved within the innovative expression that seeks to make it appropriately intelligible to a particular historical situation. Although the letter of the text possesses a certain contingency, the principle that the letter articulates is "permanent." It always remains within the deposit of faith "as an undercurrent, motivating decisions" about how the Church in various epochs should speak it in the text's letter. The principle embodied in the letter must therefore not be obviated in the name of a "true spirit" that seeks "courageously" to go beyond the textual novelty. As an example, Benedict refers to the Declaration on Religious Freedom (DH), whose innovation does not erroneously derive from the relativist principle that humanity is incapable of knowing the truth about God, the self, and the world.

that the Council's set of documents functions like a government constitution. Both texts, *mutatis mutandis*, "facilitate the realization of the values . . . that lie behind the text." In the case of Vatican II, these values embody "the biblical revelation that Jesus saves." But who is to interpret the biblical revelation, and by what criteria? See Grant Kaplan, "Vatican II as a Constitutional Text of Faith," *Horizons* 41 (2014): 23–38, at 35.

⁶ Benedict cites John XXIII, "Pope John's Opening Speech to the Council," trans. given by Vatican Press Office and Press Office of Vatican II in *Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Guild Press, 1966), 710–19, at 715. John served as Pope from October 28, 1958, to June 3, 1963.

Even more important, Benedict points out that discontinuity does not result only from creatively adapting principles to changing circumstances. It can embody an authentic development that “has actually preserved and deepened” the patrimony in ways previously not understood. Although he does not mention it, we might cite the example of the term *homoousios* (consubstantial) used by the Council of Nicea to define the relations in the Trinitarian God between the Father and the Son. Given the fragmented references to these relations in the Scriptures, Nicea harnessed a term not found in them precisely to express their inner coherence and underlying meaning. Although this term introduced a marked discontinuity, and to the Arians a heterodox one, it was warranted under the Council’s authority to conserve the deposit of faith. Accordingly, discontinuity can be paradoxical. It can posit a faithful interpretation of a principle even when it seems at odds with it and, in so doing, require an assent of faith.

III

In his parting address to the clergy of Rome delivered fourteen days before retiring as pope, Benedict gave a gloss on the Christmas address of seven years earlier. His remarks on the history and significance of *Dei Verbum* (DV) laid out more fully his understanding of Vatican II’s true spirit that, lying in the heart of the hermeneutic of reform, bonds the Council’s texts intimately to their “living subject,” the Church.⁷ Identifying DV as “one of the finest and most innovative [documents] of the entire Council,” the Pontiff underscores the dogmatic constitution’s reciprocity between the Church’s living Tradition and Sacred Scripture. Scripture, the divine word, emerges only from the Tradition, which nonetheless is subject to Scripture, even as Scripture requires the Church’s enlightened voice to “speak with all its authority.” The Church’s light is received from the Holy Spirit, sent by the Incarnate Son, even as Christ was sent by the Father. If the Church, by its divine mandate, gives Scripture “ultimate clarity,” then ecumenical councils, in their exercise of the Tradition’s magisterium, become supreme interpretive authorities of Scripture. Accordingly, the spirit of Vatican II is the spirit of the Tradition, whose principles are animated by the one Spirit who guides the Church “into all the truth”

⁷ Benedict XVI, “Meeting with the Parish Priests and the Clergy of Rome,” Address of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, February 14, 2013, AAS 105 (2013): 283–94.

(John 16:13). Because these principles can be expressed only in words, even as God expresses himself in the one Word, the letter of conciliar texts is conjoined with them.⁸

The teaching of DV, which affirms the person of Christ as the object of divine revelation and the Church as its living subject, provides evidence for Benedict that Vatican II's true spirit, the hermeneutic of renewal in continuity, is grounded in "faith seeking understanding." It seeks "to find in the word of God a word for today and tomorrow." Against it, however, works a "profane" hermeneutic of the secular media obsessed by power and politics. It depicts in the world's imagination a "virtual Council" that at times seems stronger than the "real Council." For its part, this virtual Vatican II feeds the hermeneutic of rupture by obviating faith and undermining confidence in the integrity of the letter of the conciliar texts, as the Pope noted in 2005.⁹

IV

Benedict's conciliar hermeneutic posits an analogous relation between Vatican II's spirit and its letter, in contrast to the equivocal relation put forth by the hermeneutic of rupture. Analogy maintains a unity within the creative tension of two opposing elements, whereas equivocation entails an unreconciled dialectic between them. Aquinas reminds us, for instance, that soul and body, the matter and form of the human person, while qualitatively different as simple and complex principles, cohere in the harmonious functioning of the single substance (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 76). For this reason, Karl Rahner interprets them as analogous, not equivocal, and so, as joined into a union fundamentally congenial to both.¹⁰ By similarly framing the relation between letter and spirit, Benedict heals the rift caused by the hermeneutic of rupture, thus concurring with Avery Dulles that analogy is essential to Catholic theology.¹¹

⁸ Gerald O'Collins, S.J., argues that the dogmatic constitution *Dei Verbum* takes precedence in interpreting the Council (*The Second Vatican Council: Message and Meaning* [Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2014], 141f.).

⁹ For other hermenetucs of Vatican II, see Étienne Fouilloux, "Histoire et événement: Vatican II," *Cristianesimo nella Storia* [Cr St] 13 (1992): 515–38.

¹⁰ Karl Rahner, "Theology of the Symbol," in *Theological Studies*, vol. 4, *More Recent Writings*, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore, MD: Helicon, 1966), 221–52, at 231–33.

¹¹ Avery Dulles, "Criteria of Catholic Theology," *Communio: International Catholic Review* 22 (Summer 1995): 303–15, at 305–06 and 309–10.

More important, both thinkers concur with DV, which defines divine revelation as a dynamic system of interlocking analogies. As we have seen, Christ reveals the Father to the apostles by his words, works, symbolic acts, and miracles (§4). In faithfully handing on their meaning, the apostles, under the Spirit (§7), generate ecclesial Tradition, which develops the community's understanding of Christ's message. From this understanding emerges the New Testament (§8), which regulates Tradition and, in turn, is regulated by it (9). In short, the divine reality is historically mediated in an unfolding continuity that begins in Christ and flows into his words and acts, the apostles' words and acts, and the Church's Tradition, which gives birth to Scripture and its authoritative interpretation. Analogous unity-in-diversity constitutes the core of Christianity precisely because it constitutes the core of Christ, whose two natures subsist "without confusion" but also "without [hypostatic] separation."¹²

Although grounded magisterially in DV, the roots of Benedict's hermeneutic extend deeper into the most important theories of doctrinal development, those of Johann Adam Möhler (1796–1838) and John Henry Newman (1801–1890). Neither influence in the Pontiff should come as a surprise. On the one hand, Ratzinger notes that the ferment caused by the Tübingen School, of which Möhler was the recognized chief, bears much of the responsibility for DV.¹³ On the other hand, Benedict beatified Newman on September 19, 2010, in Birmingham's Cofton Park during the first state visit of a Roman Pontiff to the United Kingdom.

V

Möhler's creative notion that an "internal force" animates the Church should be underscored as having an impact on DV and Benedict. For

¹² "The Chalcedonian Decree," in *Christology of the Later Fathers*, ed. Edward R. Hardy (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1954), 373–74, at 373. For a consideration of analogy as central to Vatican II's doctrinal development, see Stephen M. Fields, *Analogies of Transcendence: An Essay on Nature, Grace and Modernity* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 243–52.

¹³ Joseph Ratzinger, "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Origin and Background," in *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Herbert Vorgimlér, trans. Lalit Adolphus et al, 5 vols. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967–1969), 3:155–66 [originally "Dogmatische Konstitution über die göttliche Offenbarung," in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, ed. Josef Höfer et al, 3 vols. (Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder, 1968), 2:498–583].

the Tübinger, the ecclesial community constitutes a living consciousness that, perduring in time, develops dialectically by resolving the challenges presented to it by historical contingencies. Although the Church retains its substantial identity through the successive resolution of kerygmatic crises, its doctrines and institutions, which empirically manifest its identity, must necessarily be modified.¹⁴ The internal force, which harmonizes the dynamism of renewal in continuity, cannot be reduced to human self-consciousness, although our rationality is necessarily part of it. It is derived ultimately from the Trinitarian source of Christ's Incarnation.¹⁵ "The Church is Christ acting and manifesting himself through the ages"; it is "his permanent incarnation," in which the Son of God continues "to appear in human form."¹⁶ Just as humanity is "won again to God" by the merits of the Paschal Christ, which remain undivided from the God-man, so the Church derives its inner life undivided from the Son and communicates this life undivided to the doctrines and institutions that historically emanate from it.¹⁷

Möhlner's ecclesiology thus reconciles the transcendent and the immanent, divine teleology and historical contingency, by a twin ontological participation. The organic life of the Church's internal force is derived from Christ's organic unity with God, whereas the Church's doctrines and institutions that appear through the ages are

¹⁴ Johann Adam Möhler, *Gesammelte Schriften und Aufsätze*, ed. Johann J. I. von Döllinger, 2 vols. (Regensburg: Manz, 1839–1840), 2:273–77; cited in Edmond Vermeil, *Jean-Adam Möhler et l'école catholique de Tübingue (1815–1840)* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1913), 156.

¹⁵ See Johann Adam Möhler, *Die Einheit in der Kirche oder das Prinzip des Katholizismus dargestellt in Geiste der Kirchenväter der drei ersten Jahrhunderte* (Tübingen, 1825), ed. E. J. Vierneisel (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald, 1925), 24; cited in Gustav Voss, "Johann Adam Möhler and the Development of Dogma," *Theological Studies* 4 (1943): 420–44, at 428. See also Joseph Fitzner, *Moehler and Baur in Controversy, 1832–38: Romantic-Idealist Assessment of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation* American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion 7 (Tallahassee, FL: American Academy of Religion, 1974), 19.

¹⁶ Johann Adam Möhler, *Symbolik oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegensätze der Katholischen und Protestanten nach ihren öffentlichen Bekenntnisschriften*, 4th ed., 2 vols. (Mainz: Kupferberg, 1835), 1:301, cited in Hervé Savon, *Johann Adam Möhler: The Father of Modern Theology*, trans. Charles McGrath (Glen Rock, NJ: Paulist Press, 1966), 95; Möhler, *Symbolik* (4th ed.), 1:335, cited in Vermeil, *Jean-Adam Möhler*, 95.

¹⁷ Johann Adam Möhler, *Symbolism or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and Protestants as Evidenced by Their Symbolical Writings*, trans. James Burton Robertson, 3rd ed. (New York: Catholic Publication House, n.d.), 178; in Fitzner, *Moehler and Baur*, 41.

derived from, and reciprocally act on, the Church's internal force. For its part, DV, as we have seen, adapts the internal force by stratifying it into dynamic analogies, and Benedict adapts it to fuse Vatican II's letter to its spirit, precisely as this spirit embraces the permanent principles of the deposit of faith.

Moreover, Möhler's deepened analysis of the relation between discontinuity and continuity helps us better understand why Benedict places such importance on carefully discerning discontinuity in Vatican II. For the Tübinger, doctrines are eternally true, even as they are expressed in changing forms. Accordingly, they possess both an objective and a subjective sense. The first means that the Church, at its inception, receives the immutable divine revelation in its full truth.¹⁸ This truth, the source of all subsequently formed doctrines, necessarily must evolve because the Word of God lives perpetually "in the hearts of believers."¹⁹ The second sense means that the Church is able to unfold the objective revelation. As its self-consciousness matures, the community of faith gains clearer and more distinct insights into the truth that it receives.²⁰ The continuing immutability of these evolving insights is guaranteed by the Spirit, who cannot admit of contradiction.²¹ As new insights renew the primordial revelation that abides, the Church, using its authoritative organs, articulates as doctrines what it discerns to be authentic.²²

The upshot is that, when subjectively framed, doctrines represent objective revelation; the inner truth of the divine message perdures.²³ The difference between the language of the Gospels about God and the Nicene dogma mentioned above is, for Möhler, formal not substantial. The difference applies only to the conceptual formulation of the revelation.²⁴ For both him and Benedict, therefore, vitally at stake in the interpretation of councils is the extent to which their

¹⁸ Möhler, *Einheit*, 24, 325, cited in Voss, "Development," 428, 430.

¹⁹ Möhler, *Symbolik*, 9th ed. (Mainz: Kupferberg, 1884), 357; Möhler, *Symbolism*, trans. Robertson, 5th ed. (London: Thomas Baker, 1906), 279; cited in Voss, "Development," 428.

²⁰ Voss, "Development," 429.

²¹ Möhler, *Einheit*, 24; in Voss, "Development," 428.

²² Möhler, *Einheit*, 33; in Voss, "Development," 429.

²³ Möhler, *Einheit*, 22; *Symbolik* (9th ed.), 369–71; *Symbolism* (5th ed.), 289–90; cited in Voss, "Development," 430–31.

²⁴ Möhler, *Symbolik* (9th ed.), 368; *Symbolism* (5th ed.), 288; in Voss, "Development," 434.

subjective sense is related to the Church's objective sense. At stake, to use Benedict's words, is discerning in councils' subjective sense (the letter of their texts) the "undercurrent" (permanent principles of the Tradition). The undercurrent "motivates decisions" about how the Church has adapted, and should continue to adapt, in history.

VI

With similarities to Möhler, Newman applies his own genius to doctrinal continuity within change by developing the likeness between the Church's deepened knowledge and that of the individual.²⁵ The human mind receives the impression of objects in the world through the senses. Although this impression comes from a single, whole, and integral object, the senses assimilate the impression as a system of complex and manifold relations.²⁶ Initially, these are imbibed implicitly and lodged in the imagination and memory, "vast magazines," says Newman, of "dormant, but present and excitable ideas" (11; "Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine" given by page no. hereafter). Only with the passing of time and the gaining of experience is such implicit knowledge rendered explicit "by the activity of our reflective powers" (ibid.). When this rendering occurs, the consequences entailed in the original idea taken implicitly from the object become clear without, however, surpassing the content of the idea, which in fact "can never be said to be entirely exhausted" (16).

Developing the simile, Newman posits that "theological dogmas are propositions expressive of the judgment" that the Church "receives of Revealed Truth" (10). Revelation constitutes a divine Idea given by Christ to the community of faith. Although absorbed whole and entire, its intrinsic principles are understood only as history progressively discloses how they "imply each other, as being parts of the one whole" (20). When framed as doctrines, these parts are not adding to the original idea, but rather only clarifying "that sacred impression which is prior to them, which acts as a regulating principle [of their explication], ever present" (19). Crucially,

²⁵ As Newman acknowledges, he had no direct knowledge of Möhler (Owen Chadwick, *From Bossuet to Newman: The Idea of Doctrinal Development* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], 111).

²⁶ John Henry Cardinal Newman, "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine" (Preached on the Purification, 1843), in *Conscience, Consensus, and the Development of Doctrine: Revolutionary Texts by John Henry Cardinal Newman*, with introduction and notes by James Gafney (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 6–29, at 17; this work will be cited in the text by page.

as a result, Newman, presaging Benedict, asserts that the words of conciliar texts “are not a mere letter which we handle by the rules of art at our own wills, but august tokens of most . . . adorable” elements of the ecclesial Tradition (19). We shall return to Newman after selectively surveying the extended debate that surrounds Benedict’s hermeneutic. This survey will demonstrate the enduring relevance of the renowned English convert’s theory, now in its one hundred and seventy-fourth year.

VII

The relevance of continuity and discontinuity in conciliar hermeneutics as proposed in both Newman and Benedict is disputed in Neil Ormerod’s appeal to Lonergan’s work. These terms imply a dichotomy, whereas every shift in meaning, as from Scripture to the *homoousion*, entails “a leap in the ‘being of meaning’” in the schemes of meaning that constitute a tradition.²⁷ But the analogous account that we have offered of these thinkers (and DV and Möhler) affirms understanding development as a dialectical shift in the meaning of revelation. “Analogous” applies, of course, to “being.” Because development does indeed represent such a shift, our thinkers caution that we carefully discern the reality in the appearance of discontinuity. In *The Way to Nicea*, Lonergan complements Newman’s theory by a detailed account of the structure of “human interiority” that renders analogous “the leap in the being of the meaning” of the primordial revelation given in history.²⁸ Although “leap” sounds like discontinuity, it entails quite the opposite. At Nicea, the leap guarantees continuity by moving from Scripture’s descriptive, culturally conditioned language to the explanatory, transcultural meaning of faith-enlightened metaphysics. Precisely this same transition concerns our thinkers when their hermeneutics account for continuity, albeit in their own distinctive ways. The upshot is that continuity, however analogous, is irreducible in Catholicism and is therefore explanatory of it. It cannot be replaced by a hermeneutic “of the authenticity/unauthenticity” of the council’s developments, as Ormerod argues, because authenticity is necessarily a function of continuity.²⁹

²⁷ Neil Ormerod, “Vatican II—Continuity or Discontinuity? Toward an Ontology of Meaning,” *Theological Studies* 71 (2010): 609–36, at 632.

²⁸ Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology* (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1976); Ormerod, “Vatican II,” 626.

²⁹ Ormerod, “Vatican II,” 634.

For his part, Richard John Neuhaus focuses the Pontiff's opposition on John O'Malley's *What Happened at Vatican II*.³⁰ He claims that O'Malley's perspective, "dominantly sociological and psychological," stresses the importance of grasping the Council's spirit that "moved beyond the 'status quo'" of Catholicism's Tridentine model.³¹ Neuhaus finds O'Malley's view of this spirit to be "wondrously malleable . . . to the spirit of the times." As an illustration, he observes that, whereas O'Malley identifies *aggiornamento*, *ressourcement*, and doctrinal development as the Council's dominant themes, still "the latter two are always in the service of the first." For this reason, he interprets O'Malley's claim that Vatican II represents primarily a "language-event" as meaning that the Council's "style is its substance, is its spirit." Still, he does readily acknowledge O'Malley's bringing home Vatican II's difference "in the long history of church councils." This difference, Neuhaus contends, is crystallized in a series of polarities that show the true colors of O'Malley's "hermeneutics of rupture." Among these, O'Malley lists commands/invitations, laws/ideals, definition/mystery, threats/persuasion, coercion/conscience, and vertical/horizontal.

By contrast, Joseph Komonchak offers a nuanced reading of Benedict's hermeneutic consistent with the account that we have presented. He notes, for instance, that Benedict's Christmas address does not posit a sharp dichotomy: discontinuity does not necessarily entail rupture, and reform "acknowledges some important discontinuities."³² Importantly, he observes that continuity can be examined from various perspectives: doctrinal, theological, and sociological or historical. Doctrinally, it recovers, for instance, episcopal collegiality and the priesthood of the baptized, previously displaced or neglected.³³ Theologically, it bears the fruit of nineteenth- and twentieth-century renewals, as in Thomism, liturgy, and patristic studies (336). Nonetheless, historically, as an "event" extending beyond debates about its spirit and letter, the Council surely represents a break in the outlook

³⁰ John W. O'Malley, *What Happened at Vatican II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

³¹ Richard John Neuhaus, "What Really Happened at Vatican II," *First Things* (October 2008), accessed April 23, 2017, www.firstthings.com/article/2008/10/001-what-really-happened-at-vatican-ii; all citations of this piece by Neuhaus come from this source.

³² Joseph A. Komonchak, "Benedict XVI and the Interpretation of Vatican II," *Cr St* 28 (2007): 323–37, at 335; this work will be cited in the text by page.

³³ *Ibid.*

and practice of many Catholics when viewed against the short- and longer-term preceding it.³⁴

Komonchak's comments enable us to give a critique of both O'Malley and Neuhaus's response to O'Malley.³⁵ If Neuhaus is correct that, from a doctrinal and theological perspective, O'Malley gives short shrift to the hermeneutic that accounts for the perduring truth of divine revelation, still Neuhaus too quickly accuses O'Malley of the hermeneutic of rupture. We could well argue that both of the polarities in the pairs that O'Malley mentions are embodied within the ecclesial tradition and that, when Vatican II emphasizes one pole at the expense of the other, the Council is simply recovering it for the sake of achieving balance in the tradition. Möhler reminds us, for instance, that, under pressure from forces hostile to the Church, one of its constituent elements may assume a disproportionate importance and subsequently require a curtailment.³⁶ Indeed, in another source, O'Malley, implicitly echoing Newman's famous adage that "to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often," affirms that, "for believing Christians, a total shift of paradigm is by definition impossible."³⁷ He thus, in principle, accepts Benedict's hermeneutic. Still, he emphasizes, Vatican II did induce a shift in some basic ecclesial assumptions that dislodged older, settled ones. In so doing, the Council bears a kinship with only two previous events in Church history: the eleventh-century Gregorian reform and the sixteenth-century Reformation.

O'Malley identifies the Council's shift with John XXIII's definition of *aggiornamento* as "religion had to change to meet 'the needs of

³⁴ Ibid., 336. For more, see Martin Madar, "An Alternative Middle Position: The Contribution of Joseph A. Komonchak to the Hermeneutics of Vatican II," *Cr St* 36 (2015): 643–69, accessed April 23, 2014, www.exhibit.xavier.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=theology_faculty.

³⁵ Komonchak also argues that the Bologna Institute's work of interpreting the history of Vatican II falls within Benedict's hermeneutic of reform ("Benedict XVI," 324–25, 336–37).

³⁶ Möhler, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 2: 273–77; in Vermeil, Jean-Adam Möhler, 156.

³⁷ John Henry Cardinal Newman, *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, in *Conscience, Consensus, and the Development of Doctrine*, 38–385, at 75; John W. O'Malley, S.J., "Developments, Reforms, and Two Great Reformations: Towards a Historical Assessment of Vatican II," *Theological Studies* 44 (1983): 373–406, accessed April 23, 2017, www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/offices/mission/pdf1/c7.pdf; all citations of this work by O'Malley come from this last source.

the times.”³⁸ Such a definition represents “an awareness more radical than ever before in the history of the Church,” and it is reflected in the polar pairs previously mentioned. It is not surprising, he thus argues, as precursory to Benedict’s addresses, that Vatican II should have “evoked a crisis.” This is partially due to a certain clericalism (my word): on the one hand, the laity had been ill-prepared to receive the Council’s message, while, on the other hand, some of what was done in its name, like the liturgical reform, was “autocratic,” thus defying the Council’s “conciliatory language.” With deference to Benedict’s addresses, these discontinuities, although more sociological than doctrinal or theological, cannot be blamed on a profane secular media.

However much we may heartily embrace the hermeneutic of renewal in continuity, therefore, we cannot avoid O’Malley’s definition of the central issue lodged in it. In accepting “historical consciousness,” albeit from nuanced moderates like Möhler and Newman, the Council admits “contingency on a large scale.” Although historical (or sociological) discontinuity does not entail dogmatic and theological discontinuity, it does significantly complicate interpreting the Council. If we agree that the Council worked under a hermeneutic of doctrinal and theological reform, still it was released into a world sociologically entering the throes of its own hermeneutic of rupture. We need continually to inquire into what extent this secular hermeneutic holds the sacred one hostage.³⁹ For instance, although Prudence Allen and Judith O’Brien admirably show the continuity in the Council’s advocacy of the reform of religious life, we must still admit that its call for institutes to reappropriate the charism of their founder has been answered by the withering decline of many.⁴⁰ This historical fact may well indicate that a herme-

³⁸ “The needs of the times” is an alternate translation of John XXIII’s words quoted by Benedict, cited in note 6 above. See the translation of Benedict’s Christmas address in *Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition*, ed. Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), ix–xv, at xi, citing S. Oec. Conc. Vat. II, *Constitutiones Decreta Declarationes* (1974), 863–65.

³⁹ Tracey Rowland deals with this scenario in the liturgy (“Joseph Ratzinger and the Hermeneutic of Continuity,” in *The Hermeneutics of Tradition: Explorations and Examinations*, ed. Craig Hovey and Cyrus P. Olsen [Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014], 193–225).

⁴⁰ M. Prudence Allen, RSM, and M. Judith O’Brien, RSM, “The Decree on the Appropriate Renewal of Religious Life, *Perfectae Caritatis*,” in Lamb and Levering, *Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition*, 251–70. The essays in this volume

neutic of rupture, whether profane and/or theological in its origins, has tended to secularize the renewal.⁴¹

Fidelity to Benedict's hermeneutic of reform requires us to discern in the specific letter of Vatican II's texts what is contingent (doctrine's subjective sense) and what is permanent (its objective sense). Among recent efforts contributing to this project, Gerald O'Collins offers as a rule the analogous relation between "retrieval" and "*aggiornamento*." If *aggiornamento* denotes adaptation to historical contingency, retrieval denotes recovering overlooked or neglected sources in the Tradition. Renewal results when those sources guide the Church's decisions about "what should be changed and what should be introduced as pastorally desirable."⁴² He thus specifies how doctrine's subjective sense (*aggiornamento*) and objective sense (retrieval) correlate in conciliar hermeneutics (renewal). As a first example, he notes that *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, in order to give the sacred rites "new vigor" (SC, §4), reintroduced the third-century eucharistic prayer of Hippolytus and the ancient Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults.⁴³ But then arises the more complex question of whether DH represents a development of doctrine or a reversal of it when contrasted with Pius IX's Syllabus of Errors.⁴⁴ On the one hand, O'Collins locates *aggiornamento* in DH's intention to address the facts of contemporary social practice and governmental organization that make religious liberty desirable, even compelling. On the other hand, he locates retrieval in two of its claims: our understanding of the person's dignity has become clearer as human reason has developed; and our understanding of the scrip-

focus on the doctrinal and theological continuity of each of the conciliar texts. In the main, they do not deal with the discontinuity that the texts either contain or generate. For the Decree, see *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* (hereafter, DEC), ed. Norman P. Tanner, S.J., 2 vols. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), 2: 939–47.

⁴¹ It could, of course, indicate that, in recovering the charism of their founder, some religious institutes faced obsolescence when they discovered how conditioned by a particular period in history their charism was.

⁴² O'Collins, *Second Vatican Council*, 25–56 (ch. 2: "Does the Second Vatican Council Represent Continuity or Discontinuity?"), at 30.

⁴³ Ibid., 27, 30. Doubt has lately been cast on the authenticity of the Apostolic Tradition as owing to Hippolytus (see Paul F. Bradshaw, "Liturgy in the Absence of Hippolytus," The Kavanaugh Lecture, Yale Divinity School, October 10, 2002, accessed April 23, 2017, <http://ism.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Liturgy%20in%20the%20Absence%20of%20Hippolytus.pdf>).

⁴⁴ Pius IX, Syllabus attached to *Quanta Cura* (December 8, 1864), *Acta Sanctae Sedis* 3 (1867): 168–76, accessed April 23, 2017, <http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-ix/la/documents/encyclica-quanta-cura-8-decembris-1864.html>.

tural roots of religious liberty has become clearer as divine revelation has developed. Accordingly, the Council's renewal, in more deeply retrieving the Scriptures in light of new circumstances and intellectual expansion, "can correct distorted and false traditions," just as Möhler avers.⁴⁵

The application of O'Collins's analogical rule to religious liberty brings home forcefully why the Council evoked a crisis. If Vatican II's acceptance of historical consciousness means that both the subjective and the objective senses of doctrine develop to produce renewal, then what remains as the guarantor of the truth of divine revelation? Does contingency speak the final word? Can we be sure that what is taught in one era will not obliquely or conversely develop in another? Ironically, it might seem that Newman's theory, so influential in both the Council and Benedict, has strengthened the liberalism in religion that the English Cardinal spent his life opposing. By it, he means the relativism that sees our private judgments as sufficient arbiters of dogmatic and moral truth.⁴⁶ To respond to these issues, let us delve more deeply into his theory.

VIII

Newman, like Benedict, shows sophistication in the task of interpreting what the Church declares as authoritative. No evidence exist, he readily acknowledges, to demonstrate with apodictic necessity that whatever doctrines are proclaimed do in fact authentically interpret revelation.⁴⁷ In other words, although doctrinal development infers implications from the primordially received revelation, it is not the deductive proof of a geometric theorem. Nonetheless, as he says, if we first give our assent in faith to the infallible teaching charism of the Church, then our subsequent assent to the truth that it enunciates is grounded in a "certitude." For Newman, this state of mind explains why our moral and religious convictions can be indefectible even when they are not subject to falsification under the principle of non-contradiction.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ O'Collins, *Second Vatican Council*, 36–39.

⁴⁶ For more, see Note A, "Liberalism," that Newman appends to the 1865 edition of his *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, published in David J. DeLaura's edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 216–25.

⁴⁷ Newman, *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, 104–05; this work will be cited in the text by page.

⁴⁸ See: John Henry Cardinal Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), ch. 7; Newman, *Apologia* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 139–41).

By appealing to the Church's infallibility, Newman is not, however, advocating a fundamentalist faith disconnected from argument and evidence. On the contrary, our moral and religious beliefs do admit of reasonable, if not rationally absolute, warrant and defense. Infallibility itself, for instance, is grounded in what Newman calls "antecedent probability." This rule of logic means that the assent given to a particular proposition is based on the prior probability of other propositions from which it is inferred. Thus, if we first accept that God is infinite truth and goodness, that humanity has radically alienated itself from God, and that God would therefore likely act in history to overcome our sinful condition, then it is likely further to follow that God would have established an institution in history to perpetuate his saving truth free from error—an infallible Church (101–13; *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* given by page no. hereafter).⁴⁹

Newman uses antecedent probability to provide empirical evidence to support the doctrines that the Church teaches under its divine mandate to safeguard the Tradition. If authentic, the later developments of a doctrine corroborate the previous trends that lead up to it. In other words, it is reasonable to believe that the doctrine's antecedent tendencies contain its subsequent development *in posse*, as semi-nally embedded in the primordially revealed Idea (124). Understood in light of this criterion, the Nicene doctrine of consubstantiality, for example, not only recapitulates the message of the New Testament but also interprets the full authority of its meaning. Newman expands this criterion into seven "notes" that allow us to distinguish a doctrine's authentic development from its corruption. Two of these shed light on Benedict's hermeneutic.

The first, "continuity of principles," posits that developments ensue from a doctrine even as a doctrine embodies a principle. A development, therefore, must be faithful to both doctrine and principle. Principles tend to be "abstract and general," and hence, opines Newman, the doctrines of Protestantism "develop" as it ramifies into different sects and denominations (180). But these doctrines themselves bear the false principle of private judgment that is opposed to the Catholic principle of Scripture's intrinsic relation to Tradition (182). For his part, Benedict, deferring to this note of Newman's, cautions us not to infer from Vatican II's textual innovation a corrup-

⁴⁹ See also Newman, *Apologia*, 319f.

tion that is discontinuous with an antecedent doctrine and principle of Tradition from which the innovation has developed. As we have seen, on this point, he mentions religious freedom in particular.

The second “note” from Newman, “conservative action upon its past,” means that a new development both illustrates and corroborates the principle, doctrine, and previous developments from which it springs (196). To be sure, a development can represent a “real and perceptible” change, but it nonetheless protects “what was before” in such a way that, without the development, the Church’s patrimony would not be so well supported, articulated, and understood (198, 363). It may be that developments “appear at first sight to contradict that out of which they grew,” yet sober reflection shows them otherwise (365). Deferring to this note of Newman’s, Benedict cautions us that what appears in Vatican II as discontinuity may well represent the deepest of continuity. On this point, important distinctions need to be made, depending on the level of authority with which interpretations of Scripture are enunciated in the Tradition.

The Nicene *homoousios*, for example, although appearing to many as discontinuous with Scripture, represents a dogma of the faith explicitly defined by an ecumenical council as supreme interpreter. The letter of its text is therefore not subject to replacement, although the dogma can develop within its fixed expression, as it did at Chalcedon one and hundred twenty-six years later. By contrast, Vatican II’s teaching on religious liberty is discontinuous with the Syllabus in both its letter and content (its subjective and objective senses). Because the Syllabus was an appendix to a papal encyclical and, as such, belongs to the ordinary magisterium, it might be argued that its authority is superseded by an ecumenical council. If so, this claim does not mean that Pius IX misinterpreted Scripture, only that, because Scripture is incomplete, it requires continuing interpretation. As Newman reminds us, “Great questions exit in the subject matter of which Scripture treats which Scripture does not solve” (89). Hence, Pius’s understanding of Scripture, together with his expression of that understanding, is subject to development by appropriate authority.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ See the penetrating analysis of Basile Valuet: “The discontinuity between Vatican II and Pius IX stems from the fact that the right to religious freedom [in *Dignitatis Humanae*] is not the ‘freedom of conscience’ condemned in the 19th century: it did not have either the same foundation, or the same object. . . . So it will always remain true that the liberalism condemned by Pius IX was condemnable”; but because *Dignitatis Humanae* is addressing a changed set of

Nonetheless, it is not unfair to say that, when magisterial discontinuities arise as the Church develops its understanding of Scripture in light of Tradition, our arguments for doctrinal continuity feel the most stretched. In light of Vatican II's acceptance of historical consciousness, this stretching will likely give us some continuing stress. It may well be, as Bruce Marshall claims, that the Council, coming when it did, permitted the Church, whose capital was sufficiently rich, to undertake "a sweeping pastoral 'update.'"⁵¹ But then, as Ross Douthat also observes, even after the thirty-five years during which Benedict and his predecessor emphasized the hermeneutic of reform, continuity's "victories were not as permanent as [many] supposed" and "the future of Catholicism is still deeply contested."⁵² If we hold that the future belongs to Benedict's hermeneutic because it embodies the past of Möhler and Newman that made Vatican II possible, then the present task requires us to probe its implications and clarify its nuances. Intending this purpose, we shall now introduce the articles of this special edition. They offer us prime seats from which to view the drama of living tensions: not only between continuity and discontinuity in conciliar Catholicism, but also between Christianity and secular modes of meaning, between the earlier and later Benedict, and between critically sympathetic interpreters of one of the most original religious intellects of our time.

IX

As an opening, Cardinal Dulles puts Benedict's analysis of relativism in center stage. Serving to remind us of Newman's diagnosis of it as the nemesis of revealed religion, Dulles's essay provides insight into the context in which the Pontiff's hermeneutic of reform must be both

circumstances, the natural law, while continuing to be valid, "no longer applies in the same way" ("Religious Freedom. Was the Church Also Right When It Condemned It?" accessed April 23, 2017, <http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/1348041?eng=y>; citing his *Le droit à la liberté religieuse dans la Tradition de l'Église* [Le Barroux: Abbaye Sainte-Madeleine, 2011], 676.

⁵¹ Bruce D. Marshall, "Reckoning with Modernity: Why Vatican II was a Necessary Council at Just the Right Time," *First Things* (December 2015), accessed April 23, 2017, www.firstthings.com/article/2015/12/reckoning-with-modernity.

⁵² Ross Douthat, "A Crisis of Conservative Catholicism: Ross Douthat Delivers the 2015 Erasmus Lecture," *First Things* (January 2015), accessed April 23, www.firstthings.com/article/2016/01/a-crisis-of-conservative-catholicism (emphasis removed).

framed and implemented. Benedict confronts a wide range of thinkers—from Kant and Nietzsche to Troeltsch and Loisy, and Knitter and Boff—to show the variations on relativism’s central theme: reason’s incapacity to know universal truth that reduces freedom to individual choice. The Pope finds relativism particularly inimical to Vatican II because it leads to an emphasis on religious dialogue over against the forthright proclamation of Christianity’s saving Gospel. Dulles concludes by suggesting that Benedict’s reflections would be strengthened by developing, as the Council did, the distinction between relativism and salutary diversity.

Focusing on the first volume of *Jesus of Nazareth* (JN), two essays appear next that deal with Benedict’s innovative approach to interpreting the written word of God. JN applies the principles of Vatican II in order to compensate, as the Pontiff avers, for an exaggerated emphasis on historical criticism in post-conciliar exegesis. In so doing, Benedict develops an “ecclesial hermeneutics” that takes into account the reciprocity between Scripture and Tradition as DV defines it. If Scripture emerges from the community of faith that in turn authoritatively regulates it, then the Bible should be illuminated by that community’s normative teachings.

In the first of the two essays, Joseph Koterski sensitively analyzes how the four senses of Scripture, a practice lodged in the Church’s ancient patrimony, richly nourish the Pope’s meditations. Simultaneously present in the literal sense of the words of the inspired text, the three spiritual senses consist of the allegorical, moral, and eschatological. Koterski’s study offers the additional benefit of helping us better to understand the comprehensiveness of Benedict’s notion of reform. In explicating the relation of spirit to letter in the New Testament, it encourages us to draw comparisons and contrasts with the same relation in his conciliar hermeneutic of renewal in continuity. In the second essay, Joseph Mueller adeptly shows that ecclesial hermeneutics provides Benedict with the key to interpreting the core of the New Testament’s vision of Jesus, his unique relation to the Father. In explicating this vision, the Pope must reconcile the Jesus of history, who is the basis of the Gospels, and the historically transcendent God, who is Jesus’s inner reality. It is only the Church’s dogmatic Tradition, the Incarnate Word *homoousios* with the Father proclaimed at Nicea and Chalcedon, that synthesizes finite and infinite and thus allows us in time and space to foster a personal relation with the universally saving Christ. Both articles attend to the

wealth of Scriptural detail that makes JN so deeply inspiring to read.

Cardinal Dulles, in his second contribution, engagingly traces the development of Benedict's ecclesiology from the more youthful Joseph Ratzinger's eagerness for reform through its post-conciliar maturation. Dulles contends that deepened experience enabled Benedict to hold aspects of the Tradition in creative polarity. Initially, for instance, preferring the image of "People of God" over against "Mystical Body of Christ," he came to stress "sacrament of communion" as embodying the best of both. Similarly, although concerned not to compromise the individual bishop's exercise of his charism within his diocese by aggrandized episcopal conferences and synods, he does assign priority to the universal Church over the local community.

Michael McCarthy's erudite study examines Benedict's retrieval of the great Father of the West in his seminal study of *The Spirit of the Liturgy* (SL). Two theological symmetries between the Pope and Augustine underscore that spirit's Christological and eschatological import. "Sabbath" denotes that our public praise of God should anticipate and participate in the divine rest after creating that constitutes the goal and destiny of the groaning cosmos. "Sacrifice" denotes that, in liturgy, our surrender to God does not mean destruction, but rather transformation into the very Mystery both lauded and imbibed. McCarthy's moving exegesis of these themes in Augustine's *Exposition on the Psalms* and other works shows how the Pontiff draws deeply from the tradition to inform his contemporary vision of reforming Christian worship.

Benedict's three encyclicals generate some contention in the subsequent four articles. The first two tease out of *Deus Caritas Est* (DCE) and *Caritas in Veritate* (CV) the Pope's implicit understanding of the relation of nature and grace. Stephen Fields responds to Tissa Balasuriya's throughgoing critique of DCE by showing that the encyclical's reciprocal treatment of charity and justice is owing to the Pontiff's firm roots in John's Gospel, together with his retrieval of Augustine's view of original sin and Aquinas's treatment of the virtues. Especially renewing, Fields contends, is Benedict's weaving of these sources into an analogy of nature capable of grounding the dialogue of Catholic social thought with "the signs of the times." For his part, Vincent Strand argues that CV favors *Communio* scholars like David Schindler in the debate with neoconservative "Whig Thomists" like John Courtney Murray over the putative neutrality of democratic capital-

ism to Christian revelation. CV thus introduces an innovative discontinuity into the tradition of social encyclicals. For Benedict, because economic activity concerns “integral human development,” it cannot be separated from the Christian view of the person. Noting in this union the influence in CV of Henri de Lubac’s model of nature and grace, Strand disagrees with Fields. Although both align DCE with de Lubac’s model, Fields nonetheless reads Benedict as preserving a more robust concept of nature than Strand finds in CV.

Entering this vigorous exchange, Thomas Massaro, in contrast to Strand, stresses the continuity of CV with the core principles of Catholic social thought since its modern inception in *Rerum Novarum* (RN). These include its emphasis on the common good and the exigent duty of public authority to intervene in the private sphere to guard this good. Although also marked by continuity, Benedict’s concern for the protection of the environment does offer a fresh perspective by developing its important role in promoting world peace. Moreover, Massaro notes that, whereas CV deals again with the reciprocity between charity and justice discussed in DCE, it supplements DCE’s seemingly abbreviated treatment of justice. On this point, he disputes Fields, for whom DCE’s account of justice constitutes perhaps its strongest contribution.

Robert Araujo draws some surprising conclusions in speculating about how Benedict would define social justice. Although Massaro underscores CV’s legitimation of public authority’s intervention to promote the common good, Araujo contends that Benedict would be highly wary of state-sponsored solutions to social injustice. He warrants this claim by reading the “Regensburg Address” (RA) and *Spe Salvi* (SS) in light of the tradition since RN. Whereas these sources insist upon each person’s duty to bring about the common good, they also emphasize that moral agency demands the discipline of virtue. It follows that social justice is intimately tied to education of the mind in the true and the will in the good. In further follows that, at root, a renewal of social justice concerns the right ordering of persons rather than the imposition of new bureaucracies. This renewal, Araujo reminds us, stands in full continuity with the Tradition’s principle of subsidiarity.

Christopher Cullen, in dealing with Benedict’s views on the Church and the political order, provokes us to give deeper thought to Strand’s thesis that the Pontiff favors the *Communio* school over the Whig Thomists. Surveying Benedict’s writings from 1980 through

the 2010 address in Westminster Hall, Cullen concludes that the Pope has consistently carved out a position giving him common ground with both. Still, we should note that the Pope does separate himself from Thomists in his frank admission that “the victory of the theory of evolution” has impaired the Church’s ability to appeal to the natural law as the foundation of ethics.⁵³ Nonetheless, as Cullen makes clear, Benedict does not mitigate the Church’s public role in civil society: robustly to preach the Gospel; to leaven the state as a promoter of freedom, human dignity, and morality; and to mediate transcendence and charity. Cullen leads us to wonder how this task can be done without the natural law, which the tradition uses as the bridge for dialogue between the sacred and profane realms. Similarly, he leads us to wonder whether CV represents the later Benedict’s discontinuity with himself. Has he now decisively embraced the *Communio* position? If so, then we might also wonder how, and even whether, the Pontiff would apply his hermeneutic of renewal in continuity to the Church’s engagement with broader cultures of meaning.

Ending the collection with, appropriately, “the four last things,” two essays make clear that Benedict’s interest in eschatology extends beyond its liturgical implications explored by McCarthy. Peter Ryan considers why, for the Pope, this theme lies in theology’s heart. Beginning with a sobering meditation on the significance of death so denied even in religious milieux, Benedict retrieves biblical themes in light of Aquinas. He thereby puts forth a fresh synthesis of the human person’s perduring existence in an afterlife defined by social union with others in Christ. Moreover, Ryan clarifies how the Pontiff reconciles hell with God’s infinite mercy, on the one hand, and human free will, on the other. Concluding with his own incisive reflections, Ryan, building on Benedict, rescues the divine justice entailed in hell from the dustbin of post-conciliar theology.

For his part, John Gavin focuses on Benedict’s renewal of the intermediate state of the person between death and the general resurrection. Traditionally, this state has depended on the notion of soul, roundly criticized by some contemporary thinkers as unbiblically dualistic. Others, while retaining soul, claim that eternity commences immediately at death when the perfection of the person as a union

⁵³ Joseph Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2006) [originally *Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs: Die Herausforderungen den Zukunft bestehen* [Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder, 2005]], 383–89.

of matter and spirit obtains. Mediating between these positions, the Pontiff defends the intermediate state, even as he moves beyond a static definition of soul. He reconceives it as engaged in a dynamic dialogue with God, all the while oriented to matter. Gavin is less critical than Ryan of Benedict's eschatology, possibly because, unlike Ryan, he views the intermediate state as sufficient to satisfy the divine justice.

X

Finally, a word about the genesis of the articles. They have been selected from the diversity of work initially delivered and discussed at four meetings of the Jesuit Colloquium on Papal Thought. These gathered in the month of June under the auspices of three leaders at four universities: Loyola in Chicago (2012: Robert John Araujo, S.J.), Georgetown (2009: Stephen M. Fields, S.J.), and Fordham (2007 and 2006: Christopher M. Cullen, S.J.). Subsequently reviewed and revised, the papers have been closely edited for publication. The Jesuit Colloquium has convened twelve times since 1990 and was initiated by Terrence Prendergast, S.J., now Archbishop of Ottawa, and John M. McDermott, S.J., now of the faculty of Sacred Heart Major Seminary in Detroit. The first eight sessions studied the thought of Pope John Paul II and were hosted at Marquette and Xavier Universities and at Boston and Canisius Colleges, in addition to multiple hostings at the four schools already mentioned. This special edition represents the fifth publication of the Colloquium's work. It is preceded by four volumes, two of which were published by St Joseph's University Press (Philadelphia): *John Paul II on the Body: Human, Eucharistic, Ecclesial*, edited John M. McDermott, S.J., and John Gavin, S.J. (2007); and *Creed and Culture: Jesuit Studies of Pope John Paul II*, edited by Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., and John J. Conley, S.J. (2004). The initial two collections appeared as *Prophecy and Diplomacy: The Moral Doctrine of John Paul II*, edited by Koterski and Conley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999); and *The Thought of John Paul II*, edited by McDermott (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1993).

In 2009, the Colloquium was named in honor of Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J. (1918–2008), to whom our conferences owe their greatest debt of gratitude. From the second through the tenth assemblies, he contributed a major paper, two of which now come to publication for the first time. For many of us, especially Jesuits his junior, "Avery," as we warmly called him, served as a beloved and inspiring mentor. We hold him, together with the Pope Emeritus, in honor, not only for their unfailing courtesy and generous humility, but for their tenaciously incisive intellects shaped by prayer and ecclesial zeal. N&V